[G.R. No. 149588, September 29, 2009] FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C.

LLAMAS
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IN MAKATI CITY and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati with the crime of “other
forms of swindling.” After the trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
Assailing the aforesaid issuances of the appellate court, petitioners filed before this Court their
petition for review. The Court, however, denied the same for petitioners’ failure to state the material
dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the judgment of conviction
became final and executory.
With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested
petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas on 27 April 2001 for her to serve her 2-month jail term. However, the
police failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.
On 16 July 2001, petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest,
raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. There
being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule
47 to assail a decision in a criminal case.

ISSUE:
Whether the remedy of annulment of the Trial Court’s judgment under Rule 47 can be availed of
in criminal cases.

RULING:
No. After a thorough evaluation of petitioners’ arguments vis-à-vis the applicable law and
jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition. In People v. Bitanga, the Court explained that the remedy of
annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court,
limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to the following:
“Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals
of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”
The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a
criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it
excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:
“Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The
provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in
the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar
as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.”
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases.
As we explained in Macalalag v. Ombudsman, when there is no law or rule providing for this remedy,
recourse to it cannot be allowed.
In substance, the petition must likewise fail. The trial court which rendered the assailed decision
had jurisdiction over the criminal case.
[G.R. No. 95918 March 5, 1993] LUCIO M. CAYABA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND SPOUSES RODOLFO AND ROSARIO RAPADAS

FACTS:
Private respondents executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their parcel of land located at
Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City together with the improvements thereon to defendant Rural Bank in the
amount of P15,000.00. The property is not yet covered by any sales or free patent. The defendant Rural
Bank of Olongapo, Inc. extrajudicially foreclosed the property and was issued a Certificate of Sale being
the highest bidder in the amount of P17,557.15. Defendant Lucio Cayaba bought the property from
defendant bank under conditional sale. Before the expiration of the redemption period of one year, private
respondents tried to repurchase or redeem the property from the petitioner but the latter refused so they
filed a motion to consignate the amount in Court.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, which declares that the Real
Estate Mortgage executed is hereby declared null and void; declaring the sale made by the bank in favor
of Lucio Cayaba is also declared null and void; all other documents relating to the sale of the property is
declared no force and effect; and that the plaintiffs are allowed to repurchase the property from the
defendants in the amount of P17,557.15 plus legal interest thereon.
From said decision, defendant Rural Bank of Olongapo seasonably appealed to the Court of
Appeals while the appeal of petitioner Cayaba was dismissed for having been filed out of time and so
with his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution. Petitioner appealed said order by way of certiorari to the Court of Appeals but said court
dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the timely appeal of the bank benefit the petitioner and the same decision be validly
enforced by execution against petitioner who did not perfect an appeal therefrom.

RULING:
Yes. The rule on this matter is that a reversal of a judgment on appeal is binding on the parties to
the suit but does not inure to the benefit of parties who did not join in the appeal. The recognized
exception is when their rights and liabilities and those of the parties appealing are so interwoven and
dependent so as to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal to all.
Petilla vs. Court of Appeals was a case where precisely one of the respondents, Maximiniana
Marcella, derived her title from her co-respondent, Evaristo Marcella. The petitioners therein claimed that
since Maximiniana did not appeal, she could not benefit from Evaristo's appeal. The Court found out that
she did appeal; it further stated that even assuming for the sake of argument that said respondent did not
appeal from the judgment of the lower court, this Court has held that a defendant may nevertheless be
benefited by the judgment in favor of her co-defendants who inteposed an appeal.
Whether an appeal by one of several judgment debtors will affect the liability of those who did
not appeal must depend upon the facts in each particular case. If the judgment can only be sustained upon
the liability of the one who appeals and the liability of the other co-judgment debtors depends solely upon
the question whether or not the appellant is liable, and the judgment is revoked as to that appellant, then
the result of his appeal will inure to the benefit of all.
In the same vein, it is petitioner’s position that if the Rural Bank of Olongapo wins the appeal, the
victory of the bank inures to his benefit since he derives his title from said bank, thereby upholding his
ownership of the property in question. If the bank loses the appeal, it may still elevate the matter to this
Court under Rule. And if it wins, petitioner is benefited.
[G.R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015] HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I, (IN SUBSTITUTION OF
HEIRS OF MELECIO BUENO) vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES

FACTS:
The late Melecio R. Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land located in
Iba, and Zambales. He brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality of Iba,
Province of Zambales, claiming that the latter had constructed the public market on a substantial portion
of his land without his consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of Iba to vacate the
property had remained unheeded. After due proceedings, the MTC ruled in favor of Bueno.
Thence, the Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the
notice of appeal. Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC Iba to assail the
denial of due course by the MTC. RTC ultimately granted the petition for certiorari. The petitioners
moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to
the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA “dismissed” the petitioners’
petition for review for not being the proper mode of appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been
issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners substantially complied with the requirements of an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41.

