The Viet Cong

Their Story

Ernest Chamberlain
Battalion
D445

The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story Ernest Chamberlain

 The Viet Cong

D445 Battalion

their story

Ernest Chamberlain – 2011

Published in Australia in 2011 by Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale VIC 3225.

Copyright  Ernest Chamberlain 2011 email - chamber@pipeline.com.au

This monograph is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private
study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be
reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying or otherwise, without the prior written
permission of the author. Inquiries should be made to the publisher.

The author has also published:

The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor; Editions - 2003, 2004 and 2008
(ISBN 9780980562309).
Perjuangan di Iliomar: Perlawanan di Pedesaan di Timor-Leste, 2004 (ISBN 0-9750350-
1-0).
Faltering Steps – Independence Movements in East Timor in the 1950s and 1960s; 2005
(ISBN 0 97500350 2 9).
Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor – 1940s to the early 1970s;
Editions – 2007, 2008 and 2010 (ISBN 9780980562330).
Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor; Editions - 2007 and 2009
(ISBN 9780980562316).
Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, 2010
(ISBN 978-0-9805623-2-3)

National Library of Australia : Cataloguing-in-Publication Entry

Chamberlain, Ernest, 1944 –

The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: their story.

Bibliography; Index.

ISBN 978-0-9805623-4-7

Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 – History.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 – Participation , Australian.

Dewey number: 959.7043394

Every effort has been made by the publisher/author to contact holders of copyright to
obtain permission to reproduce copyright material. However, if any permissions have
been inadvertently overlooked, apologies are offered, and should the rightful party
contact the publisher, all due credit and necessary and reasonable arrangements will be
made at the earliest opportunity.
 PREFACE

To date, the Australian War Memorial has published two volumes of an official
history on Australia’s military involvement in the Vietnam War.1 Each of the nine
Australian Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) infantry battalions that served in Vietnam
has produced histories of their tour – or tours, of duty. This modest work on a battalion on
“the other side” will hopefully complement those publications and the official histories.
This 145,000-word work presents a translation and examination of The Heroic
445 Battalion : its History and Tradition (Tiểu Đoàn 445 Anh Hùng : Lịch Sử/Truyền
Thống) – ie the “445 Battalion History” published in 1991. As near as possible to a literal
translation of the Vietnamese text has been attempted - without any omissions. As a
result, the English prose may appear somewhat stilted in parts.2 Nevertheless, it is hoped
that this work will bring an understanding of D445’s story to a wider readership.
As comments on the text - and to add context, a considerable number of
“Translator’s Notes” have been added as footnotes to the translation. The original
footnotes (14) in the Vietnamese text have been retained and are indicated with an
asterisk eg “6 *”.The “Translator’s Notes” include detailed references to enable interested
readers to readily access primary source material – much of it now available via the
Internet. Many of these comments relate to other Vietnamese histories that have
somewhat different accounts of events - including engagements with the Australian forces
eg: the “Đồng Nai History – 1986”, the “Đồng Nai Monograph – 2001”, the “Military
Region 7 History – 2006”, the “History of the 5th Infantry Division – 2005”3, the “Long
Đất District History – 1986”, “The Minh Đạm Base” – 2006, the “History of the Hòa
Long Village Party Chapter – 2009”, and a major Vietnamese work on the War: “The
History of the Anti-American Resistance War of National Salvation – 1997/1999”.
As Part II of this work, a series of annexes have been offered that cover a range of
aspects of probable interest. These annexes include translated extracts from the 5th
Infantry Division History - 2005, the organisation of 445 Battalion in mid-1966,
casualties at the Battle of Long Tân, outline biographies of key 445 Battalion cadre, and
information on the Battalion’s Party organisation and activities – that also includes age
and social data on the Battalion’s personnel. The work includes a comprehensive index.
Many of the comments on the 445 Battalion History are based on an examination
of captured North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Việt Cộng (VC) documents and the
debriefs of prisoners and ralliers (ie defectors). During the Vietnam War, this material
was collated centrally by the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CIC-V) in Sài Gòn
1
McNeill, I., To Long Tân – The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, Allen & Unwin in
association with the Australian War Memorial, St Leonards, 1993; McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the
Offensive, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, Crows Nest, 2003. The third
volume – Fighting to the finish, is planned for publication in April 2012.
2
The Vietnamese text uses “…” as an equivalent for the English “etc” and also for pauses – and this
original “…” expression has been retained in the translation of the 445 Battalion History – ie Part I.
3
A Vietnamese language copy was provided by Colonel (Retd) Bruce Davies. Unlike the 445 Battalion
History – 1991, the 5th Division History – 2005 relates that the Việt Cộng forces at the Battle of Long Tân
were not fully prepared for the engagement against the Australian forces on 18 August 1966, see Annex I.
– with the captured documents processed by its Combined Document Exploitation Center
(CDEC).4 A very large quantity of CIC-V material is held by The Vietnam Center and
Archive (VCAT) at the Texas Tech University, Lubbock – Texas, United States. Without
access to the records held by the VCAT, it would have been very difficult to comment
meaningfully on the text of the 445 Battalion History. Accordingly. access to the records
held by Texas Tech University is gratefully acknowledged and noted in this work as
“VCAT” material.
Among other issues, the text of the 445 Battalion History and access to
VCAT/CDEC material has enabled the resolution of several minor queries on the Battle
of Long Tân fought on 18 August 1966 in Phước Tuy Province. The two volumes of the
official Australian history on the Vietnam War5 have cited Nguyễn Văn Kiềm (Năm
Kiềm)6 as the commander of D445 Battalion at the Battle – based on interviews by a
senior Australian military historian7 with Kiềm in Vietnam in June 1988. However, Kiềm
was not present at the Battle.8 Subsequently, this error has been repeated in several other
published works and on Internet websites. Kiềm also met and guided visiting Australian
dignitaries, and participated in other interviews in which he described the fighting at Long
Tân.9 Another interesting aspect is that while the combat effectiveness of NVA/VC forces
was seriously hampered by high malarial rates, malaria is not mentioned at all in the 445
Battalion history. At Annex J, this aspect is examined in relation to 275 Regiment – the
major Việt Cộng element at the Battle of Long Tân on 18 August 1966.
445 Battalion still exists. In late February 2011, a meeting of officials and the
Liaison Committee for a proposed D445 Memorial determined that a stela and memorial
would be completed by December 2011.
A more comprehensive edition of this work is planned following a further
research visit to Vietnam and the examination of additional captured and recovered
documents of the 1969-1975 period.

Ernie Chamberlain
July 2011
4
At the Australian Task Force base in Núi Đất, captured documents were processed by the Detachment of
the 1st Divisional Intelligence Unit before on-forwarding to CDEC in Sài Gòn.
5
McNeill, I., To Long Tan , op.cit., 1993; McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the Offensive, op.cit., 2003.
6
Biographies of key 445 Battalion cadre are included at Annex B. Almost all NVA/VC cadre, soldiers and
infrastructure personnel had two-word nicknames/aliases/pseudonyms (tự, bí danh). Invariably, these
comprised a number (from 2 to 10) – or occasionally “Út” (meaning “youngest”), followed by their given
name. Party members sometimes also had a secure cover-name – ie an additional “full” Vietnamese name
of three words.
7
The transcripts of interviews conducted in the mid-1980s are held in the Official Historians’ Collection in
the Australian War Memorial (AWM), and several are not yet accessible as they are still within the “closed
period” of 30 years – advice to the author by the AWM Research Centre, RCIS26101, 9 April 2010.
8
At the time of the Battle of Long Tân, Nguyễn Văn Kiềm was the commander of the Châu Đức District
Unit, and he did not join 445 Battalion until late 1967/early 1968 - see: Chamberlain, E. P., Research Note
23, “Vietnam War: Commander of D445 Battalion at Long Tan – Not “Nguyen Van Kiem” but “Bui Quang
Chanh”, 23 September 2010 (to the Australian War Memorial and the Australian Army History Unit).
9
Including, for example, the television documentary and DVD: “Long Tan – The True Story: - Horsefield,
B. (Director/Producer), Australian Broadcasting Commission/Film Australia, Lindfield, 1993.
 CONTENTS

Part I

The Heroic 445 Battalion : its History and Tradition – an English

translation of Tiểu Đoàn 445 Anh Hùng : Lịch Sử/Truyền Thống, with
translator’s notes.

Chapter I- Concealed Among the Forces of the Sects.

Chapter II – Coming of Age during the Concerted Uprising
Movement and Attacking the “Strategic Hamlets”.
Chapter III – “We Will Fight and Defeat any Enemy”.
Chapter IV – The Attack on the Enemy during the Mậu Thân
Spring Phase in Bà Rịa.
Chapter V – Destroying the Australian Military’s Bunker and
Barrier-Shield Strategy; Holding Ground
Staunchly; Sticking to the People and Standing
Firm in the Main Areas.
Chapter VI – Towards the Day of Total Victory.
Chapter VII – A Confident and Deserved Victory.

Part II

Annex A – Senior Cadre: D445 Battalion.

Annex B – Key Cadre: D445 Battalion – Outline Biographies.
Annex C – D445 Battalion: Strength Figures.
Annex D – Probable Organisation of D445 Battalion - Mid-1966.
Annex E – The Battle of Long Tân: Casualties.
Annex F – The Party in D445 Battalion.
Annex G – D445 Command and Political Reports – mid-1966.
Annex H – Higher Headquarters.
Annex I – The History of the 5th Infantry Division (1965 – 2005):
Extracts.
Annex J – 275 Main Force Regiment.
Annex K – D440 Local Force Battalion.
Annex L – Long Đất District History – 1986: Extracts.
Annex M – The Minh Đạm Base – 2006: Extracts.
Annex N – The History of the Hòa Long Village Party Chapter – 2009:
Extracts.

Bibliography

Index
 This Giấy Khen – “Letter of Appreciation” was awarded to Trịnh Văn Liêm
– a section commander in the 2nd Company of D445 Battalion. Liêm was born in “Long
Phước village, Châu Đức [sic] District, Bà Rịa Province.” The Letter recognises his
bravery and other achievements in the battle at Phước Hải. Dated 10 January 1967, the
Letter is signed by the D445 Battalion Political Officer, Đổ Văn Liên (CDEC Log 05-
1407-67). Subsequently, while serving as the Political Officer of the 2nd Company, Trịnh
Văn Liêm was killed in an Australian ambush at Cà Thi (Xuyên Mộc) on 31 December
1970 (see footnote 262.)
 1

PART I
The Heroic 445 Battalion : its History and Tradition
Tiểu Đoàn 445 Anh Hùng : Lịch Sử/Truyền Thống

Nguyễn Thanh Tùng (ed), published by the Military Headquarters of Đồng Nai Province,
Đồng Nai, 1991
(Bộ Chỉ Huy Quân Sự Tỉnh Đồng Nai, Đồng Nai, 1991)

Compilation Guidance: Đồng Nai Province Military Headquarters

Major General Nguyễn Thanh Tùng – Commander

Colonel Đỗ Tiến Đậm – Deputy Commander responsible for Historical Science
Colonel Nguyễn Công Hạnh – former Deputy Commander responsible for
Historical Science

Implementation

Historical Science Section

Staff Department

Compilation

Phạm Thanh Quang1

Participation in Document Production

Lê Rẫn
Đàm Đức Thung

1
Phạm Thanh Quang is cited by the Đồng Nai Library (Biên Hòa) as the principal author.
2

Introduction

Shaped and developed at the peak of our uprising and bearing arms against the
enemy in order to liberate the Fatherland, 445 Battalion was a core armed force from its
inception – a fist and a driving force in Biên Hòa-Bà Rịa.2
Throughout the war, 445 Battalion fought on this extremely dangerous and critical
battlefield under constant enemy attack. Under the leadership of the Party and shielded and
protected by the mountains and rivers of the Fatherland, in all situations the cadre and
soldiers of 445 Battalion firmly grasped their weapons to confront the invading American
troops, the Australian vassals and the puppets – and defeating their many plots and tricks,
we inflicted heavy casualties and panic upon them.
Throughout the stages of the fighting that were full of hardship and sacrifice, 445
Battalion achieved many great feats-of-arms and combat exploits. These are memories that
cannot fade in the minds of the cadre and soldiers - nor be forgotten by the cadre, Party
members, and the people in the two provinces of Biên Hòa and Bà Rịa. The Battalion
displayed intelligence and resolve, a will to struggle, and confidence and belief in the Party
– and has been worthy of the noble accolade: Hero Unit of the People’s Armed Forces.
To introduce our readers to the Heroic 445 Battalion, the Đồng Nai Publishing
House has produced this work. While it is possibly inadequate - and has its shortcomings,
we hope that it satisfies in some part the long wait by the cadre, the soldiers and our fellow-
countrymen who have been associated with 445 Battalion - as well as the wider readership.

Đồng Nai Publishing House

2
Translator’s (E. Chamberlain) Note: Bà Rịa Province – the Sài Gòn Government’s Phước Tuy Province, was
445 Battalion’s principal area of operations. Occasionally, the Battalion also operated in Long Khánh
Province and Bình Tuy Province – respectively to the immediate north and northeast of Phước Tuy/Bà Rịa
Province. Phước Tuy Province was about 55 kilometres from east-to-west and about 35 kilometres from
north-to-south (an area of about 1,958 sq km – about 83% of the size of the Australian Captial Territory). The
Province capital - Phước Lễ/Bà Rịa Town, was about 110 kilometres by road southeast of Sài Gòn via Route
15 (nowadays Route 51). In 1967, the population of the Province was about 103,000 - including Bà Rịa
Town’s population of about 15,600; and was 112,683 in January 1970. An historical summary of Phước Tuy
Province from the late 18th century can be found in O’Brien, M., Conscripts and Regulars – with the Seventh
Battalion in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1995, pp.14-22. A detailed political history of the Phước
Tuy-Vũng Tàu region from 1930 can be found in Liên đoàn Lao động tỉnh Bà Rịa Vũng Tàu, Lịch sử Phong
Trào Công Nhân, Viên Chức, Lao Động va Hoạt Động Công Đoàn Bà Rịa Vũng Tàu Giai Đoạn 1930-2006 –
The History of the Workers’, Public Servants’ and Labourers’ Movement and Trade Union Activities in the
Period 1930-2006, Vũng Tàu, 2011.
 3

CONTENTS
Pages

Chapter I - Concealed Among the Forces of the Sects. 1-5

Chapter II – Coming of Age during the Concerted Uprising 5-23

Movement and Attacking the “Strategic Hamlets”.

Chapter III – “We Will Fight and Defeat any Enemy”. 23-54

Chapter IV – The Attack on the Enemy during the Mậu Thân 54-63
Spring Phase in Bà Rịa.

Chapter V – Destroying the Australian Military’s Bunker and 63- 85

Barrier-Shield Strategy; Holding Ground
Staunchly; Sticking to the People and Standing
Firm in the Main Areas.

Chapter VI – Towards the Day of Total Victory. 85-96

Chapter VII – A Confident and Deserved Victory. 96-99

4

Attack !

(A Việt Cộng soldier armed with a MAT-49 submachine gun)

 1

CHAPTER I

CONCEALED AMONG THE FORCES OF THE SECTS

On 20 July 1954, the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam was signed. The long and
heroic resistance war by our people against the French colonialists had been completely
victorious.3 Our country was temporarily divided into two regions: North and South, with
the calm Bến Hải River on the 17th parallel as the border. The North had been completely
liberated. The South was temporarily controlled by our adversaries.
Almost all the revolutionary cadre and soldiers in the South had to regroup to the
North (in accordance with the Agreement). Our happiness at our coming together was still
fresh when this sadness of division broke upon us. However, our countrymen and soldiers
in the South believed that - in a not too distant time, the North and the South would be one.
In July 1954, the American imperialists installed Ngô Đình Diệm as the Prime
Minister of the puppet government, and immediately leapt to annex the South and elbow
aside the French-appointed officials from the puppet regime.
In November 1954, the American imperialists appointed General Collins4 to Sài
Gòn as an Ambassador with the aim of fulfilling the six-point plan of the Eisenhower
Government.
In defiance of the international agreement, the Americans and Diệm shamelessly
sabotaged the Geneva Agreement. They savagely suppressed the revolutionary people. It
was a time of arrests, imprisonment and deportation. Blood flowed and heads fell – all of
the South was faced with the Machiavellian schemes and cruelty of the new enemy.
Apart from purging the revolutionary organisations, the Americans and Diệm
launched many campaigns to attack the forces of the pro-French religious sects: the Cao
Đài, Hòa Hảo and the Bình Xuyên. At the end of 1955, over 4,000 Bình Xuyên troops in
the Rừng Sác5 (Long Thành) were attacked and dispersed by Diệm’s forces.
In the face of the enemy’s schemes and tricks, the revolutionary cadre remaining in
Biên Hòa and Bà Rịa had to revise their strategy and activities. The Bà Rịa Province
Committee – whose cover-name at that time was “Miss Hai”, advocated a daring policy to
win over the few disintegrating Bình Xuyên units in order to take their weapons and
organise long-term armed revolutionary resistance forces.

3
Translator Note: For a brief history of Việt Minh activity post-World War II to 1954 in Phước Tuy Province
- see Lưu Dương, “Những chặng đường phát triển của lực lượng vũ trang Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu” - “The Stages of
Development of the Armed Forces Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu”, Cơ Quan của Đảng Bộ Đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam
Tỉnh Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu, Vũng Tàu, 17 December 2009; and Lịch sử Đảng bộ xã Hòa Long (1930-2005) - The
History of the Hòa Long Village Party Chapter (1930-2005), 25 April 2009 (see Annex N).
4
Translator’s Note: General J. Lawton Collins was appointed as the United States (US) President’s “Special
Envoy” to Sài Gòn with the diplomatic rank of “Ambassador”. He arrived in Sài Gòn on 8 November and
replaced the US Ambassador in the Republic of Vietnam Donald R. Heath (June 1952 – November 1954).
5
Translator’s Note: For the early history of the Bình Xuyên – ie to late 1955, see Chapter 19 in Department
of Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, Pamphlet 550-105, Washington, 1966. The Rừng
Sác/Rừng Sát lies about 32 kilometres south-southeast of Sài Gòn and comprises about 1,250 square
kilometres of tidal swamp. Its population in 1968 was about 18,000. The Lòng Tàu River runs through the
Rừng Sác and connects Vũng Tàu/South China Sea and Sài Gòn. For a very detailed US report (circa mid-
1968) on the Rừng Sác and the Việt Cộng Đoàn 10 Group (997-strong, including 211 guerrillas) see Rung Sat
Special Zone Intelligence Study – VCAT Item No. 4000105007. For a comprehensive history of the conflict
in the Rừng Sác to 1975 – in Vietnamese, see Hồ Sĩ Thành, Đặc Khu Rừng Sác, Nhà Xuất Bản Trẻ, 2003.
See also the following footnote 127. 1 ATF conducted its “first combat assault” and a “search and destroy”
operation (Operation Hayman) into Long Sơn island – adjacent to the Rừng Sác, in the period 8-12 November
1966 – 1 ATF Opord 1-14-66, 4 November 1966, AWM95, 1/4/16.
2

In Nhơn Trạch – in the Long Thành area, there was still a Bình Xuyên company led
by Nguyễn Văn Phú as company commander. The company had been dispersed by Diệm’s
forces, but there were still about 17-18 personnel. Phú was frightened and was preparing to
surrender to the Diệm regime. Following a directive from above, comrades Ba Hóng and
Ba Đắc – the two Party members assigned from Nhơn Trạch District, won over Company
Commander Phú. The problem was how to incorporate our people and develop this force –
and whom to choose ? On receipt of the higher directive, Nguyễn Văn Bảy – the Party
member from Phước Khánh village, lost sleep worrying to find an optimum solution. He
personally made a number of decisions to resolve this important responsibility.
The 15th of December 1955 was a very bright moon-lit night – with the Milky Way
like an immense and brilliant road traversing the heavens. From the wharf at Lô Đất – Nhà
Bè, a small boat appeared cleaving the water silently and carrying Nguyễn Văn Bảy
accompanied by a young woman. The boat also carried a small group of strong young men
including Năm Ninh – Bảy’s son, and Nguyễn Tấn Thành, his grandson. There were silent
and regretful farewells – no one spoke a sentence, but the perplexed mood had a spark of
hope. The boat continued to quietly and secretly cross the Lòng Tàu River skimming past
the enemy posts on the river’s banks. At 2am, the boat reached Rạch Bàng, the Chà Là
River and – close to dawn, arrived at Sở Dừa (Phước Khánh) and delivered the group of
youths to Ba Hóng and Ba Đắc (who were waiting at the agreed location). Bảy grasped
Năm Ninh’s hand and, shaking it strongly, said:
“Now you are not only my son, but you are a revolutionary soldier ! Strive to listen
- Năm ! Strive to listen, all of you ! ”
“Please rest assured, father !” Năm Ninh replied briefly, then he and his
companions alighted and watched the boat with Bảy and the girl move away from the bank
unnoticed !
On 16 December 1955, the first three revolutionary soldiers were incorporated into
the Bình Xuyên force. Seven days later, Ba Hóng and Ba Đắc guided Bảy Cơ, Minh, Sáu
Sang, Hai Rổ, Hường, Tửu, Hai Xuân, Tư Ù, Mười Tùng … to Phú’s Company. In this
way, in the period of only one month, 15 revolutionary youth were incorporated into the
Bình Xuyên force. Following this, Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh (Ba Thanh) - the first
Communist Party member, was placed in Phú’s Company in the position of its second-in-
command. Nguyễn Văn Phú and a number of his Bình Xuyên men had not yet been won
over completely to the Revolution. However, faced with the threat of disintegration, they
were forced to cooperate in order to fight Diệm. Our people comprised half the strength of
the Bình Xuyên Company. After convincing Phú, Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh quickly
arranged for the force to take additional weapons from Phú’s storehouse in the Rừng Sác.
The weapons had been placed in three drums that had been heavily smeared with grease
and placed on a small watch-tower.
The weapons were sufficient to equip over 30 personnel - and included three
medium machineguns (American) and a 60mm mortar. The armed group was very well
manned and armed, but still without a common aim. All the operations of the group at this
time were termed as being conducted by: the armed forces of the sect. Immediately after
the first phase of strengthening, reorganising and stabilisation, in about February 1956 the
armed forces of the sect prepared an attack on Long Thành to kill Second Lieutenant Hải
and Lâm – the village chief of Phước Thọ, together with another wicked second lieutenant
in the region. These three thugs were widely notorious in the Phước Thọ (Long Thành) area
and were tried and punished – an initiative that elated the local people.
On 4 March 1956, Ngô Đình Diệm organised an election for the puppet National
Assembly. In support of the strong wave of struggle by the people, the armed sect group
was dispersed in several elements to sabotage the election – employing the 60mm mortar to
 3

shell Long Thành Town, firing medium machineguns at the ballot boxes in Phước Lý
village and attacking the post at Phước Khánh etc … . With these operations, the Long
Thành area was the only place in the Province that experienced armed activities in
opposition to Ngô Đình Diệm’s National Assembly elections. The enemy was not able to
conduct elections in many hamlets and villages.
In this series of operations, Nguyễn Văn Phú was killed in action. Comrade Nguyễn
Quốc Thanh then assumed command. With a clear understanding of the unit’s heavy
responsibilities, he quickly consolidated the force and allowed a number of Bình Xuyên -
who were in weak health or who had not yet been won over to the Revolution, to return to
their families. At that exact time, Bảy Môn and Tư Đại – the Bình Xuyên superiors,
appointed Mười Đôi to replace Phú. However, Nguyễn Quốc Thanh remained in command.
Although Mười Đôi revealed his intention to upset matters, he was alone ! Nguyễn Quốc
Thanh cleverly suggested that Mười Đôi command a Bình Xuyên unit in Rừng Dòng (Châu
Pha – Hắc Dịch).
In this way, all of the weapons and equipment for half of a Bình Xuyên company
fell into the hands of the Revolution. From that time, these armed forces took the title:
armed self-defence force.
In October 1956, the armed self-defence force received a directive from the
Provincial Committee to cross Route 15 6*, occupy a base in the Hắc Dịch, and take the
title: armed propaganda unit.
On 2 December 1956, the American-Diệm “Tân Hiệp Prison” was attacked and
broken wide open. Over 500 revolutionary cadre escaped from detention and, like birds,
flew off in all directions to the areas that had continued to operate. In the Hắc Dịch base,
the armed propaganda unit welcomed hundreds of comrades who had escaped from prison.
Following this, Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh received an order from the Provincial
Committee to continue in command of the armed propaganda unit and return to the Rừng
Sác to prepare to guide a group of cadre who had escaped from prison in the Western
Region to cross the Lòng Tàu River to Gò Công and safely return to Military Region 9.
After a campaign of attacks by the sect forces, the Americans and Diệm launched a
campaign titled: “Trương Tấn Bửu”7 - employing main-forces, the Civil Defence Force8
and the police in coordination with the “Denounce the Communists” groups, to attack and
destroy the revolutionary organisations in the Eastern Nam Bộ Region9. Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa
was the main target of their attacks. Hundreds of cadre and countrymen were captured,
exiled, beaten and savagely murdered. The enemy was increasingly revealing his true cruel
nature.
In the face of this situation, the Bà Rịa Provincial Committee continued to send
personnel to join the Bình Xuyên force stationed in the Rừng Dòng in order to build up the
armed force.
In January 1957, Comrade Lê Minh Hà (Tám Hà) – Deputy Secretary of the
Provincial Committee, directly appointed Comrade Vũ Tâm (Sáu Tâm) to meet with the
prison escapees and to escort Comrades: Ba Liên10, Tấn, Vinh, Bổn … who had just
escaped from the Tân Hiệp Prison, to join the Bình Xuyên unit - then at Châu Pha and
6
* Nowadays titled Route 51 (Sài Gòn – Vũng Tàu).
7
Translator’s Note: Trương Tấn Bửu (1752-1827) was a general of the Nguyễn dynasty.
8
Translator’s Note: The “Bảo An” – Civil Defence Force/Civil Guard (also translated as “Provincial Guard”)
were established in 1955. They were a local force who were both armed and uniformed – and were replaced
by the Regional Forces in 1964.
9
Translator’s Note: The Nam Bộ Region constituted that area of Vietnam south of the Central Highlands -
equating to the French colonial “Cochin China” region.
10
Translator’s Note: For a biography of “Ba Liên” - ie Đổ Văn Liên (real name Đỗ Văn Chương/Đồng Văn
Chương), who became the political officer of 445 Battalion, see Annex B – Key Cadre.
4

commanded by Mười Đôi. Since leaving Nguyễn Quốc Thanh’s unit and taking charge of
the Bình Xuyên unit there, Mười Đôi had continued to reveal that he had not been won
over to the Revolution – and only fought for his own personal aims, and liked to eat and
over-indulge … . Although they understood Mười Đôi’s aims and attitude, the Provincial
Committee still directed that Mười Đôi be treated in a respectful manner. The lives of our
cadre and soldiers were still very difficult – and they were forced to eat vegetables and
gruel. Each day however, we continued to provide Mười Đôi with a litre of liquour and two
packs of “Cô Táp” cigarettes … . At the same time, the Provincial Committee continued to
send additional cadre, Party members and youth to Mười Đôi’s unit – including, in this
phase, Comrades: Hai Thuận, Năm Kiên, Năm Nhân (Trung), Dậu, Ân, Yên …, and slowly
our numbers placed in the unit reach 30 comrades. A Party Chapter was established
comprising nine Party members and a Chapter Committee of three comrades - with Vũ
Tâm as the secretary and Ba Liên and Hai Thuận as members of the Chapter Committee. At
this time, we had clearly enunciated the Party’s position and path and the responsibilities of
the unit to a number of the Bình Xuyên personnel in order that they might firm their ideals
and resolve when the time came to oppose the Americans and Diệm and save the nation.
We allowed Mười Đôi and a number of his men who lacked the revolutionary spirit and
were in weak health to return to their families in accord with their wishes. So, in the Bà Rịa
Province area, two armed propaganda units had come into being - and these forces were the
predecessors of 445 Battalion.
To achieve the directive of the Provincial Committee, at the end of 1957, the armed
propaganda unit led by Comrade Vũ Tâm attacked the “Bàu Lâm Forced Resettlement
Camp” – which, in fact, was Diệm’s “Civil Service Training School” in Phước Tuy.11 The
aim of destroying the Bàu Lâm camp was to both break up this disguised military
organisation and to acquire finances and solve some of the difficulties in the basic life of
the Province. The secret elements of the Party Chapter in Bàu Lâm village had closely
studied the enemy situation and provided information to the armed propaganda unit –
including on the enemy’s operational methods. The armed propaganda unit then prepared
an ambush on the enemy. At 3pm, when the director’s jeep had just reached the gate of the
camp, it was struck by a sudden volley of shots. The driver of the vehicle was killed on the
spot. We assaulted and captured the director and seized 500,000 piastres (in Indochina
currency). In the following days, the secret Bàu Lâm Party Chapter mobilized the people to
struggle and to strike from their work. The Bàu Lâm Forced Resettlement Camp in Bà Rịa
– a disguised Diệm military organisation, disintegrated.
At the end of 1957, the Bà Rịa armed propaganda unit killed Cỏn – a wicked thug
who was widely notorious in the Hòa Long region. He was a former member of the Party
Chapter and commander of the Hòa Long village public security element during the anti-
French period but, in an act of betrayal, he had surrendered to the enemy. Also at this time,
the armed propaganda unit was given the task to strike the post at Bưng Riếng – and to
liberate the two villages of Bưng Riếng and Bình Châu. However, although having studied
the battlefield, the unit was ordered to cancel the operation on the Bưng Riếng post – and
implementation of the plan to kill the wicked thug was specifically forbidden.
The directives prohibiting the above combat operations upset a number of the men
in the armed propaganda unit. Many of them asked the leadership: “Why can the enemy

11
Translator’s Note: On 22 October 1956, the Sài Gòn Government (ie the Republic of Vietnam) retitled Bà
Rịa Province as “Phước Tuy” – which included the adjacent Cần Giờ District and Vũng Tàu. However, the
communist side preferred the earlier title of “Bà Rịa Province”. While the Province capital was officially
titled “Phước Lễ”, it was commonly referred to as “Bà Rịa Town” by both sides. Cần Giờ District and Vũng
Tàu were subsequently detached from the Province which thereafter had an area of 1,958 sq km – about 55km
from east to west and 35km from north to south (ie about 83% of the size of the Australian Capital Territory).
 5

attack us, but we’re not allowed to attack them ? Why are we armed with weapons, but
must stand by and watch the enemy kill our countrymen and comrades ?”

CHAPTER II

COMING OF AGE DURING THE CONCERTED UPRISING MOVEMENT AND

ATTACKING THE “STRATEGIC HAMLETS”

With the coming into force of the American-Diệm Law “10/59”, the Americans and
Diệm killed people by guillotine ! Guillotines were taken everywhere. Thousands and tens
of thousands of nation-loving people in the South were decapitated by the guillotine !
Countrymen in the South, countrymen in Biên Hòa and Bà Rịa, could no longer believe in
the “General Consultative Election to Unite the Nation” that had been determined by the
Geneva Agreement. Hundreds of political struggles opposing the Americans and Diệm
arose in Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa – Xuân Lộc – and the rubber-growing regions. However, these
hundreds of political struggles were stamped out with bayonets and gun barrels – and great
grief and death ensued across the land.
In January 1959, the 15th Conference of the Executive Committee of the Party’s
Politburo was convened. The Conference affirmed: “… The fundamental way forward for
the Vietnamese revolution in the South is through an uprising to secure the government in
the hands of the people … It is essential to employ the strength and political force of the
masses – in coordination with the armed elements …”.12*
The Central Committee Conference stressed: With their bellicose nature, the
American imperialists can intervene militarily to recover the situation. In those
circumstances, the uprising will have to adapt to a protracted armed struggle.
Resolution 15 of the Executive Committee of the Party’s Politburo was like a
brilliant beacon showing the way forward for the battlefield in the South.
The two provincial armed propaganda units were concentrated in the Hắc Dịch base
area to deeply study Resolution 15. Comrade Năm Hoa – a Military Region cadre,
disseminated the Resolution. Listening to each section of the Resolution, our men leapt up
with happiness – and then embraced one another in a circle, and their tears overflowed.
They cried with joy at being able to take up their weapons and kill the enemy.
Having studied Resolution 15, the Provincial Committee and the Eastern Region
Military Committee13 decided to merge the two provincial armed propaganda units and
create a concentrated unit for military training, the study of sapper and reconnaissance
tactics, and armed propaganda operations in order to support the political struggle of the
masses.
In February 1960, the 40th Company – the first concentrated mobile unit in Biên
Hòa and Bà Rịa in the Anti-American/National Salvation period, was formed under the
direct leadership of the Province and the Eastern Region Military Committee. The 40th

12
* The Vietnam Military History Institute, The Resistance War Against the Americans to Save the Country,
p.52.
13
Translator’s Note: The Eastern Region - ie “Miền Đông”, was the eastern half of “Nam Bộ”. As noted,
Nam Bộ comprised those provinces in the Republic of Vietnam from the Central Highlands to the south. A
Military “Ban” – literally “Section”, has been translated as “Committee” at echelons above Province. A
history of Việt Cộng political geography in the South from 1954 is detailed in United States Mission in
Vietnam, Viet-Cong Political Geography of South Viet-Nam – March 1971, Viet-Nam Documents and
Research Notes No. 93, March 1971. The organisation of the Eastern Nam Bộ Region changed five times in
the period 1967-1972 – see Communist Territorial Organization in the "Eastern Nam Bộ" and the Saigon-
Cholon-Gia-Dinh from 1966 to Date – VCAT Item No. 2310510003.
6

Company (C40) was commanded by Comrade Lê Thành Công (Sáu Thịnh) – a cadre of the
staff branch of the Eastern Region Military Committee. Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh –
the first Communist Party member to join the Bình Xuyên force, was appointed as the
Company’s political officer (C40 was officially established in August 195814 – but to
maintain secrecy it was only officially announced in February 1960. At its inauguration,
C40 was given the title: Liberation Force of the Bà Rịa – Long Khánh region).
At the end of February 1960, the Provincial Committee and the Eastern Region
Military Committee decided to select the 40th Company to attack the enemy at the Bình Ba
plantation in order to support the rubber workers in the region to rise up and kill the tyrants,
destroy the oppressors, and give sovereignty to the people of the Bà Rịa – Long Khánh
region.
The first company-level attack in the Province was urgently prepared.
The Bình Ba camp lay on Inter-Provincial Route 2, 18 kilometres north of the town
of Bà Rịa. At Bình Ba, the enemy had employed the Civil Defence Force ((Bảo An))
combined with a Self-Defence Corps platoon ((Dân Vệ15)) and many sections of
gendarmerie ((hiến binh)) to block access to Route 2, to operate deep into our base areas,
oppress the struggle movement of the rubber workers and to defend the Bình Ba rubber
plantation16 – one of a number of large French colonial plantations.
The enemy had constructed three large posts, many blockhouses - and the strong
defensive works were surrounded by a fence.
With the support of the rubber workers – who drew sketches and knew the enemy
situation, on the night of 30 March 1960, C40 deployed to attack the Bình Ba camp.
At the time, C40’s organisation comprised two platoons and an administrative staff
section (C cell). Comrade Lê Hồng Sơn – a platoon commander, led one assaulting
spearhead while comrade Hương – a platoon commander, led another. The administrative
section was also responsible for an attack axis. Within 24 hours, all three assault groups
had closed-in to the objective. When the two medium machineguns in the two principal
attacking spearheads had just fired their resounding bursts of fire, grenades and explosive
charges flew thick-and-fast into the enemy camp. At the same time, our soldiers assaulted -
one and all. Comrade Mười Hương led a spearhead that rushed straight towards the enemy
headquarters. The enemy were caught by surprise, did not have enough time to respond,
and quickly disintegrated. Entering the enemy headquarters, Mười Hương put aside the
grenade in his hand in order to strike a match to light a lamp (as it was very dark). He then
suddenly remembered that the pin of the American “duck’s bill” grenade17 had been
removed. At that moment, Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh and many of our men also
entered the area. Comrade Mười Hương only had the time to think to swiftly grab the
grenade and rush outside. However, as he reached the door the grenade exploded. The
grenade tore open part of Mười Hương’s stomach, and another two comrades were
wounded.

14
Translator’s Note: According to the “Đồng Nai History - 1986”: “In the middle of 1958, at the Suối Quýt
T-junction, the armed forces of Bà Rịa led by Vũ Tâm and the Long Thành (Biên Hòa ) group led by Nguyễn
Quốc Thanh united as one unit and took the title of the 40th Unit ((bộ đội)) – with a strength of almost 30 …
Subsequently, they established a number of bases at Phước Thái, Cẩm Mỹ, Gia Ray, Vũ Đắc, Định Quán,
Xuyên Mộc … Footnote 1: The Commander of the 40th Unit was Lê Thành Công and the Nguyễn Quốc
Thanh was the Deputy Commander.” - Phan Ngọc Danh, Trần Quang Toại & Phạm Van Hy, Đồng Nai 30
Năm Chiến Tranh Giải Phóng (1945-1975) - The 30-year Liberation Struggle in Đồng Nai (1945-1975), Nhà
Xuất Bản Đồng Nai, Đồng Nai, 1986, pp.86-87.
15
Translator’s Note: The Dân Vệ were replaced by the Popular Forces (PF) in 1964.
16
Translator’s Note: The principal plantation in the area was the French-owned Gallia plantation.
17
Translator’s Note: Either the US Mk I or Mk II fragmentation grenade.
 7

Comrade Mười Hương was the first of C40’s soldiers to be heroically sacrificed
while saving the lives of his companions-in-arms. The heroic revolutionary qualities of this
cadre platoon commander exemplified the first military exploit of the Province’s first
concentrated unit.
In coordination with our troops, the rubber plantation workers lit torches, beat
drums and struck wooden bells to hunt down the enemy soldiers – and killed many wicked
thugs including Nuôi, a thug who was widely notorious in the Bình Ba region.
The victory at Bình Ba was not large in terms of wiping out the enemy’s strength or
its means of war-fighting, but it strongly supported and mobilized the political struggle of
the rubber workers. Also – the movement spread out from there, with all the people of the
Province rising up, and subsequently the “three spearheads” form of attack was utilized
throughout the countryside.
Following the Bình Ba victory, the 40th Company continued to attack the enemy in
the plantations and the villages in the Route 2 region such as: Ngãi Giao, Xuân Sơn, Xà
Bang, Hắc Dịch … . The rubber plantation workers and the people used sticks and canes,
swords, rubber-tapping knives … to rise up and kill the thugs and destroy the enemy
oppressors – thus becoming masters of many villages and hamlets contiguous to our base
areas. From then on, the Hắc Dịch region became a secure base area for the Province, the
rubber-growing districts and Châu Đức throughout the whole campaign to oppose the
Americans and save the nation.
Enlightened by the Party’s Politburo Resolution 15 and emulating the Concerted
Uprising by the people of Bến Tre and the whole of the South, the Party organisations in
Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa rose up to seize mastery of the villages and hamlets adjacent to War
Zone D (Biên Hòa) and along Routes 2, 23 and 52 (Bà Rịa). The political struggle
expanded in many places after our battle victory at Bình Ba – and, in the uprisings by the
masses of the people, hundreds of youth volunteered to join the armed revolutionary forces.
The revolutionary momentum of the attacks signaled a comprehensive change.
The political struggle developed widely in the regions of the Province, demanding
the support of the armed forces. In April 1960, the Provincial Committee and the Eastern
Region Military Committee decided to establish the 45th Company. Personnel and weapons
– and especially the cadre personnel, were shared with the 40th Company to provide a core
element. Consequently, in the Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa – Long Khánh region, there were then
two companies as the concentrated mobile force for the Province.
The 40th Company was commanded by Comrade Sáu Thịnh, with Comrade Ba Đại
as its political officer. The 45th Company was led by Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh, and
Comrade Ba Hà was the political officer. The two company commanders18 were members
of the Provincial Committee and held very important positions in the Provincial Military
Section.19*
The 40th Company was stationed to the east of the Route 2 area (Mây Tàu [sic] –
Xuyên Mộc) with responsibilities for armed propaganda in the villages in the coastal area
and the region of Routes 23 and 52. The 45th Company was located west of Route 2 and
operated as a mobile element to destroy a number of the enemy’s concentrated forces and
18
Translator’s Note: Việt Cộng personnel did not have formal military ranks or insignia. Rather, they were
referred to by the functional title of their position. Generically, they were also referred to as “cán bộ” (cadre –
ie officer-ranking) or “chiến sĩ” (combatant or soldier). Prior to 1958, the People’s Army of Vietnam (ie the
North Vietnamese Army – NVA) did not have rank insignia. Until the early 1970s, infiltrating NVA
personnel routinely discarded their rank insignia - although some were still referred to by their NVA ranks –
ie lieutenant, major etc.
19
* Comrade Sáu Thịnh was concurrently the head of the Provincial Military Section. Comrade Ba Thanh was
the deputy of the Provincial Military Section. Translator’s Note: Lê Thành Công (Sáu Thịnh) was also known
as Lê Minh Thịnh.
8

to defend the Hắc Dịch base area while conducting armed propaganda and supporting the
political struggle of the people in a number of villages and hamlets on Routes 2 and 15.
In May 1960, the 40th Company coordinated with our fifth-column agents to destroy
a puppet commando section led by the wicked thug – Tài, who was the most widely
notorious in the region. They had killed 30 former resistance personnel and had attacked,
injured and crippled over 70 people. This commando section had been dispatched to Xuyên
Mộc by the Phước Tuy Sector.20
Comrade Sáu Chiến21 was our underground agent in the Self-Defence Corps ((Dân
Vệ)) post at Gò Cà. Chín Tờ was the one who had directly proselytized and educated Sáu
Chiến from being a Self-Defence Corps soldier to becoming our clandestine revolutionary
agent. Sáu Chiến provided a lot of important news on the enemy to us and, on this
occasion, directly coordinated with the 40th Company to kill Tài and his commando unit.
Having firmly grasped the operational methods of the puppet commando unit, Sáu Chiến
advised the 40th Company on how to develop a plan to destroy the enemy – while, at the
same time, telling Tài that he could guide him to where “there were Việt Cộng”22. At 7am,
the whole commando section - led by Sáu Chiến and Tài, fell into the 40th Company’s
ambush (at a place that had been coordinated with Sáu Chiến). Tài was holding on fast to
Sáu Chiến’s belt – so close that he was always within half a step of Sáu Chiến. How could
we guarantee that Sáu Chiến’s life would be safe ? The only way was to separate Sáu Chiến
far from Tài. When Sáu Chiến and Tài were only a few tens of metres away, the medium
machinegun of our forward blocking group fired a short volley over the heads of Sáu Chiến
and Tài. Tài moved very quickly. He dropped down close to the ground and shouted for his
soldiers to take up defensive positions. Like lightning, Sáu Chiến moved away from where
Tài was lying. At the same time, our soldiers rushed out and fought hand-to-hand with the
enemy. Tài and the commando section resisted stubbornly, and a few of our soldiers
became casualties. However, after a few minutes of fighting, all 12 of the enemy
commando section were killed - as well as Tài. We recovered all their weapons and a radio.
That very afternoon, Sáu Chiến guided the 40th Company to kill the enemy in the Gò Cà
Self-Defence Corps post. These concentrated attacks were highly successful for the 40th
Company and were known throughout the Xuyên Mộc – Phước Bửu – Cây Cám Slope – Bà
Tô region … - and became the first step in destroying the enemy oppression in the coastal
area.
Also in May 1960, the Provincial Committee directed the 45th Company to deploy
for its first battle with the aim of destroying an important element of the enemy’s strength
and to force their withdrawal from the Hắc Dịch post and guarantee security for our base
area.
Every day, on the section of the unsealed road from Phú Mỹ to Hắc Dịch, a Civil
Defence Force company scoured the area of the route and rotated with another company.
Knowing these enemy traits well, we prepared an ambush at Bến Tàu.

20
Translator’s Note: A “Sector” (Tiểu Khu) was the regional Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
military command covering a province; “Sub-Sector” (Chi Khu) were the subordinate district-level ARVN
military commands. These regional levels commanded “territorial forces” - ie the Civil Guard/Regional
Forces and Self-Defence Corps/Popular Forces.
21
Translator’s Note: It is unclear whether “Sáu Chiến” was Trần Van Chiến (Sáu Chiến) who later became
the commander of the Battalion’s 1st Company – see footnotes 65 and 160; and Annex A – Senior Cadre.
22
Translator’s Note: The Vietnamese communists did not refer to themselves as “Việt Cộng” (“Cộng Sản
Việt Nam” - Vietnamese Communists) – this was a pejorative term initiated and used by the Republic of
Vietnam (RVN - ie South Vietnam).
 9

At that time, the 45th Company only comprised one platoon with little more than ten
weapons – but the principal weapon was the “Mantis”23. The Company also had all types of
mines, 82mm mortar ammunition and a 61mm home-made mortar which were all
concentrated for the attack. To guarantee the 45th Company’s victory in the engagement,
the Provincial Committee reinforced the 45th Company with the defence unit of the
Provincial Committee’s administrative section. At the same time, the local armed forces –
such as the village guerrillas of Long Phước, Hòa Long … led by Comrade Tám Việt,
coordinated with the Company. Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh – the second-in-command
of the Provincial Unit and concurrently the Company Commander, was the commander of
the operation. Also involved were Comrade Lê Thành Ba (Ba Bùi) – a Provincial
Committee cadre, Comrade Vũ Tâm – the Provincial Committee cadre responsible for the
masses movement in the villages along Route 15, Comrade Tư Ù, and Comrade Ba Hà as
the second-in-command. Although his wound had not yet healed and he was on crutches,
Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh still led the action.
Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh directly commanded the medium machinegun and
the 10 comrades in the forward blocking group. Comrade Lê Thành Ba commanded the 10
comrades in the rear blocking group. Comrades Ba Hà, Tư Ù and Vũ Tâm led the main
forward element (along the edge of the road). At 8am, a Civil Defence Force company
stumbled into our ambush site and – at the same time, another Civil Defence Force
company appeared that was returning from its searching operation. They met, discussed
their tasks and sat scattered around right in our ambush site – although they had not
completed their deployments (which stretched beyond the two ends of our ambush site by a
couple of tens of metres). A surprise situation had arisen beyond our anticipation with the
enemy strength ten times ours – and their formation was quite spread out in length. After a
few minutes consideration, Comrade Nguyễn Quốc Thanh crawled to the side of Comrade
Tư Chánh – the section second-in-command who directly controlled the medium
machinegun in the forward element, in order to change the attack plan. At that time, one of
the enemy carrying a medium machinegun placed the weapon against a bush while he went
to relieve himself. Comrade Tùng in the guard element immediately killed the enemy
soldier and seized his medium machinegun. At the same time, Tư Chánh’s machinegun
opened up with resounding bursts of fire into the midst of the enemy formation. Next,
Comrade Tư Chánh turned the machinegun’s fire on the small groups of enemy who were
still beyond the extent of our ambush site. At that time, our attack groups in the killing
zone24 simultaneously rushed forward and fought decisively. The enemy machinegun that
had just been seized by Comrade Tùng also fired bursts – thick-and-fast, into the groups of
enemy beyond the ambush site. Consequently, in only a blink of an eye, the enemy’s
formation was broken into three clusters. The enemy had been surprised and, panic-
stricken, disintegrated. We killed over 30 and seized 15 weapons, including three medium
machineguns. The remaining enemy took flight. The other enemy forces in the Hắc Dịch
were also fearful and abandoned their posts. The next morning, hundreds of countrymen
gathered at Hắc Dịch carrying a pig, many chickens and ducks, and cakes as a feast for our
troops - and to see the “Soldiers of the Forty-Fifth” first-hand. We held a large meeting to
proselytize the victory that we had won. Hắc Dịch had become the first liberated village in
Bà Rịa.
The Battle of Bến Tàu – the first combat victory of the 45th Company, was not only
a battle of the highest effectiveness by the provincial armed forces at that time, but also

23
Translator’s Note: The Việt Minh – and later the Việt Cộng, manufactured over 40 different types of “súng
ngựa trời” – ie “mantis guns”. These were locally-produced tube-type recoilless rifles or rocket launchers –
dubbed “mantis guns” as their thin supporting legs resembled those of the mantis insect.
24
Translator’s Note: Literally “quyết chiến điểm” – “decisive point”.
10

created a spirit of affection and confidence among our countrymen for their young people
who had only just come of age. The term “Soldiers of the Forty-Fifth” was popularized
from that time. Also as a result of the Bến Tàu battle, we had been able to seize enough
weapons to establish an additional two platoons – and so the 45th Company was fully
constituted with three platoons.
A month after the Bến Tàu success, the 45th Company deployed to fight a battle at
Khánh Lâm (Phước Thái) and destroyed a commando section and a section of the Self-
Defence Corps, seizing many weapons. The enemy mounted sweeping operations into the
Hắc Dịch base area in the last months of 1960, but these were all driven back by the 45th
Company. In one engagement, a whole Civil Defence Force company was destroyed. At
the end of 1960, the 45th Company coordinated with the district forces to wipe out an
enemy platoon at the Bầu Đập post. This was the first battle in which the 45th Company
employed a tactic of coordinating with clandestine elements among the workers in the post
– resulting in a great victory and the seizure of 30 weapons of all types that were passed to
the district troops and the village guerrillas.
On 20 December 1960, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was
formed. Following this important event, on 15 February 1961 a military conference was
held in War Zone D during which the armed revolutionary forces in the South were
officially united to become the “South Vietnam Liberation Forces”. The COSVN25
Military Committee became the Headquarters of the Liberation Forces of South Vietnam.
The Revolution in the South had entered a new phase.
At the beginning of 1961, the revolutionary movement in the countryside had
expanded across a wide area requiring that our armed forces strike the enemy in many
places in support of the masses. It was necessary to raise district forces and self-defence
guerrilla elements in a number of critical areas. The Provincial Committee decided to
transfer a number of our cadre and soldiers in the provincial concentrated unit to build the
core of the armed forces in the districts. Comrade Biên – together with a section of troops,
moved to Long Đất District; Comrade Nhẫn – and a section, joined Xuân Lộc District.
Comrade Mười Nông - and a section, went to Long Thành District. Comrades Hai Thuận
and Năm Kiên – together with a section, were allocated to Châu Đức District. From that
time, the concentrated mobile forces in a number of the critical districts became the core of
the process of setting up the district companies.
After reinforcing the districts with a large number of troops, the Provincial
Committee combined the 40th Company and the 45th Company and designated the new unit
with the title of the “445th Company”.26
Comrade Tư Ù was appointed as the company commander of the 445th Company27,
and Comrade Năm Ninh28 became its political officer and concurrently operated as the

