Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Olle Tornquist
�
MANO MAR
1989
Prilim
Preface
Department of Political Science for research. I am most thankful for Peter Waterman and many others. Through them I have been able
this support, not only for the resources but also for the understand to benefit from contacts with a vast number of other knowledgeable
ing. researchers and activists. For practical reasons, it i5 not possible for
In doing the research on the PKI, I was intellectually supported me to mention all the names here.
and stimulated through contact with a vast number of colleagues, About two years later I got valuable comments Qn the first part
comrades and friends in Scandinavia, as well as in Holland, of the present book at the XII Indian Social Science Congress in
Australia, and Indonesia. Many of them have helped me also during Mysore, 1987. The full manuscript has been discussed within the
my attempts to follow up the earlier study. Unfortunately, were I to AKUT group (especially with Inga Brandell, Bjorn Beckman, and
mention names, I would still only be able to thank a few of all those Lars Rudebeck) and during an "India Day" in Uppsala in early 1988
in Indonesia who have trusted me, at considerable risk to them (with, among others, M.R. Bhagawan, Goran Djurfeldt, John Mar
selves. There are also many Indonesians in exile and researchers on tinussen and Manoranjan Mohanty). Discussions on my theoretical
Indonesia, primarily working in Holland and Australia, who have conclusions continued at the XIII Indian Social Science Congress in
been of assistance. I shall not name them all here. A relatively com New Delhi and at the conference on "State and Civil Society in In
prehensive list is to be found at the back of the book on the PKI with donesia arranged by the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash
the references plus in the new research report from late 1984, University, Australia, in the end of 1988. In addition to this Gail
"Struggle for democracy-a new option in Indonesia?" (AKUT-series Omvedt has communicated important comments. Hans Blomkvist,
no.
�
�
). In Scandinavia I have, since 1975, had the privilege of work Mats Dahlkvist, Staffan Lindberg, Bo Rothstein, Goran Therborn
ing with interested and knowledgeable colleagues, comrades and and other colleagues have helped me with stimulating views on
friends within and in contact with the AKUT-research collective. drafted versions of the manuscript. Thank you, all of you! Plus Patrik
Stimulating arguments and encouragement were and are also and Felix for "disturbing" but also for beginning to understand why
forthcoming through the Skytteanean D epartment of Political I'm not always listening or even present in Uppsala.
Science. Comments and reactio'1S are most welcome! Please write me on
I turned from rindonesia to India in 1984/85 and was over the following address:
whelmed. I eveµ got my first cultural shock when I arrived in Cal
cutta in mid-1984 on my way back from Java to Sweden. The misery
of most people was much more visible, and a quite common ar University of U ppsala Olle Tornquist
rogance often in sharp contrast with gentle Javanese modes. (Is this Dept. of Political Science
the Indian price for not being "repressive enough" to domesticate Unit of Development Studies
people and "clean up" most of the places which the well off St. Ologsgatan 11 B
patronise?) The Indian academic self-confidence was striking, both S-751 23 Uppsala, Sweden
in terms of quantity and quality. I am therefore particularly thankful
for the kind introductory help given to me by colleagues, comrades Uppsala, Autumn 1988
and friends, including Raza Ansari, Venkatesh Athreya, Nripen Ban
dyopadhyay, Sumanta Banerjee, M. Basavapunnaiah, M.R. Bhag
wan, Praful Bidwai, D.K. Bose, Nikhil Chakravartty, Boudhoyan
Chattopadyay, Goran Djurfeldt, A.K. Ghosh, S.K. Goyal, Harsh
Kapoor, Kumar Ketkar, the late Mathew Kurian, Praful Lahiri,
Staffan Lindberg, John Martinussen, Kitty Menon, Ashok Mitra,
R.K. Mishra, Manoranjan Mohanty, Gautam Navlakha, Gail Om
vedt, Sandeep Pendse, Govinda Pillai, R-amdass, Krishna Raj , Ajit
x
What's Wrong with Marxism?
1--
Elite and patron democracy? 31
.
Dependent, independent, and weak capitalis� states 81
Relative autonomous states 83
State with powers of their own 86 Part I:
Neo-patrimonia1 states 88
90
Introduction
Class and factions within the state
Rent capitalism and the state 94
Two Questions,
CHAPTER 6: PRECONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRACY
One Approach - and the Argument
UNDER THE TRANSITION TO CAPITALISM 108
The problem 108
Alternative approaches 110
At the conceptual level 110 Marxist theories are of particular interest not only because they indi
Democracy as a product of revolutionary changes 113 cate ·some of the causes of mass poverty and misery in the third
A democratic "national bourgeoisie" 1 14 world but also because they try to show what possibilities there are
Undemocractic capitalists 116 for the repressed and e�loited to alter their situation and develop
Regulative democracy 1 17 their societies along more equal lines.
Enforced democracy 118 theory and practice in South and Southeast Asia. The main questions
Democracy under rent capitalism? 1 19 that emerge are: what are the main problems involved in applying
Marxist understanding of the driving social forces in post-colonial
CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL MARXISM 126 societies for radical political purposes? And, what are the implica
tions of those problems for theory and analysis?
129 In the present study I focus upon ideas, and the attempt to apply
References
141 them, about capitalists and the state as driving social forces in In
Interviews
143 donesia and India. I will take up the implications for peasants and
Index
workers in my next work wherein I will also make an additional brief
comparison with the Philippines.
Struggles for·radical change are social projects_ that may have in
tellectual components. Drawing on Robert Brenner, 1 among others,
I maintain that classes are mainly interested in reproducing them
selves and their positions. From the point of view of such class inter
ests, radical changes are, thus, an unintended effect. Consequently, a
revolution, may occur without or despite political guidance.
However, I am one of those political scientists who are mainly in
terested in if and how people attempt to transcend this "irrationality"
of historical change. They could do so by understanding how their
societies work and by u�ing political instruments to plan and struggle
for a better life rather than by. only securing their reproduction.
According to Marx, the philosophers had only interpreted the
world while the point was, and presumably still is, to change it. Mar-
What's Wrong with Marxism? Introduction 3
xist theories and analyses are meant not only to dlsclose how and ·or dependent on political monopolies a5 they are. There is a need,
why societies change and·function; they are also meant to be applied. and the option exists, for the real producers to fight for more control 1
In my attempts to. develop· a new theory, I talk about regulative capitalism to develop and reach its ultimate limits before they out
rentiers and political rent capitalists. The latter are rentiers and lined and implemented revolutionary policies. And the top-down
capitalists since they control, broadly speaking, �eans of production elitist character of such a project was hardly unattractive for radical�
and function in a capitalist framework. They are not necessarily intellectual, and usually young aristocract nationalists in the so called
parasitic. Some of them even become political finance capitalists by backward countries. They were not only alienated by imperialism
investing their resources in individual economic units. It is an open and wanted to do something immediately but also· fascinated by the
question as to whether they promote-development or not. benefits of Western development and, thus, convinced about the im
These dominating classes are afraid of political democracy, based possibility of drawing- on conservative dissidents in their own
Introduction 5
4 · What's Wrong with Marxism?
argued that the "national bourgeoisie" had abandoned its· own class
countries who were ·based on pre-colonial forms of reproduction and
interests and that no co-operation whatsoever was possible. The
domination.
Chinese themselves were more cautious. They maintained, on the
Furthermore, according to the Leninist understanding of Russia,
one hand, that there were still driving bourgeois forces worth co
it was an incapacity of the bourgeoisie to develop capitali5m without
operating with. The Maoists, on the other . hand, rooted th�mselves
adjusting to retarding and belligerent feudal and foreign imperialist
among the peasantry.
forces that had made the revolution possible. This was ea.sy to link
During the 1950s,. Moscow returned to Stalin's original theses.
up with Lenin's theory and analyses of imperialism, according to
But when the "national bourgeoisie" once again proved. unreliable,
which, among other things, capitalism was imposed upon the
· the solution was not left extremism, as in 1928, but to look for
colonised societies in co-operation with local feudal forces thus in
pr�essive forces within independent post-colonial state ap
hibiting progressive developments.
paratuses. They should-be able, jt was argued,. to shoulder the his
When these perspectives were . applied to less developed
torical mission of the weak progiressive bourgeoisie and carry. out. a
countries, the political Marxist argument emerged, that the main
"non-capitalist development", provided.they had.the right perspective
contradiction was bourgeois nationalism ·against imperiali.sm and
and got support from the masses and from socialist states.
feudalism. Temporary and conditional communist ·support for a .
The·. approaches briefly outij.ned here inay be called "a progres
bourgeois national revolution was therefore prescribed. But at the
sive bourgeoisie and nation state" and will be taken as a point of
same time the forecast was that such a·revolution was.held back, and
departure in this study.
that, when this became obvious to the masses' communists would'
·.
The Chinese, in contrast, wer:e even more disillusioned with the
just as in J3iussia, have the chance to take the lead and carry out
modem· development from. above, with the use of the state and sup-
developments in the late 1920s and: �s I have afready hinted, in
·
vented a second tradition within Soutn and1Southeast Asian political
ported by workers (,lnd peasants.
Marxism. Mao was looking for a new basis after the Kuomintang
This first political Marxist, tradition was thus originally based on
repression. He quietly abandoned Stalin's prescriptions and
the conclusion that the bourgeoisie, with the nation-state that it
transcended the old ideas o! only looking for support among . the
might create, was the. essential driving social force in the East-'as ·
peasantry to stress them and their anti-feudal interests as a new driv
long as it was revolutionary, i.e., tried to develop capitalism through
ing social force provided they were properly led by a party guided_by
a radical change of the structure of power by fighting feudal and
the interests of th'� working class. Only thereafter did he advan�
imperialist forces, not adapting to them.
into conditional co-operation with anti-feudal and anti�!mperialist
Thy,n came· Stalin and his flock. They maintained that the con
sections of the bourgeoisie and sugges�ed "a new democracy''.
tradiction between the bourgeoisie in the East and feudal plus im
In terms of political projects of different generations,4 the older
perialist forces was objective and necessary rather than only possible.
nationalistic and etatistic Leninists-cum-Stalinists were thus followed
The crucial prefix "revolutionary" was purged and the concept of
by somewhat younger theoreticians and activists inspired by Maoism.
"national bourgeoisie" was given prime importance. Also, the deter
They talked about landlords and a. lumpen state as their main
minist character of this contradiction implied that capitalist develop
enemies, and about the need to enforce bourgeois land-reforms
ment generally waJ; blocked and not only the type that required
sillce the bourgeoisie itself was too weak. In the process of post
changes in class structures. This was to bee� �n important basis
colonial capitalist expansion, m,any of them now emphasis�xploita
of the dependency perspective that stressed blocked .capitalist .
development and imperialist underdevelopment.
tton of the peasants by the state via the market rather by �an
·
landlords.
The Comintf?m at this stage prescribed for the Chinese com
Simultaneously, however, a new generation of often intellectual
rades, among others, an almost unconditional co-operation with the
new left rebels grew up. Some of them turned t<r�reme interpreta
"national bourgeoisie" ·and the Kuommtang. This policy, however,
·tions of Maoism and tried to initiate armed uprising& Others, in-
ended in. totaj failure and holocaust. Thus,· Stalin turned around and
6 What's Wrong with Marxism? Introduction 7
eluding many of those who gave up extreme Maoism after a decade capitalist state".
_ or so are not only disappointed with a state and a bourgeoisie that To begin with, each position is presented. Then - follows an
do �
n t offer any real alternative but also with established parties evaluation of the interpretation and strategy under review by jux
. within this set-up, including communist, and with official socialism in taposing them with results and actual developments. Does reality
India and elsewhere. In addition to this, they watch capitalism ex confirm forecasts, recommendations and calculated results?
panding in a way that increasingly alienates and represses not only I study what actually happened with a general Marxist perspec
some among themselves but also a majority of the population. tive. This is not only because it suits me. fine, but mainly because
Within this framework, one school stresses including marginalisa such an approach does not, by definition, produce results that differ
tion and repressive domestication, of the rural masses in particular. from the communists. I will frequently use the communists' own con
Applied Marxism has, according to this view, become preoccupied cepts, not for analytical purposes but only as objects to be evaluated.
with, and become an economic and political prisoner of, the mo9- My analytical tools for this evaluation are mainly the categorisation
ernising side of the coin often at the cost of the other. Any radical of communist theses. Finally, I will draw maiiily on comparatively
changes require, therefore, a broader -all-peasant line thap undisputed common scientific literature, supplemented by some
prescribed by the old communists who mainly want more favourable sources related to1the parties and organisations plus interviews.· ·
conditions for the rich and middle pe�ants in the pr<?cess of
·
capitalist expansion. The broad front must instead include and be In search for more fruitful theory ·
The inerit of this book is not new empirical results but, hopefully,
the interpretation of old ones as well as the arguments presented
arid the comparative perspective. I draw on standard scientific litera
ture that is · relevant and supplement with some· sources and inter
views with scholars and with actors in the organisations and move
ments under review.
I am most thankful to all those who have been kind enough to
share their analyses with me. Without their support, this study would
not- have been possible.
Introduction 11
perspective during the early and mid 1950s. The Communist Party of
India (CPI) adopted the same orientation some years later and stuck
Part II · to it till at least the mid 1960s, when the party split.
The second perspective will be referred to as "the national
democratic state position". Many communists analysed problems
within the first approach in terms of the weakness of the national
bourgeoisie and argued that this made it possible for politicians and
Problems of Political Marxism:
administrators within the state to act on their own and embark on
A Progressive Bourgeoisie
state-led development that was neither capitalist nor socialist but
and Nation State "non-capitalist"-provided they got support from peasants, workers
and advanced socialist states. Consequently, communists ought· to
co-operate with and support progressive leaders of the state. The
In what way did political Marxists in South and Southeast Asia inter PKI favoured such ideas in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In India
pret and adapt the thesis about a progressive bourgeoisie and nation the arguemt had been advall.ced since the mid 1950s but it was only
state as the driving social force to their own post-colonial societies? after the party split in 1964 that the Communist Party of India (CPI)
What conclusions did they reach? What forecasts did they make? - one of the now two parties-made it its official policy.
What strategies did they try to implement? And do the actual · One version of the third perspective emerged out of the split
developments confirm the forecasts, recommendations and calcu among the Indian communists and is still maintained bY. the other
lated results? party, the Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M). The CPI-M
In concrete politics,. the ideas about a progressive bourgeoisie argued that India's state-led development should not be supported
and nation state have been most forcefully upheld by the Indonesian because the big and monopolistic b ourgeoisie dominated the state in
and Indian communists and a comparative study of their experiences co-operation with semi-feudal or semi-capitalist landlords and tried
should be fruitful. Though the problems are quite similar, the to enforce a brutal and dictatorial capitalism upon the people. These
societies differ. The Indonesian and Indian bourgeoisies and states tendencies had to be fought not only by threatened workers and
are not the same. According to conventional wisdom, the Indonesian peasants but also by the progressive non-monopolistic sections of the
private bourgeoisie was very weak in comparison with the Indian, bourgeoisie, which were held to be interested in a somewhat more
while the Indian state was less forceful than the Indonesian. A com revolutionary capitalist development.
prison may, therefore, indicate which common problems are related This argument has not been forcefully put forward in Indonesia
to the different societies and those that can he explained by a similar where another version emerged out of an originally Chinese argu
background. ment. According to this there is a large domestic monopolistic bour
Within the broad framework of the thesis under review, it is pos geoisie which, however, is rooted in co-operation with not only
sible to distinguish three or four types of interpretations and general semi-feudal forces but also imperialist ones-just as the pure-com
strategies. The first approach may be called "the national bourgeois prador bourgeoisie; in addition it also depends upon powers in the
state position". This departs from Stalin's original argument, which executive organs of the state for its own survival and expansion.
stressed the' necessary progressive nature of a so-called national These "bureaucratic capitalists" thus contradict the interests . of,
bourgeoisie with anti-feudal and anti-imperialist interests to create among others, a progressive non-monopolistic national bourgeoisie
and use a nation state for the development of an independent which communists, consequently, should try to mobilise.
economy, bourgeois democracy, etc. Communists should, therefore, This line was maintained-through it was only partially followed -
try to expand from within this type of policy. The Indonesian Com by the Indian Maoists from the mid 1960s and onwards. A similar,
munist Party-:-{PKI) Partai Komzmis Indonesia-made use of this and in terms of concrete politics much more important version, was
12 What's Wrong with Marxism?
put forward by the PKI in the early 1960s. Substantial sections of the
civil servants including the military officers, gained tremendous 1
powers within the increasingly important Indonesian state which they
used for self-gain. However, according to standard Marxism,
capitalist power is rooted in control within the economic base and The National Bourge.ois State Position
not in the super structure. Bureaucrats and officers only administer
and execute the powers of real capitalists. In the absence of strong
Indonesian capitalists, the PKI, therefore, claimed that the roots of TOWARDS NEW LINES .
bureaucratic powers mainly stayed with foreign imperialists. Hence,
. a broad front against imperialism was prescribed. In the final struggle for national independence neither the
I will call the third persp((ctive, including the CPI-M's and the fadonesian nor the Indian communists were decisive. Aceording to
PKI's versions respectively, "the big- and bureaucrat-capitalist state them it was national bourgeois forces that took the lead; in
·
positions". Indonesia a complicated coalition of radical nationalists, socialists
Let me now further expfore these theses one by one and evaluate and muslims, including president Sukarno and vice-president
them by juxtaposing the foreca�ts,. recommendations and calculated Mohammed Hatta; in/ India the accommodating Congress party with
results with what actually happerted. leaders such as Gatj dhi and Nehru. Initially a majo�ity of the
communists in both countries worked from within these movements.
But when the cold war spread, the main issue became one of
following either the United States or the Soviet Union. When these
powers tried to consolicta!;e whatever influence they had in. various
countries� most communists in South and Southeast Asia adjusted
themselves. They re-evaluated their former comparatively positive
·
the socialist countries to build an independent economy of its an . inde penden t eco nomic
fight . ·for
"national bourgeois" really i-feudal"
Thus, the Congress, the.st�te and the national bourgeoisie wer ��i they struggle for radical "ant
development? Second, did foster .the
ea�er to ca�ry ��t anti-feudal ·agrarian reforms and fight sector? And third, did they
changes in the agrarian
anti-de�ocrat!c �ohtical monopolies. Though there were reactionary ral democracy?
development of bourgeois libe
�enden�ies �thm the bourgeoisie, the progressive ones wete
mc�easmgly important and should be supported conditionally. The omic development?
National bourgeois econ
leftists on the other hand, were more inclined to expose the socialist
?
arkable.12 By
rhetoncs of the Nehru· Government, the attacks by the state upon
In Indonesia the strategic advances were rem
PKI's arno, the
workers an� peasants, the monopolistic tendencies in the to the-PNI and President· Suk
offering conditional support
·
co-o peration
development of the economy as well as co.llaboration with for them to abstain from
communists made it possible
.
18
What's Wrong with Marxism? The National Bourgeois State Position 19
nt levels of
I, therefore, have to conclude that most of the existing domestic
cap1tal1s� d velopment, similar strategies based capitalists themselves w_ere not eager to follow their . ascribed
� on assumed national
bourge01s mterests faced analogical problems-un national bourgeois interests, while relatively progressive leaders -who
dynamic escape
�?��.�� for _the presumed bourgeois forces. And if the outcomes are tried to implement such ideas lacked a predominant and solid base
·
similar we should look for a common cause. in a dynamic business community.
