Professional Documents
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Q2: CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF A SHOOTOUT, THE SPOUSES NAZAL AND THEIR SON TAKE SHELTER
IN A DILAPIDATED SHELTER. AFTER SOME TIME OF HIDING BEHIND A WALL, MRS. NAZAL AND THE
SON DECIDE TO MAKE A RUN FOR IT. A BULLET IMMEDIATELY CATCHES MRS. NAZAL IN THE HEAD.
HER SON, HOWEVER, JUMPS TO SAFETY BEHIND ANOTHER WALL JUST IN TIME. HE STAYS HERE FOR
ALMOST TWO HOURS WHEN THE DILAPIDATED SHELTER FROM WHICH HE AND HIS MOTHER HAD
JUST FLED IS SUDDENLY ENGULFED IN FLAMES. HIS FATHER DOES NOT COME OUT. THREE HOURS
LATER, THE SON DECIDES TO TRY TO LOOK FOR THE FATHER IN THE SHELTER, DESPITE THE FIRE.
AS HE RUNS FOR THE SHELTER, HOWEVER, HE IS SHOT. THE FIRE CONTINUES FOR ABOUT TWO
HOURS MORE BEFORE IT IS EXTINGUISHED. MR. NAZAL’S CHARRED BODY IS FOUND AND
IDENTIFIED. A SURVIVOR OF THE SHOOTOUT TESTIFIES AS EYEWITNESS TO ALL THIS. IT IS ALSO
ESTABLISHED THAT AT THE TIME OF THE SHOOTOUT, MR. NAZAL WAS 65 Y/O, MRS. NAZAL WAS 70
Y/O, AND THEIR SON, 25 Y/O. IN WHAT ORDER WILL THE DEATHS BE FOUND TO HAVE OCCURRED?
A2: The order of deaths is: Mrs. Nazal first, Mr. Nazal second and their son last.
There is no question that Mrs. Nazal died first and that both her son and husband were alive when she
did. The question arises as between Mr. Nazal—who is caught in the fire that subsequently breaks out—
and his son, who dies 3 hours after said fire begins but 2 hours before it is extinguished.
Since there is no way of ascertaining when during the 5-hour fire Mr. Nazal died, the statutory
presumption of survivorship applies. Art. 43 will apply in case Mr. Nazal and son “are called to succeed
each other,” and they will be presumed to have died simultaneously, with no transmission of rights from
each other.
If, however, survivorship is contested in a case unrelated to succession, the Rules of Court [Rule 131, Sec.
3 (jj)] applies. According to the Rules, if one of the persons whose order of death is in question is over
60, and the other is between 15 and 60, the latter is deemed to have survived. The son is 25 y/o. and
therefore deemed to have survived his father, who was well over 60 during the fire.
Thus, Mrs. Nazal died first according to the facts of the case; Mr. Nazal died next and the son last
according to Rule 131, Sec. 3 (jj) (5).
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Alternatively ratio: In the case of Joaquin v. Navarro [G.R. No. L-5426, May 29, 1953], the Court explained
that mere inference when drawn from established facts and common sense, is enough to overcome the
statutory presumption of survivorship laid down by Art. 43 of the Civil Code and Rule 131 (jj) of the Rules
of Court. In this case, there is no question that Mrs. Nazal died first and that both her son and husband
were alive when she did. There is also no question that it took a full two hours—during which the house
where Mr. Nazal was admittedly hiding was on fire—before his son came out of hiding and was shot. It
can be reasonably inferred from the length of time that had passed, Mr. Nazal’s age (he was 65), and
common sense, that Mr. Nazal died within those three hours that his son was safely hiding behind a
wall, whether from the fire or from suffocation from the smoke.
Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls. The statutory
presumptions of survivorship thus find no application. By at least a preponderance of evidence, Mrs.
Nazal died first, Mr. Nazal died next and the son last.
Q3: JACK AND JILL, BOTH FILIPINO CITIZENS, MARRY. THEIR MARRIAGE IS IMMEDIATELY AN
UNHAPPY ONE, AND JILL SOON LEAVES FOR THE UNITED STATES, WHERE SHE IS ABLE TO OBTAIN
A DIVORCE DECREE. (A) IS THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY JILL VALID? (B) DOES JILL’S ACT OF
“DESERTION AND SECURING A DIVORCE DECREE” ENTITLE JACK TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES?
DECIDE.
A3: The divorce decree is of no legal effect, and the valid marriage between Jack and Jill subsists. The
prohibition in our jurisdiction against absolute divorce cannot be circumvented by obtaining a divorce
decree in a foreign country, when the one who so obtained it is a Filipino citizen (Jill) to whom Art. 15 of
the Civil Code applies. Said article states that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties or to
the status of persons are binding upon its citizens, even if living abroad. (b) Jack’s is entitled to damages.
Desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover moral
damages. [Tenchavez v. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965]
Q4: MARIA, A FILIPINO, MARRIES ANOTHER FILIPINO. LATER, HOWEVER, MARIA IS NATURALIZED AS
AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AND OBTAINS A DIVORCE DECREE. WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS, IF ANY, OF
SUCH A DIVORCE DECREE (A) ON HERSELF, AND (B) ON HER FILIPINO SPOUSE? EXPLAIN.
A4: (a) The divorce decree is valid and binding upon Maria as a U.S. citizen by virtue of Art. 15 of the Civil
Code, which states that laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status or legal capacity of
persons are binding upon its citizens. Thus the reckoning point is not necessarily the time of her
marriage but the time she obtained the divorce decree [Quita v. Dandan, G.R. No. 124862, December
22, 1998]. By then, as established, Maria was already a U.S. citizen, and so the divorce is valid and
recognized as such by our jurisdiction. (b) The valid divorce decree is likewise binding upon the Filipino
spouse. The Court has time and again ruled that where a foreign court has granted a divorce between
an alien spouse and a Filipino, the decree binds the Filipino spouse as well [Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R.
No. 80116, June 30, 1989]. Whether or not the Filipino spouse may now remarry will depend upon (1) the
validity of the divorce decree obtained by his/her spouse; and (2) whether the decree is one that legally
dissolves the marriage and capacitates the foreign spouse to remarry, according to Art. 26, par. 2 of the
Family Code.
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BASELESS RUMORS ABOUT THEIR FAMILY. SHE TESTIFIED THAT HE WAS UNBEARABLY JEALOUS
AND HOT-TEMPERED. SHE SHOWED LETTERS WRITTEN TO HER BY HER HUSBAND UNDER VARIOUS
PSEUDONYMS, PRETENDING TO BE HER PAST LOVERS OR FICTITIOUS ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
SEEKING RECOGNITION. SHE ALSO TESTIFIED THAT SHE HAD TO SLEEP IN HER PARENTS’ HOUSE
ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION BECAUSE OF HIS VIOLENT TANTRUMS. HER HUSBAND DENIES
THESE ALLEGATIONS AND POINTS OUT THAT ABSENT AN ACTUAL MEDICAL EXAMINATION
CONCLUDING THAT HE ACTUALLY SUFFERS FROM SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ILLNESS, NORMA’S CASE
CANNOT PROSPER. IS HE CORRECT?
A5: No, Norma’s husband is not correct. The past years have seen a decreasingly restrictive construction
of the standards of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code, with the Court relying on
the facts on a case-by-case basis. In Marcos v. Marcos [G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000] and
succeeding cases, the Court in particular ruled that if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, there is even no need to resort to the actual medical
examination of the person concerned, as such is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. The same would, however, strengthen the petitioner’s claim.
That said, the Court is also not quick to conclude the psychological incapacity of a validly married
spouse. Although medical examination is not an absolute requisite, incapacity must nevertheless be
proved from a totality of sufficient evidence rather than from the petitioner spouse’s lone testimony, as
ruled in the case of Republic v. Melgar [G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006].
Q7: LIZA WAS FOUND ABANDONED AS A NEW BORN INFANT IN OLONGAPO CITY BY SPOUSES DELA
CRUZ, A FILIPINO COUPLE. UNABLE TO LOCATE LIZA'S PARENTS, SPS. DELA CRUZ OBTAINED A
FOUNDLING CERTIFICATE IN FAVOR OF LIZA. AFTER 2 YEARS, THEY LEGALLY ADOPTED THE
BROWN-HAIRED AND BLUE-EYED BABY GIRL. WHEN LIZA WAS 15, SHE WAS ISSUED A PHILIPPINE
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PASSPORT. AFTER FINISHING COLLEGE, LIZA MARRIED AN AMERICAN SOLDIER AND IMMIGRATED
TO AMERICA WHERE SHE WAS NATURALIZED AS A US CITIZEN.
A FEW YEARS LATER, LIZA WENT BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES FOR GOOD AND BUILT A HOUSE IN
OLONGAPO. LIZA NOW WANTS TO RUN AS REPRESENTATIVE OF ZAMBALES. SHE REACQUIRED HER
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP PURSUANT TO RA 9225 AND RENOUNCED HER US CITIZENSHIP. SHE THEN
FILED HER CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.
LODIE REMA WHO IS ALSO RUNNING FOR THE SAME OFFICE, FILED A PETITION TO CANCEL LIZA'S
COC WITH THE COMELEC ON THE GROUND THAT LIZA IS NOT A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN
TO BEGIN WITH AND, THUS, DID NOT RE-ACQUIRE THE SAME WHEN SHE WAS REPATRIATED
PURSUANT TO RA 9225. LODIE, IN SUPPORT OF HER CLAIM, POINTS TO LIZA'S FEATURES AND THE
FACT THAT SHE WAS FOUND NEAR AN AMERICAN NAVAL BASE. THUS, FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLE
OF JUS SANGUINIS, LIZA CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO. WILL LODIE
REMA'S PETITION PROSPER?
A7: No. The case of Poe Llamanzares v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016]controls. As in the
1935 Constitution, which was the law applicable to the abovementioned case, the 1987 Philippine
Constitution may not expressly mention foundlings as natural-born Filipino citizens, but it shows no
discriminatory intent to exclude foundlings either. This is in keeping with the Constitutional mandate to
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
Under Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." "Having to perform an act" requires that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In
this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities.