25
Translator’s Note: COSVN – the Central Office for South Vietnam (Văn Phòng Trung ương Cục Miền
Nam), directed from Hà Nội, was the communist political and military headquarters responsible for Vietnam
south of the Central Highlands - an area termed “Nam Bộ” (equating to the French colonial “Cochin China”
region). Sometimes abbreviated to “Miền”, COSVN’s principal cover designators were “R” and “Năm
Trường”.
26
Translator’s Note: The formation of the 445th Company at the beginning of 1961 is also related in the
publication: The Armed Forces of Military Region 7 – 50 Years, 1995. Military Region 7 (Eastern Region) –
founded in 1945, was re-established in May 1961 to encompass the provinces of: Tây Ninh, Bình Dương,
Bình Long, Phước Long, Phước Thành, Biên Hòa and Bà Rịa.
27
Translator’s Note: The “Đồng Nai History - 1986” similarly relates that in 1962, “the 445th Company – the
concentrated Province Unit, was established with three platoons (120 troops) and sufficient weapons – and
led by Năm Ninh and Tư Chánh.” - Phan Ngọc Danh …, Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit.,1986, p.101. Note: a
draft version - ie “Sơ Thảo”, is also available, see Bibliography.
28
Nguyễn Minh Ninh (Năm Ninh), see biographical detail at Annex B – Key Cadre.
 11

secretary of its Party Chapter. Comrade Tư Chánh was made second-in-command, and
Comrade Ba Quảng was appointed deputy political officer.
Immediately after being established – and although its organisation had not yet been
fully set up, the 445th Company was deployed over a wide area in Long Thành – Xuân Lộc
– Bà Rịa – Long Đất … to operate in concert with a number of local district platoons and
companies and village guerrillas that had recently been formed to fight the enemy and who
had liberated a number of villages such as: Tam An, Phước Nguyên, Bình Sơn (Long
Thành) Tam Phước, Phước Thọ, Long Tân (Long Đất) … With the strong support of the
armed elements, the people in many places had risen up and become the masters of their
areas and set up a large number of new organs in their hamlets. … Everywhere in the
Province, the momentum of the revolutionary struggle was advancing strongly.
At the end of 1961, the Staley-Taylor “Pacification” plan – to pacify the South in 18
months, was launched. This was the first plan in the Americans’ “Special Warfare”
strategy.29 The gathering of the people into “Strategic Hamlets”30 was elevated to become a
national policy.
In March 1962, the Americans and Diệm began their “Sunrise” campaign.31 On a
large scale, they coordinated their regular main-forces, Civil Defence Force, Self-Defence
Corps and police from company to regiment level in devastating attacks in the provinces of
the Eastern Nam Bộ Region, and they forced the people to establish “strategic hamlets”. In
Bà Rịa, the enemy concentrated a large force and launched a sweeping operation termed
“Thunder and Wind” into the Hắc Dịch base area – but they were driven back by the 445th
Company.
Our armed forces and the people in Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa – Long Khánh faced a
serious challenge caused by these tricks and plots of the enemy.
The 445th Company launched concentrated attacks – and also at times operated in a
dispersed mode in coordination with the district and village-level forces to attack the
enemy and support our countrymen to resist the destruction of their homes and forced
relocation into strategic hamlets. We strove to coordinate our armed forces and the people
in order to retain a number of villages and hamlets in critical areas. However, we were
faced by the enemy’s sweeping campaigns, massed attacks, the destruction of houses and
the forced relocations … - and everywhere our forces were thin on the ground.
Consequently, in 1962 about 70% of the people in the Province were regrouped to live in
the strategic hamlets. Large numbers of those in our political apparatus were captured or
were unable to operate any longer.
In such a serious situation, the Provincial Committee ordered the 445th Company to
return to Long Phước in order to defend the liberated region and support our countrymen
oppose the relocations and the setting up of “Strategic Hamlets” in the “Central” area of
Long Đất. Immediately on its arrival in its newly-designated area, the 445th Company

29
Translator’s Note: The strategy announced in May 1961 – and, together with its component “Pacification
program”, was colloquially referred to as the Staley/Maxwell plan - ie after the Stanford University academic
Eugene Staley and US General Maxwell Taylor (later US Ambassador in the Republic of Vietnam 1964-
1965).
30
Translator’s Note: The “Strategic Hamlet” (Ấp Chiến Lược) programme was wider than the “Agroville”
resettlement program begun by President Diệm in 1959. In 1964, post- Diệm, it was “revitalized” as the “New
Life Hamlets” (Ấp Đời Mới) - and in 1965 retitled “Secure Hamlets” (Ấp Tân Sinh – ie New Life Hamlets,
but in Sino-Vietnamese).
31
Translator’s note: “Operation Sunrise” – launched in Bình Dương Province in late March 1962, began the
Strategic Hamlet programme. In 1962, the focus of the program was the six provinces around Sài Gòn
(including Phước Tuy) and Kontum Province. Initially, 11,316 strategic hamlets were planned – but the
program faltered with the assassination of President Ngô Đình Diệm in November 1963.
12

organised an operation to kill many of the notorious and wicked thugs in the Long Điền and
Hòa Long region and to strike at the enemy’s oppression of the people.
In August 1962, 445 Company employed a platoon to conduct an ambush at Đá
Giăng – Long Hải to kill the thug Sáu Lỏ – together with his commando platoon.
Sáu Lỏ led a commando platoon that was part of the enemy force at Long Điền.
Each day, Sáu Lỏ would lead his platoon on search operations from Long Điền to Long Hải
to destroy our revolutionary apparatus. Whenever suspected Việt Cộng were captured, Sáu
Lỏ would shoot them right away – then cut open their stomaches and remove the livers. On
returning to Long Điền, he would give the livers to the innkeeper to cook - and then Sáu Lỏ
would eat these in a drinking session. The evil Sáu Lỏ and his vicious commando platoon
had to be captured, and retributive punishment enacted for the people. With that resolve,
the 445th Company eliminated this platoon and Sáu Lỏ at Đá Giăng – Long Hải. Next, the
445th Company prepared an ambush at the Hòa Long intersection to kill the thug, Thu. Thu
was a “Pacification cadre”32 who deceived, enticed and tried to win over the people, raped
women, and attacked our underground apparatus. He had shot and killed Miss Bửu – a
cadre of our movement in Bắc Hòa Long hamlet. After she had been killed, Thu then raped
her dead body. This vile act greatly outraged the local people. With the assistance of the
people, a reconnaissance cell from the 445th Company led by Comrade Lê Tranh33
concealed themselves in a scorpion tree for several days in order to determine Thu’s routine
and movements. Following this, we deployed a platoon to secretly ambush and eliminate
Thu in Hòa Long. A further seven enemy were captured.
The most notorious and wicked thugs in the Long Điền, Hòa Long region had been
judged and punished – and this limited the brutal and cruel activities of the other thugs. The
people were extremely elated and increasingly believed in the struggle to oppose the
enemy’s attempts at the destruction of their homes and concentrating them into strategic
hamlets.
At the beginning of 1963, in the Long Đất area, only the villages of Long Tân and
Long Phước were liberated villages. There, a tunnel system had been dug in order that our
armed elements could staunchly stand their ground and, with the people, counter the
enemy’s violence.34
The tunnel system in Đông Long Phước had been begun in 1948 by Comrades Vũ
Tâm, Chín Sanh, Bảy Thử – Party members; together with: Lê Văn Tư, Trần Thị Ký, Trần
Thị Tấc, Nguyễn Thị Dừa, Tư Ngà, Mười Hơn, Ba Lung … who played their roles by
digging the first tunnels with their hoes. At that time, Party Chapter 116 (the Long Phước
Party Chapter) had 48 Party members leading the people of Long Phước to achieve this
marvellous feat-of-arms. The Soldiers’ Mothers’ Organisation mobilized the people to
contribute grain35, foodstuffs, fruit and vegetables, sugar and milk … The Womens’
32
Translator’s Note: The killing of Thu in August 1962 is very similarly related in The History of the Hòa
Long Village Party Chapter (1930-2005), op.cit., 2009, except that Thu is described as a member of the
“Popular Forces”.
33
Translator’s Note: Lê Tranh (Năm Tranh) was interviewed by T. Burstall in November 1987 – see Burstall,
T., A Soldier Returns – A Long Tan veteran discovers the other side of Vietnam, University of Queensland
Press, St Lucia, 1990, pp.141-145. Lê Tranh claimed to have later been the deputy commander of 445
Battalion in 1972-1974 – see Annex A.
34
Translator’s Note: The other major Việt Cộng tunnel systems in Phước Tuy Province were at Kim Long in
the Việt Cộng Châu Đức District and at Hắc Dịch in Tân Thânh District. The Long Phước tunnels were
declared an historical site by the Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu authorities on 9 January 1990 – see “Đia Đạo Long
Phước”, 26 September 2010 – note the item also claims two Australian battalions were destroyed at the Long
Tân battle in August 1966.
35
Translator’s Note: Literally “lương thực” – translated as “grain”. This term is sometimes more broadly
translated as “cereals” – encompassing rice, corn/maize, manioc, potatoes and beans; and is also occasionally
translated in other contexts more generally as “rations” or “supplies”.
 13

Organisation organised the cooking of the food for the hundreds of people engaged in
digging the tunnels. Every night, hundreds of candles spread light within the tunnels.
Throughout the night, there were the sounds of movement and the digging of shovels
within the area controlled by the enemy. The earth that was removed was spread and
scattered about in family garden plots, disguised as the foundations for new houses … At
first, the tunnel complex in Đông Long Phước hamlet was 300 metres long, 1.5 metres in
height and .8 of a metre wide – and many entrances were dug. In 1949, the women and
children continued to dig the tunnels at Bắc Long Phước. Throughout the whole period of
Resistance against the French, the tunnels of Long Phước silently protected hundreds of
people on the road to victory ! In the times of opposing the Americans, the provincial
troops (C445) helped develop the tunnels in Bắc Long Phước hamlet to a length of more
than 800 metres and a depth below ground level of five metres. The tunnels were two
metres in height and a metre wide. On the surface, on both sides of the tunnels there were
communication trenches, fighting positions, spike traps and minefields. This area was used
as the base for the District Committee and also the Provincial Committee. At the time, it
was a firm rear area where the 445th Company could stand its ground and deploy to other
locations to strike the enemy in support of the district troops, guerrillas and the people in its
task of destroying the enemy’s plans to concentrate the populace into strategic hamlets – in
particular in the two important areas of Long Điền and Hòa Long.
Acknowledging those areas as critical, Lê Đức Đạt – the Phước Tuy province chief,
announced on many occasions that he would “mow down” Long Phước. To implement the
province chief’s order, the captain in command of Long Lễ District – Mai Lang Luông, had
led Civil Defence Force battalions on sweeping operations into Long Phước village on
several occasions.
At the beginning of March 1963, the 38th Ranger Battalion and the 61st Civil
Defence Force Battalion coordinated with Self-Defence Corps elements and aircraft and
artillery support to launch an operation over several days with the aim of wiping out the
Long Phước liberated zone. At this time, the 445th Company’s strength was over 120 –
organised in three platoons. One platoon was operating with the local combat force at An
Ngãi (Đất Đỏ) – with the other two platoons in Long Phước. On the very first day, the
enemy’s vanguard elements flooded violently into Long Phước. The village guerrillas and
the 445th Company occupied their defensive positions … (in the outer perimeter) to drive
the enemy back – and the fighting waged back-and-forth for weeks. At night, the enemy
would withdraw, and we would control the area. We would repair and consolidate the
defences to ensure their effectiveness for the next day. After more than ten days of the
enemy’s failure in their attempts to take Long Phước, the enemy reinforced its strength to
the equivalent of a regiment – supported by a squadron of armoured vehicles and aircraft
and artillery, to bomb and shell Long Phước. Their firepower cratered the ground – not one
tree or metre of dirt in the hamlet of Bắc Long Phước was left intact. Our trenches and
fighting revetments were devastatingly blown apart. Our soldiers fought on doggedly,
blocking each forward step of the enemy troops. At that time, we did not have anti-tank
weapons and could only use mines and grenades against their tanks and armoured vehicles
– but our weapons were ineffective. Many of our comrades were wounded and - unable to
be evacuated, had to be treated in the tunnels. Slowly, our ammunition ran out. The
situation was extremely tense and dangerous.
The 1st of April 1963 was a very decisive day - and an historic day for the 445th
Company at Long Phước. The lives of hundreds of people would be decided in a few short
seconds. Faced by continuing mass attacks day-after-day by almost a full enemy infantry
regiment, an armoured vehicle squadron and very heavy fire support, the fighting spirit of
our soldiers never wavered – but our ammunition was down to its last bullet and shell. The
14

enemy assaulted en masse, and we had to ensure that each of our bullets brought down an
enemy soldier. Using our sniping skills, every round struck one of the enemy. Nguyễn Văn
Bảo (Sáu Bảo) – second-in-command of a section, shot and killed tens of enemy. All our
communications trenches and external defensive works had been seized by the enemy. Our
12 loopholes had been blocked by 12 of the enemy’s armoured vehicles. The two major
entrances to the tunnel system were covered over by two armoured vehicles. Below in the
tunnels, there were 250 cadre, soldiers and Long Phước villagers. The enemy used
megaphones to call on them to surrender – if not, in an hour, the enemy would pump
poisonous gas down into the tunnels and collapse the whole tunnel system. The fate of our
provincial main-force unit and hundreds of villagers would be decided in a few final
decisive minutes. Our soldiers below in the tunnels crawled to the entrance and saw – with
growing hate, the underbelly of an enemy tank. But how to remove it ? They couldn’t just
give up and die. The Company headquarters gave the last remaining bazooka to Comrade
Năm Tranh and Comrade Tốt – of the reconnaissance team, to crawl forward and place the
weapon beneath the armoured vehicle and detonate it. However, the blast of but one
bazooka against an armoured vehicle was ineffective.
Down in the darkness of the tunnels, the atmosphere was silent. For many tens of
minutes, Comrade Năm Ninh was unable to either sit or stand – as if ants were biting all
over his body. He checked and remembered that there was a lone “Câm” mine remaining
and thought of the recent attempt by the reconnaissance team. The mine had been
manufactured from a 15 kilogram cluster bomb to attack tanks - but because its fuze was
faulty, it had not exploded. Comrade Năm Ninh consulted with Comrade Tư Chánh on a
method of attack and delegated the task to Comrades Mười Dậm and Sáu Bảo.36 With a
clear understanding of their heavy responsibility towards the fate of hundreds of people,
Mười Dậm and Sáu Bảo quickly carried the mine to the tunnel entrance. Having crawled up
to the entrance and groped for a while examining the underbelly of the tank, Mười Dậm
used a plank of wood to affix the mine to the bottom of the tank. With the mine attached,
he took a very deep breath, then jumped back down into the tunnel and followed the
detonating wire back to the firing position. An explosion violently shook the earth and
erupted from the mouth of the tunnel. The tank was blasted aside. Immediately, in a wink,
Comrade Sáu Bảo crawled up and pulled out the pin on a “Sáng fruit” grenade and threw it
at the enemy infantry. Flames burst out everywhere, and the enemy - screaming, fled
helter-skelter. With the smoke and fire obscuring the tunnel entrance, one our soldiers
shouted – “Attack”, and with grenades, weapons of all calibres and illuminating grenades,
they attacked the enemy and occupied the entrance to the tunnel. At the other tunnel
entrances, the enemy’s armoured vehicles also withdrew in panic. Our soldiers seized the
opportunity and sprang forward to seize the entrance to the tunnel. It was then 2pm. At
3pm, the enemy again attacked, but their armoured vehicles only fired on us from a
distance and didn’t dare approach close to the tunnels. At 5pm, all of the enemy withdrew
to Bà Rịa.
The lives of 250 cadre, soldiers and villagers in the tunnels were saved. That night,
although the enemy shelled sporadically, our countrymen of Long Phước flocked to the

36
Mười Dậm - probably Quách Văn Mười ie noted as the commander of the Battalion’s 1st Company in
February 1968 – see footnote 197*. Nguyễn Văn Bảo (Sáu Bảo), noted above as a section commander, was
interviewed post-War by T. Burstall in August 1987. Bảo – b.1943 near Long Mỹ, declared that he had
“joined the guerrilla army” at 16, and had been a company commander in 445 Battalion in the period 1966-
1968 (but “had not been involved personally” in the Battle of Long Tân) – then posted to 5th VC Division -
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.65-66. See also the following footnotes 37, 188 and 197 -
and also Annex A.
 15

tunnels to warmly greet the victorious men of “Four Four Five”. They joyfully embraced
one another, chatting happily and were bathed in tears !
The people and our troops remained awake throughout the night - evacuating the
people, consolidating our positions, gathering weapons and ammunition and preparing for
the next day’s battle.
After 45 days of staunchly holding out in the Long Phước tunnels against enemy
forces that outnumbered us by tens of times, the 445th Company proved that it had matured
in leaps and bounds – especially in morale and its will to fight doggedly. In both body and
will, they had proven themselves worthy of the boundless affection of the people. In
summary, after 44 days and nights of holding out in the Long Phước tunnels, many cadre
and soldiers of the 445th Company were nominated by the Province authorities for medals
and letters of appreciation. In particular, Comrade Mười Dậm and Comrade Sáu Bảo37 were
accepted into the Party on the field of battle. Also, after the “Battle of the Long Phước
Tunnels”, people everywhere requested that the 445th Company come to their assistance.
The term “Soldiers of Four Four Five” began to echo resoundingly throughout the region.
Many of our countrymen brought their children and entrusted them to the 445th Company
so that they might join the Revolution. Also from that time, the 445th Company was able to
form five platoons and continue its fight to defend the Fatherland.
From the beginning of 1963 – after the victory of Ấp Bắc (Mỹ Tho), the movement
to destroy the strategic hamlets across the South gained strong momentum. The Bà Rịa –
Long Khánh Provincial Committee continued to direct the 445th Company to strongly
attack the enemy’s posts and to support our countrymen to wipe out a number of the
American-Diệm model strategic hamlets.
In May 1963, the 445th Company was tasked to destroy the Bàu Lâm strategic
hamlet. Comrade Nguyễn Việt Hoa (Mười Thà)38 – the commander of the Provincial Unit,
personally accompanied the 445th Company.
Bàu Lâm was a hamlet contiguous to our base area in Xuyên Mộc. The enemy had
used bulldozers to flatten the terrain. They had built a church, tile-roofed houses, houses
roofed with steel sheets and thatched houses … for the inhabitants (according to their
political classification). Our Christian countrymen who had emigrated from the North lived
on both sides of the road - our nationalist countrymen and revolutionary families … were in
a separate area. The enemy exploited the contradictions of religion and nationalism to
create divisions. They contrived hatred against the Revolution hoping to convert each
person into a shock-troop soldier and destroy the Revolution in this border area.
Surrounding the hamlet, there was a system of communication ditches two metres deep and
1.5 metres wide – with a barbed-wire fence. The whole hamlet only had two gates – and
these were guarded. Everyone entering or leaving the hamlet was monitored and checked.
Rations for every family were calculated for each member. Schools and an infirmary were
built … and Bàu Lâm was the second model “strategic hamlet” in the Province (after Bình
Giả). This false scene of prosperity created by the ideology of the new American
colonialists now appeared throughout the villages and hamlets.
With information on the enemy’s activities and routine provided by our agents
within Bàu Lâm, three platoons of the 445th Company secretly entered the hamlet and
concealed themselves. Each morning, the enemy soldiers would leave their post and,
carrying their weapons, swagger down to the market for breakfast – and then go off on
search operations. We placed two platoons in ambush positions on each side of the road,

37
See footnote 36.
38
Translator’s Note: “Mười Thà - a military cadre, returned ((from North Vietnam)) at the end of 1962 and
became the Provincial Commander.” - Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.101. In late
1963, Nguyễn Việt Hoa (Mười Thà) was noted as the Provincial Unit Commander ie of then Bà Rịa Province.
16

with one platoon to block the rear. Comrade Bé (Bé Giò)39 carried the heavy machinegun
and was in the lead element at the “Bùng Binh” market. Waiting until the whole enemy
group had entered the ambush site, Bé Giò then pulled the trigger and the machinegun
sprayed rounds into the enemy. At the same time, the soldiers of the 445th Company
simultaneously rushed forward from both sides and the rear and, from close quarters, shot
each of enemy. Although attacked by surprise, the enemy went to ground and took up
defensive positions. Comrade Nguyễn Phi Hùng was struck by a bullet and was killed.
Before his heart stopped beating, Nguyễn Phi Hùng tried to lift his head up and shouted
three times: “Long live Hồ Chí Minh”. After only a few minutes of fighting, 27 enemy
were killed in the engagement – including Hương, a wicked thug in charge of pacification.
The people were extremely elated and gathered to assist our soldiers in clearing the
battlefield, destroying the barbed-wire fence, and pulling out the steel pickets … The Bàu
Lâm strategic hamlet had been destroyed – and the enemy was never able to rebuild it.
With the Bàu Lâm strategic hamlet destroyed, the 445th Company moved to operate
in the Route 2 area.
At this time, our armed forces routinely interdicted traffic on the roads in order to
conduct propaganda among the people – sometimes disguised as civilians, and on other
occasions publicly as revolutionary forces. The Đức Thạnh district chief had discovered
that Comrade Mười Quang – the commander of our Cao Su District40 Unit, often disguised
himself and propagandized the people on Route 2. Exploiting Mười Quang’s weak point
when “stopping vehicles”, the enemy planned an operation to capture him. Both the Đức
Thạnh district chief and his deputy directly participated in the operation. They placed a
medium machinegun in a three-wheeled Lambretta which they disguised as a civilian
vehicle. Back in the camp, there was a vehicle-mounted enemy platoon ready to move as a
rapid reinforcement element once the machinegun opened fire. Comrade Mười Quang had
just waved down the Lambretta – when the machinegun fired a burst past his ears. Mười
Quang dived to the ground. At that moment, the military vehicle in the camp rushed out in
support. At this time, the 445th Company was about 400-500 metres from Route 2 and
deploying towards the road to conduct armed propaganda activities. Comrade Tư Chánh –
the company commander41, Comrade Năm Tranh and three reconnaissance soldiers heard
the sounds of the gunfire and moved forward to the road where they saw the Jeep carrying
the enemy troops. We opened fire. Realizing that they had been attacked by guerrillas, the
enemy stopped their vehicle and were engaged fiercely by the 445th Company’s
reconnaissance element. The Jeep was overturned, and all the troops on the vehicle were
eliminated – except for one who fled. Hearing the sound of the reconnaissance team’s fire,
the 445th Company deployed to the road and immediately engaged a vehicle carrying
39
Trần Văn Bé (Tư Bé) - Trần Văn Bé (Tư Bé aka Bé Giò) was reportedly later a company commander in
440 Battalion in mid-1968 and appointed a 2ic of 445 Battalion on 4 November 1969 – Annex B to 1 ATF
INTSUM 35/71, 4 February 1971. Subsequently, when Commander of the Châu Đức District Unit, Trần Văn
Bé (Tư Bé) was killed by Australian forces on 4 February 1971 - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 35/71, Núi
Đất, 4 February 1971.
40
Translator’s Note: The principal Việt Cộng districts (huyện) in the Bà Rịa (ie southern) half of Bà Rịa –
Long Khánh (ie “Bà Long”) Province were Long Đất (ie Long Điền and Đất Đỏ were combined in April
1960), Xuyên Mộc and Châu Đức – see map at back cover. Châu Đức District was formed from Châu Thành
and Đức Thạnh Districts on 24 May 1965 [sic] – see the The History of the Hòa Long Village Party Chapter
(1930-2005), op.cit., 25 April 2009. Occasionally, Cao Su (“Rubber”) District – encompassing the rubber
plantations from Bình Ba to the north, the Courtenay plantation and several in southern Long Khánh
Province, was included as a discrete district. For the boundaries of Việt Cộng “sub-districts”, see 1st
Australian Task Force (1 ATF), VC Districts and Sub-Districts, Special Overprint AFV/MISC/ 2187, Special
Use S.E. Asia 1:100,000 – Sheet 6430 Series L607, circa 1971. The boundaries of the Việt Cộng “Bà Rịa”
area were adjusted during several re-organisations – see Annex H, Higher Headquarters.
41
Translator’s Note: Previously, Tư Ù had been the Commander of the 445th Company.
 17

enemy reinforcements. We opened fire and killed all the troops aboard the vehicle. As a
result, a Civil Defence Force platoon was destroyed – and the district chief and his deputy
were captured. We seized a large number of weapons, including a 60mm mortar and a
PRC10 radio.42
A chance combat engagement – that was never intended, involving the 445th
Company and the forces of Cao Su District had resulted in a big victory. The senior
leadership of an enemy district ((quận)) had suffered retributive punishment, and their
soldiers were now extremely fearful. It was not a very large victory, but those who were
directly involved in the fighting would not easily forget the “Battle of Đồng Ngọc Khải”.
Also, from this time, the 445th Company and our Cao Su District elements increased their
cooperation in attacking the enemy, and our armed propaganda was more effective.43
In October 1963, the people told 445 Company that there was a Civil Defence Force
platoon that usually came to the Sông Cầu44 strategic hamlet in Hòa Long and stayed
overnight among the people. The 445th Company’s reconnaissance element crept in to
check and saw the enemy erecting their hammocks in the people’s houses and gardens. A
plan for an attack on Sông Cầu hamlet was quickly approved by the Company’s Party
Chapter. Comrade Lê Minh Việt (Sáu Việt)45 – the company political officer and
concurrently the Party Chapter secretary, represented the Party Committee and ratified the
basic elements of the attack plan: the battle must be successful and force the enemy to
abandon its practice of staying overnight among the people in the hamlet; in order to
maintain the Company’s prestige, no villagers must be killed; and the attack would take
place on Sunday night when the enemy would be more complacent and off-guard. Comrade
Tâm (Tâm Méo) was given the responsibility for the medium machinegun. All the orders
for the engagement were concretely coordinated with each planned firing of the
machinegun to be controlled by Comrade Tâm.
In the middle of the night, the whole Company entered the hamlet and infiltrated to
within a few metres of the enemy. The silvery moonlight lit up each of the enemy
hammocks clustered together. Comrade Tâm elevated his machinegun to 45 degrees and
fired a short burst (as warning shots so that the villagers would seek safety in their
bunkers). He then lowered his weapon and swept its fire thick-and-fast at the enemy’s
positions. Our soldiers then threw a large number of grenades and assaulted into the main
area of the enemy - while Comrade Tâm moved his machinegun to a new position and fired
sweeping bursts into pockets of enemy resistance.
The attack was conducted in a very business-like manner. The enemy had no
defensive positions and resisted passively – so in a few minutes they were completely
wiped out. We seized two medium machineguns and tens of other weapons, and captured
seven of the enemy.
42
Translator’s Note: A United States AN/PRC10 VHF manpack radio.
43
Translator’s Note: A major attack by Việt Cộng forces in late August 1963 is not included the 445 Battalion
History. According to The Minh Đạm History, on 24 August 1963, the “45 Company Provincial Unit” in
conjunction with Long Đất District guerrillas and elements of the Military Region’s 800 Battalion attacked an
officers’ recreation facility at Long Hải – killing and wounding 19 and seizing 40 weapons – see The Minh
Đạm History - 2006 ie Phạm Chí Thân, Căn Cứ Minh Đạm 1945-1975 - The Minh Đạm Base 1945-1975, Bà
Rịa-Vũng Tàu Province Information and Cultural Office, 2006, p.45 – translated extracts are at Annex M.
The Long Đất District History - 1986 also relates that: “on 25 August 1963, C25, C45 and Khu (D800)
attacked the Long Hải complex – killing 19.” - Phan Ngọc Danh & Toại, Trần Quang Toại, Lịch Sử Đấu
Tranh Cách Mạng Của Huyện Long Đất -The History of the Revolutionary Struggle in Long Đất District,
Nhà Xuất Bản Đồng Nai (Đồng Nai Publishing House), Đồng Nai, 1986, p.113 – See Annex L.
44
Translator’s note: Việt Cộng sketch maps of Sông Cầu hamlet were made on 31 July and 5 October 1963
by “agent 980” – CDEC Log 12-1845-66.
45
Translator’s note: Sáu Việt (“Six Việt”) – the nickname for Lê Minh Việt, was subsequently (1966) the
deputy political officer of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit.
18

Not one villager was wounded, and the villagers greatly admired the fighting skill
of the 445th Company. Many people happily remarked: “The soldiers’ bullets must have
eyes.” On that night, our countrymen assisted the soldiers to destroy the strategic hamlet’s
barbed-wire fence. And, from that time, the enemy never dared to stay in the hamlet
overnight.
With the impetus of that victory, the 445th Company immediately deployed to other
critical areas of the Province to coordinate with the district platoons, companies and village
guerrillas to attack the enemy’s posts, and to assist our countrymen to destroy a series of
enemy strategic hamlets – allowing our people to return to their former homes and make a
living.
On 11 November 1963, a coup broke out in Sài Gòn. Ngô Đình Diệm and Ngô Đình
Nhu were both killed, and the nepotistic and dictatorial regime in the South was
overthrown. There were internal conflicts within the puppet regime, and there had been a
continuous struggle for power and influence. Immediately on 11 November 1963, the 445th
Company – in coordination with the forces of Cao Su District, attacked the Đồng Ngọc
Khải strategic hamlet, wiped out a Self Defence Corps platoon, and supported the people to
rise up, destroy the strategic hamlet and liberate Đồng Ngọc Khải. Exploiting this
victorious achievement, a few days later the 445th Company coordinated with the Cao Su
District forces to attack the enemy in the strategic hamlet at Xuân Sơn – and, in the day,
wiped out an enemy platoon. The people were elated and joined our soldiers in up-rooting
hundreds of steel pickets, destroying the strategic hamlet’s barbed-wire fence and liberating
the village of Xuân Sơn.
The victories related above provided the impetus for cooperation between the armed
forces and the people to destroy a whole series of enemy strategic hamlets across Bà Rịa.
The Revolution in the South had moved forward and undergone a comprehensive
change – with the liberated regions expanding in almost all the rural areas. On the main
communications axes in Bà Rịa – Long Khánh, the enemy only maintained its posts in the
towns, the sub-sectors46, the province capital and a number of key points. This
revolutionary momentum saw attacks breaking out everywhere. In these circumstances –
and in response to the requirement to further develop the Revolution, our Provincial
Committee decided to establish an additional company as a concentrated mobile force.
At the beginning of 1964, the 440th Company came into being. This Company was
commanded by Comrade Năm Đành, with Comrade Năm Ninh as its political officer. The
445th Company transferred a number of cadre and soldiers to the 440th Company to build its
nucleus – and then was itself additionally strengthened. Comrade Tư Chánh remained its
company commander, and Comrade Sáu Việt was its political officer.
At the end of the 1964 Wet Season, the 445th Company and the 440th Company
combined in an attack on the enemy post at Bình Ba Xăng – with the aim of seizing
quantities of rice to support later larger attacks. We wiped out a Self-Defence Corps
platoon at Bình Ba Xăng and seized 51 bags of rice (each weighing a quintal).47 This
quantity of rice overcame the food difficulties of the provincial concentrated armed forces
– and was also sufficient to support over 500 people in our civilian labour group within the
Province.48 At this time, the 445th Company also continued to provide a platoon to protect
the civilian labour group. Together with the labour group, that platoon from the 445th

46
Translator’s Note: “Chi khu” – military sub-sectors, meaning the RVN Government district capitals/
centres. In Phước Tuy Province: Long Lễ, Long Điền, Đất Đỏ, Đức Thạnh and Xuyên Mộc.
47
Translator’s Note: One quintal equals 100 kilograms.
48
Translator’s Note: The organisation and management of civilian labour is detailed in the Bà Rịa-Long
Khánh Province Forward Supply Council report of 25 August 1969 – that report also covers the purchasing
and requisitioning of rice and other foodstuffs - CDEC Log 02-1480-70.
 19

Company safely moved over 20 tonnes of weapons provided from the North that had been
moved by sea through the port of Lộc An (in November 1963) and had taken this materiel
to our base area.49
By this time, the liberated zone had expanded greatly, and the enemy’s strategic
hamlet system within the Province had basically been destroyed. The Bà Rịa – Long Khánh
armed forces had increased, but were not yet strong enough to liberate the towns. Having
assessed the situation, the leadership cadre of the 445th Company and the 440th Company
decided to attack Bình Giả. This resolution was agreed by the Province authorities – but
there were still a few aspects on which there was not yet unanimity.
Bình Giả - a village on Route 2 (18 kilometres north of Bà Rịa Town), comprised
three hamlets and had a population of 5,726. 99% of its inhabitants were Christian
refugees. Exploiting religious and ethnic contradictions, the enemy had created divisions
and hatred among the populace towards the Revolution and built Bình Giả into its premier
strategic hamlet in the Province.50 Enemy strength in Bình Giả comprised 147 Popular
Force troops ((“Dân Vệ”))51 – organised in many platoons, and a Ranger company ((Biệt
Động Quân)) from the 38th Battalion. Additionally, there were 108 well-armed “Defenders-
of-the-Church Youth”. Different to other strategic hamlets, at Bình Giả the enemy had
mobilized the people to grow bamboo in groves to form a thick fence around the village.
Beyond, there was a system of deep trenches with spikes and mines - both within the
trenches and on the ramparts. The enemy regarded Bình Giả as an “Inviolable” place. And,
in fact, none of our units had ever struck Bình Giả.
In October 1964, our two companies attacked Bình Giả. We organised two forces:
one force comprised a company (minus) to strike at the main gate at the Our Lady ((Đức
Mẹ)) church in Village 2. The remaining elements were kept in reserve. At exactly 6am, the
enemy soldiers opened the hamlet gates. Our force had secretly concealed itself and - as
one, opened fire and poured through the gate. The bodies of many enemy soldiers fell right
beside the gate. Exploiting the advantage of surprise, our force advanced like lightning to
directly seize Village 2 – and captured a wicked gendarme ((hiến binh)), before moving on
to Village 3. The fighting became increasingly fierce as the enemy were able to reinforce

49
Translator’s Note: Lộc An is located on the coast about five kilometres northeast of Phước Hải village. The
landing is also related in the Long Đất District History – 1986 - ie Phan Ngọc Danh …, Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh
Cách Mạng Của Huyện Long Đất, op.cit., 1986, pp.114-115 – giving the landing date as 29-30 November
(see Annex L). However, according to the The Minh Đạm History - 2006, the vessel arrived at Lộc An on the
night of 3 October 1963 – see Phạm Chí Thân, Căn Cứ Minh Đạm, op.cit., 2006, p.45. A political/labour
history also cites 3 October and relates that the onward movement was managed by Group 1500 (“Đoàn
1500” - previously Group 555) – assisted by the 5th Company of 800 Battalion (a “Regional” element) - Liên
đoàn Lao động …, Lịch sử …, op.cit., 2011, p.16. A detailed account of this supply operation - confirming
the date as 3 October, can be found in Nguyễn Quý Đại, “Hành trình từ những con tàu không số”, in Hàng hải
VN - Một thời hào hung (“Những tập thể và cá nhân tiêu biểu ngành GTVT 1945-2005”) eg – the vessel,
Number 41, was captained by Lê Văn Một and landed 40 tonnes of weapons and stores. This landing is
briefly described in McNeill, I., To Long Tan – The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966,
Allen & Unwin/Australian War Memorial, St Leonards, 1993, pp.219-220 citing the Long Đất District
History – 1986. However, in the Australian work “Đoàn 1500” (ie “Group 1500” – see also footnote 140) - a
logistics element of 84 Rear Services Group (Đoàn 84) was incorrectly translated as “1500 cadres”. A further
two landings at Lộc An (29 November 1964, 1 February 1965) are related in extracts from the Đoàn 125
History ie - Phan Lữ Hoàng Hà, “Chuyện kể về ‘đường mòn Hồ Chí Minh’ trên biển: Huyền thoại những con
tàu”, vietbao.vn, 30 April 2005.
50
Translator’s Note: According to a principal Vietnamese military history account, the population of Bình
Giả comprised “more than 400 families – religious refugees from the North, and almost all were the families
of officers and soldiers of Ranger and Marine units.” - Lịch sử Kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước - Tập 3 (Vol
3), Nhà Xuất Bản Chính Trị Quốc Giả, Hà Nội, 1997.
51
Translator’s Note: As noted earlier, the Dân Vệ were replaced by the Popular Forces (PF) in 1964.
20

their units. At 9am, they coerced a number of reactionary Catholics to arm themselves with
sticks and canes and demonstrate to demand that we release the wicked gendarme. Our
force had to disperse - while at the same time fighting the enemy who were counter-
attacking the objectives and conducting armed propaganda among the Catholics who they
had exploited. Two days later, we again launched an attack, striking into Village 1 and
destroying much of the enemy’s capability before withdrawing to consolidate our forces.
Although we didn’t completely liberate Bình Giả, we had been able to seize both
Village 2 and Village 3 in our first attack, and had destroyed an important part of the
enemy’s strength and energy. The enemy’s No.1 model strategic hamlet in Bà Rịa was no
longer “Inviolable”. A few days later, the two companies – the 445th and the 440th,
continued to attack Bình Giả for a second time, with the targets still Village 2 and Village
3. However, this time the enemy deployed 60 helicopters in the afternoon to insert a Ranger
battalion to relieve the encirclement. Our forces dug trenches in order to hold on in the
hamlet and repelled all the enemy’s counter-attacks. This unequal fighting was extremely
fierce, and we suffered increasingly heavy casualties. The 445th Company itself suffered
over 20 casualties. Comrade Sáu Việt52 – the company political officer, had to take direct
charge of the wounded.
When the 445th Company and the 440th Company withdrew from Bình Giả to
consolidate their forces and to prepare for subsequent attacks, Comrade Năm Ninh and
Comrade Sáu Việt met a group of COSVN staff cadre who had come to reconnoitre
battlefields in the area.
This group of COSVN staff cadre was led by Comrade Trần Đông Hưng and had
come to study the battlefields in preparation for a large campaign in the Xuyên Mộc-Long
Đất region. Having listened to the ideas put forward by Năm Ninh and Sáu Việt – ie: “We
should launch a large campaign against Bình Giả”, the COSVN staff cadre remained in the
Route 2 area to follow the situation. The 445th Company and the 440th Company launched
three further attacks against Bình Giả. In the final phase, we held on for five days in the
hamlets. Each time that we attacked, helicopters would swarm like flies to insert enemy
support forces for Bình Giả. Despite the fierce fighting and large casualties after our many
attacks - which had not been able to completely liberate Bình Giả, the 445th and the 440th
Companies had however, from that time, given the higher echelons the main idea for the
“Bình Giả Campaign”.53
On the night of 2 December 1964, the Bình Giả Campaign began.54 Our forces
comprised: 761 Regiment55, 762 Regiment56, the COSVN artillery regiment (ie Q761,

52
Translator’s note: As noted earlier, Sáu Việt (Lê Minh Việt) was subsequently (1966) the deputy political
officer of the Bà Rịa District Unit.
53
Translator’s Note: The attack on Bình Giả was an element of COSVN’s 1964-65 Dry Season campaign.
54
Translator’s Note: The Battle of Bình Giả is cited in most Vietnamese communist histories as a major
victory. It is related in Lịch sử Kháng chiến …, op.cit., Tập 3 (Vol 3), op.cit., 1997; in the History of the 5th
Infantry Division (1965-2005) - Lịch Sử Sư đòan Bộ Binh 5 (1965-2005), The People’s Army Publishing
House, Hà Nội, 2005; and also in the Long Đất District History – 1986: ie from 2 December 1964 to 7
January 1965, in Phan Ngọc Danh …, Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Của Huyện Long Đất, op.cit., 1986,
p.119 – see Annex L.
55
Translator’s Note: Q761 Regiment (founded in July 1961) – also known as the “1st Regiment”, was later re-
titled 271 Regiment (the Bình Giả Regiment) and was subsequently a founding formation of the 9th VC
Division in early September 1965. Q761was reportedly commanded at Bình Giả by Nguyễn Thế Truyện (aka
Năm Truyện and also aka Năm Sài Gòn). Truyện later commanded the 5th VC Division from 1966 until late
November 1967 - and was killed in combat in early February 1968 during the NVA/VC Tết Mậu Thân 1968
offensive while serving as Commander of Sub-Region 1. Bùi Thanh Vân (Út Liêm) was the second-in-
command of Q761 at the Battle of Bình Giả.
56
Translator’s Note: Q762 Regiment – also known as the “2nd Regiment” and the Đồng Xoai Regiment, was
later re-titled 272 Regiment and was subsequently a founding formation of the 9th VC Division in early
 21

Q762 and Q56357), the 445th Company, the 440th Company (Provincial), and the Châu Đức
District armed force. The 455th and the 440th Companies had the mission of attacking
directly into Bình Giả.58 The two COSVN regiments were the main force to destroy the
puppet troops that would be sent as a relieving force.
At this time, the 445th Company had been strengthened to 140 comrades (of whom
120 participated directly in the fighting). The Company’s weapons were almost all
Thompsons, carbines and Garands. Our fire support was quite strong, comprising 14
medium machineguns, two 75mm recoilless rifles, two 60mm mortars and two heavy
machineguns. This included a .30 calibre US heavy machinegun that was usually mounted
on an armoured vehicle. This weapon had been seized by the Long Đất District Unit from
an armoured vehicle at An Nhất bridge (August 1963). The heavy machinegun was quite
heavy – weighing 24.7 kilograms, so Long Đất District had sent it to the Province storage
facility. Then, it was given to Nguyễn Văn Quang (Quang Hùm)59 to use. From that point
on, Nguyễn Văn Quang and the heavy machinegun were inseparable throughout the long
years of fighting the Americans, and together they achieve many outstanding feats-of-arms.
In the first days, the 440th Company was the reserve unit. At 3am on 2 December
1964, the 445th Company was divided into two forces to continue the attack against Bình
Giả. The main force was the 1st Platoon under the direct leadership of platoon commander
Ba Lòng. Comrade Sáu Việt – the political officer, and Comrade Đào Thanh Xuân (Hai
Xuân) – the Company second-in-command, also accompanied this force. The secondary
force was the 2nd Platoon led by its platoon commander - Ba Kiên, and the Company
deputy political officer - Tô Dũng. Both forces attacked on an axis through the main gate of
Village 2. The enemy at that site had been attacked many times and were therefore very
vigilant, regularly changing the location of their mines and their system of defence. When
the 1st Platoon force approached the hamlet gate, they struck grenade traps - and three
comrades were wounded. All types of enemy firepower began to fall like rain.
Immediately, Nguyễn Văn Quang set up his heavy machinegun 60 metres from the hamlet
gate and fired waves of volleys thick-and-fast to pin down the enemy’s firepower so that
the Company’s reconnaissance element could plant explosives to destroy the hamlet gate.
When a round from Comrade Hường’s bazooka blasted the hamlet gate wide-open, the two
infantry forces poured through as one – and, crossing through the gate, fought their way
forward in two directions. In his first engagement with the heavy machinegun, Nguyễn Văn
Quang brought into play his bravery and strength. He was strong - like a nimble tiger,
constantly on the move and carrying his heavy machinegun swiftly from one point to

September 1965. Q762 was raised in 1961 from former Việt Minh troops who had “regrouped” (“tập kết”) to
North Vietnam in 1954-1955 and infiltrated back into the South - ie were “returned cadre” (“cán bộ hồi kết”).
A comprehensive booklet on the history of 272 Regiment (dated 19 May 1967) is at CDEC Log 03-2284-68.
The Regiment’s major ambush on Route 2 on 9 December 1964 is related in more detail in a captured
document at CDEC Log 03-2656-67. At Bình Giả, Q762 Regiment was led by Tạ Minh Khâm with Nguyễn
Thới Bưng (Út Thới) as the Regiment’s second-in-command. Subsequently, Nguyễn Thới Bưng commanded
275 Regiment at the Battle of Long Tân on 18 August 1966. In October 1966, he was appointed Deputy Chief
of Staff of the 5th VC Division until moving to COSVN staff in January 1967. Nguyễn Thới Bưng later
served as Commander 7th VC Division – and on retirement in the late 1990s , was Vietnam’s Vice Minister
of Defence (as a Lieutenant General). For further information, see Annex J - 275 Regiment.
57
Translator’s Note: The COSVN Artillery Regiment’s title was Q763 (cover designator: Đoàn 80) – and
comprised four battalions.
58
Translator’s Note: “On 2 December 1964, in support of 445 Battalion’s [sic] attack on Bình Giả, the 1st
Battalion of Q761 and COSVN artillery attacked the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector headquarters” - Lịch sử Kháng
chiến …, op.cit., Tập 3 (Vol 3), 1997.
59
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Văn Quang – see also footnotes 105, 112, 113, 175, 280 and 296, was later
declared a “Hero of the People’s Armed Forces” and - after training in North Vietnam from 1968 to 1972,
returned as the second-in-command/Chief of Staff of D445 Battalion in March 1972.
22

another in order to provide effective support to the infantry. After a few minutes of
fighting, an enemy Regional Forces ((Bảo An60)) platoon was in disarray – and we moved
on to seize Village 2 and Village 3, and killed over 60 enemy. On the same night, a
battalion of 761 Regiment attacked and seized Village 1. In this way, our force had struck
the “Objective” of the Campaign and successfully achieved the mission to create
advantageous conditions for the “Reinforcement Killing” force that was ready to meet and
strike the enemy from many different directions. After having seized Village 2 and Village
3, the 445th Company consolidated its defensive works in order to hold out and repel all the
enemy’s counter-attacks. In withstanding the strong enemy counter-attacks, in only two
days of fighting the 445th Company had suffered nine comrades killed in action (including
Comrade Tín - a platoon-level cadre from the Châu Ro ethnic group61) and tens of other
comrades were wounded. On the second day of the Campaign, the enemy employed their
helicopters to insert the 38th Ranger Battalion from Phú Mỹ (Long Thành) into an area
southwest of Đức Thạnh (in the direction of the bamboo fields along the Soài River). This
enemy force was struck into disarray by 762 Regiment. At 6pm, the remaining elements of
the 38th Ranger Battalion - which had huddled together, were attacked by the 445th
Company and 20 enemy were killed. After four days of holding out in Bình Giả, the 445th
Company was ordered to withdraw from the area and coordinate with the main-force
regiments to attack the enemy’s relief forces. The Company joined with 761 Regiment to
strike and disintegrate the 30th Ranger Battalion.
The 440th Company was then ordered to deploy down to Long Đất – together with
761 Regiment, to attack the enemy at the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector and the surrounding area, and
to create the conditions for 762 Regiment to destroy a squadron/company ((chi đoàn)) of
armoured vehicles advancing on Route 2 to relieve Đất Đỏ. After the fighting, only three of
the enemy’s 14 armoured vehicles remained intact and 100 enemy had been killed –
including nine American advisors.62 The first phase of the Bình Giả Campaign had
concluded in victory.
At 4am on 28 December 1964, the sounds of gunfire opened the second phase of the
Bình Giả Campaign. The 445th Company again struck Bình Giả to lure the enemy into
inserting troops. In this phase, the Company again fought alongside 761 and 762 Regiments
to destroy the 33rd Ranger Battalion and the crack 4th Marine Battalion of the puppet forces’
General Reserve that had been deployed to relieve Bình Giả.
Supported by COSVN and provincial troops, the people, and the armed forces of
the districts and villages, we had blasted wide-open the strategic hamlets on Route 2, Route
52, Route 44 and the coastal areas of Xuyên Mộc – and further developed the resistance
bases from Châu Pha to Hắc Dịch, east and west of Route 2, to join up with War Zone D
and the provinces of Region 6. The momentum of the Revolution’s attacks resounded
everywhere.

60
Translator’s Note: The Bảo An (Civil Defence Force/Civil Guard) – established in 1955, were a local force
who were both armed and uniformed. As noted earlier, in 1964, the Bảo An and the Dân Vệ were replaced
respectively by the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF). However, communist writings
continued to use the term “Bảo An” for the Regional Forces. For detail, see the MACV RF/PF Advisor’s
Handbook: January 1971 - VCAT No. 2171811002; 1970 – 2171811001; 1969 – VCAT No. 0440319001.
61
Translator’s Note: The Châu Ro are a minority Mon-Khmer ethnic group of about 26,800 (2009) of whom
about 85% live in Đồng Nai, Bà Rịa and Long Khánh provinces
62
Translator’s Note: This engagement is related in the Long Đất District History – 1986: “At the end of
December 1964, the 445th Company (Province) assisted the Đất Đỏ area – attacking at Đá Giăng on Route 44
between Long Hải and An Ngãi on 24 December 1964. Long Đất was provided with two 75mm recoilless
rifles (RCL) by 800 Battalion; two companies from the Long Hải training centre were destroyed (150 killed -
including a US advisor).” - Phan Ngọc Danh …, Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Của Huyện Long Đất,
op.cit., 1986, p.121 - see Annex L. 800 Battalion of 272 Regiment was later retitled H-12.
 23

On 3 January 1965, the second period of the Bình Giả Campaign had concluded in
victory.63* COSVN Headquarters now directed that the Campaign be developed along
Route 1 and into Bình Tuy Province.
With a will to continuously and tirelessly attack, all the concentrated mobile forces
of the Province had come of age very quickly. From an armed propaganda force, we had
created many companies to strengthen the districts, and then deployed in continuous
combat. From our very beginnings, we had grown by steps - as demanded by the
Fatherland, and had played an important role in armed propaganda and the fulfillment of
our mission to effectively support the people’s political struggle movement. We had been
the decisive “Fist” that destroyed the “strategic hamlets”. Our combat capability had grown
unceasingly by leaps and bounds – from destroying the wicked thugs, to small attacks by
sections, platoons and companies – and then joining in the combat of a very large
campaign. We had to continuously oppose numerous enemies that were better armed than
us – but we still won. Having contributed importantly to the victory of the Bình Giả
Campaign, General Secretary Lê Duẩn stated “… With the Battle of Ấp Bắc in 1963, the
enemy realized that it would be difficult to defeat us – after the Bình Giả Campaign, the
enemy realized that they had lost to us.”