It is obvious �hat communists could have made But there were also 1mportant tendencies of development that
better analyses of
the so-�aJled national bo�r_gwisie. To begin with, seem difficult to take into- due consideration with the use of
_ the PKI as well as
_ . predominant Marxist theories in South and Southeast Asia.
I The National Bourgeois State Position 23
22 What's Wrong with Marxism?
state came to an end and the exploited and high-taxed masses did independent small holders (Marhaens) who would work collectively.
not get more money to· buy with, many producers could survive by The front from above between the PKI and PNI/Sukarno made it
fighting for patronage and speculate. They thus escaped most of possible for the communists to reach the countryside where the
what makes capitalism dynamic: the need to compete by making nationalists were influential. The PKI and its mass-organisations
production more effective and to produce and, sell more by making . propagated land to the· tiller but concentrated ·on concrete limited
the products cheaper in order to stay alive.27 actions in defence of the "small people" and on attempts at collective
In sum, Indonesian capitalists were · weak. "Progressive" self help. Their success was remarkable. From almost nothing· the
politicians and administrators did not strengthen them but turned PKI became the largest party in Java in the 1957 local electiOns and
themselves into middlemen. The Indian capitalists were much received almost as many rural as urban votes. Finally, Sukarno �d
stronger. . But similarly extra-income seeking politidans . a�d his nationalists introduced a bourgeois land reform in the· late 1950s
administrators saw to it that capable· businessmen · were not and early 1960s, . which aimed · mainly at securing the tenant's
compelled to function as progressive capitalists in order to survive. position and prescribed a ceiling on ownership of land.
We need better theoretical tools than those· which informed the It is usually argued that India off�rs typical exanwles of
predominant pQlitical marxism to explain_ the dynamics 9f these unsuccessful bourgeois land reforms. Let us remember what Daniel
bourgeois _escape routes. I will · return to this task in part III of the Thorner, the not · too uncritical authority· on India's rural
book. development said, "the facts are that in India's first twenty-one years
of independence (i.e., . when Thorner made his statement) more has
National bourgeois agrarian change? been done · to foster change in agriculture, and more has actually
taken place, than in the preceding two hundred years".29
In both Indonesia and India most "anti-feudal" struggles were
·
Hardly anyone would dispute that the <;ongress party has not
interwoven with actions against the colonial stf).te.· only talked a lot about the need for comparatively radical land
In the early 1940s, workers and poor peasants in Indonesia28 - /reforms but has also introduced central laws and recommendations.
started occupying plantation land to cultivate edible crops and later Their land reform measures in various _states have ·also . abolished ·a
on also to paralyse the colonisers. After independence, the squatters
24 What's Wrong with Marxism?
The National Bourgeois State Position . 25
all the risks argument, that despite differences like stronger capitalists in India
with trade and moneylending, etc., than to shoulder
ion and reliance on laboure rs only:38 and much weaker landlords in Indonesia, similar strategies based on
involved in agricultural product
were revived as a kind of · competi ng ascribed bourgeois interests in anti-feudalism faced analogical
Middle-caste organisations _
nity develop ment and governm ent organs problems-ex-tenants found easier ways than the capitalist one . of
associations.39 Commu
and credit co-operatives were extracting swplus. Does my superfi'cial evaluation of the political
including semi-state trade .
�
. approaches indicate not only common results but also · similar
penetrated.
s and causes?
The central government, despite radical recommendation
without The complicated Indonesian developments up to the early 1960s45
ambitions, was unable to intervene and to alter this situation
priority. do not reveal any strong resistance on the part of the urban, and
undermining its own base. Industrialisation had been given
emerge almost perhaps not even rural nationalists, against anti-big-landlordism. 1t
It was felt that agrarian development would
similar changes in the was in fact Sllkarno and the PIN-not the PKI-that initiated land
automatically out of the agrarian reforms and
come about · there was little reform programmes in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, the
social structure . When this did . not
in agricultu re and raise the nationalists in general and their powerful rural followers in
money left to subsidise investments
thereby artificial ly make it more particular became very nervous when their political and
prices of peasants' output and
ion
profitable for the rural well-off to abstain from rents and speculat administrative positions, rather than assumed big landownership,
producti on.41 Moreove r, it was not the were threatened. As far as I can see, this indicates that the rural
in favour of promoting
main
compar atively radical central government that had the nationalists were less potential farmers than administrative and
·
reforms , etc., but he variou states where the political patrons who based their surplus extraction more on control
responsibility for land � �
were even more depende nt upon support from the over-local organs of the state than on private ownership of land.
governments
and their clients.42 Finally, if and when central and state Could the PKI have made better analyses of these complications
rural rich
s
money was injected into ir.rigation or co-operatives, the· resource without altering the theoretical perspectives that informed its brand
not only . monopo lised by the rural rich but quite often also of political marxism? The problem is that the questions that follow ·
were
their
used by them to sell and buy patronage and to further support from the predominant perspectives file tied to a conventional
ural producti on European understanding of feudalism, such as exploitation based on
unproductive ways of enricl.P.ng themselves.43 Agricult
a new policy was
stagnated till the seeond par{ of the 1960s when monopoly of land. Consequently, oneJooks for correlated indicators
introduced.44 and does, of course, find quite a few. It is also provoking that many
of the alternative approaches, which stress specific Asiatic
E�ra-economic options characteristics, end up underlining quite egalitarian social structures
in the villages while it is obvious that some are much more powerful
Asian
The common perception among South and Southeast and well-off than the majority. And fmally, not only the communists
the Indonesian bourgeo isie was too weak to but also the nationalists were rooted in the combined struggles
communists is that
·enforce radical agrarian change while the Indian bourgeoisie, despite against .the colonial state and its feudal-like landed collaborators.
the
its relatively much stronger position, could not cope with There is a need to explore alternative approaches to explain the
"remnants of feudalism" because the landlords were more powerful roots of power among -the rural patrons which made it possible for
than in Indonesia. The problem is, however, that neither the weaker them to evade capitalistic forms of surplus extraction. My evaluation
nor the_ stronger -b ourgeois forces demonstrated any decisive of PKI's political project in the 1950s and early 1960s does not allow .
of
attempts at really doing away with extra-economic forms further elaboration. we have to wait for additional indications from
s et al. who the evaluation in the next report on peasants of PKI's attempts to
exploitation once they had domesticated the big landlord
28 What's Wrong With Marxism? · The National Bourgeois State Position 29
put its class ·analysis o{ rural Java and a more militant strategy into National bourgeois democracy?
practice from 1963 onwards.
In India the Congress party was even more inclined to proclaim During the first two decades of India's independence, parliamentary
anti-feudal reforms. And the viable former tenants had obviously democracy was, in comparison with many other post-colonial
demonstrated their interest not only in anti-colonialism but also in societies, remarkably stable.47 Representative organs of the state had
anti-big-landlordism. My evaluation reveals limited further interest been established and the Congress party had nurtured them during
in bourgeois agrarian development among the new potential the closing decades of the British raj. After independence they were
. farmers. On the contrary, they almost immediately started to
_ given more powers. Democratic rule was extended to the whole
develop new positions as petty-landlords by enforcing continued nation and all citizens. Elections were held on several levels. The
protection from their political representatives and allies within the executive organs of the state remained powerful. But they were
various organs of the state .who were in desperate need of their formally and sometimes also actually subordinated to the
support. Thus, the new· propertied peasants could exploit loopholes representative · organs. · And the judicial state organs were
in the land reform laws, retain the tenants they needed, penetrate impressively independent, again in a comparative perspective. All
and mobilise new government support as welras local organs of the political parties, including communist ones, were allowed and there
state and distribute some patronage to the poor. was freedom of the press etc. There were no signs of military coups.
These options to evade new progressive bourgeois solutions were Despite_ all the freedoms in this huge country-continent, with so
thus rooted in the relations of class power.46 Potential farmers many different cultures, languages, religions, levels of economic and
existed, most big landlordism had been abolished, markets were social development etc., the political structure and system was not as
available, and so on. frawented as it might have been. The Congress party dominated on
The Indian communists could have made better analyses of the a nation-wide scale. Even powerful rural forces with some
n ew petty landlordism and why it prevented progressive feudal-like characteristics followed suit and used the representative
developments without altering their theoretical tools. Extra- . organs in general and their capacity to mobilise votes in particular to
ecoriomically · based appropriation of surplus continued to be used. reproduce their own p ositions. Finally, even though the
But the causes for why the previously anti-feudal tenants turned to comparatively strong Indian bourgeoisie definitely influen{:ed and
petty landlorism in th� first 'place were more difficult �o address. penetrated the representative as well as executive organs of the state,
This had more to do with political protection of the ex-tenants as the autonomy of politicians and bureaucrats was impressiv�.48
well as the poor rural masses. Though it may sound strange these days, and given the fact · that
To summarise, the experiences in Indonesia up to the 1960s the stability of India's democracy was and is unique, Indonesia's
indicate that the socio-economic basis of the peasants with a · attempts at people's rule49 were also comparatively consistent until
potential to become farmers were not only ownership of land but the end of the 1950s.
also administrative and political positions within the local organs of Despite the lack of any important representative organs under
the ·state. They could thus evade bourgeois -developments by using the Dutch, and despite the very-fragmented struggles for liberation,
the latter bastions for their .extraction of surplus. with very many different organisations and patrimonial leaders, the
The ex-tenants in India, on the other hand, were indeed more new Republic first developed a functioning parliamentary system
rooted in their land, but could enforce sufficient political and and then turned to more presidential powers with a democratic
administrative protection-which also spilled over to the rural framework.
masses-to escape much of the progressive logic of capitalism: �o While it is true that Indonesia l}.�ver . �eached India's level of
compete, invest and produce cheaper and more. autonomy between the representative, executive and judicial organs
of the . state, attempts at military coups-backed by frustrated elitist
"social-democrats"-were actively and successfully fought not least by
30 What's Wrong with Marxism? The National Bourgeois State Position 31
President Sukarno and the nationalists. So were also regional thus left without potential organisational backing.52
rebellions, some of which were sponsored by agencies· such as the Third, there was some ambivalence at more central levels as well.
CIA and some with ideas of an authoritarian muslim state. When Sukarno and the nationalists had conquered the
Moreover; the communist party was admitted important freedoms. representative and a . good deal of the administrative organs of the
Despite all the turbulence, the so far only free and clean elections . state, they preferred to share them with the army rather than to risk
that have been held in Indonesia took place to the parliament in them in electoral competition with communists. They proclaimed. a
1955 and to regional and local organs in the reasonably stable parts state of emergency (formally because of the regional rebellions and
of the country in 1957. the struggles against the Dutch) and introduced the aforementioned
Also, as in India,_ many feudal-like rural patrons adapted "guided democracy"-a combination of strong presidential and
themselves to the new trends and successfully collected votes to central army powers over corporations . of peasants, "'70rkers,
uphold their positions. If we set aside the previously discussed abuse administrators et al. and some acceptable parties which, before the
of political and administrative powers on the part of the politicians "new order", included the PK1.
and bureaucrats, the latter were even less . dependent on vested Even the Congress party felt threatened now and then. For
interests rooted in private business· groups than in India. example, the first elected communist-led state government-in
On a superficial level I could, therefore, conclude that the Kerala-was overthrown in 1959 under the leadership of the sam_e,
so-called political representatives of national bourgeois interests Mrs. Gandhi53 who finally, in 1975, proclaimed the nation-wide state
undermined pre-capitalist political monopolies, upheld a �elative of emergency, to which I shall return in a short while.
autonomy (acceptable to capitalists since thei could rely on private
ownership and economic control of the masses) and introduced Elite and patron democracy
democratic forms of government to solve contradictions among
powerful groups and to uphold law and order. However, an It is common among communists to explain the problems of
evaluation of the strategies in India and Indonesia that were based so-called bourgeois democracy in India and Indonesia by applying a
on such assumptions point in other directions.50 somewhat longer perspective, one which includes the brea}cdown of
First, in each of the countries most of the votes were mobilised democracy in Indonesia during the 1960s . and its restoration in India
with the use of traditional loyalties, especially in rural a,reas. This after only a few years of emergency. They argue that the differences
pattern revived cultural, religious, caste, ethnic, regional and other had to do with a much stronger national bourgeoisie in India than in
loyalties, and consolidated, though in a new garb, patron-client Indonesia.
relationships. Consequently, powerful rural patrons were favoured However, when the domestic bourgeoisie was extremely weak in
by the introduction of "modern" democracy.�1 Indonesia, the likely political representatives fought actively for
Second, this tendency was further strengthened by the fact that democracy. But when they began to consolidate and further develop
full democratic freedoms were not accepted at the very local levels. their positions, .not least ·with the use of the state, they undermined
Indonesian patrons were, as I have discussed earlier, terrified by the the democratic processes.54 Although the Indian developments are
communist advances in the 1957 local elections and relieved by the less drastic, one can hardly ·argue that the increasing problems of
so-called "guided democracy" that followed. The "new order" regime democratic rule, which were indicated by the evaluation of
that came to power in the mid-sixties . elaborated on this lme and communist politics during the period under review, were
prevented political activities at the village level through its "floating qualitatively different or that they were correlated with weakened
mass" doctrine. domestic capitalists.
Similar. ideas, though not so strict or strongly enforced, were Once again it is necessary to re-examine the evaluation of marxist
present also in India. During the period under review, parties were assumptions and political strategies in the search for similarities that
not allowed to compete in village level electi<ms and the poor were can help us understand common problems.
32 What's Wrong with Marxism? The National Bourgeois State Position 33
No doubt, politicians, administrators, and judges had a lot of 7. Ram (1973) p. 300. Also, interviews with Dange and Basa\iapunnaiah (18/3)
who both participated in the delegation. According to Basavapunnaiah, Stalin
autonomy during the period under review in Indonesia55 as well as in
"drew out a new programme", meant that the Indian communists should get
India. Sukarno and the PNI as well as the Congress party-the closer to the "bourgeoisie as a whole" and advance in a peaceful way and
assum e d agents of national b ourgeois interest in liberal signaled that "Madiun had been wrong" and that this was "not the first time".
No PKI people had been directly present in the discussions with Stalin but at
democracy-did fight old political monopolies, tried to solve
the spot in Moscow. Previously, I have stressed the pioneering role of PKI and
contradictions between powerful gr,oups, and to uphold law �d Aidit in relation to the development· of the new strategy in Indonesia in the
order. early 50's. To my knowledge, there has been no research on influences from
Moscow-only on Aidit's references; a bit earlier, to a presumably made up
However, their autonomy is �ot in any easy way related to a
visit to Vietnam and China. Cf. Tornquist (1984a) p. 63.
capacity of the domestic capitalists to reproduce their positions on 8. For the following-to fn. 9-see e.g. reviews in Ram (1969), Sen Gupta (1972),
their own. On the contrary, as I have disc.ussed earlier Inqones i� Brass (1973), Overstreet/Windmiller (1960), Ghandra (1981) and �ources in
Documents of the history of . . . (1976) and (1977).
capitalists were either extremely dependent upon political patronage
9. Cf. Frankel (1978) p. 211.
or about to emerge as speculators who utilised their positions within 10. Cf. Chandra (1974) and (1981) pp. 308f. I also draw on interviews with Mishva,
the organs of the state. And the Indian capitalists based a lot of their who talks about "guess work" and that the leaders always were prepared to
adopt the Indian capitalists to international theoretical and strategical
activities on government protection and support.
prescriptions, not the other way around, and with Chakravartty, who stresses
Also, private capitalists in both countries were . totally incapable the predominance of analyses of the political situation and that the leaders did
of mobilising broad support. They were entirely dependent on not do any "homework" but took over official investigations etc.
feudal-like patrons, traditional elites, etc., who drew on · "pre 11. Cf. e.g. what Balaram had to say in his discussion with me "we cooperate (with
bourgeois forces, Q.T.) to the extent that they are anti-imperialist", and what
capitalist" ideologies. lndrajit Gupta said "We were, right or wrong, mainly judging progressiveness
As far as I can understand, this indicates that the development of by to what extent they stood up against colonialism etc. or not. This is still the
main factor".
- democracy in India and Indonesia had more to do with the interests
12. On Indonesia, see Tornquist (1984a) pp. 86-88 and on Marhaenism, see
of traditional patrons and elites to reproduce and further strengthen original texts in Indonesian political thi�king (1970). ,
their own positions than with an emergence of independent 13. On India, see, e.g., the general reviews in Frankel (1978) and pesai (1984).
14. On Indonesia; see Tornquist (1984a) pp. 88-92 supplemented by Robison
· capitalists who would not need to use extra-economic powers to
(1986).
foster their positions. 15. On the workers' problems, see Tornquist (1984a) pp. 144-147.
The fact that, within this framework, patrons and elites in India · 16. See, e.g., Frankel (1978) and Sau (1981) for general reV:iews plus Bardhan
were more securely based on private property and traditionally (1984) for specific arguments on the role of the state expenditures.
17. See e.g. Levkovsky (1972) i.a. pp. 449 and 632ff., Malyarov (1983), Patnaik
rooted respect for intellectual-elitist leadership than in Indonesia (1975) i.a. pp. 148f. and 159 and Roy (1965}p. 270f.
might explain the more stable and well developed democracy in 18. Myrdal (1968) p. 1099 and cf� Sen, A. (1982) p. 107ff., 117-119.
19. See fn. 17 and Roy (1975) and (1976) i.a. ch. 11 plus Kochanek (1974),
India as compared with Indonesia. In Indonesia they had to rely
Chandra, N.K. (1979), Oza (197i ), Hazari (1967), and Bhagavan (1987) p. 62.
much more upon political and administrative positions, and these 20. Cf. Patnaik (1985), pp. 146f.
could be directly threatened by, for example, communist electoral 21. For a recent convinCing analysis, see Bardhan (1984) but also the previous and
more general Kochanek (1974) and, of course, Myrdal's (1968) classical
advances.
argument on the soft state .
. 22. Cf., eg. Kochanek's (1974) conclusions on p. 329, Bardhan (1984), p. 38f.,
Goyal (1979) and Malyarov . (1983), refening to Goyal, pp. 288ff., Sen, A.
(1982) and, for a fine case study, Harriss (1984).
References
23. See, e.g., Nossiter (1982) i.a. pp. 270 and 283f., Issac (1982), Leiten (1978), and
1. For the Indonesian developments dealt with, see Tornquist (1984a) pp. 66f. E.M.S. (1984) i.a: p. 72f. for Kerala and, for a general review of West Bengal,
2. See, e.g., Sundaryya (1972) and Ram (1969) Ch. 1, (1971) and (1973). Pedersen (1982).
·
24. The arguments will be spelled out in the following chapters on the national
3. See Tornquist (1984a) pp. 63-65.
4. Ibid. democrartic state position and big-capitalist state position respectively.
25. Cf., e.g., Anderson (1974), Andersson (1981), Berend/Ranki (1982) and
5. Ibid, chapter 6 "A new strategy". ·
Gunnarsson (1985) for some studies that inspire me.