Further, through the doctrine of incorporation, generally accepted principles of international law form
part of the law of the land. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child (UNCRC) and 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Right recognize the right of
every child to have a nationality at birth and ensure that no child is stateless. The 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws also states that a foundling
is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth". Thus, since Liza's parentage cannot be
ascertained through no fault of her own, she must be enjoy the presumption of being a natural born
Filipino as she was found in the Philippines. This, being a disputable presumption, must be overcome
by those who want to prove otherwise.
It may also be noted that our laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee.
Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino to be adopted, which assumes that Liza was already a citizen
when she was adopted by Sps. Dela Cruz.
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(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless
the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a STD found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
It should further be noted that the fraud of which Art. 45 (3) speaks is limited to the cases enumerated
in Art. 46 of the Family Code.
Q9: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE ON A MARRIAGE AND WHEN
IS A MARRIAGE LICENSE UNNECESSARY FOR THE VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE?
A9: The marriage license being a formal requisite under Art. 3 of the Family Code, its absence will, as a
general rule, render the marriage void ab initio (Art. 4, FC), so that not even the securing of a license
subsequent to the marriage may “cure” such a defect.
Chapter 2 of the Family Code also enumerates the 4 instances in which a marriage license becomes
unnecessary. Under Art. 27, marriages in articulo mortis may be solemnized without necessity of a
marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. Under Art. 28, a
license is not required if the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such to appear before the local civil registrar. Marriages among Muslims or
among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of
marriage license under Art. 33, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or
practices. And under Art. 34, no marriage license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other.
Q10: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE RULES OF LEX REI SITAE AND LEX NATIONALI AS APPLIED IN THE
PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION.
A10: The first paragraph of Art. 16 of the Civil Code embodies the principle of lex rei sitae—real and
personal property are subject to the law of the country (situs) where they are situated. The exception lies
in the second paragraph, which states that properties subject to intestate and testate succession are
governed by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. This follows the
nationality principle, or what is also known as lex nationali. This principle on the other hand can be found
in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, which states that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines though living
abroad.
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Q12: X TELLS HIS AGENT Y THAT HE IS AUTHORIZING HIM TO SELL A PARCEL OF LAND. IF Y EXECUTES
A DEED OF SALE WITH A THIRD PARTY, IS THE SALE VALID?
A12: No, the sale is not valid. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent,
the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void [Art. 1874].
Q14: DEAN NAMED SAM AS HIS AGENT IN ALL OF HIS TRANSACTIONS. AS SUCH, SAM ATTENDED A
MEETING WHEREIN HE RESOLVED, AS DEAN’S AGENT, TO FOREGO CASTIEL’S DEBT TO DEAN OF
P50,000 SINCE HE OVERHEARD DEAN SAY THAT HE WAS PLANNING ON DOING THIS HIMSELF. WAS
SAM’S ACT VALID?
A14: No. Their relationship was essentially an agency couched in general terms. As such, this only
covered acts of administration no matter how broad the power seems. Additionally, Sam’s act of waiving
Castiel’s obligation was one of the specific acts stated in the New Civil Code which needs a special power
of attorney. Therefore, the action was invalid. [Art. 1877, Art. 1878]
Q16: MARY KATE AND ASHLEY OLSEN WERE SISTERS AND CO-OWNERS OF A REGISTERED LOT. ON
APRIL 21, 1954, THE SISTERS EXECUTED A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY (SPA) IN FAVOR OF THEIR
BROTHER TRENT AUTHORIZING HIM TO SELL IN THEIR BEHALF THE LOT. MARY KATE DIED ON
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MARCH 3, 1955. TRENT, DESPITE KNOWING THAT MARY HAD ALREADY DIED, SUBSEQUENTLY SOLD
THE LOT TO DUFF & DUFF CO. ON SEPT. 12, 1995. THE DEED OF SALE WAS REGISTERED WITH THE
REGISTRY OF DEEDS AND A NEW TCT WAS ISSUED TO DUFF & DUFF CO. AFTER THE ORIGINAL ONE
WAS CANCELED. ON MAY 18, 1956, JAKE OLSEN, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE
OF MARY KATE, FILED A COMPLAINT PRAYING THAT THE SALE OF MARY KATE'S UNDIVIDED SHARE
BE DECLARED UNENFORCEABLE AND SAID SHARE BE RECONVEYED TO THE ESTATE. IS THE SALE
BY TRENT OF MARY KATE'S SHARE AFTER THE LATTER’S DEATH ENFORCEABLE?
A16: No. By reason of the very nature of the relationship between principal and agent, agency is
extinguished ipso jure upon the death of either principal or agent. Article 1931 is the applicable law.
Under this provision, an act done by the agent after the death of his principal is valid and effective only
under two conditions, viz: (1) that the agent acted without knowledge of the death of the principal AND
(2) that the third person who contracted with the agent himself acted in good faith. Good faith here
means that the third person was not aware of the death of the principal at the time he contracted with
said agent. These two requisites must concur and the absence of one will render the act of the agent
invalid and unenforceable. [Art. 1919; Rallos vs. Felix Go Chan, G.R. No. L-24332, January 31, 1978]
Q18: X AND Y FORMED A PARTNERSHIP, X BEING THE INDUSTRIAL PARTNER AND Y BEING THE
CAPITALIST PARTNER. IF X ENGAGES IN BUSINESS FOR HIMSELF, AND Y OBJECTS, WHAT ARE THE
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO Y?
A18: The general rule is that an industrial partner cannot engage in business for himself, unless the
partnership expressly permits him to do so. If the industrial partner fails to comply with this obligation,
the capitalist partner may either: (1) exclude him from the firm; or (2) avail himself of the benefits which
the industrial partner may have obtained. In either case, the capitalist partner has a right to damages.
[Article 1789]
Q19: X AND Y FORMED A PARTNERSHIP, X BEING THE INDUSTRIAL PARTNER AND Y BEING THE
CAPITALIST PARTNER. IS Y ALLOWED TO ENGAGE FOR HIS OWN ACCOUNT IN OTHER BUSINESSES?
A19: The capitalist partner cannot engage for their own account in any operation which is the kind of
business in which the partnership is engaged, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. [Article 1808]
Q20: HARVEY SPECTER ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH JESSICA PEARSON AND LOUIS LITT TO FORM A
LAW FIRM. AFTER SEVERAL YEARS, SPECTER WROTE A LETTER TO PEARSON AND LITT STATING
THAT HE IS WITHDRAWING AND RETIRING FROM THE FIRM AND ASKING FOR A MEETING WITH THE
LATTER TO DISCUSS THE MECHANICS OF THE LIQUIDATION. HE SUBSEQUENTLY FILED A PETITION
WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISION'S (SEC) SECURITIES INVESTIGATION AND
CLEARING DEPARTMENT FOR THE FORMAL DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF THE
PARTNERSHIP. THE HEARING OFFICER RENDERED A DECISION RULING THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF
SPECTER HAS NOT DISSOLVED THE PARTNERSHIP. ON APPEAL, THE SEC EN BANC REVERSED THE
DECISION AND SUCH DECISION AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. DID THE CA ERR IN ITS
DECISION?
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A20: No. Any one of the partners may cause the dissolution of the partnership when no express term
was specified for its existence. The birth and life of a partnership at will is predicated on the mutual
desire and consent of the partners. The right to choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself
is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. Its continued existence is, in turn, dependent on
the constancy of that mutual resolve, along with each partner's capability to give it, and the absence of
a cause for dissolution provided by the law itself. Verily, any one of the partners may, at his sole pleasure,
dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. He must, however, act in good faith, not that the
attendance of bad faith can prevent the dissolution of the partnership, but that it can result in a liability
for damages. [Art. 1830(1)(b); Ortega vs. CA, G.R. No. 109248, July 3, 1995]
Q21: RIA ASSIGNED HER WHOLE INTEREST IN THE PARTNERSHIP TO JO. JO NOW WISHES TO TAKE
PART IN THE DECISION-MAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTNERSHIP. MAY SHE
DO SO?
A21: No. The conveyance of a partner of his or her interest does not make the assignee a partner. She
cannot interfere in the management or administration of the partnership nor can she require
information or inspect the partnership books. She may only receive profits originally allocated for the
assignor, avail of the usual remedies in case of fraud and, require an accounting in case of dissolution
from the date of the last account agreed to by all the partners. [Article 1813]
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CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Q22: DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN COMMODATUM AND MUTUUM.
A22: Commodatum involves non-consumable things while mutuum involves money or other
consumable things. In commodatum, ownership of the thing loaned is retained by the lender, while in
mutuum, ownership is transferred to the borrower. Commodatum is essentially gratuitous, while
mutuum can be gratuitous or onerous, i.e. with stipulated interest. In commodatum, borrower must
return the same thing loaned, while in mutuum, borrower need only pay an equal amount of the same
kind and quality. Commodatum is a loan for permissive or temporary use, while mutuum is a loan for
consumption. In commodatum, the bailor may demand the return of the thing loaned before the
expiration of the term in case of urgent need. Bailor suffers the loss of the subject since he is the owner.
In mutuum, the lender may not demand its return before the lapse of the term agreed upon. Borrower
suffers the loss even if caused exclusively by a fortuitous event, and he is not discharged from his duty
to pay. Commodatum is purely personal in character while mutuum is not.
Q24: WHAT ARE THE RULES FOR AWARD OF INTEREST IN THE CONCEPT OF ACTUAL AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES?
A24: (1) When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan
or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Art. 1169 of the Civil Code.
(2) When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially [Art. 1169], but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made
(at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
(3) When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to
a forbearance of credit. [Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, modifying Eastern
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Shipping Lines vs. CA, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, in light of BSP-MB Circular No. 799]
Q27: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF A CONTRACT FOR THE RENT OF A SAFETY DEPOSIT BOX WITH A
BANK?
A27: It is a special kind of deposit. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease because
the full and absolute possession and control of the safety deposit box was not given to the renters. The
guard key of the box remained with the bank; without this key, the renters could not open the box. On
the other hand, the bank could not likewise open the box without the renter's key. [CA Agro-Industrial
Development Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 90027, March 3, 1993]
Q28: DISTINGUISH THE RIGHT OF A DEPOSITARY UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND THAT OF A
WAREHOUSEMAN UNDER THE WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS LAW (ACT NO. 2137) AS REGARDS THE
COMMINGLING OF GOODS.
