B.
PERSONS
CIVIL PERSONALITY
a. JURIDICAL CAPACITY VS CAPACITY TO ACT
b. NATURAL PERSONS
1. Quimiguing v Icao, 34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another
order denying amendment of the same pleading. Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors in Dapitan City, they had close and
confidential relations; although defendant was married, the latter succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by
defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney’s fees.
Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born, the trial
judge sustained defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a
result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant’s objection, ruled that
no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly
to this Court.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM SUPPORT AND DAMAGES
HELD:
YES THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM SUPPORT AND DAMAGES. According to ART. 21 of the Civil Code. Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage. In the case at bar defendant, a married man, to force a plaintiff not his wife to yield to his lust
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim therefore entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Supporting ART. 21, ART 2219 of the same Code provides “Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts: (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28
….Therefore plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint. The orders under appeal are
reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
2. Geluz v Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar Lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt
Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and
to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953
since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became
pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P.
Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesn’t
have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE:
Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who
caused the same.
HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an
unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated. Since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action
could deliberately accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked of juridical
personality under Article 40 of the Civil Code, which expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that
the child should be subsequently alive. Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of moral damages
evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration
of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wife’s indiscretion to
personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It
shows that he’s after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that
serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated
3. Joaquin v Navarro, 93 Phil 257
FACTS:
Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion,
and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club
Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell.  Sr. decided to leave
building. His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his son, his son’s wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez . As they came out, Jr.
was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping may people
presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days.
Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. Trial Court
ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that son outlived his mother.
ISSUE:
Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
HELD:
Reversed. Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons who would
inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the
presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. In light
of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother.  The presumption that AJ died
before her son was based on speculations, not evidence.  Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil
cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct, (2) indirect, (3) circumstantial or (4)
inferential. Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them
died first.  In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to another.  In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
c. JURIDICAL PERSONS
1. Roldan v Philippine Veterans Board, 105 Phil 1081
FACTS:
Mariano Bernardo, a minor, inherited 17 parcels of land from his deceased father. Respondent, Mariano’s step-mother, was
appointed his guardian. As guardian, she sold the 17 parcels to Dr. Ramos, her brother-in-law, for P14,700. After a week, Dr.
Ramos sold the lands to her for P15,000. Subsequently, she sold 4 out of 17 parcels to Emilio Cruz. Petitioner replaced Roldan as
guardian, and two months thereafter, this litigation sought to declare as null and void the sale to Dr. Ramos, and the sale to
Emilio Cruz.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale of the land by the guardian is null and void for being violative of the prohibition for a guardian to purchase
either in person or through the mediation of another the property of her ward
HELD:
Remembering the general doctrine that guardianship is a trust of the highest order, and the trustee cannot be allowed to have
any inducement to neglect his ward’s interest, and in line with the court’s suspicion whenever the guardian acquires ward’s
property we have no hesitation to declare that in this case, in the eyes of the law, Socorro Roldan took by purchase her ward’s
parcels thru Dr. Ramos, and that Article 1459 of the Civil Code applies.
2. Philrock v Bank of Liquidators, 180 SCRA 171
FACTS:
B. PERSONS
Petitioner, Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. (PHILROCK) filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, a complaint against the Board of
Liquidators as liquidator of the defunct Reparations Commission (REPACOM), and prayed among others: that the defective rock
pulverizing machinery which it purchased from REPACOM be replaced with a new one, or to refund its value at 31% of its
contract price; and for actual damages for losses incurred, unrealized profits, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees plus
expenses and costs of the suit. Thereafter, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of PHILROCK where petitioner filed an urgent
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Solicitor General, on behalf of the State, filed a notice of appeal and an opposition to the
motion on the ground that the funds sought to be garnished by PHILROCK are public funds, hence, exempt from attachment and
execution. Nevertheless, the RTC judge issued a Writ of Execution, an order of Garnishment served to Philippine National Bank
against the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators to satisfy judgment in favor of PHILROCK. The Board
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals where it set aside the RTC’s order of execution. PHILROCK
filed this petition for review and contended that the proceeds from the disposal of the assets of REPACOM are funds
appropriated by law.