6. Ibid., especially pp. 69f.
34 What's Wrong with Marxism?
economic development and became more and more frustrated with The approach was well received by CPI-moderates, while radicals
communists, who took over their clients and threatened their rejected it. The centrist general secretary (Ajoy Ghosh) maintained
political and administrative positions. Sukarno as well as the that it was correct to stress differences between the Indian state and
nationalists had thus several reasons to welco�e powerful· support those in advanced capitalist societies but dismissed the idea that
from the army leadership. General Nasution ignored the Pfil and Nehru's government was about to advance . towards socialism in a
p�eferred to enhance the power of the· army leadership by staying peaceful way. Moreover, the national bourgeoisie was not only
with the central government in relation to rebellious colleagues in interested in . an�imperialism and anti-feudalism but also · in
the outer provinces. Finally, the communists were not strong enough exploiting and repressing the people with state support. In · short, a
to stay independent; militant peasants' and workers\ struggles would non-capitalist path of development might · be possible but not under
have meant abandoning Sukarno's patronage. the presep.t bourgeois leadership.58
At the same time, ·however, Sukarno became more and more Because of the harsh conflicts within the CPI, it was. only after ·
radical. He proposed broad coalition governments which would the . radicals and some centrists had left the party in the mid 1960s
include the communists but not the parties supporting the rebellious and started their own CPI-M (to which I shall return ··i� the next
"anti-communist compradors" He intensified the struggles against chapter) that the national democratic state position became
imperialism in general and the Dutch in particulaL He initiated predominant within the remaining CPI.
better refations with the existing socialist states and so on. Obviously, India's development stagnated in the 1960s and was further be
_ devilled by a series of bad harvests and famines in certain areas. The
said the PKI, the state was quite autonomous. .
Thus, the communists decided to support Sukarno's ideas of a central government became more dependent upon foreign aid,
more radical state-led development-including nationalisation of particularly from the United States, and had to devalue the rupee by
foreign companies, state-directed trade and industrialisation plus more than 35% in 1966. Also, Nehru had died and so had his weaker
agrarian reforms-simultaneously with struggles against imperialists successor Shastri less th4Il two years later.
and their domestic allies. The PKI was · prepared to pay for this and Economic and social problems were thus combined with severe
Sukarno's patronage with a positive attitude to a strong presidency political uncertainties. The various interests and movements that had
ppendage to private monopoly capitalists as in advanced Europe or policies and soon maintained that she represented the progressive
�
_
the U mted anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-monopolistic tendencies within
m Stat�s. Under the leadership of progressive
nationalists like Nehru, the state could be used to foster independent the Congress party and the domestic "national bourgeoisie as . a
industrialisation, agrarian change, etc. The national bourgeoisie whole". Moreover, she wanted to solve the economic ·and social
could not advance without state support against imperialism and problems not only by attacking big business and conservative landed
.feudalism and state capitalist of this kind was · a step towards forces but also by extending �he public sector, co-operating with the
_ existing socialist states and the CPI, and perhaps even by �llowing
socialism.:l7
W:hat's Wrong with Marxism? The National Democratic State Position 39
38
Gandhi and the CPI should also be added a considerable number of already existing
communists into government. Finally, Mrs.
communists in state-owned enterprises and the established practice of state
were equally interested in fighting �he more radical
interventions in the economy.
the new CPI-M.00
st While fighting Western imperialism, Sukarno a·s . well as the
Of course, the CPI leaders realise d that "non-capitali
with much weak�r central army command welcomed support from state socialist
development" was originally meant for countries
that it should be countries. Within a few years Indonesia became the largest
capitalists than India. They argued, however,
men�"-one non-communist recipient of military assistance and the third largest
possible to struggle for a "national democ rati � govem
equal basis. It was envisaged recipient of economic assistance from the Eastern bloc, after India
which would include communists on an
the organs of the state to prevent and Egypt.
that such a government could use
big capitalism, initiate an alternative Finally, Sukarno and the radical nationalists introduced the
further development of private
sector, provide state guidan ce to previously mentioned land reform laws and integrated them as well
path based on an expand ing public
be rooted among intellec tuals, peasan ts as the state-owned enterprises, aid from the Eastern bloc, etc., into
progressive capitalists and
extremely ambitious development plans. These incorporated
and workers.61
Sukarno's concepts of "guided deniocracy't, "guided economy", the
NT consensus-oriented "Panea Si/a" (five principles) and his radical
. THE SUPPORT FORS TATE-LED DEVELqPME
EVALUATED political manifesto as a framework.
So far one must conclude that the Indonesian developments
came up to PKI's expectations. In a society where the private
Favourable prerequisites
bourgeoisie had proved weak, there was obviously room for
ratic state-led far-reaching and comparatively autonomous actions from within the
Initially, the strategies in support of national democ
1950s and early 1960s and state by progressive groups without a distinct class basis. Even the
development in Indonesia during the late
the mid · 1960s till the late central army command took a radical position. The dynamic sections
in India, on the part of the CPI, from
ed much of the theore tical of th'.e economy were now under state command and land reforms
1970s were quite successful and confirm
were ab ut to be implemented. "Pr�-imperialist forces11 were fought,
and analytical assumptions involved. �
lists but also the commumsts were protected and state socialist countries offered their
· In Indonesia62 not only Sukarno and his nationa
actively fought against rebels co-operating support. The prescribed pre-requisites for so-called non-Capitalist
central army leadership
, includi ng the CIA. PKI's main enemie s on t�e development were obviously present.
With Western powers
were isolate d, and over the years even outlaw ed, while For many years· Indian developments63 seemed to confirm the
political .scene
CPI-�pproach as well. During Mrs. Gandhi's struggles within the
the communists received continued patronage.
up Western New Congress party, she finally did away with the more conservative
Struggles against the Dutch, who refused to give
n�st trade unions groups which had strong positions within the party apparatus and
Guinea, made it possible for nationalist and commu
the auspices of also, perhaps, closer links with business and landed interests
to initiate nationalisation of Dutch companies under
Sukarno. Soon enough the army used the state of emerge ncy to take especially at the state -level. Radical Congress members strengthene d
other transpo rt · compa nies� their positions and communicated with CPI-leaders. The CPI's
over the rest. The huge shipping line and
ions (two-th irds of all the support for the · Congress(!) from the late 1960s and onwards was
. trading houses, banks and some 540 plantat ·
of their policies.
Moreover, the new agricultural policy was· not follo�ed by
massive radical opposition on the part of the rural masses-w�ch The Congress(!) had neither the proper and well functioning
many had expected-but rather by greater demands on the state from organisation nor committed members to carry out, or at least
the new farmers. They wanted more and cheaper inputs, more supervise the bureaucratic implementation of Mrs Gandhi's ideas.
favourable credits, and better prices but not the tax on their land and The CPI was almost as weak and much smaller; it did not even try to
mobilise popular support and pressure in favour of radical policies
incomes which the state governments were in desperate needs of but
did not dare to enforce. as did the PKI in Sukarno's Indonesia. The executive organs of the
state} to which Mrs Gandhi turned, were filled with people who were
To this we should add also that the division of the Congress party
hardly interested in, for example, full implementation of land
and Mrs Gandhi's electoral victory in 1971 plus the alliance with the
reform�, or harsh action against corruption, or in favour of higher
CPI did not signal a� effective and well-rooted political organisation
a agricultural wages, even if some success was achieved against
outside the state organs. The 1971 electoral triumph was rather
al one over old institutions and loyalties . Many tax-evasion and smuggling in urban areas. The co-operatives were
populist and ideologic
weak and ineffectual for the same reasons.
party bosses with firm local bases had been .replaced by Mrs
Production, as in Indonesia, was somewhat favoured by fewer
Gandhi's agents who, however, had little powers of their own and
strikes and "better discipline". The CPI was careful not to stage any
were quite incapable of implementing what she asked for. The
situation was not altered when quite a few of the old bosses returned protests or strikes. But no economic expansion took place. And
to · Congress(I) after 1971. Either Mrs Gandhi did not trust them, or allowing for the effects of initially good rains, agricultural production
they were powerful enough to abstain from implementing her ideas. did not increase either.
Though support from the CPI gave her a radical image among the On the other hand, the policies that �eally were . efficiently
implemented - the repressive slum-clearances, the enforced
Indian poor as well as in Moscow, the CPI-communists were ·
sterilisations, the harassments of political oppqnents-had disastrous
organisationally very weak · as compared to the CPI-M. And to the
effects. It was not the assumed agents of "non-capitalism" who tried
extent that the leaders were engaged in extra-parliamentary work,
to uphold and foster democracy but the so called conservative and
this was mainly carried· out among influential civil servants within the
almost fascist forces plus the rival communist5 within the CPI-M. In -
organs of the state.7�
1977 Mrs Gandhi expected that she and the Congress(I) were stro1:1g
Finally, no matter how one analyses the the popular opposition
in enough to stand eleetions, but people by-passed even the traditional
against Mrs Gandhi and the Congress(!), which became evident
declare the state of emergen cy, the oppositio n Congress vote banks and displaced her as well as the CPI except in
1974 and made her
able dissatisfa ction with the abuse of state powers: Kerala, where the excesses had been rare.
did signal consider
. It was not till 197873 that the CPI p�blicly stated that at least its
It was mainly middle class people who revolted. Many of them
concrete analyses and short term ta<:tics had been wrong.74 The 1974
protested against the way in which Mrs Gandhi tried to monopolise
popular opposition against Mrs Gandhi was, the_ CPI said, no longer
state organs · and to undermine the independency of the judicial ones
fascist as a whole. The splitting up of the :, Congress party had not
besides supporting private monopolies and thwarting · changes from
reflected the assumed division of the bourge.oisie and this plus the
below in the civil society.72 And the hardly petty bourgeois 1974
emergency had not opened up , for national democracy and
nation-wide railway strike was even more brutally repressed by the
central government. non-capitalist development. At least, the CPI should have withdrawn
its support when · the emergency was "abused". But the Achutha
'46 What's Wrong with Marxism? 47
The National Democratic State Position
Menon government in Kerala had done well75 and nothing was policies. The main argument is that the split within the Congre�s
wrong with the party programme and the theoretical points of party did not reflect any strategic division of the dom�stlc
departure-it was Wrong only in the implementation. bourgeoisie as a whole but that the Congress(I) represe:qted the
most aggressive big capitalists and modern landlords who had to find
Contained states absolutist-or Prussian or Bonapartist-political solutions to their
problems. Others maintainedthat foreign imperialists and landlords
My .brief evaluation of . the strategies in support of national were more decisive.
democratic state-led developments gives no immediate rise to Again, it is difficult-and unnecessary-to discuss these theses on
serious disagreements with the standard communist explanation of the basis of what has already been evaluated. I will return to the
the problems: Neither of the states nor their leaders, including issues in the next chapter, where especially the first argument-which
communist supporters, were capable of initiating a so-called informed the s�rategy of the CPI-M-will be scrutinised, and the
non-capitalist development despite the presence of prescribed second brand-put forward by the Maoist groups-touched upon. ·
conditions. Though capitalists �ere weaker in Indonesia than in The above evaluation of CPI's strategy does, . however, indicate
India, the common explanatory factor is that the autonomy and that even if Indian politicians and bureaucrats as individuals were
capacity of the state and progressive leaders within it were decisively much less powerful than their armed Indonesian colleagues, and
restricted by disagreeing classes of · various kinds. The general, ·even if it is thus much more likely that we will find the opposing
though not necessarily communist, conclusion could well be that it is Indian forces outside rather than inside the state, we still have to
impossible to introduce socialist-oriented ·development from above answer the question why the emergency was revoked despite the
without first altering the structures of power at the base level.76 obvious fact that the structural crisis of capitalism-which radical
However, we still have to identify and analyse the roots of the communists identified as the root cause of the emergency-had
forces that restricted the autonomy of the progressive state leaders. hardly been solved.77 This does not indicate that it was only ':>r
The most important argument among Indonesian communists was mainly the still powerful bourgeois-landlord interests that enforced
that the so-called anti-people officers and bureaucrats within the the emergency and undermined attempts at so called non-capitalism
state had no class basis of their own but relied upon landlords, in India.
compradors and foreign imperialists, whose interests they defended.
However, so far in the evaluation it remains questionable
whether this type of argument was valid or not. It did become the References
basic assumption of the new alternative PKI strategy and I will wait
till it is evaluated in the next chapter. 56. For Indonesia see ibid., pp. 80-83, 97f. and 112-114.
57. Rubenstein (1977), pp. 603-13.
At this stage, I can only say that my evaluation also suggests that
58. Ghosh (1977), pp. 588-602.
PKI's "anti-people", bureaucrats and officers had quite solid bases of 59. See Frankel (1978) for a more extensive review of the events.
their own within the organs of the state and did not only have to rely 60. ?
See Sen Gupta (1979), ch 2 and especially Schar�a (1 84) . Cf. also
.
Resolutions ... (1970) and n. 67 below. I also draw on an mterview With Menon
upon outside "feudal'' and jm.perialist interests. The tricky question is in which he said that "I now realise that a lot had to do with the tense feelings
whether the countervailing forces were based outside the state against the CPM. The CPM wanted to destroy us. We went to the Congress
organs or within them. Or, in other words, if the Indonesian for support".
61. Scharma (1984), especially pp. 164-173.
attempts at "non-capitalism" were undermined from outside the state 62. For Indonesia, s.ee Tornquist (1984a), especially pp. 99-102, 145, 117f. and 133.
or from inside by its own logic and actors?1 63. For India, see mainly Frankel (1978), especially chs. 10 and 11.
In India, the standard communist answer to the roots of forces 64. See also Nossiter (1982), ch. 9-11.
65. Quoted from Frankel (1978), p. 545 f.
blocking the attempts at non-capitalism is less clearcut� even if we
I 66. Ibid., p. 547.
restrict ourselves to analyses informing applied and important
48
What's Wrong with Marxism?
Indonesia
Despite numerous successes, the PKI was in a blind alley and its
leaders were aware of the need to develop new approaches.79 How
could they unleash the potential strength of the world's third largest
communist party and all its mass movements_? How could they stage
48 What's Wrong with Marxism?
Indonesia
Despite numerous successes, the PKI was- in a blind alley and its
leaders were aware of the need to develop new approaches.79 How
could they unleash the potential strength of the world's third largest
communist party and all its mass movements? How could they stage
51
The Big- and Bureaucrat-Capitalist State Positions
50 What's Wrong with Marxism?
Attempts by the US and the International Monetary Fund to central goverm:nent fostered and became somewhat more dependent
collaborate with kindred souls in Indonesia, and in particular t.o upon foreign support from the West as well as from the USSR, this
enforce a traditional capitalist stabilisation scheme in May 1963, did not und�rmitle the stability of the regime, as the Maoists had·
were blocked by means of a policy of confrontation with the predicted, but rather enhance� Mrs Gandhi's capacity to enforce
so-called neo-colonial new state of Malaysia. The army leaders lost capitalism from· above without altering the socio-economic
their state of emergency. Also, they had to favour military. struetures. It is perhaps . possible to interpret Rajiv Gandhi's new
manoeuvres against the British in Malaysia and US interests in the emphasis on ''modernisation" in co-operation with foreign capital in
·
region as a whole in order to uphold their positions. More and more a similar way. ·
. ·
foreign companies were nationalised, mainly British and American. In . additio� to this confirmation of certain parts of the left
Attempts at introducing · corporatist labour unions as an alternative · communists' · analyses, the CPI-M's own strategy proved successful
to : the strong communist-led workers organisatfons were blocked. for quite some time, especially in comparison with the CPI's political
Bureaucrats and officers felt threatened by communist campaigns to suicide and the Maoists' failure: It was possible for the marxist
disclose mismanagement and corruption and to "retool" the organs communists to uphold radical and even revolutionary traditions
of the state. Most of the remaining groups and parties in opposition including Leninist and Stalinist · organisational princ1ples
· were · isolated as enemies of Sukarno's radical policies and their simultaneously with quite successful work inside the
organisations banned . . Sukarno himself spoke about "New Emerging parliamentary system, extensive co-operation . with some bourgeois
Forces", as opposed to "Old Established Forces", based in the third ' forces and consistent struggles in ·defence of liberal democracy. Mrs
world and led by people like himself, liberation movements and the Gandhi gave up her state of emergency and lost. the 1977 elections.
Chinese but no longer by the Soviet Union. He suggested the. The �PI-M �merged as the largest, best organised, most capable,
formation of an axis between Peking, Pyongyang, Hanoi, Phnom and mternat10nally most independent of the Indian communist
Penh and Jakarta; left the United Nations in 1965 when Malaysia parties.
was accepted as a member; declared that Indonesia and China were After the emergency, the future for the marxist-communists
to start a revolutionary alternative; and told the US to "go to hell seemed bright. Leaders even complained about growing pains.86 The
with its aid". Sukarno allowed some communists to enter his huge electoral victories in West Bengal, Tripura, and Kerala were
cabinet, and finally, he and the PKI tried to implement the land impressive. CPI-M led left front state governments in Calcutta have
reform laws which I shall · deal with separately in the next report on in fact been in power since 1977. And in the recent elections in
' the peasants. Kerala, the marxist-led front, which had been out of the state -
Subs�antial parts of actual developments in India also . confirmed government for quite some time, bravely decided to resist any kind
the CPI-M approach.85 The party foresaw Mrs Gandhi's increased of agreements with communalist parties and despite this-or rather,
authoritarianism and that it would not hit hard against monopolists, not least because of this-won a surprising victory.tr7
no matter whether they were based on land or capital. The leaders
had underestimated the degree to which broad sections· of the Bad harvests
non-left opposition were prepared to resist these policies in general
and Mrs Gandhiin p'1rticular and to uphold liberal democracy. The Struggles for non-capitalist development were hopeless, according to
central government was perhaps more active in repressing the .the renewed PKI and the CPI-M, because powerful classes
CPI-M and its followers than had been expected. For example, the circumscribed the autonomy of the state and progressive leaders.
1969 West Bengal left front government was undermined, toppled But despite quite successful communist planting of alternative
and replaced with harsh state policies against left movements, strategies to fight their enemies, the latter did not behave as they
counter attacks upon . militant workers and peasants, and electoral "should" have and the political harvests were bad in general and
rigging. Also, just as the CPI-M leaders had hinted, even though the disastrous.in Indonesia.
56 What's Wrong with Marxism? The Big- and Bureaucrat-Capitalist State Positions
57
Indonesia's economic crisis deepened from 1964 onwards.88 The "bureaucratic capitalists11 by contributing to the ·dissolution
of the
colonial economy had long since been run down. Income fro� May 1963 programme of liberalisation and stabilisation
· exnorts did not suffice for essential imports. Many companies were of the
economy. Even independent researchers support the PKI-vie
w, that
uri�ble to utilise their capacity. The nationalised companies were the US-sponsored regulations . were backed by the leading
officers
mismanaged. A good deal of the local and regional �ade ha� .b�f?.n and other "bureaucratic capitalists", since they desired to
privatis e
paralysed because of the persecution of the Chinese mmonty. and liberalise the state economy though collaboration with foreign
Moreover, substantial foreign loans were · drying up b ecause of capitalists. According to this ver�ion, the programme was
_ . stopped
Sukarno's anti-West foreign policy. Nor was Moscow satisfied WJ.th simply because of the confrontation with Malaysia. Howeve
r, not
Sukarno and the PKI, and China had no -economic facilities �o offer. even General Nasution supported . this view in a
private
A purely speculative economy gained ground. �The go�e�nme�t conversation.89 The main part of the leading officers did not.wa
nt to
totally lost control over inflation, crops failed and contrad1ctiqns _m yield to "technocrats" who were totally dependent upon the
US, he
the rural areas (to which I shall return in' the next report) further said.