A28: Under Art. 1976 of the Civil Code, as a general rule, a depositary may commingle grain or other
articles of the same kind and quality, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. As for a
warehouseman, under Sec. 22 of the Warehouse Receipts Law, a warehouseman shall keep the goods
so far separate from goods of other depositors and from other goods of the same depositor for which a
separate receipt has been issued, as to permit at all times the identification and redelivery of the goods
deposited. The exception, found in Sec. 23, is, if authorized by agreement or by custom, the
warehouseman may mingle fungible goods with other goods of the same kind and grade.
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Q40: C BOUGHT CERTAIN SHARES OF STOCK FROM PF CORP. THE SHARES OF STOCK WERE
DELIVERED TO CUSTODIAN BANKS WHO HELD SUCH ON C’S BEHALF. WHEN PF CORP. WAS PLACED
UNDER RECEIVERSHIP BY THE SEC, THE RECEIVER WITHDREW THE SHARES FROM THE CUSTODIAN
BANKS AND WERE SOLD WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE AND WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM THE SEC. THE
PROCEEDS WERE COMMINGLED WITH PF CORP.’S OTHER ASSETS. UPON LEARNING OF THIS, HE
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FILED A CLAIM FOR PAYMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE STOCKS IN THE RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS.
A 15% RATE OF RECOVERY WAS APPROVED FOR PF CORP.’S CREDITORS AND INVESTORS. C CLAIMS
THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO THE ENTIRE MONETARY VALUE OF THE SHARES OF STOCK, ARGUING THAT
HE IS A PREFERRED CREDITOR UNDER ART. 2241 (2) OF THE CIVIL CODE SINCE HIS CLAIM FOR THE
MONETARY VALUE OF THE SHARES AROSE FROM THE UNAUTHORIZED SALE OF SUCH HIS STOCKS.
IS C CORRECT? EXPLAIN.
A40: No. Under Art. 2241 (2), claims arising from misappropriation, breach of trust, or malfeasance by
public officials committed in the performance of their duties, on the movables, money or securities
obtained by them, are preferred with reference to specific movable property of the debtor. While C’s
shares were specific movable property, the money raised from them after their sale is a generic thing.
C’s claim is for the payment of the monetary value of the shares, thus it does not fall under Art. 2241 (2).
At most, C is deemed an ordinary creditor whose credit, along with other ordinary credits, shall be paid
pro rata [Art. 2251(2)]. [Cordova v. Reyes Daway Lim Bernardo Lindo Rosales Law Offices, G.R. No.
146555, July 3, 2007].
Q41: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORTGAGE CREDITS AND UNPAID VENDOR’S LIENS WITH
RESPECT TO PREFERRED CREDITS WITH REFERENCE TO THE DEBTOR’S SPECIFIC IMMOVABLE
PROPERTY AND REAL RIGHTS?
A41: While Art. 2242 specifically requires mortgage credits to be recorded in the Registry of Property in
order to be given preference, no such requirement is made with respect to the vendor's lien for the
unpaid price of real property sold. The law does not make any distinction between a registered and
unregistered vendor's lien. Any lien of that kind enjoys the preferred credit status. [De Barretto v.
Villanueva, G.R. No. L-14938, January 28, 1961]
Q42: EXPLAIN THE ORDER OF PREFERENCE AND CONCURRENCE OF CREDITS PROVIDED IN THE
CIVIL CODE.
A42: The Civil Code establishes a two-tier order of preference among the enumerated special preferred
credits: taxes come first, and all other claims come after. Only taxes, duties, and fees due on the movable
or immovable properties enjoy preference among the special preferred credits in Arts. 2241 and 2242.
All other claims in the said articles are not preferred over any other, as there is only a concurrence of
credits among them.
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Q44: IN 1978, X AND Y, FILIPINO CITIZENS, BOUGHT A PARCEL OF LAND FROM C, WHO HAS
COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION UNDER THE PUBLIC LAND ACT. A YEAR
AFTER THE SALE, A AND B WENT ABROAD AND SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRED CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP.
WHEN THEY RETURNED TO THE PHILIPPINES, THEY FILED AN APPLICATION FOR THE REGISTRATION
OF SAID LOTS. THE GOVERNMENT OPPOSED THEIR APPLICATION ON THE GROUND THAT THEY ARE
ALIENS. THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWED THE REGISTRATION. IS THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT? EXPLAIN.
A44: Yes. The Supreme Court held in the case of Republic v. CA and Lapiña, G.R. No. 108998, August
24, 1994, that even if X and Y were already Canadian citizens at the time they sought registration, what
is important is at the time they bought the land, the land was already private land. Hence, they already
acquired a vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property, before they lost their
Philippine citizenship.
Q45: JUAN IS THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A PARCEL OF LAND. THE NORTHEASTERN BOUNDARY
WAS A RIVER. FOR MANY YEARS, A GRADUAL ACCRETION TOOK PLACE BY ACTION OF THE CURRENT
OF THE SAID RIVER, SO MUCH SO THAT AN ALLUVIAL DEPOSIT OF AROUND 20,000 SQUARE
METERS HAD BEEN ADDED TO THE REGISTERED AREA. IN THE MEANTIME, JOSE ENTERED UPON
THE PORTION OF LAND FORMED BY ACCRETION UNDER CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. JUAN FILED AN
ACTION AGAINST JOSE TO QUIET TITLE TO SAID PORTION, ALLEGING THAT HE AND HIS
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST WERE FORMERLY IN PEACEFUL AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION
THEREOF, UNTIL THE TIME WHEN JOSE ENTERED THE LAND. WILL JUAN’S ACTION PROSPER?
EXPLAIN.
A45: No. The Supreme Court held in the case of Grande v. CA, G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962, that
accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such
accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Therefore, the increment never became registered property, and
hence is not entitled to the protection enjoyed by registered property. Consequently, it was subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.
Q46: MARIO APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION OF A PARCEL OF LAND CONTAINING 1,000 SQUARE
METERS. DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE CASE, HE BOUGHT THE ADJOINING PORTION OF 200
SQUARE METERS. CAN THE ADDITIONAL PORTION BE INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL APPLICATION?
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A46: Yes, by amendment of the original application pursuant to Sec. 19, PD 1529 (Property Registration
Decree). However, amendments which consist in the inclusion of additional land shall be subject to the
same requirements of publication and notice as in an original application.
Q47: THE GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTED TO SELL THE ROPPONGI PROPERTY IN TOKYO, WHICH WAS
ACQUIRED BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT FOR USE AS THE CHANCERY OF THE PHILIPPINE
EMBASSY. THIS WAS AFTER THE CHANCERY TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER LOCATION. CAN THE
GOVERNMENT VALIDLY SELL THE ROPPONGI PROPERTY SINCE IT IS NOT BEING USED ANYMORE?
EXPLAIN.
A47: No. In Laurel v Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, the Court ruled that property of public domain
retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Roppongi property is a property for public
service, therefore, it is outside the commerce of man. The fact that the Roppongi property has not been
used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
property.
Q48: PEDRO AND MARIA FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST JOSE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND
DAMAGES. IN HIS ANSWER, JOSE AVERRED, BY WAY OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, THAT THE LOT IN
QUESTION WAS A PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND SOLD TO HIM BY A CERTAIN JUAN. HE
INTERPOSED A COUNTERCLAIM THAT GREGORIO, PEDRO AND MARIA’S PREDECESSOR, OBTAINED
HIS TITLE THROUGH FRAUD. PEDRO AND MARIA COUNTERED THAT JOSE’S COUNTERCLAIM
CONSTITUTED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE TITLE OF GREGORIO. ARE THEY CORRECT? EXPLAIN.
A48: No. The Supreme Court in Leyson v. Bontuyan held that an action is a direct attack on a title if its
object is to nullify the same, and thus challenge the proceeding pursuant to which the title was issued.
A direct attack on a title may be in an original action or in a counterclaim assailing it as void.
Q49: THE MUNICIPALITY OF CABANATUAN EXPROPRIATED THE LAND OF MARIA FOR THE PURPOSE
OF A PUBLIC MARKET SITE. THE COURT GRANTED THE EXPROPRIATION WITHOUT CONDITION.
SUBSEQUENTLY, MARIA FILED AN ACTION SEEKING THE RETURN OF THE LAND TO HER ALLEGING
THAT THE MUNICIPALITY HAS ABANDONED THAT PURPOSE AND THEREBY LOST ITS RIGHT TO THE
PARCEL OF LAND SO EXPROPRIATED. IS THE ACTION LEGALLY VIABLE?
A49: No. The municipality had acquired a fee simple title to the land in question, without any condition.
When the land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of
eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may
be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or
title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. [Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 17540,
July 23, 1921]
Q50: F AND G WERE OWNERS OF A PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY A TCT. THEY ALLOWED THEIR
FIRST COUSIN, N, TO USE THE LAND, BUT ARE NOW DEMANDING THAT THE COUSIN VACATE IT. N
CLAIMS POSSESSORY RIGHTS BECAUSE HE AND HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN
CONTINUOUSLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY POSSESSING THE LAND FOR MORE THAN 59 YEARS
AFTER HIS FATHER RECEIVED THE LAND BY A DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS FROM THE ORIGINAL
OWNER, HIS GRANDFATHER, E. ON THE OTHER HAND, F AND G CLAIM THAT THEIR PARENTS
PURCHASED THE PROPERTY FROM THE GRANDFATHER, E, IN 1941 AND HAD THE LAND REGISTERED
UNDER A TCT AND THEY SUBSEQUENTLY INHERITED THE SAME. WHEN THEIR PARENTS DIED, THEY
HAD THE LAND REGISTERED IN THEIR NAMES BEFORE ALLOWING N FREE USE OF THE LAND. WHO
HAS RIGHTFUL POSSESSION OF THE PARCEL OF LAND?
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A50: F and G are entitled to possess the land. It is a fundamental principle in land registered under the
Torrens system that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title
to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The certificate becomes the best
proof of ownership of a parcel of land; hence, anyone who deals with property registered under the
Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond it (doctrine of indefeasibility of title). F and
G have the preferential right because they hold a Torrens title in their name and may enjoy possession
of the thing to the exclusion of any other person. N’s manner of attacking the title was a collateral one,
which is prohibited under Sec. 48 of PD 1529. [Abobon v. Abobon, G.R. No. 155830, August 15, 2012; J.