CHAPTER III

“WE WILL FIGHT AND DEFEAT ANY ENEMY”

The Bình Giả Campaign demonstrated the utter defeat of the Americans’ “Special
Warfare” strategy. However, in accordance with their bellicose nature, the American
imperialists moved from their “Special Warfare” strategy to a strategy of “Limited War”.
With the strength of their wealth, weaponry and war-fighting means, this leading
imperialist nation hoped to crush the morale and fighting will of the Vietnamese people.
To implement their new strategic intrigue, the American imperialists began a
destructive air power war against the North, massing ultra-modern weapons, and pouring
American troops and those of their vassal nations into the South. The whole world turned
its attention to Vietnam in fearful expectation.
Together with the whole of the South, the armed forces and the people of Bà Rịa –
Long Khánh – Biên Hòa 64, under the leadership of the Party, had determined that their
strategic mission was to stand up and confront the invading American aggressors. Our
armed forces at every level were swiftly consolidated and strengthened to respond to the
requirements and demands of the battlefield.
63
* We had removed 1,755 enemy from the battlefield – including 60 American advisors. We had captured
293 enemy, destroyed 45 military vehicles, shot 56 aircraft down in flames, and completely destroyed two
battalions and one armoured vehicle company. We had inflicted heavy casualties on six other battalions.
Importantly, for the first time we had destroyed an armoured company and a battalion of the puppet strategic
reserve (the 4th Marine Battalion). The puppet forces’ tactic of deployment by helicopters and armoured
vehicles had been bankrupted in our great Campaign. Translator’s Note: According to the official history of
the 5th VC Division - 2005, the communist forces at the Battle of Bình Giả inflicted the following casualties:
“2.000 enemy captured; 45 M113s destroyed; 56 aircraft shot down; 611 weapons seized; and three
battalions, an armoured company and two detachments of mechanized vehicles destroyed.” - Phạm Quang
Đinh, Colonel, Lịch Sử Sư đòan Bộ Binh 5 (1965-2005) – The History of the 5th Infantry Division (1965-
2005), The People’s Army Publishing House, Hà Nội, 2005. According to a principal Vietnamese military
history, the Sài Gòn Government’s forces suffered: 1,755 killed; 193 captured; 45 vehicles destroyed (mostly
M113 armoured personnel carriers); and 56 aircraft - Lịch sử Kháng chiến …, Tập 3 (Vol 3), op.cit., 1997.
64
Translator’s Note: The Việt Cộng Bà Biên Province – encompassing Bà Rịa–Long Khánh–Biên Hòa was
first established in April 1963 – see Annex H, Higher Headquarters.
24

On 19 May 1965 – in an area of jungle at Suối Rau (Bà Rịa), the Provincial
Committee founded 445 Battalion. Four Four Five – was the title for a series of groups that
had been used many times, split up and regrouped. Now – on the birthday of our revered
Uncle Hồ, those numbers would go down in history as officially designating a local
battalion !
In essence, the troops and weapons of the two companies – the 440th and the 445th,
were the core elements - together with additional recruits. The Battalion was fully
structured with four companies65* totaling 350 personnel with Comrade Bùi Quang Chánh
(Sáu Chánh)66 as the battalion commander. Comrade Lê Thành Ba (Ba Bùi) – a member of
the Provincial Committee and the deputy political officer of the Provincial Unit, was
appointed the political officer and was concurrently the secretary of the Battalion’s Party
Committee. The Battalion’s Party structure was comprised of five Party Chapters.
At its founding, the Battalion had innumerable problems and was in straitened
circumstances. However, the Provincial Committee paid special attention to all aspects in
order to ensure that the Battalion had sufficient to achieve its tasks.67 The issue of rear
service support required immediate attention and was resolved in stages. Comrade Ba
Tâm68 was appointed the staff officer responsible for rear services, and Comrade Nguyễn
Tuấn Giải (Mười Giải)69 became its adjutant. The Battalion was provided with one hundred
thousand piastres (Sài Gòn currency) by the Province – together with seven tonnes of rice.
The rice was placed in three storehouses in two areas – one in the Suối Rau area and two in

65
* The four companies were three infantry companies and one fire support company: 1st Company: Sáu
Chiến as company commander and Tô Dũng as political officer; 2nd Company: Sáu Thu as commander and
Hai Khanh as political officer; 3rd Company: Năm Thành as commander, Khởi as political officer; 4th
Company: Tư Như as commander, Thống as its political officer.
Translator’s Notes: Subsequently on 20 October 1965, the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit formally promoted: Trần
Văn Chiến (Sáu Chiến) from company executive officer to company commander; Tô Dũng from platoon
leader to assistant political officer; Nguyễn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh) from assistant political officer to
political officer; Nguyễn Đức Thu (Sáu Thu), Trần Văn Khởi, and Nguyễn Văn Thống from platoon leaders
to executive officers - CDEC Log 09-1876-66. Note however, that the date on that document (Command
Committee T.1 No. 602/TB) was incorrectly translated at CDEC as 20 October 1966, instead of 1965.
66
Translator’s Note: Earlier on 23 February 1965, as “Nguyễn Quang Chánh”, Bùi Quang Chánh had been
assigned to the “Bà Rịa Province Concentrated Unit” as the “Battalion Commander” - CDEC Log 09-1863-
66, Bulletin 1063. According to the Đồng Nai History - 1986: “On 19 May 1965 in the Long Tân base (Long
Đất), the Bà Rịa Provincial Committee established the Provincial Main Force [sic] Battalion with the title of
445 – with Comrade Tư Chánh as the Battalion Commander and Comrade Lê Thành Ba as its political
officer.” – Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.123. It appears that the 445 Battalion
History – 1991 (ie the text above) has corrected the name of 445 Battalion’s inaugural commander to “Bùi
Quang Chánh (Sáu Chánh)”. However, a number of other publications have cited Tư Chánh as the initial 445
Battalion Commander – probably influenced by the Đồng Nai History – 1986 eg: the Đồng Nai Monograph –
2001 - Địa Chí Đồng Nai, Nhà Xuẩt Bản Tồng Hợp Đồng Nai, Biên Hòa, 2001. For biographical notes on Bùi
Quang Chánh (Sáu Chánh), see Annex B – Key Cadre.
67
Translator’s Note: On 10 October 1965, 445 Battalion’s 4th (ie Support/Heavy Weapons) Company was
equipped with three 57mm recoilless rifles (RCL) with 50 rounds; two 81mm mortars – with 28
rounds/bombs, three MG-34 machine guns – with 8,000 rounds; and 17 individual weapons – CDEC Log 04-
1322-66.
68
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Thanh Tâm (aka Ba Tâm) – CDEC Log 05-1808-67, Log 05-1797-67. For his
correspondence with the 445 Battalion adjutant - Nguyễn Tuấn Giải (Mười Giải), see CDEC Log 05-3474-67,
Log 05-3406-67. Nguyễn Thanh Tâm – as the Battalion 2ic, was killed in an ambush by the Australian 7th
Battalion (7RAR) on 1 January 1971 at Cà Thi in the Xuyên Mộc area – see footnotes 260 and 262.
69
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Tuấn Giải (Mười Giải - b. Quảng Ngãi, North Vietnam) was noted as a platoon
commander in the 5th Company of 445 Battalion in January 1966, attended a COSVN training course at the
H21 Rear Services School in February-early August 1966, and was formally appointed adjutant (quản lý) of
445 Battalion in September 1966. The Battalion adjutant was responsible for managing rear service support
including finances. Nguyễn Tuấn Giải’s diary indicated that he was enroute from H21 back to Phước Tuy
Province at the time of the Battle of Long Tân on 18 August 1966.
 25

the Suối Lồ Ô area. Additionally, the Battalion had two sewing machines to make uniforms
for the troops. One sewing machine was provided by the Province, while the other
belonged to Miss Năm Mỹ of Hòa Long village who had left and joined our forces - and
her family allowed her to bring the machine to support the Revolution. The Battalion was
also allocated two assistant doctors ((y sĩ)) in order to set up a surgical section under
Comrade Năm Hiếu.70 The surgical section had the capability to resolve and treat minor
wounds, remove appendixes … obviating treatment in a hospital. Each company had from
two to three medics ((y tá)). All of the companies organised their messes on a section basis.
The Battalion immediately conducted tactical training for its soldiers aimed at
responding to the combat requirements facing the unit. Special importance was given by
the Battalion to training in individual combat tactics within the teams and sections in
coordination with combat at the platoon and company level. Based on its tasks and the
particular traits of the operational environment, the Battalion also conducted in-depth
training in a range of basic tactics such as: “ambush”, “mobile ambush”71, “attacks on
camps” … and model-making - specific planning and training areas were also carefully
addressed. There were training areas within the bases and training areas in the field …
training was conducted by day and night. All the companies were engrossed with the
impetus of the training and utterly focused on being victorious in the first battle. Political
studies were undertaken to thoroughly grasp the directives and resolutions of the Party at
all levels and the Battalion’s responsibilities in the new environment. This included
studying the current and longer-term plots of the American imperialists – with political and
military training alternating. In only a short period of time, the tactical and political
standards of the cadre and soldiers in the Battalion had clearly risen. The Battalion’s
training activities continued concurrently with reconnaissance of the enemy’s situation
preparatory to our forces receiving orders for the first battle.72
With training completed, the Battalion organised its forces to attack the enemy at
the Láng Cát strategic hamlet (on Route 15) – but the number of enemy killed was not high,
as they slipped away among the populace. We only seized two weapons, and a number of
our comrades were wounded. Taking aboard the experiences of that battle, the Battalion
concluded that, for this first deployment73, the target had been too complicated and

70
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Văn Hiếu – see CDEC Log 12-2427-66. However, a discrete medical history
reports his name as Nguyễn Thanh Hiếu (Tư Hiếu) – see: Lê Thanh Dũng (et al), Lịch Sử Ngành Y Tế Bà
Rịa-Long Khánh (1945-2006) - The History of the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Medical Services (1945-2006), Vũng
Tàu, 2008.
71
Translator’s Note: “Phục kích vận động” – see discussion of the “mobile ambush” tactic at footnote 79.
72
Translator’s Note: According to a principal Vietnamese history of the War: In May 1965, “the troops of
Xuân Lộc District – together with 445 Provincial Battalion and Military Region main force elements, attacked
and liberated Route 1 from Gia Ray to Rừng Lá ((Long Khánh Province)), and the hamlets of Trà Tân 1 and
Trà Tân 2 on Route 3” - Lịch sử Kháng chiến …, Tập 3 (Vol 3), op.cit., 1997, footnote 16. The 445 Battalion
History does not record any involvement in such engagements in Long Khánh Province in 1965,
73
Translator’s Note: There is little in the 445 Battalion History on the Battalion’s activities in the period to
December 1965. However, in July 1965, the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit reported that, during June, their forces in
the Province were involved in 169 engagements in which 148 enemy were killed, 134 wounded - while
suffering 15 killed and 34 wounded. Almost all activity involved district forces and village guerrillas – CDEC
Log 12-2987-66. More specifically, two subsequently captured Letters of Appreciation signed by Lê Thành
Ba - the 445 Battalion political officer, commended two personnel of the 4th Company for their “outstanding
combat exploits” in a successful attack on Bà Rịa on 16 (or 26) July 1965 – CDEC Log 12-2425-66. Morale
problems were later discussed at a four-day political conference held by the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit in mid-
September 1965, and it was reported that 44 personnel in the Province had deserted in the preceding two-
month period (July, August) – including eight from 445 Battalion, 10 from the Long Đất District Unit, eight
from the Châu Đức District Unit and four from the Bình Châu (Xuyên Mộc) guerrilla unit. The main reasons
cited for desertion were: fear of death, shelling - particularly enemy aircraft attacks, hardship - and a
preference for the “easy” life at home – CDEC Log 09-2601-66 (signed by Bá [sic] Liên – Head of the
26

consequently our aim had not been achieved. But, more basically, we had been able to
achieve mutual tactical support between our attacking elements.74
On 23 December 1965, the Battalion deployed to attack the enemy at the Five-
Building Complex75 in the town of Long Điền (Bà Rịa). An element of the Long Điền
District police force occupied the Five-Building Complex. Its system of defences was
rudimentary – there were no defensive positions, blockhouses, or trenches, and there was
only a single simply-constructed surrounding fence. To approach this Complex, we would
have to cross open rice fields, and there were a large number of enemy guard posts on the
tracks. The enemy had never been attacked here – so consequently they were very
complacent.
We collected information on the enemy and also focused on our own capabilities. In
order to guarantee victory and to create a momentum and resolve for the whole unit, the
Battalion leadership decided to employ all of the Battalion’s companies in the battle with
the reconnaissance force as a core element – together with Party members, Youth Group
members and a number of the local people who had a heroic fighting spirit. The selected
force was in excess of two companies – divided into three spearhead thrusts. The
reconnaissance element led by Comrade Năm Tranh and Comrade Bảy Bình was divided
into two teams that would lead the two infantry thrusts. The attacking elements were
reinforced with a 57mm recoilless rifle set up 300 metres from the Five-Building Complex.
A further 2nd Company group led by Nguyễn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh) was assigned the
task of blocking any enemy reinforcements that might come from the direction of Vạn
Kiếp.76 The Battalion headquarters was established within Long Điền Town, about 500
metres from the objective. Comrade Sáu Chánh and Comrade Ba Liên were in direct
command (Comrade Ba Liên had just replaced Comrade Ba Bùi as the political officer).77
This was the first time that a battle had been commanded using a telephone system. Our
communications soldiers had surmounted every obstacle to ensure constant liaison –
including the techniques for using the equipment and laying the telephone lines in enemy-
controlled areas.
By midnight, the attacking elements had completely concealed themselves in the
Town and finalized their tactical deployments. Comrade Năm Tranh and Comrade Hùng
(the commanders of the two spearheading forces) used pliers to secretly cut sections of the
barbed-wire security fence. Comrade Năm Tranh then crawled through with an explosive
charge, placed it against the base of a wall, and moved back. An explosion resounded
throughout the Town – following which the 57mm recoilless rifle fired three rounds at its
target. The enemy had been attacked by surprise – some were killed, others were wounded,
and a number of those remaining ran helter-skelter seeking somewhere to dig in. At the
same time, our reconnaissance elements and infantry in the two spearhead groups
simultaneously assaulted – throwing a large number of grenades into the enemy buildings.
Our grenades and the fire of our supporting weapons demolished one building. Over 30

Political Section of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit – the signature is identical to that of Đổ Văn Liên - aka Ba
Liên, who became the 445 Battalion political officer soon after, see footnote 77).
74
Translator’s Note: According to the 5th Division History - 2005, in mid-December 1965, a coordinating
conference was held between the staffs of the 5th Division, “the 445th Bà Rịa Battalion, the 25th Long Đất
Company and the 240th Company” to plan future activity.
75
Translator’s Note: Literally: “lầu Năm Căn” – possibly a five-storied building.
76
Translator’s Note: A few kilometres to the west of Long Điền, the ARVN Vạn Kiếp National Training
Centre was located on Bà Rịa Town’s eastern outskirts.
77
Translator’s Note: Ba Liên - ie Đổ Văn Liên, had been the Head of the Political Section of the Bà Rịa
Provincial Unit up until at least late September 1965 – see footnote 73 and Annex B – Key Cadre. Ba Bùi (Lê
Thành Ba) appears to have been posted to the Political Section of Bà Rịa Provincial Unit – CDEC Log 09-
1883-66 and subsequently to Long Đất District – see Annex L, footnote 30.
 27

enemy were eliminated from the battlefield. Our soldiers quickly seized the buildings one-
by-one and continued to pursue the enemy. After a few minutes of our surprise attack, a
number of the surviving enemy retreated to higher floors of the buildings. Blocking the
stairways, they hurled down a large number of grenades, and our forces suffered many
casualties. Comrade Hùng – the leader of one of the attacking groups, and Comrade Lực –
a very experienced soldier in the reconnaissance element, both died heroically ! In the
darkness, we could no longer determine the enemy’s positions in the nooks and crannies of
the stairwells and were therefore unable to rush up to the higher floors and wipe out the
enemy. The 2nd Company’s combat group was able to kill more than 10 enemy as the
enemy’s relief elements advanced to destroy our blockade. After an hour of fighting, the
Battalion headquarters ordered our attacking groups to withdraw their troops.
Our wounded and our dead were taken back to Long Phước village. Mr Hồ Văn
Quang and the villagers in Đông hamlet (Long Phước) prepared food and drink, resting
places, bandages and medicine for our soldiers – and treated the wounded and buried the
dead. … At daybreak, the people of Long Phước organised a group of labourers who –
together with our soldiers, carried the wounded on stretchers, as well as rice, back to our
base area.
The battle at the Five-Building Complex in Long Điền – the first coordinated
tactical battle at battalion-minus level in a town by 445 Battalion had destroyed much of
the enemy’s strength and crippled an important element of the Sub-Sector’s police forces.
The repercussions were wide-ranging - intimidating the morale of the enemy troops and
their officers. The battle proved our ability to organise, to infiltrate and conceal a quite
large force – and to defeat the enemy right in his lair. However, the battle also revealed our
weaknesses in tactics, technical aspects and the choice of combat formations. We had only
studied combat coordination at the section and platoon level within a company context –
but we had then fought at battalion level. We had trained on the individual techniques of
deploying and fighting the enemy in jungle and mountain environments and in their camps
… - but then we had attacked them in a town that had the characteristics of city-fighting.
The result was that we were confused when the enemy fought back from the higher floors
of buildings using grenades and causing us many casualties – and we were not able to
achieve our goal. This was the first lesson that 445 Battalion’s Party Committee and
leadership drew and planned to implement in future engagements.
The victory in our first battle had the power to fire with enthusiasm the spirit and
will-to-fight throughout the whole Battalion. Although we had suffered casualties, the
troops never flinched – death was something that had to be accepted. The Party Committee
and the Battalion’s leadership continued to train and develop the unit’s tactics – while, on
the other hand, deploying the reconnaissance group to study future battlefields in
preparation for a large ambush action that would involve the whole Battalion. This would
implement the slogan: “Go forth for victory – attack to the end” and build the basis for the
Battalion’s tradition. After three weeks of close and arduous observation of the enemy, the
Battalion’s reconnaissance element had fully grasped the enemy’s deployment methods in a
number of locations - including the ambush site at Đá Giăng. The tactical plan for the
ambush at Đá Giăng was then approved by the Province cadre.
Đá Giăng was a location on Inter-Provincial Route 44 that ran from Long Điền to
Long Hải. The enemy’s Non-Commissioned Officers School for Phước Tuy Province was
in Long Hải. Their training grounds were in the valley at the foot of Minh Đạm Mountain.78

78
Translator’s Note: The Minh Đạm is a range of hills – and a Việt Minh/Việt Cộng base area/secret zone
within the areas/boundaries of the villages of Tam An, Phước Long Hội, Phước Hải and Long Hải - (of Long
Đất District in modern-day Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Province). The Minh Đạm area is more than nine kilometres
long and almost five kilometres at its widest. See The Minh Đạm History – 2006 at Annex M.
28

Every day, when moving to their training grounds, the enemy had to pass along the stretch
of road at the Đá Giăng bend. They moved in a close formation with less than 10 metres
between each soldier. On their way to the training area, hundreds of “student soldiers”
would shuffle along in a column many kilometres long – some singing aloud to themselves.
The foregoing were the basic factors why we decided to mount a mobile ambush79 at Đá
Giăng.80
On the night of 7 January 1966, the four companies of 445 Battalion – together with
an element of the Long Đất local troops81 secretly threaded their way past the enemy posts
to Đá Giăng (Long Hải) to set the ambush. The 2nd Company was tasked as the forward
group (located near the base of Minh Đạm Mountain) and was reinforced with a 57mm
recoilless rifle from the 4th (Fire Support) Company. The 1st Company had the task of
killing the enemy at the “Decisive point”82 (the centre section). The 3rd Company was the
rear element (close to the village of Long Hải). A platoon led by Quang Hổ was stationed
on the edge of the salt fields opposite the killing ground of the ambush (in the Rừng Sác).
The ambush site was almost 3 kilometres in length and about one kilometre from the road.
The Battalion’s headquarters was located on Minh Đạm Mountain. Comrade Nguyễn Việt
Hoa (Mười Thà)83 – the commander of the Provincial Unit, Comrade Sáu Chánh – the
Battalion commander, and Comrade Ba Liên – the Battalion political officer, were in direct
command.
By midnight, all of the ambush groups had deployed into their ambush positions. At
1am, a team from the platoon in the ambush group located in the Rừng Sác salt fields came
to the headquarters and reported that the tide was coming in, and they would be unable to
conceal themselves. This unexpected situation worried the command element: if there was
no group in that area, the enemy would be able to escape into the area and fight back like
“trapped rats”. After thinking for a while, Comrade Ba Liên said to Comrade Mười Thà and
Comrade Sáu Chánh :
- “I guarantee you that at first light the tide will slowly drop. I still remember the
proverb by which our countrymen calculate the tide heights: In January, July
it’s clear-cut, on the 5th and the 19th of the month it comes in between 7am and
9am – then the ebb occurs from 9am to 11am.” 84
- “Is that correct ?” – Mười Thà responded, slapping Ba Liên on the shoulder.
- “Yes, it’s right !”
79
Translator’s Note: Việt Cộng ambushes were generally classified as either area, static, mobile or
manoeuvre. Detailed discussion on such from a Việt Cộng doctrinal publication is in McAulay, L., The Battle
of Long Tan, Arrow Books, London, 1987 – see Appendix 4 “The Vietcong Ambush”. A recent analysis by a
senior Australian military historian cites a Việt Cộng “annihilation /triple ambush plan” that became an
“encounter battle” - Ekins, A., “Unravelling the riddles of Long Tan”, Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War
Memorial, Canberra, July 2011, pp.46-47. See also footnote 145 for discussion of “ambush” or “attack”.
80
Translator’s Note: Several “Letters of Commendation” were awarded by the 445 Battalion Commander –
Bùi Quang Chánh (Sáu Chánh), for exploits at the Đá Giăng battle on “Route 44” – including for the 57mm
recoilless rifle section of the 4th Company – see CDEC Log 12-2425-66. Đá Giăng is sometimes misspelt in
communist sources as “Đá Vắng” – and on some maps appears as Núi (Mount) Đá Dung. The ambush
occurred in the vicinity of grid reference (GR) YS 432549.
81
Translator’s Note: The involvement of the Long Đất District unit is described in the Long Đất District
History – 1986 ie Phan Ngọc Danh …, Lịch Sử … Huyện Long Đất, op.cit., 1986 - see Annex L.
82
Translator’s Note: “Quyết chiến điểm” – as noted earlier, the ambush “killing ground”.
83
Translator’s Note: Captured Việt Cộng documents show the commander of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit in
1965 to mid-1966 was Nguyễn Văn Mười - ie the cover name for Nguyễn Việt Hoa (Mười Thà). Nguyễn Văn
Mười – as the commander of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit, signed several Letters of Appreciation including for
a sapper/reconnaissance member of the 445 Battalion’s 5th Company for exploits at the Đá Vắng [sic] battle
on 8 January 1966 – CDEC Log 06-1013-66.
84
Translator’s Note: Literally: “Tháng giêng, tháng bảy phân minh, mồng năm, mười chín, thìn sinh, ty hồi.”
– however, the last two words should read “tỵ hồi”.
 29

- “Okay – go down and directly encourage the men. They can climb into the trees
or get soaked in the water – as long as they hold that position. Remind them that
to surprise the enemy, they must not open fire until the enemy is very close.”

Ba Liên then returned with the troops to their ambush position.

At 8am, the tide dropped, but the enemy had not appeared. By 10am, there was still
no sign of them. The villagers were going to work in large numbers, and any who saw our
troops were temporarily detained until the battle would be over. The atmosphere in the
headquarters was becoming increasing tense and deeply worrying. At midday on 8 January
1966, two wheeled armoured vehicles (“copper pot” vehicles) appeared leading hundreds
of enemy troops and moving into the battle area. The whole Battalion held its breath and
waited in anticipation. The enemy had stumbled into our ambush site. The leading
armoured vehicle was 200 metres from our forward group when the order was given to fire
the 57mm recoilless rifle. The round hit the vehicle’s hull, and it slowly reversed while
rapidly firing its heavy machinegun. The enemy column began to pile up. At that moment,
Nguyễn Văn Quang opened fire with his heavy machinegun, and the weapons of all
calibres in the forward group also fired furiously into the enemy infantry. Not giving the
enemy any time to regain their composure, the 2nd Company - as the leading spearhead,
rushed out at the enemy. At the same time, the rear group also stormed forward. While
rushing towards the enemy, our soldiers fired their weapons, threw grenades and loudly
shouted: “Attack”. Screaming in panic, the enemy huddled in the middle of the road and
returned fire. Then, the 1st Company rushed to attack the “killing ground” and spit
scornfully in the faces of the enemy. A very large number of the enemy were killed – and
the remainder ran for their lives in the direction of the salt fields. Quang Hổ and his platoon
– with their clothes soaked, were in the bushes of the Rừng Sác and, wholly unexpected by
the enemy, fired into their ranks. Bodies lay all around, and blood spread into the salt pans.
After only ten minutes of fighting, the enemy had been wiped out, and our troops in
the four groups met and “shook hands”. One enemy company and two other platoons had
been eliminated - and we seized 32 weapons, set fire to two armoured vehicles and
captured 25 prisoners.85 It took more than two days for the enemy to recover their dead.
Weeks later, the villagers going to their fields were still picking up enemy weapons and
ammunition which they handed over to our troops.
The Đá Giăng Victory – resulting from the first battalion-level mobile ambush
conducted by the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion, will live forever in history.86 Even
now at 445 Battalion anniversary celebrations, those soldiers who were present at Đá Giăng

85
Translator’s Note: A captured Việt Cộng document claims that at Đá Giăng, the communist forces
“appealed to US troops to surrender” unsuccessfully, so they “shot and killed them all” – see CDEC Log 03-
1270-66. According to the Đồng Nai Monograph – 2001: on 24 December 1965, 445 Battalion with C25
Company (Long Đất) destroyed two companies of NCOs from the Long Hải Regional Forces Training Centre
- Địa Chí Đồng Nai, op.cit., 2001.
86
Translator’s Note: On 15 May 1966 – vide Decision #49/QD-KT, the Headquarters of the South
Vietnamese Liberation Army awarded the Liberation Military Exploits Medal 2nd Class to the “Concentrated
Battalion of Bà Rịa Province” for its “destruction of the Long Hải NCO School students on 8 January 1966”
and its “superior performance of duties in the Phước Thành Battle on 26 April 1966.” – CDEC Log 09-1972-
66. Letters of Commendation were also awarded to 445 Battalion personnel for the Đá Giăng battle –
including to platoon commander Nguyễn Văn Ái and squad leader Hồ Văn Phong – see CDEC Log 12-2413-
66. On 10 January 1966, the Battalion Political Officer – Đỗ Văn Liên (Ba Liên), wrote a letter of condolence
to the parents of section commander Nguyễn Quốc Thống “killed in a battle on Route 44 on 8 January 1966”
– CDEC Log 01-1032-67.
30

speak of the battle as a resounding combat exploit likened to the sound of waves crashing
on the shore.87
Also at the beginning of 1966, the Battalion conducted an ambush on Route 15 with
the aim of destroying military transport vehicles and seizing war booty to equip our unit’s
logistic personnel who lacked equipment. The Battalion destroyed six trucks of the South
Korean forces and seized a quantity of white cloth (lengths of cloth) which was later dyed
and made into uniforms. At this time, the Battalion also organised a production unit – led
by Comrade Hai Hồ, comprised of those comrades who were disabled or feeble, and which
was set up in overgrown bushy areas. In but a short time, the production unit had cultivated
five sào88 - principally growing vegetables, raising pigs, chicken and cattle … and
providing a place where our disabled and wounded could convalesce while producing some
grain and food for our unit. As the area was close to the enemy, the cultivated area could
not be extensive. Consequently, throughout its setting-up period and development, the
production unit was only able to function as a “Production improvement” programme – and
was not able to provide “Self-sufficient production”.
At the beginning of 1966, across the Southern battlefield, the Americans and their
vassals had increased their strength to 200,000. The puppet troops numbered over 500,000.
44 American battalions had been brought into the South. In Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa – Long
Khánh, the 173rd Airborne Brigade89 and an element of the 1st “Big Red One” Division had
completed the deployment of their forces. Westmoreland’s “search and destroy” tactics –
together with Phase 1 of their “Limited War” strategy90* was being implemented in a hectic
manner.
The American military massed into the South with the rashness and bellicose
characteristics of that leading imperialist nation. However, from the first days, they
stumbled up against the fierce resistance of a people who had never submitted to any
invading foreign aggressor.91 The resounding victories of our the troops and the people of
the South at Văn Tường, Núi Thành, Bầu Bàng and Plâyme … had all stirred public
opinion world-wide. Hundreds of Americans and many of their battalions had been wiped
out in a battle that made them panic. These feats-of-arms were increasingly a source of

87
Translator’s Note: The Đá Giăng battle of early January 1966 is not mentioned in the published history of
the Minh Đạm “Secret Zone” Base – ie Phạm Chí Thân, Căn Cứ Minh Đạm, op.cit., 2006. However, on 22
March 1966, a force comprising Việt Cộng sappers (240C Company) and an artillery element from the 5th VC
Division moved from the Minh Đạm base and attacked and shelled the Vũng Tàu airfield and the Chí Linh
Rural Development Cadre Training Centre in Vũng Tàu – see Phạm Chí Thân, Căn Cứ Minh Đạm, op.cit.,
2006, pp.47-48. The Eastern Năm Bộ Region citation for the attack on Vũng Tàu shows the date of the attack
as 12 March – CDEC Log 09-1880-66; as does the COSVN award of the Liberation Combat Achievement
Medal 3rd Class – CDEC Log 09-2189-66. See also the account of the attack in the 5th Division History –
2005 at Annex I, footnote 10. According to a rallier (hồi chánh) from 240C Sapper Company, the unit
incorporated a platoon from 445 Battalion and had undergone training directed by Sáu Chánh - the
commander of 445 Battalion prior to the attack on Vũng Tàu – MACV Report 6 026 1864 7. The organisation
of 240C and preparations for the attack on “13 March 1966” are detailed in the MACV Report.
88
Translator’s Note: One sào is an area of 360 square metres. The cultivation method was “làm rẫy” – ie the
“slash and burn” technique.
89
Translator’s Note: The 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived at Biên Hòa in early May 1965.
90
* Phase 1 (July-December 1965) - to destroy our Wet Season plans and rapidly deploy the American
military and its vassals. Phase 2 (1966-1967) – to launch a strategic counter-offensive to destroy our main-
force elements and control the rural areas. Phase 3 (1967-1968) - to finish off our main-force elements,
destroy our bases (control the jungle and mountain areas) and withdraw American forces. Source: Selected
Writings of Hồ Chí Minh – Book 2, Sự Thật Publishing House, 1980, p.367.
91
Translator’s Note: The Chinese occupied Vietnam on several occasions – the longest being from 111 BC to
939 AD, see Bắc-Thuộc Thời-Đại (The Period of Northern Occupation) in Trần Trọng Kim, Việt-Nam Sử-
Lược - A Summary of Vietnam’s History , Edition 7, Tân Việt, Sài Gòn, 1964, pp.45-81.
 31

strong encouragement for the morale and will-to-fight of our troops in their struggle for
victory over the invading American aggressors.
To complement the momentum of the whole nation’s resolve to fight the
Americans, 445 Battalion launched an emulation movement to kill the foreign aggressors
throughout 1966. This merit programme was divided into three phases (each of three
months duration). The first phase was termed the “Determined to fight and defeat the
invading American foreign aggressors” movement. The Battalion promulgated the
emulation targets for each of the units and their personnel. Being the first to be granted the
honourable title of “Valiant Killer of Americans”92 created noisy discussion. Across the
whole Battalion, all unanimously registered as one to be “Valiant Killers of Americans”.
The resolve within the Battalion had never been so enthusiastic. The companies shook
hands pledging emulation competitions and loudly shouted the teachings of the revered
Uncle Hồ: “… Overcome every difficulty, fight and defeat every enemy !”.
Having developed its logistic base at Biên Hòa, the Americans’ 173rd Airborne
Brigade launched a very destructive sweeping operation into the base area of the Biên Hòa
Provincial Committee at Gang Tói (Đại An – Vĩnh Cửu), but they were given a hiding and
dealt a warning blow by the troops and guerrillas of Vĩnh Cửu (Biên Hòa) - and lost 100
killed.
At the beginning of April 196693, the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed a force to
sweep the Long Thành and Bà Rịa areas aimed at eliminating the nerve centres of our Bà
Rịa – Long Khánh Province and guaranteeing the security of National Route 15 to transport
the Americans’ weapons and war materiel from Vũng Tàu to Biên Hòa – Sài Gòn.
Having thoroughly grasped the new combat guidelines promulgated by the
Provincial Committee, the Military Region and COSVN headquarters, the leadership of
445 Battalion was directly instructed by the Provincial Unit to deeply examine all aspects
and strengthen and adjust the unit’s operating methods and tactics. Although the Battalion
had yet to clash with the American infantry, the companies were directed to thoroughly
absorb the combat ideology, develop a spirit of initiative and creativeness in their methods
of attack, and increase the dispersal of their teams and sub-elements in order to swiftly
attack the enemy. The companies were to coordinate orders for opening fire – and, when
necessary, concentrate their forces rapidly to strike the enemy blow-by-blow. They were to
stand firm, strike a warning blow against the Americans and resolve to defeat them in the
first battle. The companies would gain experience while fighting.

92
Translator’s Note: On 22 February 1966, the Political Section of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit issued a
directive on establishing “Anti-American Belts” (ie zones) and the “Killing Americans Campaign” – CDEC
Log 09-1879-66. A week earlier on 15 February 1966, the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit awarded 445 Battalion’s 1st
Company and the Long Đất District Unit the rotating “Determined to Fight and Defeat the Americans” flag –
CDEC Log 04-1394-66. For the criteria for the award of the title “Valiant Killer of Americans”, see the
Group 84 Circular dated 5 July 1966 with the attached COSVN memorandum dated 5 February 1966 – CDEC
Log 12-1913-66. In September 1966, the Military Political Department of the National Liberation Front
promulgated a clarifying instruction on awards – by grade, of the “Valiant Killers” programme that noted
American vassals (chu hầu – comprising troops from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Korea)
were included in the programme – VCAT Item No. 23119093001.
93
Translator’s Note: The 445 Battalion history does not mention the major ARVN operation Dân Tâm 36 (22
February-5 March 1966) into the Đức Thạnh, Xuân Son, Bình Ba, Tam Long (Tam Long = Hòa Long, Long
Phước, Long Tân), and Minh Đạm areas. A detailed report by an element of the Bà Rịa Provincial Committee
(C900 – ie the intelligence staff) dated 16 March 1966 is at CDEC Log 09-2447-66. That report claimed that
206 enemy were killed, 73 wounded and two weapons seized in the engagements. Subsequently, on 29 March
1966, the Political Section of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit produced a directive on “political activities” deemed
necessary following “counter-sweep operations” in the Long Tân area in the period 23-28 February indicating
morale problems in 445 Battalion – CDEC Log 09-1882-66.
32

In implementing the Battalion’s combat concept, the companies were always

organised into two elements. One element was dispersed by teams to conduct
reconnaissance on the enemy and launch lightning attacks. Another element was ready to
deploy for a coordinated attack when ordered.
When conducting reconnaissance close to the enemy, the infantry teams were - at
the same time, effective “aircraft-hunters”. Using all types of infantry weapons, the soldiers
of 445 Battalion shot to smithereens tens of American aircraft during the Americans’ first
sweeping operations. 445 Battalion regularly engaged American aircraft involved in
heliborne operations east and west of Route 2. The aircraft-hunter team led by Comrade
Chinh shot down four UH-1A American aircraft in one day. Comrade Nhan and Comrade
Trí even shot down heavy-lift “crane” aircraft (CH5494 and CH4795) with oblique and
flanking fire.
On 8 April 1966, the Battalion’s reconnaissance elements reported that the
Americans were landing troops on the tactical airstrip at Bà Lang (Bình Giả). Assessing the
weak points of the American force when it had just landed in this new area preparatory to
launching a large sweeping operation, the Battalion headquarters directed a swift attack on
the Bà Lang tactical airstrip using two mortars – one 81mm calibre and the other 61mm
[sic] calibre, of the 4th Fire Support Company with the company commander - Comrade Tư
Như96, in direct command.
The reconnaissance element guided the 4th Company’s mortar section, and assisted
their survey activities and the selection of a firing base. On the night of 8 April, the mortar
section traversed four kilometres of jungle – pushing their way forward, and carrying their
mortars and ammunition to a position 500 metres from the Bà Lang airstrip. From there,
they fired their mortars by “applied fire” (observing and adjusting the fall-of-shot by sight –
and not requiring the optical aiming equipment and other technical elements of artillery
troops). At 4am, when the enemy was soundly sleeping after a day of field operations – and
their aircraft, artillery and vehicles were in jumbled groups, 35 mortar rounds from 445
Battalion rent the air and plunged down on the enemy. The whole of the Bà Lang tactical
airstrip was enveloped in smoke, fire and loud explosions. 12 helicopters and four M113
armoured vehicles were smashed to pieces, and 20 Americans were killed and wounded.
On the next day, our Provincial authorities sent a message commending this latest
combat exploit by the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion.97 This first feat-of-arms - that
destroyed a large quantity of weapons, war materiel and Americans in Bà Rịa, was a
significant exploit by the reconnaissance troops and the artillery of 445 Battalion. This
evidenced the failure of Westmoreland’s “search and destroy” tactics in those first years in
which the whole nation attacked the Americans together.
Secrecy, surprise ambushes - and using concentrated forces to wipe out large
numbers of enemy in their very dens, were the versatile methods employed by our local
troops who were familiar with the terrain and also thoroughly understood the enemy’s
operational methods. These were our tactical strong points that - in the spirit and tradition
of the earlier 445th and 440th Companies, were passed down and adopted by 445 Battalion.
While still employing its forces against the enemy’s sweeping operations98 on Route 2, the
94
CH-54 Sky Crane helicopter.
95
CH-47 Chinook helicopter – passenger capacity 35.
96
Translator’s Note: Phan Văn Như (aka Tư Như) was formally appointed Company Commander of the 4th
Combat Support Company by the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit on 9 December 1965 – CDEC Log 09-1830-66,
Item 7. He is also noted as the Company’s inaugural commander – see footnote 65.
97
Translator’s Note: Hoàng Văn Lý of the 4th Company was awarded a Certificate of Commendation by the
Bà Rịa Provincial Unit for his role in the attack on Bà Lang. – CDEC Log 09-1830-66, Item 10.
98
Translator’s Note: Letters of Appreciation were awarded by the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit to soldiers of the 1st,
2 and 4th Companies of 445 Battalion for action in counter-sweep operations in the Đồng Ngọc Khải/Xuân
nd
 33

Battalion concentrated its elements to launch a surprise attack to wipe out the enemy deep
in the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector and support the district troops, the guerrillas, and the political
struggle movement of the people. Having been supplied by the people with information on
the enemy, on 24 April 1966, the Battalion used its concentrated forces to mount a mobile
ambush in the Bà Kỳ Slope area (Phước Thạnh) less than one kilometre from the Đất Đỏ
Sub-Sector. After an hour of fighting, the Battalion had wiped out a “Panther Skin”
commando99 company of the puppet military. One of the enemy captains was brought to
justice, many other enemy soldiers were captured, and 53 weapons were seized together
with two radios. Also, this was the first battle in which our Battalion’s soldiers seized the
American “rapid-fire light machinegun” (AR 15).100
With the support of the Provincial Unit, the Phước Thạnh village Party Chapter
immediately led the people to destroy the “New Life Hamlet”101 set up by the enemy, and
won a great victory by organizing almost 100 of our countrymen to flock to the Đất Đỏ
Sub-Sector demanding compensation for the lost lives of their husbands, children and
property.
Following our battle success in the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector, the whole Battalion
deployed to the area of Route 2 to continue the fight against the enemy’s sweeping
operations. We also fought a decisive battle there – our first battalion-level engagement by
the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion against the Americans in the Jackfruit Gardens base
area of Sông Cầu.
For a long time, 445 Battalion had determined that the base areas were not only a
place to billet its troops – but rather they were a rear base, a training area, and a decisive
point within which to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy in a battalion defensive battle.
At this time, the Battalion’s rear base area was usually established in two locations - the
“primary rear base” and the “combat rear base”. The combat rear base was normally set up
on the axes of the enemy’s principal sweeping operations (as assessed by the Battalion) and
a few kilometres away from the primary rear base. The positions of the companies were
arranged in a formation like the “feet of a cooking tripod”102 - with defensive works,
strongly-built shelters and trenches. Assumptions on the enemy’s attack tactics were
included in our combat plans and practised daily. The companies were deployed 500-1,000
metres apart as the sides of a triangle, and ready to strike to the flank to aid each other if
attacked by the enemy.
On 18 May 1966, while all of the military cadre (company and battalion-level) were
preparing the battlefield and only the political cadre were in the base arranging political
study material for the Battalion, one of our reconnaissance soldiers ran into the base in
panic:

Sơn area of Châu Đức District in the period 1-8 April 1966 – see CDEC Log 09-1830-66, Items 9 and 15;
Log 12-2405-66, Items 8 and 10; Log 09-1863-66, Items 8 and 10.
99
Translator’s Note: The text uses the term “biệt kích” – a term used by the communist forces for enemy
commando/special forces- type troops eg the Civilian Irregular Defence Groups/Mobile Strike Force
(CIDG/Mike Force) elements, the Special Air Service and earlier Diệm-era forces. In February 1960,
President Diệm established 75 150-man commando companies – later to become ARVN Ranger units (ie the
Biệt Động Quân). A “1st Commando Company” was based in Hòa Long village adjacent to 1 ATF in June
1966. In this case, the ARVN unit is probably an ARVN Ranger element – ie Biệt Động Quân.
100
Translator’s Note: Letters of Appreciation were awarded by the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit to soldiers of the of
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Companies of 445 Battalion for action in the Đất Đỏ/Phước Thạnh area in the period 24-26
April 1966 – see CDEC Log 09-1830-66, Items 8, 11 and 14; Log 12-2405-66, Item 9; Log 09-1863-66,
Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11 and 14.
101
Translator’s Note: Literally “Ấp Tân Sinh” – see footnote 30.
102
Translator’s Note: Literally: “Chân Kiếng” – but should be spelt as “Chân Kiềng”.
34

- “Comrade Commander, one of our minority countrymen has told me that there
is a unit with a large number of strange-looking soldiers – with blue eyes,
aquiline noses, and including some with coal-black skin and speaking raucously
like highland minority people, and they are moving tactically towards our base.”
- “Americans ! The Americans are here”. Ba Liên bit his lips for a moment.
“Comrade, report back to the reconnaissance element - stay very close to the
enemy and lure them slowly in the direction of the 2nd Company. It is
imperative that you fire on them, then withdraw quickly and let them follow
you. Remember, in the direction of the 2nd Company !”
- “I understand !” After a very short reply, the reconnaissance soldier ran off.

Ba Liên called Hai Khanh – the political officer of the 2nd Company, for a very brief
meeting – nominally a conference of the Standing Committee of the Battalion’s Party
Chapter, to decide on tactics. Following this, orders for the deployment of the companies
were sent down.
The company political officer Tô Dũng also ran off like a flying shuttle103 - running
back to check the teams’ fighting positions for a last time. Nguyễn Văn Quang’s heavy
machinegun was sited in the defences on the edge of the rubber plantation’s dyke and very
carefully camouflaged.
The Battalion’s reconnaissance element had fired on the enemy and correctly lured
them in the direction ordered by the Battalion. In the whole base area, there wasn’t a single
shadow of anyone above ground – all was ready awaiting the enemy.
The American soldiers were huge in their flak vests and staggered into the battle
area. When the enemy was only 50 metres away, the whole of the 2nd Company suddenly
opened fire. From the very first volley, tens of Americans fell down headlong. In the
pandemonium, they screamed raucously, fell to the ground, and crawled about in disorder
trying to set up a defensive formation. Nguyễn Văn Quang noticed an American 60mm
mortar firing rounds into our positions. He quickly dragged his heavy machinegun in that
direction, fired a burst, and many Americans writhed about in pools of blood. However,
they still clustered around their mortar and continued firing – and suddenly the mortar
became a focus point for the destructive fire of Nguyễn Văn Quang’s machinegun. With a
large number of American soldiers being killed, the enemy worried about retrieving their
dead rather than fighting back. They were only concerned with recovering their comrades’
bodies under our fire – and more fell. Bodies piled up on one another. The cadre and
soldiers of 445 Battalion had discovered the Americans’ weak point as soon as the enemy
had set foot on the Bà Rịa battlefield.
While the enemy was focused on its engagement with the 2nd Company, the 1st and
rd
3 Companies sortied forth and attacked the enemy’s flank. However, our exposed forces
were discovered by the enemy who quickly deployed into blocking positions. After a few
minutes of combat and wiping out a number of Americans, the 1st and 3rd Companies
withdrew to their defences.
The enemy poured in additional troops, but were unable to seize our base. They dug
commanding defensive positions and called in armed helicopters (AH1G)104 to fire fiercely
into our formations. Follow this, their infantry attacked again, but they couldn’t move
forward an inch. Our soldiers held firm in their defences and repelled tens of counter-
attacks by the American infantry. Comrade Nguyễn Văn Quang’s machinegun alone shot

103
Translator’s Note: Tô Dũng was the political officer of the 1st Company. A “flying shuttle” (“Con thoi”) ie
is a reference to a shuttle used in weaving ie that is passed rapidly across the threads in the warp.
104
Translator’s Note: The AH-1G Cobra helicopter - equipped with miniguns, 2.75 inch rockets and 40mm
grenade launchers.
 35

down tens of Americans around their 60mm mortar. Late in the afternoon – as it became
dark, the whole Battalion abandoned the base.105
In 445 Battalion’s first face-to-face engagement with the American 173rd Airborne
Brigade, the Battalion had removed over a hundred enemy from the battlefield. As a result
of this victory over the Americans, our resolve was increasingly effervescent. Even when
withdrawing, our men excitedly discussed the battle, laughed and chattered boisterously.
When they heard the sounds of gunfire in the base area, our military cadre comrades
who had gone to study future battlefields turned about and returned. Later, the Battalion
organised a military affairs conference to gain experience from our first battle with the
Americans. From this, the Battalion determined four problem areas:
The Americans’ firepower was very strong – comprising their infantry, artillery and
air firepower. Their “Lẹp Fish106” armed helicopters (AH1G) were very dangerous and
capable of blasting our firing positions with their rockets. However, the American infantry
were timorous; their individual mobility was slow; they only attacked on one axis; and
when their soldiers were killed, they worried more about recovering the bodies than
continuing the attack. They were also very afraid of close combat.
If we were to confront the Americans in a conventional manner over a protracted
period, we would be wiped out by their firepower. To be victorious over the Americans, we
would have to exploit surprise and attack aggressively. By close combat – “grabbing them
by their belts”, we would be able to make their firepower ineffective. We needed to
increase guerrilla-style attacks, deploy in small groups and deliver lightning attacks by both
day and night whenever they were getting ready to attack us. In this way, their thinking
would be affected – they would become wary and apprehensive before setting out on
operations and clearing sweeps.
After the battle in the Jackfruit Gardens at Sông Cầu107, the Americans deployed
their forces to attack into the Đất Gai and Long Phước areas108 with the aim of gathering all
the people of Long Phước into Long Điền – Đất Đỏ, and thereby expanding the security
zone for their key position at Núi Đất. 445 Battalion continued to engage the Americans in
this area. One of the Battalion’s platoons held the Long Phước tunnel system and, for a full
day, engaged an American battalion. However, they were able to drive our platoon from the

105
Translator’s Note: In a directive on 19 May 1966, the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit noted that the US forces
“from Biên Hòa” had commenced a “sweep operation” in the Province on 16 May, and on 17 May had
clashed with the Provincial Battalion at Long Phước. The Châu Đức, Long Đất and Xuyên Mộc district units
were directed to interdict, respectively: Routes 15, 2 and the Bình Ba airstrip; Routes 44 and 52; and Route 23
– CDEC Log 09-2499-66.
106
Translator’s Note: The Parapelecus argenteus fish species – was the communist forces’ nickname for the
US AH-1G helicopter, see footnote 104.
107
Translator’s Note: According to the “Hòa Long History” – ie The History of the Hòa Long Village Party
Chapter (1930 - 2005), op.cit., 25 April 2009 (see Annex N), elements of the Châu Đức District Unit – under
the command of Nguyễn Văn Kiềm, also fought the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in the “Jackfruit Gardens at
Sông Cầu” from 18 May 1966.
108
Translator’s Note: The 5th Division History relates that on “6 May, the 1st Battalion ((of 274 Regiment))
combined with the 445th Battalion to drive back two battalions of the US 2nd Brigade sweeping into the Long
Phước base” … The 4th ((274)) Regiment was given the mission – together with the 445th Bà Rịa Battalion
and local troops to counter the enemy and defend the Long Phước War Zone. From 15 May – continuously to
15 August, the Regiment coordinated with the Bà Rịa local forces.” For the Australian official history’s
account of the fighting at Long Phước, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.243-246 ie 173rd
Airborne Brigade (Operation Abilene) attacked Long Phước on 17 May – and lost 12 KIA and 35 WIA
against a Việt Cộng company on the day of arrival and inflicted 16 enemy KIA. Two days later, the clearance
of Long Phước began – including participation by 3/43/10th ARVN Division (ie later retitled 18th Division) –
joined by the recently-arrived Australian 5RAR for Operation Hardihood a few days later (24 May). Half of
Long Phước village’s 3,000 inhabitants were resettled to Hòa Long village - others to Đất Đỏ and Long Điền.
Long Phước village was reported as having been “cleared” on 24 May 1966.
36

Long Phước tunnels. Once again, hundreds of villagers and local cadre were trapped below
in the tunnels while the American troops held the ground above. The people and our local
cadre had to be rescued from the Long Phước tunnels. To achieve this, the Battalion
employed sapper tactics – striking with a “blossoming” attack among the enemy to save the
people and local cadre in the Long Phước tunnels.109
On the night of 21 May 1966, the Battalion sent seven reconnaissance comrades –
with Comrade Nguyễn Văn Bỉ (Hai Bỉ), Comrade Lê Tranh (Năm Tranh)110 and Comrade
Năm leading the two teams, to crawl into the Long Phước base and attack the Americans.
The whole Battalion’s stock of American “duck’s-bill” grenades was gathered and given to
the seven reconnaissance comrades. Each carried a bandolier of grenades and a sub-
machinegun. The two reconnaissance teams both crawled towards the tunnels at Bắc Long
Phước hamlet where the Americans had most densely deployed their troops. By employing
sapper infiltration techniques, our reconnaissance soldiers each crawled past the
American’s “three human fences”. Close to the tunnels, our comrades crept through a
flattened banana garden (that had been leveled by bombs), treading on the heads of a few
sleeping Americans. They awoke screaming and fired at random. Two comrades in Năm
Tranh’s team were hit and killed. Năm Tranh stayed put, took out grenades and threw them
into the enemy’s heavy machinegun positions – throwing them one at a time to where the
enemy were in great disorder. Having thrown 16 grenades, Năm Tranh was wounded in the
buttocks. Using a large fallen tree, he crawled forward and fired the rounds in all seven of
his carbine’s magazines before dragging himself beyond the encircling enemy. In the teams
led by Hai Bỉ and Năm, everyone had thrown all their 20 grenades – and all three in Hai
Bi’s team had been wounded. It’s unclear whether they had been wounded by the enemy or
by their own grenades. With the explosion of more than a hundred grenades within
throwing distance, the sound was ear-splitting – like a heavy artillery barrage. The enemy
screamed in pandemonium. At first, they fired indiscriminately – and only their cries and
the sounds of exploding grenades could be heard. Our soldiers’ ears were ringing and
bleeding. Exhausted, they were unable to distinguish direction - and those strong enough
dragged themselves slowly away from the screaming, the clamour, and the sounds of the
enemy’s random firing.
When they heard the gunfire, the exploding grenades and the screaming above
ground, the local forces below in the tunnels knew that our forces had come to their rescue.
A plan to escape their entrapment was implemented immediately. A small opening was
made at the tunnel entrance only about five metres from where wounded Americans were
moaning. A reconnaissance element crawled out first to take defensive positions to protect
the wounded, women … who, in turn, withdrew from the tunnels that very night.
During the day, 445 Battalion blocked each sortie of the Americans’ sweeping
operations. At night, we divided into many teams to attack their tactical bases. The
Battalion fought continuously for weeks killing hundreds of Americans, seizing weapons
and ammunition, and military equipment. With 15,000 American troops engaged in their
sweeping operation, the enemy were able to seize Long Phước and a number of our bases
in the jungle. However, they were unable to destroy our forces – but rather were attacked

109
Translator’s Note: According to the 5th Division History - 2005, the Division’s 274 Regiment “was given
the mission – together with the 445th Bà Rịa Battalion and local troops to counter the enemy and defend the
Long Phước War Zone. From 15 May – continuously to 15 August, 274 Regiment coordinated with the Bà
Rịa local forces” in combat against the Americans – with its 2nd and 3rd Battalions operating in the Route 2
and 15 area, and the 1st Battalion of 274 Regiment fighting alongside 445 Battalion in Long Phước from 5
May until 4 June. However, the 445 Battalion History makes no mention of 274 Regiment’s involvement at
Long Phước.
110
Translator’s Note: See footnote 33 and Annex A – Senior Cadre.
 37

continuously both by day and night. Their casualties and losses were heavy, and they were
forced to withdraw to Núi Đất to consolidate.111
After almost two weeks of contesting with the Americans, 445 Battalion had gained
additional experience. The momentum for the “Kill Americans” emulation programme in
the Battalion became increasingly active. Tens of comrades were awarded the title of
“Valiant Killer of Americans”. Many of the comrades in the reconnaissance element and
the 1st Company received the title: “Distinguished and Valiant Killer of Americans”.112
These included Comrade Nguyễn Văn Quang – the exceptional heavy machinegunner, who
was awarded the Liberation Forces Combat Achievement Medal.113
In April 1966, the Royal Australian mercenary forces deployed a task force into the
South. The Australian Headquarters was located at 12 Trần Quốc Toản Street (Sài Gòn)
and commanded by Major General Priro’ (Parasen).114 At the end of May/beginning of
June 1966, the Australian task force completed its deployment and moved to pacify the Bà
Rịa region. The tactical headquarters of the Australians was established at Núi Đất and
commanded by Brigadier Henderson.115