·
·
· aggravated the food shortage. The programme of stabilisation appe_ars, contrary to what
the
Of course, wage workers and poor peasants et al., who had to PKI said, to have_ been a threat to the arIJ?-y officers and
to their
buy rice and other necessities, were th� hardest hit. Private business, "bureaucratic capitalists". If the programme had been put into
effect,
however flourished outside and inside the state sector. If anyone they would have been hard hit by a heavily-reduced military
budget,
� �
was stu id en ugh to try to profit only from production, things went drastic saving's plans within the rest of the state appara
tuses, ·and
wrong, but not many seem to have tried. attempts to give effective and US-educated technocrats, who
. . were
Nor were the communists able to succeed m exposmg . and willing to co-operate with foreign capitalists, power
within the
_ isolating the "bureaucratic capitalists" as .pro-imperialist traitors w�o state-owned companies and the state economic plannfug.
This would
wanted to privatise the economy by relying on their alleged base m not only have threatened certain individual business leaders
, officers
imperialism. The campaign for so-called retooling of the state and others,. but also the · army's opportunities for buildin
g up its own
�pparatuses led to the exposure of n\�Y individual rotten eggs but funds with money from .state enterprises in order
to finance the
not to any structural changes. machinery of violence independently of Sukarno. Rather
, it was the
The army officers did not need to challenge the ever more technocratic state capitalists who needed the
· support of
accentuated anti-imperialist state ideology expressed by Sukarno. On Washington-to drive our "incompetent bureaucrats
and parasites"
the . contrary, they behaved like the PKI. They tried to interpret the from the state economy; to use their OWi} words<
teachings of Sukarno to their own advantage. For example, they The conclusion is that anti-imperialism w�s a blunt
weapon
continued to take over foreign companies. A�d it was . not the a$ainst the "bureaucratic capitalists" and their chance
s of making a
communists alone or in co-operation with Sukarno who created the quick buck. They could not be exposed and isolate
d as imperialist
confrontation with Malaysia-there were many indications that traitors who wanted to privatise and even less
to liberalise the
leading officers engineered the conflict. They had good reasons to �conomy, since they themselves needed to· act against imperialis�,
fear demobilisation, a reduced share of the state budget and general JUSt as they needed to defend their administrative positio
ns of power
threats to their strong position now that the state of emergency had and not to lose the political initiative.
been revoked. And the army, exactly as the major established parties I will soon come back to what happened during th�
"new order"
except the PKI, had no intere.st in renewing the que�tion of general regime after 1965, when a similar stabilisation
and liberalisation
elections. On the other hand, the military did not want the PKI an,d programme really was adapted. At that time, howev
er, the army-led
S ukarno to benefit from the policy . of confrontation. Th_u s, ·
"bureaucratic capitalists" were in firm power. The
PKI as well as
operations remained decidedly limited. Sukarno had been eliminated. How did that happe
n?90
Moreover, the PKI did _not .di;ect a knock-out blow at the A group of junior officers, knoWn · as the
30 September
58 What's Wr�ng with Marxism?
substantial resistance. Sukarno did his best to halt the reaction but It is by now _ quite obvious that when S'ukarno and
the PKI had
was finally forced to resign. The massacre and the arrests of been neutralised, the army led "bureaucratic capital
ists" had enough
communists and others was 'most macabre in Central and East Java power to ensure that policies of stabilisation, some
·privatisation and
and in Bali. The left movement as a whole was eliminated. even certain liberalisations could be comma
nded by themselves
This- is not the place to detail the full events nor to tackle the rather than by left-oriented groups or, next
worse, technocrats
delicate problem as to whether the PKI, th� CIA et al. or perhaps supported by foreign powers and capitalists.
e�en General Suharto was responsible for what happened. My Moreover, the new regime93 proved remarkably
stable and
general conclusion from previous studies is the following: The .PKI capable of fostering rapid state commanded capital
ist development,
had been forced to give up the militant peasant struggles, to which I even if it has stagnated in recent years. This has,
of course, a lot to
shall return in the next study. Also, workers had been dome�ticated do with the oil revenues. But first, the "bureaucratic
capitalists" were
and. the party had been unable to undermine the position of �h� strong and independent enough not to become
the victims of foreign
"bureaucratic capitalists" by attacking imperialism. Most of the civil powers and · transnational corporations. And
· secondly, pure
opposition had been forced undergrourid-and had turned . to the _ economic resources are just one of several necess
ary preconditions
army-or to foreign supporters� for development. The new ruling forces might
.. not have been skilled
Therefore, when the PKI leaders were faced with threats of industrialists but were quite capable of mobili
sing, offering a11d
coups, which.would �ndermine Sukarno's capacity to pro��ct the left putting other factors to use, such as protection
against powerfui ·
movement as a whole, they could no longer rely upon militant mass foreign competition, 'control of labour, and the
giving of priority to
struggle. A few of them involved themselves-but not the party-in
-
some and not all businessmen-even though this
was not based on
preventive elite conflicts. rational calculations made by technocrats.
Therefore, there is still no independent capital
ist class in
What's Wrong �th Marxism? The Big- and Bureaucrat-Capitalist State Positions 61
60
Indonesia. .The private capitalists all need state support, or at least whole.95 ,
prot�ction. · So do foreign capitalists no matter how influential and The new Congress(!) had lost a good deal of its old local roots
powerful they may be. And foreign donors require authoritative and attempts at revitalising the party failed. Mrs Gandhi had
counterparts, even if they would prefer a less .protected domestic challenged a lot of party bosses in I the late 1960s and early 1970s·.
economy and more rational technocratic planning. Even scholars Many of them had been able tcr rely not only on the party . but also,
stressing the predominance of imperialism and Indonesia's and perhaps mainly, upon their own bases of power when they acted
dependent position in the world economy agree. The business as patrons with clients, mobilised votes and funds, and got things
partners of the officers (at all levels) need support and protection. done; they had been quite capable of questioning and acting
Even scholars and activists who argue that the so-called cukongs and relatively independently of the party leadership. Some of them left
cronies are the real rulers agree. The pribumi, "real" Indonesian1 the party. Others were replaced by less well based and more
private and often Muslim oriented capitalists, need it. Scholars and dependent loyal bosses who had to draw more exclusively upon party
activists who maintain .that the pribumis may constitute a progressive and state allocated means for patronage.
national bourgeoisie sometiµies even argue that the weak pribumis Therefore, Mrs Gandhi came to rely more on the executive
need special state support in order to survive. And no one, of course; organs of the state than on her party and institutionalism was·
disputes · the fact that all the new subcontractors are extremely frequently abandoned as well. Her administrative and techriocratic
dependent on state contracts, permissions, protection, infrastructural absolutism turned centralised and personalised. The increasingly
arrangements, availability of necessary inputs, domesticated unreliable old ways of mobilising votes had to be supplemented by
labourers, etc. All capitalists need this, even the petty traders populistic rhetoric, political manipulation and exploitation of
frequently require state credits, permissions, protection etc. communalist tensions plus control and use of modern media. Rajiv
This, however, does not mean that the state is a unified, rational, Gandhi is apparently following suit although with a less arrogant
ruling actor. Quite on the contrary, actual developments and new image.96
scholary research94 strongly indicate a fragmentation of state powers The CPI-M, however, has been busy fighting the "one party
and complicated patron-client relations, despite President Suharto's dictatorship".
indisputable position as a super patron-a rentier general governor Secondly, the CPI-M, among others,97 maintained that Mrs
rather than a neo-colonial governor general. Various individuals and Gandhi and the Congress(!) represented a section of the big
groups are . in control of different organs, sectors and resources. It bourgeoisie and landlords that had abandoned democracy, because
seems as if it is not mainly the state but patrons within its organs they attempted to enforce a brutal capitalism from above that left .
who -are powerful . and use their control over common property and most of the petty producers and labourers behind.
nation-state authority to become, or to benefit from co-operation However, it was not only the CPI's progressive stat�-led
with, capitalists. developments that failed to materialise. There was no trace of West
The CPI-M in India correctly predicted increasing state European absolutist anti-feudalism, (as opposed to the East
_authoritarianis-m-and acted in defence of parliamentary democracy. European late feudal absolutism) based . on an alliance between
But" was the charac.:terisation of the nature and causes of queen Gandhi and the big capitalists. Absolutism was there, and so
authoritarianism equally vafia? And did not the party, therefore, hit were anti-feudal ideas. But as we know from the former section on
only at the pianoplayer? the CPI-approach, very little anti-feudalism was implemented.
To begin with, the marxist-communists often spoke about "one The German alternative marriage between big capitalists .and
party dictatorship" in relation to the emergency. However, Mrs junkers under the auspices of an Indian Bismarck also faile.d:� to
Gandhi's central_isation of powers and emergency were preceded by appear. The introduction of the green revolution in at least some
the breakdown of the Congress party and is more fruitfully analysed parts of the country could, of course, be analysed as an attempt to
in terms of continued struggles within the Congress movement as a foster petty junkers. As we know, the business houses were not hard
62 The Big- and Bureaucrat-Capitalist State Positions 63
What's Wrqng with Marxism?
hit by the Congress(!). But most "kulaks" turned against Mrs the CPI-M allied itself with, according to its leaders) often equally
Gandhi. They formed. an important basis of the non-left opposition "bourgeois-landlord" opposition parties? Did these, in any case,
- before as well as after the emergency, even if she constantly tried to represent interests in a slightly more traditional path of . capitalist
win theni back.98 Also, she never dared to withdraw some basic development, which, in turn, required more local freedom for
protection of petty producers and labourers. And more and more of farmers and entrepreneurs et al. and struggles against both
the state revenues was used for comparatively unprod�ctive stat� . centralisation, and political and economic monopolies?
expenditures. Pranab Bardhan's argument, that state professionals There is no doubt that almost all of the non-left dissident parties
are so decisive that they intervene in a potential "German marriage11 were strong enemies of Mrs Gandhi, however, it was Mrs Gandhi
between industrialist_s and farmers and form a complicated, herself who opted for the 1977 elections, which she lost and thus had
regulatory and consensus oriented menage a trois is well taken.99 to give up the emergency. It would be wrpng to say that she had
Moreover, not even a South Asian Bonaparte, emerging out of a been forced to stage the elections by a strong opposition. Rather, she
stalemate between the bourgeoisie and the· proletariat, . showed up. presumed that the opposition had been neutralised.102 Moreover,
India's state authoritarianism was · and is far from the classical quite a few of the old Congress bosses had previously been prepared
Bonapartist solution to a crisis of bourgeois politicai hegemony. It to leave the opposition when the winds changed.103 The fact that
was hardly the proletariat-as once · in France-that threatened the many were against Mrs Gandhi did not necessarily indicate that they
bourgeoisie to such an extent that the latter had to abandon had equally solid interests in a more liberal capitalist development.
democracy and introduce its naked dictatqrship. Which is not to say The J anata Government at centre that replaced Mrs Gandhi m
that the .big Indian capitalists did not welcome the emergency. But 1977 soon· fell apart and was quite incapable of guiding an alternative
the dominating classes had no serious problems in handling the path of development; it could only give more freedoms and subsidies
working masses. Even the Maoists, who had taken to the hills and to those who already had power enough to utilise them. Suddenly
started armed struggles, were soon neutralised. The nation-wide several of all the competmg interests, loyalties and organisations in
railway strike in 1974 was quickly repressed. The stalemate was India-which had previously been accommodated by and
between rival "bourgeois" groupings, among which one tendency subordinated to the Congress party leaders-permeated the central
defended their local bases of power in a fragmented society while government. Thus) Mrs Gandhi, Congress(!) and their state
the other tried to subordinate them all to a single authority. This had authoritarianism, minus the emergency, returned.104
.little to do with Bonapartism, even if we benevolently label the Many of the non-left opposition parties were remarkably
·
groups bourgeois.100 .
reactionary and sometimes even communalist. They struggled 1 for
When the ·emergency was revoked after some two years, a short elections, for example, but not for the possibility of common people
period of time in comparison with Indonesia, it was, neither because ·to cast their votes without being dependent upon patrons, communal
big-bourgeois-landlord capitalism had been successfully enforced loyalties, etc. And non-Congress state governments, as for instance
from above nor because the internal "bourgeois" struggles for in Andhra, did fight for their democratic rights against Delhi, but
political leadership had been resolved.101 implemented harsh repression back home. The CPI-M frequently
There are thus .strong indications that India's state became involved in s4nilar dirty politics and followed the rules of the
authoritarianism was not caused mainly by pure big-capitalist and game. Until recently, communists in Kerala, for example�
landlord interests. co-operated with communalist groups like the Muslim League to
But even though the marxist-communists did not hit at the root beat the Congress(I).105
causes, they got rid of the pianoplayer for some years whereby they The liberal face of the "bourgeois" opposition was mainly
contributed to a new lease of life . for India's parliamentary restricted to common interests of defending existing private bases of
democracy and paved the way for foft front governments in West power and ways of reproducing them against state intervention.
Bengal, Kerala and Tripura. Were these obvious successes because There were no unified attacks upon private monopolies. The
64
What's·Wrong with Marxism?
The Big- and Bureaucrat-Capitalist State Positions 65
states and loyal patrons. Partly because of this, the Left Front
�
investments without taxing the well-,off-and not onl he poor-so
�1
hard that they get upset and important markets dry up.
governments in West Bengal have had to compromise· with their .
The communist and "bourgeois" dissident alternatives seem,
harsh criticism of capitalism in general and imperialism in particular.
1 however to be more "retarded" than the present path of state
For example, by inviting transnational corporations to Calcutta. 07
Generally speaking the marxist-c.om�unists have, on the one hand,
d
regulate capitalist development. And, fi�ally, Rajiv G�ndhi's
liberalisations of the economy do not necessarily have clo�er lmks to
combined electoral and governmental pragmatism to defend the
big bourgeois-landlord interests than did his mother's �ta�e
masses against even more brutal capitalism with, on the other,
authoritarianism. The private sector is invited to take the lead withm
revolutionary rhetorics about the impossibility of doing anything
1 industry but, the state puts even more emphasis than be_fore on
substantial till the basic structures of power have been al.tered. 08
supporting various inputs and infrastructure. The deregulations are
However, a fresh start might be on its way after the recent elections
not only due to demands from and COfl:Cessions to the "middle and
in Kerala of \Which more later.
upper classes". I would emphasise that they Gust as Suharto's) are
The CPI-fyl has thus not only been incapable of hitting hard
essentially state-led and discretionary. They are not only
against the bas�s of state authoritarianism, but incapable also of
contradicted by the left but also by those who, on the one hand, get
defending the wea,,_ker sections of the masses against its most brutal
lower taxes and in.ore freedoms, but, on the other hand, run the risk
.
expressions in a way that a realistic and dynamic alternative path of 112 •
traditional. "liberal" capitalist development, from a discussion with a scholar (1979), especially, p : 310.
was strong. Cf. Brass (1973), p. 46
an.d now former CPI-M minister, . who stressed that "it was all short term · 105. Less so in West Beno-al, where tlie CPI-M
and Ghosh (1981), F�anda (1969) and (1973), and for Kerala Nossitier (1982),
tactics� We were weak . . . we needed democracy . . . we needed freedom to and (1987).
organise� Now we are prisoners in this short term tactics", from dis<;ussions plus, on the recent development there, EPW (1986)
Harris s (1984) most interes ting case study, and Bardhan (1984) e.g., pp. 48
with E.M.S.: "No, it was no tactics to get a weaker government. A weaker 106. Cf.
3 and 6ff.
government open up for imperialists" and with Basavapunnaiah (16/3), "Of f., as well as Chattopadhyay (1969) and (1979), pp.
lly Deb Kumar Bose, Prabat
· course our struggles for democracy are defensive. Democracy .is absolu1tely 107. Rudra (1985b) and inte1views with especia
CPI-M argument on the
necessary. There are constant attempts at destroying us." · Patnaik and Satyabrata Sen; plus the _official
. . . (1985), pp. 39_:41.
84. For Indonesia, see Tornquist (1984a) ch. 16, "Anti-imperialist struggles against transnationals in West Bengal, Political organisational
I will return to this in the report ahead. In this framework I draw mamly on
the wrong form of capitalism", pp. 165-169. 108.
more concrete short term
85. For a review of CPI-M's succe,sses and optimism at the time see Sen Gupta interviews with E.M.S., who would like to see a
. ah (12/3), who claims that th� cl_assical ideal path to
.
. strategy; Basavapunnai
�� of corrupt petty capitah sts but has to be
86: See Review report . . . (1978) and especially Resolution on organisation . . . capitalism is closed because
"It is not poss�ble to start
(1979). supported anyway for political reasons; Irfan, �ab!b,
Thus we mamly have to
87. See, e.g., EPW (1986) and (1987). buildino- socialism within the framework of capitahsm.
r°the reform s"; Sailen Das Gupta, "We have no good solution �ow fo�
88. For Indonesia, see Tornquist (1984a), ch 16, "Anti-imperialist struggles against protec
from top down ; SaroJ
the wrong form of capitalism", pp. 169-173. . the unemployed. We can only propagate basic change
need total change ... " and
89. See ibid., pp. 171-172. Interview Jakarta 22 October 1980. Mukhe1jee, "What can we do without money? We
ies without funds and
90. For the following, see ibid., ch. 18, "Mass struggle bypassed: elite conflicts and Manoranjan Roy, "We cannot take over sick compan
what the Congress(!)
massacre", pp. 224-237. ability to market . . . the best we can do is to expose
cannot do." Cf. also Vanaik (1986).
91. ? espite the fact tha! already George Otwell in his "Burmese Days" outlined a,
·
and Patel (1985). (According to
. .
m principle, not unhkely scenario. Cf. Otwell (1983), p. 131f. For new evidence 109. See Raj (1984), Djurfeldt (1985), pp. 56-58
Patel, India's growth of GDP 1950-80 was 3,5% per year while the volume has
on t�1e CIA, see Dale Scott (1985). (My, originally Swedish, book was figures are 4,5% and 3,5
pubhshed 1982.) . increased with 2,8 times. In the world as a whole the
4,5% (or 40% more than
92. See R.obiSon (19��) an� (1981). Cf. my critique in Tornquist (1984a), pp. times. In the third world as a whole the figures are
·
. India) and 4,2 times.) . .
176-182 and m Tornquist (1984b), pp. 48-57. In his recent book, Robison rate of labour absorption m
(1986) �a� moderated his position. I do not think that there are any serious . 110. Cf. Vanaik (1985), p. ?Sf. who stress the lower
earlier phase to 1,91 %
cont�adicttons between our conclusions anymore besides of the fact that factories, mines and plantations, from 3,04% in an
Robiso� now, in my view, overestimates the progressive logic of capitalism in during 1965-75. Cf. also Bardhan (1984), pp. 20f. . . .
passun, - Patnaik (1985),
Indonesia and does not e}..-pose its special character as compared to "ideal" 111. See, e.g., Vanaik (1985), pp. 59f., Bardhan (1984)
(1986) and Goyal (1985). Also, I draw on discussi ons with Goyal and
capitalism. Kurien
03. In a�dition to n. 84, see Tornquist (1984b), pp. 32-58. · Patnaik.
Goyal (1985), Bhagavan
94. Robison _(1�86) and Je�kins (1984) in particular. (But of course also new 112. Ali (1985), Paranjape (1985) especially, p. 1517,
ns with Patnaik,
research mside Indonesia, e.g. the studies of Arief Budiman). See also the (1987), and, on the character of the liberalisations, discussio
reports by investigating journalists on cronyism in Indonesia, e.g. Jenkins Goyal and Mishva.
·
(1986) and Jones/Pµra (1986). 113. Desai, A. (1984).
95. Cf. The Mani.st Review . . . (1977), pp. 317f.
96. For the above on Indi�, see Frankel (1978), pp. 474ff., 481 ff., Roy (1975),
.
p. 46 and passim, Vanaik (1985), pp. 61, 71f. and 76ff.' and Kaviraj (1986) pp.