Bersamin]
Q52: A VACANT LAND IN WHITE PLAINS WAS COVERED BY A TCT IN THE NAME OF D, WHO LATER
LEARNED THAT CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES WERE BEING UNDERTAKEN ON HER PROPERTY
WITHOUT HER CONSENT. UPON INVESTIGATION, SHE FOUND OUT THAT S REPRESENTED HERSELF
AS THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY AND PETITIONED THE RTC FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A NEW
OWNER’S COPY OF THE TCT, APPENDING A DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED BY D
(JULY 14, 1997) AND AN AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS (JULY 17, 1997). A NEW TCT WAS ISSUED IN S’S FAVOR
(AUGUST 26, 1997), AND SHE SUBDIVIDED THE PROPERTY AND SOLD IT TO SPS DV AND SPS C. THE
2 SETS OF SPOUSES PAID P1-M EACH FOR THE ENTIRE PROPERTY WHICH WAS VALUED AT NOT LESS
THAN P14-M. D FILED AN ACTION AGAINST ALL OF THEM. WHO HAS RIGHTFUL OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY, D OR THE SPS. WHO ARE THIRD PARTY BUYERS?
A52: D is the lawful owner. The 2 sps. cannot be considered purchasers in good faith and for value by
claiming that S’s TCT was free from liens or encumbrances that could have made them suspicious.
Under the Torrens system, there is the curtain principle, in that one does not need to go behind the
certificate of title because it contains all the information about the title of its holder. This dispenses with
the need of proving ownership by long complicated documents kept by the registered owner. The sps.
may have purchased it in good faith as they failed to find any encumbrance annotated, but their
observance of diligence must one in good faith and for value. It was insufficient that they checked if the
1
(a) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when new
interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when
the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will
thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after
its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.
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property was unfenced and vacant or that the TCT was not annotated. They were aware that S’s TCT
was derived from a duplicate owner’s copy reissued due to the loss of the original duplicate owner’s
copy. This should have alerted them to inquire beyond the face of S’s TCT. In addition, the transactions
affecting the property took place in a short span of time and the property was grossly undervalued. As
in Garcia v. CA, the reissuance of duplicate owner’s copy is considered as merely a reconstituted
certificate of title. It is a mere subsequent copy of the original, and are not the originals themselves, so
anyone dealing with them must be extra-careful. Since the sps. were aware, they oculd not be innocent
purchasers for value. [Sps. Cusi v. Domingo, G.R. No. 195871, February 27, 2013; J. Bersamin]
Q53: P WAS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN WHO SUBSEQUENTLY LOST HIS PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
ASSUMING THAT P IS OF AGE, CAN LAND BE LAWFULLY TRANSFERRED TO P? IF SO, WHAT ARE THE
LIMITATIONS?
A53: Under Sec. 5 of BP 185, land may be transferred to P via voluntary sale, devise or donation, or
involuntary sales on tax delinquency, foreclosure and execution of judgment. Additional documentary
requirements must be complied with under Sec. 6. In addition, the land that may be transferred must
only be a private land, up to a maximum of 5,000 sqm. (urban land) or 3 ha (rural land) for business or
other purposes (Secs. 2 and 3 of BP 185, as amended by Sec. 10 of RA 7042, pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA
8179). If P is married, either he or his wife may avail of the privilege, but the total cannot exceed the
maximum.
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Q55: A, B, C, AND D AGREED THAT THEY WILL OBTAIN A LOAN OF P1 MILLION. THEY AGREED THAT
THE LOAN WILL BE DISTRIBUTED AND PAID USING THE FOLLOWING RATIO - 40:40:10:10,
RESPECTIVELY. THE NEXT DAY, THEY EXECUTED A PROMISSORY NOTE WHICH STATES: “WE
PROMISE TO PAY X P1 MILLION AT THE END OF THE YEAR, SIGNED BY A, B, C, AND D.” HOW MUCH
CAN X COLLECT FROM EACH OF THE DEBTORS COME DUE DATE?
A55: P250,000 each. The general rule is that an obligation is presumed to be joint if there is
concurrence of two or more debtors in the same obligation except if otherwise provided by (a)
stipulation, (b) law, or (c) the nature of the obligation. The debt shall be presumed to be divided into as
many equal shares as there are debtors. Here, the promissory note did not mention the ratio of payment
and none of the exceptions are present, thus the general rule on joint liability applies. This is without
prejudice as to the enforcement among the debtors themselves of the settlement ratio in accordance
with their agreement. [Art. 1207 – 1208]
Q56: X WAS WALKING AT THE SIDE OF THE ROAD WHEN AN ONCOMING CAR DRIVEN BY Y SUDDENLY
HIT X WHICH CAUSED THE LATTER SEVERE INJURIES. Y RAISED THE DEFENSE OF FORTUITOUS
EVENT DUE TO TIRE BLOW-OUT. WILL THE DEFENSE OF Y PROSPER?
A56: No. As a general rule, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen,
or which foreseen, were inevitable. The exceptions are (1) when expressly specified by law, (2) when
expressly stipulated in the contract, and (3) when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption
of risk. However, jurisprudence expressly provides that defective brakes, tire blow-outs and others of
similar nature cannot be classified as fortuitous events per se within the meaning of the law. (Tugade v.
CA, 85 SCRA 226, July 31, 2003; La Mallorca v. De Jesus, 17 SCRA 23, May 14, 1966)
Q57: X OPENED A SAVINGS ACCOUNT WITH BANK Y AND DEPOSITED P500,000. SUBSEQUENTLY, X,
AS AN ACCOMMODATION TO HIS FRIEND Z, OBTAINED A LOAN FROM BANK Y IN HIS NAME FOR
100,0000 PAYABLE AFTER 6 MONTHS. ON DUE DATE, BANK Y DEMANDED PAYMENT FROM X BUT
HE REFUSED TO PAY. CAN BANK Y DEBIT THE ACCOUNT OF X TO SATISFY THE DEBT?
A57: Yes, by virtue of legal compensation. All the requisites of a valid compensation are present here,
namely (1) there are two parties who, in their own right, are principal creditors and debtors of each other,
(2) both debts consist in money, (3) both debts are due, (4) both debts are liquidated and demandable,
(5) there is no retention or controversy commenced by third persons, (6) compensation is not prohibited
by law. Moreover, as a general rule, a bank has a right to set off the deposits in its hands for the payment
of any indebtedness to it on the part of a depositor. [Gullas v. PNB, 62 Phil 519, November 13, 1935] The
accommodation is of no moment because the debt was obtained in X’s own name.
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Q59: GSIS AND SPS. LEUTERIO EXECUTED A CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE OF A HOUSE AND LOT
FOR P2 MILLION. WHEN THE CONSTRUCTION WAS FINISHED, GSIS FOUND THAT THE
CONSTRUCTION COST WAS HIGHER THAN THEY PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED. GSIS INSERTED A CLAUSE
IN THE DEED OF SALE “SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENT PENDING APPROVAL OF THE BOARD.”
SUBSEQUENTLY, GSIS INFORMED THE SPS. THAT THE BOARD APPROVED THE PRICE OF P2.5
MILLION. CAN GSIS INCREASE THE PRICE AS APPROVED BY THE BOARD?
A59: No, the unilateral subsequent increase in price by GSIS is not valid as it is in violation of the general
principles of contracts, particularly the mutuality and obligatory force of contracts. (On Mutuality) Art
1308 provides that contracts must bind both contracting parties and its validity or compliance cannot
be left to the will of one of them. Art 1473 likewise provides that the fixing of the price can never be left
to the discretion of one of the contracting parties. Here, the Sps. did not consent to the new unilateral
price, thus invalid. Any change in the contract must be mutually agreed upon, otherwise it is bereft of
any binding effect. (On Obligatory Force) The law on contracts does not excuse a party from specific
performance just because of bad business judgments in estimating the production cost and selling
price. GSIS is bound by the selling price set in the conditional deed of sale as initially agreed upon.
Q60: X WAS LOOKING FOR A LOT WHERE HE CAN BUILD HIS WAREHOUSE. ON NOVEMBER 5, Y
OFFERED TO SELL HIS LOT TO X FOR P5 MILLION. Y TOLD X TO THINK ABOUT THE OFFER FOR 1
MONTH AND PROMISED THAT HE WILL NOT SELL THE LOT TO ANOTHER DURING THE SAID PERIOD.
ON NOVEMBER 20, X SENT A LETTER TO Y STATING THAT HE WILL BUY THE LOT AS OFFERED. ON
NOVEMBER 21, Y SOLD THE LOT TO Z FOR P6 MILLION AND INFORMED X THEREOF. Y RECEIVED X’S
LETTER ON NOVEMBER 29. IS Y LIABLE TO X?
A60: No, because the option contract was without consideration. An option is a contract granting a
person the privilege to buy or not to buy something at any time within the agreed period at a fixed price.
The contract of option is a separate and distinct contract. If the option is without consideration, the
offeror may withdraw his offer by communicating such withdrawal to the offeree at any time before
acceptance [Art 1324]. Here, the option contract was without consideration and was withdrawn before
the acceptance which was on November 29 when the letter was received and made known to the offeror.
Thus Y may validly withdraw the offer without liability.
