Case No.

11

BPI v HONTANOSAS
G.R. No. 157163, June 25, 2014

DOCTRINE: 
Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the applicant has a right in
esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such right.
A preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide
controverted facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened
wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can
be settled. 
FACTS: 
Respondent Spouses Silverio et.al. filed a case against BPI to seek the declaration of
the nullity of the promissory notes, real estate and chattel mortgages and continuing
surety agreement they had executed in favor of the petitioner. 
They further sought damages and attorney’s fees, and applied for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the petitioner from
foreclosing on the mortgages against their properties. 
The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from the petitioner, and
had executed promissory notes binding themselves solidarily. and constituted real
estate mortgages on several parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had
been made to sign a continuing surety agreement and a chattel mortgage on their
Mitsubishi Pajero as security. 
The petitioner required them to issue postdated checks to cover the loan under threat of
foreclosing on the mortgages. 
Petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim, as well as its
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the
foreclosure of the mortgages was within its legal right to do. 
A motion to dismiss was filed by Petitioner, but was denied. RTC granted the application
for Preliminary Injunction. 
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC decision. 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper.

RULING: 
No.
The RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and
unwarranted. 
The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the
respondents was improper. 
a. They had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the
performance of their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully
aware of the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should
the loan secured be unpaid. 
b. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the
mortgagee to exact payment. In fact, they did not dispute the petitioner’s allegations that
they had not fully paid their obligation. 
c. Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by them in order to stave off the
impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on their claim that they had been
compelled to sign pre-printed standard bank loan forms and mortgage agreements. 
Injunction only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm
or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. The respondents failed to prove
that they would suffer an irreparable injury. Fear of potential loss of possession and
ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution did not constitute the requisite irreparable
injury that could have warranted the issuance of the writ of injunction. 
As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction – whether
preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal prosecution. But there are
extreme cases in which exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, including:
 a. When the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused; 
b. When it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; 
c. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; 
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 
e. When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 
g. When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. When it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;

i. When the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and 
j. When there is clearly no prima faciecase against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied. 
However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil Case No. CEB-26468
came under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of the
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal complaints
for violation of BP No. 22 against the respondents was unwarranted.

Case No 12.

City Gov’t. of Butuan vs. CBS Inc.,

G.R. No. 157315, December 1, 2010
Facts:
City Mayor Plaza denied the application for mayor’s permit of respondent Bombo
Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS) for operating its broadcasting
business in a residential area, hence violating the City’s zoning ordinance. CBS filed a
complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages against the petitioners in the RTC of
Butuan City (RTC) with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from closing its station, or from
disturbing and preventing its business operations.
The preliminary injunction was granted.
At the close of the proceedings, Judge Dabalos granted CBS’s prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction stating among others that the City Gov’t of Butuan did not
introduce any evidence in spite of the order of the Court to show cause why no writ of
preliminary injunction be issued and the repeated directive of the court in open court for
them to present evidence which they firmly refused to do so on flimsy grounds. The
Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction as the complaint under oath
alleges that CBS is a grantee of a franchise from the Congress of the Philippines and
the act threatened to be committed by petitioners curtail the constitutional right of
freedom of speech of the defendant which the Court finds that it should be looked into,
the defendants' refusal to controvert such allegations by evidence deprived the Court
[of] the chance to be guided by such evidence to act accordingly that it left the court no
alternative but to grant the writ prayed for. The petitioners further submit that Judge
Dabalos improperly resolved CBS’s application for preliminary injunction by not first
requiring the applicant to adduce evidence in support of the application. 
Issue: 
Whether the evidence of CBS should have first been required before Judge Dabalos
issued the writ of preliminary injunction 
Held: 
No. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to
refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a
particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the performance of some
positive act to correct a wrong in the past. 
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party
who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be
protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief
demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation
of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing
of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the
injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue
to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise;
or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the
perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by
injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a
matter of law. 
While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove its entitlement to
the injunctive writ, the writ was nonetheless properly granted on the basis of the
undisputed facts that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the Legislature, and that
the acts complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayor’s permit and resulting closure of
the radio station) were imminent and, unless enjoined, would curtail or set at naught
CBS’s rights under the franchise. In this regard, worthy of mention is that even the Vice
Executive Judge, acknowledging that CBS had stood to suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury should its radio station suffer closure, had issued ex parte the TRO. 
It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS should have
first been required before Judge Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule
58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the shoulders of the petitioners, as
the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to show cause why the application for
the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue, thus: 
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before
the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective
only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must
order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order. 
In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first present evidence why the
application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted. By their refusal to
comply with the directive to show cause by presenting their evidence to that effect, the
petitioners could blame no one but themselves.