'
1699-1707.
97. See, e.g., Banaji (1979) and Roy (1975); Roy was the scholar who made the to
'
my knowledge, best prediction of the emergency.
98. S�e, e.g., Vanaik (1985), pp. 65 and 70f., Kaviraj (1986), pp. 1705f. and
·
DJurfeldt (1979).
99. B�rdhan (1984), pp. 65-71. Cf. also Rudra's (1985a) review of Bardhan's book
with a useful summary of central parts of the argument.
100. C�. Va�1aik (1985), pp. 61 � n? _ 71, and Kaviraj (1986), although I do not agree
WIth his most general defmitton of Bonapartism, and Djurfeldt (1976) and
_
Djurfeldt/Lindberg (1977).
·
Bad management
while capitalists in India, for. example, found ways of escaping t�e
need for expansion by using extra-economic power�. <=:ons�quently,
The main problem identified by those who recognise the importance
what makes a capitalist interested in developing capitalism is har�ly
of state interventions is, instead, what the state does. That is, the
that he is a capitalist (employing and exploiting labour producmg
usually arbitrary nature of the state, ·lack of clear rules and rational �
for the market, making profits, etc.) but rather that he ts fc�rced by
and powerful state plam;1ing and management. This was, for ex
others-other capitalists, the workers, the state, etc.-to sust�in h!s
ample, the essence of Gunnar Myrdal's message and it is still .
powers to appropriate surplus in a capitallst way by mvestmg m
elaborated upon by many others, Marxist as well as IMF-and World
more efficient production.
Bank experts.11 They · stress nepotism, corruption, neo
In a recer.t article Brenner has elaborated on this type of interest
patrimonialism, etc. Of course these exist. We would not have a
to reproduce one's position i� relati�n to the means ?� production
development problem if there was a socio-economic structure which
and/or the economic product. 4 Such mterests are conditioned by t�e
enabled the state to . function according to rules and which was
structure and balance of power. And it is only when somebody is
manned by well disciplined. and educated civil servants whose plans
were implemented. Thus, a whole lot of things are lacking, but why? forced to change .his way of reproducing his position that he may
turn progressive and even revolutionary.
And why is it that capitalism has expanded in Indonesia despite the . ·. .
If we apply this perspective to my matenal, 1t becomes qmte un
fact that more or less corrupt officers, bureaucrats and their business
derstandable that both ex-tenants who had the chance to become
friends have been much more influential than the rational tech
farmers and many capitalists often avoided developmental capitalist
nocrats? Perhaps the solid state is not even a necessary, not to talk
solutions. They could reproduce their positions Wlthout drastically
about sufficient, precondition of capitalist development?
altering any structures or systems. However, many politicians and
administrators had to change the1r modes of reproducing themselves
Interests of reproduction
from just plundering the state into mobilising a lot of revenues and
appropriating as much a� possible for themselves. Some of them had
Let me return to the transition debates in Europe and partly Latin
to promote the development of capitaljsm.
America-not in search of the previously discussed empirical
This reproduction-approach is much wider than the common
generalisations but rather principal theoretical and methodological
class-concepts which draw on relations within the labour process as
experiences.
such.15 It is possible, therefore, to take not only traditional economic
Laclau and Brenner, in their critique of A.G. Frank and others,12
effectively demonstrated that markets were not the decisive precon factors but also the frequent use of extra-economic power over
. dition for capitalist growth. They existed long before capitalist labour and also other prerequisites for trade and production
growth began to gain momentum. Social relations of production whether they are privately owned or not-into due consideration and
were more important. �n the same way Brenner showed, with regard to further conceptualise these phenomena. Also, it should be pos
to Europe, 13 that there were markets not only in those European sible to bring into the analysis those people who reproduce their
countries which first turned to capitalism but also in others. Thus positions but are not lin l<:ed to processes of production in any clear
that something else seems to be decisive-the social balance of cut way such as many state employees and . the so-called mar-
powers, class struggles. ginalised.
Howeyer, these results do not actually support the problematic Finally, there is a need to go beyond Brenner's approach on cer
political · Marxist interpretation under review, about class interests. tain points. The frequent use of extra-economic power implies that
Capitalists with assumed universal interests seem to be just like we must find better conceptual tools to analyse the way in which the
markets-always present in the transition to dynamic capitalism but state arranges, manages and effects the framework which enables
also in other cases. Even Eastern European junkers used markets, people to reproduce themselves. It might, for example� be fruitful to
draw on some of the ideas and concepts generated within the French
78 What's Wrong with Marxism?
References
The Role and Basis of the State .
1. Hence, I do not profess completeness.
2. Anuparn Sen (1982). · in the Transition to Capitalism
3. Tichelman (1980).
4. Chattopadhyay (1969) and Baran (1957).
5. Warren (1980); cf. also, for a fine review-<liscussion, Werker (1985).
6. E.g. Gunnarsson (1985).
THE PROBLEM
7. See e.g. Arrighi (1986). Compare aISo Simoniya (1985).
8. Cf., for example, the discussions in Resnick (1973), Ashok Sen (1984)
· ·
and
McFarlane (1985). Generally speaking, conventional Marxist theory propounds two
paths to capitalist development.17 The first is the ideal and traditional
9. Cf., for example, Ahluwalia (1985) and Hyden (1983).
10. See, e.g., Bardhan (1984), p. 27f. and 64f.,. and Frankel (1978), p. 558. Cf. also
Goyal (1979) who, among other things, forcefully argues against the thesis that road characterised by the liberation of viable actual producers from
the business houses have to be supported since they are the only ones which feudal lords, wheryafter some advance and turn into capitalist with a
can generate growth and can show find results pp. 109-116 and passim.
minLtTI.um of state support. The second, and shall we say more Ger
?
11. For so �e ra ical scholars, who at least partially apply this perspective, see, on
the Indian side, Bardhan (1984) and, for Indonesia, Robison, e.g. (1986) and man, path, emerges when the real producers are not liberated from
on this issue in (1986a). Budiman (1987) also seem to advance in this direc feudalism and when a threatening capitalism has already developed
tion.
in some other countries. Thus, capitalism emerges among the al
12. Brenner (1977) and Laclau (1971).
13. Brenner (1976). ready powerful groups, landlords, big trader; etc., who need a lot of
14. Brenner (1986). ·support from a quite solid and rational state which acts as a collec
15; Ibid., especially, pp. 48-51.
16. See eg. Lipietz (1982) and (1984) and Ominami (1986).
tive capitalist to enforce capitalism upon the not yet liberated
masses. The two paths are simplified below:
There is room for neither the Indonesian nor the Indian state-led
developments in this table. T}i�s_e states are interventionist but they
do not act in a unified and rational way; they are infact extremely
discretionary and even arbitrary. The most common label. would be
80 What's Wrong with Marxism? The Role and Basis of the State in the Transition to Capitalism 81
"neopatrimoniar states"; patrimonial but within a formally modern might even find other theories than those which informed the
Webrian bureaucratic framework. We .are thus far from the collec political marxism applied in Indonesia and India which can help us
tive capitalist or, Bismarckian interventioriism.18 develop better explanations. Let me discuss the arguments I find
Even worse, as we have seen, the decisive capitalists in Indonesia most important.19
are neither liberated producers nor old powerful monopolists but
mainly a new brand who have emerged from within state organisa Dependent, independent, and weak capitalist states
tions and co-operate with private businessmen, domestic as well as
foreign. It should be obvious from my previous analyses that the role and
Comparatively old-fashioned monopolists, and sometimes also character of the state in the · Indonesian and Indian transition to
liberated producers, are much more important in India. Neverthe.; capitalist development are hard to explain within the framework of
less, as we know, they do not shape the state and its important inter the dependency theory. The power of the states is not based mainly
ventions but rather rely on co-operation with politicians and on foreign capital and compradors. The ruling segments, whoever
bureaucrats who are not only servants but also possess substantial they may be, usually have quite solid socio-economic and political
resources. foundation upon which they can build when they coopera�e with for
It -is difficult to take these indications of decisive developments eign capitalists and their agents.
into due consideration and explain them within the standard For the same reason it is not fruitful to use the common concepts
Marxism that informed the communists in Indonesia and India. We of bureaucratic capitalists.20 It is then stressed that the ruling groups
therefore have an additional category and the prospect of a third draw a lot on support from, and positions within, the state ap
path of capitalist development. paratuses. But we are still left with the idea that they r�ly mainly on
imperialists and their private property.
ROLE OF THE STATE However, neither is it useful to apply notions such as the national
non solid discretionary
bourgeoisie. First, even if we were able to, solve the various problems
interventionism interventionism and arbitrary
interventionism of defmition (it is hardly a question about nationality, but is it a
"nationalist" political position that matters or to what extent the
MAIN BASIS liberated kl) The idealised
capitalist is dependent on international markets and capital?) we still
OF THE producers path from
STATE below have to face a situation where national and international capital and
capitalists are more and more interwoven. Second, all the common
landlords (2) The Prussain
notions of a bourgeoisie start from private ownership and, based oh
& traders path from above
private power, adqitional influence upon the organs of the state. But
capitalists (3) ? we have seen that many powerful groups in Indonesia and India start
emerging
also with control over formally public assets.
from within
the states in The dependency paradigm · also stresses state in which th�e is
co-operation permanent emergency. The state has to be very authoritarian, repre
with private ssive, etc., in order to reproduce dependent capitalist relations.
capitalists
However, it is quite obvious that the Indonesian as well as the Indian·
states rarely have to rely on bayonets. Their cultural, social a�d
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES political roots are old and comparatively stable; there is' no urgent
crisis of legitinlacy�
The unexpected and unexplained third path to capitalist develop
, ment should, of course, be related to the general discussion on the
role and the basis of the state in the transition, to capitalism. We
What's Wrong with Marxism?
The Role and Basis of the State in the Transition to Capitalism 83
tal and the creation of nation states, etc. In other words · the emer
capitalists also from within their own organs are conspicuous.
gence of abs_oJutist states in · Europe after the transition from
·
feudalism to capitalism.
The autonomy of the absolutist states from the direct interests of
84 What's Wrong with Marxism? The Role and Basis of the State in the Transition to Capitalism 85
the dominating classes is often explained by a balance of power be faculty of ruling the nation"�33 And; according to Engels, the rule of
tween the feudal lords and the rising bourgeoisie. Of course it is not Bismarck in Germany was characterised by G:ie fact that "capitalists
that easy. For example, they often had common interests against and workers are balanceq against each other and equally cheated for
independent peasants and other petty producers. The development the benefit of the impoverished Prussian cabbage junkers ."34
of a rational-legal bureaucracy is often related to the break3own of There are interesting parallels, which I will address in the next
the feudal unity between politics and economy.3° There are also im report between the attempts at developing capitalism within a basi
portant differences between West and East Europe. Perry cally unreformed agrarian structure in Germany and India.35 But if
Anderson31 maintains that the absolutist states coincided with the we concentrate on the state, I fail to identify eithe� junkers or Bis
disappearance of serfdom (but not feudalism in general) and marckian state apparatuses in Indonesia and India · despite some
reflected the need for new ways and instruments to uphold would-be Bismarckian leaders like Suharto and Mrs. Gandhi and
feudalism. This, however, actually paved the way for capitalism. In son. Perhaps one can talk about "kulaks" as a result of the so-called
parts of Eastern Europe, where the aristocracy did not face a com green revolutions but these , are far from the old big junkers with
paratively strong rising-bourgeoisie and had firm roots in the military I?-uge amounts of labourers. In India they have usually turned against
apparatuses, a sort of state-led and militarised late . feudalism the would-be Bismarcks . . Moreover, the legal-rational . and tech
. developed which later became capitalism from above. In Western nocratic German bureaucracies and state interventions are far from
Europe, on the other hand, these tendencies were moderated by the the soft Indonesian and Indian state apparatuses.
urban bourgeoisie and later capitalism developed from below rather Bonapartism is often used as · an ideal type of state autonomy fos
than from above. tered by a stalemate b�tween classes in any type of society.36
However, - there can be no distinct historical parallels. Indonesia However, I fully agree with Poulantzas (and Gramsci when he dis
and India do not have a similar inheritance of classical antiquity and cussed "caesarism") . that such a broad definition is unfruitful.37 In my
feudalism. Their Asiatic form includes among other things, less view, Bonaparti�ril is basically a historically �pecific theory about an
private ownership, locally autonomous . rulers ·but stronger central authoritarian :Tiegime which comes about due to a certain degree of
powers, and some hundred- years of colonial absolutism. Perry An state independence· from the two basic c�asses . under emerging
derson stresses this: "The Absolute monarchies of the early modern capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Neither of them · is
period were a strict European phenomenon . . . it was just at this strong enough to uphold its negemony but each is able to reproduce
point that Japanese evolution stopped: Far Eastern feudalism never itself without full use and control over the extra-economic powers.
passed over into Absolutism . . . . O ne basic characteristic . .
� divided This, of course, implies that the concept is alien to . the . Indian and
the Absolute monarchies of Europe .from all the myriad other types Indonesian societies under review where the proletariat is not a
of despotic, arbitrary or tyrannical rule, incarnated or controlled by a . decisive threat and the capitalists are in desperate need of state
personal sovereign, which prevailed elsewhere in the world . . The in protection. In both countries there were periods of balance between
crease in the political sway of the royal state was accompanied, not various more-or-less dominating socio-:economic factions and politi
by a decrease in the economic security of noble landownership, but · cal groups which made possible some autonomy of the state and
by ' a corresponding increase in the general rights of private authoritarian regimes. However, having said this we still have to ex
property."32 plain under what conditions such factions and groups have emerged,
Later forms of absolutism were more related to the their role and character.·
breakthrough of capitalism and characterised by such a balance of Hamza Alavi attempted at such an explanation in his pioneering
· . ·power between the. warring classes that·the state acquired a degree " article on the post-colonial state.38 His state was relatively
of independence of both. According to Marx, Bonapartism "was the autonomous b.ecause of, first, its "overdeveloped" character. Ad
only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie vanced and extensive executive colonial- state apparatuses were in
had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the herited from colonialism. They reflected, generally speaking, the in-
The Role and Basis of the_ State in the Transition to Capitalism 87
86 What's Wrong with Marxism?
Parallel to renewed ,interest in the importance of administrative
terests of dominating classes in developed Britain rather than in un and coercive state organisations, Otto Hintze's theses about the state
derdeveloped India. Thus, the post:-colonial state was as conditioned not only by domestic socio-economic and political or
"overdeveloped" in the Indian context and - provided politicians and ders but also international competition between various states have
bureaucrats with an impressive apparatus. Second, despite capitalist been recalled frequently.41 Further, theorists like Claus Offe have
predominance on a world scale, Alavi strongly emphasised the com stressed an institutionalised self-interest of the state. In order to sur
plex class structure in societies such as India and the fact that no vive it has to sustain accumulation.42 Also, in trying to understand the
_ particular class was hegemonic. Thus, the state, the politicians, and niuch neglected importance of the state in the development of both
bureaucrats had extensive space for manoeuvring within the huge Eastern and Western Europe, Jan Otto Andersson has talked about
inherited state apparatus. a logic of the statt< separate from, but partly similar to, -the logic of
However, Alavi's way of explaining the role and character of the capit_al-that is,
its need to promote accumulation, to get more
often authoritarian post-colonial state has more to do with what he revenue and expand.43
does not say than with what he stresses. It follows from my previous If one applies similar perspective in order to understand the
analyses that in India and Indonesia the state has space for powerful so-called developmental states in East and Southeast Asia,
manoeuvring beyond the interests of dominating classes based on it is possible to conclude that the important and decisive state inter
private ownership, and within this it can mediate, regulate and even ventions do not reflect specific interests of any powerful group but
introduce some policies benefiting the weak. But the state can and rather their weakness. . The state is autonomous. But if it faces
does lead and enforce development of capitalism in such a way, and domestic and international opposition, pressure and threats f
to such an extent, that it has to possess extensive powers of its own. various kinds, the political elite is forced to modernise or die. Such
In other words, the importance and powers of the state can only par pressures have been present in many East and Southeast Asian
tially be eXplained by the fact that no classes are able to dictate to countries and hence the emergence of strong and developmental
the state from outside. The question then is, from _where do the states. In other words, it is not sufficient to argue with
politicians and bureaucrats derive their extraordinary powers? Gerschenkron,44 that the more - backward · a country is the more
One answer would be that the state actually possesses some decisive will state interventions have to be if the countries are to
power in itself. All powers are not directly rooted in production, as develop within the framework of a world system )Vith-'-many already
many Marxists would have it. Another approach is to argue that if established economic powers. It is only when the 11right" combination
some groups and persons within the organs of the state are very of internal and external pressure upon the state is present that the
decisive, they might have some hidden powers rooted in production elite � abandon parasitism and repression to uphold their powers
which we should disclose. These schools of thought are not mutually and, instead, work out and implement an effective development
exclusive and I will now proceed by discussing each of them. strategy.45
I -
No doubt1 this makes a lot of sense but we must pay attention to
States with powers of their own · the decisive role of the owners and workers despite the fact that the
more a coinpany deyelops, for example, the more important will the
To what extent does the state itself matter? Writing about the executive powers of the experts and managers be. The servants still
Bonapartist state, Marx mentioned , its "immense bureaucratic and have a master-as long as the servants do not also constitute the
military organisation . . . broadly based state machinery and an army rulers (not necessarily in a socialist framework), which is µot argued
of half a million officials alongside the actual army" and hinted at in _by the scholars mentioned but which I shall return to shortly. Unfor
terests and purposes of their own?9 Recently Theda Skocpol has tunately scholars like Skocpol abandon the socio-economic basis of
returned to the same tr�ck suggesting that we should "bring the state state power with summarising formulations such as "nevertheless -
back ll,i". She argues that 1'directly or indirectly, the structures and ac the administrative and coercive organisations are the basis ·of stat �
tivities of states profoundly condition � . . class capacities" .40 •.
88 What's Wrong with Marxism?
The Role and Basis of the State in the Transition to Capitalism 89
6
power" .4 charismatic leader, is firmly b"'sed in the social and politica) order.
. . .. . .