111
Translator’s Note: The Bà Rịa Provincial Unit Headquarters sought medals from T1 (Military Region 1)
for counter-sweep operations in period 16-24 May 66 (including at Long Phước) comprising a First Class
Liberation Forces Combat Exploits Medal for 445 Battalion, Second Class Medals for its 1st and 2nd
Companies and Third Class Medals for the C20 and C21 Châu Đức District Companies. In a cited period of
nine days of continuous combat - ie 17-25 May 1966, 445 Battalion was claimed to have killed a total of 423
Americans, wounded 25, and shot down seven helicopters – see detailed medal citations at CDEC Log 09-
1885-66 and, for C21, CDEC Log 09-1887-66. 445 Battalion’s casualties were reported as 10 killed and 20
wounded. For claimed US casualties, see footnotes 112 and 113 below.
112
Translator’s Note: Sub-units of 445 Battalion and individuals (37) were noted as being awarded “Valiant
Killers of Americans” status. For having successfully “checked the RVNAF sweep operations” in the period
16-24 May 1966, the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit sought Liberation Combat Exploit medals for 445 Battalion, its
1st and 2nd Companies, C20 and C21 Companies (Châu Đức) and Nguyễn Văn Quang (“machine gun cell
leader”) – CDEC Log 09-1863-66. C20 Company was reported to have killed 143 Americans and wounded
50 – while suffering five wounded; while C21 Company reportedly killed 180 Americans in the Long Phước
battle (19-23 May).
113
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Văn Quang (see also footnotes 59, 105, 175, 280, and 296) was awarded a
Certificate of Commendation by the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit for his exploits at Phước Thạnh (Long Đất
District) on 26 April 1966 (as a squad leader/2/3/445), and was recommended for a “Third Class Liberation
Combat Exploits Medal” for his exploits as a “machinegun team leader” in engagements against ARVN
forces in the period 16-24 May 1966 – CDEC Log 09-1863-66. His citation recommendation dated 3 June
1966 noted that in an engagement on 17 May 1966, his heavy machinegun team had killed 65 Americans, and
Quang had personally killed 35 Americans - CDEC Log 09-1885-66.
114
Translator’s Note: The Headquarters Australian Force - Vietnam (HQAFV) was established in the Free
World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) building at 12 Trần Quốc Toản Street (Sài Gòn) on 3 May 1966
under Major General K. Mackay, MBE. Earlier – from May 1965, the commander of Australian Army Force
- Vietnam had been Brigadier (from July 1965) O.D. Jackson. The above passage in the 445 Battalion History
appears to have been borrowed from Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.132 that
refers to a “Major General Fraser” - but “Fraser” has been corrupted to “Parasen” in the 445 Battalion
History. Major General C.A.E. Fraser served as the commander of AFV from March 1970 to March 1971.
115
Translator’s Note: The 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) “opened” at Vũng Tàu on 20 May 1966.
Following Operation Hardihood to secure the area, 5RAR occupied the Núi Đất area on 2 June – with
elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in adjacent positions to the west across Route 2 until their departure
on 8 June. That US formation reportedly “lost 23 killed and 160 wounded in helping establish the 1st
Australian Task Force (1 ATF)” - O’Neill, R.J., Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion – Royal Australian
Regiment 1966/67, Cassell Australia, Melbourne, 1968, pp.48-49. Headquarters 1 ATF - commanded by
Brigadier O. D. Jackson, arrived at Núi Đất on 5 June 1966 (Brigadier W.G. Henderson took command in
June 1970) – the same error appears in both the Đồng Nai History – 1986, the 5th Division History – 2005,
and The History of the Hòa Long Village Party Chapter (1930-2005), op.cit., 2009. The Đồng Nai History –
1986, op.cit., p.132 (footnote 2) adds that the Task Force’s strength was “7,824 troops” and was supported by
31 Australian aircraft. The Hòa Long History adds that the Task Force occupied Núi Đất on “29 May 1966”,
38

Like the Americans, having developed their base at Núi Đất, the Australians began
to launch sweeping operations deep into the jungle with the intention of destroying our rear
base areas, storehouses and fighting strength.116
On 15 July 1966 during one of their sweeping operations, an Australian company
clashed with a reconnaissance team from the 1st Company of 445 Battalion that was closely
following the Australians.117 Hearing the sound of the reconnaissance element’s gunfire,
the 1st Company independently moved swiftly from the base at the Lồ Ô stream (Long Tân)
through the jungle for 2-3 kilometres to come to their aid, engage the enemy, and put into
practice the Company’s combat tactics. After advancing for 15 minutes, the leading platoon
met the enemy and, opening fire immediately, killed almost all of the Australian military’s
vanguard platoon that had left Núi Đất on the sweeping operation. Our other platoons
followed in time to assist and inflicted heavy casualties on another Australian platoon.
Hearing the sound of the 1st Company’s bugles (at this time the Battalion used bugles to
coordinate our actions), the Battalion ordered the 2nd and the 3rd Companies to attack from
the flank. They struck another Australian column, and the 2nd and 3rd Companies inflicted
heavy casualties on the enemy’s leading elements. However, the enemy quickly adopted a
defensive formation, threw coloured smoke grenades, and called in artillery to break up and
block us. The enemy’s artillery fell like rain, and we were unable to close with their
infantry. The Australian force discovered the thrust of our attack and continued to call
down artillery to strike deep into our formations. A number of comrades were wounded.
Comrade Tô Dũng – the political officer of the 1st Company, died on the withdrawal route
back to our base.118
The battle was our first test-of-strength with the Australian forces. We suffered a
number of wounded, but we had inflicted heavy losses on an Australian company. This

and the “Royal Australian Task Force” comprised 8,080 troops with a New Zealand artillery company of 20
“106.7mm” guns.
116
Translator’s Note: When deploying Australian forces from Vũng Tàu to Phước Tuy Province in May 1966,
1 ATF noted the local Việt Cộng battalion as “860 Battalion” – with “Code Names” of “C860 Battalion” and
“D445 Battalion”, and a strength of 550 – 1 ATF Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) 1/66, Vũng Tàu, 21 May
1966 (the intelligence information was based on the US 173rd Airborne Brigade OPORD 7/66 - Operation
Hardihood). The INTSUM did not mention Việt Cộng district companies or village guerrilla elements.
117
Translator’s Note: A report by Đổ Văn Liên (Ba Liên) – the 445 Battalion political officer, shows the date
of the engagement as “25 July 1966” – see Annex G. In an interview in March 1989, Đổ Văn Liên claimed to
have been the “commander on the ground” and stated that 445 Battalion’s losses “had not been more than six,
but one had been a company commander” (connect with the following footnote) – Burstall, T., A Soldier
Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.116-117. For the Australian official Australian, see McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit.,1993, pp.280-281: “At Suối (stream) Đá Bang; Australian forces (B/6RAR) suffered two KIA; the
enemy reportedly suffered 6 KIA including possibly the commander of the 1st Company of D445.” In May
1971, in an historical review of 445 Battalion, the 1 ATF Intelligence Staff noted that in June 1966, 445
Battalion had been “caught in a 1 ATF counter sweep in the Long Tan area and lost 50 KIA, 20 WIA and 10
weapons CIA ((captured in action)).” - Peters, C.C.M. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle
Intelligence Section, Núi Đất, 6 May 1971 – ie a repeat of the “50 VC KIA (BC)” cited in an earlier 29 May
1970 edition of their D445 Order of Battle study.
118
Translator’s Note: “Tô Dũng” was noted earlier in this 445 Battalion History as the deputy political officer
of 440th Company in December 1964. He was formally promoted from “platoon leader to assistant political
officer” by Military Region 1/Bà Rịa Provincial Unit on 20 October 1965 – CDEC Log 09-1876-66. However
earlier in the 445 Battalion History, Tô Dũng is shown in May 1965 as the 1st Company political officer. He
was also noted in a captured document conducting a motivational campaign as the 1st Company political
officer in December 1965 - that included a quite detailed history of the then 117-strong 1st Company (CDEC
Log 05-1293-66). In mid-1966, a “Tô Văn Dũng” was recommended for promotion to political officer of the
Battalion’s 1st Company – CDEC Log 12-2393-66. 1 ATF reported the recovery of the body of an “officer of
D445 Battalion, possibly the commander of C1/445 Company” who had been “badly wounded … and
executed by VC troops … VC had searched the body and removed weapon” – 1 ATF INTSUM No. 55, Núi
Đất, 26 July 1967.
 39

proved our capability to deploy and apply our combat tactics swiftly - and that 445
Battalion’s cadre and soldiers had the spirit and will to fight doggedly and defeat all
enemies in any situation. However, from this first test-of-strength, the Battalion confirmed
that it could not under-estimate the Australian forces – particularly their application of
artillery fire to break up counter-attacks and their ability to flexibly redeploy their own
forces for counter-attacks.119
Following the coordinated sweeping operations by the Americans, Australians, and
the puppet forces, tens of thousands of enemy troops struck into our base areas at Sông
Cầu, Suối Lồ Ồ, Long Phước and Minh Đạm with the aim of achieving victory in the first
phase of their “Counter-offensive Strategy” on the Bà Rịa battlefield – but they were all
defeated. From the 1966 Wet Season, the Americans transferred the responsiblility for
pacification in all of Phước Tuy Province (Bà Rịa) to the Australian forces.120 The New
Zealand artillery was placed wholly in support of the Australians. In August 1966, the
Australians set up two further major positions at Núi Đất and Bàu Lùng121.
At the end of the 1965-66 Dry Season, COSVN reinforced the Bà Rịa battlefield
with a regiment from the 5th Division to join with the local forces against the enemy’s
sweeping operations.122
In the 1966 Wet Season, the headquarters of the 5th Division123 coordinated with the
military headquarters of Bà Rịa - Long Khánh Province to direct a major destructive strike

119
Translator’s Note: According to the 5th Division History - 2005: “On 15 July, the Australian 3rd Battalion
secretly attacked the base of the 445th Battalion at Lồ Ồ stream. In this first engagement, we lacked tactical
experience against the Australians – and although the cadre and soldiers of the 445th Battalion fought very
bravely, they were unable to destroy many of the enemy. Rather, the unit suffered heavy casualties from the
enemy’s artillery firepower.” The initial Australian infantry battalions of 1ATF were 5RAR and 6RAR - ie
not 3RAR which arrived in Vietnam in December 1967.
120
Translator’s Note: On “pacification”, see footnotes 29 and 225.
121
Translator’s Note: “Bàu Lùng” is probably a reference to “Bầu Lun” – where a US Special Forces element
established a camp (B-36) in January 1967 to train Vietnamese Mobile Strike Force (MSF-Mike Force)
elements. The camp was located on Route 44 west of the Long Hải Mountains – about a kilometre north of
Long Hải village. The Long Đất District History – 1986 relates that, in 1970, the Australians “set up a
battalion-level training centre at Bầu Lun for the Lon Nol troops and used them for patrolling on Routes 23-
44.” Australian personnel trained Khmer Republic soldiers at the Long Hải camp from January 1972. The
Đồng Nai History – 1986 refers to a base at “Bàu Lùn … with more than one thousand” troops. - Phan Ngọc
Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.132.
122
Translator’s Note: The 5 Division History - 2005 relates: “In June 1966, the 4th ((274)) Regiment received
orders to move to the Châu Pha-Hắt Dịch with the task of attacking the enemy and defending the supply areas
of Group 84. The 5th Regiment moved from Long Khánh to east of Route 2 to protect the offices of the
Divisional Headquarters and to prepare its forces to attack the Australian forces developing their base at Núi
Đất – Bà Rịa.” In June 1966, the strength of 274 Regiment’s battalions was 1,128 (D1/800 Bn/H12 – 411
personnel; D2/265 Bn/H14 – 401; D3/308 Bn/H16 – 316) – CDEC Log 09-1854-66. On 20 October 1966,
Australian 5RAR troops in an operation in the Núi Thị Vải mountains recovered the notebook/diary
(completed to 7 October 1966) of Nguyễn Nam Hừng – the second-in-command of 274 Regiment - see
CDEC Bulletins 1413 and 1418; CDEC Log 11-1259-66 (translated text); and 1 ATF Troops Information
Sheet No. 31, Núi Đất, 13-19 February 1967 (for a three-page commentary). The capture of the diary and an
outline of its contents is related in O’Neill, R.J., Vietnam Task, op.cit., pp.48-49 and pp.155-156. According
to Australian sources, the diary reportedly related that, in the period 9-11 June 1966, 274 Regiment lay in wait
to ambush an Australian sub-unit expected to recover a US observation aircraft shot down in the Núi Nghe
area. Similarly - according to the Australian official history, the diary indicated that 274 Regiment “had
planned to ambush Australian troops near the Núi Nghe feature in early June 1966.” – see McNeill, I., To
Long Tan , op.cit.,1993, p.249. Author Paul Ham interviewed Nguyễn Nam Hừng in Vũng Tàu in mid-
November 2005, but Hừng could not “recall the loss of his diary.” – Ham, P., Vietnam – The Australian War,
HarperCollinsPublishers, Pymble, 2007, p.710.
123
Translator’s Note: The 5th Division History – 2005 also relates the Battle of Long Tân in some detail – see
the translation at Annex I, pp.5-10. In August 1966, the Headquarters of the 5th Division moved three
kilometres south from its base at Suối Đu Đủ (YS 780820 – in Base Area 301) to the vicinity of YS 790785.
40

against the Australian forces on the Bà Rịa battleground. Comrades Năm Truyện124, Năm
Tâm125 (Sư Năm), Ba Út126, Út Đặng127 (Bà Rịa - Long Khánh Provincial Unit) – together
with the staff elements of the two units, held many meetings to carefully consider and
assess the situation - while delegating Comrade Nguyễn Hữu Nghĩa128 - the second-in-
command of the reconnaissance company of the 5th Division, and the 445 Battalion’s
reconnaissance element to go and examine the battlefield in the Long Tân and Long Phước
region of Bà Rịa. After three days, the reconnaissance elements of the two units had
completed their study of the battlefield.129 In the Lồ Ồ stream base, the Province’s military

124
Translator’s Note: Colonel (Thượng Tá) Nguyễn Thế Truyện (aka Năm Truyện and Năm Sài Gòn) had
commanded the 1st Regiment (271/Q761 Regiment) during the successful battle of Bình Giã in early 1965. He
commanded the 5th Division until late November 1967. Năm Truyện was killed in combat in early February
1968 during the NVA/VC Tết Mậu Thân offensive while serving as Commander of Sub-Region 1.
125
Translator’s Note: Trần Minh Tâm (Năm Tâm) was the founding commander of the 4th Regiment (274
Regiment) of the 5th VC Division. In August 1966, he was the Chief of Staff of the 5th Division – confirmed
by the NVA defector Lieutenant Colonel Lê Xuân Chuyển. His participation in the planning and conduct of
the battle at Long Tân as the “Deputy Divisional Commander” is also related in the 5th Division History –
2005, see Annex I, p.5, p.8. That History relates Năm Tâm meeting with “Comrade Đặng Hữu Thuấn
(Commander of the Bà Rịa Unit)” on 10 August 1966 to plan the engagement, and Trần Minh Tâm is
described as the “battlefield commander”. Tâm’s presence is also related later in the 445 Battalion History –
see footnotes 142, 149 and 162. Tâm is also noted in a major Vietnamese account of the War as leading the
5th Division elements at Long Tân – ie Lịch sử Kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước – The History of the Anti-
American Resistance War for National Salvation, Tập 4 (Vol 4), Nhà Xuất Bản Chính Trị Quốc Giả, Hà Nội,
1999. However, Trần Minh Tâm is not mentioned as the senior 5th Division Headquarters representative
during the Battle by Nguyễn Thanh Hồng (Hai) – a 5th Division operations officer, who strongly implied that
he - ie Hồng, played the premier 5th Division role - see Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.99-
104. According to Nguyễn Thanh Hồng, during the Battle, the headquarters of 275 Regiment was on Núi Đất
2 Hill (see footnote 142), and he commanded the 5th Division Headquarters forward element in Ấp Phước
Hưng (GR YS 495670) – see footnotes 137, 142, and 144. Post-War, Nguyễn Thanh Hồng appeared in an
Australian DVD/video documentary and described aspects of the Long Tân battle - Horsefield, B.
(Director/Producer), Long Tan – The True Story, Australian Broadcasting Commission/Film Australia,
Lindfield, 1993.
126
Translator’s Note: Ba Út – ie Nguyễn Đức Hoạt, Deputy Commander of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit – was
also reportedly known as Nguyễn Văn Út. He was transferred to the staff of Military Region (MR) 7 in June
1969 – VCAT Item No. 2310510003. Nguyễn Đức Hoạt (Ba Út) - Deputy Chief of Staff of MR7, was killed
by Australian forces on 21 November 1969 in northwest Phước Tuy Province – 1 ATF INTSUM No. 39/70,
Núi Đất, 8 February 1970.
127
Translator’s Note: Đặng Hữu Thuấn was also known as Út Đặng, Đặng, and Thiêm. He had infiltrated
into the South in 1961, and in 1965-1966 he served at Military Region 1/T.1 as the Chief of Operations and
Training with the grade of “regimental executive officer” – CDEC Bulletin 257, Log 03-1253-66. Thuấn was
transferred from T.1 to Bà Rịa on 30 June 1966 – CDEC Log 12-2459-66. Đặng Hữu Thuấn (Út Đặng) is
noted in the 5th Division History - 2005 as the commander of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit. According to that
History: on “10 August 1966, the Combined Battle Headquarters – comprising Trần Minh Tâm and Comrade
Đặng Hữu Thuấn (Commander of the Bà Rịa Unit) met to determine the fighting tactics to destroy an
Australian battalion in the Long Tân region.” Út Đặng is also later described in the 445 Battalion History at
p.67, pp.75-76 as the commander of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit – apparently replacing Nguyễn Văn
Mười/Nguyễn Việt Hoa (Mười Thà) in mid-1966. Nguyễn Việt Hoa (Mười Thà) was transferred to command
the Việt Cộng “Đoàn 10/Group 10” unit in the Rừng Sác/Sát - CDEC Log 06-2022-67. Đoàn 10 was
reportedly 64-strong – Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.132. However, see the
detailed Rung Sat Special Zone Intelligence Study (circa mid-1968) of the Rừng Sác and Đoàn 10 (997-
strong, including 211 guerrillas) – VCAT Item No. 4000105007.
128
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Hữu Nghĩa – or probably more correctly Lê Hữu Nghĩa, was either the
commander or 2ic of the reconnaissance company of 275 Regiment – see following footnote 153. A “Nguyễn
Hữu Nghĩa” – a member of the 9th VC Division, had been attached to Bà Rịa but, as directed by the Bà Rịa
Provincial Unit on 19 July 1966, was returned via MR6 – CDEC Log 09-1979-66.
129
Translator’s Note: The 445 Battalion political officer – Đổ Văn Liên (Ba Liên), stated that he and Sáu
Chánh (Bùi Quang Chánh – 445 Battalion Commander) “coordinated with the 275 Regiment and the element
of 5 Division headquarters” – Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.117.
 41

command section and the headquarters of the Division convened a conference of cadres
comprising the platoon commanders and above of the two units - ie 445 Battalion130 and
the 4th [sic] Regiment131 of the 5th Division, to thoroughly study the tactical outline of the
ambush battle to destroy the Australians at Long Tân.132
The forces to participate in the fighting comprised133:

130
Translator’s Note: According to the Australian official history, the Australian Task Force assessed the
strength of 445 Battalion as 550 – McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351, p.559 (endnote 114).
McNeill has apparently reported the 1 ATF estimate as at late May 1966 – see footnote 116. However, 445
Battalion’s strength was probably no more than about 380 – see “social data” on the Battalion’s personnel at
Annex F and translated extracts of the recovered 445 Battalion Command and Political Reports of July and
August 1966 at Annex G. In this 445 Battalion History - 1991 account of the Battle of Long Tân, the name of
the 445 Battalion commander is not mentioned. The Australian official histories cite Nguyễn Văn Kiềm (see
footnote 195) as the 445 Battalion commander at the Battle – ie rather than Bùi Quang Chánh (Sáu Chánh) –
see Chamberlain, E. P., Research Note 23, “Vietnam War: Commander of D445 Battalion at Long Tan – Not
‘Nguyen Van Kiem’ but ‘Bui Quang Chanh’ ”, 23 September 2010 (to the Australian War Memorial and the
Australian Army History Unit - Canberra) - and discussion in outline biographies at Annex B – Key Cadre.
Note however that an “Australian intelligence document” (an organisational chart) in September 1966
included “Sau Chanh” as the commander of 445 Battalion – reproduced in Burstall, T., Vietnam – The
Australian Dilemma, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993, p.94.
131
Translator’s Note: An apparent error – as the 5th Regiment (275 Regiment) was the principal Việt Cộng
formation involved in the Battle of Long Tân – ie not the 4th Regiment (274 Regiment). 274 Regiment is also
incorrectly cited (in lieu of 275 Regiment) in the history of the C.12-65 “Binh Gia Victory” Assault Youth
Group – see Annex E: Long Tân Casualties. The official histories of the 5th Division - 2005 and the Đồng Nai
History - 1986 – as well as the major Vietnamese history of the War ie Lịch sử Kháng chiến …, Tập 4 (Vol
4), op.cit., 1999 – all cite 275 Regiment (ie the 5th Regiment) as the principal Việt Cộng formation at the
Battle of Long Tân. At Long Tân, 275 Regiment was commanded by Nguyễn Thới Bưng (also known as Út
Thới – see footnotes 56, 142 and Annex J) and Nguyễn Văn Cúc was the Regiment’s political officer. The 2ic
of 274 Regiment – Nguyễn Nam Hừng, noted in his diary on 28 September 1966: “the 5th Regiment ((ie 275
Regiment)) attacked Núi Đất”, “600 Australians” were killed and “1 Australian battalion exterminated” –
CDEC Log 11-1259-66. On 274 Regiment activity, Hừng related that “for most of August and September, the
((274)) Regiment was transporting rice.” Hừng’s statement conflicts with claims – including by Nguyễn Văn
Kiềm (Commander D445, early 1968-1969), that 274 Regiment was tasked in mid-August 1966 to interdict
any US forces moving south on Route 2 to relieve Australian forces during the Long Tân battle – see Kiềm’s
statement in Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan – The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. On 274
Regiment’s activities, see also extracts of the 5th Division History – 2005 at Annex I, footnote 29. According
to the 275 Regiment commander Nguyễn Thới Bưng, during the Battle of Long Tân, his 275 Regiment
headquarters was located “on the small feature of Núi Đất 2” – see map at page 100, and he was accompanied
by his executive officer “Major Ba Du” (ie Ba Đức) - see the interview in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns,
Book 2, op.cit., 1990, p.100 and p.206. According to the Australian official history: “In the final evaluation,
including forces held in depth, the task force assessed the enemy as 275 Main Force Regiment of three
battalions reinforced by at least one battalion from the North Vietnamese Army together with 445 Battalion.
… The total strength of 275 Regiment was 1600 … The strength of the NVA battalion was 500 and the
strength of D445 Battalion was 550.” – McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351 and p.559 (endnotes
113 and114). A contemporary account reported that: “At least one North Vietnamese battalion was attached
to 275 Regiment for the operation.” - Townsend, C. Lieutenant Colonel, 6 RAR After Action Report –
Operation SMITHFIELD: 18-21 August 1966, Nui Dat, 7 September 1966.
132
Translator’s Note: The Australian official account of the Battle of Long Tân – including discussion of
casualties, is in McNeill, I., To Long Tan , op.cit., 1993, pp.305-375. Other relevant Australian works on
Long Tân include: Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns (Book 2), op.cit.,1990, pp.92-124; McAulay, L., The
Battle of Long Tan, op.cit., 1987; Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan: As Told by the Commanders to Bob
Grandin, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004; and Ekins, A., “Unravelling …”, op.cit., July 2011. The account
of the Long Tân battle as related in the 5th Division History - 2005 is included in Annex I, pp.5-10.
133
Translator’s Note: Additional to the elements listed below, according to “Mr Quang”: the “Long Tan
Village Guerrilla Group” also participated – see interview in Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan –
The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. In 2006, the officer commanding the Australian forces at Long Tân
(Major H. Smith) related Việt Cộng forces involved as: “275 VC Main Force Regiment. These plus D445 and
D400 [sic] made around 3,000 enemy troops.” - Smith, H. “No Time for Fear”, Wartime – Issue 35,
42

- the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion with the responsibility of being the forward
blocking force at Hamlet 1 of Long Tân village – reinforced with one B40134, a
reconnaissance element from the 5th Division and a 57mm recoilless rifle from
the Battalion.
- the 1st and 3rd Companies of 445 Battalion directly commanded by Comrade Sáu
Thu (the Battalion second-in-command)135 – together with the 1st Battalion (4th
[sic] Regiment136 of the 5th Division) as the rear blocking group.
- the 3rd Battalion137 (4th [sic] Regiment of the 5th Division) with the responsibility
for the flanking thrust (the decisive point138). We reinforced the area of the
killing ground with a minefield comprising 12 DH5 and DH10139 mines, and 42
American Mk1 mines.
- the 80-strong Võ Thị Sáu140 civil labour company – comprised mainly of
females from the Province and led by Chín Phương as company commander, to
support the battle.

Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 2006. However, neither 440 Local Force Battalion (see Annex K) - nor a
“D400” were involved. A map of the battle site follows at page 100.
134
Translator’s Note: B40 – a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-2), effective range 150 metres; B41 – a larger
rocket propelled grenade (RPG-7), effective range 500 metres.
135
Translator’s Note: Sáu Thu (Nguyễn Đức Thu) – previously noted as commander of the 2nd Company at
the founding of 445 Battalion. Post-War, Nguyễn ĐứcThu appeared in an Australian television documentary
and described aspects of the battle - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan – The True Story, op.cit.,
DVD, 1993.
136
Translator’s note: see footnote 131 above – should be 5th Regiment throughout not 4th Regiment.
137
Translator’s Note: This indicates that 275 Regiment’s 3rd Battalion was allocated the “killing ground” at
Long Tân – as confirmed by the 5th Division History – 2005, see following footnote 138. However, Nguyễn
Thanh Hồng (footnote 125) stated that at the 5th Division forward headquarters element in the small deserted
hamlet of Phước Hưng near Long Tân, he “had with him there the third battalion of the 275 as a reserve
element.” - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, Part 2, op.cit., 1990, p.99. According to the NVA defector Lê
Xuân Chuyển (Chief of Staff of 5th VC Division – see VCAT Item No 4080124002), the 3rd Battalion of 275
Regiment was “fairly good” because it consisted entirely of North Vietnamese who had been recalled to
active duty and infiltrated into the South. The 3rd Battalion was previously the North Vietnamese Army’s
605th Battalion and had initially been raised as the 4th Battalion of the 32nd Regiment in Thanh Hóa on 15
April 1965 – of its 500 members, two-thirds were “Southerner regroupees” – ie “cán bộ hồi kết” (soon joined
by 200 Northern recruits). On 10 September 1965, the Battalion was redesignated D605 and began its
2,000km/112-day infiltration on 13 September – CDEC Bulletin 3975. D605 Battalion (commanded by
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu; and with Vũ Ngọc Khuyến as political officer) was incorporated into 275 Regiment in
May 1966 following the Regiment’s heavy casualties at the second battle of Võ Su (Bình Tuy Province) in
mid-March 1966 which had forced the incorporation of the Regiment’s 2nd and 3rd Battalions as a restructured
2nd Battalion. The Australian official history notes that the Australian Task Force estimated that 275
Regiment “of three battalions ((had been)) reinforced by at least one battalion from the North Vietnamese
Army together with D445 Battalion.” - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351. Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
did not command 275’s 3rd Battalion at Long Tân as he had been killed in the Ông Đồn engagement in March
1966 in Long Khánh Province – as related in the 5th Division History - 2005. A major Vietnamese history of
the War incorrectly cites the “6th Battalion of 275 Regiment”– ie rather than the 3rd Battalion, and “a company
of 445 Battalion” destroying a “company of Australian soldiers” at Long Tân - Lịch sử Kháng chiến …, Tập
4 (Vol 4), op.cit, 1999. For detail on 275 Regiment, see Annex J.
138
Translator’s note: Literally – “Quyết chiến điểm” which equates to “killing ground”. The 5th Division
History – 2005 (see Annex I, footnote 33) similarly states that “The 3rd Battalion was deployed about 800
metres to the northwest of Route 52 with the task of attacking into the main killing zone at the Thất Pagoda.”
139
Translator’s note: DH10 was a directional mine – “equivalent” to the US Claymore mine.
140
Translator’s Note: In May 1950, Võ Thị Sáu, a member of the Đất Đỏ Công An Xung Phong was captured.
She was born in 1933 in Phước Lợi (joined Việt Minh at age of 14), sent to Côn Đảo (a prison island in the
South China Sea), and executed in January 1952. Võ Thị Sáu was made a member of the Đảng Lao Động
Việt Nam (Vietnamese Labour – ie Communist, Party) on day before being shot. A statue of the female
martyr Võ Thị Sáu was erected in Đất Đỏ in 1985 – see the Long Đất District History - 1986 at Annex L –
pp.64-65, p.99 for detail. According to its unit history, the C.12-65 “Bình Giả Victory” Company also
 43

- a surgery element led by Dr Phong and Dr Kính.141

- a forward command element was established two kilometres to the north of
Long Tân142 by Comrades Út Đặng and Năm Tâm143 to directly command the
battle.144

The ambush145 configuration for the battle was almost three kilometres long.

assisted at the Long Tân battle: ie as the enemy artillery was very heavy and destroyed the NVA/VC field
telephone lines, they were employed in commo-liaison duties taking messages from the headquarters to the
battlefront, repairing broken field telephone lines, and evacuating casualties to "Hospital 1500" in the area of
the “Mây Tào” mountains. Reference to casualties being treated at “Đoàn 1500” (ie Đoàn 555 until mid-late
1963) is also included in Hữu Thanh, Miền Đông Nam Bộ khói lửa, Thursday - 28 August 2008. For
translated extracts related to NVA/VC casualty evacuation, see Annex E – Battle of Long Tân: Casualties.
141
Translator’s Note: Comrade Hai Phong and Comrade Nguyễn Đình Kính.
142
Translator’s Note: The headquarters would appear to have been on the southern slopes of Núi Đất 2 (GR
YS 485676) – a small wooded hill about 126 metres in height, also called “Núi Thơm” (see footnote 291).
During the Battle, a Việt Cộng heavy machinegun and a medium/light machinegun fired on Australian troops
from that location, and “the enemy command element” was thought to be “on the forward slopes of Nui Dat
2” – McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.328 and p.323. As noted earlier however (see footnotes 125
and 137), Nguyễn Thanh Hồng related that the “headquarters of the attacking force of the 275 Regiment
under the command of Senior Captain Ut Thới” (ie Nguyễn Thới Bưng) was located “on the small feature of
Nui Dat 2, just to the north of the ((Long Tân)) plantation’s edge.”, and that he (Hồng) commanded the
forward headquarters element of the 5th Division “in a small deserted hamlet just on the eastern side of the
Long Tân plantation called Ấp Phước Hưng” – ie about two kilometres east of the Long Tân battlefield at GR
YS 495670. Hồng made no mention of the presence of Trần Minh Tâm – the Chief of Staff of the 5th Division
at the Battle – see T. Burstall’s interview with Nguyễn Thanh Hồng in Biên Hòa City on 10 November 1987 –
pp.99-112 in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns …, op.cit., 1990.
143
Translator’s Note: Trần Minh Tâm – Chief of Staff of the 5th Division, See footnotes 125 and 127.
144
Translator’s Note: This passage notes Út Đặng (Đặng Hữu Thuấn – the Commander of the Bà Rịa
Provincial Unit) and Năm Tâm (Trần Minh Tâm – Chief of Staff /Deputy Commander of the 5th Division, see
footnotes 125 and 127) directly commanded the battle from a position two kilometres north of Long Tân – ie
Núi Đất 2. However, as noted above, Nguyễn Thanh Hồng (born 1932, Hội Mỹ – aka Hai Hồng) - an
operations staff officer on the Headquarters 5th Division, has claimed that “it was left to him to plan the
attack” at Long Tân and that he was the on-site commander throughout from Phước Hưng hamlet.
NguyễnThanh Hồng also stated that he chose a tactic for the Battle that he described as “the luring of the tiger
from the mountain” – see T. Burstall’s interview with Nguyễn Thanh Hồng in Biên Hòa City on 10
November 1987 – pp.99-112 in Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns …, op.cit., 1990. Subsequently, Hồng also
outlined his role – including the “luring the tiger” tactic in Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan –
The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993. See also Annex J – 275 Regiment, footnote 34 for information on
Nguyễn Thanh Hồng.
145
Translator’s Note: Vietnamese accounts describe the engagement as a planned “ambush” (see footnotes
138 and 144). The 5th Division History – 2005 (see Annex I, p.9) describes the tactic as a “mobile ambush to
destroy the Australian force – a new combat objective on the battlefield.” Several Australian works contend
that an “encounter battle” is a more appropriate description – see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993,
pp.362-371; Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, Book 1 - p.160, Book 2 – p.99, pp.109-110,
pp.122-123; Ekins, A., “Unravelling …”, op.cit., 2011. See also footnote 79. In his report – citing intelligence
indications, the commander of 6RAR wrote that D Company “contacted 275 Regiment plus elements of D445
Bn which was moving to attack 1 ATF base on the night 18/19 Aug 66.” - Townsend, C. Lieutenant Colonel,
6 RAR After Action Report – Operation SMITHFIELD: 18-21 August 1966, Nui Dat, 7 September 1966. The
1 ATF Report similarly implied that the Việt Cộng force intended to attack the Núi Đất base - 1st Australian
Task Force - Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report – Operation Smithfield, R723-1-5, December
1966. In recent publications, Lieutenant Colonel H. Smith (the officer commanding D/6RAR at the Battle of
Long Tân) and David Sabben (a platoon commander at the Battle) have argued strongly that the Việt Cộng
force had planned a ground attack against the 1 ATF base at Núi Đất - ie rather than an “ambush” at Long
Tân – eg see Grandin, R., The Battle of Long Tan …, op.cit., 2004, pp.275-293; and Sabben, D., Was the
Battle of Long Tan a VC ambush? : A presentation, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1996.
44

At 10.15am on 18 August 1966146, two Australian battalions and an armoured

vehicle squadron147 advanced in three columns (a main column and two subsidiary
columns) that moved in parallel into our battle zone. The main column advanced along the
dirt road to Long Tân with four tanks148 in the vanguard, followed by two infantry
companies supported by two armoured vehicles. The two subsidiary columns advanced as
pincers – parallel with the main column and at a distance of 300 metres from it. Each of
the pincers comprised a battalion with two tanks in support. All three enemy columns fell
into our encircling ambush.149
Nguyễn Văn Bượng – the commander of the observation post element reported the
following to the headquarters:
“Report ! The enemy has appeared 650 metres from the rear blocking position of
our battle zone.”
After having confirmed the situation with the observation group, Út Đặng flicked
the switchboard150 to another line and loudly and clearly ordered: “Attention, forward

146
Translator’s Note: This 445 Battalion History does not mention the shelling of the Australian Núi Đất base
on 17th August. However, according to Đổ Văn Liên – the 445 Battalion political officer, the Battalion
provided “guides for the units that mortared the Task Force” – Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990,
p.117. The 5th Division History – 2005 (see Annex I, p.7) relates: “Continuously through 16 and 17 August,
the local forces and the Division’s reconnaissance cells fired mortars into Núi Đất”. The 1 ATF Commander’s
Diary for August 1966 described the impact on 17 August of “63 VC 82mm mortar bombs and five 70mm
howitzer rounds” based on “crater analysis” – Headquarters 1 ATF - Commander’s Diary, August 1968 – see
also 1 ATF INTSUM No. 77, Núi Đất, 17 August 1966 that reported the shelling “as probably by D860
Battalion”; and McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.305 that related the 22-minute shelling that began at
0243hrs on 17 August. The shelling comprised 82mm mortar, 75mm RCL and 70mm howitzer rounds
(probably from an obsolescent Japanese Model 92 howitzer). 1 ATF suffered 24 wounded – two seriously. On
17 August, patrols from B Company of 6RAR found the firing site of the Việt Cộng 75mm RCLs (at GR YS
468655) with 23 discarded 75 mm shell cases, “bits of bodies and blood-stained clothing”, and an ox cart
destroyed by the 1 ATF artillery counter-battery fire. - Mollison, C.S., Long Tan and Beyond – Alpha
Company 6 RAR in Vietnam 1966-67, Cobb’s Crossing, Woombye, 2006, pp.124-125. Mortar base-plate
positions were also found in the vicinity of GR YS 459671. Post-War, a Việt Cộng medic - Chung, related
that three of Việt Cộng RCL party from 275 Regiment were killed in the 1 ATF counter-battery fire and were
buried nearby. - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan – The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993.
According to the official Australian account of the Battle in McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993 pp.305-
375, the ground battle commenced at 4.08pm on 18 August 1966. According to the 5th Division History -
2005, the Australian force was sighted: “at 3.30pm” by “the 2nd Battalion’s reconnaissance cell” (of 275
Regiment) and engaged soon after. A comprehensive contemporary Australian report of the Battle is at: 1st
Australian Task Force - Vietnam, Combat Operations After Action Report – Operation Smithfield, R723-1-5,
December 1966 (Internet-accessible, see Bibliography). According to the Report, the first contact between the
two forces was at 1540hrs (3.40pm). Maps and sketches attached to the Report illustrate the phases of the
Battle and also note the Việt Cộng shelling positions and the 1 ATF counter-battery targets.
147
Translator’s Note: Literally – “chi đoàn xe bọc thép”. The initial Australian force at Long Tân – ie the
108-strong D Company of 6RAR (infantry, three artillery personnel) was not mounted in armoured personnel
carriers and was not accompanied by armoured vehicles. Australian armoured personnel carriers (APCs -
M113A1 11-tonne) - carrying infantry reinforcements, only arrived at Long Tân towards the end of the Battle
– at approximately 1850hrs (ie 6.50pm) on 18 August 1966.
148
Translator’s Note: Literally - “xe tăng”. The Australian tanks (“xe tăng”) – ie 51-tonne Centurions, did
not arrive in Vietnam until February 1968 (by August 1968, the squadron was at full strength with 28 tanks).
Subsequently, in this 445 Battalion History, the Vietnamese term, “xe thiết giáp” has been translated as
“armoured vehicle” – this is almost always a reference to the M113A1 APC, and its variants.
149
Translator’s Note: The 5th Division History – 2005 (see Annex I, p.8, p.9) indicates that the 275 Regiment
elements were caught off-guard by the Australian advance because Trần Minh Tâm (Năm Tâm) – who was
“directly commanding the battle”, had “directed the observation element to temporarily withdraw” … “We
had committed an error in our observation of the enemy and in arranging our formations to start to attack
from a far distance – because of this, we were unable to surround and destroy the enemy battalion.”
150
Translator’s Note: Literally: “tổ hợp điện thoại” - probably a field telephone switchboard, most likely the
Chicom Type 10.
 45

blocking group: the enemy is advancing in three columns to the west-northwest straight
into our battle zone. Comrades must strive to maintain complete secrecy. Wait until the
enemy is truly close, and only open fire when the order is given by the headquarters.”
Năm Tâm151 picked up his communications device and added: “Attention ‘Tail’, the
enemy force is very long. If there are any difficulties with the command’s communications
system, then automatically open fire on the enemy when they are 30 metres from the battle
zone’s forward blocking position.”
Everything went without a hitch until the last minute. When an enemy tank was 50
metres from the forward blocking position, the trigger was pulled on a recoilless rifle
(RCL) - but the round misfired ! The enemy then discovered our battle position. They fired
thick-and-fast – while withdrawing and redeploying their formations. Comrade Lê Thanh
Trừng – a 5th Division reinforcement to D445152 and armed with a B40, had just got up to
fire on a tank when he was shot through the chest by a round from an enemy heavy
machinegun. The hero Lê Thanh Trừng had fallen ! Nguyễn Hữu Nghĩa – the commander
of the reconnaissance element (from the 5th Division)153 came forward and grabbed the B40
and hit the leading armoured vehicle, setting it on fire. Comrade Vĩnh – the number two154
of a 57mm RCL crew, followed up by loading a second round for Comrade Tân to hit and
set fire to the second armoured vehicle. The third armoured vehicle was destroyed by two
B41 rounds fired by the reconnaissance element from the 5th Division. The engagement at
the forward blocking position became increasingly fierce. The situation was like a “Battle
Royal” as the enemy massed quite close to our positions. The battle became close combat,
fought in groups and by areas – it was difficult for our infantry and artillery to support one
another. Rain began to come down in buckets. Our 57mm RCL155 was “nullified” at a
tactical distance of a few tens of metres, and many of the comrades in the weapon crew
were killed and the crew commander was captured.156 After the first few minutes of

151
Translator’s Note: Trần Minh Tâm (Năm Tâm) – Chief of Staff of the 5th Division, see footnote 125. As
noted at footnote 144, Trần Minh Tâm was reportedly collocated with Út Đặng (Đặng Hữu Thuấn) - the
commander of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit, most likely on the southern slopes of Núi Đất 2 Hill (see footnote
142).
152
Translator’s Note: This is the only reference in this 445 Battalion History to the Battalion as “D445”. The
NVA/VC used letter designators for their formations, units and sub-units - ie A for section/squad, B for
platoon, C for company, D for battalion, E for regiment and F for division. 445 Battalion was referred to as
“D 445” in the reports by the Battalion commander and the political officer – see Annex G.
153
Translator’s Note: Earlier – see footnote 128, Nguyễn Hữu Nghĩa was described as the 2ic of the
reconnaissance company of the 5th Division. The 5th Division History – 2005 however relates that a “Lê Hữu
Nghĩa” as the officer commanding 275 Regiment’s reconnaissance company – and who “used a B40 to
destroy the leading armoured vehicle” at the Long Tân battle.
154
Translator’s Note: Literally: xạ thủ phụ – not the “firer” of the DKZ 57 (57mm recoilless rifle), but the
support soldier who loaded the weapon.
155
Translator’s Note: The Vietnamese text implies a single weapon only. However, two 57mm recoilless
(RCL) rifles were among the weapons captured by the Australian forces at Long Tân. Individual weapons
recovered were 33 AK-47 rifles, five SKS rifles, two M1 carbines, one M1 Garand rifle, one Browning
automatic rifle, seven RPD light machineguns, one PPSh M1941 sub-machinegun, one Thompson sub-
machinegun, and four RPG-2 rocket launchers. Crew-served weapons captured were one 7.62mm SGM
heavy machinegun (with shield/wheels) and two 57mm RCLs – see McAulay, L., The Battle of Long Tan,
op.cit., 1987, p.141 and McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.558, endnote 108. Several “side-arms” –
particularly K-54/Tokarev automatic pistols, were also recovered but retained by Australian personnel.
156
Translator’s Note: On the evening of 18 August 1966– ie at the conclusion of the Battle, 1 ATF reported
that “the VC unit was probably the 274 Regiment of the 5 Division” – 1 ATF INTSUM No. 78, Núi Đất, 18
August 1966. On the afternoon of the day following the Battle, a 6RAR situation report noted recovering “ID
cards issued in North Vietnam. Enemy units involved in battle identified as C14 Company, D3 Battalion, Q5
Regiment; D605 and 45 NVA Regiment.” - Mollison, C.S., Long Tan and Beyond , op,cit, 2006, p.201. Only
one member of 445 Battalion was captured at Long Tân (reportedly a 57mm RCL gunner); and two members
of 275 Regiment were captured – who declared themselves as members of “Đoàn 45” (ie then a cover
46

confusion, our forward position was still able to force the enemy into the killing zone. They
fell into our minefield and were killed in large numbers. Our rear element also began to
storm into the enemy in the killing zone – while, at the same time, our flank attacking
group advanced. The enemy was in a miserable situation and surrounded, but the tanks and
infantry in their subsidiary columns continued to press into our areas that lacked anti-tank
firepower and counter-attacked us. Following this, the enemy regrouped and used coloured
smoke to mark their positions and called in directed artillery fire. We were unable to move
even a half-metre to finish off a number of the enemy because of their “rain of artillery”
from the “New Zealand orchestra” (a term used by the enemy for their New Zealand
artillery battalion in Bà Rịa157). Almost all our attacking elements suffered casualties to the
enemy artillery.158 Comrade Sáu Thu – the commander of 445 Battalion’s rear blocking
group, was seriously wounded by an AR15 round that passed through one ear lobe to the
other.159 Comrade Sáu Chiến160 – the commander of the 1st Company was killed.
After about an hour of fighting, the headquarters ordered our elements to
withdraw.161 Miss Chín Phương and her comrades in the Võ Thị Sáu civil labour company

designator for 275 Regiment). Later on 19 August, 1 ATF reported that the two “Northern” PW “were
members of NVA 45 Regiment whilst the other was a member of D445 Battalion Local Provincial Mobile.
The North Vietnamese prisoners revealed that 45 Regiment formally [sic] 23 Regiment (possibly means 33
Regiment) moved into Phuoc Tuy Province in May this year and is allied to 66 Regiment. … Captured
documents revealed that D3 Battalion, D605 Battalion, and C14/D3/Q5 Regiment were in contact with
elements of 6RAR on 18 August” – 1 ATF INTSUM No. 79, Núi Đất, 19 August 1966. Translator’s note:
Some published Australian accounts have misinterpreted the foregoing to indicate that a North Vietnamese
unit titled “45” – ie separate to 275 Regiment, was involved at Long Tân (see footnotes 131 and 137). The
foregoing three unit/sub-unit designators in the captured documents all relate to the 3rd Battalion of 275
Regiment of the 5th VC Division – for an outline history of 3/275 Regiment see footnote 137, and also Annex
J for 275 Regiment (including a very brief account of the Long Tân battle by NVA Captain Trần Văn Tiếng).
On 21 August, the 1 ATF intelligence staff were still unsure of the enemy elements engaged at Long Tân –
assessing that: “The 275 VC Regt, 605 Bn 250 Regt and C860 Bn withdrew East and NE following the 18
Aug operations against 6 RAR” – Annex A to Op Toledo Frag Order 1-8-66, OPS204, 211600H Aug 60. As
noted earlier at footnote 137, D605 was the earlier title of the 3rd Battalion of 275 Regiment that had joined
the Regiment in May 1966, and C860 was believed by 1 ATF to be a cover-name for 445 Battalion.
157
Translator’s Note: The New Zealand artillery element – ie 161 Battery - Royal New Zealand Artillery
(RNZA) had earlier been attached to the US 173rd Airborne Brigade since June 1965. In mid-1966, it joined
the Australian Task Force and was located in the Task Force base at Núi Đất – not “in Bà Rịa”. Two New
Zealand infantry companies were later integrated into Australian battalions – the first arriving in April 1967.
For New Zealand forces in Vietnam, see Rock, J.R., Kiwis Under Fire: The New Zealand Armed Forces in
South Vietnam c.1965-1972, University of Auckland, November 1995.
158
Translator’s Note: Artillery units in the 1 ATF base at Núi Đất comprised: 1 Field Regiment (105mm
M2A1 howitzer – maximum range 10,575 metres), 161 Battery RNZA (105mm), A Battery of the US 2/35
Regiment (155mm M109 medium self-propelled gun – maximum range 14,600 metres). A total of 3,198
105mm and 242 155mm rounds were reportedly fired in support of the Long Tân battle – McNeill, I., To
Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.351.
159
Translator’s Note: Some of the Australian troops at Long Tân were armed with the 5.56mm M16 rifle –
not the very similar AR15 model. Post-War, in an Australian television documentary, Nguyễn Đức Thu (Sau
Thu) spoke on the Long Tân battle and displayed his head wound - Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long
Tan – The True Story, op.cit., DVD, 1993 – see also notes on Nguyễn Đức Thu (Sáu Thu) at Annex B.
160
Translator’s Note: Trần Văn Chiến (Sáu Chiến) was appointed - from Executive Officer, to command the
1st Company on 20 October 1965 - CDEC Log 09-1876-66. He was awarded a Certificate of Commendation
by the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit in mid-February 1966 - CDEC Log 04-1394-66, was as an “outstanding
emulator of 1965”- CDEC Log 05-1294-66 (very unusual for such a high-ranking military cadre), and had
been formally promoted to Commander of the 1st Company on 15 February 1966 - CDEC Log 05-1294-66.
161
Translator’s Note: In an interview on 18 March 1989 in Biên Hòa, Đổ Văn Liên (Ba Liên) – the 445
Battalion political officer, related to Terry Burstall that after the battle: “Ba Lien’s part of the D445 went to
the area of the Song Rai [sic] forest and moved around the area telling the people all about the big battle in
the rubber plantations. They did not go anywhere near the Nui May Taos [sic]” – Burstall, T., A Soldier
Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.117. After the battle, 275 Regiment elements “moved back to Lá Jungle base camp”
 47

– unafraid of death, ran fearlessly through the enemy’s falling artillery and - together with
the troops, carried the wounded to safety.
In this large battle with the Australian forces, we wiped out an entire company and
inflicted heavy casualties on one of their battalions.162 COSVN Headquarters awarded the
Liberation Combat Exploits Medal Third Class for the battle.163 However, it was also a
battle in which we suffered heavy casualties. In 445 Battalion’s 2nd Company alone, there
were 23 casualties – of whom three died.164 The 5th Division lost 30 comrades killed and
over 60 wounded.165 Our casualties were mainly inflicted by the enemy’s artillery. Once