RULING:
No. An appeal brings up for review any error of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction
over the subject of the suit and over the persons of the parties, or any error committed by the court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. It was, therefore, very
crucial for the petitioners and their counsel to have been cognizant of the different modes to appeal the
adverse decision of the RTC in the special civil action for certiorari brought by the Municipality of Iba.
Such modes of appeal were well delineated in the Rules of Court, and have been expressly stated in
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to this rule, in conjunction with Section 3 and Section 4 of Rule 41, the petitioners
should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice of the
judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of the notice of appeal within the
period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of ordinary appeal because the appeal is deemed
perfected as to the appealing party upon his timely filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon the perfection
of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties that the RTC
shall lose jurisdiction over the case. On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate court docket fee
within the reglementary period as required by Section 4, is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the non-
compliance with which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1,14 (c),
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The compliance with these requirements was the only way by which they
could have perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC.
In contrast, an appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely
filing of the petition for review before the CA, while the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon perfection
thereof and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily
dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the
appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which
refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists
after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or
final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by
the superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to due course to the petition
for review or not.
The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs
from that taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to
immediately undertake the transmittal of the records by verifying the correctness and completeness of the
records of the case; the transmittal to the CA must be made within 30 days from the perfection of the
appeal. This requirement of transmittal of the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon order of
the CA when deemed necessary.
As borne out in the foregoing, the petitioners’ resort to the petition for review under Rule 42 was
wrong. Hence, the CA did not err in denying due course to the petition for review.
Yet, the petitioners plead for liberality, insisting that their petition for review, albeit the wrong
mode, was a substantial compliance with the proper mode of appeal.
The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have always looked at
appeal as not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties invoking the privilege, the
petitioners should have faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to
do so forfeited their privilege to appeal. Indeed, any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure
may be properly invoked only in cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but
definitely not in cases like now where a liberal application would directly subvert the essence of the
proceedings or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court.
[G.R. No. 137761, April 6, 2000] GABRIEL LAZARO and the heirs of FLORENCIA PINEDA and
EVA VIERNES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses JOSE and ANITA ALESNA

FACTS:
Spouses Jose and Anita Alesna, private respondents herein, filed a civil action for annulment of
title, reconveyance and damages (with prayer for preliminary injunction) against Petitioners Gabriel
Lazaro and the heirs of Florencia Pineda and Eva Viernes. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioners. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.
In a Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal for failure of herein private respondents to pay the
required docket fees within the prescribed period. Thereafter, it issued its first assailed Resolution
granting their Motion for Reconsideration and reinstating the appeal. Subsequently, the petitioners also
filed their own Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said Resolution. The CA denied their Motion. In
reinstating the appeal despite the failure of herein private respondents to pay the docket fees within the
prescribed period, the Court of Appeals invoked “the interest of substantial justice.” It did not elaborate
however. No specific circumstance or any other explanation was cited in support of its ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion
in granting the appeal for failure of herein private respondents to pay the required docket fees and for
denying the reconsideration without cogent or compelling reason.

RULING:
Yes. The Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides that appellate court docket and other
lawful fees should be paid within the period for taking an appeal. Contrary to the submission of private
respondents that the aforecited rule is merely directory, the payment of the docket and other legal fees
within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court provides: “Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule
41” is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. Indeed, it has been held that failure of the appellant to
conform with the rules on appeal renders the judgment final and executory. Verily, the right to appeal is a
statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply with the statute or the rule.
In the present case, the private respondents failed to pay the required docket fees within the
reglementary period. In fact, the Court notes that they paid the fees only after the CA had dismissed the
appeal, or six months after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Clearly, existing jurisprudence and the
Rules mandate that the appeal should be dismissed.
The appellate court nonetheless reinstated the appeal “in the interest of substantial justice.” But as
earlier observed, it did not cite any specific circumstance or any other explanation in support of its ruling.
For their part, private respondents failed to offer a satisfactory explanation why they paid the docket fees
six months after the prescribed period. Indeed, neither they nor the Court of Appeals showed fraud,
accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or any other reason to justify the suspension of the aforecited
rule.
The bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. “Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.” Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the Court
held that the said rules may be relaxed only in “exceptionally meritorious cases.” In this case, the CA and
the private respondents failed to show that this case is one such exception.
[G.R. No. 202430, March 06, 2019] METRO BOTTLED WATER CORPORATION v. ANDRADA
CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC.