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a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making
thereof;
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Q65: ALDEN AND STELA WERE BOTH FORMER FILIPINO CITIZENS. THEY WERE MARRIED IN THE
PHILIPPINES BUT THEY LATER MIGRATED TO THE UNITED STATES WHERE THEY WERE
NATURALIZED AS AMERICAN CITIZENS. IN THEIR UNION THEY WERE ABLE TO ACCUMULATE
SEVERAL REAL PROPERTIES BOTH IN THE US AND IN THE PHILIPPINES. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY
WERE NOT BLESSED WITH CHILDREN. IN THE US, THEY EXECUTED A JOINT WILL INSTITUTING AS
THEIR COMMON HEIRS TO DIVIDE THEIR COMBINED ESTATE IN EQUAL SHARES, THE FIVE SIBLINGS
OF ALDEN AND THE SEVEN SIBLINGS OF STELA. ALDEN PASSED AWAY IN 2013 AND A YEAR LATER,
STELA ALSO DIED. THE SIBLINGS OF ALDEN WHO WERE ALL CITIZENS OF THE US INSTITUTED
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS IN A US COURT IMPLEADING THE SIBLINGS OF STELA WHO WERE ALL IN
THE PHILIPPINES. (A) WAS THE JOINT WILL EXECUTED BY ALDEN AND STELA WHO WERE BOTH
FORMER FILIPINOS VALID? EXPLAIN WITH LEGAL BASIS. (B) CAN THE JOINT WILL PRODUCE LEGAL
EFFECT IN THE PHILIPPINES WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTIES OF ALDEN AND STELA FOUND
HERE? IF SO, HOW? (C) IS THE SITUATION PRESENTED AN EXAMPLE OF DEPECAGE?
A65: (a) Yes, the joint will of Alden and Stela is considered valid. Being no longer Filipino citizens at the
time they executed their joint will, the prohibition under our Civil Code on joint wills will no longer apply
to Alden and Stela. For as long as their will was executed in accordance with the law of the place where
they reside, or the law of the country of which they are citizens or even in accordance with the Civil Code,
a will executed by an alien is considered valid in the Philippines. [Article 816, Civil Code] (b) Yes, the joint
will of Alden and Stela can take effect even with respect to the properties located in the Philippines
because what governs the distribution of their estate is no longer Philippine law but their national law
at the time of their demise. Hence, the joint will produces legal effect even with respect to the properties
situated in the Philippines. (c) No, because depecage is a process of applying rules of different states on
the basis of the precise issue involved. It is a conflict of laws where different issues within a case may be
governed by the laws of different states. In this situation, no conflict of laws will arise because Alden
and Stela are no longer Filipino citizens at the time of the execution of their joint will and the place of
execution is not the Philippines.
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Q66: FELIPE IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN. WHEN HE WENT TO SYDNEY FOR VACATION, HE MET A FORMER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATE, WHO PROPOSED TO HIM A TRANSACTION WHICH TOOK HIM TO MOSCOW.
FELIPE BROKERED A CONTRACT BETWEEN SYDNEY COALS CORP. (COALS), AN AUSTRALIAN FIRM,
AND MOSCOW ENERGY CORP. (ENERGY), A RUSSIAN FIRM, FOR COALS TO SUPPLY COAL TO
ENERGY ON A MONTHLY BASIS FOR THREE YEARS. BOTH THESE FIRMS WERE NOT DOING, AND
STILL DO NOT DO, BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES. FELIPE SHUTTLED BETWEEN SYDNEY AND
MOSCOW TO CLOSE THE CONTRACT. HE ALSO EXECUTED IN SYDNEY A COMMISSION CONTRACT
WITH COALS AND IN MOSCOW WITH ENERGY, UNDER WHICH CONTRACTS HE WAS GUARANTEED
COMMISSIONS BY BOTH FIRMS BASED ON A PERCENTAGE OF DELIVERIES FOR THE THREE-YEAR
PERIOD, PAYABLE IN SYDNEY AND IN MOSCOW, RESPECTIVELY, THROUGH DEPOSITS IN ACCOUNTS
THAT HE OPENED IN THE TWO CITIES. BOTH FIRMS PAID FELIPE HIS COMMISSION FOR FOUR
MONTHS, AFTER WHICH THEY STOPPED PAYING HIM. FELIPE LEARNED FROM HIS CONTACTS, WHO
ARE RESIDENTS OF SYDNEY AND MOSCOW, THAT THE TWO FIRMS TALKED TO EACH OTHER AND
DECIDED TO CUT HIM OFF. HE NOW FILES SUIT IN MANILA AGAINST BOTH COALS AND ENERGY FOR
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. SHOULD THE PHILIPPINE COURT ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE? EXPLAIN.
A66: No, the Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case of Felipe. Firstly, under the rule
of forum non conveniens, the Philippine court is not a convenient forum as all the incidents of the case
occurred outside the Philippines. Neither are both Coals and Energy doing business inside the
Philippines. Secondly, the contracts were not perfected in the Philippines. Under the principle of lex loci
contractus, the law of the place where the contract is made shall apply. Lastly, the Philippine court has
no power to determine the facts surrounding the execution of said contracts. And even if a proper
decision could be reached, such would have no biding effect on Coals and Energy as the court was not
able to acquire jurisdiction over the said corporations. [Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120077,
October 13, 2000]
Q67: ABLE, A CORPORATION DOMICILED IN STATE A, BUT DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
HIRED ERIC, A FILIPINO ENGINEER, FOR ITS PROJECT IN STATE B. IN THE CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT EXECUTED BY THE PARTIES IN STATE B, IT WAS STIPULATED THAT THE CONTRACT
COULD BE TERMINATED AT THE COMPANY'S WILL, WHICH STIPULATION IS ALLOWED IN STATE B.
WHEN ERIC WAS SUMMARILY DISMISSED BY ABLE, HE SUED ABLE FOR DAMAGES IN THE
PHILIPPINES. WILL THE PHILIPPINE COURT APPLY THE CONTRACTUAL STIPULATION?
A67: No, using the significant relationships theory, there are contacts significant to the Philippines.
Among these are that the place of business is the Philippines, the employee concerned is a Filipino and
the suit was filed in the Philippines, thereby justifying the application of Philippine law. Moreover, the
Court held that when what is involved is paramount state interest, the court can disregard choice of
forum and choice of law. [Zalamea v. CA, G.R. No. 104235, November 18, 1993]. The Philippine
Constitution affords full protection to labor and the stipulation as to summary dismissal runs counter
to our fundamental and statutory laws. [Cadalin v. POEA, G.R. No. 104776, December 5, 1994]
Therefore, the Philippine Court should not apply the stipulation in question.
Q68: X AND Y ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT IN AUSTRALIA, WHEREBY IT WAS AGREED THAT X WOULD
BUILD A COMMERCIAL BUILDING FOR Y IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND IN PAYMENT FOR THE
CONSTRUCTION, Y WILL TRANSFER AND CONVEY HIS CATTLE RANCH LOCATED IN THE UNITED
STATES IN FAVOR OF X. WHAT LAW WOULD GOVERN: (A) THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT?; (B) THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT?; AND (C) THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CONTRACT?
A68: (a) The validity of the contract will be governed by Australian law, because the validity refers
to the element of the making of the contract in this case unless the parties agreed to be bound by
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another law. (b) The performance will be governed by the law of the Philippines where the contract is
to be performed. (c) The consideration will be governed by the law of the United States where the ranch
is located. In the foregoing cases, when the foreign law would apply, the absence of proof of that foreign
law would render Philippine law applicable under processual presumption.
Q69: FRANCIS ALBERT, A CITIZEN AND RESIDENT OF NEW JERSEY, U.S.A., UNDER WHOSE LAW HE
WAS STILL A MINOR, BEING ONLY 20 YEARS OF AGE, WAS HIRED BY ABC CORPORATION OF MANILA
TO SERVE FOR TWO YEARS AS ITS CHIEF COMPUTER PROGRAMMER. BUT AFTER SERVING FOR
ONLY FOUR MONTHS, HE RESIGNED TO JOIN XYZ CORPORATION, WHICH ENTICED HIM BY OFFERING
MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TERMS. HIS FIRST EMPLOYER SUES HIM IN MANILA FOR DAMAGES ARISING
FROM THE BREACH OF HIS CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. HE SETS UP HIS MINORITY AS A DEFENSE
AND ASKS FOR ANNULMENT OF THE CONTRACT ON THAT GROUND. THE PLAINTIFF DISPUTES THIS
BY ALLEGING THAT SINCE THE CONTRACT WAS EXECUTED IN THE PHILIPPINES UNDER WHOSE LAW
THE AGE OF MAJORITY IS 18 YEARS, HE WAS NO LONGER A MINOR AT THE TIME OF PERFECTION OF
THE CONTRACT. WILL THE SUIT PROSPER?
A69: The suit will not prosper. Being a U.S. national, Albert’s capacity to enter into a contract is
determined by the law of the State of which he is a national, under which he to still a minor. This is in
connection with Article 15 of the Civil Code which embodies the said nationality principle of lex patriae.
While this principle is intended to apply to Filipino citizens under that provision, the Supreme Court in
Recto v. Harden [100 Phil 427, (1959)] is of the view that the status or capacity of foreigners is to be
determined on the basis of the same provision or principle, i.e., by U.S. law in the present problem.
Q70: ALMA WAS HIRED AS A DOMESTIC HELPER IN HONGKONG BY THE DRAGON SERVICES, LTD.,
THROUGH ITS LOCAL AGENT. SHE EXECUTED A STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT DESIGNED BY
THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS WORKERS ADMINISTRATION (POEA) FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO
WORKERS. IT PROVIDED FOR HER EMPLOYMENT FOR ONE YEAR AT A SALARY OF US$1,000.00 A
MONTH. IT WAS SUBMITTED TO AND APPROVED BY THE POEA. HOWEVER, WHEN SHE ARRIVED IN
HONGKONG, SHE WAS ASKED TO SIGN ANOTHER CONTRACT BY DRAGON SERVICES, LTD.
WHICH REDUCED HER SALARY TO ONLY US$600.00 A MONTH. HAVING NO OTHER CHOICE, ALMA
SIGNED THE CONTRACT BUT WHEN SHE RETURNED TO THE PHILIPPINES, SHE DEMANDED
PAYMENT OF THE SALARY DIFFERENTIAL OF US$400.00 A MONTH. BOTH DRAGON SERVICES, LTD.
AND ITS LOCAL AGENT CLAIMED THAT THE SECOND CONTRACT IS VALID UNDER THE LAWS OF
HONGKONG, AND THEREFORE BINDING ON ALMA. IS THEIR CLAIM CORRECT? EXPLAIN.
