(APPLICATION OF ART.

526 NCC)

AGUEDA DE VERA, MARIO DE LA CRUZ, EVANGELINE DELA CRUZ, and EDRONEL DE

LA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and RICARDO RAMOS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 97761, April 14, 1999

FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioners for recovery of property
with damages. Private respondent (then plaintiff) was alleging that he is the legal and absolute
owner of a certain parcels of land with a title evidenced by an OCT; that the defendants are
occupying a portion of the property wherein they have constructed a house of strong and
permanent material.

Private respondents demanded the petitioners (then defendants) to remove their improvements
thereon and vacate the said portion, but the latter refused and failed to do so, without any just or
lawful cause.

Petitioners claimed that they are in possession of the land through their predecessor-in-interest,
as owners, before 1956. Also the petitioners contended that private respondents’ cause of
action is already barred by prescription and/or laches.

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondent and declared the same as the owner of all
lands.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. One of their arguments is that the trial
court erred in holding they are possessors in bad faith in other portions of lands (Portions “B”
and “C”). However, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC regarding the said issue.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in adjudging the herein petitioners as possessors and builders in
bad faith of Portions “B” and “C” of the property?

RULING: NO.

Art. 526 of the New Civil Code, provides:

Art. 526 — He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exist in his title
or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.

Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

In distinguishing good faith and bad faith possession, the Code refers to the manner of
acquisition in general. A possessor in good faith is one who is unaware that there exists a flaw
which invalidates his acquisition of the thing, Good faith consists in the possessor's belief that
the persons from whom he received a thing was the owner of the same and could convey his
title. It consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, and is the opposite of fraud. Since good faith is a state of the mind, and is not a visible,
tangible fact that can be seen or touched, it can only be determined by outward acts and proven
conduct. It implies freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on
inquiry.

Records disclose that prior to the construction in 1983 of petitioners' house on the land under
controversy (Portions "B" and "C'), a demand letter dated April 27, 1981 was sent by private
respondent to the petitioners, informing them that the land they were possessing and occupying
is within his (private respondent's) titled property.

In the same letter, the private respondent gave petitioner Agueda de Vera the option to either
pay him the value of the property or lease the same on a yearly or monthly basis. However, the
contending parties failed to reach a compromise agreement. The lower court found, "that the
defendants (herein petitioners) are occupying . . . an area of 22 square meters (Portions "B" and
"C"), . . . , in which land, defendants constructed a house of strong materials in 1983 after
dismantling heir (sic) previous building erected thereon on or about January or February, 1970.

The facts and circumstances aforestated are "outward acts and proven conduct" indicating bad
faith of petitioners as possessor and builder.
(Application of ART. 562)

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its SCHOOL’S

Division Superintendent, petitioner, vs. CELSO OÑATE, respondent.
G.R. No. 161758, June 8, 2007

FACTS: Spouses Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños owned Lot No. 6849 (disputed lot)
registered under the Torrens System. Claro Oñate had three children, namely: Antonio, Rafael,
and Francisco, all surnamed Oñate. Respondent Celso Oñate is the grandson of Claro Oñate,
being the son of Francisco Oñate.

In 1940, Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga (Now Daraga North Central Elementary
School) was constructed on a portion of the disputed lot wherein the Municipality of Daraga
leveled the area while petitioner DepEd developed and built various school buildings and
facilities on the disputed lot.

Through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to the petitioner, proposing that they purchase the
disputed lot, as well as reasonable rentals from 1960. Also, respondent wrote to the District
Engineer regarding the on-going construction projects in the disputed lot. The District Engineer
answered the respondent, stating that the petitioner is the owner of the disputed lot by virtue of
a Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga.

Consequently respondent instituted a Complaint for Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of

Title with Recovery of Possession of the land.

The RTC ruled in favor of Respondent. As a result, petitioner and the Municipality of Daraga,
elevated the matter to the CA but denied appeal and the MR.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON DepEd- Division of Albay has the rights of possession and usufruct over Lot
6849-A?

RULING: YES.

In the recent case of De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that
they have consistently applied in laches:

The law provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner can
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Nonetheless, while it is true that a Torrens
Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover
the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.

Thus, with our resolution of the principal issue of applicability of the equitable remedy of laches,
the issue of suability of the State has been mooted.