Case no 13.

PPA vs. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc., G.R. No.
214864, March 22, 2017

Facts: 
Sometime in November 2000, PPA, through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) accepted bids for a 10-year contract to operate as the sole cargo
handler at the port of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte (Nasipit Port). Subsequently, PBAC
issued a Resolution No. 005-2000 recommending that the 10-year cargo-handling
contract be awarded to NIASSI as the winning bidder.
However, instead of formally executing a written contract, NIASSI requested PPA to
issue a Hold-Over Authority (HOA) in its favor, in view of CASCOR’s pending protest.
PPA granted NIASSI’s request and issued a HOA dated August 1, 2001, effective until
October 31, 2001, “or until [such time] a cargo handling contract shall have been
awarded, whichever comes first.”
Meanwhile, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion
No. 028, series of 2002 on February 7, 2002 (OGCC Opinion) which confirmed the
authority of PP A to bid out the cargo-handling contract and affirmed the validity of the
award in NIASSI’s favor. Despite this, the HOA was subsequently extended several
times upon NIASSI’ s request. While the exact number of extensions and their
particulars cannot be ascertained from the records, the last extension of the HOA
appears to have been issued on October 13, 2004, for a term of six months.
However, barely two months after the last extension of the HOA, PPA, through its
Assistant General Manager for Operations, Benjamin B. Cecilio (Cecilio), issued a letter
dated December 6, 2004 revoking the extension. In said letter, Cecilio advised NIASSI
that PPA received numerous complaints regarding the poor quality of its services due to
the use of inadequately maintained equipment. Cecilio PPA further relayed that PPA
would take over the cargo-handling services at the Nasipit Port beginning December 10,
2004. It was not extended but NIASSI has been operating as the cargo handler since
the reinstatement of the preliminary mandatory injunction. It is estimated that NIASSI
has been operating for 12 years, 3 months and 15 days.
For its part, PPA argued, among others, that NIASSI was not entitled to the issuance of
the injunctive writ because it had no legal right to continue providing cargo-handling
services at Nasipit Port, considering that PPA has no existing cargo-handling contract
with NIASSI.PPA concludes that it can no longer be compelled to formally execute a
contract with NIASSI upon finality of the Amended Decision, since the term of the
perfected contract already expired on January 3, 2011, 10 years after PPA received
notice of NIASSI’s conformity to the Notice of Award. The HOA and its subsequent
extensions constituted partial fulfillment thereof.
 
Issues:  
1) Whether or not the issuance of a write of preliminary injunction based on an expired
contract was proper

Held
No, The Supreme Court ruled that the term of the perfected contract has already
expired.
PPA avers that its 10-year cargo-handling contract with NIASSI already expired on
January 3, 2011, after the lapse of 10 years from the date when said contract was
perfected. In turn, PPA concludes that it can no longer be directed to formally execute
another contract with NIASSI, since such a directive would unduly lengthen the term of
the cargo-handling contract contrary to the intention of the parties.
While the Court agrees with PPA’s submission that the perfected contract has already
expired, the Court clarifies that such expiration is not because of the mere lapse of 10
years reckoned from the date when the same was perfected. To hold as such would be
to feign ignorance of the events that transpired thereafter, which led to the institution of
this very Petition.
It bears emphasizing that PPA assumed the management and operations of the cargo-
handling services at Nasipit Port on two separate instances- first, by virtue of its letter
dated December 6, 2004 revoking the last extension of the HOA, and second, by virtue
of the April 2005 RTC Order lifting the preliminary mandatory injunction granted in
NIASSI’s favor. The IO-year term of the perfected contract must be deemed interrupted
during the periods when PPA assumed management and control over NIASSI’s cargo-
handling operations.
Clearly, the 10-year term of the perfected contract had already expired, leaving the R
TC with nothing to enforce.
Finally, it bears stressing that PPA issued the Notice of Award on December 21, 2000.
To compel PPA to formally execute a 10-year cargo-handling contract at this time on
the basis of conditions prevailing nearly two decades ago would certainly be
unreasonable and iniquitous.
Case 14
NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION v. PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, GR No. 167057, 2012-04-11
Facts:
FACTS: In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to
pre-qualify and to bid for a contract known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of
about 60,000 pieces of wood poles and 20,000 of cross-arms.
Nerwin was one of the bidders The contract was awarded to him being the lowest
bidder. However, NEA’s board of directors passed a resolution reducing by 50% the
material requirements for IPB 80 to which Nerwin protested. A losing bidder, Tri State
and Pacific Synergy filed a complaint alleging the documents Nerwin submitted during
the pre-qualification bid were falsified.
Finding a way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the opinion of Gov’t Corporate Counsel who
upheld the eligibility of Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for
IPB 80 contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a complaint with prayer of injunction which was
grabted by RTC Manila.
PNOC – Energy Dev’t Corp issued an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for O-ILAW
project. Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC alleging that it was an attempt to subject
portions of IPB 80 to another bidding. He prayed for TRO to enjoin respondents to the
proposed bidding. Respondents averred that this is in violation of a rule that government
infrastructure are not subject to TROs. RTC granted TRO nevertheless. CA ruled in
favor of respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975 which prohibits
issuance of TRO except SC to gov’t projects