A70: Their claim is not correct. A contract is the law between the parties but the law can disregard the
contract if it is contrary to public policy. Since the case is being litigated in the Philippines, the Philippine
Court as the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. The
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the protection of labor and on social justice [Sec. 10. Art II] embody
a public policy of the Philippines. Since the application of Hongkong law in this case is in violation of
that public policy, the application shall be disregarded by our Courts. [Cadalin v. POEA, 238 SCRA 762,
December 5, 1994]
Q71: IN A CLASS SUIT FOR DAMAGES, PLAINTIFFS CLAIMED THEY SUFFERED INJURIES FROM
TORTURE DURING MARTIAL LAW. THE SUIT WAS FILED UPON PRESIDENT EM’S ARRIVAL ON EXILE
IN HI, A U.S. STATE. THE COURT IN HI AWARDED PLAINTIFFS THE EQUIVALENT OF P100 BILLION
UNDER THE U.S. LAW ON ALIEN TORT CLAIMS. ON APPEAL, EM’S ESTATE RAISED THE ISSUE OF
PRESCRIPTION. IT ARGUED THAT SINCE SAID U.S. LAW IS SILENT ON THE MATTER, THE COURT
SHOULD APPLY: (1) HI’S LAW SETTING A TWO-YEAR LIMITATION ON TORT CLAIMS; OR (2) THE
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PHILIPPINE LAW WHICH APPEARS TO REQUIRE THAT CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL INJURY ARISING
FROM MARTIAL LAW BE BROUGHT WITHIN ONE YEAR.
PLAINTIFFS COUNTERED THAT PROVISIONS OF THE MOST ANALOGOUS FEDERAL STATUTE, THE
TORTURE VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT, SHOULD BE APPLIED. IT SETS TEN YEARS AS THE PERIOD FOR
PRESCRIPTION. MOREOVER, THEY ARGUED THAT EQUITY COULD TOLL THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS. FOR IT APPEARED THAT EM HAD PROCURED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
GRANTING HIMSELF AND THOSE ACTING UNDER HIS DIRECTION IMMUNITY FROM SUIT DURING HIS
TENURE. IN THIS CASE, HAS PRESCRIPTION SET IN OR NOT? CONSIDERING THE DIFFERENCES IN
THE CITED LAWS, WHICH PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD SHOULD BE APPLIED: ONE YEAR UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW, TWO YEARS UNDER HI’S LAW, TEN YEARS UNDER U.S. FEDERAL LAW, OR NONE
OF THE ABOVE? EXPLAIN.
A71: The US Court will apply US law, the law of the forum, in determining the applicable prescriptive
period. While US law is silent on this matter, the US Court will not apply Philippine law in determining
the prescriptive period. It is generally affirmed as a principle in private international law that procedural
law is one of the exceptions to the application of foreign law by the forum. Since prescription is a matter
of procedural law even in Philippine jurisprudence, [Cadalin v. POEA, 238 SCRA 721, December 5, 1994],
the US Court will apply either HI or Federal law in determining the applicable prescriptive period and
not Philippine law. The Restatement of American law affirms this principle.
Q72: WHAT IS: (1) COGNOVIT? (2) A BORROWING STATUTE? (3) CHARACTERIZATION?
A72: (1) Cognovit is an acknowledgement of debt or liability in the form of a confessed judgment. [Black’s
Law Dictionary, 1996 ed.]; (2) Borrowing Statute is a legislative exception to the conflict-of-laws rule
holding that forum state must apply its own statute of limitations. It specifies the circumstances in which
a forum state may adopt another state’s statute of limitations [Black’s Law Dictionary, 1996 ed.]; (3)
Characterization is otherwise called "classification" or "qualification." It is the process of assigning a
disputed question to an area in substantive law. [Coquia and Pangalangan]
Q73: MARVIN, A FILIPINO, AND SHELLEY, AN AMERICAN, BOTH RESIDENTS OF CALIFORNIA, DECIDED
TO GET MARRIED IN THEIR LOCAL PARISH. TWO YEARS AFTER THEIR MARRIAGE, SHELLEY
OBTAINED A DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA. WHILE IN BORACAY, MARVIN MET MANEL, A FILIPINA, WHO
WAS VACATIONING THERE. MARVIN FELL IN LOVE WITH HER. AFTER A BRIEF COURTSHIP AND
COMPLYING WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS, THEY GOT MARRIED IN HONGKONG TO AVOID
PUBLICITY, IT BEING MARVIN'S SECOND MARRIAGE. IS THE SECOND MARRIAGE VALID?
A73: As to extrinsic validity, the marriage with Manel in Hong Kong is valid if it complied with the
formalities of the place where it was celebrated, Hong Kong law, based on the principle of lex loci
celebrationis. As to intrinsic validity, it depends if the divorce obtained by Shelley capacitated her to
remarry. In Garcia v. Recio [G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001], the SC held that for a Filipino spouse to
have the capacity to contract a subsequent marriage, it must also be proven that the foreign divorce
obtained abroad by the foreigner spouse gave such foreigner spouse capacity to remarry. If such
requirement is complied with, Marvin is likewise capacitated to remarry and the second marriage is
considered valid. [Art. 26, Par. 2, Family Code]
Q74: JUAN IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN RESIDING IN TOKYO, JAPAN. STATE WHAT LAWS GOVERN: (1) HIS
CAPACITY TO CONTRACT MARRIAGE IN JAPAN; (2) HIS SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS AS REGARDS HIS
DECEASED FILIPINO FATHER’S PROPERTY IN TEXAS, U.S.A.; (3) THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT WHICH JUAN EXECUTED WHILE SOJOURNING IN SWITZERLAND; (4) THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF SAID WILL.
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A74: (1) Juan’s capacity to contract marriage is governed by Philippine law. This is pursuant to Art.
15 of the Civil Code, which provides that our laws relating to, among others, legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad. (2) By way of exception to the
general rule of lex rei sitae prescribed by the first paragraph of Art. 16 of the Civil Code, a person’s
successional rights are governed by the national law of the decedent [Art. 16, Par. 2, Civil Code]. Since
Juan’s deceased father was a Filipino citizen, his national law which is the Philippine law governs Juan’s
successional rights. (3) The extrinsic validity of Juan’s will is governed by (a) Swiss law, it being the law
where the will was made [Art. 17, Par. 1, Civil Code], or (b) Philippine law, by implication from the
provisions of Art. 816 of the Civil Code, which allows even an alien who is abroad to make a will in
conformity with our Civil Code. (4) The intrinsic validity of his will is governed by Philippine law, it being
his national law. [Art. 16, Civil Code]
Q78: KEVIN AND SUSAN ARE CHINESE NATIONALS. THEIR PARENTS ARE NOW FILIPINO CITIZENS
WHO LIVE IN MANILA. WHILE STILL STUDENTS IN MNS STATE, THEY GOT MARRIED IN ACCORDANCE
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WITH THE LAWS OF THAT STATE, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE FIRST COUSINS. IT APPEARS UNDER
CHINESE LAW THAT FIRST COUSINS COULD MARRY LEGALLY. HOWEVER, IN MNS STATE, IT IS NOT
LEGAL. THEY PLAN TO RESIDE AND SET UP BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES. BUT THEY HAVE BEEN
INFORMED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MARRIAGE OF FIRST COUSINS HERE IS CONSIDERED VOID FROM
THE BEGINNING BY REASON OF PUBLIC POLICY. (1) IS THE MARRIAGE VALID? (2) WILL THEIR
MARRIAGE BE RECOGNIZED AS VALID IN THE PHILIPPINES?
A78: (1). Yes, the marriage is valid. Lex loci celebrationis governs the extrinsic validity of the marriage
but under the principle of lex nationalii, the personal capacity of the parties to enter into the marriage
is governed by their national laws. In this case, their national law, Chinese law, allows marriage between
first cousins, and it is stated in the facts that their marriage was celebrated in accordance with MNS
State law. (2). Yes, their marriage will be recognized as valid in the Philippines, since it is valid where
celebrated. This is based on lex loci celebrationis principle under Art. 26, Par. 1 of the Family Code. The
prohibitions against marriage between first cousins on the ground of public policy will not apply in this
case as they are not Filipino nationals.
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PROPERTY
Q79: THE PROPERTIES OF KHLOE AND KENDALL, WHO ARE NEIGHBOURS, LIE ALONG THE BANKS
OF THE MARIKINA RIVER. AT CERTAIN TIMES OF THE YEAR, THE RIVER WOULD SWELL AND AS THE
WATER RECEDES, SOIL, ROCKS AND OTHER MATERIALS ARE DEPOSITED ON KHLOE AND
KENDALL’S PROPERTIES. THIS PATTERN OF THE RIVER SWELLING, RECEDING AND DEPOSITING
SOIL AND OTHER MATERIALS BEING DEPOSITED ON THE NEIGHBOURS’ PROPERTIES HAVE GONE
ON FOR MANY YEARS. KNOWING THIS PATTERN, KHLOE CONSTRUCTED A CONCRETE BARRIER
ABOUT 2 METERS FROM HER PROPERTY LINE AND EXTENDING TOWARDS THE RIVER, SO THAT
WHEN THE WATER RECEDES, SOIL AND OTHER MATERIALS ARE TRAPPED WITHIN THIS BARRIER.
AFTER SEVERAL YEARS, THE AREA BETWEEN KHLOE'S PROPERTY LINE TO THE CONCRETE BARRIER
WAS COMPLETELY FILLED WITH SOIL, EFFECTIVELY INCREASING KHLOE'S PROPERTY BY 2 METERS.
KENDALL'S PROPERTY, WHERE NO BARRIER WAS CONSTRUCTED, ALSO INCREASED BY ONE METER
ALONG THE SIDE OF THE RIVER. (A) CAN KHLOE AND KENDALL LEGALLY CLAIM OWNERSHIP OVER
THE ADDITIONAL 2 METERS AND ONE METER, RESPECTIVELY, OF LAND DEPOSITED ALONG THEIR
PROPERTIES? (B) IF KHLOE AND KENDALL’S PROPERTIES ARE REGISTERED, WILL THE BENEFIT OF
SUCH REGISTRATION EXTEND TO THE INCREASED AREA OF THEIR PROPERTIES?