A final word. Considering our foregoing disquisition and upon grounds of equity, a modification
of the final decision prevailing between respondent Oñate and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay
is in order. It would be grossly iniquitous for respondent Oñate to pay PhP 50,000 to the
Municipality of Daraga, Albay considering that he is not entitled to recover the possession and
usufruct of Lot No. 6849-A.
(Application of ART. 622)

BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF
MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 124699, July 31, 2003

FACTS: Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents purchased from Feliciana
Santillan, a parcel of unregistered land. He took possession of the property and declared it for
tax purposes in his name.

Prior to the sale, the entire length of the land from north to south was already traversed in the
middle by railroad tracks owned by petitioner. The tracks were used for hauling sugar cane from
the fields to petitioner’s sugar mill.

When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. died in 1948, herein private respondents inherited the land.
However, Bomedco was able to have the disputed middle lot which was occupied by the
railroad tracks placed in its name in the Cadastral Survey of Medellin, Cebu in 1965. The entire
subject land was divided into three and remained in the name of private respondents. However,
the narrow lot where the railroad tracks lay, was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was
declared for tax purposes in its name.

The heirs filed a complaint for Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of the lot claiming
that Bomedco was granted by the seller of the lot a railroad right of way for a period of 30 years
which had expired sometime in 1959 but that the heirs allowed Bomedco to continue using the
land because one of them was then an employee of the company.

On the other hand, Bomedco claimed that it was the owner and possessor of the registered lot
when it bought the lot from seller in 1929 and that the heirs were already barred by prescription
and laches because of Bomedco’s open and continuous possession of the property for more
than 50 years.

The trial court rejected the evidence presented by Bomedco (as it was only a Xerox copy of an
unsigned deed of Sale) but ruled that Bomedco had already acquired ownership of the property
through acquisitive prescription because it possessed the property in good faith for more than
10 years. This was reversed by the CA which ruled that Bomedco only acquired an easement of
right of way by unopposed and continuous use of the land, but not ownership.

ISSUE: WON Bomedco acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way?

RULING: NO.

In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s trains denotes the
existence of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of
the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by
title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over the use of the railroad right
of way whether by law, donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the right of
way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622,
the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired by title and not by
prescription.
(Application of ART 649/650)

ALICIA B. REYES, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES VALENTIN RAMOS, FRANCISCO S. AND

ANATALIA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015

FACTS: Petitioner, through Dolores B. Cinco, filed a complaint before the RTC for easement of
right of way against respondents.

In her complaint, petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land. Also,
she alleged that respondents’ land surrounded her property, and that it was the only adequate
outlet from her property to the highway. The easement sought was the vacant portion near the
boundary of respondents’ other lot.

On the other hand, respondents contended that the isolation of petitioner’s property was due to
her mother’s own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the
pendency of an agrarian case between her and her tenants. The property chosen by petitioner
as easement was also the most burdensome for respondents. Respondents pointed to an open
space that connected petitioner’s property to another public road.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. Petitioner appealed before the CA, however CA denied
it and affirmed in toto the RTC's Decision. Also, Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the CA.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over respondents’
property?

RULING: NO.

The acts of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest necessarily affect petitioner's rights over the
property. One of the requirements for the grant of an easement of right of way is that the
isolation of the property is not due to the acts of the dominant estate's owners.

Assuming, however, that petitioner or her mother did not cause the isolation of petitioner's
property, petitioner still cannot be granted the easement of right of way over the proposed
portion of respondents' property. This is because she failed to satisfy the requirements for an
easement of right of way under the Civil Code.

Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide the requisites of an easement of right of way:

ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without
adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the
needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of
the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate
surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a
permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such
encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own
acts.
ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right of way is granted to
another person, the rights of the property's owner are limited. An owner may not exercise some
of his or her property rights for the benefit of the person who was granted the easement of right
of way. Hence, the burden of proof to show the existence of the above conditions is imposed on
the person who seeks the easement of right of way.

Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an easement of right
of way, the requirement of "least prejudice to the servient estate" trumps "distance [between] the
dominant estate [and the] public highway." "Distance" is considered only insofar as it is
consistent to the requirement of "least prejudice."
(Application of Prescription)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. ROSARIO L. NICOLAS, Respondent

G.R. No. 181435, October 2, 2017

FACTS: Respondent filed a Petition before the RTC, seeking to register her title over a parcel of
land. She asserted that she was entitled to confirmation and registration of title, as she had
been in "natural, open, public, adverse, continuous, uninterrupted" possession of the land in the
concept of an owner since October 1964.

Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Petition. It contended that (a) neither respondent nor her
predecessors-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land since 12 June 1945; (b) the Tax Declarations attached to the Petition did not constitute
sufficient evidence of the acquisition or possession of the property; (c) respondent failed to
apply for registration of title within 6 months from 16 February 1976 as required by P.D. 892;
and (d) the land in question was part of the public domain and not subject to private
appropriation.

During the trial, the respondent presented a report from CENRO stating that the land "appears
to be not covered by any public land application nor embraced by any administrative title.
However, the entry with respect to whether the land was within the alienable and disposable
zone was left blank. Moreover, respondent presented three witnesses to prove her right to
register the property.

The RTC granted the Petition and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration in favor of
respondent. It declared that she had acquired ownership of the land by way of open,
continuous, public, adverse, actual and bona fide possession in the concept of an owner since
1940 without specifying the provision in PD 1529 from which the Decision is based.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification. According to the appellate court, the
evidence presented proved that respondent had occupied the land since 1940. Even assuming
that her possession of the property started only when she had it privately surveyed in 1964, she
had been its occupant for more than 30 years. As such, she was still entitled to registration of
title under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is entitled to registration of title based on ownership by acquisitive
prescription under Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529?

RULING: NO.

By express provision of the law, only private lands that have been acquired by prescription
under existing laws may be the subject of applications for registration under Section 14(2). The
starting point of the Court's evaluation must, therefore, be whether the property involved falls
within the scope of the paragraph.

Under the Civil Code, all things within human commerce are generally susceptible of
prescription. Properties of the public dominion, or those owned by the State, are expressly
excluded by law from this general rule, unless they are proven to be patrimonial in character.

To establish that the land subject of the application has been converted into patrimonial property
of the State, an applicant must prove the following:

l. The subject property has been classified as agricultural land.

2. The property has been declared alienable and disposable.

3. There is an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial, or is
no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth.

It must be emphasized that without the concurrence of these three conditions, the land remains
part of public dominion and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.

Here, the records show that respondent has failed to allege or prove that the subject land
belongs to the patrimonial property of the State. As earlier discussed, the evidence she has
presented does not even show that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land.
She has also failed to cite any government act or declaration converting the land into
patrimonial property of the State.
(Application of Donation)

HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO, as represented by ESTRELLITA

FLORENCIO-CRUZ and RODRIGO R. FLORENCIO, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF TERESA
SEVILLA DE LEON as represented by VALERIANA MORENTE, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 149570, March 12, 2004

FACTS: Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the
spouses Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to construct a house on the said property and stay
therein without any rentals therefor.

De Leon, with the consent of her husband Luis, leased the aforesaid parcel of land to
Bienvenido Santos for as long as the lessor had an outstanding loan with the Second Quezon
City Development Bank of Quezon City but not to exceed the period of 15 years. De Leon
assigned her leasehold right in favor of the Second Quezon City Development Bank. Thereafter,
Bienvenido Santos constructed a house thereon.

De Leon died intestate. In deference to her wishes, her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to
continue staying in the property. Then Florencio also died intestate, but his heirs remained in
the property.

However, the heirs of De Leon sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding that they
vacate the property within 90 days from receipt thereof but the latter refused and failed to vacate
the property. As a result, the heirs of De Leon filed a complaint for ejectment against the heirs of
Florencio before the MTC.

The heirs of Florencio alleged that the plaintiffs had no cause of action against them, as Teresa
de Leon had executed a Deed of Donation over the said parcel of land in favor of their
predecessor.

The heirs of Florencio further averred that since then, their predecessor and his family
possessed the aforesaid property as owners. After De Leons death, Florencio and his children,
in coordination with the administrator of the aforesaid property, arranged for the registration of
the land subject of the donation in the name of Rosendo Florencio, which was, however,
superseded by the untimely demise of Jose de Leon in 1991. Thus, the property remained in the
name of Teresa Sevilla de Leon, even after Florencios death in March of 1995.

In 1996, the heirs of De Leon (plaintiffs) also filed a complaint for ejectment against the heirs of
Bienvenido Santos before the MTC. The MTC rendered an Amended Decision in favor of the
defendants.