((ie the Rừng Lá – vicinity YT 7610 in Xuân Lộc District of Long Khánh Province)) – see Annex J, 275
Regiment.
162
Translator’s Note: For an “all-sources” summary of casualty claims for the Battle, see Annex E – Battle of
Long Tân: Casualties. On Australian casualties, in his 153-page diary (to 7 October 1966, recovered by
Australian forces on 20 October 1966), Nguyễn Nam Hừng (2ic of 274 Regiment) related that “the 5th
Regiment attacked at Núi Đất” and “500 Australians” were killed and “1 Australian Battalion” was
“exterminated” – CDEC Log 11-1259-66. The 5th Division History - 2005 relates that the Long Tân battle:
“had a very important significance: it was the first time that we had destroyed an Australian company.” The
Military Region 7 History relates: “The 5th Division … fought many battles … and - in particular, together
with the Bà Rịa 445 Battalion, for the first time struck the Australian forces in the rubber plantation at Long
Tân (18 August 1966) and inflicted heavy casualties on an Australian company.” - The Armed Forces of
Military Region 7 – 50 Years, 1995, p.35. The Đồng Nai History – 1986 relates: “As planned, on 19 August
445 Battalion ambushed (“phục kích”) the Australian group at Vườn Xoài. Their 3rd Battalion advanced with
tank support from Núi Đất and fell into our ambush. 275 and 445 manoeuvred to decisively fight the enemy.
Our troops killed 500 Australians and destroyed 21 tanks.” - Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …,
op.cit., 1986, p.132. The Đồng Nai Monograph - 2001 similarly records: “The Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu 445
Battalion attacked the Australian troops at Vườn Xoài on 19 August 1966 and killed 500 and destroyed 21
tanks.” - Địa Chí Đồng Nai, op.cit., 2001. A major Vietnamese account of the War relates: “On 18 August,
the troops of the 5th Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division led by Deputy Divisional Commander Trần Minh
Tâm set an ambush and attacked the Royal Australian Battalion [sic] which was sweeping the Núi Đất-Đất
Đỏ area. After 30 minutes of fighting, the 6th [sic] Battalion (of the 5th Regiment) – supported by a company
of the 445th Battalion (Bà Rịa Provincial Unit) destroyed a company of Australian soldiers. As a result, this
Australian mercenary force - renown for its experience in counter-guerrilla warfare, became panic-stricken
and fled to Đất Đỏ.” - Lịch sử Kháng chiến …, Tập 4 (Vol 4), op.cit., 1999.
163
Translator’s Note: Several 445 Battalion soldiers were awarded Letters of Appreciation (Giấy Khen) for
their exploits “fighting the Australians on 18 Aug 66” at Long Tân including Đào Văn Trung – section 2ic/2nd
Company - CDEC Log 12-2368-66; Trần Văn Tranh – section 2ic/2nd Company; Phạm Văn Đương - 2nd
Company – CDEC Log 01-1673-69. Soldiers of 275 Regiment also received medals, letters of appreciation
and commendation certificates for action in the battle at Long Tân – see Annex J.
164
Translator’s Note: The same casualty figures for the 2nd Company are cited in a medical history - Lê
Thanh Dũng (et al), Lịch Sử …, op.cit., 2008. A former commander of 445 Battalion (early 1968-1969) –
Nguyễn Văn Kiềm, but who was not present at the Long Tân battle, claimed that 445 Battalion’s casualties –
both dead and wounded, were “approximately 30, mainly from artillery fire” – McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit., 1993, p.368. According to Nguyễn Văn Nhường (alias Lộc) – a 445 Battalion platoon 2ic at Long Tân
who subsequently defected under the Chiêu Hồi programme (see footnote 233), 445 Battalion casualties were
“10 killed in action and 16 wounded in action.” – Pannell, B.W., “Postscript to Long Tan”, Australian
Infantry, 16, No.2, May 1970, p.180. In mid- September 1966, 1 ATF reported: “D445 had probably lost
between 30-40 KIA.” - 1 ATF Intelligence Review No.1, Núi Đất, 13 September 1966, para 4.c. Much later,
in May 1971, the 1 ATF Intelligence Staff noted that “returnees” had stated 445 Battalion’s “casualties were
70 KIA and 100 WIA.” - Peters, C.C.M. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section,
Núi Đất, 6 May 1971. At time of the Battle, 445 Battalion’s strength was probably 380-400 (see Annex G).
Captured 445 Battalion documents detailed the Battalion’s strength as 392 in early August 1966, 409 in
November 1966 and about 415 in December 1966 – see Annex C – D445 Battalion: Strengths.
165
Translator’s Note: For a summary of Long Tân battle casualty claims and assessments, see Annex E. On
the 5th VC Division’s casualties in the Long Tân battle (ie almost all suffered by its 275 Regiment), the 5th
Division History – 2005 relates: “The 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion ((of 275 Regiment)) suffered high
casualties. … Our forces suffered a large number of casualties – 32 were killed and 60 comrades were
wounded.” - Phạm Quang Đinh, Colonel (ed) Lịch Sử …, op.cit., 2005. A recent medical history has related
that the 5th Division’s “main forces” suffered “over 200 casualties” - Lê Thanh Dũng (et al), Lịch Sử …,
48

more, 445 Battalion’s cadre and soldiers again discovered a dangerous trick: the use by the
Australian forces of directed and counter-assault artillery fire.
Throughout the 1966 Wet Season, the Australian forces coordinated with the puppet
military to continuously launch deep clearing operations into our rear service bases located
east and west of Route 2, in Long Phước, and the Minh Đạm … they had met our forces on
the Bà Rịa battlefield – particularly 445 Battalion which they regarded as a “Force to be
afraid of”. They coordinated with intelligence networks and the military intelligence of the
puppet forces to find out 445 Battalion’s operating methods and the location our bases in
order to attack us with artillery and airpower – and launched large clearing operations using
infantry … with the aim of “eradication”. However, not only were they unable to achieve
such, but there were many occasions on which they suffered heavy casualties. 445
Battalion continued to operate right beside them. In places where the enemy’s bombs, shell
and tanks had flattened the earth, it looked like not even a mouse could exist. However
from July [sic]166 1966 onwards, 445 Battalion did not conduct any large operations (at
battalion-level) as we were continually on the defensive countering the enemy’s sweeping
operations. Nevertheless, unplanned engagements occurred regularly – and these were very
tense. After almost a year of contending with the enemy’s “counter-offensive strategy” in
the critical areas, many of our core soldiers and battle-experienced cadres had become
casualties. The morale and the fighting will of the Battalion were still good – but our
combat strength was uneven.
At the end of the 1966 Wet Season, 445 Battalion headquarters decided to strike a
staggering blow against the puppet forces deep within the enemy’s area of control – a blow
that would resound across the region, while gaining experience for us to attack the
Australians’ base on Da Quy Mountain.167
After our reconnaissance platoon had reported on the situation, the Battalion chose
the Đồn Sập camp (Phước Hải) as the target for its attack. The Đồn Sập camp – in a

op.cit., 2008. Nguyễn Văn Nhường (see the preceding footnote) stated that the official casualty figure for the
5th Division was “about 200 killed in action”, but he believed “the figure of 200 to be a gross under-estimate.”
- Pannell, B.W., “Postscript …”, 1970, op.cit., p.180. Subsequently, a 5th Division POW – NVA Captain Trần
Văn Tiếng – an assistant political officer in 275 Regiment at the Long Tân battle (captured on 26 February
1969), stated that 275 Regiment “sustained over 200 casualties, including both KIA and WIA” at the Long
Tân battle “on approximately 17 August 1966” – VCAT Item No. 2310305007. The Australian official
history relates that “A diary of the enemy commander at Long Tan which was subsequently captured listed
his losses as 500” - McNeill, I., To Long Tan, 1993, op.cit., p.351 and p.558 (endnote 110) - note however,
that no copy or translation of that reported document is available. In 2008, Vietnamese contributors to an
official Vietnamese military blogsite challenged the Australian figures for Việt Cộng casualties as excessive –
see Altus, Trận Long Tân, Quân Sử Việt Nam website, 8 May 2008 – and postings in August 2008 by
sudoan, and in February and March 2011. None of the available Vietnamese district-level histories make any
mention of the Long Tân battle - including the Long Đất District History - 1986 (although the battle took
place on the far northern border of Long Đất District) - Phan Ngọc Danh & Trần Quang Toại,, Lịch Sử …,
op.cit., 1986; The History of the Hòa Long Village Party Chapter (1930 – 2005), op.cit., 2009; nor The Minh
Đạm History, op.cit, 2006. As noted, for further discussion on aspects of the Battle, including Vietnamese
and Australian casualty claims and assessments – see Annex E, Battle of Long Tân: Casualties.
166
Translator’s Note: As the battle at Long Tân occurred on 18 August 1966, the reference to “July 1966”,
may imply that 445 Battalion did not regard the battle at Long Tân as an engagement in which they had
operated at “battalion-level” – or, more likely “July 1966” should perhaps have been “September 1966”.
167
Translator’s Note: Sometimes also spelt as “Gia Quy” – was an ancient partially-collapsed volcano about 8
kilometres southeast of the Australian 1ATF base, and termed “The Horseshoe”, or “Horseshoe Hill” or “the
Horseshoe Feature”. Located at YS 494620 on the northern edge of Đất Đỏ Town, the height of its rim was
about 60 metres, and the crater floor was about 550 metres across. The Horseshoe was first permanently
occupied by D Company of 5RAR on 6 March 1967. Artillery in The Horseshoe base extended the range of
1 ATF fire support. ARVN units were also trained at The Horseshoe.
 49

commanding position and manned by a Regional Forces168 platoon, obstructed our

movement from the direction of Lộc An169 to the Minh Đạm base. While termed a platoon
base, Đồn Sập had all the strength characteristics of an entrenched defensive position. The
camp was atop a white sand hill and comprised a large blockhouse with a large number of
firing loopholes and three other blockhouses – all connected by communications trenches.
Alongside the fighting trenches, there were many bunkers constructed of “sand bags”.170*
Heavy machineguns were placed at the loopholes – and there were also bins full of
grenades for the enemy to throw out around their blockhouses. Beyond the
communications trenches, there were many barbed-wire fences (loose-wire fences, stacked-
roll fences, single-layer fences) – 15 metres in depth and sown with many different types of
mines and illumination flares. This was the first attack on a camp by our Battalion171, so the
Provincial Party Committee and the Provincial Military Command Section were very
concerned. Comrade Út Đặng 172 – the Provincial Unit Commander, and many of the
Provincial cadre staff specifically came down to the Battalion to provide guidance. The
Battalion had selected a reconnaissance detachment of seven soldiers - directly led by
Comrade Hai Bỉ, and the whole of the 2nd Company for this task. All were under the
general command of Comrade Tư Chánh, the Battalion’s second-in-command. The battle
was practised on a tactical model and rehearsed in our Suối Rau base. For the engagement,
the force was bolstered with a 57mm recoilless rifle from the 4th Company to suppress the
enemy firepower, six DH10 directional mines, and two bazooka rounds. The bazooka
rounds were to be used as large explosive charges to blow passages through the barbed-
wire and create two entrances for our assault forces to seize the camp.
At midnight on 20 November 1966, our two columns had concealed themselves
close to the Đồn Sập fences. Late on that deserted and quiet night, an explosion resounded
and a three-metre wide gap was blown in the array of fences. The sound of the explosion
had not completed died away when Hai Bỉ – carrying a pistol, had placed six grenades
against the “principal blockhouse”; and was followed by Comrade Hường. With their
grenades, the two comrades had crippled the main blockhouse and allowed our two infantry
spearheads to pour into the camp. In only a few minutes, we had seized the complete camp.
Such a victory was beyond our expectations. However, it had been too quick and unusually
easy – and this kindled complacency. Two of the remaining enemy in the corner of a trench
threw grenades, and 12 of our comrades were wounded.173 It took another 15 minutes
168
Translator’s Note: Formerly termed the Civil Defence Force/Civil Guard – ie until 1964. However,
communist writings continued to call both the Civil Defence Force and the Regional Forces – “Bảo An”. At
the end of 1966, there were 17 Regional Force (RF) companies and 46 Popular Force (RF) platoons in Phước
Tuy Province (totaling 4,500 troops) – together with an understrength ARVN battalion (1/43/10th Division) –
ie later retitled 18th Division – McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.403. The locations of all ARVN –
including RF and PF elements, in Phước Tuy Province as at 30 November 1966 are recorded in 1 ATF,
ARVN, RF and PF Dispositions in Phuoc Tuy Sector, R92-1-2, Núi Đất, 31 December 1966 – see AWM95,
1/4/20, folio 40 (Internet accessible).
169
Translator’s Note: Lộc An is located on the coast about five kilometres northeast of Phước Hải village -
see footnote 49.
170
* A type of bag made of synthetic material that the enemy filled with soil or sand to build their bunkers –
each bag weighed about 30 kilograms.
171
Translator’s Note: A captured document showed 445 Battalion’s strength in November 1966 as 409:
Headquarters and 1st Company – 110, 2nd Company – 42, 3rd Company 41, 4th Company- 75, 5th Company -
81 (CDEC 05-1754-67). The Australian official history shows the Battalion’s strength as 350 in November
1966 - McNeill, To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, p.48 and p.501 (endnote 56).
172
Translator’s Note: As noted earlier, Đặng Hữu Thuấn – ie as related in the 5th Division History – 2005,
was the commander of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit.
173
Translator’s Note: A captured document shows that 445 Battalion’s 2nd Company lost four personnel
killed on 20 November 1966 - ie the date of the attack on the Đồn Sập camp - CDEC Log 05-1754-67. At
0650hrs on 21 November, ARVN Bà Rịa Sector advised 1 ATF that VC elements had launched a small arms
50

before we were able to grab these two and take hold of the whole battlefield. More than 30
men and women (civilian labourers) from three villages in the Đất Đỏ area assisted our
troops to collect all the weapons – that included tens of boxes of grenades.
Following the Đồn Sập victory – and through the example from the very beginning
of the bravery of Comrade Hai Bỉ and Comrade Hường, the Battalion had gained the
needed experience in attacking a camp. 30 seconds after an explosion had blasted a way in,
our forces had to be right at the base of a blockhouse – that was the most critical moment in
which to seize victory. This experience helped in many subsequent attacks on camps in
which the Battalion was victorious.
Our elements that attacked the camp had achieved a significant military exploit.
However, our troops in the base area were to suffer unimaginable losses. They were
developing the barracks area when a number of seemingly aimless artillery rounds
impacted. No one was able to count the number of rounds in that indiscriminate
bombardment. Suddenly, a number of our people felt a heat gnawing at their insides, and
they appeared quite exhausted. Following this, a few comrades died. The Battalion assessed
that our base had been hit by chemical rounds174 and decided to move from the area. Our
forces were just leaving the base when it was suddenly struck from the air by a B52 raid,
and the base became a sea of fire. Next, American and Australian troops began a sweeping
operation. On our withdrawal to a new base, many more comrades fell down without
apparent cause and could not be saved ! Comrade Hai Ban - a doctor, and a number of
comrades from the Province’s military medical group came to the Battalion and conducted
surgery and tests and discovered that those who had died had pale livers and their lungs
were full of blood. Looking at the poisoned soldiers, Comrade Ba Liên – the Battalion
political officer, wept his heart out at the enemy’s extremely wicked act. Something that we
could no t fully comprehend.
The outcome of the enemy’s chemical shelling was quite serious. Apart from
burying its dead, the Battalion had to organise a group to transport a number of its soldiers
who had been poisoned to our Province hospital. This evacuation group was led by
Comrade Ba Kiên, the Battalion’s second-in-command. However, the enemy’s aggressive
sweeping operation was still ongoing - they had discovered the blood trails of the
evacuation group and were in pursuit. Comrade Ba Kiên delegated Comrades Thắng,
Thống and Nguyễn Văn Quang to remain behind and block the enemy. At this time,
Nguyễn Văn Quang had cached his heavy machinegun and was armed with a B40 - that
had been left behind by the 5th Division, to enable him to more easily carry the wounded.
The three comrades climbed a large tree to observe the approaching enemy. Six tanks
appeared – each a few tens of metres apart, knocking down the trees and foliage as they
advanced. The leading M41 tank halted when it was about 40 metres from the large tree.
The enemy opened the turret hatch to look around. The situation was very dangerous. From
a fork in the large tree, Nguyễn Văn Quang raised his B40, aimed at the tank and pulled the
trigger. Hit by the rocket, the tank burst into flames. As all three comrades were descending
from the tree, the ammunition in the tank exploded. The explosion shook the surrounding
area, and they were flung to the ground. Comrade Thống was killed. Comrade Quang was

attack at Phước Hải. At 1035hrs, Sector reported “15 KIA and 12 WIA” (presumably RF), but APC-borne
assistance from 1 ATF was not required – 1 ATF Operations Log, Sheets 66 and 68, 21 November 1966 –
AWM95, 1/4/19.
174
Translator’s Note: A directive from the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit - signed by Deputy Chief of Staff Nguyễn
Kim Trào on 9 May 1966, warned of the US use of poisonous products on the battlefield (reportedly used on
11 April 1966) . The directive was not to be disseminated to village militia and guerrillas fighters “lest they
be confused”, but included advice on protective measures. - CDEC Log 12-1826-66. Subsequently in October
1966, a circular advised personnel in Châu Đức District of preventative measures and first-aid against CH and
BZ chemicals – CDEC Log 10-2443-66.
 51

seriously wounded and unconscious. Slightly wounded, Comrade Thắng shouldered their
three weapons and - with Comrade Quang leaning on him, dragged Quang 500 metres and
hid in the undergrowth. Following this event, Province awarded Certificates of
Commendation to all three comrades. For his exploit in destroying the tank and many other
outstanding achievements175, Comrade Nguyễn Văn Quang was declared a “Hero of the
People’s Armed Forces”.
In the fighting, Party work and political work were routinely important tasks.176 In
arduous, violent and difficult situations, our cadre had to strive even harder. After the
losses in the chemical attack, the Party Committee and the Battalion Headquarters both
reinforced the 2nd Company – the sub-unit that had suffered the heaviest casualties.177 The
Battalion transferred a number of Party cadre and key soldiers from the other companies to
the 2nd Company. Party and Youth Group Chapters were also strengthened in both the
quantity and quality of personnel to achieve their tasks. The Battalion initiated a series of
activities entitled “Remember and Respond” in order to change the deep grief into
revolutionary action, successful combat, training and other good activities - and to exact
revenge for our comrades who had been killed by the enemy. The Province authorities also
provided funds to purchase materials for political activities in the Battalion. Each company
was given from one to two transistor radios and guitars, chess sets and packs of cards …
Art and cultural activities were strongly encouraged throughout the companies, and the
morale and fighting spirit were soundly maintained. Many disabled comrades in the rear
areas (production units) - who had not yet recovered from illness and injury,
enthusiastically rushed back to their units to again take up arms.178
Youth in the villages of Long Đất and Châu Đức Districts volunteered to join the
revolutionary armed forces179 in this period, and the Province authorities allocated them all
to 445 Battalion (at the request of the youths). At this time, the Battalion had 21 sets of
brothers (from two to three siblings) who fought alongside each other.180*

175
Translator’s Note: For Nguyễn Văn Quang, see footnotes 59, 105, 112, 113, 280 and 296.
176
Translator’s Note: In several captured documents, the political staff are described as “non-combatants” –
eg statements by Trần Văn Tiếng (3/275 Regiment), Đổ Văn Liên (445 Battalion).
177
Translator’s Note: As noted earlier, a captured document shows that the 2nd Company lost four personnel
killed on 20 November 1966 - ie the date of the attack on the Đồn Sập camp - CDEC Log 05-1754-67. Losses
would have also included those in the fighting with 6RAR (Operation Bribie, 17-18 February) east of Hội Mỹ
and probably at Lò Gốm on 17-18 February 1967. An Australian report noted that - supporting an ARVN
operation, 6RAR elements had assaulted a VC position following an airlanding at YS 542572 on 17 February
1967 and reportedly killed 35-50 VC, later identified as D445 Battalion personnel – 1 ATF Troops
Information Sheet No. 44, Núi Đất, 15-21 May 1967. In Operation Bribie, 6RAR suffered seven killed and 27
wounded – and, among the six VC bodies recovered on the battlefield were reportedly the officer
commanding D445’s 3rd Company – and his 2ic. In January 1968, 1 ATF reported that 445 Battalion had “not
operated as a battalion since February 1967.” - “Discussion Point: The Enemy In And Around Phuoc Tuy”,
Troops Information Sheet No. 77, 31 December 1967 - 6 January 1968, Section 3, p.4.
178
Translator’s Note: At about this time – 445 Battalion’s strength was about 415. A captured finance report
for “D/445” listed the strength of the Battalion’s companies in December 1966 as follows: 1st Company: 104
personnel; 2nd Company: 88; 3rd Company: 38; 4th Company: 73; and 5th Company: 91 = Total 394 (ie not
including a discrete figure for Battalion headquarters) - CDEC Log 05-1724-67.
179
Translator’s Note: Below the level of 445 Battalion and the local district companies, the Việt Cộng
“irregulars” in Phước Tuy Province included village guerrillas, “self-defense forces”, and “secret self-defense
forces”. In early December 1966, the United States Sector S-2 (Intelligence) advisor in Bà Rịa Town
estimated the strengths of these elements respectively as: guerrillas – 467; self-defense forces – 245; secret
self-defense forces – 207; Total – 917. The ARVN estimates were respectively 420; 1,445; 410; Total –
2,275. The MACV Order-of-Battle estimates were 405; 575; 410; Total 1,390. See - Estimate of Việt Cộng
Irregular Forces Strength in SVN, CIC-V Item No. 0240612012, 24 March 1967. See also Annex C.
180
* Xuất - Cải – Sinh – Tranh, Hùng, Đức – Bé Mến, Bé Sáu, Bé Bảy, - Ba Bùi, Thăng, Tám Tông – Tô
Dũng, Tô Sỹ – Oanh, Vũ – Huyền, Thanh – Tặng, Xuân – Bỉ, Lưởng – Đế, Băng – Tinh, Minh – Quang Hổ,
52

With reinforcements and a period of consolidation, the Battalion launched many

181
attacks directly against the bases of the Australians and the puppet forces in Long Điền,
Phước Long Hội and Phước Hải182 and destroyed much of the enemy’s strength. These
victories contributed importantly to the defeat of the enemy’s second counter-offensive (in
the 1966-1967 Dry Season) on the Bà Rịa battlefield.183
As the limited war of the American imperialists reached its peak, aid to the South
from our fraternal brothers in the North progressively increased greatly – “All for our blood
brothers in the South”, “Everything to defeat the invading American aggressors”, “Cross
over the Annamite Mountains to save the country” …
Share everything – from your own lives to even potatoes.184 That feeling moved the
hearts of millions in the South who loved their homeland. Make the Fatherland an
impregnable fortress. This wholehearted assistance even reached 445 Battalion. The
Battalion was completely re-equipped with new weapons and reinforced with a number of

Hồng Linh – Quý Thảo – Tư Bốn, Lợi – Xuân, Tuấn – Trung, Tư – Là, Ngà – Thùi, Lọ – Hoàng Anh, Nghĩa
– Tí, Nhật.
181
Translator’s Note: A major engagement on the eastern outskirts of Bà Rịa Town in December 1966 is not
mentioned in the 445 Battalion History – ie on 9 December 1966, 180 ARVN recruits were captured at the
Vạn Kiếp National Training Centre, and the VC subsequently released 62 elderly and sick ARVN POW on 9
January 1967 – see the report by the Phước Tuy Sector S-2 on 5 Feb 67 – VCAT 6 075 3301 67. See also the
S-2 debriefing report of POW at VCAT 6 075 3302 67 and 1 ATF INTSUM No.192, Núi Đất, 10 December
1966 (ARVN casualties: 11 KIA, 26 WIA, 184 MIA; VC: 2 KIA. VC possibly “265 Bn/274 Regiment or
D445 Provincial Battalion”). According to the 5th Division History - 2005, this attack on Vạn Kiếp was
conducted by the 2nd Battalion of 274 Regiment and the “Chau Đức Company” on 18 November 1966 –
resulting in 187 ARVN captured and 71 weapons of various types seized. 274 Regiment reportedly
“organised an education program for the prisoners and chose 80 of the soldiers who had volunteered to join
the revolutionary forces. 40 were incorporated into the Bà Rịa local forces and 40 into the units of the 4th
Regiment” (ie 274 Regiment).
182
Translator’s Note: The 445 Battalion History does not mention the Battalion’s reported major attack on the
Regional Forces outpost near Phước Hải village on 17 February 1967 – nor the subsequent heavy fighting
against Australian elements (6RAR - Operation Bribie) that ensued east of Hội Mỹ and Lồ Gồm. 6RAR
suffered six killed and 27 wounded in Operation Bribie, while the “official estimate” of Việt Cộng killed was
“between 50 and 70” - see McNeill, I & Ekins, A., On the offensive, pp.90-115. According to Nguyễn Thanh
Hồng – a 5th VC Division operations staff officer interviewed in November 1987 (see footnotes 125, 137, 142
and 144), the initial attack at Phước Hải in February 1967 was undertaken by 445 Battalion, but he recounted
that 5th Division elements lured Australian troops into their prepared defensive positions east of Hội Mỹ.
Hồng stated that – “from his recollections”, 275 Regiment was the 5th Division formation involved –
Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, pp.110-111. The 5th Division History – 2005 does not mention
any 5th Division participation in the engagements, nor was it mentioned in the comprehensive POW debrief of
a 3/275 Regiment political cadre. However, the 2nd Battalion of 275 Regiment attacked the Popular Force
outpost at Lồ Gồm several weeks later on 20/21 March 1967 – McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the offensive,
op.cit., pp.146-148. , O’Neill, R.J., Vietnam Task, op.cit., 1968, pp.236-239 and VCAT Item No.
F034600701813. Accordingly, it is most probable that 445 Battalion attacked the Phước Hải RF post on 17
February and the 2nd Battlion of 275 Regiment attacked Lồ Gồm on 20/21 March – with Nguyễn Thanh
Hồng conflating aspects of these engagements – which were close both in time and physical location, when
interviewed 20 years later.
183
Translator’s Note: The Đồng Nai Monograph - 2001 relates: “On 19 June 1967, troops of the 5th Main
Force Division coordinated with the sappers of the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh 445 Provincial Battalion to ambush
the enemy on Route 2 and inflicted heavy casualties on an American infantry battalion and destroyed the
headquarters of the 11th Armored Regiment.”- Địa Chí Đồng Nai, op.cit., 2001. On 20 June 1967 – according
to the 5th Division History – 2005, the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion was employed as a reserve element for
the attack on an ARVN force at He An-Kim Long (about 5 kilometres northwest of Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector)
by two battalions of 274 Regiment.
184
On the night of 26-27 November 1967, the 3rd Company of 445 Battalion raided the Farmers’ Bank and a
number of government offices on the western outskirts of Bà Rịa Town – and seized 250,000 piastres
(equivalent to USD 2,119) – 1 ATF, “Discussion Point: The Enemy In And Around Phuoc Tuy”, Troops
Information Sheet No. 77, Núi Đất, 31 December 1967 - 6 January 1968, Section 3, p.4.
 53

new recruits from the North.185 Every section received a B40 or a B41 and parachute-fitted
anti-tank grenades.186 AK assault rifles and RPD machineguns (of Soviet or Chinese
manufacture) replaced almost all the types of obsolescent infantry weapons. The Battalion
only retained a number of weapons: the AR15, M79 and the Malaysian heavy machinegun
(an American weapon). Accordingly, the Battalion’s infantry weapons were of the most
modern and up-to-date types (the most formidable weapons of both sides).
In December 1967, the Battalion set an ambush to destroy enemy tanks on Route 2
(in the area of the Quang Minh plantation).187
An infantry detachment of the Battalion coordinated with the local district troops to
attack the enemy at Đức Thạnh in order to lure the American 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment at Suối Râm to come down to their relief.
To ensure success against an enemy armoured unit in this battle – and especially to
create confidence in our new types of anti-tank weapons, the Battalion had chosen Party
and Youth Group members from the companies to be armed with B40s and B41s. These
personnel were quite capable in combat and in this first battle would be the core element of
the tank-destroying teams. Each company organised from three to four teams. Each team
was armed with a B40 or a B41 (and six rounds) and two AKs. Everyone had parachute
grenades. In particular, the forward team was equipped with one B40, one B41 (12 rounds)
and a large number of parachute grenades. The ambush site stretched out over 300 metres,
and our forces were positioned about 50 metres from Route 2. The commander of the 1st
Company – Đào Văn Tổng (Tám Tổng), and its political officer – Nguyễn Văn Bảo (Sáu
Bảo)188 were directly in charge of the forward element. The 2nd Company covered the
killing ground, and the 3rd Company comprised the rear group. Exploiting broken sections
of the sealed road and rough dirt patches, we buried two mines in the middle of the road. At
2am, an American armoured squadron from the 11th Regiment coming down from Suối
Râm to aid Đức Thạnh fell into the 445 Battalion ambush. In the very first minutes, three
American tanks had struck the mines and been destroyed by our forward element. At the
same time, our groups in the groves of trees and undergrowth burst forth and split the
armoured column in order to destroy it. The 445 Battalion soldiers with B40s and B41s
moved as swiftly as squirrels and, in a flash, engaged the bulky and imposing American
M41 and M48 tanks. Almost all the Americans in the tanks huddled under cover in their

185
Translator’s Note: During infiltration into the South, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN - ie North
Vietnamese Army) military personnel routinely physically discarded their rank and other insignia and adopted
“functional titles”. However, in many formations and units this was nominal, and their military ranks were
used – see Advanced Research Projects Agency, Basic Profile: NVA PW – MR3, Summary Report No.15,
Washington, 14 January 1971, VCAT Item No. 2321314001.
186
Translator’s Note: The RKG anti-armour grenade – this was a shaped-charge grenade with a stabilizing
drogue parachute that deployed from the grenade’s throwing handle once thrown - ie for a stabilized and
controlled descent onto an armoured vehicle or bunker. Sometimes called a “stick grenade”.
187
This was probably the attack at 0300-0400hrs on 31 December against a US armoured convoy
(comprising two M48 tanks, 12 APCs) moving south on Route 2 just north of Xà Bang at YS 454864
resulting in nine US killed and up to 25 wounded. Two US tanks and five APCs were reportedly “gutted” or
“put out of action”. No VC casualties were reported. 1 ATF assessed that the VC unit involved was “likely
the Cam My District Company”, possibly strengthened either by sub-units of 274 Regiment or D445
Battalion. - 1 ATF Intelligence Review No. 16, Núi Đất, 3 January 1968. The US 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment’s (11 ACR) “Blackhorse” base was located on Route 2 in the Suối Râm area about six kilometres
south of Xuân Lộc Town. The Regiment’s combat power comprised: three armoured cavalry squadrons and
an air cavalry troop. Each squadron comprised three cavalry troops, a tank company and a self-propelled (SP)
155m howitzer battery. Its principal equipments were: 51 M48A3 Patton medium tanks/M551 Sheridan light
tanks, 296 M113 APCs and 18 M109 155 SP howitzers. - Chesney, E.J. Major, The 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment in Vietnam – January 1969 through June 1970, Fort Leavenworth, 2002. VCAT Item No.
168300010420.
188
Nguyễn Văn Bảo (Sáu Bảo) - see footnotes 36, 37, 197 and Annex A.
54

vehicles - relying on the steel armour and not daring to engage with our soldiers. It was a
“struggle” between men and steel. One of our comrades dodged to one side, let a tank pass
– and then launched his rocket and set the vehicle on fire. The whole ambush site was
clouded by smoke and dust, and the hulks of tanks and armoured vehicles were in a
scattered disorder. Thus the battle was set. Many of our soldiers even forgot to support one
another. They even forgot their orders to coordinate their actions and the combat plans –
thinking only of one thing, pursuing the tanks and destroying them. After nearly an hour of
fighting, 445 Battalion had set fire to and destroyed 12 tanks and armoured vehicles and
completely destroyed an armoured squadron of the American 11th Armored Regiment.
With the battle over, enemy aircraft appeared while we were withdrawing. The L19 (Old
Lady) aircraft189 focused on the tracks through the rubber plantation to the east of Route 2
(our withdrawal route) and fired rockets inflicting a number of casualties on us. Comrade
Tám Tổng – a company commander, was struck in the mouth by a piece of shrapnel and
half of his jaw was broken, and another piece passed through his neck rendering him
unconscious. Comrade Sáu Bảo was wounded in the hand. Sáu Bảo carried Tám Tổng on
his back, and inched his way for a few hundred metres until he noticed that Tám Tổng had
ceased breathing. He then hid his comrade-in-arms in some bushes, took Tám Tổng’s
weapon and some unit documents, and returned to the unit to report the situation. Near
midday, Tám Tổng regained consciousness and, waiting until dark, crawled in the direction
of the firing and reached the unit’s initial regrouping position. The following morning,
villagers on their way to work found Tám Tổng and told local guerrillas who carried him
back to the unit.
After two years of implementing their “Limited War” strategy – that peaked with
the two strategic offensives in the 1965-66 and 1967 Dry Seasons, not only had the
American imperialists been unable to achieve their intention - but they had suffered a
humiliating defeat. Hundreds of thousands of Americans, puppet troops and vassals had
been driven from the battlefield. Many well-trained and battle-tested American units had
been attacked and had disintegrated. A large number of their aircraft, tanks … had been
destroyed, resulting in heavy losses.190*
Almost 3,000 of the most modern American aircraft had been shot down over the
North, hundreds of pilots captured, and the number of American troops against the War
grew larger every day. The American imperialists were at a strategic impasse.

CHAPTER IV

THE ATTACK ON THE ENEMY DURING THE MẬU THÂN SPRING PHASE
IN BÀ RỊA

While the American imperialists were bogged down in a stalemate in the war in
Vietnam, the Politburo of the Party’s Central Committee in Hà Nội directed:

189
Translator’s Note: The US Cessna L-19/O-1 “Bird Dog” aircraft was used for reconnaissance and forward
air control tasks. During the Vietnam War, 469 L-19/O-1 aircraft were lost to all causes.
190
* In the first strategic counter-offensive (in the 1965-1966 Dry Season), the enemy deployed 200,000
troops, 2,200 aircraft, 1,400 tanks and armoured vehicles, and 1,200 artillery pieces … And their troops
driven from the battlefield and killed comprised 114,000 men (including 4,300 Americans), 1,440 aircraft and
1,300 armoured vehicles destroyed … . In the second counter-offensive (in the 1966-1967 Dry Season), the
enemy deployed 440,000 troops, 4,300 aircraft, 3,300 tanks and armoured vehicles, and 2,300 artillery pieces
… And their troops driven from the battlefield comprised: 175,000 men (including 70,000 Americans and
15,000 vassals) and 1,800 aircraft – Vietnam’s Strength, People’s Armed Forces Publishing House, 1977,
p.157, p.159.
 55

“Mobilize the greatest effort from the whole Party, the whole armed forces and all the
people in both parts of the country in order to bring our revolutionary war to its highest
stage and through a general offensive and general insurrection seize the decisive
victory.”191*
This major policy statement from the Politburo of the Party’s Central Committee
was promulgated widely to all the cadre and soldiers in the South Vietnam People’s
Liberation Armed Forces. The local units made every effort to prepare urgently to attack
the enemy at Tết Mậu Thân in 1968.192
445 Battalion also paid immediate attention to reorganizing and preparing every
facet in order to participate in the general offensive. At this time, the whole Provincial
Committee apparatus, the agency branch committees and 445 Battalion were moved from
east of Route 2 to the west (the Núi Dinh region, Bà Rịa). 445 Battalion continued to
receive a number of recruits from the North – while at the same time, the Provincial
Committee reduced the establishments of a number of agencies and branches within the
Province to provide reinforcements for 445 Battalion. The strength of the Battalion reached
608.193 This was the highest strength figure for the Battalion from its inception to its
coming-of-age.194 At this time, Comrade Nguyễn Văn Kiềm (Năm Kiềm)195 was the
Battalion Commander and Comrade Năm Ninh196 was the political officer and concurrently
the secretary of the Battalion’s Party Committee. The Battalion was still structured with
four companies197* and five Party Chapters198. Additionally, the Battalion appointed a

191
* The Vietnam Military History Institute, The Resistance War Against the Americans for National
Salvation, p.178.
192
Translator’s Note: According to the Đồng Nai Monograph - 2001: On 26-27 January 1968 – preparatory to
the Tết 1968 Offensive, a Command Committee was established for the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Front. For Bà
Rịa Town and the districts of Bà Rịa: Lê Đình Nhơn – the Secretary of the Province Committee (since late
1966) was appointed political commissar (chính ủy) and Đặng Văn Thuấn (Út Đặng) – the commander of the
Bà Rịa–Long Khánh Provincial Unit was made commander (tư lệnh). For Long Khánh Town: Phạm Lạc (Tư
Lạc – the deputy commander of the Bà Rịa–Long Khánh Provincial Unit was made commander (tư lệnh) with
Lê Sắc Nghi of the Bà Rịa–Long Khánh Standing Committee as political commissar (chính ủy). The towns
and districts all established command committees led by their secretaries. - Địa Chí Đồng Nai (Đồng Nai
Monograph), Tập 3 (Vol 3) – Chương 6 (Chapter 6), op.cit., 2001, footnote 21.
193
Translator’s Note: When interviewed by Dr I. McNeill in Vũng Tàu in June 1988, Nguyễn Văn Kiềm
stated that 445 Battalion had an effective strength at Tết 1968 of “over 600 soldiers”- McNeill, I. & Ekins, A.,
On the offensive, op.cit., 2003. p.305.
194
Translator’s Note: For a summary of 445 Battalion strength figures, see Annex C.
195
Translator’s Note: This is the first mention of Nguyễn Văn Kiềm (Năm Kiềm) in the 445 Battalion
History. Kiềm had been the commander of the Châu Đức District Unit since early 1966 – and he signed a
document as the Commander of the Châu Đức District Unit on 28 January 1968 (CDEC Log 01-1333-69),
two days before 445 Battalion’s attack on Bà Rịa Town at Tết Mậu Thân. As noted earlier, a number of
published Australian works incorrectly cite Nguyễn Văn Kiềm as the D445 Battalion commander at the Battle
of Long Tân on 18 August 1966 – including the Australian official history which describes Nguyễn Văn
Kiềm as the “most important witness” among the “former enemy” on the Battle - McNeill, I., To Long Tan,
op.cit, 1993, p. 365. However, Dr McNeill noted: “There were some ambiguities about the precise nature of
Kiem’s command of D445 Battalion, though, and his actual role in the battle at Long Tan.” - Ekins, A.,
“Unravelling …”, op.cit., July 2011. Kiềm also appeared in a DVD/video as the on-site D445 Commander at
Long Tân describing the battle in detail - see Horsefield, B. (Director/Producer), Long Tan – The True Story,
op.cit., 1993. For biographic detail on Nguyễn Văn Kiềm and discussion of his career, see Annex B.
196
Translator’s Note: Năm Ninh – ie Nguyễn Minh Ninh. Other reports indicated that Đổ Văn Liên was still
445 Battalion’s political officer in February 1968 and led the Việt Cộng attack on Long Điền – see footnote
210.
197
* 1st Company: Comrade Hai Bỉ as Company Commander; Chín Phấn as Political Officer. 2nd Company:
Comrade Bốn as Company Commander; Sáu Bảo as Political Officer. 3rd Company: Comrade Mười Dậm as
Company Commander; Sáu Phương as Political Officer. 4th Company: Comrade Tư Đức as Company
Commander; Sáu Thống as Political Officer. Translator’s Note: The Battalion’s 5th Company is omitted – the
5th Company was noted as active in 1965 (CDEC Log 04-1431-66 – commendation for Le Văn Loi; CDEC
56

number of cadre as core elements for a battalion of northern recruits who had just been
allocated to reinforce the Province and had been given the title: 440 Battalion.199
The plan for COSVN’s Mậu Thân Spring Offensive in the Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa –
Long Khánh area was carefully studied by the local units – and by each cadre and soldier,
to ensure its unqualified implementation. The 5th Division (a COSVN main-force
formation) and the Biên Hòa armed forces were to attack the enemy in the city of Biên Hòa
and at the Biên Hòa airfield.200
440 Battalion – together with the armed forces of Long Khánh Town were to attack
the enemy in Long Khánh Town.201
445 Battalion was to coordinate with the Bà Rịa Town special action unit202 to
attack the enemy in Bà Rịa Town.203
At about 5pm on the last day of January 1968, Comrade Lê Đình Nhơn (Chín Lê)204
– the secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, and Comrade Út Đặng205 - the
Commander of the Provincial Unit, came down directly to 445 Battalion to thoroughly brief
on the orders for the fighting. Comrade Chín Lê stated: “A thousand years of history comes
down to this point. 445 Battalion must swear its resolve to die so that the Fatherland might
live.” The whole Battalion leapt up, calling out and resoundingly shouting slogans and their
pledges of resolve in front of the Provincial Party Secretary. Having listened to the
directives and orders for the fighting – and the inspiring encouragement of the cadre from
several levels, almost all the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion believed that this was the
final battle. Everyone was extremely elated, and there was vigorous discussion. The
prospects of returning to their home villages and meeting once again with their families
after our victory – which was only a few more days away, ran repeatedly through the hearts

Log 12-2451-66 - promotion of Hồ Văn Phong) and in 1966 (see previous footnotes 69, 83, 171 and 178).
The Military Affairs Committee Roster document (CDEC Log 12-2393-66) of mid-1966 lists promotions for
nine junior personnel of the 5th Company. In December 1966, according to a captured finance report, the 5th
Company’s strength was 91 – CDEC Log 05-1724-67.
198
Translator’s Note: See Annexes F and G for detail on Party membership, organisation and activities in 445
Battalion.
199
Translator’s Note: In November 1967, 1 ATF at Núi Đất reported that on 22 May 1967 the Bà Biên
Provincial Committee had ordered 41 cadre from 445 Battalion and other local VC units to assembly on 10
June 1967 for the formation of 440 Battalion – and its first Political Officer was Nguyễn Hữu Thi, and its first
Assistant Political Officer was Trần Văn Khồi. – 1 ATF Troops Information Sheet No. 69, Núi Đất, 5-11
November 1967. Recent (2008) Vietnamese sources however relate that: “440 Battalion’s antecedent was the
2nd Battalion of the 9th Regiment of 340B Division, and was established on 14 September 1965.”– see Annex
K for detail.
200
Translator’s Note: The attacks at Biên Hòa are detailed in the 5th Division History - 2005.
201
Translator’s Note: Detail on the Tết Mậu Thân (1968) attacks on the Long Khánh Province capital - ie
Xuân Lộc Town, can be found in Annex I (III Corps Advisory Group) to Tết Offensive After Action Report
(not dated) – VCAT Item No. 13680112021 and at Annex K – 440 Local Force Battalion.
202
Translator’s Note: Literally the “biệt dộng thị xã Bà Rịa” – however, the US III Corps Advisory Group
After Action Report (footnote 201) referred to the “C610 Baria City Company”.
203
Translator’s Note: According to the Đồng Nai History – 1986: “Út Đặng ((Đặng Hữu Thuấn)) – the
Provincial Unit Commander directed the political officer Lê Đình Nhơn ((Chín Lê)) to directly control the
attack on Bà Rịa City.” - Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.142. For the Australian
official history account of the attack on Bà Rịa at Tết Mậu Thân, see McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the
offensive, op.cit., 2003, pp.304-320.
204
Translator’s Note: Lê Đình Nhơn (Chín Lê/Chinh Lê/Lê Chính) was posted form U1 (Biên Hòa)/MR1 to
Bà Rịa Province as Secretary of the Party Committee and political officer of the Bà Rịa Provincial Unit. “Lê
Chính” was noted on 21 June 66 and 22 July 1966 as Secretary of the Provincial Civil Affairs Committee -
see CDEC Log 9-2049-66; and also later in January 1967 – CDEC Log 05-2647-67. Lê Chính was also noted
holding the position in 1971 and 1972 - CDEC Log 07-1132-72. See also Annex H, Higher Headquarters.
205
Translator’s Note: Đặng Hữu Thuấn/ Út Đặng – also as Võ/Vũ Đặng – aka Thiêm. Út Đặng became the
chief of staff of Military Region 7 in January 1969 – VCAT Item No. 2310510003.
 57

and minds of everyone. No matter how ill or debilitated, no one wanted to stay at the base.
Everyone picked out their newest uniform to wear. There were some who washed their
only uniform. Left-over accoutrements were thrown into the corners of their trenches.
There were some comrades who poked holes in their cooking and eating utensils - and
shouted: “Farewell Forever to the Forest”. Mr Hai Cà – who was over 60 years of age, and
his 20-year old daughter were responsible for cooking the rice for the Battalion’s
headquarters group. They both approached the headquarters in tears asking that they might
accompany the unit and take part in this final battle. The Battalion cadre explained
endlessly, but Hai Cà would absolutely not listen. Finally, only when ordered, did the father
and daughter remain at the base – but Hai Cà was still very melancholy.
The whole Battalion was in readiness and awaiting the order to deploy, but we
waited and waited and still received no word. It was past the first day of Tết and
approaching the afternoon of the second when we heard a radio broadcast and knew that
the attacks had begun almost everywhere else206 – and that there had been great victories.
Our forces had seized the imperial capital of Huế, the radio broadcast station in Sài Gòn,
the American Embassy, and the city of Biên Hòa. The Battalion then deployed over several
tens of kilometres to attack Bà Rịa Town.207
The Battalion’s reconnaissance detachment attacked the civil administrative
headquarters building and the Province Chief’s official residence.
The 1st Company attacked the self-propelled artillery base.
The 2nd Company attacked the Police Field Force and the compound of the public
security service.
The 3rd Company attacked the provincial Regional Forces Group. The 3rd Company
opened fire first and, with the advantage of surprise and the initiative, seized almost all of
their objectives in the Regional Forces Group’s complex – only a few of the enemy’s
fighting pits held out in a corner of the base. The Battalion’s reconnaissance detachment
attacked and seized a number of objectives in the civil administrative headquarters building
and the Province Chief’s residence – and then took the jail (prison) and advanced to attack

206
Translator’s Note: An official media article following the 2008 conference presided over by the former
Deputy Secretary of Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province Phạm Văn Hy to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the
Tết 1968 Offensive, included the following: “H-hour on D-Day for the whole of the South was set as 0000hrs
(giao thừa) of the Lunar New Year (Tết Nguyên đán). The calendar calculation in the North that year was
one day earlier than that in the South. The Nam Bộ Region opened fire according to the Southern calendar –
one day late, and so the B2 battlefield did not have the element of surprise as the enemy was forewarned, had
organised their defences and ordered all their troops to remain in camp. In Bà Rịa–Long Khánh, as the key to
the codes had been lost, we began our attacks a further day later, losing the surprise factor. - Nguyễn Đình
Thống, “Những ký ức không thể nào quên” – “Memories that can never be forgotten”, Communist Party of
Vietnam - Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Agency, Vũng Tàu,1 February 2008. See also Annex L, footnote 39.
207
Translator’s Note: As noted, the official Australian account of VC attacks at Tết Mậu Thân in 1968 in
Phước Tuy Province is in McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the offensive, op.cit., 2003, pp.304-320. Dr I. McNeill
interviewed the former 445 Battalion commander Nguyễn Văn Kiềm in Vũng Tàu on 18 June 1988 – and
some information from Kiềm is included at p.305. As noted earlier, Kiềm stated 445 Battalion had an
effective strength of “over 600 soldiers”. The 445 Battalion History – 1991 account does not mention that “at
5am on 2 February 1968, Comrade Bùi Quang Chánh ((the former 445 Battalion Commander)) - the
commander of the Châu Đức District Unit, led the District’s armed forces to attack the Long Lễ Sub-Sector
Headquarters ((in Hòa Long village)) and the enemy’s post at the Long Xuyên T-Junction.” – The History of
the Hòa Long Village Party Chapter (1930 - 2005), op.cit., 2009 (see Annex N). Bùi Quang Chánh is also
reported as leading the Châu Đức District Unit in attacks in the first days of February 1968 on Hòa Long and
shelling the Australian base at Nui Dat with 82mm mortars - Hà Nhân, “Bà Rịa-Long Khánh và ký ức không
thể quên”, Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Communist Party Agency, 29 January 2008. 1 ATF records show 40 82mm
mortar rounds impacted in the 1 ATF base on 1 February, with a further shelling on 2 February 1968. The
Châu Đức District report on their attacks in the period 31 January-10 February 1968 – including against
Australian troops at Hòa Long, is at VCAT Item No. 2131111007.
58

the self-propelled artillery base in coordination with the 1st Company. The 2nd Company
attacked the Police Field Force area (at the Thành Thái junction). This objective was in
greater depth and attacked later – and so the enemy had the opportunity to deploy all its
troops to occupy the blockhouses and defensive positions. Our soldiers of the 2nd Company
fought doggedly but were only able to seize one-third of the objective. By 3pm, all the
Battalion’s attacking columns had still not been able to take all of the objectives that had
been allocated. We moved onto the defensive. In the first minutes, the enemy had been
confused, but they then relied on their blockhouses and strong defensive positions to hold
out – and then counter-attacked to retake in-turn each of their blockhouses and buildings
within the Town. All types of enemy aircraft gathered and fired devastatingly into the rear
of our attacking formations. At the same time, the enemy’s reinforcements also arrived
from many different directions. A Ranger battalion advanced from the training centre at
Vạn Kiếp. A squadron of Australian armoured vehicles and an infantry battalion came
down from Núi Đất208 … At that time, we had no troops at all to repulse these enemy units.
There was only the provincial reconnaissance company that was attacking the military
training centre at Vạn Kiếp, and our forces were too few. The fighting in Bà Rịa became
increasingly more tense and decisive. 445 Battalion had to simultaneously contend with the
enemy’s forces counter-attacking out from their positions - while fighting against their
elements arriving and attacking us from the outside. 35 of our comrades were killed and
108 were wounded209 – but many of 445 Battalion’s cadre and soldiers still held on
staunchly and repulsed tens of counter-attacks from all directions by the enemy’s infantry
and tanks and were able to retain the objectives that they had seized. At the one time,
Comrade Phạm Văn Đương of the 2nd Company set ablaze four enemy tanks with his B40.
Comrade Tiến – a section commander in the 3rd Company, fired seven B40 rounds and
destroyed several pockets of enemy resistance. As a result of the explosive force of the
seven B40 warheads, blood flowed from both of Tiến’s ears, but he still remained on the
battlefield. Comrade Sửu – the assistant company political officer, and three soldiers drove
back tens of enemy counter-attacks. However, when the enemy retook their blockhouse, the
brave Comrade Sửu was killed. … And it’s unknown how many other comrades were
seriously wounded and were unable to be evacuated from the battlefield. After a day and
two nights of fighting in Bà Rịa Town, we had set fire to 14 enemy tanks, eliminated over
300 enemy from the battlefield, crippled their self-propelled artillery and almost all of the
important targets within the town (the Phước Tuy Province Chief was forced to flee to
Vũng Tàu). At daybreak on the fourth day of Tết, the Battalion was ordered to withdraw
from Bà Rịa Town. The 1st Company and the 2nd Company were immediately ordered to
Long Điền Town – and together with the local force troops, to attack the enemy there and
to defeat the enemy’s forces attempting to relieve the town.210 We fought the enemy at
208
Translator’s Note: The tactical headquarters of 1 ATF and its 2RAR and 7RAR infantry battalions - and a
company from 3 RAR, were deployed about 55km to the northeast of Núi Đất on the approaches to the Biên
Hòa and Long Bình base areas (Operation Coburg: 24 January – mid-February). In early February, 3RAR(-)
and APC units engaged in the fighting in Bà Rịa and Long Điền. In an interview on 18 March 1989 in Biên
Hòa, Đổ Văn Liên (Ba Liên) – the 445 Battalion political officer, stated that “D445 were unaware that most
of the Task Force was away at Long Bình in Biên Hòa province, but Ba Liên said that would hardly have
mattered.” - Burstall, T., A Soldier Returns, op.cit., 1990, p.117.
209
Translator’s Note: According to the Đồng Nai History – 1986: “after one day of fighting in Bà Rịa, we had
suffered 50 casualties.” - Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.142. For US and 1 ATF
reports on total Việt Cộng casualties during the Tết 1968 attacks on Bà Rịa, Vạn Kiếp and Long Điền, see
footnote 213.
210
Translator’s Note: According to the Đồng Nai History – 1986: “For the attack on Long Điền, the Standing
Committee strengthened our forces which were led by Ba Liên (445 Battalion political officer) and the
Secretary of the District Committee.” - Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.142. The
“three-platoon attack on Long Điền led by the Long Đất District Secretary - Lê Thành Ba, together with Đỗ
 59

Long Điền for a full week.211 The 3rd Company attacked the enemy at the Rạch Ván bridge
on Route 15.212
This was the first time that all of the Battalion had engaged in a large attack in a
town – and also a time when we had to develop new methods and structures for complex
and rapidly changing combat situations during which we were forced to contend with
enemy forces that outnumbered us by tens of times. … However, the cadre and soldiers of
445 Battalion had fought doggedly and had worn down and destroyed large enemy forces
from many of their units. The Battalion had achieved its tasks well, attacking into the
centre of Bà Rịa Town, crippling many of Phước Tuy Province’s key organisations, and
destroying a large weapons warehouse and much of the enemy’s war materiel. We crushed
many important enemy units and played our part in the conflagration across the whole
battlefront.
Any victory in battle however entails losses, sacrifices and death.213 Any soldier
who takes up arms on the battlefield must also accept this. The most optimistic thing - and
final hope, is that a battle or a campaign will be successful. … And, if success is not
achieved, then that’s very harmful to the combatants’ psychology. The attack on Bà Rịa
Town was not the final battle. The victory at Tết Mậu Thân was not yet the final victory.
In that situation, a negative tendency arose in the resolve of the unit. The Battalion’s
Party Current Affairs Committee held a very urgent meeting with the core leadership and
convened a symposium on ideological work. Following this, a broader conference of the
Party Committee was held for all of the political cadre in the Battalion. This conference
unanimously ratified the key ideological aspects put forward by the leadership. The
atmosphere of silence, vague thoughts and foolish optimism had to be eliminated.
Discipline must continue for each stage of the war, and the enemy must not be under-
estimated. The belief had to be reinforced that, while the war will continue to be arduous
and protracted – victory is certain. The activities of the Youth Group Chapters had to be
increased. In each unit, art and cultural events had to be accentuated, and the initiative
taken to improve the mental and material lives of the troops. In a short time, the resolve of
the unit was raised to a new level in preparation for the tasks to come.
To implement the resolution of the Party Committee, the Battalion’s leadership
focused every effort on the political and ideological work before them. Political funds were
increased and provided to the companies to purchase guitars and “Croky” paper with which