FACTS:
Metro Bottled Water (MBW) and Andrada Construction entered into a Construction Agreement
for the construction of a reinforced concrete manufacturing plant in Cavite. The Agreement has a
provision for Change Orders which required the mutual agreement of both parties in writing for any
addition or reduction in the contract price, extension or shortening of the contract period. The initial
contract period was for 150 days. However, MBW extended the period of completion upon Andrada’s
request due to the movement of one bay of the plant building, weather conditions, and change orders.
(But according to MBW, this was not an extension but rather just a change of schedule.)
The project consultant recommended to MBW the forfeiture of Andrada’s performance bond to
answer for the completion and correction of the project, as well as liquidated damages for delay. MBW
filed a claim against Andrada’s performance bond. Andrada opposed the claim for lack of legal and
factual basis. Andrada contested the consultants Special Report. Andrada then sent letters to MBW
requesting for payment of unpaid work and accomplishments. MBW refused to pay.
Andrada filed a Request for Arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC) alleging that MBW refused to pay its unpaid work accomplishment and interest. In its Answer,
MBW denied the allegations and counterclaimed for cost to complete and correct the project. In its
Decision, the CIAC found that Andrada Construction was entitled to unpaid work accomplishment, with
legal interest. It, however, denied MBW’s counterclaims.
MBW filed a petition for review before the CA assailing the arbitral award but was dismissed for
lack of merit. CA upheld the CIAC’s factual findings and held that denial of payment to MBW would
constitute unjust enrichment. MBW filed an MR but was likewise denied. MBW then elevated the case to
SC via petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether an appeal from an arbitral award of the CIAC raising questions of law and facts is
proper.

RULING:
No. Due to the highly technical nature of proceedings before the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, as well as its emphasis on the parties' willingness to submit to the proceedings,
the Construction Industry Arbitration Law provides for a narrow ground by which the arbitral award can
be questioned in a higher tribunal. Section 19 states that the arbitral award shall be binding upon the
parties. It shall be final and unappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the
Supreme Court. To standardize appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that appeals “may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the
manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law.”
The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission is among the quasi-judicial agencies
explicitly listed in the rule. In CE Construction v. Araneta Center, however, the Court emphasized that
Rule 43 must be read together with the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, which provides that
appeals of arbitral awards must only raise questions of law. Thus, even if Rule 43 now provides that
appeals may be brought before the Court of Appeals, these appeals must still be confined to questions of
law.
CE Construction further provides that even exceptions that may be allowed in the review of Rule
45 petitions, such as the lower court's misapprehension of facts or a conflict in the factual findings, will
not apply to reviews of the arbitral tribunal’s decisions. Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. sufficiently
explains the rationale of why courts are dutybound to uphold the factual findings of the tribunal. It says
that the Court will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon the artful allegation that
such body had “misapprehended the facts” and will not pass upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of
fact, no matter how cleverly disguised they might be as “questions.” The parties here had recourse to
arbitration and chose the arbitrators themselves; they must have had confidence in such arbitrators. The
Court will not, therefore, permit the parties to relitigate before it the issues of facts previously presented
and argued before the Arbitral Tribunal, save only where a very clear showing is made that, in reaching
its factual conclusions, the Arbitral Tribunal committed an error so egregious and hurtful to one party as
to constitute a grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction.
Spouses David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission laid down the instances
when factual findings of the CIAC may be reviewed on appeal: (1) the award was procured by corruption,
fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of
them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of
the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully
refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not
made. Notably, these exceptions refer to the conduct of the arbitral tribunal and the qualifications of the
arbitrator. They do not refer to the arbitral tribunal’s errors of fact and law, misappreciation of evidence,
or conflicting findings of fact. Thus, parties seeking to appeal an arbitral award of a construction tribunal
must raise an egregious error of law to warrant the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. Absent
any allegation and proof of these exceptions, the factual findings of the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission will be treated by the courts with great respect and even finality. In this case, MBW raised
issues that are questions of fact in the guise of questions of law. As such, they are not proper for the
Court's review.
Lastly, MBW submits that the CIAC and CA erred in applying the equitable principle of unjust
enrichment, since applying Article 1724 of the Civil Code (changes in the contract must be in writing)
was more appropriate under the circumstances. The CIAC, however, cannot be faulted for applying the
equitable principle of unjust enrichment in determining petitioner's liability to respondent. CE
Construction discusses two (2) main principles that guide the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission in accomplishing its tasks. First is the basic principle of fairness. The second is that of
“effective dispute resolution or the overarching principle of arbitration as a mechanism relieved of the
encumbrances of litigation.” Here, services were rendered for which compensation was demanded. The
contract between the parties, however, inadequately provides for the mechanism by which compensation
may be due. The fair and expeditious resolution of the issue requires the arbitral tribunal to instead apply
equitable principles to arrive at a just conclusion.
[G.R. No. 156160.  December 9, 2004] JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO,
in his capacity as Ombudsman, PAUL ELMER CLEMENTE, JENNIFER A. AGUSTIN-SE,
PELAGIO S. APOSTOL and ROBERTO E. KALLOS, in their capacities as EPIB officers,
LILIAN B. HEFTI, PACITA M. EQUILLOS, ARCHANGEL A. ALBIENTO, ANICETO T.
DAGDAG, JR., RIZA P. DEL ROSARIO, VICTOR Q. LIM and CATHERINE WEIR

