006 Lagunzad v. De Gonzales and CA (Soriano) position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without limitations.
August 6, 1979 | Melencio-Herrera |
Petitioner: Manuel Lagunzad
Respondents: Vda de Gonzales and CA
SUMMARY: Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie
entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his own business outfit, the
"MML Productions." It was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished
book. The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises
Padilla who was a mayoralty candidate. Although the emphasis of the movie was
on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his
private and family life. The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing before
the November 1961 elections. Lagunzad received a telephone call from Amante,
half-sister of Padilla, objecting to the filming of the movie and the "exploitation" of
his life. Amante objected to many portions thereof notwithstanding petitioner's
explanation that the movie had been based on the book. Eventually, petitioner
and private respondent executed a “Licensing Agreement.” Petitioner takes the
position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because of private
respondent's demand for payment for the "exploitation" of the life story of Moises
Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press conference declaring the whole picture
as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press,
radio, television and that they were going to Court to stop the picture. Petitioner
then refused to pay additional amounts pursuant to the agreement, private
respondent file a case. Lower Court and CA ruled in favor of private respondent
and ordered petitioner to pay. SC initially denied the petition for lack of merit, but
resolved subsequently to give due course after petitioner moved for
reconsideration on the additional argument that the movie production was in
exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of expression, and that the
Licensing cement is a form of restraint on the freedom of speech and of the
press.
W/N CA erred in upholding the right to privacy of respondent as defined in Art.
26 of the New Civil Code over the right of the petitioner to film the public life of a
public life of a public figure, infringed upon the constitutional right of petitioner to
free speech and free press – No. In the case at bar, the interests observable are
the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of
expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those
interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and
considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by
petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression
touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
DOCTRINE: The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of
the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test."
FACTS:
1. Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie
entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his own business
outfit, the "MML Productions." It was based mainly on the copyrighted
but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long
Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story," the
rights to which petitioner had purchased from Atty. Rodriguez in the
amount of P2,000.00.
2. The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises
Padilla who was a mayoralty candidate. Governor Rafael Lacson, a
member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and
convicted for that murder in People vs. Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises
Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."
3. Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises
Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life
including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda.
de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his
girlfriend.
4. The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing before the November
1961 elections
5. Lagunzad received a telephone call from Amante, half-sister of Padilla,
objecting to the filming of the movie and the "exploitation" of his life.
Amante objected to many portions thereof notwithstanding petitioner's
explanation that the movie had been supervised by Ernesto Rodriguez,
Jr., based on his book "The Long Dark Night in Negros."
6. After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, which was
P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to P20,000.00, petitioner and private
respondent executed a “Licensing Agreement.”
7. Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the
Agreement because of private respondent's demand for payment for the
"exploitation" of the life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would
"call a press conference declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud and
a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio,
television and that they were going to Court to stop the picture.
8. Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to
the Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the
present suit.
1
 9. Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises
Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and
occurred at or about the same time that the deceased became and was a
public figure; that private respondent has no property right over those
incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or
consideration and that he signed the same only because private respondent
threatened him with unfounded and harassing action which would have
delayed production
10. Lower Court ruled in favor of the private respondent. CA affirmed.
11. SC initially denied the petition for lack of merit, but resolved subsequently to
give due course after petitioner moved for reconsideration on the additional
argument that the movie production was in exercise of the constitutional
right of freedom of expression, and that the Licensing cement is a form of
restraint on the freedom of speech and of the press.
3. The principle it requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation
or type of situation.
4. In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy
asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked
by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we
hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering
the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by
petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld
particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached
when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is denied and the
judgment appealed from hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N CA erred in upholding the right to privacy of respondent as defined in
Art. 26 of the New Civil Code over the right of the petitioner to film the public
life of a public life of a public figure, infringed upon the constitutional right of
petitioner to free speech and free press – No.

RATIO:
1. No merit in petitioner's contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes on
the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a
citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in
film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right of
freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the
"hierarchy of civil liberties."
It is not, however, without limitations.
a. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law
may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.
The realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would
be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances
it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition. (Gonzales v. Comelec
(1969))
2. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech
and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test."