Văn Chương ((Đổ Văn Liên/Ba Liên)), Nguyễn Văn Hoạt and Nguyễn Hoan”, was related in a 2008 media
article - Hà Nhân, “Bà Rịa-Long Khánh và ký ức không thể quên” - “Bà Rịa-Long Khánh and Unforgettable
Memories”, Communist Party of Vietnam - Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Agency, 29 January 2008. The Australian
official history noted a “pro-Viet Cong attitude in Long Dien” - McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the offensive,
op.cit., 2003, p.309 and p.315.
211
Translator’s Note: The “Free World Forces” engaged in Long Điền were elements of the ARVN 52nd
Regiment of the 18th Division and A Company of 1 ATF’s 3rd Battalion (3RAR).
212
Translator’s Note: As noted earlier, more detailed accounts of the Tết Mậu Thân (1968) fighting at Bà Rịa
and Long Điền can also be found in McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the offensive, op.cit., 2003, pp.304-320 and
the US MACV report cited at footnote 213.
213
Translator’s Note: For the US MACV report noting 445 Battalion’s activities during the Tết 1968
Offensive, see Weyand, F.C. Lieutenant General, Military Assistance Command – Vietnam, Combat
Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3-32) (K-1) - Tet Offensive After Action Report (31 January –
18 February 1968), Saigon, 1968 – VCAT Item No. 13680112021 or 168300010351. At Annex I (II Corps
… ), p. I-14, the report relates: “206 VC were killed and 61 weapons found in the town ((Bà Rịa)). … At the
Van Kiep training centre, 52 VC were killed, 2 VC and 53 weapons were captured.” 1 ATF reported the total
Việt Cộng casualties during Tết attacks on Bà Rịa, Vạn Kiếp and Long Điền as: “43 enemy KIA (BC) and 17
possible”. – 1 ATF Intelligence Review No. 17, Núi Đất, 23 February 1968. According to the analysis in the
US MAC-V After Action Report, the pre-Tết Offensive strength of D445 Battalion was estimated as 350, and
the post-Offensive strength was 225. – see Weyand, F.G., Combat Operations …, op.cit 1968, VC Order of
Battle, Appendix I to Annex A, p.A-1-4, VCAT Item No. 13680112004.
60

to make posters to hang in the units. Comrade Năm Ninh – the Battalion political officer,
Comrade Năm Kiềm – the Battalion commander, and other comrades in the Battalion
leadership group participated in-turn in up-lifting cultural events and group activities in the
companies. At the same time, each company organised the hunting of wild jungle animals
to improve the meals for their units … In this way, the reasons behind these developments
was correctly assessed and redressed in time by the leadership. The morale and material
welfare of the soldiers was thoughtfully addressed, leading to a gradual strengthening and
raising of the resolve of the whole Battalion.
On the night of 4/5 May 1968214, 445 Battalion undertook its mission for the second
phase of the Tết Mậu Thân attacks. The Battalion’s task was to destroy the enemy’s
facilities on Route 2 in order to hold back any enemy relief force that might move against
the critical thrusts by our forces in this phase. 440 Battalion attacked the enemy at
Courtenay Hill (Cẩm Mỹ) while 445 Battalion laid an ambush on Route 2. An armoured
squadron of the American 11th Armored Brigade [sic] fell into the ambush, and a fierce
engagement ensued. While engrossed in pursuing the enemy, Comrade Lợi – a soldier in
our reconnaissance element, became surrounded by enemy tanks. As he lifted his B40 to
aim at an armoured vehicle, an American jumped down from another adjacent armoured
vehicle. Lợi turned, intending to strike the American on the head with his B40. However,
the American was too tall and strong, and was able to snatch the B40. After a few minutes
struggling, the American grabbed Lợi’s groin area and put his Colt pistol in Lợi’s back
intending to capture him. With the special skill of a reconnaissance soldier, Lợi flexed
himself - then, suddenly raising his arm, stuck a swift and hard blow to the American’s
private parts. The American gave a loud roar, and then stumbled away. Lợi still had time to
grab his B40 and disappear into the jungle. After a few tens of minutes of fighting, 445
Battalion had destroyed 16 of the enemy’s tanks and armoured vehicles.
Following this victory, 445 Battalion deployed its forces in a counter-sweep
operation in the Route 2 area. The Battalion had attacked an outlying base of a battalion of
the puppet’s 18th Division at the Sesame Bushes T-junction (close to Xuân Lộc).215 The
Battalion inflicted casualties on this unit at a time when the enemy were preparing to
launch a sweeping operation into the Provincial Unit’s base. Having suffered a painful
blow, the puppet forces frantically deployed two other battalions to continue their
operation. However, they were attacked by 445 Battalion, suffered serious losses and were
forced to abandon the operation. In this phase of the fighting, Comrade Kiên – the
Battalion’s second-in-command, was killed !
In the Long Đất area, in a series of attacks and the uprising for the second phase of
Tết Mậu Thân, the local armed forces attacked the Đất Đỏ and Long Điền Sub-Sectors and
wore down and destroyed an important part of the enemy’s war-making capacity.
Afterwards however, the Australian military and puppet forces discovered that our forces
were too thin on the ground and that there were no main-force troops. Consequently, they
counter-attacked deeply into our bases – particularly into the Minh Đạm base area. Our
forces had to fall back and ward off large sweeping operations launched by the Australian
214
Translator’s Note: On 5 May 1968, the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR) reported heavy
contact with elments of 440 Battalion in the vicinity of Cẩm Mỹ (YS 4888) – 1 ATF INTSUM 126/68, Núi
Đất, 5 May 1968. 1 ATF reported that in the attack by 445 and 440 Battalions at Cẩm Mỹ (YS 4692) on 5
May 1968, Việt Cộng casualties were 36 killed (by body count), a further 57 killed by artillery, and five
prisoners taken. US losses were five killed, nine wound, one M48 tank destroyed and two damaged - 1 ATF
INTSUM 127/68, Núi Đất, 6 May 1968.
215
Translator’s Note: 1 ATF records indicate that on 7 June 1968 445 Battalion attacked a night defensive
position of the 43rd ARVN Regiment (at GR YS 580931) and suffered 58 killed (by ARVN body count) –
four enemy weapons were recovered. ARVN casulaties were reported as three killed and 26 wounded -
1 ATF INTSUM No. 158/68, Núi Đất, 7 June 1968.
 61

infantry and armoured elements. In these circumstances, 445 Battalion was ordered to
return to Long Đất and assist the local forces. Over a three-month period, the Battalion
coordinated with C25 (Long Đất), hamlet and village forces and the people to keep that key
base secure. The enemy conducted many large sweeping operations scouring the Minh
Đạm War Zone, but the base remained secure and unyielding.
In August 1968, 445 Battalion wiped out the 18th Puppet Division’s “Crazy
Buffalo” battalion.
These resounding victories by 445 Battalion since its founding, greatly enthused the
people and the local armed forces in the Long Đất – Châu Đức – Xuyên Mộc region. The
Australian military and the puppet forces were extremely bitter. On many occasions, they
had used every sort of trick to destroy the Battalion. This time, a well-credentialed battalion
from the 18th Puppet Division – with the title of “Crazy Buffalo”, sent a provocative letter
threatening to destroy 445 Battalion in the open ground around Đất Đỏ. The Battalion’s
leadership group didn’t respond with a declaration of war on the enemy, but resolved to
wipe out this battalion at Đất Đỏ. With the assistance of the people in the hamlets and
villages of Phước Thọ, Phước Thạnh and Phước Long Hội … the Battalion prepared an
ambush on Route 52 about 300 metres from the Phước Long Hội camp. The enemy was
completely surprised – and could not understand what had happened. The 2nd Company
was our forward group. The 1st Company led by Comrade Hai Bỉ – the company
commander, was responsible for the killing ground. The 3rd Company led by Comrade
Nguyễn Văn Vũ – the uncle of Comrade Hai Bỉ, acted as the rear group. Comrade Hai Bỉ
and his uncle had met before we deployed and had pledged to shake hands right in their
home area after only 10 minutes of the fighting. At 8am on 8 August 1968, the “Crazy
Buffalo” Battalion – with two American advisors in command, had only just stumbled out
of their camp on their clearing operation when they suddenly came under fire and were
attacked from three sides. After more than 10 minutes of fighting, only an enemy platoon
was able to break through our encirclement - and fled in disorder. We seized over 40
weapons.216
A top-notch puppet-force battalion – together with its two American advisors, was
wiped out right in Đất Đỏ. Comrade Hai Bỉ and his uncle were able to honour their pledge
and shook hands right in their own home area ! Our Battalion remained in Đất Đỏ for two
days and continued fighting - but none of the enemy’s forces dared come to the rescue. The
people of Phước Thọ, Phước Thạnh and Phước Long Hội had been able to witness with
their own eyes the “art of fighting the aggressors” by people, who - as children, had been
born in their dearly loved homeland of Đất Đỏ.
Angered and frenzied, almost a month later, the 18th Puppet Division sent the
“Thunder and Lightning Battalion” of its 52nd Task Force [sic] to Đất Đỏ to exact revenge.
However, as soon as they set foot there, they were ambushed by 445 Battalion and two of
the enemy’s companies were wiped out.217 The 18th Puppet Division’s plans to destroy 445
Battalion had gone up in smoke. Further – from that time onwards, whenever our guerrillas

216
Translator’s Note: Such an engagement by 445 Battalion in the Đất Đỏ area is not recorded in 1 ATF
records. This action might possibly be a reference to the Việt Cộng attack farther north later in August ie: on
the afternoon of 23 August 1968 in southern Long Khánh Province (Courtenay plantation area – YS 579958),
a Việt Cộng force attacked the Headquarters of the 43rd ARVN Regiment, 3rd Battalion/43rd Regiment and 3rd
Battalion/52nd Regiment. The ARVN force was reportedly surrounded, and their casualties were reported as
14 killed and 80 wounded. Việt Cộng casualties were reportedly 13 killed (by body count) - 1 ATF INTSUM
236/68, Núi Đất, 24 August 1968.
217
Translator’s Note: According to the Long Đất District History - 1986, “At the beginning of August 1968,
Phước Tuy Sector deployed the “Thunderbolt Battalion” of the 18th Division to Phước Hòa Long to support
pacification. ... On Route 52, we ((D445)) ambushed them between Phước Lợi and Triên Vườn – the battalion
was destroyed in 30 minutes.”
62

in the Đất Đỏ area engaged the enemy, they would shout: “445 Battalion – Attack !”. And,
on many occasions, the enemy just ran off.
Such large victories – consecutively defeating two elite puppet-force units,
encouraged the Battalion’s resolve in the closing months of 1968. In September 1968, the
Battalion moved its forces to directly attack the Australians at Long Điền.218 Here, we
destroyed a number of tanks and inflicted losses on an Australian company. The Battalion
was united and resolved to “Strike strongly and fight to the utmost”. However, the
Australians employed a very large force and deployed in many columns. We became
perplexed – moreover, the terrain was sandy and water-logged, and our defences could not
withstand the intensity of the enemy’s air and artillery firepower. As a result, 21 of our
comrades were killed including Comrade Phấn – the political officer of the 1st Company,
and a platoon commander (in a rear blocking group). The Battalion learnt a bloody lesson
in the battle at Long Điền: Be daring - but you must seek advantageous terrain and prepare
everything with circumspection to ensure success in combat. Hanging-on in open terrain,
that’s sandy and water-logged - against a heavily-armed enemy with air and artillery
support, is a road leading only to defeat.
In November 1968, after almost a year of continuous combat, the Battalion received
orders to withdraw to Bàu Nhám (Xuyên Mộc) to consolidate and train, and to prepare to
receive our tasks to attack the enemy in the 1968-1969 Dry Season.
While strengthening and training, the Battalion received information that the Minh
Đạm base of the Long Đất District organisation had been fiercely attacked by B52
bombers. Many cadre, local soldiers and people had become casualties. So, the Battalion
took the initiative and ordered the 1st Company to take up positions at Đất Đỏ to threaten
the enemy – while the rest of the Battalion cut across into the Minh ĐạmWar Zone and
assisted the local elements to carry the wounded back north to the Sông Ray. Also at this
time, we became aware that the people in the Phước Bửu liberated region - who had
endured the enemy’s destructive sweeping operations, were now suffering serious hunger.
The Battalion took 800 litres of rice from its storehouse and directed Comrade Mười Giải
and 14 soldiers to take the rice there to help the people. The Battalion’s spirit of supporting
one another - in the good times and bad, has always been praised by the local cadre and
people. The Battalion would not have been able to come of age and be victorious in battle
without that consideration.
In the spring of 1969219 – together with the attacks across the whole of the South,
445 Battalion was ordered to attack the enemy in Bà Rịa Town.220 The firepower employed

218
Translator’s Note: These passages of the 445 Battalion History probably refer to engagements in August
1968 – not September. On 11 August 1968, a company-sized Việt Cộng force attacked Long Điền Town – 1
ATF INTSUM 223/68, Núi Đất, 11 August 1968. On 22 August 1968, an estimated 100 Việt Cộng attacked
Long Điền and were engaged by 1RAR resulting in 29 Việt Cộng killed (body count) and 11 Australians
wounded. Việt Cộng forces involved were reportedly the 1st and 3rd Companies of 445 Battalion, probably
supported by the 4th Company. On 22 August 1968, Đất Đỏ Town was shelled by forty 82mm mortar rounds
and RPG rounds by an estimated two Việt Cộng platoons – 1 ATF, Enemy Situation - Phước Tuy Province,
Núi Đất, 23 August 1968. According to the Long Đất District History – 1986: “on 22 August 1968, D445
attacked Long Điền – and inflicted heavy casualties on a relieving Australian company – D445 lost 11
killed.”
219
Translator’s Note: In January 1969, 1 ATF produced a 12-page “history” of 445 Battalion – ie: D445
Local Force Battalion, HQ 1 ATF – Núi Đất, 18 January 1969, that assessed the Battalion’s “actual strength”
“to be in the vicinity of 350.” The study did not include any detail on 445 Battalion personalities. The study
related: “Combined with elements of 5 VC Div, the Battalion attempted to ambush Australian forces at Long
Tan ((18 August 1966)). They were surprised by an encircling movement and suffered very heavy casualties
in the order of 70 KIA and 100 WIA.”
220
Translator’s Note: According to 1 ATF records, 445 Battalion attacked Bà Rịa Town on 23 February 1969
and suffered 10 killed and 12 wounded. 445 Battalion elements noted in the attack included the 1st and 3rd
 63

by the Battalion included B40s, B41s, 61 [sic] mm mortars, 82mm mortars, recoilless rifles
and H12s221 … the attack was principally by firepower with a supporting ground assault,
but once we struck, we withdrew immediately and did not hold any ground. At 1am on the
third day of Tết, 445 Battalion’s firepower enveloped almost all the enemy’s important
bases in Bà Rịa Town. As soon as the shelling ceased, the Battalion’s infantry attacked and
seized a number of the enemy’s important targets – most importantly, the base of the
Province Regional Forces Group. Comrade Nguyễn – a platoon commander in the 3rd
Company, was given the task of placing the liberation flag on the flagpole of the Province
Regional Forces Group. Defying the enemy fire that was as thick as rain, Nguyễn tightly
grasped the flag in his hand and - sometimes crawling, sometimes running and sometimes
taking cover, rushed swiftly forward. When the flag – with its yellow star and half-blue and
half-red background222, was flying freely on the flagpole of the Province Regional Forces
Group, Comrade Nguyễn’s shirt had already become soaked in blood. He spent his last
breath in a final farewell to his homeland and our nation beneath the proudly flying flag.
In this attack on the enemy in Bà Rịa Town, the Battalion destroyed 13 tanks and
armoured vehicles, two artillery pieces, and a large quantity of ammunition - and removed
from the battlefield almost 100 puppet soldiers. Afterwards, the Battalion moved down to
Long Đất and continued to attack the enemy in the 1969 Spring-Summer Campaign.223
Three years after being formed – with our spirit of self-reliance and self-sufficiency,
a will to continuously attack the enemy, and under the leadership of the Party and the love
and mutual support of the people, 445 Battalion had quickly reached its maturity and had
sufficient strength to stand up to the Americans, the puppet forces and the vassals and to
win many victories. From the beginning, we had fulfilled the teachings of the revered
Uncle Hồ: “We’ll fight and defeat any enemy”. The military exploits of the Battalion had
played an important part in the defeat of the Americans’ “Limited War Strategy” on the Bà
Rịa battlefield.

CHAPTER V

DESTROYING THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY’S BUNKER AND BARRIER-

SHIELD STRATEGY; HOLDING GROUND STAUNCHLY; STICKING TO THE
PEOPLE AND STANDING FIRM IN THE MAIN AREAS

The great victories in the General Offensive and Uprising of the Mậu Thân Spring
(1968) and the attacks launched in the Summer-Spring of 1969 by our armed forces and
people across the whole Southern battlefield had destroyed the American imperialist’s

Companies and a reconnaissance element - 1 ATF INTSUM 54-69, Núi Đất, 23 February 1969; Graham, N.F.
Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, Núi Đất, 29 May 1970.
221
Translator’s Note: On 26 February 1969, over-calibre 107mm rockets were fired into the Vạn Kiếp
National Training Centre on Bà Rịa’s eastern outskirts – the 4th Company of 445 Battalion was believed to
have been responsible – 1 ATF – Enemy Situation in Phước Tuy Province, 11 March 1969. “H12” was the
nomenclature for the H12 Type 63 multiple rocket launcher - ie a 12-tube 107mm rocket launcher. It is highly
probable that over-calibre 107mm rockets were fired from a single tube or a field-expedient launcher.
222
Translator’s Note: The flag of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam – the Front was
formed in December 1960.
223
Translator’s Note: The 445 Battalion History does not specifically relate a Việt Cộng company-strength
attack on Đất Đỏ Town on 15 May 1969 – see footnote 230, that reportedly involved elements of 445
Battalion and the C25 Long Đất District Company. The attack is also not mentioned in the Long Đất District
History - 1986 - ie Phan Ngọc Danh …, Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Của Huyện Long Đất, op.cit., 1986 –
see Annex L.
64

“Limited War” strategy. We had forced them to de-escalate the war and move from a
strategy of “search and destroy” (counter-offensive) to a strategy of “clear and hold” (the
defensive). Nixon had become President, replacing Johnson in the “White House”. The
policy of “Un-Americanizing” the war in Vietnam was adjusted by Nixon to a strategy of
the “Vietnamization” of the war.
The enemy was forced to scale-down the war, but in essence from the summer of
1969 fighting on the battlefield became extremely tense and decisive. In Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa
– Long Khánh, the enemy did their utmost to counter-attack us everywhere. The main-force
elements of the Americans, their puppets and their vassals launched attacks into the outer
areas, while the Regional Forces and Popular Forces scoured the intermediate zones. The
police, spies and Pheonix224 operatives pacified the inner area. Their drive for destruction
and pacification was aimed at achieving their principal targets in the first phase of the
“Vietnamization” strategy: to destroy our main-force units and wipe out our infrastructure,
and to pacify almost all the rural areas in order to hand these over to the puppet forces as
the Americans and their vassals were progressively repatriated.
In the South, the Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa – Long Khánh zone was a close-knit element of
the Fatherland’s impregnable fortress – and also the “foot of the ladder” for the Americans.
Their climb up the ladder began there, and they were also forced to descend there. And so it
was there that the fighting became decisive.
The direct and dangerous combat opponents of 445 Battalion in this period were the
Australian and American forces, the 18th Puppet Division and the Phước Tuy Regional
Forces.
The Australians were especially responsible for pacifying the Long Đất region and
southern Route 2 – an area that the enemy considered as the main area for their
“Accelerated Pacification Program”225 and the backbone of their strategy to “Vietnamize
the war” in the region northeast of Sài Gòn. Here, the Australian forces applied their utmost
effort to turn the Long Đất and Route 2 area into a “White Zone”. At the one time, they
focused on two aims: to conduct sweeping operations and to destroy our bases and forces in
the outer areas; and to destroy our inner organisations through pacification operations in the
hamlets and villages with the intent of cutting the connections between the revolutionary
forces and the people.
From the beginning of 1969, the Australian forces launched their “bunker tactic” –
an extremely dangerous tactic that replaced their “M16-E3 minefield barrier-fence
tactic”226 which we had earlier destroyed. East-northeast of three villages in the Đất Đỏ

224
Translator’s Note: The Pheonix (“Phượng Hoàng”) programme was targeted against the Việt Cộng’s
political infrastructure - ie the Việt Cộng Infrastructure (VCI). For data and a listing of VCI in Phước Tuy
Province, see the 1 ATF document: L’Epagniol, J.L. Captain, Summary of VCI Personnel in Ba Long
Province, Det 1 Div Int Unit, Núi Đất, 2 April 1969.
225
Translator’s Note: On 16 May 1969, the Commander of the US II Field Force Vietnam (FFV) at Long
Bình issued a new directive to the Commander 1 ATF that changed the operational priorities of the Task
Force. The first priority was now to be pacification, the second – upgrading of the South Vietnamese forces,
and the third was to be military operations – see Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam
War, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.40, Australian National University, Canberra, 1986.
226
Translator’s Note: In the 445 Battalion History, there is no previous mention of the 11km-long minefield -
and associated fences, laid by the 1 ATF beginning in mid-March 1967 from The Horseshoe (Đất Đỏ) south
to the coast at Phước Hải. The Australians laid 20,292 M16 “Jumping Jack” mines (lethal radius 25 metres,
dangerous out to 200 metres) – of which 12,700 (about 25%) were fitted with an anti-lifting device below the
mine – see Lockhart, G., The Minefield: An Australian tragedy in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest,
2007, p.xvii. More extensively than the 445 Battalion History, the minefield is covered in the Long Đất
District History – 1986 - ie Phan Ngọc Danh …, Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Của Huyện Long Đất,
op.cit., 1986 – see Annex L. According to the Đồng Nai History – 1986: “On 1 May 1967, COSVN ordered
the Long Đất District Unit under Lê Thành Ba to destroy the initial minefield and fence – and this was
 65

area – ie Phước Thạnh, Phước Thọ and Phước Hòa Long, a 15 kilometre-long area was
closed off with a system of blockhouses, barbed-wire fences and mines. The enemy
constructed 36 concrete blockhouses – with two-thirds of each blockhouse below ground.
Each of the blockhouses had numerous firing loopholes at ground-level. The largest of the
blockhouses were manned by a section of troops, and the small blockhouses by a half-
section. The large blockhouses were about 300-500 metres apart, and interspersed between
them were the small blockhouses about 100-200 metres apart. These were all connected
with each other by telephone lines. The large blockhouses were surrounded by a barbed-
wire fence of concertina wire, while the smaller blockhouses had a single barbed-wire
fence. Alongside the blockhouses’ barbed-wire fences ran a wide track – about eight metres
wide, for the movement of tanks that would come to the rescue when the positions were
under attack. Beyond the track for the tanks, there was a system of barbed-wire fences
(with all types of fence configurations) 20 metres wide and sown with mines. Finally, there
was a communications ditch about 1.5 metres wide – with mines in its bund.
In the hamlets, the enemy laid out tape to divide the hamlet areas into small zones
and tested the ground with sharp implements to search every house for hidden underground
shelters which they suspected our secret cadre might be using. In a short time, many of our
comrades and countrymen were captured, and many of our revolutionary organisations
working among the people gradually dried up or were smashed. The revolutionary
movement in the countryside sunk into a period of silence.
445 Battalion had to regularly contend with large sweeping operations launched by
the Australian, American and puppet forces into our jungle base areas. However, they were
unable to dislodge the Battalion from the Long Đất area. Nevertheless, over many day-long
and successive large counter-sweep engagements, the Battalion’s numbers thinned out
considerably. A basic factor was that the source of our food reserves and rear service
support was gradually drying up.
Different to the main-force units of the Military Region and COSVN, 445 Battalion
did not rely on rations and rear service support from above – but rather our development
and our battlefield victories were a result of self-sufficiency and self-reliance. The
Battalion survived thanks to the “Hidden Rear Services Warehouse” in the hearts of the
people in the Long Đất area. At set times, the Provincial authorities provided funds, and the
rear services cadre of the Battalion would enter the hamlets and entrust villagers to
purchase material for us.227 When we didn’t have any money, the people would let us
purchase on credit or give us what we needed. Rice, ammunition, explosives, medicine …
were all hidden by the families of our underground organisations in the hamlets within the
enemy-controlled areas. By night, the Battalion would enter the hamlets to pick up rice, and
the next day the Battalion would go off to the fighting. If we needed a roll of electrical wire
or a few batteries, we would just go into the hamlets. If we needed a shaving razor or just a

successful as no anti-lifting devices had been attached to the mines. The Australians then “rebuilt” the
minefield - Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, pp.137-139.
227
Translator’s Note: Large quantities of rice and other foodstuffs were acquired by the Province Forward
Supply Council through “purchasing agents”. For example in the first half of 1969, the Council reported - on
25 August 1969, having purchased or requisitioned: 66,000 litres of rice in Long Đất, 18,775 in Châu Đức;
1,630 in Xuyên Mộc - CDEC Log 02-1480-70. With effect from 1 November 1969, the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh
Province Unit directed that the ration entitlements for 445 and 440 Battalions were 27 litres of rice per
man/month when on operations and 25 litres when in base areas or training – CDEC Log 06-2911-70. For
detail on NVA/VC rice and salt rations, see 1 ATF Troops Information Sheet No. 33, Núi Đất, 21 February-5
March 1967: VC rations – combat troops 750gm of rice per day, but 875gm for artillery troops. For NVA/VC
use of flour as a food staple, see Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 166/71, Núi Đất, 16 June 1971.
66

few things with which to “have a few drinks”228 – then we would also just go into the
hamlets … From the Battalion’s founding, no matter whether we had won victories,
suffered losses, or endured hardships and violence – we had never really been hungry often.
We had never had to miss a few meals. Now however, the enemy was launching sweeping
operations and setting up blockades everywhere. The hearts of the people in the Route 2,
Châu Thành and Long Đất areas … were, for the Battalion, like a gourd of mother’s milk.
The three villages in the Đất Đỏ area were the Battalion’s nipple, but these were now
tightly blocked off by the enemy’s “steel net”. Difficulties, hardships and violence that we
had never before experienced, then began.
In those times229, organising any force – even if it was very small, to attack the
enemy in the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector, was not an easy thing to do. However, despite it not being
an easy or a favourable situation, the Battalion attacked the enemy.230 Sometimes only a
228
Translator’s Note: Literally – “nhậu lai rai”, which implies a small social-type gathering at which a few
drinks and “nibbles” would be consumed – “nibbles” might include food such as dried squid, dried prawns,
peanuts, pickled onions etc.
229
Translator’s Note: The 445 Battalion History does not mention the early June 1969 “Battle of Bình Ba” –
probably because it did not participate in that engagement. The Australian after-action report claimed 43
enemy killed (1st Battalion of 33rd Regiment) – later amended to 126 killed after Popular Forces troops
reportedly found many more bodies beneath the rubble of destroyed houses – Battle, M.R. & Wilkins, D.S.
(eds), The Year of the Tigers, Trojan Press, Thomastown, 2009, p.346, p.350. Another Australian military
record relates that the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 33rd Regiment of the 5th Division – together with the local
force D440 Battalion, was engaged by battalions of the Australian Task Force in the Bình Ba area (Phước
Tuy Province) in the period 5-11 June 1969 - Johnson, L., Operation Lavarack - Phước Tuy Province,
Vietnam, 1969, Australian Army Journal, Vol VII, No.2, Winter 2010, pp.89-114. 1 ATF contemporary
reporting identified the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment – together with the Regiment’s heavy machine gun
and recoilless rifle elements – 1 ATF Vietnam Digest No. 22-69 (covering the period 1- 6 June 1969) and
listed 71 enemy killed, six wounded and 12 POWs. In July 1969, a rallier stated that 440 Battalion had fought
at Bình Ba on 6-7 June 1969 – together with the 33rd Regiment, and that 440 Battalion suffered “about 60
casualties” – 1 ATF INTSUM No. 198/69, Núi Đất, 17 July 1969. Subsequently, 1 ATF reported “51 NVA
KIA (BC), 11 POWs” – 1 ATF INTSUM 268/71, Núi Đất, 25 September 1971. However, the 5th Division
History - 2005 does not record any activity by the 33rd Regiment in Phước Tuy province in June 1969. Rather,
the 5th Division History relates that its 33rd Regiment “ambushed and destroyed an engineer company on
Route 3” on 6 June 1969 and “blocked a relief force from the ARVN 52nd Regiment destroying 11 armoured
vehicles and inflicting casualties on two enemy companies.” In 2009, a memorial article for the 33rd
Regiment's Ex-Soldiers’ Liaison Section stated: “The Regiment had 3,050 martyrs - including 2,008 who
bravely fell on the Eastern Nam Bộ battlefield. In particular, in the fighting to liberate Bình Ba in the 1969
Spring Campaign, close to 50 cadre and fighters bravely died." - Thanh Tùng, "Lễ cầu siêu và dâng hương
tưởng nhớ các anh hùng liệt sỹ Trung đoàn 33” (“A Buddhist Mass and Ceremony to Remember the Heroic
Martyrs of the 33rd Regiment"), Baria Vũng Tàu Television, late August 2009. There is a 33rd Regiment
memorial (khu tưởng niệm) with a stela (bia) to the 53 fallen soldiers of the 33rd Regiment in Bình Ba village.
In a 2010 article, 33rd Regiment veterans related that at battle of “Bình Ba on 6 June 1969 more than 50
members of the Regiment fell in an unequal battle with the enemy.” - Lê Đình Thìn, “Trung Đoàn 33 – một
thời hào hùng …” – “The 33rd Regiment – an heroic time …”, Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu (magazine), Vũng Tầu, 30
April 2010, p.18. A subsequent article related that 33rd Regiment suffered 50 killed at Bình Ba, and the
Regiment had destroyed “two Australian companies” – Hồng Quốc Văn “Gặp gỡ một chiến sĩ của Trung
đoàn 33 Anh hùng” – “Meeting a combatant of the heroic 33rd Regiment”, Báo cựu chiến binh online, 17
December 2010. A 2011 television program showed the 33rd Regiment memorial at Bình Ba, and a 33rd
Regiment veteran related that 55 of the Regiment’s personnel had been killed in the Battle and 54 were “bull-
dozed” into a mass grave by the Australian forces – Walker, M. (Director), “Private Terrence ‘Hippo’
Hippisley – Vietnam”, In Their Footsteps, Channel 9, Melbourne, 12 June 2011. The D440 “Long Khánh”
Battalion was formed in September 1965 from the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Regiment of the North Vietnamese
340B Division – see Annex K: 440 Local Force Battalion. It remains somewhat unclear whether 440
Battalion was involved in the Battle of Bình Ba in early June 1969. For an outline of the history of the 33rd
NVA Regiment, see footnote 271.
230
Translator’s Note: Although not specifically mentioned in the 445 Battalion History, a captured report
related the Battalion’s attack on Đất Đỏ on 14-15 May 1969 – by all four companies and with elements of 440
Battalion, resulting in six of their men killed and 31 wounded. The report claimed to have “put out of action
 67

small explosion in the enemy’s heartland could have resounding repercussions - regaining
the momentum for us and restoring our resolve. In July 1969, 445 Battalion decided to
coordinate with our underground elements and attack the police offices in Đất Đỏ. The
Battalion tasked two comrades to take with them a three-kilogram time-bomb that had been
manufactured by the Battalion’s engineers. It took attempts over several successive nights
before they were able to infiltrate into Phước Thạnh hamlet and meet our agent, Năm Đáng.
Taking the device, Miss Năm Đáng said: “You two take this small amount of rice back to
your comrades. I promise that I’ll place the bomb in the police offices, even if I die doing
so.” Each of the two comrades took half an armful of rice and left the hamlet immediately
that night. However, both were killed in the enemy’s minefield ! The next morning, Miss
Năm Đáng shouldered her panniers of water-cress and went to the side of the Đất Đỏ police
offices. Here, she placed the bomb against the wall of a building and then safely returned
home. However, after waiting for quite some time without hearing any explosion, she
became very worried. Năm Đáng sent her younger sister – Sáu Cũ, to check. However, the
bomb was still in its original position and untouched. Remembering our two soldiers who
had died, Sáu Cũ decided to put the bomb in one of the baskets on her carrying pole and
take it back home – despite knowing that she was carrying a live bomb that could explode
at any time. The two sisters were both pleased and afraid when placing the live bomb in
their home. They waited many months, but none of our soldiers entered their hamlet –
although every night mines could be heard exploding in the enemy’s minefields and a
number of our soldiers were killed. The girls wanted to use the bomb to strike the enemy -
but as it was the first time they had seen a bomb, how could they prepare it ?
On 13 August 1969, an element from 445 Battalion entered Đất Đỏ and attacked the
enemy at the Phước Thới communal hall. The sound of gunfire didn’t cease until the
afternoon. Mrs Lê Thị Mầu’s legs had been paralysed since she was little. For many years,
she had been a reliable agent for 445 Battalion (as she was crippled, the enemy didn’t
suspect her). Mrs Mầu was very fond indeed of our soldiers and - although she couldn’t
walk properly, she shuffled out to the site of the clash to see whether any of our wounded
had been left behind. However, after she had dragged herself there, the enemy fired an
intense artillery barrage, and a shell blew off both of Mrs Mầu’s arms and also wounded
her on the right side of her chest. She didn’t die, but was completely incapacitated.
The lack of rice became increasingly serious each day, and for months the cadre and
soldiers of 445 Battalion had to eat bushes, leaves and jungle roots in lieu of rice. The
people of Long Đất had always been deeply attached to 445 Battalion and had protected
and nurtured the unit like members of their own family. These serious difficulties only
made their commitment more unshakeable and constant. Although the enemy strictly
controlled the rice, our countrymen were still able to hide rice in their homes to sustain our
troops. Rice was buried below ground, hidden in the walls of houses, poured into American
“sandbags” and disguised as bags of earth placed on the tops of bunkers and in front of
house doors as protection against artillery fire – and the enemy remained unaware. No one
knows how many people were imprisoned, banished and killed for the crime of “supplying
the Việt Cộng”. But the rice was still moved to our bases. Miss Năm Đáng (of Phước
Thạnh village) and Miss Nguyễn Thị Đẹp (Phước Thọ village) regularly hid hundreds of

107 enemy, seized five weapons and captured a PW.” - CDEC Log 07-2146-69. On the morning of 15 May,
1 ATF ready-reaction elements (9RAR) deployed to assist the Regional Forces at Đất Đỏ. A “consolidated
report” on the morning of 16 May by 1 ATF on the engagements in Đất Đỏ listed “friendly losses” as:
“ARVN KIA: 7, ARVN WIA: 26, ARVN MIA: 12 – 12 M16 rifles missing”; and “enemy losses”: as “ 2 KIA
(possible), one M2 rifle and one pistol captured.)” – 1 ATF INTSUM No. 136-69, Núi Đất, 16 May 1969. 1
ATF assessed the “company-strength attack” as comprising elements of 445 Battalion and the C25 Long Đất
District Company. The attack is also not mentioned in the Long Đất District History – 1986 (Annex L).
68

litres of rice in their houses for the 445 troops. In the houses of Tư Phụ, Tư Lứu, Hai Nam
… there was always rice available – or batteries, electrical wire, medicine … The troops
would enter the hamlets where the material was ready and carry it off. Miss Tư Mút (Hội
Mỹ hamlet) – in 1969 alone, provided the troops of 445 with 18.75 grams231 of gold. On
many occasions, Mr Ba Trừ (of Phước Thạnh village) used his ox-cart to transport rice to
the troops. Thanks to his clever camouflaging, the enemy’s check points were never able to
discover his loads of rice … It’s impossible to relate in full the noble feelings of our Long
Đất countrymen for the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion in those wartime years of
hardship and violence. The people’s constancy and unshakeable loyalty manifested itself in
many different acts – both large and small, that exemplified their sacrifice.
Daily, the enemy’s control of rice became even more strict, and – with our troops
unable to enter the hamlets, the villagers sought every way of bringing food and grain into
the jungle. Rice was hidden under baskets of faeces. Salt was dissolved in water and carried
in cans. Rice was hidden in buckets of rubber latex. Sodium glutamate and medicine were
hidden in blouses and shirts and in the hems of trousers … But slowly the enemy also
discovered these measures. They checked the blouses and trousers of all women as they left
the hamlet gates. It was very difficult, and only a few people got through. Mr Sáu Chất of
Long Phước was carrying very large handfuls of food into the jungle for the 445 troops,
when he was stopped by the enemy. He told them that it was for his own consumption – but
a soldier forced him to sit down and eat the lot. Sáu Chất tried to eat it all - to the point
where he couldn’t get up but fainted, and he nearly died from “over-eating”. If a handful or
a small can232 of rice was slipped out by the villagers in 1969-1970, it was paid for in
blood. But not even this was enough to sustain a whole battalion.
Enduring hardship and violence was the yardstick of a person’s spirit and integrity.
This hardship and the violence was also the “travelling companion” of betrayal. 445
Battalion had traitors who surrendered to the enemy. These included Lộc233 – the deputy
commander of the 2nd Company, and Quốc Hùng – the Battalion’s political adjutant.234
They guided enemy battalions on sweeping operations that destroyed many of the
Battalion’s bases and storehouses. At this time, Comrade Sáu Thu235 was the Battalion
commander and Comrade Hai Khanh236 was the Battalion political officer. On one
occasion, Lộc and Hùng guided two battalions of Australian and puppet troops in an attack
on the Battalion’s base area near Long Tân. Having suffered a number of casualties, the

231
Translator’s Note: Literally “năm chỉ vàng”- five chỉ of gold. A “chỉ” was 3.75 grams.
232
Translator’s Note: Literally “Lon” – a re-usable aluminium powdered milk can (capacity 275 grams or 1/3
litre) – usually “Guigoz” brand, routinely used for measuring quantities/volumes of rice and also for storage.
233
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Văn Nhường (aka Lộc – see also footnotes 164 and 165, and further detail at
Annex A) rallied under the Chiêu Hồi programme on 29 July 1969 at a RF post and that evening revealed the
locations of the headquarters of 445 Battalion and four of its companies. Nhường claimed to have been the
commander of the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion – see AWM photo P04667.589 for the author (Lieutenant
E.P. Chamberlain – 1TALU) in discussions with Nguyễn Văn Nhường in Bà Rịa on 31 July 1969. Nhường
was also debriefed in Biên Hòa on 17 August 1969 - see Report FVS-19,822 of 18 August 1969; and by 1
ATF intelligence staff , see - Pannell, B.W., “Postscript …”, op.cit., 1970, p.180. Nhường was later
employed as a Bushman Scout with the Australian 6RAR and subsequently was a member of a Chiêu Hồi
Armed Propaganda Team in Bà Rịa. For Chiêu Hồi statistics for all provinces – see VCAT Item No.
2234403020. For Phước Tuy: 1965 – 77 ralliers (hồi chánh); 1966 – 278; 1967 – 317; 1968 – 45; 1969 –
121; 1970 – 196; 1971 – 37: for seven years 1,071 (National: 176,756). The 1963 and 1964 rallier figures
were not broken up by province.
234
Translator’s Note: This may be a reference to Trần Văn Kinh – a 445 Battalion Assistant Political Officer,
who rallied on 8 September 1969 - Graham, N.F. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence
Section, Núi Đất, 29 May 1970.
235
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Đức Thu (Sáu Thu) – see his outline biography at Annex B.
236
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Minh Khanh (Hai Khanh) – see his outline biography at Annex B.
 69

Battalion withdrew towards Hội Mỹ. At this time, Comrade Hai Khanh – the Battalion’s
political officer, had gone to a provincial-level meeting and was unaware of the situation in
our base area. When Comrade Hai Khanh, Mười Sinh237 (who had just been appointed as
the Party secretary of the Long Đất District Committee – replacing Ba Bùi238) and Ba Bùi
(a provincial cadre dispatched to give direct on-the-spot guidance) were on their way to the
445 Battalion base, the Provincial Committee received a radio message from the Battalion
that the enemy had seized the base. The Provincial Committee was extremely worried
about the fate of the three key cadre of the Long Đất area and a number of our troops
escorting them. The Provincial Committee dispatched someone to catch up with them, but
Hai Khanh’s group had left the base of the Provincial Committee two hours earlier.
When Hai Khanh’s group was about 40 metres from the Battalion base at Tà Loong,
tens of Claymore mines239 exploded at once. Smoke and dust filled the air, and trees and
bushes were blown down. The four leading soldiers were killed on the spot. Hai Khanh was
wounded in the stomach and the arm. Mười Sinh was wounded in the thigh and the
stomach, and another comrade was also seriously wounded. Before the dust and smoke had
cleared, our comrades staggered to the rear and hid among the bushes – and thankfully
were not discovered by the enemy. When night came, our seriously wounded comrade died
! They buried their comrade-in-arms in an old bunker of decaying wood. Early the next
morning, Ba Bùi and one of the courier troops set off through the jungle to the new base to
let the Battalion know what had happened. Meanwhile, Hai Khanh, Mười Sinh and two
couriers remained behind in the thick bushes awaiting rescue by the unit. An extremely
tense day passed. The enemy artillery fire was heavy. Their only cover was the old bunker
in which they had buried their comrade. Hai Khanh and Mười Sinh decided that - no matter
the cost, they had to find their way to the new base. They understood that - apart from the
importance of their own positions in the unit and the local region, Hai Khanh was still
carrying 300,000 piastres that had been provided by the provincial authorities. At this time,
three thousand piastres was enough to sustain the whole Battalion for a while.240 On the
first day, the four helped one another through the jungle and were able to move more than a
kilometre. Their strength however gradually waned as they hadn’t had even a grain of rice
to eat. From the third day, they could only crawl forward slowly through the wild jungle -
inch-by-inch and metre-by-metre. Mười Sinh’s courier became feverish and could crawl no
more. Tearfully, they said good-bye to one another ! Hai Khanh crawled in front – with
Mười Sinh crawling behind him. Whosoever could crawl the strongest, it was essential that
one of the two found their way back to the base. After 11 days and nights of crawling
through the jungle and eating only leaves, their bodies and their clothes were scratched and
torn. Then, Hai Khanh came upon some slash-and-burn fields tended by our countrymen
and collapsed into unconsciousness. He only had time to remember that he still had his
Claymore mine ((mìn mo)) satchel full of the money. Mười Sinh also crawled out into the
villagers’ fields. They were carried back to the base by the anonymous villagers and
handed over the 300,000 piastres (Sài Gòn currency)241 - not knowing whom their
benefactors had been.

237
Translator’s Note: In mid-1971, when Xuyên Mộc District was absorbed into Long Đất District - ie to
become Long Xuyên District, Tạ Hồng Sinh (Mười Sinh) was appointed Secretary of Long Xuyên District –
see The Minh Đạm History – 2006 at Annex M. Mười Sinh may also have served as the Chief of Staff of 440
Battalion in early 1970 - Appendix II to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 84/70, Núi Đất, 25 March 1970.
238
Translator’s Note: Lê Thành Ba (Ba Bùi) – see footnotes 66, 73, 77, 180, 210, 226 and Annex A.
239
Translator’s Note: M18 Claymore – a directional mine with a lethal range of 50 metres, remotely
detonated by wire.
240
Translator’s Note: Food and monetary allowances were outlined earlier at footnote 227, see also footnote
273.
241
Translator’s Note: At the official exchange rate, 300,000 piastres was about USD 2,542.
70

Hai Khanh got a bit of “rice” into him - and although his wounds became inflamed
and swollen, he was determined to be treated at the unit so that he could brief all on the
policies of the Provincial Committee in the new circumstances. The whole Battalion was
briefed on the Provincial Committee’s call to “hold on” – and especially the directive to
destroy the bunkers constructed by the Australians.242 The Provincial Committee had
absolute confidence that the Battalion could achieve this task. But how to destroy these
bunkers, what methods might be used ? These questions troubled everyone. But, by giving
it a go, we would find out. The Battalion declared its resolve for the task.
An element of “elite cadre and soldiers” from the 1st Company was chosen as the
first unit to attack and destroy the bunkers.243 The 1st Company was reinforced with a
57mm recoilless rifle, two B40s, one B41 and a 12.7mm heavy machinegun. In the attack
that lasted from midnight to 4am, ten recoilless rifle rounds were fired – along with over
ten B40 and B41 rounds, and several containers of 12.7mm machinegun ammunition were
also expended. However, the bunkers were unaffected as they were buried two-thirds below
ground level. Moreover, a number of our cadre and soldiers became casualties at a time
when each company’s strength was only a little over 10 riflemen. Both Hai Khanh and Sáu
Thu (respectively the political officer and the Battalion commander) were in anguish - and
had to direct the unit to withdraw and bear the defeat of that first engagement.
The Party Committee and the Battalion’s leadership held a meeting to determine a
method of attack. Finally, the Battalion’s Party Committee agreed to use sapper tactics to
destroy the bunkers.
Over a 20-day period, Comrade Tư Lôi and the Battalion’s sapper section
conducted training in the basic techniques – especially sapper “infiltration” methods, for a
number of the Battalion’s selected cadre and soldiers.
On the night of 21 September 1969, 445 Battalion organised a group of 15
comrades – based on the Battalion’s sapper detachment and a team from each of the

242
Translator’s Note: A captured 28-page Việt Cộng notebook (entries: August-October 1969) by a “D1”
cadre revealed that 445 Battalion received instructions in August 1969 from the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh
Province Party Committee – “Attacks on Đất Đỏ …” to “foil the enemy’s accelerated pacification effort in the
Province”, and three villages in the Đất Đỏ area (Phước Thạnh, Phước Thọ and Phước Vĩnh Long) were
chosen as the “pilot area for counter-pacification” … “to destroy the enemy blockhouse network thereby to
boost the local revolutionary movement.” – VCAT Item No. 2131409011 (CDEC Log 11-2585-69). The
CDEC document incorrectly linked “D1” with 440 Battalion. D1 was a cover designator for 445 Battalion,
and D2 was a cover designator for 440 Battalion.
243
Translator’s Note: According to the captured notebook (see the footnote above), “the first attack was made
at 2200hrs on 4 September 1969 and carried out by 34 selected outstanding cadre – including the 445
Battalion executive officer” (presumably Hai Khanh). They reportedly killed 20 enemy while suffering one
killed and one wounded. The second attack was mounted by 24 “hard-core” personnel at 2400hrs on 2
October 1969 – in which they reportedly killed 25 enemy and captured 11 “AR-15” rifles. The third attack
occurred on the night of 21 October 1969 in which 14 bunkers were reportedly destroyed. While the dates in
the notebook do not exactly match the dates in the 445 Battalion account above, the notebook detail – being a
contemporary record, is likely to be accurate. – VCAT Item No. 2131409011 (CDEC Log 11-2585-69). 445
Battalion’s attacks on the bunkers are also related in The Minh Đạm History – 2006, see Annex M, which
records attacks on 21 September (the second) and 28 September. Regarding the early September 1969 attacks,
1 ATF reported that in the Việt Cộng attacks on bunkers northeast of Đất Đỏ on 5-6 and 6-7 September 1969,
three bunkers were over-run – and four soldiers of 613 RF Company were killed and four wounded. One Việt
Cộng was killed – the leader of a sapper/reconnaissance platoon – 1 ATF INTSUM No. 252-69, Núi Đất, 9
September 1969. Subsequently, a captured Việt Cộng letter dated 11 September from “Ba Anh” (a Long Đất
District cadre) discussing these attacks noted that, in Đất Đỏ, they: “hit four bunkers …and about one enemy
squad was wiped out … and five M16s were seized” but “in Đất Đỏ, we lost one of our platoon commanders
due to one of our shells.” Ba Anh’s assessment on the availablility of rice from the villages was very sanguine
ie: “The food situation in the villages had gone back to normal … ((our people were)) going in-out all the
time.” – Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 262-69, Núi Đất, 19 September 1969.
 71

companies comprising personnel of proven ability. The group to attack the bunkers was
divided into three teams, and directly commanded by the second-in-command of the
Battalion – Comrade Tâm. Crawling through the minefields, the soldiers of the
reconnaissance detachment led the three infantry teams up to the barbed-wire fences.
Passages were blown open in the fences with explosives, and the infantry applied
suppressive fire on the enemy to allow the sappers to throw explosive charges into the
bunkers. … However, the explosive charges only detonated outside the wire, and no enemy
troops were killed. Rather, they returned fire fiercely. Without any defences, we suffered
casualties. Although we fought throughout the night, only one of the teams was able to
destroy one bunker – the other two teams were unsuccessful. Once more, we had been
defeated.
In a meeting to examine our experiences in attacking the bunkers this time,
Comrade On – a brave and resourceful member of the reconnaissance detachment, voiced
his opinions heatedly. Comrade On was the soldier who had crawled through all the
barbed-wire fences and dense minefields surrounding the bunkers and had lain atop a
bunker and listened to the enemy chatting, playing chess and gambling. And, it was On
who had earlier proposed that the Battalion employ sapper tactics to destroy the bunkers.
He outlined his views: When attacking to destroy the bunkers, no new method was needed
– we should just use the same tactics as when we attacked the Western camps. We just
needed to ensure secrecy and surprise when getting into the enemy’s wire. From that point
onwards, we must get flat to the ground and endure all types of heavy enemy firepower.
That’s all there was to it.
Following meetings reviewing our experiences in methods of attack, a
democratically-decided viewpoint was broadly disseminated – which then produced a
satisfactory attack plan.
On the night of 28 September (a week later), the Battalion organised five teams to
destroy the bunkers. Five comrades from the reconnaissance element guided five infantry
teams to attack the bunkers. On reaching the fences, the infantry personnel laid on the
ground. The reconnaissance personnel disarmed the mines and crawled through up to
loopholes of the bunkers and stuffed grenades into the bunkers. A “popping” sound was
followed by an explosive boom in the bunker, and none of the enemy had time to cry out at
all before blood flowed from their noses and mouths. The enemy soldiers in the bunkers
were all killed – and our reconnaissance troops then crawled outside the barbed-wire fence
and joined with the infantry in placing explosives to destroy the fences and the bunkers. We
seized 14 weapons and only lost one killed – Comrade Nhất, a reconnaissance soldier. Nhất
had led one of the teams, and when crawling up to the loophole he saw that the enemy in
the bunker were playing cards. Nhất turned around to crawl back, but didn’t follow his
earlier path. He struck a mine and was killed !
Following this very significant engagement, each night soldiers of the Battalion’s
reconnaissance element crawled up to each of the bunkers in order to understand how best
to destroy them. The enemy however, had only one plan of resistance – they didn’t dare
sleep in the bunkers.
At the beginning of October 1969, to implement the directive of the Provincial
Committee, the Long Đất District Committee coordinated with 445 Battalion in a “general
attack to destroy the bunkers.”
445 Battalion gathered together all its explosives and created 12 explosive charges
(each 4-5 kilograms in weight). Again employing sapper tactics, the Battalion’s
reconnaissance soldiers – together with 12 infantry teams, crawled in and set explosives at
each of the bunkers’ loopholes, and then reeled out the electrical detonating wire. When
this was completed, they awaited the order - and then all 12 explosive charges were fired.
72

With a resounding explosion, the 12 bunkers were blown to pieces. From that time on, no
enemy soldier dared sleep in a bunker.
The underground elements of the Long Đất District Committee active in the Đất Đỏ
region led the people in demonstrating against the enemy’s policy of oppressive control,
and demanded the destruction of the bunkers and the lifting of the mines so that the people
had the freedom to move about and make their living. Hundreds of people took up
hammers, crowbars, and shovels to destroy four bunkers.
In the middle of October 1969, 25 of the 36 Australian bunkers had been smashed
to pieces. A few bunkers remained, and the Australians and the puppet troops joined
together to guard them. However, they were on tenterhooks with worry and only dared to
occupy the bunkers by day – when night came, they sought a safe place to avoid any
calamity. The Australians’ “bunker tactic” had been defeated.
The “bunker tactic” – the enemy’s extremely dangerous “net of steel” had been
breached. Immediately – in the following nights, 445 Battalion sent many of its companies
into the hamlets to meet with the people and to bring out grain and food. This was not only
sufficient to supply the Battalion, but also to assist even the provincial agencies. Every
night, the Long Đất District local forces went in to make contact with the people and
continued to build additional underground organisations in the villages. …
At a time when the general situation across the whole Southern battlefield was daily
becoming more difficult and our people faced seriously straitened circumstances, there was
still rice to eat here.
After our victory in defeating the “bunker tactic”, 445 Battalion continued to attack
the enemy’s Regional Forces and the Australian military – and supported our local forces in
destroying “pacification”. The Battalion destroyed the camp at Phước Hòa Long and wiped
out a 70-strong Regional Forces company – including Major Bé, the deputy commander of
the Sector, who was killed while leading a relief force. Following this, the Battalion
inflicted heavy casualties on an Australian company. In these extremely difficult and
violent situations – with the support of 445 Battalion, Long Đất District’s 25th Company
and the village guerrillas increased their attacks against the enemy’s oppressive system of
control. Tens of the enemy’s People’s Self Defence Force (PSDF)244 groups in Phước Hải,
Phước Thạnh, Phước Thọ, Phước Hòa Long … were destroyed; and tens of wicked
“pacification cadre”245 were killed. In the Long Điền and Tam Phước regions, many PSDF
groups abandon ned their guarding and patrolling functions.
The Australian military’s “bunker” tactic had essentially been defeated.246
However, entry into the hamlets by our local armed forces and 445 Battalion was still not