ISSUE:
Whether the funds of REPACOM in the account of the Board of Liquidators, a government agency, in the PNB may be garnished
to satisfy a money judgment in favor of PHILROCK?
HELD:
No. The Board is a government agency under the direct supervision of the President of the Republic created by EO 372. Pursuant
to PDs 629 and 635-A, it is tasked with the specific duty of administering the assets and paying the liabilities of the defunct
REPACOM and not created for profit or to engage in business. Although the sale of the rock pulverizing plant is proprietary in
nature, it was merely incidental to the performance of the Board’s primary governmental function of settling the affairs of
REPACOM. Hence, its funds in the PNB are public funds exempt from garnishment. Furthermore, being an unincorporated
government agency, it possesses no juridical personality, and suit directed against it, is a suit against its principal, the State. The
state enjoys immunity from suit except when it conducts business thru a government-owned and controlled corporation, or a
non-corporate agency set up primarily for a business purpose. Contention of PHILROCK is not tenable, for an executive order is
not an appropriation law which must only emanate from the legislature, not from the Chief Executive.
3. Municipality of San Fernando v Judge Firme, GR No 52179, April 1991
FACTS:
Petition: certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or
modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme
A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact,
several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a complaint for damages against
the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality and its dump truck
driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Baniña.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the respondent court committed GAD when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
2. W/N the respondent court committed GAD when he held that the municipality is liable for the quasi-delict committed by its
regular employee.
HELD:
1. No. The doctrine of non-suability of the state is expressly provided in Aticle 16, Section3 of the Constitution, “The State may
not be sued without its consent." Thus, the general rule is that they can’t be sued without its express or implied consent. Such
consent can be found in the general or special law. Unfortunately for the municipality, it is written under their charter that they
can sue and be sued.
2. Yes. The question of whether or not the municipality can be held liable for torts committed by its employee depends on
whether or not the driver is performing governmental or proprietary functions. If the employee was committing a governmental
function, they (the municipality) are generally not liable for torts committed by such employee; but if the employee was acting in
a proprietary capacity, the municipality shall be liable for the tort committed. It has been held in a different case that the
construction or maintenance of roads is considered governmental activities. In the case at bar, the driver was on his way to get a
load of sand and gravel for the repair of the municipality street, which is an act of exercising a governmental function. Thus, the
municipality cannot be held liable for torts committed by its regular employee.
4. Torio v Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599
FACTS:
The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 “to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta
celebration…” The “1959 Malasiqui ‘Town Fiesta Executive Committee” was created, which, in turn, organized a sub-committee
on entertainment and stage.
A “zarzuela” troupe, of which Vicente Fontanilla was a member, arrived for their performance on January 22. During the
“zarzuela”, the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was pinned underneath. He was immediately hospitalized, but died the following
day.
Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint to recover damages against the Municipality of Malasiqui, its Municipal Council and all the
Council’s individual members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign
functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to
answer for the negligence of any of its agents.
The councilors maintained that they merely acted as the municipality’s agents in carrying out the municipal ordinance and as
such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care
and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance.
After trial, the RTC dismisses the complaint, concluding that the Executive Committee had exercised due diligence and care in
selecting a competent man for the construction of the stage, and the collapse was due to forces beyond the control of the
committee. Consequently, the defendants were not liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente
Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages:P1200.00 its attorney’s fees; and the costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.
HELD:
Yes. Under Philippine laws, municipalities are political bodies endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be
exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name,
they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with.
The powers of a municipality are two-fold in character: public, governmental or political on the one hand; and corporate, private,
or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the
state and promoting the public welfare. These include the legislative, judicial public, and political. Municipal powers, on the other
hand, are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community. These include those which are ministerial, private
and corporate.
This distinction of powers are necessary in determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in
injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function/duty, no recovery can be had from the
municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties
honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex
contract or ex delicto. They may also be subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.
5. Cease, et al. v Court of Appeals, et. Al, 93 SCRA 493
If there were a valid genuine claim of Exclusive ownership of the inherited properties on the part of petitioners to respondents'
action for partition, then under the Miranda ruling, petitioners would be sustained, for as expressly held therein " the general
rule of partition that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are terminated will not apply where
appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and denies the adverse party's right to any partition."