_
or-less autonomous state organs in the third world. The state is no authoritarian school of thought is that in Soµtheast Asia, and.I would
unified act�r. It is penetrated and abused for private ends and add India, the state is much more powerful than in most of the Latin
various patrons mobilise popular support from their clients. ·
American cases.55 His quotation from Evans is well taken: "In Brazil
However, even if we accept that this is made possible by remnants and Mexico the state is a critical actor in the tnple alliance, but most
from the past, used by domestic as well as foreign· elites, we still .
analysts would agree that the interests . of private capital
ne�d to answer questions about why and how various corrupted . . ·
?
pre ommate. While East Asian NI� �
cle3!1Y1, �r to the interests of
patrons are sometimes able to utilise and reproduce these· remnants �
capital, most an ysts ?f the East Asian tnple £illiance argue that the
to their own benefit.49 What are their different bases? Do they draw state plays a dominant rather a complementary role".56
mainly on support from outside the state or do they rely on control If the state is dominant it might be worthwhile considering "the
of the executive apparatuses? What is the basis for the corruption state as plurcder capitalism", which is what Mahmood Mamdani has
they have developed? How do they uphold patron-client relations? Is . �
suggested from s African studies and analyses of Uganda's political
clientelism really mainly due to traditionally rooted false conscious .
economy m particular. "A political position or. state connection is a
ness �bout real oppression and exploitation? necessary i precondition for membership in .
the African
bourgeoisie . . . .1 A political posi�on . . . is in fact the very foundation
· Class and factions within the state
of wealth."57
This i� quite close to my own results on the emergence of the
Who are the corrupted state leaders and professionals and what is
new Indonesian capitalists from within the organs of the state.
the specific basis of their power? Discussing differences between the However, they co,..operate extensively with both domestic as well as
colonial and post-colonial state in Indonesia, Ruth McVey has noted foreign private capitalists whose importance should not be underes
that today's top bureaucrats and generals are no longer only servants tim ated. Private capitalists in india are even more decisive despite
but also rulers.5° Karl D. Jackson has fruitfully departed from simple .
their dependence upon state protection and support.
notions about military rule and stressed the importance · of the
Related to this approach is also the idea about a rentier state-in
bureaucratic polity.51 Even though we should neither forget that of �
t e sense that huge parts ?f t e revenu�s �ome from, for example,
ficers, in or out . of uniform: dominate most state apparatuses, nor
�
011, rather than from taxat10n. Influential persons within the state
that they function within a bureaucratic framework and do not only
may then steal these extra state incomes. No doubt this is important.
rely on weapons, these approaches lack firm analyses of the
But we should not mainly concentrate on the sources of state income
economic bases and importance of the state. Other scholars have
and/or the plundering of state resources. It is obvious that it is not
tried instead to apply the concept of bureaucratic authoritari�
the origin and original quantity of the resources but rather the mo
regimes, developed mainly within a Latin American context but with
nopolisation of them that is basic-and thereby the possibility to
some relevance in Indonesia.52
profit from trading or investing them to capitalists who appropriate
The bureaucratic authoritarian state is a product of economic
surplus value.
crisis, under which there is a need for foreign assistance and political
The importance of Dick Robison's (and Harold Crouch's David 1
stability. An alliance emerges between the state, the local big bour
geoisie, and international capital; and dependent capitalist develop
Jenkins' and Arief Budiman's . . . ) studies of the develop ent of �
cont�mporary Ind�nesian capitalists is to my understanding,'
ment- may take place.53 Oligarchal corporatism is stressed rather
precisely that they disclose the ways in which private and state capi
than neo-patrimonial patrons or bureaucratic/military institutions. .
tal are mtegrated. And the recent study by Kunio of "Ersatz
This is, in my view, the main benefit of the model from the point of
capitalism in South East Asia" is particularly useful for comparative
view of India and Indonesia,54 even if I still think that leading patrons . 59
interlinkage between private and state capital but · rather if �d how sionals (civilians as well as military) as a tbird dominant propertied
we can conceptualise the emergence and growth of capitalists from class besides the industrialists and rich farmers.68
within the organs of the state. Notions such as corruption, plunder The main problem, however, is the way in which he distinguishes
ing, parasitism, etc., are much too general and do not help us this class of state employees. Bardhan starts off froµi the so-called
theorise about their involvement in tht? economy in general, and in analytical Marxist argument6') that not only "physical capital" but also
the appropriation of surplus in particular, along the same lines. as "human capital, in the form of education, skills and technical exper
with private capitalists and their exploitation. And there is definitely tise" can be the basis of class stratification.70 To this he adds that
a need to go beyond old ideas about bureaucrats or generals who there is in India "a tradition of an 'independent' civil service, par
also invest their "extra incomes" just like a private capitalist. (Cf. ticularly in its upper echelons, with social origins that do not have
PKI's notion oL 11bureaucrai capitalists") . This simple form of � much of a direct stake in the fortunes of private capital".71 However,
privatisation is hardly decisive. It is rather still formally state-owned he makes a distinction between the political leadership (or "the state
resources which are invested. I will return to this shortly. elite") which takes the decisions and the bureaucracy which in the
In Robison's earlier writings there are hints at analysing officers, process of implementation is able to generate "rental income from
bureaucrats and politicians involved in state and private business as a disbursement of permits and favours" .72 Finally, he sums up by argu
group of parasitic merchants who make profit on alienation by trad ing that "it seems the old rentier class in Indian society, deriving its
ing everything from rice to licences on oligopolistic markets.61 income from absentee landlordism, has now been replaced by the
However, this kind of trading, among other things, presupposes con new rentier elements in the privileged bureaucracy".73
trol and/ or regulation of the decisive resources themselves.62 I, Bardhan's wide and relatively unprecise distinctions are open to
therefore, prefer to start with the concepts of control and rent. criticism. For example, if we identify a class on occupational grounds
This track, is followed also by Pranab Bardhan, among others, (being a bureaucrat), or education, or access to strategic executive
when he addresses the problems of Indian development.63 Bardhan instruments, or as with John Saul access to surplus appropriated by
challenges the neo-liberal argument that there is a desperate need the state,74 there will be huge difficulties in deciding which in
for deregulation and privatisation to liberate the market forces and dividuals should be or not be part of the class. What interests in
thereby stimulate growth.64 In his view, the role of the state, and common do bureaucrats, for example, have as bureaucrats? And are
those who control it, is definitely decisive. Th�ir reproduction and those interests really decisive? Also, where shall \ve place those who
regulations do hamper economic and social progress. But this in turn have high education but are not state employees? Further, does it
is conditioned by complicated coalitions and compromises between not happen that the political leaders also demand rents? And what
the main dominant _classes.6.5 So far B ardhan is in agreement with about bureaucrats in the private sector? Moreover, do all
Alavi and his relatively autonomous state, partly as a result of a kind bureaucrats demand rent? How do we distinguish between, for ex
of stalemate between the main classes. ample, top level civil servants and others? And what shall we do with
However, Bardhan goes two decisive steps ahead. First, he pays all the professionals who also possess shares, real estate, etc.?
attention to Skocpol's remarks about the importance of administra Finally, the rather low real incomes of most state civil servants are
tive and coercive state organisations and argues that the state is hardly indicative of a dominant exploiting class.75
"combining its monopoly of the means for repression with a substan However, some of the problems can be solved if we begin by
tial ownership in the means of production, propelling as well as making a distinction between the pattern of surplus appropriation,
regulating the economy".66 Hence, the state is not only a relatively that is rents and the preconditions-acwrding to Bardhan they are
autonomous superstructure above those who privately control the privileged education, access to public funds and apparamses, etc.
economic base in the civil society but is also "an important part of Ranjit Sau takes a step in this direction by setting aside a com
the economic base itself'.67 Second, Bardhan not only stresses the prehensive analysis of · the root causes for the rents hinted at by
importance of the state as a whole but also introduces its profes- Bardhan in ord�r to make a more precise conceptualisation of the
94 What's-Wrong with Marxism? The Role and Basis ()f the State in the Transition to Capitalism 95
very. form of appropriation?6 He utilises the. Ricardian theory of rent explain by the standard mamsm which informed the comm�ts in
TI .
by replacing "land" by "bureaucracy". both countries. Having related these indications to the general dis
Sau comes close to the rather extreme neo-liberal and public course on the role and basis of the state in the transition to
choice oriented ideas that people within public sectors are mainly in p
capitalism in order to search · foi more · appro !iate- analytical tools
. terested in not only positions and wages and · theft, but also· in and theories, i� is now time to sum up and discuss still unsolved
·
regulating the markets in order to make extra money out of their' problems.
privileges. They are, thus, according to the theoretical assumptions, A more fruitful understanding of the state in countries such as
.
parasites who hamper economic progress.78 "(T)here is a motley Indonesia and India leads us beyond theories that emphasise mainly
crowd of white-collar workers, public bureaucrats, and political imperialism and non-domin�t domestic capitalism. The ruling
brokers who corner a part of the surplus product of the economy by groups have their own bases oi{ which they can rely in their coopera
deViolis means. They are essentially rent-seekers, mainly engaged in tion with foreign capital, the states are quite stable, and capitalism is
.
what is called directly unproductive profit-seeking activities."79 As on the offensive both from within and from outside the states. To
we know, this is hardly in tune with my previous results, according to analyse the enhanced powers of the state in terms of either a
which at least some of Sau's rentiers may be decisive for the genera'" regeneration of pre-colonial independent Asiatic central powers or a
tion of capitalist development. Also, Sau stresses only generation of more forceful penetration by the stronger private capitalist is no
rents through abuse of complicated regulations (the "licence-quota solution. The states are relatively autonomous but the question is
raj") and executive processes. He does not consider rents on real why?
resources such as finance, inputs, infrastructure, control of labour, The relative autonomy is not due to the emergence of an ad
etc., which would not be looked upon as something unnecessary �r vanced capitalism that, generally speaking, can do without extra
evep unproductive in the context of a private company. Aiid as far as econoniic interventions. Rather, it is the other way around. Strong
I can see, Sau is only talking about a kind of differential rent-to pos roots in Asiatic specificities make it unfr1:Jitful to draw on generalisa
sess a licence, for example, is like having more fruitful land than tions from the experience of absolutist European states. The lack of
your neighbour-but not about monopoly rent on the exclus�ve con a dominant contradiction between a bourgeoisie and a rising
trol of state assets and administration, to which I shall return shortly. proletariat makes it difficult to use classical studies of Bonapartism
Sau arrives at naive prescriptions because he concentrates on ap as a point of departure.
plying the concept of rent and does not pay much attention to its The relative autonomy is due not only to the lack of strong civil
basis. Having repeated Bardhan's general ideas about causes such as classes but also to an increase in the powers of the states. These
high education, certain occupations, access to executive apparatuses, state powers are not based mainly on the immense administrative
etc., he suggests, for example, a government-led "clean surgery" of and coercive state apparatuses. Rather, the states have become
the alliance betvveen some bureaucrats and big capitalists.80 In my decisive parts of the economic basis� in addition to being an arena
\iiew, this is almost like asking some of the rentiers to commit with institutions for the mutual benefit of the dominating civil
suicide. classes. Also9 the states are no unified actors; their organs are
penetrated both from within and without by various groups and in
Rent capitalism and the state di�duals for their private ends. We have quite substantial knowledge
about the background of the groups that penetrate the state from
My evaluations of problems of political Marxism in Indonesia and without. We need to know more about the bases of those who arise
India indicated th�t a state-led transition to capitalism, characterised "vithin the state itself. Only then can we hope to understand their fre- ·
by discretionary aftd arbitrary interventionism with a basis among quent corruption1 patron- client relations, and corporatist forms of
capitalists emerging ' from within the state and co-operating with co-operation with important civil groups. If it is true that the state is
private capitalists, was still going on and was difficult to describe and "an important part of the economic base itself' it is, essential that we
96 What's W.rong with Marxism? The Role and Basis of the State in the Transition to Capitalism 97
proceed by adding the materialist foundations. and their administration that is basic-and ther.eby the possibility to
The recent writings of Manoranjan Mohanty offer an example of add rents from trading or investing favourable regulations, etc., as
one way of conceptualising the material basis. 81 Mohanty starts from well as real assets to the initial resources. Even if state incomes dry
the idea of several co-existing modes of production as a framework up (like oil revenues in contemporary Indonesia), there is still the
for analysing the "duality of state process in the complex social for option for influential persons within the state apparatuses to demand
mation in India".82 He says: "This duality is the manifestation of the reni from capitalists appropriating surplus value who need
dynamic contradictions in the Indian social process and the political "favourable" regulations and/or can give something in return for get
economy which the leadership of the state seeks to orient towards ting access to the remaining resources. Therefore we will not discuss
mailltaining its power through a process of capitalist development here rentier state in terms of its sources of income as well as plun
while sustaining several forms of pre..,_capitalist relations. The duality dering of the state, but ·turn to legal or illegal appropriation of rents
also presents opportunities for the challengers to the existing system by people with capacity to control public administration and
to struggle for transformation of this order."83 resources.
Leaving aside my scepticism of the fruitfulness of mode-of According to Ranjit Sau, as the reader might remember, it is
production approach except in analyses of very long term general mainly through manipulation of the very processes of administration
ti-ends, I still sympathise With Mohanty's attempts at holding on to a inside the organs ohlie state that it becomes possible to appropriate
holistic perspective and emphasise the complexity of the task. renfs. We are now talking about politicians and civil and military
However, I doubt that it is possible to do · this and concentrate on state personnel with control of licences, contracts, quotas, etc.84
finding the principal ways in which the complex structures are held However, we should not only consider regulation, implementa
together and reproduced. For example, Mohanty is able to show ho_w tion, etc., but also basic control over necessary preconditions for
pre-capitalist and capitalist forms of exploitation are combined un production, trade and other forms of generating surplus. The d1f
. der state leadership (as one plus one), but has little to say about why ference is similar to the one between ownership of a company and
this happens or what new structures and forms of exploitation the management of it. What I have in miri.d is, for example, the con
emerge in this very process (as one plus one equals three) . . trol of real resofilces such as finance, inputs, know-how, transport
In my view we should, therefore, continue by concentrating on and infrastructure, access to markets, disciplined and skilled labour,
the material causes for why the "perverted" state, and the forces etc.
within it, are able to integrate, regulate, and reproduce complex rela- · In an "ideal" capitalist economy, most of these preconditions for
tions of power and exploitation. I am looking for one decisive aspect, generation of surplus are privately owned and available on an open
. and do not aim at giving a fulr explanation of all the complex dimen market. Capitalists sell and buy and niake profit. The state takes
sions. One way of doing this is to conceptualise the roots of the state care of what they have in common and mediates. As long as the
powers that cannot be linked to "civil" classes in terms of rents. capitalists survive on the market, their activities are, according to the
To begin with, one may talk about rentier states to indicate that, assumptions of most economic theories, not parasitic. However, in
for example in Indonesia, huge parts of the state income originate countries like Indonesia and India very m�y of these preconditions
from rent on oil (plus foreign aid) which makes the state less de for generation of surplus are at least regulated and often also con
pendent upon trucing people and on promoting production in order trolled by the state. Now the "rules of the game" are changed. Ac
to increase revenues. Also, it may be easier for influential persons cording to extreme bourgeois economists, most · costs for public
within the state apparatuses to get privileged access to or simply regulation and control imply parasitic rents-since everything could
· despoil these resources rather than generate income based on taxa (and should) have been taken care of by the market.85 Others sug
tion of the people. No doubt this is important. However, it leaves us gest . that we should talk about corruption and parasitism when
with a rather _static view. As I have already mentioned, it is _hardly politicians and civil and military state personnel do not function as
the origin of the resources but rather the. monopolisation of them loyal servants (of at least the dominating classes) but discriminate
The Role and Basis of the State in the Transition to �pitalism 99
98 What's Wrong with Marxism?
tion.
1 without c;tny basis in the law and the rules.86 .I would argue that plun The second case, on the other hand, has to do with precisely such
dering of the state is usually corruption but that appropriation of more t�orough control over, . broadly speaking, public means of
rents less often illegal and parasitic. ·production-assets and _services necessary for generation of surplus.
"How shall we conceptualise all this? Besides plundering the state For example, once we have paid to be considered for irrigation serv
through self-aggrandising (e.g., bypassing others in the queue that ices and to be favourably treated by those who order the _queue, we
you administrate) or despoiling of public resources, a reasonable als� �ave to pay rents, often via middlemen, to the particular
point of departure should be a distinction between monopoly-rent on .
. politicians and servants who have monopolised · control over the
public administratfon and monopoly-rent on public assets. - water, the dam and the channels. What we face is, thus, an informal
The first case is close to what Sau calls rent on bureaucracy.87 He type of privatisation of the public sector within the framework of
discusses mainly the differential rent that those who get access to a
licence can make in comparison with_ others-without improving or
and this is very important, the legitimacy of the state as a whole :
A�ain, the r�nts may be appropriated through trade or investment of
adding something to the trade or production. For example, like the t4e as� ets, in �ash or in kind, directly or indirectly, legally
farmer who happens to have more fertile land than his neighbour. (sometimes even m the form of wage) or illegally. Consider, for ex
However, I would rather start from the monopoly on. administration.
amp�e, how certain �enerals in I�donesia manage to control-and
Rent on favourable regulations, etc., can be appropriated by either _
legitrmat � contr ?l�vanous state-owned companies, state apparatuses
trading the privileges or "investing" them (or ones capacity to deliver
(an� sections wi� them), monopolising thereby a whole range of
them) in a �pecific business venture and then getting a share of the
necessary preconditmns for trade and production like raw materials
profit. In the latter case Sau's differential · rent may also turn up on
(not least oil and gas), fmance, labour, know-how and so on. Hence,
top of the monopoly-rent. The rent may be in cash or in kind. T4e
they can dem�d rent on letting these resources out-just like a
appropriation may take place directly or indirectly, for example via
landlord who rents out part of bis land-or enters into partnership
middlemen and relatives. As we all know there are,. to make but two
with the actua1 businessmen.
comparisons, perfectly legal ways to avoid taxes or to find acceptable
In this ca� e, distinguishing a new class of rentiers is theoretically
reasons to e�ploy someone close to us eve� though other applicants
unproblematic. We have to consider mon9polised control of neces
may be more qualified. If it is legal or not, or called corruption or :
sary real assets which happen to be public and not available on an
not, is not important here. And quite often those need the servii:;es
open r_narket, but which could just as well have been privately owned,
are well placed enough to pay rent in the form of higher wage or ad
ditional wage-employment. ?r w�ich coul� b � .bought, by anyone. . It is difficult but possible to
identify what mdividuals and groups are_ in control of what assets,
We can set aside simple occupational criteria such as politicians
and how they are linked to private businessmen and m-oups.89 In the
or bureaucrats. Despite this I would hesitate to distinguish a class. It
fin�l ana!�sis it is their control of the conditions of roduction, not
;
is a distinct . form of surplus appropriation. But the foundations of
their positions as bureaucrats or officer� or politicians, that matters.
the monopoly over various parts and levels in state regulation and
Further, by studying the interrelationship between these rentiers
implementation that makes rents possible are very diverse and
and private capitalists it is possible to distinguish between at least
hardly promote similar interests and ways of reproducing the mo
nopolistic positions.88 For example, �ome would turn to fellow �wo segments of the class: thosewho "only" appropriate rent by trad.1.
mg the "product" to anyone who pays, as a banker, and those who in
bureaucrats or officers, others to strong civil classes or even foreign
vest the assets or mm?-opolised services in specifiF companies in
,business and government agencies for basic support. I would argue
return for � sh�re of their profits on trade and/or production, like a
that this first type of rentiers, which I will call regulative rentiers, are
finance capitalist. (Other characteristics, such as high concentration
unusually independent servants and/or representatives of various
of capital, that go with the concept of finance capitalism do not
classes and factions which in their turn have obvious and direct rela
necessarily follow suit!) I will label the. first as political rent c_apitalists
tions (in terms of ownership and control) to the means of produc-
What's Wrong with Marxism?
The Role and Basis of the State in the Transition to Capitalism 101
100
I could not refrain from identifying actors within the boxes but
and the second as political finance capitalists.
While it is common that rents on favourable administration may
y �
would like to stress what people ·actuall do-since the distinctio s do
not imply that specific individuals and groups are engaged in one
distort regulations, etc., that are essential for the promotion of
sort of "business" only. A particular bureaucrat or officer or
production (e.g., within the framework of import-substitution
politician (or middleman with access to them) may be partly "clean",
policies), monopoly rents on necessary �ssets are not more parasitic
partly �elf-aggrandising, partly despoiling, partly appropriating rents
than private rents on, for example, real estate or profits on trade.
by trading favourable administration, partly engaged in political rent
And we are not talking about plundering the state. Our rentiers, and
or ev� n finance capitalism. Lik.ewise, concrete political rent
especially the· financers, must see to it that their clients are doing _
capitahsts, for example, may also to some extent be regulative ren
reasonably well so that they can continue to · pay and. not turn to .
tiers1 Th� rent may be in cash, even in the form of wage, or in kind,
other p(ltrons. However, all monopolies may hamper economic and
legal or ille�al. The state as a whole is, of course, not only an organ
social progress.
f�r the rentiers themselves but also for the civil classes and factions.