A79: (a) Only Kendall can claim ownership over the additional one meter of land deposited along her
property. Art. 457 provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the water." Where the land is not formed
solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering land but is also the consequences
of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it is man-made accretion and a part of the public
domain [Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, G.R. No. 98045. June 26, 1996]. Thus, Khloe cannot legally claim
ownership of the additional 2 meters of land along her property because she constructed a concrete
barrier about 2 meters from her property causing deposits of soil and other materials when the water
recedes. In other words, the increase in her property was not caused by nature but was man-made. (b)
If the properties of Khloe and Kendall are registered, the benefit of such registration does not extend to
the increased area of their properties. Accretion does not automatically become registered land because
there is a specific technical description of the lot in its Torrens title. There must be a separate application
for registration of the alluvial deposits under the Torrens System (Grande v. CA, G.R. No. L-17652, June
30, 1962).
Q81: THE RENUNCIATION BY A CO-OWNER OF HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE CO-OWNED PROPERTY
IN LIEU OF THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OBLIGATION TO CONTRIBUTE TO TAXES AND EXPENSES FOR
THE PRESERVATION OF THE PROPERTY CONSTITUTES DACION EN PAGO. TRUE OR FALSE? EXPLAIN.
A81: True. Under Art. 488, NCC, a co-owner may renounce his share in the co-owned property in lieu of
paying for his share in the taxes and expenses for the preservation of the co-owned property. In effect,
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there is dacion en pago because the co-owner is discharging his monetary obligation by paying it with
his non-monetary interest in the co-owned property.
Q82: SPOUSES REYES MANAGED AND OPERATED A HARDWARE STORE ON A 500 SQ.M. LOT WHICH
THEY LEASED FROM JOHN DESIDERIO. THE CONTRACT WAS FOR A PERIOD OF THREE (3) YEARS.
WHEN THE CONTRACT EXPIRED, JOHN ASKED THE SPOUSES TO PEACEFULLY VACATE THE
PREMISES. THE SPOUSES IGNORED THE DEMAND AND CONTINUED WITH THE OPERATION OF THE
HARDWARE. ONE MONTH AFTER, JOHN, WITH THE AID OF A GROUP OF ARMED MEN, CAUSED THE
CLOSURE OF THE HARDWARE BY CONSTRUCTING FENCES AROUND IT. WAS THE ACT OF JOHN AND
HIS MEN LAWFUL? EXPLAIN.
A82: No, the act was not lawful. Even if the lessee’s right to occupy the premises has expired, the lessor
cannot physically oust the lessee from the leased premises if the latter refuses to vacate. The lessor
must go through the proper channels by filing an appropriate case for unlawful detainer or recovery of
possession. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession [Article 539] and in no case my
possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto
[Article 536]. The act of John is an abuse of rights because even if he has the right to recover possession
of his property, he must act with justice and give the lessees their day in court and observe honesty and
good faith.
Q83: X, Y, Z ARE SIBLINGS WHO INHERITED A 10-STORY BUILDING FROM THEIR PARENTS. THEY
AGREED IN WRITING TO MAINTAIN IT AS A CO-OWNED PROPERTY FOR LEASING OUT AND TO DIVIDE
THE NET PROFITS AMONG THEMSELVES EQUALLY FOR A PERIOD OF 20 YEARS. ON THE 9TH YEAR,
X WANTED TO GET OUT OF THE CO-OWNERSHIP SO HE COULD GET HIS 1/3 SHARE IN THE PROPERTY.
Y AND Z REFUSED, SAYING X IS BOUND BY THEIR AGREEMENT TO KEEP THE CO-OWNERSHIP FOR
20 YEARS. ARE Y AND Z CORRECT? EXPLAIN.
A83: Y and Z are partly correct. The law provides that none of the co-owners shall be obliged to remain
in the co-ownership and it is the right of a co-owner to ask for partition of the co-ownership anytime.
One exception to the rule is if the co-owners agree to keep the thing undivided which period shall not
exceed ten years. In this case, the agreement to keep the thing undivided shall be valid at the most for
ten years. [Article 494]
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Q86: JON WAS THE OWNER OF LOT A, WHICH WAS SURROUNDED BY 5 OTHER LOTS, LOTS B TO F.
LOT B WAS ALSO OWNED BY JON. HE PROMISED DANY THAT IF SHE BOUGHT LOT C, HE WOULD GIVE
HER A RIGHT OF WAY IN LOT B. CONVINCED, DANY BOUGHT LOT C; AND JON GAVE HER A RIGHT OF
WAY IN LOT B. DANY CULTIVATED LOT C AND MADE USE OF THE RIGHT OF WAY ON LOT B. DANY
LATER FOUND GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT ABROAD. SHE RETURNED AFTER 11 YEARS AND FOUND
THAT THE RIGHT OF WAY WAS NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO HER BECAUSE JON SOLD LOT B TO
YGRITTE, AND THE LATTER HAD THE LOT FENCED. (A) CAN DANY DEMAND THE ACTIVATION OF HER
RIGHT OF WAY FROM YGRITTE? (B) CAN DANY OPT TO DEMAND A RIGHT OF WAY FROM THE ANY OF
THE OTHER OWNERS OF THE SURROUNDING LOTS?
A86: (a) Yes, Dany can demand the activation of her right of way from Ygritte. An easement of right of
way is a real right, which attaches to the estate to which it belongs, and is inseparable therefrom [Art.
617]. The sale of the property includes the easement whether or not such is indicated in the deed of sale.
The buyer of the property in which an easement exists cannot prevent the dominant estate from using
it. The fact that Dany worked abroad for 11 years should not be considered as non-user, because the fact
that the right of way was not used by those left behind to cultivate Lot C cannot be implied from such
fact. Nor is there renunciation or waiver of the easement in this case because this must be specific, clear,
express, and made in a public instrument [Art. 1358]. (b) Yes, Dany can also opt to demand a right of
way from the other owners. The requisites under Art. 649 for a compulsory right of way are complied
with in this case. Alternatively, Art. 652 provides that whenever a piece of land acquired by sale,
exchange or partition, is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be
obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity.
Q87: WHEN HER RELATIVES CAME TO VISIT HER AT HER HOUSE, MRS. KOHREYNA GRABBED ONE
OF HER MOST TREASURED BOOKS AND SHOWED IT TO BROTHERS MARLOU AND XANDER, HER
FAVORITE NEPHEWS. SHE TOLD THEM WHAT THE BOOK IS ABOUT, HOW EXPENSIVE AND RARE IT
IS, AND HOW IT WAS HER FAVORITE BOOK OF ALL TIME. MRS. KOHREYNA THEN TOLD MARLOU AND
XANDER THAT SHE WAS DONATING THE BOOK TO THEM BOTH. BEFORE THE TWO COULD REACT OR
SAY ANYTHING IN RESPONSE, A COMMOTION ENSUED AS XANDER WAS PULLED OUT OF THE LIVING
ROOM BY THEIR MOTHER AND WAS DRAGGED TO THEIR CAR, AS XANDER WAS SUPPOSED TO BE
ON HIS WAY TO THE AIRPORT ALREADY SO AS NOT TO MISS HIS FLIGHT FOR HIS INTERNATIONAL
EXCHANGE STUDENT PROGRAM. WHEN THINGS WENT BACK TO NORMAL IN THE LIVING ROOM,
MARLOU RESPONDED TO MRS. KOHREYNA, SAYING THAT HE IS ACCEPTING THE DONATION. MRS.
KOHREYNA REQUESTED MARLOU TO ASK XANDER VIA VIBER IF HE ACCEPTS THE DONATION, TOO.
HOWEVER, AS MARLOU WAS WAITING FOR XANDER’S REPLY, MRS. KOHREYNA WAS HIT IN THE
HEAD WITH A STRAY BULLET WHICH CAME FROM THE ROOF, KILLING HER INSTANTLY. MARLOU
TRIED CPR ON MRS. KOHREYNA, TO NO AVAIL. WAS THERE A VALID ACCEPTANCE OF THE DONATED
BOOK?
A87: No. A joint donation, or that donation made to two or more persons, could not be accepted solely
by one of the donees independently of the other donee [Art. 753; Genato v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. L-24983,
May 20, 1968]. In this case, since the donation intended was a joint one to both Marlou and Xander,
Marlou alone could not accept the book independently of his co-donee Xander, for there is no accretion
among donees unless expressly so provided, or unless they be husband and wife [Art. 753; Genato v.
Lorenzo, G.R. No. L-24983, May 20, 1968]. Xander was not present at the delivery, and there is no
showing that he had, after the offer was made and before Mrs. Kohreyna died, authorized his brother,
Marlou, to accept donations for both of them. Hence, Marlou’s acceptance of the book solely before Mrs.
Kohreyna’s death could not have operated as a valid acceptance for the joint donation.
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SALES
Q88: DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A CONTRACT OF SALE AND A CONTRACT TO SELL.
A88: In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing
sold. In a contract to sell, the ownership is, by agreement, retained by the seller and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price. In the contract of sale, the buyer’s non-payment of the
price is a negative resolutory condition; in a contract to sell, the buyer’s full payment of the price is a
positive suspensive condition to the coming into effect of the agreement. In a contract of sale, the seller
has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property unless he takes action to set aside the contract
of sale. In the second case, the title simply remains in the seller if the buyer does not comply with the
condition precedent of making payment at the time specified in the contract. [Heirs of Atienza v. Espidol,
G.R. No. 180665, August 11, 2010]
Q91. ON JANUARY 12, BEFORE LIANA LEFT FOR CANADA, SHE SOLD TO JOHNNY A RELATIVELY NEW
MERCEDES BENZ. ON JANUARY 25, JOHNNY TOOK POSSESSION OF SAID MERCEDES BENZ. ON
NOVEMBER 6, ROBERT WENT TO JOHNNY TO RETRIEVE THE CAR SAYING THAT HE BOUGHT THE
SAME CAR FROM LIANA ON MARCH 9. WHO BETWEEN JOHNNY AND ROBERT HAS ACQUIRED
OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR?
A91: Johnny. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property. [Art. 1544]
Q92. FROM THE FACTS ABOVE, IF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED WAS A REGISTERED/TITLED PARCEL
OF LAND IN PARANAQUE, AND LOUIE HAD THE SALE TO HIM REGISTERED ON MARCH 10 AFTER
LEARNING THAT THE LOT WAS SOLD TO JOHNNY, WILL THE ANSWER STILL BE THE SAME?