FACTS:
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) placed petitioner’s foreign currency deposit account at
Citibank Greenhills Branch under constructive distraint. Contending that the BIR action was unlawful,
petitioner filed a complaint against respondent BIR officials and respondent Citibank officers before the
Office of the Ombudsman for allegedly violating (a) Section 8 of the Foreign Currency Deposits Act
(Republic Act No. 6426); (b) Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Rep. Act No. 3019);
The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman
issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal of the aforesaid complaint for want of probable cause to
indict respondent bank and BIR officials. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
Resolution, upon the ground that errors of fact and law were committed prejudicial to the interest of
petitioner.
Respondents EPIB officers issued an order, approved by respondent Desierto, denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, a copy of which was received by petitioner. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals promulgated the
assailed resolution dismissing the petition on the ground that it did not fall under its jurisdiction pursuant
to Rep. Act No. 6770.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain original petitions for certiorari from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.

RULING:
None. Under the Fabian v. Desierto case, there is the remedy of appeal from the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Stated in another
way, the Court of Appeals is now vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction involving a review of
decisions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only.
In Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario, Rep. Act No. 6770 does not provide for the remedy of appeal from
decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases. The aggrieved party may instead
avail himself of the original petition for certiorari when the circumstances would warrant the use thereof.
As ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of
appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases,
like finding probable cause to indict accused persons.
 However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to
the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In dismissing petitioners’ petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited the case of
Fabian vs. Desierto. The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, the Court ruled that appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when it
declared Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 6770 as unconstitutional, it categorically stated that said
provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.
In fine, the Court hold that the present petition should have been filed with the Supreme Court.
[G.R. No. 228267, October 08, 2018] MARIA NYMPHA MANDAGAN vs. RUFINO DELA CRUZ
OF THE SKILLS AND LIVELIHOOD TRAINING CENTER AND DING VILLAREAL OF THE
GENERAL SERVICES DIVISION, BOTH OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF SAN
JUAN CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

FACTS:
Mandagan alleged that her Honda CRV figured into a collision with a Toyota Revo owned by the
Local Government Unit of San Juan City, Metro Manila (LGU-San Juan) and driven by respondent
Rufino Dela Cruz. According to Mandagan, it was discovered during police investigation that the Toyota
Revo's last registration was in 2002 and that Dela Cruz had no valid driver's license.
Despite the foregoing, Mandagan was unable to reimburse the costs of repairs of her vehicle,
prompting her to send demand letters and make several calls to both Dela Cruz and Villareal
(respondents). However, respondents not only failed to heed Mandagan's demands and to answer her
calls, they also avoided her whenever she visited their office. Hence, Mandagan filed an administrative
complaint for Grave Misconduct, Gross Negligence, and Serious Dishonesty against respondents before
the Ombudsman. Notably, both respondents asserted that they had no obligation to cause the registration
of the Toyota Revo as the same should be handled by another division of the LGU-San Juan.
The Ombudsman dismissed Mandagan's complaint against respondents for lack of factual and
legal bases. Mandagan moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Aggrieved, she filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition
on technical grounds. It held that Mandagan's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to assail the
Ombudsman's ruling is to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not a Rule 65
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