I will shortly return to the - dynamics. But the question why the
Fmally, the control of the state resources by the rentiers and finan
political rentiers and financers .are capitalists should also be touched
upon here. Their appropriation of rents is, in principle, possible to .
�
cer� is not only hid e but integrated with official state authority and
�
legitrmacy. As I said m the beginning of this discussion: I am con
adapt to many modes of production. Hans Bobek has developed an
centrating on the material causes for why the perverted state and
extremely wide notion of rent capitalism which he . applies to very
early periods in history.90 However, rent-business in itself is not
the forces within it, are able to integrate, regulate, and repr duce�
complex relations of power and exploitation. My search is for the
capitalist; the fact that bureaucrats, for example, might invest their
one decisive aspect.
despoilt goods or rents like "proper" private capitalists is quite
However, let me also consider the role of rents in the frequently
another thing. However, contemporaty appropriation of rent in .
countries like India and Indonesia takes place within the framework
dz�cuss �d patron-client relations. According to the Webrian approach,
of a predominantly capitalist system. ·Hence, the rentiers and fman
�
�lie?te sm �eflects ways in which · dominating persons mobilise and
mstitutionalise popular support, and in this process also in other
cers are dependent upon the performance of the trading and .produc
w�ys use their subordinates in return for patron�ge. Little has been
ing capitalists in order to get the best possible rents. And the traders
said about the basis for this, besides references to the historical
and producers are often in need of most of the resources that the
political rentiers and fmahcers can offer.
_ �ackground. Marxists too have not come up with a powerful alterna
tive; they usually add that patron-client relations mirror false con
Important parts of_ what I have said so far about the roots of the
sciousness among clients for which there may be various reasons.
state po}\'ers that cannot be linked to ''civil" classes may be sum
Classes based on relations of domination and exploitation in the
marised in the following table:
process of production are present on the economic level but are
rarely formed socially and politically. Instead, organisation is blurred
SOURCES
Public Public by old social, political, cultural, and religious structures and patterns.
adminlstration resources I do not want to refute the need to go beyond so-called
FORM OF APPROPRIATION
eco�omistic �xplanations. But in this case it is actually the material
--
plundering self-aggrandisers despoilers basis as a pomt of departure that is missing. I would maintain that
patron-client relations in societies such as India and Indonesia are
trading regulative political rent
-
no� mainly superstructural remnants without firm economic bases, .
rentiers capitalists
which could thus be undermined by conscientisation of the clients
investing and regulative political finance over the "real" conflicts of class. Rather, clientelism in countries such
sharing profits . rentiers capitalists
as India and Indonesia-including dientelism as an important ele-
1-02 What's Wrong with Marxism?
The Role and Basis of the State in the Transition to Capitalism 103
ment of communalism-may often, in the final analys_is, be explained
ample, the lient may be able to choose a more favourable patron or
as a combination of economic and extra-economic forms of ap �
turn more mdependent. On the other hand, patrons will have
propriating rents. It is parallel to other forms of exploitation and to
reprod ce their positions by accumulating sources of rent� offer
contradicticms of class in the very processes of production and trade. � bet
The rents are not mediated through open markets. Assets and . z
ter services �d or rely on more "developed" extra-economic
powers
services for which rents are demanded, in particular, are tightly
� not necessarily m terms of naked force). Consider, for example
, the
rmportance of the huge resources that Indonesian patrons
linked to individuals. The "commodity" is personalised. Personal got access
to through the nationalisation of foreign companies in the
relationships between the stronger and weaker parties are necessary late 1950s
for appropriation of rents. The weaker part has to turn to specific and early 1960s as well as through oil and gas in the late
1960s and
early 1970s, or the decisive effects of the domestication
powerful individuals in o·rder to reproduce his position. The stronger of peasants
and lalJOur in the mid 1 60s. It is obvious that Indian
part has to turn to specific individuals who need (and can "pay" for) � � private busi
ness clients have a more mdependent position than their
what he can offer in order to uphold his power and to be able to ap Indonesian
propriate rent. Both parties are eager to sustain their relations as CO�teFparts 01:1 the Other hand, the balance of power
: between the
lorig as r,.o better patrons or clients appear, or at least fill one part var�ous dommatmg classes in India is .more even than
in Indonesia,
can reproduce his position on his own or through other forms of which, as Bardhan and others have maintained, re�trict
s "efficient"
developmentalism.94
: domination and exploitation.
These remarks bring me to At the same time, · regulating rentiers may
the dynamics of, broadly speaking, be somewhat
The historical background in Asiatic forms of ab weakened because political rent and · especially finance
political rents. · capitalists
solutist states, followed by the colonial state, weak civil cl_asses, etc., have to further develop their clients' trade and produc
tion to sustain
are quite obvious. However, having set aside the discussion about. a their own appropriation of rents -something which
. may_ requ.h e . a
rentier state in terms of its sources of income (which is of course more efficient and less arbitrary administration. Similar
. . . changes are
important for a full discussion about so-called developmental states) on therr way Indo esi .95 This is one possible way of interpreting
.. � . � �
and concentrating instead on appropriation .of rent based on .monop 1: �
JiV Gandhi- s pnvatisatmns, deregulations and empha
sis upon ef
olisation of public administration and resources, I would like to flcrency.
elaborate a bit on the argument . that states promote development Also, as I hav alrea�y hinted, political rent capitalists
� . may trans
when facing the "right" combination of domestic and foreign form themselves mto political finance capitalists by
associating them
threats.91 If I link my attempt at identifying the decisive forces within selves more closely with specific private capitalists
and their ven
such states with Robert Brenner's thesis that classes turn progressive �ures. Thus, they are no longer only leasing out their assets and serv
only if they have to radically change systems and structures in order ices to anyone who can ay (lik a banker) but invest
. � � their capital �
to reproduce their positions,92 I arrive at the following argument: In the as ets and services-m certam companies (like a private
. � fmance
order for states like the Indian and Indonesian to turn cap1tahst) and then share the profits. On the
· central level this is
"developmental", it is the regulative rentiers, . and especially the more important in Indonesia than in India.
The links between
political rent and finance _ capitalists with powers of their own, who pri: te client capitalists and their companies on
� the one hand, and
have to face a combinatiem of threats and possibilities in order to poh�ical rent and fmance. capitalist generals on the
other hand, are
turn progressive though not necessarily revolutionary. gettmg stronger and stronger in Indonesia.96
Rent seeking patrons cannot exist without clients wiihin trade If powerful rentiers fail to change, they may be
faced with revolu
.
tio
and production. But the latter are also in need of the resources that ?a�y threats fro!J1, for example, frustrated private client capitalists.
the political rent and finance capitalists command. Hence, it is This �s one way of interpreting the fall of Marcos
in the Philippines.
_
Fmally, there is
strategically important to study the balance of power between no need to exclude that clients who are weaker
' various patrons and within different patron-client relations. For ex- than private capitalists can also fmd ways and opport
unities to be
_
come more indepen dent and to overrule their patrons. But unf�r-
104 What's Wrong with Maixism'? The Role and Basis of the State in the Transition to Capitalism 105
tunately, I cannot give any example. Most radical organisations do But what about the other boxes? One can fill most of them
with
not give priority to struggles against the appropriation of and ex at least fragments of the transition of capitalism in various countrie
s
ploitation through- rents. And when the issue is at stake, at least and regions. One case is of particular interest. As I have
already
indirectly-like recently in the farmers' agitation fa India-the weaker shown, there are indications that at least Indonesia is headirig
slowly
groups and radical movements seem to hang on to private capitalists' in the direction of more solid interventionism with more disciplin
ed
or rich farmers' interests. However, I will continue to exclude regulative rentiers. More efficient and less arbitrary administ
ration ·
peasants and the rural scene from this book and return to it in the seems to be needed in order for political rent and finance
capitalists
next report from the project. .. to promote their clients' production and trade-and thus their
own
The problem that we started the discussion with in this chapter �ppropriation of rents. There are, perhaps, some similarities
with the
was that the state-led transition to capita�;sm in India and Indonesia development of South Korea.
does not fit into the common first and second path to capitalism,< Finally, please observe that I have "only" addressed some
decisive
Rather it is charact�rised by discretionary and arbitrary interven factors in the transition to capitalism and particularly the problem
of
tionism which has its basis among capitalists emerging from. within how to explain, within the framework of historical material
ism, the
the stateand the private capitalists with whom they cooperate. obviously decisive powers of those rulers of the state who
cannot be
Having conceptualised the roots of state powers that cannot be directly linked to "civil" classes. Thus, I'm not presumptuous
enough
linked to "civil" classes in terms of rents, we can now reformulate the to talk about the mode of production or "at least" about the
complete
table at the beginning of the chapter. structure or system of contemporary capitalism and state.
Nor there
The unexpected and unexplained third path to capitalist develop- fore about the form of regime, ideology, development strategi
es and
ment is characterised by what I would call semi-plivatised .state inter many other 1things of importance. That requires a much wider
con
ventionisni (interventionism but not solid as a collective capitalist), ceptualisation and complete analysis which still remains
to be done.
- mainly govemed by regu.lative rentiers, and based on political rent and But the problem was that when such attempts were made
with the
finance capitalists who co-operate with private capitalists. Thi$ third �tandard approaches (and applied · politically) by marxists in In
path to capitalism may, therefore, be called rent capitalist. donesia and India, they could not take into consideration,
·among
-other things, the transition to capitalism and the roots
of powers that
ROLE OF THE STATE I have now tried to make sense of.
Mohanty's (1987a) convincing arguments on established explanations of com 87. Sau (1986), p. 1070.
munalism. 88. Thu�, for �hese and other reasons I would not
subscribe to propeny rights and
49. Some scholars who seem to subscnl>e to the .concept of neo-patrimonialism pubhc choice arguments.
do, however, tty to look for the bases - though not because of but rather 89. Cf., for example, the fine research done
by Robison and Jenkins.
despite the theoretical framework. Cf. Crouch (1979). 90. Bobek Cl�?2) Cf. also the way in which
Fegan (1981) applies Bobek's notion
:
to the Ph1hppmes.
50. McVey (1982), p. 88. CT. also Anderson (1983).
51. Jackson (1978). 91. Cf. the text above related to n. 45.
52. Cf. King's (1982) arguments. 92. Cf. the text above related to n. 14.
53. _ O'Donnell (1978) an� Evans (1979), for example. 94. Bardhan (1984), chs 7 and 8.
54. Cf. the argments put forward by King (1982) and the analyses by Martinussen 95. See, for an early example, the report
s on Indonesia in FEER � , September 10
(1980) and Kochanek (1974) on business corporations. 1987. '
55. Budiman (1987), p. 535: 96. Cf. my previous analysis· in Tornquist (1984b
) , pp. 44-58, and Robison (1986).
56. Ibid. . .
:
people s r�le and enforced a c�rporatist, consensus-oriented, and
authontanan rent interventionist state. Most of them enhanced their
powe:s by mo�o�olising co1:11moil state resources. The support given
6 .
�o pnvate capitalists by political rent capitalists made it possible for
both groups to expand. Also, the new rulers could thus use the state
to domesticate those people whom they had previously been much
Preconditions for �Democracy more dependent upon. Hence, they had-and still have-no reason to
under the�Transition to Capitalism open up even for bourgeois political democracy (i.e., democratic
forms of governing what people . have in common minus what is
�-privately owned), as long as their main basis of power is located
wi�hin th� or�a�s of th� state and common property. Moreover,
THE PROBLEM
�either. did . privileged pnvate capitalist clients, nor do they, have any
lllJ.mediat� mterests of that kind no matter how much they complain.
the crisis
As we know, the PK.I and the CPI actually contributed to � _
hey are m desperate need of sustained state support and protec
CPI-M tried to
of people's rule in Indonesia .and India.97 When the tion.
at its very basis. The
fight state authoritarianism, it did not strike Xn Ind�a, on the other hand, the main question is rather why and
g previou s forms of
party was unable to go beyond restorin how parliamentary democracy has survived. As in Indonesia
by those who utilised them.
democracy but was caught by them and
upon
demo�racy emerged despite the fact that private capitalists could no �
The recent attempts at a fresh start in Kerala will be touched do without extensive political support. But were not the Indian
later on in this chapter. �
capita ists, generally speaking, much stronger than the private In
It is common wisdom to talk about "bourgeois democracy" in In dones1 an o �es? Yes . But when they grew even stronger,
as . . .
dia and till the later 1960s in Indonesia. The well known general authontanamsm t�ned mto emergency. Was this perhaps because
should be room for relativel y autonom o1:1s
sumption is that there the fu:th�r expansion of the)Jig bourgeoisie reflected a second path
common
politics, as well as democratic ways of ruling at least to �ap1talism ·:van
oben"? In the former section l have disputed this.
are capitalis ts. This is .
property, as long as the real holders of power
ce their
!?
n ian �ap1tahsts, not least the big ones, did need state support. But
because it is assumed that capitalj.sts are able to reprodu
it rn qmte clear that they could keep on expanding without either
use of
private property and appropriation of surpl�s on their own by emergency or decisive structural changes.
private
the market and their control of production. In other words,. if From �nother point of view, might - India's parliamentary
and thus
property is excluded .from what people have in common,98 democracy mstead b,e due to a strong genuine bourgeois oppo�ition?
from what should be democratically ruled, capitalist s who do not
to reproduc e them
i:owever, as we have also seen, it was hardly the 11bourgeois" opposi
need full control of common properties in order
tlon that pressed Mrs. Gandhi to stage free elections in 1977 even
selves can survive democracy - and sometim es even fight for certain
who
�
though it won �d rest?red a lot of the previous forms of dem cracy.
forms of democracy in order to get rid of, for example, leaders The common mte�est m democracy within the opp_osition obviously
free private business . .
monopolise politics and hamper had more to do with 1ts fear of central state powers, its preference
The problem is that there do -not seem to be any clear-cut cor �or .d�mocracy as a means to regulate conflicts between various free,
s and
relations betWeen the existence of strong and weak capitalist md1V1dual and propertied citizens, and its capacity to mobilise votes
cy. .
mo!."e or less democra from clients than with � ability to reproduce positions and ap"'
the
During the period of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia, .
propnatlon of surplus without the use of extra-economic means.
weak in all respects and very depende nt upon politi
capitalists were There is, of course, no reason to deny that the existence of
rent
. cal patronage. Thereafter, when private as well as political stronger and more independent private capitalists in India than in
s grew stronger , they abandon ed even quite limited f9rms of
capitalist
110 What's Wrong with Marxism? Preconditions for Democracy under the Transition to Capitalism 111
Indonesia is a fundamental precondition for some sort 9f political study its extension which, as far as I can see, is not fruitfuµy coven.�d
democracy. However, the survival of parliamentary democracy in by the concepts of form vs. content, ·and formality vs. reality. About
India se_ems to have less to do with the ability of the private what can equal, real decisions be made? To ask whether people with
capitalists to reproduce their business without extra-economic equal rights are able to rule trade and production th(!t they hold in
means, than with their interest in regulating conflicts and their de common, or if such spheres are "protected''. by private ownership, is
pendency upon others' capacity to mobilise votes and acceptance. not the same as to examine if the policy is to produce and trade
Particularly upon politicians and many civil servants who can uphold trains instead or cars, and the effects of this.
and strengthen their own positions within the framework of rela Moreover, I emphasise preconditions for democratic rule. True,
tively free elections, .etc. Also, quite a few Indian politicians and mainstream political scientists also add preconditions, formal as well
public servants tried in vain to rely exclusively in comparison with - as real, for democratic rule.101 However, they usually concentrate on
Indonesia upon their far less absolute regulative and real powers directly related necessary prerequisites such as formal and real
within the state organs during the emergency but had to return to freedom of speech; governance according to democratically decided
vote-catching, mediation, regulation and "petty" rent capitalism. rules; or a serious of factors, such as literary, and standard of living.
These preconditions indicate actual capacity to make use of formal
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES equal rights. But the more basic causes are neglected; i.e. the sys
tems and structures of which the immediate preconditions are only
Obviously, these patterns of development cannot be fruitfully con fragments. These causes are emphasised by the Marxist theories and
. ceptualised by merely assuming a positive correlation between the analyses currently under review. Thus, the frequent mapping of
development of capitalism and bourgeois political democracy. Let preconditions, and attempts to correlate indicators of to what extent
me therefore, in search for other theories, relate the actual traits and the formal prerequisites may be utilised with the presence of more
problems of democracy to the general discussion on preconditions or less democratic rule1� are rarely fruitful if we want to further
for peoples' rule under the transition to capitalism in the third world. develop theories about why and how they appear in the first place,
I will again discuss arguments which in my view are most and how more basic structure and systems affect, and are affect�d
important.99 by, the form of rule.
Within the framework of political economy in general and mar
At the conceptual level xism in particular, questions about basic causes of, first, formal pre
requisites (such as freedom of speech); second, the extent t_o which
What are the problems of democracy we are dealing with? To -begin these are real plus various capacities among people to use them;
with · 1et us assume that democracy has to do with equal rule (one and, third, the extent of democratic rule, are usually answered
man one vote, for example) of what pepPle hold in common. Then, through studies ·of socio-economic relations of power. The general
separate form (procedure) from content. The form of rule-for in thesis is that the more power is equally distributed (people's power),
stance, how decisions are made-should be distinguished from what the better are the chances for equal rule of what people have in com
is decided. Also, what is formal and what is real should be held mon (people's rule).
apart. Rules and policies may or may not be obeyed and This is· nor disputed; a certain degree of eqlJal distribution of
implemented.100 power is a necessary prerequisite for equal forms of rule. People
At this stage, it should be ob�fous that the problems of need a certain degree of autonomy. However, not even full people's
democracy under review have to do with reality and not with for power would be a sufficient condition for people's rule.
malities; with the form of rule rather than with its content. However, Consider, for example, a case where all citizens control their
even if I am not focusing on the content in terms of output and out means of production. As soon as they have something in .common,
come of more or less democratic rule, it is extremely important to that is as soon as · they start to dispute, co-operate, and exchange
112 What's Wrong with Marxism?
Preconditions for Democracy under the Transition to Capitalism 113
which resulted. Marxist approaches with rather rigid theses about only that a "national bourgeoisie" was and -is stronger in India than
only one type of capitalist development leading to bourgeois political in Pakistan, but also that the Indian bourgeoisie was politically
democracy can thus be fruitfully developed with the help of Moore's strong enough to influence state policies primarily through the rep
results. resentative organs in a9dition to the executive ones.114
However, Moore's perspective is not of much use in giving more However, as I have stressed elsewhere, the second independent
emphasis to the importance of the forms of rule as such and their variable (whether the class promotes its interests through the repre
immediate preconditions; nor in relating the forms of rule to such sentative or the executive organs of the state) is closely linked with
basic causes as those stressed by Moore himself. the dependent variable. "To use a parallel: the .correlation between
Despite his long historical perspective, and attempts to show that the fact that one party is better than the others in attracting sym
feudalism was not the same all over the world, Moore discussed the pathisers and the fact that · this party later on wins the election may
roots of bourgeois democracy only. One could argue that this is quite be impressive, but how much do we actually explain?"115
natural since no other . type of democracy occurred in the countries Moreover, as I pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, a
that he examined-and he did make some reservations about India. weak "national bourgeoisie" in Indonesia promoted its interests par
Having said this, we should also stress the fact that democracy (in ticularly through the representative organs of the state in the early
the sense that people equally rule what they hold in common) cannot 1950s. But when capitallSm grew stronger, most of the economically
be positively correlated only to specific forms of capitalist develop as well as politically strong capitalists had no interest whatsoever in
ment but must be seen also within the framework of very different upholding parliamentary democracy. I would argue that this was be
modes of production.111 Thus, it is not fruitful to generalise from cause they did not constitute a traditional private "national
Moore, that democratic rule is most likely to occur under certain bourgeoisie". They were emerging political rent an:d finan�e
types of transition to capitalism. There are many other possibilities, capitalists (with private capitalists as clients) and based their
including the forms of democracy that emerged during radical strength mainly on the monopolisation of state resources
liberation struggles and the present form of rule in India, which can monopolies which could be threatened by· quite limited forms of
not simply be labelled bo�geois. And there is no reason,. for ex political democracy.
ample, for progressive Indonesians to sit back and wait for "real Hence, we cannot generalise and theorise about the relations be
bourgeois development" of democracy just because that was the oruy tween · one type of capitalist development only (in this case, accord
positive outcome in Moore's study. Also, due to the fact that Moore ing to Martinussen, led by a "national bourgeoisie") and possibilities
focuses upon the early transition from more or less feudal societies, for democratic rule. Obviously there are other paths, followed by
he rarely stresses the importance of the labour movement in the fur other types of capitalists. Moore indicated this in principle but his
ther development of people's rule, to which I shall return in a short stress was on different types of revolutionary transition from more
while.112 or less feudal societies, resulting in different forms of rule.