244
Translator’s Note: The PSDF (Nhân Dân Tự Vệ) – ie additional to the RF and PF, was established in July
1968 after the mid-year General Mobilization (ie post-Tết 1968). The PSDF superseded earlier militia – ie the
Combat Youth, Popular Militia and the Revolutionary Development People’s Group. The PSDF encompassed
males aged 16-17 and 39-50 years. See the PSDF Handbook – 1969, VCAT Item No. 14040111001.
245
Translator’s Note: The Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre - later termed Rural Development Cadre,
were established on 4 January 1966 in New Life hamlets to train village self-defence elements. See VCAT
Item No. 13510124002 ; VCAT Item No. 13510123005. The 59-man RD Cadre teams in the villages – first
deployed in May 1966, also progressed the Sài Gòn Government’s political, social and economic
programmes. For RD Cadre organisation, numbers and activities in Phước Tuy Province to the end of 1966,
see McNeill, I., To Long Tan, op.cit., 1993, pp.420-422.
246
Translator’s Note: In a 10 December 1969 review, Military Region 7 declared that “… Australian troops
also suffered bitter failures in 1969. They are no longer as aggressive in their sweep operations as before, and
they have often told the people that they will withdraw their troops as soon as the US forces leave, and they
have requested the Việt Cộng not to attack them. … During the year … approximately 2,509 Australian
troops were killed, resulting in six companies and five platoons destroyed. Five other companies and six
platoons were depleted. They admitted that the 5th Australian Battalion has lost its combat effectiveness. …
We successfully eliminated enemy control in Long Đất (Bà Rịa) … We thwarted the Australian tactic of
 73

as easy as in past years. The Australian troops no longer lay waiting in the bunkers.
Sometimes, they would set ambushes right in the gardens of families that they suspected
we usually visited by night. Sometimes, their ambushes would be set on the edge of the
jungle and on the tracks out to the fields. There were even times when they lay down in
flooded paddy fields or in the spotlessly white salt pans to ambush our people. Hence, on
any night, our forces suffered casualties. However, our underground agents and supportive
families within the enemy’s areas of control also had clever ways of giving us secret
warning signals of the enemy’s presence. Sometimes it was only a shirt drying on a fence,
an upturned vessel on a well (by day), a small candle burning on an altar, or a pile of straw
burning behind a house to drive off mosquitoes (by night) – all these told our 445 Battalion
soldiers that the enemy had set an ambush in the house or in its garden. Thanks to these
warnings, the numbers of our comrades being killed declined. The Australians however
became even more Machiavellian. When going on ambushes, they would “parade” past the
villagers’ houses. Every soldier would be piggy-backing another soldier hidden under his
raincoat (looking as if he was wearing a large backpack). One or two hours later, they
would again “parade” back past the houses. This was essentially aimed at letting the people
observe: “Ah, six Australians went off on the ambush, and all six have returned …”.
However, the fiendish “backpacks” that had been on their backs were now lying in ambush.
Many of the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion and our local forces became casualties or
were captured as a result of this wicked ruse.247 This also led our forces in the jungle to
even suspect the most loyal people and families in the hamlets. How long would this
situation have continued without the help of our people ?
One evening at the beginning of November 1969, a section from 445 Battalion - led
by Nguyễn Sơn Minh, entered a hamlet to collect rice. On their return, they fell into an
Australian ambush at the edge of the hamlet. Four comrades were killed ! (The Australians
deeply studied the psychology of our soldiers and applied this to their ambushes. If the
number of Australians in their ambush were less than the number of our troops, then they
would only ambush us when we were returning – as when returning, we would usually be
more complacent and less careful). Mr Ba Mạnh was very angry: “Very cunning … How
come all four Australians who went out on the ambush have returned – but there’s still
gunfire in the area in which they’ve been ? …” The following night, stumbling along, he
followed five Australian soldiers wearing raincoats moving from Phước Thới (Phước Thọ
village) to the stream near the temple. And indeed it was Ba Mạnh who was first to
discover the Australian military’s “piggyback” trick. Cutting through the jungle, he ran to
report his discovery to our troops. With his stalwart spirit, the corpulent old man crossed
swamps - slipping and falling – and then getting up to run on. He continued to run with the
essential aim of finding our troops and, very luckily, he met Năm Tranh – a 445 Battalion
cadre, and a number of our men enroute to the hamlet. Ba Mạnh led Năm Tranh and our
troops on another route, and they were able to pick up the rice from the hamlet and return
safely. On that night, 445 Battalion had finally become aware of the Australian military’s
extremely dangerous deception. Also from that time on, our forces never entered the
hamlets on established tracks – but entered on many minor and different routes.
At a time when the enemy was conducting a “ballyhoo” of propanda among the
people to the effect that they had driven our forces from the villages, and that we no longer

planting M16 mines and completely destroyed the bunker and watchtower networks in the areas surrounding
strategic hamlets in Long Đất.” - CDEC Log 07-1632-70/CDEC Report No. 6 028 0700 70.
247
Translator’s Note: The Đồng Nai History – 1986 also notes that the Australians were “Machiavellian” (ie
“xảo quyệt”) and briefly related the “raincoat ruse” noting that, as a result, “many cadre and soldiers were
wounded or captured.” - Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.152.
74

had the capability to infiltrate into the areas that they controlled … 445 Battalion organised
an armed propaganda night that stirred public opinion throughout the Đất Đỏ region.
On Christmas Eve (24 December) 1969, the Battalion selected a number of strong,
well-regarded comrades from each of the companies … with the force equivalent to a
company and led by Comrade Tâm – the Battalion second-in-command, to conduct an
armed propaganda operation in the church at Đất Đỏ.248
A heavy machinegun was set up in front of the gate to the police compound - about
300 metres from the church, so that our forces had a well-developed position to threaten the
enemy. Another 20 of our troops – well-attired and led by Comrade Tâm, burst into the
church. At first, the people attending the service were very afraid of the “Việt Cộng”.
Comrade Tâm approached the clergyman and requested permission for our armed
revolutionary forces to directly address the Christian congregation on the policies of the
National Liberation Front. With the clergyman’s agreement, Comrade Tâm stepped
forward, took the microphone, and spoke to all present. After speaking intimately with the
people, Comrade Tâm announced: “Any puppet soldier who might have carelessly brought
a weapon to this church service, should now hand it in. The revolutionary forces will treat
you leniently. …” After a few minutes silence, a puppet second lieutenant raised his hand
and handed in his pistol (revolver). Following this, two enemy soldiers surrendered two
hand-grenades. The people cheered loudly. After propagandizing for an hour, we
announced: “You are free to continue the service, we will stay and provide security.” We
remained there until the service concluded, and then everyone crowded around our troops
asking questions and wishing them good health … . Many people said: “This is the first
time that we’ve seen the ‘Việt Cộng’ with our own eyes. You’re not at all like the
‘nationalists’ claim in their propaganda.”
Such a major political victory at the Đất Đỏ church evolved from a daring and
clever plan that none of our units or local groups in the area had ever dared attempt. This
evidenced the types of multi-faceted attacks undertaken by 445 Battalion in all situations
and at all times.
Although the enemy used all types of tricks: intensely searching the hamlets and
arresting people, enclosing the villages tightly and conducting major sweeping operations
against our jungle-based elements … the revolutionary forces had still not been completely
eliminated. The enemy concluded that, in essence, they had not yet been able to cut the
links between the people - in the areas that they controlled, and our troops – and this was
first evidenced initially by the failure of their “bunker” tactic. Accordingly, the Australian
military “brought forth” their third dangerous tactic: the “barrier tactic249*” – that we
usually termed the: “human barrier-shield fence”.
At the beginning of 1970, the Australians began their “barrier strategy”250. Based on
their old ring of bunkers, by night the Australians coordinated with the puppet troops to
establish a system of minefields and soldiers to surround three villages in the Đất Đỏ area.

248
Translator’s Note: At 2155hrs on 24 December 1969, the ARVN Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector reported that about 60
Việt Cộng – comprising C25 Long Đất Company elements and local guerrillas, “surrounded a church and
spread propaganda to the people” in the northern part of the Town – I ATF INTSUM No. 359/69, Núi Đất, 25
December 1969.
249
* From first arriving in the Bà Rịa region up until their withdrawal, the Australians implemented three
basic tactics – all of which caused us difficulties and losses:
1. The 16-E3 minefield; 2. The bunkers; and 3. The barrier-shield fence.
250
Translator’s Note: The “barrier-tactic/human barrier-shield fence” is described in the Long Đất District
History - 1986 (see Annex L) - in 1970: “The Australians continued their ‘chiến thuật hàng rào lá chắn’
((‘barrier shield’)), but in a more limited fashion.” This is also explained in a footnote to p.186 of the Long
Đất District History - 1986 as a tactic in which the Australians used “tanks and commandos [sic]” to make a
fence/barrier to block the Việt Cộng moving from their bases into the hamlets and villages.
 75

Their system was arranged in a circular-type formation (some close in, some further out).
Every three to five metres, a soldier lay in ambush with tens of mines of various types –
and every 15 metres, there was a fire support team to provide “emergency support” if a
mine detonated. They also even employed “tropical trees” (sound-activated sensors)251 that
they placed in those areas that were difficult for them to ambush. Early in the morning, all
their troops were withdrawn, and the mines de-activated and removed … No sign remained
at all of any weapon pit or trench.
This “barrier-shield tactic” was even more dangerous for us than their “bunkers”.
The local forces and 445 Battalion were almost never able to slip into the hamlets by night.
The numbers of our casualties and those captured increased daily. Usually, we were unable
to recover the bodies of those killed. One night, the Long Đất District Committee organised
seven groups from the Minh Đạm base to enter the hamlets, but all were ambushed by the
enemy. On the night of 15 January 1970, a group of cadre from Long Đất District entered
Long Điền intending to set up an underground element, but seven of the comrades were
killed and a further three members of the District Committee were lost. On the night of 16
February, 445 Battalion joined with district and village elements to enter the hamlets for
food – but struck the Australians’ “barrier-shield” and 12 comrades were killed. On the
night of 27 February, one of the District’s underground elements came to our base to report
on the situation – but they were ambushed and eight comrades were killed. 445 Battalion
continued to organise attempts to enter the villages, but over two successive months no one
was able to slip through. Whenever we were able to enter a hamlet, we had casualties
among our cadre and soldiers.
A time of hunger, difficulties and violence began. On many occasions, 445
Battalion mounted section-level operations – complete with heavy firepower. These were
intended to engage any enemy that they encountered, but we still didn’t know where the
enemy’s ambush teams were located. Sometimes our troops struck the Australian “barrier”
immediately at the jungle’s fringe – sometimes in the middle of the fields – and there were
times when we only engaged them at the very edge of the hamlet. No matter what track or
route we took, we couldn’t slip through. The enemy had all the initiative - so, if we struck
them, we just had to handle matters and suffer their heavy firepower. We were lucky to stay
alive – and there was no thought of counter-attacking them.
The Provincial authorities directed 445 Battalion to destroy the Australians’
“barrier-shield tactic”. Cadre from the Province staff even came down to assist the
Battalion.252 However, after many months we still had no effective response. By day, our
cadre and soldiers went out to dig up roots and also sought bamboo shoots to eat. When
night came, we again mounted attacks against the enemy and attempted to enter the hamlets
– but again suffered casualties. It was an extremely worrying time.

251
Translator’s Note: The Australians employed Patrol Seismic Intrusion Devices (PSID) to cover “dead
ground” - ie ground not covered by direct sight. A PSID set comprised four conical-shaped detectors – each
with a 20-metre detection radius, and a receiver.
252
Translator’s Note: According to a rallier (4th Company of 440 Battalion), on about 22 February 1970, the
Chief of Staff of the Ba Ria-Long Khánh Provincial Unit – Phan Thanh Hà (Hai Hà), visited 445 Battalion
and together with Hai Khanh – the Battalion’s Political Officer, conducted a 1½-day political re-orientation
course in the Battalion’s Suối Rau base (YS 555694). For the coming “rainy season”, the Battalion was to
stay in the Minh Đạm area “to support the people in Long Đất”, and the Battalion was to “split up and operate
in company strength for these missions.” The 1st Company was to operate in Long Điền District, the 2nd
Company was to cooperate with the village guerrillas and operate in Phước Hải village and Can Ba Mia
hamlet (Hội Mỹ), the 3rd Company was to join with the village guerrillas for operations in Đất Đỏ Distrct, and
the 4th Company was to “receive its missions from the Battalion Headquarters and the Long Đất District Unit
for mortar attacks”. - Appendix II to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 127/70, Núi Đất, 7 May 1970.
76

After many exchanges of views, one afternoon Sáu Thu (the Battalion commander)
and Hai Khanh (the political officer) made a plan. Sáu Thu had been struck by a round
from an AR15 rifle253 - that had passed through one ear lobe and out the other, during a
battle with the Australians at Long Tân (in 1966) – and he was deaf. In a loud and powerful
voice, Sáu Thu said:
“One of the two of us must sacrifice himself in order to find a way to fight them. I
think that I know a way that can work – and it’s the only way. I’m prepared to ‘chance my
arm’, so let me try it now and see what happens.”
“No way” said Hai Khanh with a deliberate wave of his hand. “You can’t hear –
and what could you do when a clash occurs ? Political work is very important at present.
You let me go …”
The two of them debated back and forth, and finally Hai Khanh won.
A suicide squad was set up and many comrades volunteered; but Hai Khanh only
chose seven men - using the Battalion’s reconnaissance element as the squad’s core. The
squad was quite heavily armed: two B40s, six AK assault rifles and a large number of
grenades. The squad was divided into two detachments. The leading detachment was the
“bait”. It was led by Comrade Hòa - with two soldiers who had volunteered from our
reconnaissance element, and all were armed with AKs. The rear element followed about 50
metres behind and was armed with three AKs, two B40s and many grenades. Hai Khanh
directly commanded this “resolved-to-die” element.
One afternoon at the beginning of the 1970 Wet Season, the cadre and soldiers of
445 Battalion bade a melancholy farewell to the suicide squad as they departed. Hai Khanh
put his arm on Hòa’s shoulder and, looking fondly into his eyes, asked the young soldier:
“Have you any message that you’d like to have passed on to anyone ?” “No” – he replied,
“there’s nothing more. Is it time to go now ?” “Yes”, said Hai Khanh, “all’s ready”. Hòa
and the two reconnaissance soldiers slung their weapons over their shoulders in a lively
manner, waved farewell to everyone and then set off leading the group.
Nightfall came silently. Everything appeared dim in the half-light.There was only
the light of the stars shining on the flooded paddy fields and glittering brightly.
Occasionally, a puff of wind from the sea freshened their faces. From time to time, Hai
Khanh tilted his head to hear the “cu, cu” sound (a coded signal) from in front of him in
order to maintain a distance of about 50 metres from the leading group. When a few
hundred metres from the hamlet, the three leading comrades encountered the enemy and
were killed. Many strings of Claymores exploded, renting the night. This was followed by
two heavy machineguns firing fiercely at the site where the mines had just exploded. M79
grenade launchers and 60mm mortars also rapidly fired in that direction. In our second
element, nobody said anything as they hugged the ground closely. After a few minutes of
observing the enemy’s fire, Hai Khanh crawled over to each of our soldiers and indicated to
them which of the enemy’s firing positions they had to destroy. In the wink of an eye, two
B40s rounds were launched accurately into their targets. The two enemy heavy
machineguns were silenced. This was followed by volleys of AK fire and hand-grenades
that exploded into the enemy’s positions. … After 10 minutes of fighting, our 445 Battalion
soldiers had forced a gap in the Australians’ “barrier-shield” – and 15 were killed, two
heavy machineguns were destroyed, and three AR15 rifles were seized. We had another
comrade wounded. Our four remaining comrades carried their three dead companions and
their wounded comrade into Thạnh Tân hamlet of Phước Thạnh village. Miss Tư Thế and a
number of villagers buried the dead comrades, bandaged the wounded soldier, and prepared
253
Translator’s Note: A number of the Australian personnel at the Battle of Long Tân were equipped with the
5.56mm M16 rifle - not the very similar AR15 model. Subsequently, larger numbers of M16s were made
available. In 1968, 262 soldiers in an 800-strong Australian battalion were equipped with M16s ie 33%.
 77

necessary materials for our troops to carry back with them. Hai Khanh and the three
remaining soldiers quickly arranged their loads and carried four heavy armfuls: ie rice,
sodium glutamate, batteries … safely back over their previous route to the base.
The blood of those four soldiers of the suicide squad helped the Battalion gain
experience in “counter-ambush” fighting.
Four days later, the Battalion deployed the 1st Company – together with a
reconnaissance section, to continue its destruction of the enemy’s “barrier-shield” tactic.
Again, three comrades put up their hands and volunteered for the leading group. And also
as before, the three clashed with the enemy - and two were killed on the spot. One comrade
was seriously wounded. Once the enemy’s position was identified, the 1st Company made a
frontal attack, while the reconnaissance section attacked from the flank. Under such a large
and surprise attack, the enemy called for helicopters to support them. Comrade Tốt raised
his AK straight up to the sky and sprayed half a magazine, shooting down a helicopter.
Comrade On – a reconnaissance soldier, set fire to another helicopter. The enemy’s flares
burned brightly in the sky. An enemy counter-attack was launched with tens of tanks. The
enemy had their hackles up and was very upset - but they only found an extensive
battlefield many kilometres wide littered with weapons and the bodies of their dead
comrades. An Australian company suffered heavy casualties. While our soldiers were
resting in the people’s houses in the hamlet, the enemy’s “artillery band” shelled the jungle
fringe (thinking that we had withdrawn). The families in Phước Thạnh village hastened to
prepare grain and foodstuffs … sufficient for more than a company, and which was carried
back to the base. One of our sections became lost and wasn’t able to withdraw in time.
When morning came, Mr Tư Ngân (Comrade Hai Khanh’s uncle) hid the whole section in a
stack of straw in his garden, provided food and water, and looked after their health. The
enemy began a detailed search. They even rested beside the hay stack. After some minutes
of worrying, Mr Tư Ngân set out some trays of fruit in his house to “entertain” the
“nationalist soldier chaps”. The enemy troops rushed into the house to eat the fruit – and,
thanks to that, were unaware of our soldiers’ presence. When night fell, Tư Ngân guided
the whole section safely back to the base.
The great success of these “counter-ambushes” resounded throughout all the
districts and the whole Province at a time when the situation was very violent and tense.
From then on, our local armed forces also launched a number of successful “counter-
ambush” operations. Then, every night, 445 Battalion also attacked the Australians’
“barrier-shield”. And it was the same each time - with two to three comrades putting their
hands up and willing to accept death so that their unit could successfully attack the enemy.
The will-power and extreme bravery of these men was a critical factor – the pistil of that
blooming flower of military exploits that would remain fresh and beautiful for ever.
Every night, the enemy had to lie out in the dew and wind – without defences to
protect them, and every night they were attacked. The basic weakness of mercenary
soldiers – their fear of death, had been exposed. However, they had clever tricks to protect
themselves. When night came and they were forced to man the “barrier-shield”, they would
dig defences and huddle in one place to counter our attacks. They didn’t smoke or make
any loud noises … But there was one thing that they couldn’t hide – the smell of earth from
the defences that they had dug. The warm and fragrant smell of our homeland told 445
Battalion’s reconnaissance troops where the enemy were. Knowing that, they could either
attack the enemy or find another route into the hamlet. So, the enemy’s extremely
dangerous “barrier-shield” tactic - that had spilled the blood of our revolutionary soldiers in
the Long Đất area more than any other of their tactics, had now gone up in smoke.
To implement the Province authorities’ directive to “move to vulnerable areas”, the
whole of 445 Battalion deployed out to Xuyên Mộc to fight a number of large concentrated
78

battles in support of the local revolutionary movement.254 In December 1970, the Battalion
launched an attack against an enemy commando255 company at the Cây Da camp in Xuyên
Mộc.256
For the attack on the camp, the Battalion employed two companies and the
reconnaissance element – divided into three attacking columns. The reconnaissance section
secretly lifted the mines and cut the barbed-wire to facilitate the passage of the three
columns that then concealed themselves 100 metres from their targets. At exactly “H-
hour”, the grenades of the reconnaissance section and the B40s and B41s of all three
columns simultaneously erupted in a resounding explosion. The enemy was attacked by
surprise and had no time to react. After only 15 minutes, we controlled the whole
battlefield. Lieutenant Hải – the commander of the camp, was killed in the battle. The use
of “sapper” tactics to attack a camp was a highly efficient mode of combat, as evidenced by
the victory at the Cây Da (Xuyên Mộc) camp. The Battalion had wiped out an enemy
company, killed over 80 enemy, seized 59 weapons, and captured 11 of the enemy.257 We
only suffered one comrade slightly wounded. This success was highly encouraging, and we
had efficiently supported the local guerrillas in destroying much of the enemy’s oppressive
machinery in the hamlets around Xuyên Mộc.
With the destruction of the Cây Da (Xuyên Mộc) camp, the Australians now knew
445 Battalion’s area of operations. On one hand, they increased their combat operations

254
Translator’s Note: In September 1970, there were major changes in 445 Battalion that are not related in the
History. Earlier, in August-September 1969, personnel had been withdrawn from 445 and 440 Battalion to
form a Bà Rịa-Long Khánh provincial reconnaissance company – Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 51-70,
Núi Đất, 23 February 1970. In July 1970, the Province Headquarters directed that “all units – including the
two battalions of the Province … become trained as sappers as soon as possible.” – Annex B to 1 ATF
INTSUM No. 40/71, Núi Đất, 9 February 1971. In August 1970, the 1st and 3 Companies of 445 Battalion –
and probably the 2nd Company, undertook sapper training; and in September almost all of the 3rd Company
joined with 40 personnel from the K6 Company of 440 Battalion to form the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh provincial
sapper/reconnaissance company – ie the C36 Company, under Hai Bỉ (ie probably Nguyễn Văn Bỉ, a former
commander of 445 Battalion’s 1st Company) – Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 51/71, Núi Đất, 20 February
1971. On 11 January 1971, the Chief of Staff of the Provincial Unit – Phan Thanh Hà, sent a congratulatory
letter to the C36 Sapper Company for its “5 January achievements” (probably the attack on La Van hamlet,
Đức Thạnh) and praised the Company as the “Province’s punch” and as a “never-lose”sapper unit - Annex B
to 1 ATF INTSUM 35/71, Núi Đất, 9 February 1971. With removal of the 3rd Company personnel to form
C36 Company, in September 1970 a “new” 3rd Company of 445 Battalion was created by the integration of
440 Battalion’s K9 Company (all North Vietnamese) - together with some members of other 440 Battalion
companies, into 445 Battalion. – Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 17/71, Núi Đất, 17 January 1971. The 3rd
Company – then 27-strong, reportedly retained its former company commander. - 1 ATF Battle Intelligence
Section, D445 Order of Battle, Núi Đất, 6 May 1971. On 17 September 1970, Năm Vũ (Nguyễn Văn Năm ?)
– the second-in-command and acting commander of 445 Battalion was killed in an Australian ambush
(7RAR) in Đất Đỏ. Reportedly a northerner NVA cadre who had served in Cambodia, Năm Vũ had been
assigned to 445 Battalion as its Chief of Staff on 19 June 1970 – O’Brien, M., Conscripts and Regulars – with
the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1995, pp.219-220. See also Annex A.
255
Translator’s Note: Literally “biệt kích” – a probable reference to a Mobile Strike Force (“Mike Force”)
company.
256
Translator’s Note: This is probably the attack on the Regional Forces compound in Xuyên Mộc Town on
29 November 1970 involving the 2nd , 3rd and 4th Companies of D445 reinforced by K8 – the heavy weapons
company of 440 Battalion – see O’Brien, M., Conscripts and Regulars …, op.cit., 1995, p.226; and CDEC
Log 01-1468-71. The 1 ATF Intelligence Staff reported the attack in detail: RF Company post (YS 650673)
was over-run and their casualties were six RF/PF killed and five wounded – with 36 M16 rifles lost – see
Peters, C.C.M. Major, D445 - Order of Battle, 1 ATF Battle Intelligence Section, Núi Đất, 6 May 1971
257
Translator’s Note: According to the Đồng Nai Monograph - 2001: “In December 1970, the 445 section
[sic] concentrated its forces and destroyed a Regional Forces company at the Cây Da post in Xuyên Mộc.”-
Địa Chí Đồng Nai, op.cit, 2001.
 79

and pacification activities in Long Đất258 – and, on the other, deployed forces to find and
destroy 445 Battalion in the Xuyên Mộc area.
After our victory in wiping out the Cây Da camp, 445 Battalion fought many
successful engagements in Xuyên Mộc. The guerrilla warfare movement there also
escalated. The Battalion was next given orders to withdraw to its Núi Bể base (Mây Tào –
Route 1)259 to re-organise and prepare to receive orders for a new mission. And, with this
deployment, the Battalion was to suffer it greatest number of casualties to date.
One afternoon at the end of 1970, the whole Battalion was organised to deploy back
to the Núi Bể base area. Not knowing why - but on that day, Hai Khanh felt very anxious
inside - although there was no engagement planned. Before the whole Battalion put their
loads on their backs, Hai Khanh again asked the political officer of the 2nd Company:
"You’ve checked the route carefully, haven't you ?" The political officer of the 2nd
Company angrily responded: "Don't you trust your subordinates, or what ? I'd bet my life
on it for you." At 2am, the Battalion had all reached the open area at Cà Thi.260 The night
was quiet and ethereal. Occasionally, a few owls hooted plaintively in the still and deserted
night. The whole Battalion was in the middle of the open area when suddenly a ring of fire
burst forth followed by a salvo of explosions. An Australian ambush had fired Claymores -
and this was followed by a thick hail of gunfire. All of the vanguard 2nd Company
Headquarters and two-thirds of the leading formation of the Battalion were hit by the
mines. 19 were killed on the spot - and 22 were wounded seriously (at that time, the
personnel strength of a company was only about 20 riflemen261). From our founding, the
Battalion had never suffered such large casualties as that in such a short time. Those who
survived still recall the Cà Thi clearing with grief and pain and our never-before-suffered
heavy casualties - brought about by a perfunctory attitude, subjective thinking and under-
estimating the enemy.262
Two days later, while the Battalion was reconstituting in the Núi Bể base, an
American unit launched a sweeping operation into the area. The Battalion hung on to the

258
Translator’s Note: According to the Long Đất District History -1986, “At the end of 1970, D445 ambushed
the Australians at Phước Hòa Long, killing 80 - p.184. At Phước Lợi, village guerrillas used E3 mines to wipe
out an Australian section moving into their base.”
259
Translator’s Note: The Núi Bể Mountains are in southeastern Bình Tuy Province, about 10 kilometres west
of the Mây Tào Mountains that straddle the Phước Tuy/Long Khánh/Bình Tuy tri-border area.
260
Translator’s Note: Termed by the Australians as the “Waterfall Clearing”, Cà Thi (YS 690668) was about
six kilometres southeast of Xuyên Mộc.
261
Translator’s Note: This implies a significant decline in 445 Battalion’s personnel strength in the second
half of 1970. In early July 1970, based on captured documents, 1 ATF had assessed D445’s strength as 182 in
five companies – see O’Brien, M., Conscripts and Regulars …, op.cit, 1995, p.204.
262
Translator’s Note: The Cà Thi ambush (at 0353hrs on 31 December 1970) is related in detail in O’Brien,
M., Conscripts and Regulars …, op.cit., 1995, pp.232-234. The Việt Cộng casualties are also identified in 1
ATF Intsum 365/70, Núi Đất, 31 December 1970. In 1994, Colonel M. O’Brien interviewed a former 445
Battalion commander - Nguyễn Văn Kiềm, in Vũng Tàu, and Kiềm commented that 445 Battalion “was dealt
a heavy blow” at Cà Thi. In the days immediately preceding the Cà Thi ambush, troops of the 1 ATF’s 7th
Battalion (7RAR) had forced 445 Battalion elements from a bunker system five kilometres southwest of Cà
Thi. The bodies of 21 members of 445 Battalion were recovered by 7RAR from the Cà Thi ambush site – and
a further two were found nearby several days later. Several senior cadre were identified among the 445
Battalion personnel killed, including: Nguyễn Thanh Tâm (Ba Tâm) – the Battalion second-in-command;
Nguyễn Thành Long – the 2nd Company Commander; Trịnh Văn Liêm – the 2nd Company Political Officer;
as well as Phan Thanh Chiến (Mười Chiến) – the Secretary of the Long Điền District Party Chapter. In
accord with a MACV Directive, 1 ATF had ordered the cessation of offensive operations over the New Year
period ie: from 1800hrs on 31 December 1970 to 1800hrs on 1 January 1971. The 1 ATF directive noted that
“defensive ambushing on routes to defensive positions was to continue”. – 1 ATF, OPS1719, Núi Đất, 23
December 1970.
80

base and, fighting determinedly, eliminated nearly 100 Americans in the engagement and
was able to firmly defend the base area.263
Having reorganised264, trained and having been reinforced, at the beginning of 1971
445 Battalion again received orders to return to the Long Đất area. At that time, the
Australians joined with American and puppet troops in combined sweeping operations
intending to clean out the Minh Đạm War Zone for a last time. Together with village
guerrillas in the Minh Đạm Mountain area, 445 Battalion launched continuous attacks –
striking the enemy from beyond the area. The Battalion destroyed over 20 tanks and
armoured vehicles, shot down five aircraft, and killed hundreds of the enemy. The Battalion
supported the 25th Company and the Long Đất District organisation in the Minh Đạm
Mountain area to hold on doggedly for 25 days and nights and firmly retained the base.
In April 1971, COSVN’s Standing Committee issued Directive 01 that clearly set
out the following requirements. In order to defeat the enemy’s current pacification plots,
we had to implement two steps – the first was to loosen the enemy’s oppressive and pincer-
like grip across a broad area. We needed to build our armed and political forces into strong
organisations, and change relationships between our forces in order to advance to the
second step – developing our forces and expanding our areas. …
To implement the COSVN policy for the new circumstances, in May 1971 COSVN
Headquarters decided to disband Military Region 5 and U1265 and establish two Sub-
Regions directly subordinate to COSVN - ie the Bà Rịa Sub-Region266* and the Thủ Biên
Sub-Region.
The mobile concentrated units of the Sub-Regions were also re-organised to
appropriately reflect the combat requirements in the field.
445 Battalion was temporarily divided-up267 in order to reinforce the districts: the
1st Company and the 2nd Company returned to Long Đất268, the 3rd Company moved to

263
Translator’s Note: The 3rd Brigade/1st US Air Cavalry Division launched operations into the Núi Bể area
in southeastern Bình Tuy Province in late January 1971 – and seized over 19 tons of flour and foodstuffs in
the period late January-early February (in the vicinity of YS 832937 – 445 Battalion’s camp in the western
Núi Bể area was reportedly in the area of YS 7990). In an engagement nearby on 7 February 1971, US forces
suffered six killed and 10 wounded – 1 ATF SUPINTREP 6/71, Núi Đất, 8 February 1971. The US
operations in the Núi Bể/Mây Tào area continued until late February 1971.
264
Translator’s Note: Trần Tan Huy has been incorrectly cited as a “former Lieutenant Colonel commanding
445 Battalion in 1971” – see the interview by Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) G. McKay MC, 23 September 1993 -
Australian War Memorial ID Number SO1932. For background on Trần Tan Huy, see Annex A - Senior
Cadre.
265
Translator’s Note: U1 and U3 were cover designators for the Biên Hòa Provincial Unit. The Bà Rịa
Provincial Unit’s designator was U2, Bình Dương Province was U4, Tây Ninh was U5, Long Khánh was U8,
and Phước Thành was U9.
266
* The Bà Rịa Sub-Region comprised nine districts (in the provinces of Bà Rịa–Long Khánh, and Long
Thành, Duyên Hải, Thủ Đức and the three towns of Long Khánh, Bà Rịa and Vũng Tàu). Translator’s Note:
For detail on the formation of the Bà Rịa Sub-Region, see Annex H – Higher Headquarters.
267
Translator’s Note: According to 1 ATF records, 445 Battalion had “continued to operate as a mobile
battalion until July 1971.” 1 ATF first became aware of the break-up of 445 Battalion from captured
documents in early September 1971: a captured Việt Cộng document dated 3 July 1971 related that 445
Battalion’s 2nd Company, 3rd Company, Surgical Platoon, Signals Platoon and Recce Platoon had been sent to
reinforce the local forces of Long Đất and Xuyên Mộc Districts. For detail on the 1 ATF assessment of the
“De-Activation of D445”, see Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM 302/71, Núi Đất, 29 October 1971; and the
booklet: Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force, Ba-Ria Sub Region, Vũng Tàu, 10 December 1971, pp.3-4
and p.7 – that noted however that the “fate of C4 and C5 is unknown”.
268
Translator’s Note: According to the Long Đất District History – 1986, see Annex L: “Two companies of
the D445 Battalion were allocated to Long Đất District – together with a battlefield reconnaissance cell. … In
1971 the forces were organised as follows: The 1st Company of D445 was responsible for Đất Đỏ (southwest
of Routes 23, 52) and to support the coastal areas of Phước Lợi, Long Hội Mỹ, and Phước Hải. The 3rd
Company of D445 was responsible for the area north of Route 23 and to support Xuyên Mộc and Phước Bửu.
 81

Châu Đức269, and the principal Battalion cadre strengthened the two Districts of Châu Đức
and Long Đất.270 A number of comrades were withdrawn to Province control and sent for
study and training.
Throughout a year of dispersed operations – and under the direct command of the
Districts, 445 Battalion’s companies successfully fulfilled their key roles in the mission to
kill the wicked thugs and to destroy the enemy’s pincer-like grip on the key areas. The 1st
and 2nd Companies cooperated closely with the 25th Company (Long Đất) and the village
guerrillas to destroy a mass of People’s Self Defence Force groups, kill many wicked thugs,
open up the control by our local forces in the Long Điền – Đất Đỏ region and along Route
23 in Xuyên Mộc, and to build additional underground revolutionary organisations to give
us control of many “spots” on the axes of Routes 23 and 44. The 3rd Company coordinated
with the 33rd Regiment271, the 4th Regiment272, and the local forces of Châu Đức District to

The Long Đất District Company C25 operated in the area of Long Điền and supported the villages of An
Nhứt, Tam Phước, Phước Tĩnh and An Ngãi. The four-comrade battlefield reconnaissance team was
responsible for activity in the villages of Phước Lợi, Long Hội Mỹ, Phước Hải and lower Route 44.” The
account in The Minh Đạm History – 2006 (see Annex M) of 445 Battalion’s dispersal is different – it states
that “Long Xuyên District” was “confirmed by the Sub-Region as the critical area and was strengthened with
two companies from 445 Battalion. … The Battalion Headquarters also supplemented Long Xuyên and Châu
Đức Districts” – p.59.
269
Translator’s Note: In late October 1970, 1 ATF assessed the total strength of Châu Đức District as 180 –
comprising Châu Đức District Unit: 94 personnel, C41 Company: 20, and village party chapters and
guerrillas: 66. Of these, only 86 (48%) were considered as “effective” – ie armed and free from injury or
illness – Peters, C.C.M Major, Battle Intelligence Section 1 ATF, Order of Battle – Chau Duc, Núi Đất, 23
October 1970. According to a POW captured by 1 ATF on 19 October 1971, 445 Battalion’s 2nd Company
was integrated into Châu Đức District’s C41 Company (see also footnotes 267 and 268), and Sáu Thu (ie
Nguyễn Đức Thu – the 445 Battalion Commander) operated as the Commander of the Châu Đức District Unit
- Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 294/71, Núi Đất, 21 October 1971. According to 1 ATF records, by May
1971, Việt Cộng strength in Châu Đức District had been reduced to 93 (from 204 in October 1969) -
Headquarters 1st Australian Task Force, Ba-Ria Sub Region, Vũng Tàu, 10 December 1971, p.2.
270
Translator’s Note: According to the Đồng Nai History – 1986, with the dispersal of 445 Battalion: the 1st
Company went to Long Đất, the 2nd Company to Xuyên Mộc, and the 3rd Company to Châu Đức. - Phan
Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.164.
271
Translator’s Note: Troops from the 33rd NVA Regiment had participated in the Battle of Bình Ba in early
June 1969 – see footnote 229, possibly together with elements of 440 Battalion – but, as noted, that
engagement is not mentioned in this 445 Battalion History. On 20-21 September 1971, the Australian 4RAR
Battalion (Operation Ivanhoe) engaged the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment northeast of Đức Thạnh in the
Núi Sao/Núi Lê area (YS 513857) – five Australians were KIA, and 33rd Regiment suffered 16 confimed KIA
– see 1 ATF SUPINTREP 39/71, Núi Đất, 27 September 1971 . Subsequently, the 7th Company of the 33rd
Regiment joined 445 Battalion in the fighting in the Long Tân area in February 1974. The 33rd Regiment was
reportedly formed in Tuyên Hóa District (Quảng Bình Province, North Vietnam) in May 1965 based on 101B
Regiment of 325th NVA Division and including a composite battalion from the 308th NVA Division (The
101st Regiment of 325th Division had earlier moved to South Vietnam in September 1964). The Regiment
departed for South Vietnam in the second half of July1965 and fought in the Plei Me/Ia Drang battles in the
Central Highlands in late October 1965. The 33rd Regiment joined the 5th Division in July 1968 in Tây Ninh
Province and moved into the Long Khánh-Bà Rịa-Biên Hòa area. In June 1970, the 33rd Regiment became a
subordinate formation of Military Region 7. A 12-page report – “33 NVA Regiment”, was produced by 1
ATF – see Annex F to 1 ATF INTSUM 264/71, Núi Đất, 21 September 1971. As noted at footnote 229, post-
War, a memorial to the 33rd NVA Regiment has been established at Bình Ba. At its inauguration, it was stated
that “in the fighting to liberate Bình Ba in the 1969 Spring Campaign, close to 50 cadre and fighters bravely
died." – Thanh Tung, “Lễ cầu siêu …, op.cit., August 2009.
272
Translator’s Note: 274 VC Regiment (known as the “4th Regiment”) had been the inaugural regiment of
the 5th VC Division. For the Regiment’s operations from mid-1967, see Annex I, footnote 50 - the 5th
Division History – 2005. From April 1968, 274 Regiment “continued to operate independently on the Bà
Rịa-Long Khanh-Biên Hòa battlefield strengthening the fighting formations of the Eastern Military Region.”
275 Regiment “and units directly commanded by the Division were ordered to operate as mobile elements on
the front north-west of Sài Gòn …” see Annex I, p.14 - the 5th Division History – 2005.
82

take control along Route 2 - while at the same time joining up the strategic corridor from
War Zone D to Long Đất, Vũng Tàu and the Rừng Sắc … .
With our spirit to hang on staunchly, to continuously attack the enemy in the
important areas, and to suffer the violence and sacrifices, 445 Battalion’s companies
successfully fulfilled their key role in contributing – together with the local forces, to
advancing the revolutionary movement to a new stage.273
After their heavy defeats on the battlefield, in December 1971, the Australian and
New Zealand troops furled their flags and departed Phước Tuy to return to their
countries.274 American units: the 9th Infantry Division, the 199th Brigade and the 173rd
Airborne Brigade also packed up and left Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa – Long Khánh to return home.
The weakened enemy became yet weaker.

((Seven photographs – poor quality, omitted. Titled:

1. After a series of political studies at the base.275
2. Training to raise combat standards.276
3. All working to improve living conditions in the base.
4. Captured prisoners.277
5. War materiel seized in the defence of Long Phước.278
6. A number of key Battalion and company cadre after Liberation.279
7. Comrade Nguyễn Văn Quang – Hero of the People’s Armed Forces.280))

273
Translator’s Note: In a letter dated August 1971 captured by Australian forces, a member of 445
Battalion’s signals platoon in the Minh Đạm area wrote to a 445 Battalion colleague: “personnel (in Long
Đất) were able to purchase most items easily, including drugs, milk and fabrics. The situation was similar to
that of peace time. The rice ration was 20 litres per person per month.” Some members of the signal unit had
married local girls … although the unit had plenty of food, they still felt homesick since all of them were
natives of North Vietnam. - Annex B to 1 ATF INTSUM 253/71, 10 September 1971. Tensions and “lack of
cooperation” between “Southerners” and “Northerners” in units – and between 445 and 440 Battalions, were
reported by a rallier - Appendix II to Annex A to 1 ATF INTSUM No. 84/70, Núi Đất, 25 March 1970.
More generally, see also North South Divisiveness in the PAVN/PLAF – April 1974 (within the 9th VC
Division) – VCAT Item No. 2310513021, and Division in Communist Ranks in 1974 – VCAT Item No.
2122902006.
274
Translator’s Note: The Đồng Nai History – 1986 related that the Australians withdrew in December 1971:
“after seven years as mercenaries (1965-1971) - with three generals directly commanding the Task Force, and
causing misery and loss to the people. However, they had to pay a price of over 10,000 wounded and killed.”
- Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit., 1986, p.167. The Australian flag at the 1 ATF
Headquarters in Núi Đất was lowered for the last time on 7 November 1971 – see http://cas.awm.gov.au/item/
CUN/71/0536/VN . 1 ATF withdrew from Phước Tuy Province to Vũng Tàu and on 9 November 1971 ceased
to be under the operational control of the US Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC) – which had
replaced the US II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV) on 2 May 1971. An Australian Army training group
remained in Phước Tuy Province until the Australian Government formally declared a cessation of hostilities
in January 1973. The “Embassy guard” platoon returned to Australia in July 1973. According to the
Australian official history, Australian Army casualties in Vietnam were 414 killed in action and 2,348
wounded – see McNeill, I. & Ekins, A., On the offensive, op.cit., 2003, Appendix F, "Statistics”. The
Australian Army History Unit website records that: “Army casualties in Vietnam were 413 KIA/DoW, two
MIA, 2026 WIA, 64 non-battle deaths and 999 other casualties”. Note however, that the last two Australian
Defence Force MIA (RAAF officers) were recovered in mid-2009. An analysis of 1 ATF engagements (six
major battles and over 3,900 contacts) can be found in Hall, R., 1st Australian Task Force – A new operational
analysis 1966-1971, Vietnam Center & Archives – Seventh Triennial Symposium, Session 5A, Lubbock –
Texas, 11 March 2011. VCAT Item No. 999VI3155. See also: Hall, R., “Operation Wandering Souls”,
Wartime, Issue 55, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, July 2011, pp.25-29.
275
Translator’s Note: About 27 males and two females in “black pyjamas-type” clothing.
276
Translator’s Note: Two soldiers demonstrating sapper minefield-breaching techniques.
277
Translator’s Note: A soldier with about six ARVN prisoners.
278
Translator’s Note: Four AR15/M16 rifles and an unidentified weapon.
279
Translator’s Note: 11 cadre in civilian clothing in front of a building.
 83

At the end of March 1972281, our strategic offensive was launched at Đông Hà,
Quảng Trị and in the Northern Central Highlands. At the beginning of April, the Nguyễn
Huệ Campaign broke out in Tây Ninh and Lộc Ninh. In the provinces of the Eastern
Region and the Southwestern Region, the enemy was simultaneously attacked in many
locations in concert with the Nguyễn Huệ Campaign – and many great victories were won
right from the first days of the first phase.
At the beginning of 1972, 445 Battalion was reconstituted282 - with Comrade Sáu
Thu continuing as the Battalion commander. Comrade Năm Ninh was the deputy political
officer of the Provincial Unit and concurrently the political officer of the Battalion (having
replaced Comrade Hai Khanh who had gone for training and had not yet returned).
Comrade Sáu Phương was the Battalion second-in-command and chief-of-staff. Comrade
Tư Thuật was the Battalion’s deputy political officer. In coordination with the Nguyễn Huệ
Campaign, 445 Battalion was given the task of attacking the enemy in Đất Đỏ Town and
seizing a number of important objectives – while at the same time blocking the enemy’s
use of Route 23 and preventing them deploying their forces from Đất Đỏ to relieve Xuyên
Mộc. To implement these important tasks, on 17 May 1972, 445 Battalion concentrated its
forces to inflict heavy casualties on a Regional Forces company located at the base of Da
Quy Mountain283 about two kilometres to the north of Đất Đỏ. The enemy at Da Quy
Mountain fled. With the enemy’s defensive position to the north of Đất Đỏ now cleared,
this was a good opportunity for us to deploy our troops to launch an attack into Đất Đỏ. On
the following day, the Battalion’s reconnaissance platoon – led by Comrade Thanh (Thanh
Chàm), went with the Battalion’s second-in-command and chief-of-staff – Sáu Phương, to
study Đất Đỏ Town. The police complex in Đất Đỏ was chosen to be invested by the
Battalion.
At midnight on 19 May 1972, our reconnaissance element guided the whole
Battalion into Đất Đỏ. The Battalion headquarters was set up one kilometre to the south of
the Đất Đỏ police compound. The 1st Platoon (of the 3rd Company) was divided into four
teams – with each team comprising six heavily-armed men, and given the task of
surrounding the Đất Đỏ police complex. The remaining two platoons of the 3rd Company
dug defensive blocking positions to eliminate any enemy relief force from the Đất Đỏ Sub-
Sector that might try to aid the Đất Đỏ police compound (from the west). The 1st and 2nd
Companies established blocking positions a kilometre from the surrounded police complex
in order to stop any enemy advancing up from their camp at Phước Hòa Long (from the
south) – while at the same time were tasked to operate as our mobile force should any new
developments evolve during the fighting.