Ruling:
No, Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of TRO,
preliminary injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions against gov’t.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
against... the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity,
whether public or private, acting under the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or
compel the following acts:... xxx
Case 15
SATURNINO NOVECIO v. RODRIGO F. LIM, GR No. 193809, 2015-03-23
Facts:
Respondents Maria Carmen J. Tuazon and Manuel V. Nieto, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Lope Durotan (the respondents), filed complaints[4] for forcible entry
with damages against petitioners Saturnino Novecio,... Gavino Novecio, Anastacio
Golez, et al. (the petitioners).[5]
The respondents alleged that on February 15, 2004, the petitioners, by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, unlawfully squatted and took possession of
several portions of land
The petitioners allegedly planted crops, erected makeshift shelters, and continue to
plant and /or improve the shelters as of the filing of the complaints for forcible entry, all
without the consent and/or against the will of the respondents.
The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that they have already been in
possession of the land for more than two years when the complaints were filed. They
maintained that they have planted the land with corn, durian, coconut, mango, jackfruit,
rambutan, etc. for their... livelihood.
The petitioners further maintained that Manuel V. Nieto, father of Maria Carmen J.
Tuazon, had previous landholding in the area but the same was covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and so it was subdivided in favor of
the tenants.[7]
The MTC ruled in favor the petitioners.[8]
The MTC found that the respondents anchored their alleged prior possession on the
fact that they have applied title for the land as shown by a certification authorizing land
survey.[9] Other than this, the respondents had no evidence of their actual and...
physical possession of the land. The MTC also found that they were not even residents
of the place and never personally appeared in court during trial.
The petitioners, on the other hand, claimed their prior possession on the fact that their
livelihood as fisher folks and farmers require them to live by the riverbank where the
land is located. The petitioners also asserted that they have been occupying the land for
more than... two (2) years when the complaints were filed. The MTC held that the
certification issued by the barangay captain that the petitioners are residents of the
place is a very strong evidence of their prior physical possession.[10]
The MTC concluded: "[a]s between a resident and a non-resident the likelihood is that
the resident has the prior physical possession because of his accessibility to the
area."[11]
The RTC reversed the MTC decision.[13]
The RTC ruled that the MTC should have given credence to the certification issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources - Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) showing that the land in litigation is the
subject of an application... for title and claim by the respondents. The RTC also took
judicial notice of the request for authority to conduct a survey over the subject property,
which provides that "the parcel of land herein treated was an unsurveyed land and
Manuel V. Nieto was the identified occupant and... tiller of the land."[14]
In view of these, the RTC ruled that the respondents were the actual occupants of the
property in litigation long before the petitioners had taken possession of the same
property. The RTC ordered the petitioners' ejectment.
The petitioners filed on April 30, 2009 a Petition for Review[16] with the CA
As the respondents sought the execution of the RTC judgment, the petitioners filed on
May 14, 2010 an Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order.[17]
On July 13, 2009, the CA issued a TRO effective for sixty (60) days.
On January 28, 2010, the CA issued the first assailed resolution denying the petitioners'
application for preliminary injunction.
Issues:
whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, when it denied the petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
Yes, We find the petition meritorious.
the CA ignored relevant facts that would have justified the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. Contrary to established jurisprudence, the CA also denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction without giving the factual and legal... bases for such denial.
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive
and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for in his complaint.[25]
In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary
injunction. First, the relief demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC
decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land. Second, their ejectment from
the land from... which they derive their source of livelihood would work injustice to the
petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation of the
rights of the petitioners, tending to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible
entry cases ineffectual.
Moreover, the court in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction based on the pleadings of the parties and their respective evidence must
state in its order the findings and conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This
is to enable the... appellate court to determine whether the trial court committed grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in resolving, one way
or the other, the plea for injunctive relief.[26]
Thus, we do not understand why the CA denied the prayer for preliminary injunction
without citing any legal or factual basis for the denial.
We therefore have no idea why and how the CA came to the conclusion that the
petitioners are not entitled to the injunctive relief. Hence, we are forced to go beyond the
function of a certiorari under Rule 65 and examine the factual findings of the MTC and
the RTC.
The MTC found that the petitioners have been in actual and physical possession of the
land for more than two (2) years prior to the institution of the complaints for forcible
entry.[27] The MTC also found that the respondents were not even sure how the...
petitioners entered the land. In their complaints, they alleged that petitioners entered the
land by means of "force, intimidation, threat, stealth and strategy," a shotgun allegation
which shows that respondents' lack knowledge of how the petitioners entered the
disputed... property.
The RTC, on the other hand, relied on a mere request for authority to conduct a land
survey, allegedly showing that respondent Manuel V. Nieto was the occupant and tiller
of the land.
However, this document does not prove prior possession of the subject land. It only
points to the fact that there was an application for a land title in the name of one of the
respondents, which application was not even shown to have been granted. This
document merely... authorized the survey of the land; the declaration regarding
possession was just incidental to the application for land survey.
Between the clear findings of the MTC, which conducted the trial of the forcible entry
cases, and the RTC acting as an appellate court, which relied on documentary evidence
but without sufficiently explaining how such evidence would prove prior possession, we
are inclined to... give weight to the MTC's ruling.
Under this factual backdrop, we conclude that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the prayer for preliminary injunction without explanation and
justification.
CASE NO.16
G.R. No. 172909, March 05, 2014

SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y.

PLAZA,Petitioners,v.GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND
VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO,Respondents.

BRION,J.:

FACTS:
Among her other siblings, Barbara was declared by the CA as the owner of the subject
property in question. Consequently, her successors in interest, herein respondents,
have continued to occupy the property. The son of one of Barbara’s siblings filed a
complaint for injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against the
respondents and the city government of Butuan. They prayed that respondents be
enjoined from unlawfully taking the subject property. According to petitioners, they
acquired the property from Virginia Tuazon who was the sole bidder in a tax
delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December 1997.

In their answer, respondents contended that they were never delinquent in paying the
land taxes and that Tuazon is a government employee who is disqualified to bid in the
public auction as provided under the Local Government Code and such sale, if ever
there was, is void.
The RTC denied the petition, holding that there was indeed an irregularity in the auction
sale since the highest bidder was a government employee disqualified under the LGC.
Petitioners challenged the RTC decision through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 65. While such petition is pending, petitioners filed an action for specific
performance against the City of Butuan. The CA affirmed RTC decision and found
petitioners guilty of forum shopping.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition

HELD: No. Petition Denied. CA decision affirmed

Political Law- the Local Government Code of 1991 to validate their alleged title. The law
authorizes the local government unit to purchase the auctioned property only in
instances where there is no bidder or the highest bid is insufficient
The petitioners may not invoke Section 18118of the Local Government Code of 1991 to
validate their alleged title. The law authorizes the local government unit to purchase the
auctioned property only in instances where there is no bidder or the highest bid is
insufficient. A disqualified bidder is not among the authorized grounds. The local
government also never undertook steps to purchase the property under Section 181 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, presumably because it knew the invoked provision
does not apply.

Remedial Law- A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing
of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.

As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the
petitioners despite the latter’s reimbursement of Tuazon’s purchase expenses. Because
they were never owners of the property, the petitioners failed to establish entitlement to
the writ of preliminary injunction. When the complainants right or title is doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive
relief is not proper. Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August
8, 2013, the question of issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot
and academic.