RULING:
Yes. Case law recognizes two (2) instances where a decision, resolution or order of the
Ombudsman arising from an administrative case becomes final and unappealable: (a) where the
respondent is absolved of the charge; and (b) in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1)-month
salary. Nonetheless, in Reyes, Jr. v. Belisario, the Court clarified that in situations where the
Ombudsman's ruling is deemed as “final and unappealable,” an aggrieved party is not left without any
recourse, as he may avail of the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the complainant in an
administrative complaint the right to appeal where the Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the
administrative charge, as in this case. The complainant, therefore, is not entitled to any corrective
recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or by appeal to the
courts, to effect a reversal of the exoneration. Only the respondent is granted the right to appeal but only
in case he is found liable and the penalty imposed is higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month
suspension or a fine equivalent to one month salary.
The absence of any statutory right to appeal the exoneration of the respondent in an
administrative case does not mean, however, that the complainant is left with absolutely no remedy. Over
and above our statutes is the Constitution whose Section 1, Article VIII empowers the courts of justice to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This is an overriding
authority that cuts across all branches and instrumentalities of government and is implemented through
the petition for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides. A petition for certiorari is
appropriate when a tribunal, clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial authority, acted without jurisdiction
(i.e., without the appropriate legal power to resolve a case), or in excess of jurisdiction (i.e., although
clothed with the appropriate power to resolve a case, it oversteps its authority as determined by law, or
that it committed grave abuse of its discretion by acting either outside the contemplation of the law or in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner equivalent to lack of jurisdiction). The Rules of Court
and its provisions and jurisprudence on writs of certiorari fully apply to the Office of the Ombudsman as
these Rules are suppletory to the Ombudsman's Rules. The Rules of Court are also the applicable rules in
procedural matters on recourses to the courts and hence, are the rules the parties have to contend with in
going to the CA.
In this case, considering that the Ombudsman ruling exonerated respondents from administrative
liability – a ruling which is deemed “final and unappealable” – Mandagan correctly filed a Rule 65
petition for certiorari to assail the Ombudsman ruling on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, instead
of a Rule 43 petition for review as erroneously posited by the CA. On this note, since the Court
recognizes that the dismissal of Mandagan’s petition for certiorari was due to a mere technicality, it is
only appropriate that this case be remanded to the CA for its resolution on the merits.
[G.R. No. 184466, December 05, 2016] LUZ ANATOLIA E. CRISPINO, CARIDAD O. ECHAVES
REESE and ZENAIDA ECHAVES represented by their attorney-in- fact, REUBEN CAPILI
ECHAVES vs. ANATOLIA TANSAY as substituted by LILIAN YAP

FACTS:
By virtue of two deeds of sale, Anatolia allegedly sold Lot No. 1048-A-1 in favor of petitioners.
Based on the evidence on record, the trial court found that petitioners did not pay any monetary
consideration or other valuable consideration for the transfer of the properties in their names. Hence, the
deeds of sale could not have been valid. In addition, the trial court found that Anatolia never intended to
sell the lots despite executing the deeds of sale. Rather, she merely constituted petitioners as trustees of
the properties. Petitioners appealed the Decision before the Court of Appeals.
In 2001, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Remand Records of the Case for the Re-Opening
of Trial. They anchored their motion on an Affidavit (Confirmation of Previous Sales) allegedly executed
by Anatolia after the RTC had rendered its Decision. In 2007, the CA rendered a Decision, which
affirmed the RTC’s Decision in toto. The appellate court considered the same as a motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court and ruled that the Confirmation
of Previous Sales was “not the kind of newly discovered evidence contemplated by the Rules that would
warrant a new trial.”

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals may receive additional evidence from the petitioners.