Also, Martinussen's analysis of the preconditions for limited
A democratic "national bourgeoisie" forms of democratic rule in India could be disputed. The sUrvivaI of
parliamentary democracy has not only to do with the partial ability
In his impressive and voluminous study of the state in India and of the private capitalists tu reproduce their position without extra
Pakistan, John Martinussen makes an attempt to further develop the economic means but · also with their need to regulate conflicts and
marxist theses about democratic interest of a so-called national their dependency upon the capacity of political elites to mobilise
bourgeoisie, as well a� Moore's positive correlations between. certain votes and acceptance. The political elite have strong interest of their
·types of _revolutionary transition to capitalism and emergence of own in upholding certain forms of democracy. Martinussen is wrong
democratic rule.113 Martinussen concludes, that the main reason why in characterising and explaining India's . democracy as strictly bour
India but not Pakistan developed parliamentary democracy is not geois, as conditioned by the strength of a "national bourgeoisie".
116 What's Wrong with Marxism? Preconditions for Democracy under the Transition to Capitalism 117
tern wide and flexible enough for popular demands to make them
patrimonial approach which I have discussed earlier in relation to
·
selves so strongly felt that democracy emerged.121
analyses of the state.
We could add to this detailed studies of the dynamics and regula
Howev�r, Mouzelis does not only describe the forms of rule but
tion of mature capitalism, besides the exciting studies of under what
also tries to explain them. He maintains that Argentina, Chile and
Greece experienced an early "modernisation" without industrialisa- ·
�onditions and in what forms labourers demanded more democracy
m order to defend and reproduce themselves. For instance, the
· tion which produced a strong "middle class", transforming old forms
theses of the "regulation-school" and their emphasis on "fordism" as
of oligarchic parliamentarianism into populism. This kind of mod
ernisation also produced large scale centralised clientelism often
� �ondi�on for modern democracy.122 Arrighi has also suggested that
It IS mainly when workers have to unite in order to defend their bar
within the framework of modem bureaucracies. Next, he stresses
gaining power on the labour market that they fight, defensively, for
that the late industrialisation had a "restrictive and · uneven
democracy and not when thefy more individual powers at the
character.120 Thus, wage labour could not form huge, homogeneous,
· workplaces increase because only_ a small number · of. workers are
independent and powerful organisations capable of altering the in ·
enough to stop huge complicated production processes.123
clusive type of democracy that had developed.
However, even if we added a whole arsenal of similar theses and
Mouzelis' line of thought is exciting. He hints at a fonn of
if we sta�ted extensive comparative projects, I would argue that we
democracy related to societies where there is an influential political,
would still not be able to reach a general conclusion. All we could
administrative, and intellectual elite as well as commercial (mainly
say is that what happened once in Western Europe, is not being
trading) classes, but where industrialisation,. and agrarian capitalism,
repeated at present in, for example, India and Indonesia. This is, of
have emerged orily recently. The problem is that he dwells on nega
course, due. to the fact that the theses we select for comparison are
tions. For example: Historical circumstances that (probably) condi . the
produced withm framework of theories about the emergence and
tioned "integrative democracy" in certain Western European
development of capitalism in Western Europe. Frllitful non
countries. are not present since large scale industrial capitalism did
enthnocentric comparisons would require that we work out and re
not take place early enough. Thus, we have a negative distinction and
late our theses to similar theories about the present emergence and
a description of what happens but not a positive analysis of how and
development of capitalism at a different period of time and in a
why. . The question remains: what is the qualitatively,. different
quite different setting. Unless we do so, we will not be able to learn
material basis of "inclusive" democracy? Why is it that the elites
from historical experiences eISewhere.
. uphold clientelism-'besides the fact that they are not politicians, ad
For �xample, in the observation that · neither market bargaining
ministrators, et al., in an idealised Western European country? And
power nor workplace bargaining power alone can account for how
if wage labourers do not enforce Western European forms . of
worke�s act politically, we eed t know more about toda)r's types of
democracy, what do, and can, they do? And why? _ � . � �
cap1t hsm to fmd out what Is crucial.· If we can identify clientelism as
a m am feature within politics and maintain that this is because there
Enf�rced democracy
is no full-fledged capitalism, then what is the material basis of clien
telism under· the present type of capitalism? Or). if the working class
It might be possible to advance into more positive distinctions and
is 1!-ot big and united enough to enforce democracy, because
theories by making deeper · analyses of the emergence of forms of . .
cap1tahsm IS late and "incomplete", then what contradictions and
equal rule in Westem Europe. Goran Therborn belongs to a school
of thought which argues that the decisive importance for democracy �lasses and groups are cruc�al to understanding the nature of power
of the bourgeoisie is a myth. It was mainly interested in states
m contemporary circumstances?
With Barrington Moore's approach we could show that different 1. Most pri�ate capitalists dep�nd upon extra-economic protection
more or less anti-feudal revolutions produced various forms of rule. and support m order to reproduce their positions. Political rent and
We were able to generalise about preconditions for bourgeois finance capitalists base their strength on political monopolies�
democracy only and got very little help to develop more comprehen
sive studies of the political level. . Thus, on t�e ?ne hand, the extent of what people in principle hold
_
and nee � for governing a� for compromises and mediation among the dominating classes, fac
ful than in Indonesia. Hence, the scope
s and their serv�ts . hold m tions and patrons. This in turn may, if necessary for the reproduction
co; ding to rules of what the -capitalist r and
common, plus relatively indepe� dent polit �cs generally, 1s wide of the dominating groups, give rise not only to lim,ited forms of equal
nes1�. . rule among the powerful groups but also to demands for more effi
more pronounced in India than m Indo .
rent s has decis ive importance. This has at cient and universal administration of what they hold in common.
2 Exploitation through
s for different t�pes of rule. The less absolute power of the dominating groups in India than
l�ast two basic effects upon the condition
for personalised dep ��d
To begin with there is a material basis in Indonesia seems to give room for limited forms of equal rule of
as a mea?s .of mob1hsmg what the capitalists hold in common. On the other hand, I shall not
ency relations. These encourage clientelism
al1 levels. Th1s m turn leaves
popular support, etc., among citizens on _
be surprised if the more absolute powers of political rent and fmance
popular mfluence and par
some room for very limited forms of capitalists in Indonesia will in the future, give rise to more forceful
,
n through rents, the· control demands for a more universal, technocratic and especially more ef
ticipation as long as the very exploitatio
d and as long as the patrons ficient administration (of their . common business) than in India.
of common resources, is not threatene _
s s rent1ers. . 4. Complex class structures, and socio-political mobilisation and or
can continue to reproduce their position �
by defim. tion, based on
Moreover, exploitation through rents 1s, ganisation along verticar rather than horizontal lines also condition
control of ��at
centralise d relations of power (because of the the ways in which the rulers are able to domesticate oppressed and
. Thus there are also decISIVe exploited people on various levels. There is a need for other forms of
peop1e. m principle' hold in common). . .
of political n:obI.Iisat10n .t o b. e
preconaitions for centralised forms conflict regulation between rulers and ruled than most of the
.
forcing certain democratic concessions from a bourgeoisie within the This, however, is not to SlJ.bscribe to the ideas of radical
framework of a stable and flexible capitalism. However, the democracy put forward by Laclau and others in the context of post
dynamics of rent capitalism also produces other conflicts and pos industrial societies. They argue that interests of class are no longer
sible options. decisive for democratic demands.124 On the contrary, I would main
Consider, for example, that the very basis for exploitation tain that general interests of democracy in countries such as In
through rents is monopoly of what people, in principle, hold in com donesia and India may be rooted in the very process of exploitation
mon. Thus, even if the actual producers are very fragmented and through rents.
have very different immediate .interests as well as survival strategies
for their reproduction within the existing structures and systems,
many of them have to do away with undemocratic forms of rule in References
order to radically improve thell.' situations. Moreover, they have this 97. Drawing on Rudebeck (1985) I will distinguish ·between people's rule, a form
in common with a majority of the wage labourers and also with most of government, and -people's power, its socio-economic basis.
peasants, petty businessmen and others in subordinated client posi 98. A very general definition of democracy could be that people equally rule what
they hold in common.
tions. 99. . . . and do not profess completeness.
Tlie crucial problems is, of course, that quite a few of them may 100. Hermansson (1985), pp. 5-7, drawing on Hadenius (1983).
be able to reproduce their positions, and even to some extent their 101 Hermansson (1985), p. 6f.
102 Dimon & Lipset et al. (1986), for example.
levels of life, within the framework of the present relations of power 103. Cf. Hermansson (1985), p. 13, who refer to such perspectives.
without a struggle for democracy. Their immediate common inter 104. Unfortunately, however, many studies are limited to- the examination of
programmes, statements, values etc. and abstain from systematic analyses of
ests within the fragmented and different processes of production and to what extent strategies and tactics are also based on democratic methods
trade may be more decisive for short term action whereas many and goals.
wage labourers in Western Europe had to demand democracy in or 105. Cf. Egero (1987) and Rudebeck (1985a)
106. Cf. Tornquist (1987).
der to defend their very immediate interests of protecting their 107. Amartaya Sen (1986), p. 39.
market bargaining power. However, as soon as the general exploita 108. Moore (1984).
tion through rent becomes decisive and necessary to fight for .the 109. E.g. Lipset (1969). .
110. Moore did not use "feudalism" uncritically; I will return to this.
protection and direct imp,rovement of people's standard of living-as 111. See Held (1987) for a fin� history of democratic ideas, which, unfortunately,
recently in Kerala-the interest 4i promoting democracy becomes . _
does not mclude a discussion of historical material preconditions for various
general, dynamic and- may even become revolutionary to an extent types of actual democracy.
never experienced in Western Europe. The very basis of many 112. Also, the rol� of the �orking cla�s in Russi� and China is almost neglected by
Moore, who ts more mterested m the "anti-feudal" roots of revolutions and'
economically as well as politically important rulers is un�emocratic
·
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Index 143
What's Wrong with Marxism?
142
Party of In
E.M.S. Namboodiripad; General Secretary Communist
dia (Marxist), New Delhi, 1985.03. 14.
Goyal, S.K.; Then professor I.I.P.A., New Delhi. 1985.03
.14. INDEX
of the central secretar iat and
Gupta, Indrajit; Leading member
of the CPI, New Delhi, 1985.03. 21.
central executive committee
historian , Aligarh Muslim Univers ity, and
Habib, Irfan; Professor,
al within the CPI-M, Aligarh 1985.03.1 0. Absolutism, 84-85 Caste system, 117
leading intellectu
Calcutta Agrarian reforms, 22-28 CIA, 30, 38, 58-59
Kumar B ose, D eb ; Professo r, politica l econom ist,
Agricultural policy, 43-44 Chattopadhyay, Boudhayan, 74
1985.03.04. Aidit faction, 14-15 China, 18-19, 22, 50
Achutha; Ex. . chief minister Kerala (CPI), Calicut,
Menon, Alavi, Hamza, 85-86 national bourgeoisie and, 4-5
1985.02.10. Anderson, Jan Otto, 87 Chinese trade, 42
Mishra, R.K.; Editor "PatrioC, New Delhi 1985.03.2 1. Anderson, Peny� 84 Chou En-lai, 18
tor
Mukherj ee, Saroj; Principal state secretary CPI-M and co-ordina
Andhra Pradesh, 53 fivil servants, 93
Anti-feudal struggles, 22-28 Class stratification
of the Left Front, Calcutta, +985.02.20.
s Authoritarianism, 52-54, 67 basis of, 93-94
t leading
·P atnaik, Prabha:t; Professor, poli ical economi t, · JNU, and Autonomy, 83-88 Clientelism, 89, 101
intellectual within the CPI-M, New Delhi, 1985.03.2 1. relative, 95 Cold war, 13
India
Rana, Santosh; General Secretary Communist Party of Communist Party of india, 11, 16-17,
(Marxist -Leninist )-Provis ional Central Committ ee, Cal cutta Bandung Conference, 1955, 18 37-40, 44-45, 47, 51-52, 61, 108, 121
Bank nationalisation, 4'.:> Communist Party of India (N), 11, 14,
1985.0 3.03.
at an d Baran, Paul, 74 37-38, 44-45, 47, 52-55, 60, 63-64,
Reddy, Rajasekhara; Leading member of the central secretari
4. Bardhan, Pranab, 92-93 108
central executive committ ee of the CPI, New Delhi, 1985.03.1
Beckman, Bjorn, 1 16, 121 Communists
editor "The Marxist Review", scholar and leading left
Roy, Ajit; then Bipan Chm1dra, 24 freedom sttuggles and, 13-14
wing intellectu al, Calcutta, 1985.01.1 5 and 1985.02.2 3.
Bombay Plan of 19401 18 Corruption, 89-90
Calcutta,
Roy, Monoranjan; General secretary CITU, West Bengal, Bonapartism, 84-86
Emergency democracy, 29-32 Kerala, 17,/ 20, 25, 31, 40, 46, 52, 63-64, Political rents, 102-03
declaration of economic development, 18-20 108, 113 Progressive Bourgeoisie
CPI's support to, 40-41, 44-45 _ non-capital development Kulaks, 62, 85 nation state and,-10-12
Europe struggles for, 55, 60-67 Kuomintang, 4-5
capitalism in, 76-78 parliamentary democracy in
Railway strike, 44
capitalists and, 109-10 Dmd reform measures, 22-26 Ranadive, 14-15
Feudalism, 72, 84 reasons for development of, Latin American state;90-91 Regulative rentiers, 98
abolition 'of, 22-28 114-15 Leninism, 3-4, 75 Rent capitalism, 94-105, 121-23
Foreigo capital, 81 private capitalists in, 121-22 Liberal Democracy, 54-55 democracy under, 119-20
Frank, A.G., 76 progressive bourgeoisie and, 10 Liberalisation, 3 Reproduction, 76-78
Freedom movements Indian National Congress, 13, 16-17, 29 Liberation movements Robison, Dick, 91-92
national bourgeois and, 13-14 land reform measures and, 23-26 democracy and, 112-13 Roy, Ajit, 24
Indonesia Rupee devaluation, 37t
Gandhi, Indira, Mrs., 31, 37, 39-40, anti-feudal struggle in, 22-25, 27-28 Madiun revolt, 14 Russian revolution, 3
43-45, 52-55, 60-64, 113 bureaucrats and, 49-51 Malaysia, 54, 56
Gandhi, M.K., i3, 18 capitalism in Mamdani, Malimood, 91 Sau, Ranjit, 93-94, 97-98
Gandhi, Rajiv, 55, 66, 103 growth of, 83-105 Maoism, 5-6 Saul, John, 93
Germany, 85 communists in Marhaenism, 1S Sen, Amartya, 113
Green revolution, 44 frustration of, 35-36 Markets Sen, Anupam, 73-74
Guided democracy, 42-43 developments in capitalism and, 76-77 Sino-Soviet Conflict, 49
Guinea-Bissau, 112 unfavourable outcomes, �1-42 Marttnussen, John, 114-16, 120 Skocpol, Theda, 86-87
domestic capitalists and, 20-2 � M_cVey, Ruth, 90 Socialism, 75
Hatta, Mohammed, 13 Dutch companies in Menon, Achutha, 40 South Korea, 105
Hint�e, Otto, 87 nationalisation of, 38 Mohanty, Manoranjan, 96 Soviet Union, 50
economic crisis in, 56 Monopolisation, 83 Stali!lism, 4-5
Imperialism, 3-4, 50, 72, 74-75 freedom movement in Moore, Barrington, 113-14, 120 State power
India national bourgeois and, 13 Mouselis, Nicos, 1 17-18, 123 basis of, 86-88
agrarian policy of, 43-44 guided democracy in 42-43 Mozambique, 112 types of, 83-90
anti-feudal struggle in, 23-26, 28 national bomgeoisie in Musso, 14 States' role
authoritarianism in, 54, 62-64, 67 conditional cooperation with, Myrdal, Gunnar, 76, 89 capitalist development and, 80-105
bureaucrat-capitalist in 14-15
Suharto, General, 58, 60
struggle against, 53-55, 60, democracy, 29-32 Nasution, Genera!, 57-58 Sukarno, President, 13, 15, 17-18, 21, 23,
63-64 economic development, 17-18 National bourgeoisie, 4-5, 20-21, 81 25, 27, 30-31, 35-36, 38-39, 50, 53-54,
capitalism in nationalisation of companies in, anti-feudal struggles of, 22-28 56, 58
growth of, 83-105 38-39 conditional cooperation of, 14-17
communists in parliamentary democracy in evaluation, 17-32 Tata family empire, 21
progressive leadership and, capitalists and, 108-lO democratic interest of, 114-16 Telangana uprising, 14, 16
36-38 progressive bourgeoisie and, 10 democracy, 29-32 Therborn, Goran, 118, 124
developments in, 39-41 US policy of, 54 economic development and, 17-20 Thomer, Daniel, 23
unfavourable outcomes, 43-46 Indian Communist Party (PKI), 10-12, Nehru, Jawaharlal, 13, 16, 18, 21 Tkhe!man, Fritjob, 74
domestic capitalists and, 21-22, 14-15, 20, 23, 25, 27, 31, 35-36, 39, Neo-patrimonial states, 88-90
72-73 41-43, 46, 49-51. 53, 56-59, 66 Non-alignment, 18 Uganda, 91
foreign policy of, 40 Indonesia Nationalist Party (PNI), 15,
United States of America, 54
freedom movement in 17, 23, 35, 42 Offe, Claus, 87
national bourgeois and, 13-14 Oligarchal Corporatism, 90 Warren, Bill, 74
liberalisations in, 75 West Bengal, 20, 52-53, 63-64
national bourgeoisie in Jackson, Karl D., 90 Parasitism, 74
conditional cooperation with, Janata government, 63 Peasants struggles, 14, 16 Yani, General, 58
15·-17 Junkers, 85