On appeal, the RTC rendered judgment reversing the decision of the MTC and rendered a new
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants filed a Petition for Review with the CA but the
appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the RTC decision.

The CA adopted the findings of the RTC and its disquisitions on why the deed of donation was
not a credible piece of evidence to support the petitioners claim over the property; hence, did
not transfer title over the property in favor of the petitioners.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners who appears to be the donee under the unregistered Deed of
Donation, have a better right to the physical or material possession of the property over the
respondents?

RULING: NO.
The essential elements of donation are as follows: (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of
the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c) the intent to do an act of
liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law
further requires that the donation be made in a public document and that the acceptance thereof
be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is
made in a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic
form, to be noted in both instruments.

As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is made
aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited
by law from accepting the donation.Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered
irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on account of
officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or
ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and
the donee. It must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the
donee’s acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor.

In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public
document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessor’s
Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it
is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The necessity of registration
comes into play only when the rights of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are
bound by the deed of contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest.

On the other hand, the fundamental principle is that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein as the registered owner. The registered owner has the right to possess, enjoy and
dispose of the property without any limitations other than those imposed by law.

In this case, the deed of donation, on its face, appears to bear all the essential requisites of a
valid donation inter vivos. With Teresa de Leon as the donor and Rosendo Florencio as the
donee, the deed of donation appears to have been notarized by Notary Public Tirso Manguiat.
On this premise, Florencio, and after his death, his heirs, acquired ownership over the property
although Certificate of Title No. T-44349 under the name of Teresa de Leon had not yet been
cancelled.

However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there are cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which engender veritable doubts as to whether the petitioners have
a better right of possession over the property other than the respondents, the lawful heirs of the
deceased registered owner of the property, Teresa de Leon, based on the Deed of Donation.
(Application of Formalities of Donation)

PACITA ORTIZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANDRES BASADA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-7307, May 19, 1955

FACTS: Petitioners pray for a review of the decision of the CA dismissing their complaint for
recovery of a parcel of land.

As determined by the CA, the parcel of land in question belonged originally to the spouses
Bonifacio Yupo and Vicenta de Guerra. The owners donated the lot to their grandchildren,
petitioners Ortiz, by public document acknowledged before Notary Public.

The donors were duly notified of donee's acceptance.

It appears further that the donor spouses executed another notarial deed of donation of the
same property, in favor of Andres Basada, nephew of the donor Vicenta de Guerra, subject to
the condition that the donee would serve and take care of the donors until their death. This
donation was also duly accepted by the donee in the same instrument.

In 1947, the first donee (Ortiz) filed reinvindicatory action against the second donee (Basada)
alleging that in 1946, the latter entered and usurped the land donated to and owned by them,
and refused to vacate the same.

Basada claimed ownership of the land on the ground that the donation in favor of the petitioners
had been revoked. The court upheld Basada's claim and dismissed the complaint, on the
ground that the petitioners had abandoned the donors "to public mercy", with most base
ingratitude and highly condemnable heartlessness"

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON the deed of donation made in favor of the petitioners Ortiz is valid?

RULING: YES.

The SC agrees with the petitioners that the conclusion thus drawn is unwarranted. From the
time the public instrument of donation was executed and acknowledged by donors and donees
in 1940, the latter acquired not only the ownership but also the possession of the donated
property, since the execution of a public instrument of the conveyance is one of the recognized
ways in which delivery (tradition) of lands may be made (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1463; new Civil
Code, Art. 1498), unless from the terms of the deed, the contrary is expressed or inferable. In
the present case, the donation is on its face absolute and unconditional, and nothing in its text
authorizes us to conclude that it was limited to the naked ownership of the land donated.
Considering that under the law, a donation of land by Public instrument is required to express
the charges that the donee must assume (old Civil Code, Art. 633; new Civil Code, Art. 749), the
absence in the deed of any express reservation of usufruct in favor of the donors in proof that
no such reservation was ever intended.

The mere fact that the donors remain in the property after donating it is susceptible of varied
explanations and does not necessarily imply that possession or usufruct was excluded from the
donation. And the donees Ortiz having been vested with ownership and attendant possession
since 1940, it is clear that the subsequent donation of the property in favor of respondent
Basada confered on the latter no right whatever over the property as against the former donees.