A92: Yes. The rule on double sales of registered land states that ownership is deemed acquired by the
person who first registers the property in his name in good faith. In this case, Louie registered it in bad
faith. In order for the second buyer to displace the first buyer the second buyer must show that he acted
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in good faith (i.e., in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers rights) from the time of acquisition
until title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession. [Cheng v.
Genato, G.R. No. 129760, December 29, 1998]
Q93. WHAT IS THE REMEDY OF AN APPARENT VENDOR WHEN THE INSTRUMENT IS FOUND TO BE
AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE?
A93: Reformation of the instrument. [Art. 1605]
Q97. IN THE DELIVERY OF A THING SOLD, WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS OF A BUYER IF THE QUANTITY OF
THE MOVABLES DELIVERED IS LESS THAN EXPECTED?
A97: The option of the buyer are the following:
1. Buyer may reject all
2. Buyer may accept
a. If buyer accepts with knowledge of seller’s inability to deliver the rest – buyer pays
contract rate
b. If Buyer has used or disposed of the goods delivered prior to knowing seller’s inability to
deliver the rest, or if buyer does not know of seller’s inability to deliver the rest – buyer
pays fair value [Art. 1522]
SUCCESSION
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Q98: THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF A, THE TESTATOR, WAS ACCIDENTALLY BURNED IN A FIRE. THE
CONTENTS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL WERE KNOWN TO D, A’S BEST FRIEND. WOULD THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL BE PROBATED?
A98: No. In the probate of the holographic will, the document itself must be presented to determine its
authenticity. Unfortunately, in this case, the holographic will was burnt. [Gan v. Yap, G.R. No. L-12190,
August 30, 1958]
Q99: A WAS EXECUTING A NOTARIAL WILL, AND WHILE DOING SO ONE OF HIS THREE WITNESSES
LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW AND DID NOT SEE A SIGN HIS WILL. IS THE WILL VALID?
A99: Yes. The law does not require a witness to actually see the testator sign the will. It is sufficient if
the witness could have seen the act of signing had he chosen to do so by casting his eyes to the proper
direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so (test of position). [Nera v.
Rimando, G.R. No. L-597, February 27, 191]
Q100: A DIED AND LEFT BEHIND HER HOLOGRAPHIC WILL WHICH IS ENTIRELY WRITTEN, DATED AND
SIGNED IN HER OWN HANDWRITING. HOWEVER, IT CONTAINS CANCELLATIONS WHICH ARE NOT
AUTHENTICATED BY A’S FULL SIGNATURE. MAY A’S WILL, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN, STILL BE
PROBATED?
A100: Yes, the will as originally written may be probated. The cancellations or alterations are void since
they were not authenticated by the full signature of A. The original will remains valid because a
holographic will is not invalidated by the unauthenticated insertions or alterations. [Art. 814; Ajero v.
CA, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994]
Q101: A IS THE ILLEGITIMATE DAUGHTER OF X & Y, AND SHE DIED INTESTATE WITHOUT ANY
ASCENDANTS OR DESCENDANTS. B, THE LEGITIMATE DAUGHTER OF X & Y, CLAIMS A’S ESTATE. IS
B ENTITLED TO INHERIT FROM A?
A101: No. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. [Art. 992]
Q102: A, MARRIED TO B, EXECUTED A WILL BEQUEATHING ALL HER PROPERTIES TO HER FRIEND, C.
UPON A’S DEATH, THE WILL WAS PRESENTED FOR PROBATE. B OPPOSED THE PROBATE OF THE
WILL ON THE GROUND OF PRETERITION. DOES THE OMISSION OF B ANNUL THE INSTITUTION OF C
AS HEIR.
A102: No. B’s omission of A is not preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line, thus Art. 854 does
not apply. The institution of C is valid but only up to the free portion of ½. B, as the surviving spouse, is
still entitled to ½ of A’s estate as his legitime under Art. 900.
Q103: A HAS 3 DAUGHTERS, A1, A2, AND A3. HE DISINHERITED A1 BECAUSE A1 MARRIED A GUY HE
DID NOT LIKE AND INSTITUTED A2 AND A3 TO HIS ENTIRE ESTATE OF P1,000,000. IS THE
DISINHERITANCE VALID?
A103: No, this is a case of ineffective disinheritance, as marrying a man her father does not approve of
is not a ground for disinheritance. Art. 919 provides the grounds for disinheritance of children and
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descendants – The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator,
his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of
the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the
testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits such child
or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Q104: A WAS BORN BLIND. HE WENT TO A SCHOOL FOR THE BLIND, AND LEARNED TO READ IN
BRAILLE. HE SPEAKS ENGLISH FLUENTLY. CAN HE MAKE A WILL?
A104: Assuming that he is of legal age [Art. 797] and of sound mind at the time of execution of the will
[Art. 798], A, a blind person, can make a notarial will, subject to compliance with the “two-reading rule”
[Art. 808] and the provisions of Arts. 804, 805, and 806. The “two-reading rule” states that if the
testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again,
by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
Q106: A, WHILE A FILIPINO CITIZEN, SIRED AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, C, WITH B. HE LATER MIGRATED
TO NEW YORK, USA AND THERE, BECAME AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. THE STATE OF NEW YORK DOES
NOT RECOGNIZE COMPULSORY HEIRS. CAN C, A’S ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, INSIST ON HER LEGITIME
UPON A’S DEATH?
A106: No. A died an American citizen and the national law of the testator determines succession. [Art.
16] Under New York law, compulsory heirs aren’t recognized, therefore, C cannot insist on her legitime.
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Q108: BEN WAS DRIVING ON COMMONWEALTH AVENUE WHEN HE RECEIVED A STARTLING TEXT
MESSAGE FROM HIS WIFE, CAUSING HIM TO HIT THE BRAKES ABRUPTLY. MANONG, WHO WAS THEN
DRIVING A PASSENGER JEEP CARRYING JANE, CRASHED INTO BEN’S CAR FROM BEHIND. JANE
SUFFERED AN ABRASION ON HER FACE AS A RESULT OF THE CRASH AND SUED DOMENG (THE
OWNER OF THE JEEP) FOR DAMAGES. DOMENG ALLEGED IN HIS DEFENSE THAT SINCE BEN’S
NEGLIGENCE IN ABRUPTLY BRAKING WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, DOMENG
CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES TO JANE. IS DOMENG CORRECT?
A108: No. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between the parties; but where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between them, it is
the parties themselves that create the obligation. The action can be prosecuted merely by proving the
existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination. [Calalas v. CA, G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000].
Q109: MARK WAS A BAGGER AT SM HYPERMART. ONE BUSY SUNDAY MORNING, THE SECURITY
GUARD REPORTED TO THE MANAGER THAT HE SAW MARK PLACING A KITKAT BAR IN HIS BAG
WITHOUT PAYING FOR IT. THE MANAGER IMMEDIATELY WENT TO THE BAGGER’S STATION, PULLED
MARK BY HIS COLLAR AND SCREAMED, “MAGNANAKAW! TANGGAL KA NA SA TRABAHO!” UPON
INSPECTION, NO KITKAT BAR WAS FOUND IN MARK’S BAG. THE MANAGER WHISPERED AN
APOLOGY AND SAID THAT MARK WASN’T REALLY FIRED. MARK FILED A COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST THE MANAGER ON THE BASIS OF ARTICLES 19 AND 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE. THE MANAGER
DISCLAIMED LIABILITY ON THE GROUND THAT HE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH UPON A WELL-FOUNDED
BELIEF IN DISMISSING THE EMPLOYEE AND WAS ONLY LOOKING OUT FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE
EMPLOYER. IS THE MANAGER LIABLE FOR DAMAGES?
A109: Yes. While the employer, represented by the manager, has a right to dismiss the employee for
misconduct, the manner of this right was exercised constituted a violation of Article 19, as such was
based on unfounded accusations of dishonesty [Globe v. CA, G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989].
Q110: VALMONTE WAS HIRED AS A WEDDING COORDINATOR. ON THE DAY OF THE WEDDING, SHE
LEFT THE BRIDAL SUITE TO RUN A FEW ERRANDS. UPON HER RETURN, SHE WAS ACCOSTED BY THE
BRIDE’S AUNT CARPIO IN FRONT OF THE ENTIRE ENTOURAGE AND ACCUSED OF STEALING THE
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BRIDE’S JEWELRY THAT HAD GONE MISSING. CAN VALMONTE RECOVER DAMAGES FROM CARPIO
UNDER ARTICLE 19 OF THE CIVIL CODE?
A110: Yes. To find the existence of an abuse of right under Article 19, the following elements must be
present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or
prejudicing or injuring another. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out of the
room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be
immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had
the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof
that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law
is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to
morals and good customs [Carpio v Valmonte G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004].
Q111: WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF A QUASI-DELICT UNDER ARTICLE 2176 OF THE CIVIL CODE?
A111: (1) There must be an act or omission; (2) Such act or omission causes damage to another; (3) Is
caused by fault or negligence; and (4) There is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
4. Adultery or concubinage;
6. Illegal search;
7. Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
8. Malicious prosecution;
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5. Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;
6. In actions for legal support;
7. In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
8. In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
9. In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
10. When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
11. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.
Q114: WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENSE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR?
A114: (1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
(3) he possibility of contributing conduct, which would make the plaintiff responsible, is eliminated.
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There must be pleading and proof of One does not ask for nominal damages,
actual damages suffered for the same to and it is in lieu of the actual, moral,
be recovered. In addition to the fact that temperate, or liquidated damages.
the amount of loss must be capable of
proof, it must also be actually proven with
a reasonable degree of certainty, A violation of the plaintiff’s right, even if
premised upon competent proof or the only technical, is sufficient to support an
best evidence obtainable. The burden of award of nominal damages. Conversely,
proof of the damage suffered is, so long as there is a showing of a
consequently, imposed on the party violation of the right of the plaintiff, an
claiming the same, who should adduce award of nominal damages is proper
the best evidence available in support [Gonzales v PCIB, G.R. No.180257
thereof... In the absence of corroborative February 23, 2011].
evidence, it has been held that self-
serving statements of account are not
sufficient basis for an award of actual
damages [Oceaneering Contractors v
Baretto, G.R. No. 184215, February 9,
2011].
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