RULING:
No. The 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provide: “SECTION 3. Power of the Court
to Receive Evidence. – The Court may receive evidence in the following cases: (a) In actions falling
within its original jurisdiction, such as: (1) certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rules 46 and 65 of
the Rules of Court; (2) annulment of judgment or final order; (3) quo warranto; (4) habeas corpus; (5)
amparo; (6) habeas data; (7) anti-money laundering and (8) application for judicial authorization under
the Human Security Act of 2007.”
As may be gleaned from above, in actions falling within the original jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, such as a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals' power to receive evidence is
unqualified. This does not hold true with respect to appeals in civil cases, criminal cases, as well as
appeals involving claims for damages.
In this case, petitioners filed an ordinary appeal (pursuant to Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44) from
the Regional Trial Court's Decision dated February 16, 1996. At the time the Court of Appeals ruled on
petitioners' motion to remand, the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals was in effect, providing
that the Court may receive evidence in appeals in civil cases where the court grants a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.
Although the Court of Appeals has the power to receive evidence pursuant to its expanded
powers under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this power is not without limit. The Court of
Appeals cannot simply accept additional evidence from the parties. If the interpretation were otherwise,
then there would be no end to litigation. Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the Court of Appeals may only
receive evidence when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
The document petitioners seek to present before the appellate court does not fall under the
concept of newly discovered evidence. Newly discovered evidence has a specific meaning under the law.
Under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, the following criteria must be satisfied for evidence to be considered
newly discovered: (a) the evidence could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by
exercise of due diligence; and (b) it is of such character as would probably change the result.
The document denominated as Confirmation of Previous Sales was allegedly executed on January
15, 1998, three years after the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision. Hence, it could not have been
discovered by petitioners prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence.
[G.R. No. L-28616 January 22, 1980] TOMAS RODIL and the deceased spouse CATALINA
CRUZ, substituted by her heirs vs. HON. JUDGE MARIANO V. BENEDICTO as Judge of the
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH V-GAPAN and the heirs of
ALEJANDRO ABES

FACTS:
In a cadastral case, several lots of the Penaranda (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre were claimed and
applied for by the spouses Tomas Rodil and Catalina Cruz. However, the heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a
petition with the court for the review of the registration decree upon the ground “that the petitioners are
the true owners and are the ones in actual legal possession of the aforesaid land and that the award of said
lots to claimant-spouses was secured thru fraud.”
The cadastral court denied the petition for review upon the ground that the petitioners failed to
overcome the evidence of the claimants-adjudicatees. There was no appeal but the heirs of Alejandro
Abes filed an action against the registered owners for the reconveyance of title. Essentially, this is the
same ground of fraud they urged in their petition for review of the cadastral decree. The defendants
therein filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground of res judicata; hence, the court dismissed the
complaint.
The plaintiffs file a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court. Hence, this appeal.
Upon the return of the records to the lower court, Tomas Rodil and Catalina Cruz filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession asking that they be placed in possession of the lots and that the heirs of
Alejandro Abes be evicted therefrom. The respondent Judge issued an order granting the petition.
Pursuant to said order, a writ of possession was issued.
Abes filed a motion for the reconsideration upon since the petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession was filed out of time. The respondent Judge set aside its order and ordered the dissolution of
the writ of possession issued pursuant thereto. The spouses Tomas Rodil and Catalina Cruz filed a motion
for the reconsideration of said order, but the respondent Judge denied the motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in denying the issuance of a writ of possession on the
ground that the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed out of time.

RULING:
Yes. The respondents claim that the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was filed out
of time, the said petition having been filed more than five years after the issuance of the final decree of
registration. The better rule, however, is that enunciated in the case of Manlapas and Tolentino vs.
Lorente, which has not yet been abandoned, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to
ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes. The Court therein said:
The second point alleged by the petitioners has reference to the prescription of the rights
of the respondent corporation to ask for a writ of possession.
 The law has not made applicable to the writ of possession provided for in section 17 of
Act No. 496 and its amendments, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding
execution of judgments.
It cannot be held to have been the intention of the law to permit after five years the
reinstitution of a registration proceeding, whether ordinary or cadastral, as the case may be, to
revive a decree, which on the other hand, according to Act No. 496, is to exist forever, as
provided in various sections of said Act, among which may be cited section 45 which says:
The obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of title shall
be regarded as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and
all successors in title that the land shall be and always remain registered land, and subject
to the provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory thereof.
Nor could the law make said provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to a
decree of registration, since the property rights and possession of a registered owner would be
nugatory when they are imprescriptible under the conclusive provisions of Section 46 of said Act
No. 496 which says:
No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
In a later case, the Court also ruled that the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within five years by motion, and after five years but within ten years by an
action (Section 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as land
registration cases.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except to place the winner in possession by virtue
of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession adverse or losing party, on. becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of
the period for perfecting an appear.