280
Translator’s Note: Nguyễn Văn Quang – D445 second-in-command, in dress uniform wearing 10 medals –
see also footnotes 59, 105, 113, 175 and 296.
281
Translator’s Note: According to the Đồng Nai Monograph - 2001: “On 15 February 1972, 445 Battalion
ambushed the enemy at Bàu Sấu (Long Đất) and wiped out the 4th Company of the 356th Regional Forces
Battalion – and captured 24 enemy and seized 34 weapons.”- Địa Chí Đồng Nai, op.cit., 2001.
282
Translator’s Note: In May 1972, 445 Battalion received reinforcements from North Vietnam. One group
from 325th NVA Division commenced infiltration from its base north of Hà Nội in December 1971 and
arrived in Bà Rịa Province area in May 1972. Their journey down the “Trail” – ie Military Region 559,
through Laos and Cambodia, and then across the “Liberation Corridor Line” is detailed in CDEC Report 6
028 0368 72, Log 06-1049-72 (diary of Corporal Đặng Lợi Ích) – see also footnote 25 in Annex C. For
detailed Vietnamese accounts of the “Trail”, see Đồng Sĩ Nguyễn, The Trans-Trường Sơn Route, Thế Giới
Publishers, Hà Nội, 2005 and Võ Bẩm (et al), Đường Về Thành Phố Mang Tên Bác – The Road Back to the
City Named After Uncle Ho, Nhà Xuất Bản Quân Đội Nhân Dân, Hà Nội, 2005.
283
Translator’s Note: The “Horseshoe” feature – see footnote 167. With the preparations for the departure of
the Australian forces, the Horseshoe had been occupied by elements of the 302nd Regional Force Battalion
since 10 June 1971.
84

At daybreak, our team surrounding the police complex in Đất Đỏ opened fire at
ranges of 50 to 100 metres. The enemy were tightly surrounded on four sides but fought
back while calling for assistance. However, after almost a day of fighting, no enemy force
at all came to their rescue. After nearly 10 hours of following the situation, at 5pm the
enemy ordered their 302nd Regional Forces Battalion from Long Hội Mỹ (from the south)
to break through our siege of the Đất Đỏ police complex. This enemy force fell into an
ambush set by our 1st and 2nd Companies. After more than an hour of fighting, the 1st and
2nd Companies had smashed a company of the 302nd Regional Forces Battalion to pieces –
and the enemy were forced to retreat back to Long Hội Mỹ. That very night, our Battalion
ordered the 1st and 2nd Companies to return to Phước Thạnh hamlet to counter an enemy
relief force advancing to Đất Đỏ from the southwest. Just as we had foreseen, on the third
day, the 18th Puppet Division ordered its 43rd Task Force to move down and relieve Đất Đỏ.
However, they fell into the ambush set by our 1st and 2nd Companies. The fighting waged
fiercely throughout a full day. The enemy suffered heavy casualties and was blocked at the
ambush site … The following day, the 43th Task Force continued its attacks against the 1st
and 2nd Companies’ key terrain with the intention of breaking through in that area and
relieving the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector. However, for four successive days, the enemy suffered
heavy casualties but still remained held up. Meanwhile, our 1st and 2nd Companies were
exhausted. On the seventh day of the engagements, the enemy in the Đất Đỏ police
complex found a small gap that wasn’t covered and escaped the encirclement – leaving
behind tens of dead, all their weapons and their storehouse. … In that way, we had
liberated Route 23 from east of the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector to Xuyên Mộc. The enemy now
brought up the 5th Ranger Group to replace the 18th Division’s 43rd Task Force and to
continue efforts to break through to Đất Đỏ. Two Ranger battalions (the 30th and 31st
Battalions) advanced from new directions. They entered Đất Đỏ from the northwest and
were blocked by the 4th Regiment (a Regional main-force unit).284
The 1st and 2nd Companies were both quite worn-out after more than a week of
continuous fighting against enemy forces that outnumbered them by six to seven times. The
Battalion allowed the 1st and 2nd Companies to rest and refit right on the battlefield – while
at the same time ordering the 3rd Company to block the southeastern approach to Đất Đỏ
under the direct command of Comrade Sáu Phương – the Battalion second-in-command
and chief-of-staff. The enemy’s Ranger force had been blocked by the 4th Regiment, but the
enemy still sought to “bludgeon” their way into Đất Đỏ and were engaged by the 3rd
Company. When deploying for combat, each of the Ranger troops was equipped with an
anti-tank weapon - the M72.285 In their relief operation, the Rangers deployed successive
companies in the vanguard of their attacks and counter-attacks – and this progressively
wore down our troops. However, over three successive days, they were still unable to force
a gap through our 3rd Company’s position. In the 11th day of the fighting, the 3rd
Company’s strength was only six comrades – and each was using three different weapons
to fight back the enemy (at the beginning of our attacks, the Company had 70 men). That
night, the Battalion received orders to withdraw to its initial positions where we had
blocked the 302nd Regional Forces Battalion. On the 12th day of our attacks, the Battalion
284
Translator’s Note: The 4th Regiment – ie the 274 Việt Cộng Main Force Regiment, was an original
formation of the 5th Việt Cộng Division. From about April 1968, the Regiment had “operated independently
on the Ba Ria-Long Khánh-Biên Hòa battlefield” (5th Division History – 2005) as a subordinate of Military
Region 7 and was later placed under the Bà Rịa Sub-Region. The attack is also recounted in the Long Đất
District History – 1986, p.204 – see Annex L: “D445 and the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Regiment and the Đất Đỏ
guerrilla unit attacked the Sub-Sector and the Đất Đỏ police centre – and we held the town of Đất Đỏ for 13
days before withdrawing to regroup in our base area.”
285
Translator’s Note: The M72 66mm Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) had an effective range of 200 metres.
It was also used against defensive positions and personnel.
 85

received orders to send the 1st Company – with a company from the 4th Regiment, back to
Phước Thạnh and to attack the 5th Ranger Group. On the 13th day, the whole Battalion was
ordered to deploy to the Bà Lá Culvert on Route 23 and to block an enemy force relieving
Xuyên Mộc. At this time, there were only 17 comrades in the whole Battalion who were fit
enough to undertake this task. A few days later, our troop strength slowly increased (as a
number of our men who had been lightly wounded or exhausted were by then well enough
to rejoin the fighting).
In the second phase, our Battalion consolidated its forces and - together with the
District armed forces, satisfactorily achieved its task to hold the liberated regions of Route
23 while at the same time attacking the enemy in depth at Long Điền, Đất Đỏ, Long Hải
and Phước Hải – liberating many important hamlets near the Đất Đỏ – Long Điền – Xuyên
Mộc Sub-Sectors. … The liberated region was broadened in the form of a “dove-tailed
saw-tooth pattern”. These new combat exploits by the Battalion in the Long Đất area had
contributed significantly to the whole of the South forcing the American imperialists to
sign the Paris Accords on Vietnam.
Throughout four years (1969-1972) of holding-on unyieldingly in the Long Đất
area, the Battalion had depended on the people to survive and to win. The people and the
local forces had relied on the Battalion to travel the tough and decisive revolutionary road
that at times seemed impassable. The extremely dangerous tactics employed by the
Australians had been bankrupted, wicked thugs and People’s Self Defence Force troops had
been wiped out, and the Battalion had launched small attacks deep into Đất Đỏ – but had
suffered casualties there. However, all these represented significant military exploits and
were fulcrums in a region of our dearly loved homeland that moved the revolutionary
movement forward.286

CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS THE DAY OF TOTAL VICTORY

On 27 January 1973, the Paris Accords on ending the war and re-establishing peace
in Vietnam were signed. However, in the liberation zone occupied by 445 Battalion, the
guns were only silent for one hour.
The headquarters of the Battalion and three of its companies (1st, 2nd and 3rd ) were
stationed in Đất Đỏ. The flag of the National Liberation Front flew from the rooftops and
from the tops of the coconut palms in the villages of Phước Hòa Long, Phước Thạnh and
Phước Thọ … The flag of the puppet forces had been set up in the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector and
in a number of enemy posts along Route 52. In almost all the hamlets and villages around
the Đất Đỏ District centre, we held half – and the enemy also occupied half. The borders
between our areas were delineated by the flags.
The 4th Company of 445 Battalion – directly commanded by Nguyễn Tuấn Giải
(Mười Giải) - the Battalion’s deputy political officer, occupied Phước Hải. There, our flag
had been raised about 200 metres from the destroyed Phước Hải camp.
An atmosphere of peace was felt in all the hamlets and villages, and in the streets
and neighbourhoods. The people discussed the situation excitedly, and there was no end of

286
Translator’s Note: In July 1972, COSVN severely criticised the cadre in the Bà Rịa Sub-Region for their
poor performance in the mid-May 1972 attempts to over-run Phước Tuy Province. COSVN cited “a lack of
effective civilian proselytizing and cadre ineptness in assuming control of the populace in areas over-run by
military elements that caused the near defeat of the revolutionary forces” in Phước Tuy - VCAT Item No.
2122407002.
86

happiness. They had confidence in the international treaty. However, after only an hour of
the Paris Accords coming into effect, a flight of enemy AD6 aircraft287 suddenly appeared
in the skies above Đất Đỏ. They massed and then poured their bombs down on the hamlets
where the liberation flag was flying. Flames and dark smoke enveloped the ruined houses.
In panic, the villagers picked up their children and belongings and fled the area. After tens
of bombing runs by the AD6 aircraft, the Regional Forces began to fire indiscriminately
and, shouting and screaming, invaded the liberated zones. The fighting had recommenced.
At this time, 445 Battalion was commanded by Comrade Đào Văn Tổng (Tám
Tổng) and Comrade Hai Khanh was the political officer. The whole Battalion now had to
face the cunning and bellicose enemy and hold every inch288 of our liberated homeland.
In Long Đất, the Battalion’s companies had to dig lines of trenches and defensive
positions to block the enemy. Gunfire was continuous across the battleground. Our soldiers
held on staunchly and repelled almost all of the enemy’s invading thrusts. Each time the
enemy’s penetration attempts failed, their infantry would call in artillery support and
bombers to attack our positions for several hours. Following the bombardment, they would
recommence their attacks. In the afternoon, the enemy reinforced their efforts with the
326th Regional Forces Battalion – led by Major Đề, in their resolve to dislodge 445
Battalion from Đất Đỏ Town. The fighting in the town now became increasingly decisive.
At 8am on 27 January, a helicopter appeared in the sky over Phước Hải, following
which enemy artillery from their surrounding posts fired into our positions. The 4th
Company dug shelters on each side of Route 44 about 200 metres from the Đồn Sập
(Phước Hải) camp. Each platoon dug a shelter, and there was also a shelter for the company
headquarters. Although the villagers provided wood and planks for the shelters, the shelters
were on a dry sand hill - and no matter how we tried to camouflage the positions, they still
look like “toy” shelters. The company headquarters ordered Comrade Vượng’s mortar
platoon to fire five warning rounds into the enemy’s Con Ó post. But the enemy’s other
positions shelled us more intensely. One of our soldiers armed with a B41 was ordered to
fire a round into the Đồn Sập camp - but as the grenade left the launcher, our comrade was
seriously wounded as the blast from the B41’s exhaust had bounced back off the wooden
revetment to his rear. The two sides maintained their positions and exchanged fire
throughout the day. Two of our men were killed. At 8am the next day, the enemy aircraft
continued their intensive bombing attacks on the 4th Company, and their infantry again
assaulted our positions. We lost a further B40, and at midday on 28 January the enemy
dislodged the 4th Company from Phước Hải.
The 4th Company withdrew back to Đất Đỏ, and the whole Battalion fought against
the advancing enemy. However, with their overpowering fire support from the air and their
infantry outnumbering us by tens of times, the enemy inflicted heavy losses on us. There
were many casualties, and our ammunition was gradually running out. After holding on in
Đất Đỏ for close to a week, the Battalion was ordered to withdraw to our base at Hội Mỹ.
Only one week after the signing of the Paris Accords, the Machiavellian and war-
mongering enemy in Long Đất had driven out 445 Battalion from the Đất Đỏ and Phước
Hải regions – important liberated areas within Long Đất that we had won during the
Nguyễn Huệ Campaign (1972). The Long Đất area now only contained just two liberated
villages - Long Tân and Long Phước. The enemy also began to advance their plan to invade
our zones – intending to force us back to the pre-1972 situation.
In March 1973, 445 Battalion was ordered to return to Long Tân and Long Phước to
defend the liberated zones. There, the Battalion joined with the village guerrillas and the
287
Translator’s Note: The Douglas AD-6 (A-1H) “Skyraider” AD6 aircraft was a piston-powered, propeller-
driven close support aircraft provided by the US.
288
Translator’s Note: Literally “tấc” – ie one tenth of an old Vietnamese measure for a yard.
 87

local people to set up “combat villages”. A system of spiked pits, minefields, lines of
fighting trenches and tunnels were urgently established and camouflaged. Coordinated
combat actions between the Battalion and the guerrillas were regularly practised. The
Battalion now employed “sparrow” tactics to defend the liberated zones. The companies
were dispersed in teams and sections in order to coordinate with our guerrillas in blocking
the enemy at some distance – and in all directions, from our areas of control. The
Battalion’s tactical guidance was to wear down the enemy’s strength beginning at our outer
defensive lines. We established close coordination between the blocking teams and our
mobile attacking forces – always maintaining the initiative to split the enemy’s formations
and then to separately destroy each of their component elements. This would create the
conditions for our other forces to completely destroy the enemy forces.
A number of concrete plans were made and, with close coordination between our
troops and local guerrillas, these were regularly practised. Accordingly, we were able to
attain a high degree of combat efficiency. At the end of March, the enemy concentrated two
Regional Force battalions – together with strong air support assets, to strike into Long Tân
and Long Phước. In the very first days, we drove hundreds of enemy from the battlefield,
and they were forced to regroup in the open fields where they became “prey” for the
artillery firepower of our 4th Company and destroyed. Throughout a 15-day period, the
enemy were unable to force their way through our outer-most defensive lines around Long
Tân and Long Phước. Rather, worn down significantly, they were forced to withdraw to Bà
Rịa having suffered a defeat in their drive to occupy Long Tân.289
In July 1973, the Party’s Central Executive Committee promulgated Resolution 21.
This was like a brilliant spotlight that illuminated for us a change in direction on the
battlefield. The mirage of peace and “relaxation” - that had been held by some, was no
more. 445 Battalion was no longer in two minds and hesitant in the face of the gunfire and
shelling at a time when there was a ceasefire agreement. We clearly understood the
enemy’s mind and their intentions – and were elated when we received the Party’s new
policy. In implementing the directions of the Provincial Committee and the Military Region
to “strike directly at the enemy bases from which they launched their operations”, the
Battalion conducted a large number of attacks on the enemy’s bases in the Sub-Sectors of
Đất Đỏ, Long Điền and Núi Đất … to destroy the enemy’s capabilities. These punishing
blows were able to limit many of the enemy’s attacks into our liberated zones.290
At the beginning of 1974, the Eastern Military Region (Military Region 7) ordered a
campaign on Route 2 to recover liberated regions from Đức Thạnh up to Cẩm Mỹ that had
been occupied by the enemy following the Paris Accords. While the Military Region was
directing our forces to implement the “Route 2 Campaign”, the puppet 18th Division
concentrated two task forces (the 43rd and the 48th) to join with Regional Forces and
Popular Forces to move into and occupy Long Tân and Long Phước. This was a good
opportunity for us engage the enemy’s main-forces and disrupt their campaign. The

289
Translator’s Note: In May 1973, the US Defense Attache Office (DAO) estimated the strength of “445 Bn
Ba Ria-Long Khanh Province Unit” as 180 – and also in Phước Tuy Province: “D.500 Battalion MR1” with a
strength of “55 NVA” and “634 Battalion Ba Ria-Long Khanh Provincial Unit” with a strength of “50 VC” –
USDAO, PLAF/PAVN Troop Strength by Unit - May 1973 , Saigon, 31 May 1973 – USDAO Report No. 6
918 5093 73. These USDAO figures have also been cited on a Vietnamese military history website:
Rongxanh, Phân bố - quân số các đơn vị Quân Giải phóng miền Nam trên lãnh thổ miền Nam Việt Nam đến
31/5/1973 (Deployment and Strengths of the South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces with the Territory of
South Vietnam – 31 May 1973), Quân Sử Việt Nam, 6 February 2009.
290
Translator’s Note: According to the Đồng Nai History - 1986, in mid-1973: “500 Battalion of the Bà Rịa-
Long Khánh Province was absorbed into 445 Battalion.” - Phan Ngọc Danh ..., Đồng Nai 30 Năm …, op.cit.,
1986, p.182. As noted in the footnote above, the US DAO had estimated the strength of “D.500 Battalion
MR1” in Phước Tuy Province as “55 NVA” and “445 Bn Ba Ria Long Khanh Province Unit” as 180.
88

Military Region strengthened our forces in Long Đất with the 7th Company of the 33rd
Regiment of the 9th Division and two anti-aircraft artillery companies from the 24th
Battalion. In a very important role, our Battalion had to achieve two tasks simultaneously:
to stoutly defend Long Tân and Long Phước, and to lure the enemy and block their main-
force elements. The Battalion – together with the 34th Company (Châu Đức District), the
Long Đất District Unit and two companies from the Military Region, now faced their
greatest tests of strength in this period of countering the offensive launched by the puppet
forces.
In early February 1974, two task forces of the puppet 18th Division and an armoured
squadron came and occupied Long Điền and Đất Đỏ and – together with seven Regional
Forces battalions (Bà Rịa), prepared to invade Long Tân and Long Phước.
The two villages of Long Tân and Long Phước were in hilly terrain - with Route 52
running from east to west. The boundary between the two villages was the Đá Bàn [sic]
stream that ran alongside wide areas of open fields for about one kilometre. To the south of
Long Tân and Long Phước, there was a field contiguous to Long Điền and Đất Đỏ. To the
north, there were gardens of fruit trees leading to a rubber plantation next to a forest of tall,
old-growth trees. Standing in the centre of the village, one had a clear view down on all the
surrounding terrain.
The Battalion’s defensive positions at Long Tân and Long Phước were arranged
facing three directions.
The main defences faced the west-northwest and were the responsibility of the 1st
Company and the 7th Company (of the 33rd Regiment). These were supported by our 4th
Artillery Company and an 82mm mortar detachment from the Military Region’s 274th
Artillery Unit. In this sector, the companies dug their defensive positions as small team
sites facing in many directions in order to launch surprise attacks against any enemy
airborne forces. The 7th Company’s positions faced the northwest and were located about
two kilometres from Long Tân.
The first of our secondary defences faced east-southeast from Long Tân and was
occupied by the 3rd Company. The positions were arranged in three lines. The first line was
at the edge of the hamlet; the second was half-way up the hill; and the third was on the
summit of the hill (in the centre of the village). The defensive lines and the defensive works
were set out in an arc and carefully camouflaged. Two “steel bolt” teams were located on
Route 52 to block any enemy tanks that might advance from Đất Đỏ - and were equipped
with two B40s, a B41, an American heavy machinegun, and a 60mm mortar.
The second of our secondary defences faced south-southwest from Long Phước and
was held by our 2nd Company and the 34th Company (Châu Đức).
All of the Battalion’s battlefield positions were laid out on the apexes of a triangle
with sides from two to three kilometres long. The headquarters of the Battalion was set up
east of Núi Thơm291 and about three kilometres to the north of Long Tân.
On 14 February 1974, the puppet forces launched an operation to take Long Tân
and Long Phước. The 302nd Regional Forces Battalion moved from Long Điền along Route
52 towards the 2nd Company’s position (Long Phước). The 355th Regional Forces Battalion
advanced from Đất Đỏ on both sides of Route 52 to Long Tân and engaged the 3rd
Company. From the very first day, the two enemy columns manoeuvred exactly as our
tactical plan had anticipated. The 3rd and 2nd Companies – together with the 34th Company,
fought doggedly throughout three successive days and halted the enemy’s operation.

291
Australian forces referred to the 126 metre-high Núi Thơm Hill as “Núi Đất 2” – see footnotes 125, 142
and 151 - and also footnote 9 in Annex L.
 89

On 17 February, the puppet 18th Division now formally joined the fighting at Long
Tân and Long Phước.
At 5am, a pale white mist hung over the rubber plantations – the atmosphere was
peaceful, and there no sound at all of gunfire. A few quite loud bird-calls could be heard
greeting the new day. The 7th Company’s sentries were silently re-checking their combat
materiels for the anticipated battle when suddenly they saw grey shadows moving forward
in the mist. These were enemy troops from the 18th Division’s reconnaissance company
from Núi Đất intending to insert a group into Long Tân’s flank and facilitate a larger
enemy force to launch a surprise attack. However, they didn’t suspect the presence here of
the soldiers of the 7th Company – a unit of the 33rd Regiment whose forté was the mobile
ambush, and the elite 1st Company of 445 Battalion who were all in wait for them.
The sentries urgently threw small lumps of soil at the entrances of the Company’s
defensive shelters – and, now alerted, the whole of the 7th Company took off the safety
catches on their weapons. In the Company Headquarters shelter, the PRC25 radio292 was
not used in order to ensure absolute security. When the advancing grey shadows were about
10 metres from our DH10 mines, there was a blinding flash - followed by a ground-shaking
explosion that blew down the vegetation and kicked up dust and smoke. Following this, the
call to attack rang out. The 7th Company soldiers - who had been below ground, leapt out
and attacked directly into the enemy formation firing bursts from their AK sub-
machineguns.
Meanwhile, at the 1st Company’s commanding position beside a banyan tree, Hùng
– the radio operator who was high in its luxuriant green branches, used his field telephone
to contact Vượng’s 61mm [sic] mortar platoon and report the direction in which the enemy
was regrouping and taking flight. Tens of mortar rounds rained down on the grey-clad
shadows at the edge of the rubber plantation. The 1st Company was ordered to attack and
drive off the enemy near the 7th Company’s location. After a few minutes fighting, the
enemy’s fire fell silent. Our soldiers quickly cleared the battlefield and then returned to
their trenches.
Half an hour after the battle, our political officer Nguyễn Minh Khanh took the field
telephone in the Battalion Headquarters and informed all of our positions that, with the
support of our 1st Company, the 7th Company had eliminated the 18th Division’s
reconnaissance company, seized tens of weapons, and captured two of the enemy. News of
this victory encouraged all our troops on the battlefield. There was an air of excitement
everywhere, and all competed with one another to destroy the enemy, capture prisoners and
seize weapons.
At 2pm, tens of helicopters appeared and landed the 48th Task Force of the 18th
Division in the open ground at Bẩy Mẫu about four kilometres to the north-northwest of
Long Tân. The enemy divided into many columns and advanced straight at the positions of
the 7th Company. The enemy’s M72 anti-tank weapons struck many of the 7th Company’s
defences. With their overpowering strength, the enemy inflicted a large number of
casualties on the 7th Company. The 1st Company was ordered to attack the enemy’s flank
and support the 7th Company, but was blocked by an enemy battalion. The enemy then
over-ran the 7th Company – and the situation was extremely dangerous. At the Battalion
Headquarters, Tám Tổng consulted urgently with Hai Khanh then ordered all of the 7th
Company to get below ground. Our 82mm mortars then heavily shelled the 7th Company’s
position, and tens of enemy soldiers fell down headlong at the edge of our defences. The
enemy were forced to rush back. At the same time, an infantry team from the 3rd Company
arrived in time to aid the 7th Company in clearing the battlefield and carrying away our

292
Translator’s Note: United States AN/PRC25 VHF military manpack radio.
90

wounded and our dead. After a day of tense fighting, all the three helicopter-inserted
battalions of the 18th Division were pinned down northwest of Long Tân (at a distance of
three kilometres). That very night, the 1st Company was ordered to divide up into a large
number of detachments and attack the dispersed elements of the 48th Task Force, and we
inflicted many casualties on the enemy.
Also on 17 February, at about 8am in the 3rd Company’s area, a squadron of 15
enemy armoured vehicles (that included both M41 and M48 tanks) advanced along Route
52 and struck directly into the 3rd Company. On both sides of the road (at about 100 metres
distance), two enemy infantry battalions (of the 18th Division and the Regional Forces)
moved forward in parallel. The commander of the 3rd Company and Comrade Tư Kia – the
1st Platoon commander, personally joined a “steel bolt” team beside Route 52, and both led
their troops in engaging the enemy. Tư Kia raised his B41 and aimed at the leading tank.
When it was 200 metres from the team, the B41 on Tư Kia’s shoulder shook and ejected a
jet of flame. The tank was brought to a halt and emitted clouds of pitch-black smoke. The
following tanks pulled back and returned fire randomly into our positions. The tanks then
recommenced their advance, firing while on the move. Our B40 and B41 grenadiers in the
3rd Company set fire to a further two enemy tanks. The enemy were then forced to disperse
into the fields to find positions from which to return fire, and did not dare move further
forward. At the same time, our artillery and infantry fired fiercely at each of the groups of
enemy in the open fields. Enemy bodies were strewn in disorder all over the fields. Unable
to advance, the enemy regrouped, dug defensive positions and re-constituted their units.
Then, having called down heavy air attacks against our troops, they re-commenced their
move forward. However, regardless of whether they advanced or huddled together, the
enemy still had to hug the ground in the fields under all types of fire from the 3rd
Company’s solid defences that had been dug into the red soil. After tens of enemy assaults
had been beaten back, their dead soldiers lay scattered along both sides of Route 52.
Unable to recover their dead, as darkness fell both their infantry and tanks withdrew to Đất
Đỏ. Early the next day, the enemy again advanced on their previous axis of attack, but were
again driven back.
The situation for our 1st Company was different from that at the 3rd Company’s
position. Because of the distance from their rear support, the enemy’s 48th Task Force was
unable to advance by day. So during the night, they sought areas to regroup and to launch
operations the following day. As a result, they were attacked during the night by the 1st
Company – both by ground assaults and our artillery fire. Principally by their methods of
fighting defensively by day and then attacking by night, the 1st and 7th Companies were
able to firmly hold our main positions in the face of an enemy force that was almost ten
times stronger.
Over a period of two weeks, all three zones of the Battalion’s defences at Long Tân
and Long Phước had fought with great stamina and smashed almost all of the enemy’s
operations to break-in to the area. We had killed hundreds of enemy and firmly held the
battlefield. Apart from the factor of the doggedly brave spirit of our people, we must also
acknowledge the red soil of Long Tân. For indeed it was that red earth – as bright as blood,
hard but malleable, that formed those solid defensive positions for 445 Battalion’s cadre
and soldiers and that enabled us to be victorious.
On the night of 25-26 March 1974, the curtain was raised on the “Route 2
Campaign”293 launched by the Military Region against the enemy at the Kim Long camp –

293
Translator’s Note: “The Route 2 Campaign Headquarters was established in an area of over-grown rubber
to the east of Cẩm Mỹ village (Xuân Lộc) and comprised Colonel Lê Văn Ngọc of the Military Region
Headquarters as commander. Comrade Phạm Văn Hy - the Secretary of Bà Rịa–Long Khánh Province, was
the political commissar (chính ủy) and Comrade Phạm Lạc – the Province Unit Commander, was the deputy
 91

a stroke that flabbergasted the puppet military in Bà Rịa and Long Khánh. The enemy
hurriedly ordered two of the 18th Division’s task forces to move from Long Đất and to
break through our interdiction of Route 2. They now abandoned their plan to occupy Long
Tân. Regional Forces troops from Bà Rịa replaced the withdrawing 18th Division forces,
and they never again dared to come near to Long Tân and Long Phước.
After more than a month of vicious fighting (from 26 March to 31 April 1974),
Military Region 7’s campaign on Route 2 was a resounding victory.294 We had over-run 12
of the enemy’s posts on Route 2, retaken the liberated zone from Kim Long to the Bà Cùi
plantation, and destroyed much of the enemy’s war materiel and strength. These victories
had the power to greatly encourage the fighting spirit and will of 445 Battalion as well as
the other local armed forces in that new revolutionary phase.
With the impetus of our punishing success over the enemy – and the support of the
Military Region’s 18th Sapper Battalion, 445 Battalion joined with the 25th Company (Long
Đất) to attack and seize three posts and seven enemy positions on Inter-Provincial Route
44, and recover the six kilometre-long Cầu Tum – Nước Ngọt liberated zone. This victory
also effectively supported and strongly encouraged the village guerrillas of Hội Mỹ, Phước
Thạnh, Phước Thọ and Long Điền … who attacked the enemy, killing over 200 “Pheonix”
pacification operatives, wicked thugs and Popular Forces troops while expanding our
control over the villages and hamlets in the Long Đất area. In these operations, 445
Battalion had supported our local people who were able to upgrade the status of 20 hamlets
from “weak” to that of being disputed with the enemy. Nearly 100 youths – both male and
female, volunteered to join the revolutionary armed forces, establish underground
organisations in Long Đất District, and to raise an additional local company which bore the
title: 26th Company. The number of people of the Long Đất region rushing into the
liberated zone to make their living increased daily. Many families built houses and huts
right in the rice paddies and the slash-and-burn fields. In the enemy-controlled areas, at
7pm every night our revolutionary armed forces visited the families that had clandestinely
supported us. The enemy’s pincer-like grip over the people was now only nominal and
almost completely ineffective.
In the 1974-1975 Dry Season, the situation on the Southern battlefield became
increasingly advantageous for us. On the B2 Front295 alone, the enemy lost 2,373 military
posts. The liberated zone extended uninterrupted from Lộc Ninh (Bình Long) down to Bến
Cát, Tây Ninh, Bà Rịa and Long Khánh. The political and internal situation of the puppet
central government became increasingly confused, and it was in serious crisis.
In Bà Rịa – Long Khánh Province, following the success of the “Route 2
Campaign”296, the Military Region mounted a series of victorious operations on Route 1

commander.” - See Địa Chí Đồng Nai (Đồng Nai Monograph), Tập 3 (Vol 3) – Chương 6, op.cit., 2001.
Phạm Văn Hy (Tư Hy) was also known as Phạm Văn Hiểu; and Phạm Lạc was also known as Tư Lạc.
294
Translator’s Note: According to the Military Region 7 History - 1995, p.49, the following elements
participated in the Campaign: 33rd Regiment, 44th Regiment, 18th Sapper Battalion, 445th Battalion, 25th
Company (Long Đất) and 43rd Company (Châu Đức). The Campaign began on 27 March 1974 and “after
three months of fighting, the first campaign by Military Region 7 in the resistance war against the Americans
achieved great victories … completely liberating 100 [sic] kilometres of Route 2 from north of Đức Thạnh to
Cẩm Mỹ and restoring the situation on the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh battlefield to the situation before 28 January
1973.”
295
Translator’s Note: Created in 1961, the B2 “Bulwark” Front encompassed all the provinces of ộ, as well
as the five southern provinces of Military Region 5 in southern Trung Bộ: ie Ninh Thuận, Bình Thuận, Quảng
Đức, Tuyên Đức, and Lâm Đồng. See Trần Văn Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Văn Nghệ,
Hồ Chí Minh City, 1982.
296
Translator’s Note: “At the conclusion of the Route 2 Campaign, we had killed 890 enemy, captured 37
prisoners – including a full colonel, six lieutenants/captains, seized 200 weapons and 20 radios, shot down 17
aircraft, destroyed 16 tanks, and liberated Route 2 forcing the withdrawal of 12 enemy posts. The liberated
92

and launched the “Route 3 Campaign” to surround and isolate Xuân Lộc (the principal
town of Long Khánh).
At the end of 1974, the Party’s Central Executive Committee promulgated the
Resolution: “Resolve to liberate the whole of the South in the two-year period of 75-76”.
This Resolution was disseminated to all the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion. Everyone
was extremely elated, and all were resolved to strive towards the day of final and complete
victory.
In coordination with the Military Region’s Route 3 Campaign, 445 Battalion
attacked and destroyed the enemy at the Bờ Đập (Hội Mỹ) camp, seized the Đồn Lớn camp
(Phước Hải) and occupied the hamlets of Hải Lạc and Hải Trung. Panic-stricken by the
Battalion’s attacks, the enemy were forced to withdraw and abandon their outlying posts on
Routes 23 and 52.
To strengthen our forces in important areas of the Military Region - and also those
of COSVN, 445 Battalion was deployed from the Long Đất area up to Xuân Lộc. At this
time, the momentum of the Revolution’s attacks was like a rising tide or a crashing
waterfall. Our troops and the people of the whole South were preparing to launch the
“Historic 1975 Spring Campaign”. Now, liberating a strategic area was not just the sole
responsibility of a local unit or a main-force unit. It demanded high-level tactical
coordination between all forces. The peak of the multi-faceted people’s war waged by the
whole nation had arrived, and the time was ripe. The significance of this prodded 445
Battalion’s cadre and soldiers to improve themselves in all aspects and strive to keep pace
with events.
At this time, there were also changes among the principal cadre of 445 Battalion.
Comrade Tám Tổng was the Battalion commander. Comrade Nguyễn Văn Quang – an
armed forces hero, had studied in the North in the period from 1968 to March 1972 and
returned to 445 Battalion to take up the position of Battalion second-in-command. Now, he
was both second-in-command and chief-of-staff. Comrade Bùi Chính was the political
officer - and concurrently was the secretary of the Battalion’s Party Committee. On 21
March 1975, 445 Battalion attacked a Regional Forces company at Ông Quế village (the
Ông Quế plantation) on Route 2 in Xuân Lộc.297
At 8am, when the last rounds fired by the 4th Company had exploded, the whole
Battalion simultaneously attacked on three axes (with a company on each axis) and cut the
Regional Force company’s position into many small clustered groups. The enemy had not
been unable to recover from this surprise shelling - when they were unexpectedly assaulted
in daylight. Although the enemy’s defensive positions were well-developed, after only 20
minutes the Regional Force company in the Ông Quế plantation had disintegrated. Ông
Quế was the first village on the Bà Rịa – Long Khánh battlefield to be completely liberated
in the 1975 Spring Campaign.
With the impetus of that victory, only a few days later 445 Battalion advanced
along Route 2 and liberated the hamlets of Bảo Bình 1 and Bảo Bình 2, destroyed the
enemy at Lò Than Mountain - and then turned to Route 1, liberated Bảo Hòa hamlet,
inflicted heavy casualties on two battalions of Regional Forces at Bình Phú and Bảo Toàn,
and interdicted two kilometres of Route 1 isolating Long Khánh Town (Xuân Lộc) from the

areas of Bà Rịa–Long Khánh–Biên Hòa were now connected.” - See Địa Chí Đồng Nai (Đồng Nai
Monograph), Tập 3 (Vol 3) – Chương 6, op.cit., 2001.
297
Translator’s Note: For the 1975 Xuân Lộc campaign see Phạm Văn Hy, “Tỉnh Ủy Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Với
Chiến Trường Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh” - “The Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province Committee and the Xuân Lộc-
Long Khánh Battlefield”, pp.161-164 in Military Region 7 (Quân Khu 7), Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc-Long
Khánh - The Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh Victory, Nhà Xuẩt Bản Tồng Hợp Đồng Nai, Biên Hòa. Phạm Văn Hy
was the Secretary of the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Provincial Committee in the period September 1972-1975.
 93

south. During this time, the devastating attack to smash “the steel gate of Xuân Lộc”298 also
took shape. 445 Battalion – together with K8 (Xuân Lộc), the 34th Company, the 41st
Company (both of Châu Đức)299, and the 207th Company (Cao Su District) formed a force
equivalent to a regiment and - led personally by Comrade Phạm Văn Còn (the deputy chief-
of-staff of the Provincial Unit)300, joined the attack to liberate Xuân Lộc from the south.301*
The essential task for 445 Battalion302 was to interdict Route 1 and Inter-Provincial
Route 2 three kilometres from Long Khánh Town and block the enemy’s forces from Suối
Cát (Route 1) and Suối Râm (Route 2) from reinforcing Xuân Lộc.
At 5am on 9 April 1975, our main column began its attack on Xuân Lộc. To the
north and west, we had won great victories. In the east however, we were blocked by the
enemy and suffered many casualties.
In the south, 445 Battalion significantly wore down two enemy battalions from Suối
Cát (the 3rd Battalion of the 48th Regiment and the 234th [sic] Regional Forces Battalion)
that had tried to break through to the Town. At the same time, we seized the hamlet of Bảo
Toàn. Each day, the encirclement of Xuân Lộc tightened.
After four days of unsuccessful attacks on Xuân Lộc, our forces in the north and the
east were ordered to withdraw from the Town and to change our methods of attack.
In the south, 445 Battalion continued to invest the hamlets of Bảo Hòa and Bảo
Toàn – while at the same time attacking the enemy in Bảo Thị, Bảo Liệt and the Gia Liêu
bridge … At these locations, we captured 117 prisoners, seized 43 radios and satisfactorily
completed our task of holding the enemy and thus enabling our large forces on the main
thrust line into Xuân Lộc to change to a more effective operational method. The enemy’s
1st Airborne Brigade (part of the Thiệu government’s General R eserve) was inserted south
of Tân Phong to rescue Xuân Lộc. Only a few hours afterwards, they were heavily shelled
by the 4th Company’s artillery and suffered heavy losses. Next, the Battalion joined with
the local district companies and launched continuous ground and artillery attacks on small
groups of the 1st Airborne Brigade, killing hundreds of enemy and preventing them from
entering Xuân Lộc to reinforce the rear areas of the 18th Division.
While the 52nd Task Force (of the puppet 18th Division) was being eliminated at
Kiệm Tân (Gia Kiệm – on Route 20), the enemy’s defensive line at Phan Rang was also
being shattered by our 2nd Corps – and the puppet forces at Xuân Lộc became extremely
alarmed. According to statements by the enemy’s Colonel Bảo – the deputy commander of

298
Translator’s Note: The term - “steel gate/door” (“cánh cửa thép”) ie blocking the NVA/VC northeastern
approaches to Sài Gòn, was apparently coined by the commander of the 18th ARVN Division, Brigadier
General Lê Minh Đảo.
299
Translator’s Note: The consolidation of C41 Company on 6 April 1975 in the Hắc Dịch area - under
Aspirant Lương Văn Cao (Bảy Cao), and detail of the fighting is related in Mai Thanh Xuân, “Bắt Đại Tá
Tỉnh Trưởng Ngụy Phạm Văn Phúc” - “Capturing the Puppet Province Chief Colonel Phạm Văn Phúc”, in
Military Region 7 (Quân Khu 7), Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc - Long Khánh ..., op.cit., 2004, pp.185-189.
300
Translator’s Note: Phạm Văn Còn is also referred to as the Chief of Staff of the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh
Provincial Unit commanding the “Southern Front Headquarters” at Cẩm Mỹ - see Mai Thanh Xuân, “Bắt Đại
Tá …”, op.cit., 2004. He is possibly Phạm Văn Cõn – b. Long Phước 1941, probationary Party member 1963,
platoon 2ic/1st Company/445 Battalion in May 1965 – CDEC Log 12-2394-66.
301
* For the attack on Xuân Lộc, our participating forces were more than a corps in strength and attacked the
enemy from four directions:
- from the east: the 7th Division (of 4 Corps);
- from the north: the 341st Division (of 4 Corps);
- from the west: the 6th Division (of Military Region 7); and
- from the south: the armed forces of Bà Rịa–Long Khánh.
302
Translator’s Note: 445 Battalion’s participation in the Xuân Lộc campaign is also related in Xuân Thanh,
“Tiểu Đoàn 445 Trong Tấn Công Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh” - “445 Battalion in the Attack on Xuân Lộc-Long
Khánh”, in Military Region 7 (Quân Khu 7), Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc ..., op.cit., 2004., pp.161-164.
94

the puppet 18th Division, on the afternoon of 18 April the headquarters of the 18th Division
had decided to flee Xuân Lộc and consolidate their forces on a defensive line at Trảng
Bom.
On the afternoon of 19 April, there was heavy rain, and on the unpaved roads south
of Xuân Lộc the muddy water surged like streams and rivers. In the howling storm, the
sounds of the enemy’s artillery boomed repeatedly to the west of Xuân Lộc. The
headquarters of our local forces group (to the south of Xuân Lộc) assessed that the enemy
were firing diversionary barrages and were preparing to abandon Xuân Lộc. At the
headquarters, Comrade Phạm Văn Còn – the deputy chief-of-staff of the Provincial Unit,
consulted very briefly with the key cadre of 445 Battalion, and a plan to interdict the
fleeing enemy was formed. So, immediately on the night of 19 April, the 2nd Company was
ordered to deploy from Bảo Bình to the S-bend on Route 2. The 3rd Company and the 1st
Company moved from Bảo Hòa (Route 1) to Con Rắn Mountain (Cẩm Mỹ – Route 2).
With legs that had been toughened over 10,000 miles303 – and after more than 10
years of hardships, maturing and winning victories, the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion
now focused on running across tens of kilometres in order to interdict the enemy in time.
The heavy afternoon rains further increased the difficulties. Kilograms of the thick red soil
stuck to the soles of our soldiers’ sandals and shoes. The straps on their sandals snapped.
There were sounds of stumbling, falling and exhausted breathing. Then – sandals and shoes
were cast off into the jungle. Bare-footed, they raced on over all obstacles. The red soil of
the tracks was imprinted with their blood-stained footsteps. Everyone’s hearts and minds
were firmly focused on completing every stage of the journey. Fire-flies twinkled brightly,
and the final victory was also a dazzling light before them – calling and urging them on …
Their bare feet would have to win - they had to arrive before the enemy’s armoured
columns.
On the morning of 20 April, the 2nd Company arrived at the S-shaped bend and the
C-shaped bend on Route 2 (in the area of the Hoàng Quân plantation) and, on that very
afternoon, we destroyed two Regional Force posts and deployed to stop the enemy. Would
the enemy flee through here – and had they already gone past ? No matter what – this had
been our plan.
The 1st, 3rd and 4th Companies had also reached Cẩm Mỹ. The 1st Company
deployed immediately for the attack and eliminated an enemy platoon on Con Rắn
Mountain. The 3rd Company killed 83 enemy and seized two 105mm howitzers at Cẩm Mỹ
junction. We then established our headquarters on Con Rắn Mountain. A helicopter from
Biên Hòa planned to land on Con Rắn Mountain - but as it descended, the enemy saw that
the liberation flag was flying and hurriedly climbed and flew away.
On the afternoon of 20 April, 445 Battalion and a number of the local district
companies completed their deployments to block the enemy on Route 2 from the area of
the Hoàng Quân plantation to the Quang Minh plantation – a distance of about 10
kilometres.
The accurate assessments by the leadership of the group of local forces south of
Xuân Lộc - and the first-rate efforts of the cadre and soldiers who ran for tens of kilometres
to block the enemy, produced a very satisfactory outcome. At 2am on 21 April, a mixed
convoy of mechanized vehicles led by tanks and armoured vehicles fled noisily south down
Route 2. This convoy of the Xuân Lộc puppet military and puppet civil authorities was
divided into two groups of about 70 vehicles. They were blocked and attacked by 445
Battalion and the local companies. A vehicle carrying enemy troops was set on fire, and the
soldiers leapt down in panic seeking shelter on both sides of the road. In the area from the

303
Translator’s Note: Literally “dặm” - a “Vietnamese mile” of 444.4 metres.
 95

S-bend to Cẩm Mỹ, we captured more than 100 prisoners. Still, the enemy fled onwards –
fleeing and firing aimlessly before them, and leaving the hulks of their vehicles and the
bodies of their fallen soldiers along the road. An hour later, another convoy of over 60
vehicles also fled down Route 2. These were also stopped and destroyed.
We faced a large enemy force – more than a division with hundreds of vehicles,
fleeing with tactics of “opening a road of blood”. Our forces were not able to stop them all
– only to attack and destroy elements of their convoys over several kilometres. We hadn’t
assessed that the enemy vehicles would carry the enemy’s nerve centre or that they would
have included their important units in the fleeing convoys.304
Châu Đức District’s 41st Company was the unit that stopped the head of the
enemy’s formation (south of the Quang Minh plantation) and set fire to two enemy tanks
and captured a number of prisoners – including a vehicle carry Colonel Phúc, the Province
Chief of Long Khánh.
At that point, our attacks against the “steel gate of Xuân Lộc” - that had gone on for
12 days and nights, now ended. The fate of the Colonel – the Province Chief of Long
Khánh, was also decided immediately in the field by those whom he had oppressed. That
day, a 445 Battalion cadre boldly wrote a few stanzas of poetry in his notebook (diary) to
express his happiness and pride in the victory in which he had played a part:

We stand dauntless and dignified beneath the Xuân Lộc sky.

The ‘steel gate’ was burst wide-open with lightning speed by our feet.
Uncle has returned ! Solemnly from the centre of the city, he looks upon his free
children !

After the victory at Xuân Lộc, the campaign to liberate Sài Gòn – Gia Định took
shape and was given Uncle Hồ’s revered name: THE HỒ CHÍ MINH CAMPAIGN !
In the province of Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa – Long Khánh, two attacking columns –
comprising two corps, were formed to strike into Sài Gòn.
After tens of years of hardship, sacrifice and holding-on in a strategic area close to
Sài Gòn, the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion – together with the local armed forces and
the people, had frequently thought about and waited for this day. This was the day when the
lightning-fast steps of the main-force units symbolized the will of the whole people and the
whole Party as they passed through their homeland to sweep away the enemy in their final
lair.
While the 3rd Division (of the 2nd Corps) attacked the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector and Bà
Rịa Town, 445 Battalion attacked the Sub-Sectors of Long Điền and Đất Đỏ.
Long Điền and Đất Đỏ – very well-loved names and the homeland of almost all of
the cadre and soldiers of 455 Battalion, had been downtrodden by aggressors for years. It
was also the place where the order to “wipe out” 445 Battalion was first issued. A Battalion
that now stood before all and was now facing the final battle.

304
Translator’s Note: For an ARVN account of the withdrawal on Route 2, see Hua Yen Len, Colonel, The
Line of Steel at Xuân Lộc (Long Khánh), Seattle, 5 February 1988 - ie: On 20 April 1975, the headquarters
and elements of the 18th ARVN Division successfully withdrew south down Route 2 to an assembly area at
Đức Thạnh and enroute - “easily brushed aside the enemy road-blocks and ambushes … and arrived the next
morning.” They were soon joined by the 1st Airborne Brigade and the 2nd Battalion of the 43rd Regiment that
had suffered “only light losses”. After two days of “regrouping and re-organizing our units at the Đức Thạnh
assembly area, the entire 18th Infantry Division was transported by trucks to its rear base at Long Bình to
receive new equipment and replacements.” During the 12-day battle at Xuân Lộc, “ARVN losses were 30%
for all units participating in the battle, except for the 52nd Task Force which suffered 60% losses; North
Vietnamese casualties : 5000-6000 killed or wounded and 37 armoured vehicles destroyed.” – VCAT Item
No. 3670101001.
96

The 1st Company attacked the Long Điền junction. The 3rd Company attacked the
Long Điền District Headquarters. The 2nd Company attacked the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector –
together with two companies of the Long Đất local forces. The 4th Company (the fire
support company) was dispersed to strengthen our two forces attacking the two District
capitals.
In the half-light of 27 April, the companies opened fire and attacked the enemy.
After 20 minutes of shelling by our 4th Company on two locations at the junction and the
Long Điền District capital, the infantry of the 1st and 2nd Companies simultaneously
assaulted the enemy’s last-ditch defences and trenches. With our overpowering strength,
after only half an hour we had seized all of the Long Điền District capital buildings,
captured hundreds of prisoners, seized their weapons – and then released them all. At
midnight, the 2nd Company and our local forces also occupied the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector.
On 28 April, the 1st and 2nd Companies seized the Long Điền junction and
eliminated the enemy units from Vạn Kiếp and Bà Rịa Town that had fled there intending
to regroup. Our companies held the junction to secure that position and enable the 3rd
Division to advance and attack the enemy at Long Hải and in Vũng Tàu.
On 29 April, 445 Battalion joined with the 3rd Division to liberate Vũng Tàu. The
Battalion attacked the puppet’s 4th Marine Battalion - and at 10am on 30 April, the
liberation flag flew over the enemy’s Hoàng Hoa Thám base at Vũng Tàu – symbolizing
the strength and will of 445 Battalion after tens of years of development, reaching maturity
and combat victories. Following this, the Battalion continued to coordinate with the 3rd
Division to cross the sea and liberate Côn Sơn island305 – the last part of the South to rejoin
the Fatherland.

CHAPTER VII

A CONFIDENT AND DESERVED VICTORY

The red soil region extends across Bà Rịa – Long Khánh, the homeland of tens of
thousands of people who had indomitably endured calamities and dauntlessly opposed
invading foreign aggressors. This was the homeland of such heroes as: Võ Thị Sáu, Hồ Thị
Hượng, Nguyễn Thanh Đằng, Lê Thành Duy … and produced the heroic 445 Battalion !
Throughout its history of nearly 20 years – developing and maturing from a time
when it was “concealed within the forces of the sects”, the Battalion had come of age
during the Concerted Uprising Movement and had destroyed the strategic hamlets to
become a force that “fought and was victorious over every enemy”. In the strategic coastal
area to the northeast of Sài Gòn, in all its combat exploits – whether large or small, and
even when suffering casualties that seemingly would not be overcome, the Battalion
unceasingly strove to create a reliable and firm base for the local armed forces and the
people to advance along the tough and decisive road to “reach the day of total victory”. The
blood and intellectual effort of many had been laid down to create the glorious tradition of
445 Battalion.
In its development, coming-of-age, and combat successes, the Battalion had always
held to the maxims of: belief in the Party, for the people, holding-on, and fighting
dauntlessly. Each of the Battalion’s victories was based on the clear-sighted and flexible
application of the people’s war strategy of the Party. The leadership of the Military Region,

305
Translator’s Note: Côn Sơn (Côn Đảo) is an island in the South China Sea about 180 kilometres south-east
of Vũng Tàu that had been used as a prison island since early French colonial times.
 97

the Provincial Committee and the District Committees of Long Đất, Châu Thành … of the
Battalion’s Party Committee, the Party Chapters and Party members were always to the
fore when facing the violent and difficult challenges – and were like a red thread that ran
through all of our distinguished military exploits. The people of the Long Đất region, Route
2, Long Thành … were like a gourd of sweet mother’s milk that nurtured the growth of its
“sturdy 445 child”. The more violent the difficulties, the more the spirit of the people
became even more unshakeably faithful. In these extremely difficult and violent periods of
the Revolution, the Battalion paid a price in holding on to our strategically important
region. This deep and intimate attachment was like an electric current that powered the
lights of the Revolution in the countryside.

We dared to strike all our opponents, we knew how to fight – and to fight well.

The American imperialists escalated the war – and the first rung on their ladder was
the land for which the Battalion was responsible. Every colour of enemy soldier and all the
combat arms of the Americans, their puppets and vassals operated in our area. And in this
region, the enemy also evolved many of their designs, plots and tactics as pilot schemes for
the whole battlefield and for America’s war. We confronted the Americans – and fought
the Americans; we confronted the Australians and fought the Australians … despite lacking
guidance and experience, we still fought them. Every experience had to be bought in blood.
We sought out the similarities and differences between the types of enemy soldiers, and
then focused on their weaknesses when fighting them. Consequently, their troops who
sought to destroy us – and who used all types of schemes to “wipe out 445”, became afraid
of us. Many tactics were employed by these expeditionary forces and trialled in the war –
but all were defeated by the Battalion. The Battalion’s combat victories multiplied day-by-
day and had their source in our psychology of daring to fight, knowing how to fight, and
fighting well.
The Battalion’s coming-of-age was linked to our military exploits on the battlefields
and the development of the people’s war. As the enemy became progressively more
Machiavellian and the war became more violent, the Battalion quickly came up with more
effective ways of fighting. The fires of tens of years of warfare on end had toughened the
ranks of our cadre and soldiers who had become inured to hardship and were staunch,
intelligent and creative. Many generations of Battalion and company cadre had passed on –
leaving behind many effective fighting techniques. We used small forces, surprise “attacks”
on the enemy in their dens, and “ambushes” and “mobile ambushes” to destroy large
enemy forces – all these were the basic tactics that were the forté of the cadre and soldiers
of 445 Battalion. The enemy became aware of this and took precautions – but they were
still destroyed. From year-to-year, from one period to the next, the enemy floundered and
continued to suffer the same casualties. Many times they would reoccupy positions - but
were still unable to hold them. While conversely, 445 Battalion became famous in the
region for its combat methods.
Each of the Battalion’s battles and victories had different properties and outcomes,
but all were proof of our ability to employ our leadership cadre at all levels: always having
a firm grasp on our tactical strong points; being daring; attacking by surprise on several
fronts; manoeuvring flexibly; and concentrating and dispersing in a timely manner.
Our combat abilities and flexibility in manoeuvre were very appropriate in a region
that comprised both coastal areas and jungle, as well as rural areas and towns. Our combat
exploits and the missions that we achieved were the unique marks of a unit that was both a
local force - but yet very much “main-force”.
98

We relied on the people as our rear and clandestine storehouses, we seized enemy
materiel to fight the enemy, and we employed people in the rear areas to support those in
the frontline – this was the Battalion’s tradition of self-reliance and self-sufficiency along
that long road over several tens of years of development and fighting. All this was in
concert with the special characteristics of a local unit whose families and relatives were
part of the region – and whose families and children also had to take up arms against the
enemy. The help, protection and unqualified support of the people was founded on their
revolutionary ideals - and also based on their love and deep admiration for the quality of
our soldiers. Great-grandfather Hồ would approve of 445 Battalion’s soldiers. Our soldiers
had a spirit of sharing hardships – eating whatever was available, and although hungry still
fighting the enemy and bearing all the hardships and violence to complete their missions.
Even if they lacked weapons, our soldiers still fought the enemy and seized enemy
weapons to arm themselves. Almost all of the Battalion’s weapons before 1967 had been
seized from the enemy. We fought skilfully – and also manufactured and cultivated
skilfully. In the Battalion’s rear areas, one quarter of the Battalion’s strength was engaged
in manufacturing materiel and growing produce to improve the soldiers’ living standards.
At the same time, the rear areas were a place of convalescence and rest for our
incapacitated troops and, when necessary, were the most rapid source of reinforcements …
The Battalion’s traditions were built on willpower, blood and toil, and intellect.
Hundreds of people fell306 for the “Four Four Five”- but they will live forever in their now
free and independent homeland ! Today, tens of the children of 445 Battalion are high
level cadre in the Party and the People’s Armed Forces of Vietnam.
Acknowledging our Battalion’s military exploits, 445 Battalion was honoured to
have conferred upon it by the Party and the Nation the title of Heroic Unit of the People’s
Armed Forces.307
Following in their elder brothers’ footsteps, since 1976 the young soldiers of 445
Battalion have overcome new and difficult challenges and fulfilled their mission to assist
our fraternal neighbour Cambodia, and to build and defend the fruits of the Revolution in
Đồng Nai Province.308 The achievements and combat exploits of our young cadre and

306
Translator’s Note: On 23 February 2011, at a formal meeting to discuss arrangements for a memorial for
445 Battalion by the Battalion’s veterans’ committee and government officials, it was stated that during the
War the Battalion “had wiped out more than 10,000 enemy soldiers, destroyed 120 military vehicles, shot
down 20 aircraft, and seized more that 1,800 weapons of different types. More than 1,000 cadre and soldiers
of the Battalion had heroically sacrificed themselves.” A stela and memorial for the Battalion is planned to be
completed by December 2011 - Bùi Xuân, “Xây dựng tượng đài và bia tưởng niệm cán bộ, chiến sĩ D445” –
“Erecting a Memorial and Commemorative Stela for the Cadre and Soldiers of D445”, Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu (Cơ
quan đảng bộ đảng cộng sản Vietnam – BR-VT), 24 February 2011. In recent years, a group of Australian
military historians has conducted an analytical study of about 3,900 engagements by 1 ATF during the War
against NVA and VC forces (see footnote 274) – and produced a “Vietnamese Missing In Action Database”.
The Database “identifies the approximate burial site of more than 3,790” NVA and VC soldiers killed in
action by elements of 1 ATF. The Database includes cadre and soldiers of units other than 445 Battalion – eg
other provincial elements, district forces, village guerrillas, personnel from 274, 275 and 33rd Regiments, rear
service personnel, and those killed in engagements outside Phước Tuy Province by 1 ATF. This data was
formally passed to Vietnamese authorities in March 2010 – and the Canberra-based Australian military
historians are continuing to refine their study - see: Hall, R., “Operation Wandering Souls”, Wartime, Issue
55, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, July 2011, pp.25-29.
307
Translator’s Note: The title was awarded on 3 June 1976.
308
Translator’s Note: In January 1976, Phước Tuy (Bà Rịa) Province was incorporated into Đồng Nai
Province – with the Province capital at Biên Hòa. On 12 August 1991, several districts were detached and
the current Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Province was established.
 99

soldiers 10 years after liberation309 have continued to build the traditions of the heroic 445
Battalion in a manner worthy of the confidence and affection of the Party and the people.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

309
Translator’s Note: In September 1979, D445 troops were engaged in operations against armed FULRO
elements in the Chứa Chan Mountain/La Ngà River area of Xuân Lộc – “Nhóm PV, Lật lại những vụ án do
Công an Đồng Nai triệt phá Kỳ 5: Đập tan âm mưu gây bạo loạn của Fulro” - “Over-turning of the charges by
the Đồng Nai Public Security Service wiped out – Instalment 5: The FULRO plot for violent disorder
completely destroyed”, Báo Đồng Nai, Biên Hoa, 13 August 2010. FULRO (The United Front for the
Liberation of Oppressed Races - 1964-1992) sought independence for ethnic minorities in Vietnam and
Cambodia.
100

Translator’s Endnote: Long Tân – Map

Scale: each grid square is 1km x 1km.

The site of the engagement on 18 August 1966 is indicated by the dotted lines –
based on Major H. Smith’s sketches (see Annex E – footnote 13, and the preceding
footnotes 132 and 146 in Part I). There are no maps of the Long Tân area in either the 445
Battalion History – 1991 or the 5th Division History – 2005.
The 1 ATF base at Núi Đất was about five kilometres to the west of the battle site.