Remedial Law- Forum Shopping

The cause of action in the present case is the petitioners claim of ownership of the land
when they bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon. This
ownership is the petitioner’s basis in enjoining the respondents from dispossessing
them of the property. On the other hand, the specific performance case prayed that the
City Government of Butuan be ordered to issue the petitioners the certificate of sale
grounded on the petitioner’s ownership of the land when they had bought it, either from
the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon.

Noticeable among these three types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of
action in the different cases filed. While it may appear that the main relief prayed for in
the present injunction case is different from what was prayed for in the specific
performance case, the cause of action which serves as the basis for the reliefs remains
the same the petitioner’s alleged ownership of the property after its purchase in a public
auction.

Thus, the petitioners subsequent filing of the specific performance action is forum
shopping of the third kind-splitting causes of action or filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action, but with different prayers.
CASE NO.17

G.R. No. 179665               April 3, 2013

SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,

FACTS: China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc.
(SBI). To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s
favor several surety agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of
land in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal.
Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell the
mortgaged properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until such
time that the whole obligation would be fully paid.  SBI also proposed that there be
partial releases of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without the burden
of updating interests on all loans.

In a letter dated March 20, 2000 addressed to CBC, SBI requested the restructuring of
its loans, a reduction of interests and penalties.

In response, CBC sent SBI a letter dated April 17, 2000 stating that the loans had been
completely restructured effective March 1, 1999 when SBI signed a new promissory
note. Since interest payment has not been made, no re-pricing is possible.

Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18, 2000, CBC demanded SBI to settle its
outstanding account within ten days from receipt thereof.

On October 5, 2000, claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC
were iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure
proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint “To Compel Execution of Contract and for
Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte
Temporary Restraining Order” in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which
was granted.

Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged properties shielded
from a possible foreclosure by CBC on the ground that the interest rate and penalty
charges imposed by CBC on the loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous and
unconscionable.
ISSUE: whether or not plaintiffs have the right to ask for an injunctive writ in order to
prevent defendant bank from taking over their properties.

Ruling:
The petition fails.
As debtor-mortgagors and MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee
CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of alleged
"usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of interest. First, assuming that the interest
rate agreed upon by the parties is usurious, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious
interest does not affect the lender's right to recover the principal loan, nor affect the
other terms thereof. Thus, in a... usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the
mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure by the
debtor to pay the debt due.

Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of nonpayment of mortgage indebtedness.

the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from
availing of the equitable relief that is the injunctive writ.  In particular, SBI and MFII have
stated in their Complaint that they have made various requests to CBC for...
restructuring of the loan. The trial court's Order dated December 14, 2000 also found
that SBI wrote several letters to CBC "requesting, among others, for a reduction of
interests and penalties and restructuring of the loan. A debtor's various and constant
requests for deferment of payment and restructuring of loan, without actually paying the
amount due, are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle his obligation.
SBI's default or.failure to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which
tainted its hands and disqualified it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary
injunction.

As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII.  The
accessory follows the principal.

Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury.

The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under
any standard of compensation. any injury that SBI and MFII may suffer in case of
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties will be purely monetary and compensable by an
appropriate judgment in a proper case against CBC.  Moreover, where there is a valid
cause to foreclose on the... mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed that the
irreparable damage sought to be prevented by the application for preliminary injunction
is the loss of the mortgaged properties to auction sale. The alleged entitlement of SBI
and MFII to the

"Protection of their properties put up as collateral for the loans" they procured from CBC
is not the kind of irreparable injury contemplated by law.  Foreclosure of mortgaged
property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the
extraordinary... provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.

The En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial or

Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages, further stacks the odds against SBI and
MFII.

the resolution embodies the additional guidelines intended to aid courts in foreclosure
proceedings, specifically limiting the instances, and citing the conditions, when a writ
against foreclosure of a mortgage may be issued, to wit:

(2)  No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the

extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that
the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at
least twelve... percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the
application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is
pending.
Case No. 18
Garcia vs Drilon
G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a
TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given
time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it
would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO
on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and
equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted
product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition
for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and
the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

Whether or not CA erred in denying the issuance of preliminary injunction against the
TRO

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is

discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erred in declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Held:        

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect
to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course,
even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is
immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears
fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To
issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may
not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in
appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not
violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence
and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of
due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention

that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a
memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power

includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any
part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce
and administer the laws.  The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function.  The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. 
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with
their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.