Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I. Legal Landscape
There are two incorrect perspectives of the Philippine government and legal profession regarding property
rights.
1. First is the Regalian Doctrine
2. Another cites a 1784 decree of Governor Basco y Vargas to support the erroneous assertion that
“until the late nineteenth century, all land technically belonged to the government with the exception
of property awarded to the early datus and their heirs or land sold in usufruct by the government to
private parties.
“No European government, in fact, asserted that the Indians had no claim at all to any of their lands [barring
a grant from the colonial sovereign]. Rather they questioned just what sort of title and political jurisdiction
native rulers possessed under national and natural law.”
The "regalian doctrine" relies on a narrow interpretation of Laws of the Indies Book 4 Title 12 Law 14. It
completely ignores contrary laws within the same title and elsewhere in the Laws of the Indies.
The primary innovation introduced by the Spaniards concerning legal rights to natural resources was the
concept that land could be exclusively owned by individuals.
Initially, the colonial regime recognized two types of private property rights: those held pursuant to
customary criteria and those held by the Crown. Soon after the arrival of Legazpi, private estates were
established on behalf of Spanish citizens by royal grants of crown land.
The Spanish colonial government was bedeviled throughout its existence by confusion and unrest over
land rights. Land laws consisted of "numberless single decrees forming a casuistical, disconnected,
complicated, and confused mass." The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Spanish
administration kept no systematic records of agricultural land.
Despite these vicissitudes, the colonial government, over a span of three and a quarter centuries, created
and upheld a documented individual private property regime.
· Before the concept of individual ownership was introduced, landowning was communal in character
· The phrase from time immemorial really meant that the land had been worked and cultivated before
the arrival of the Spaniards
o Leaders (datu, principalia or cacique) relied on indebted laborers to cultivate their lands
o Debt-free farmer-cultivators - more self-reliant and produced mostly for family
consumption. Their holdings were distinct from land owned by the principalia
· Spanish colonizers did not entirely disregard the land rights of Philippine natives. For example:
Instructions to Legazpi: “you shall not occupy or take possession of any private
property of the Indians”
o Ordinance 8 (1523) prohibited the taking of native properties, farms, livestock, and fruits
unless the sales and ransoms are done voluntarily and entirely free
· The Spanish regime only provided such procedures for individual land rights (including religious
institutions and private corporations)
· Procedures for securing official, documentary registration of communal holdings were never
promulgated. Indigenous communities had no documentary existence. In the minds of Spanish colonizers,
ancestral domains were mere legal abstractions.
· This facilitated illegal usurpation of ancestral lands (except for lands which are far from Manila or
urbanized areas)
· Manuel Bernaldez (colonial official) called for the Crown to require all landowners to secure official
documentation. This would effectively convert indigenes into squatters.
· All lands not owned pursuant to customary laws belong to the Crown
· Royal lands were bestowed upon deserving individuals. The modes of granting rights are as follows:
o Titulo real – rights by way of a royal grant (none made in the Philippines)
o Once rights are granted and documents, any encroachment on adjoining areas will be
sanctioned
o Grantees held usufructuary rights (right of one individual to use and enjoy the property
of another)
o Terrenos baldios or abandoned Crown lands are deemed to revert to the Crown for
failure to cultivate for two years
Legua comunal – common league; 20,000 square feet of land reserved for
common use
o For municipalities or barrios, royal lands use by them for payment of public expenses
are called bienes proprios
● Between 1571 and 1626, Spanish governors made at least 208 royal land grants (concessiones
especial) mostly on behalf of soldiers, colonial officials, Spanish citizens and native leaders if the
were deemed to be deserving.
● New Spain (Mexico) Royal grant size measurements:
○ Estancia para danado mayor- large estate, for cattle breeding
○ Estancia para ganado menor- 3/5 as large, for grazing goats, sheep, pigs and horses
○ Caballeria- 68 hectares
○ Cabalita or peonia- 34 hectares (half as large as caballeria)
○ Pedazo- irregular plots of unknown size
● Titolos de concesion especial o extraordinario were the most common form of royal grant in the
Philippine colony, usually made on behalf of soldiers and other colonial officials or subjects as
compensation for meritorious service.
● The governor-general decided whether or not a request for a special or extraordinary grant was
granted, including whether or not to sell land rights to natives.
● Governor-general did not have the authority to approve grants “within lands already settled and
cultivated”
● Manila- most land covered by royal grants
○ Tondo- all in behalf of the Spaniards
■ 19 estancias mayor (cattle ranches)
■ 9 estancias menor
■ 54 caballerias
● Pampanga- main native beneficiaries of early royal grants
○ Between 1585 and 1593, 67 grants were supposedly made on behalf of natives for aiding
spanish colonists as noted by Larkin and Cushner:
■ Pampangan leadership was the first native group to solidify their elite status in
regional society
■ Viewed as the most valuable among the native population due to their complete
and constant loyalty
○ Land Grants:
■ Cebu- 13
■ Cagayan- 11
■ Pangasinan- 2
■ Camarines-9
■ Bataan- 490 cabalitas
● During the early years of Spanish occupations, failure to cultivate agricultural and grazing lands
covered by royal grants, extortion from the encomenderos and non-productive consumption of
Spaniards contributed to a food shortage in the colonies in Manila.
○ Prompted the discontinuation of issuing royal grants
○ Purchase or donation of customary rights became the only legal ways to acquire
documented recognition of ownership
● Spanish colonizers quickly lost interest in establishing themselves as farmers or plantation owners
and their lands ended up mortgaged, sold, or donated to religious institutions
○ When they were not able to settle their obligations the friars or diocesan priests foreclosed.
● Religious orders were able to steadily expand their rights over prime agricultural lands
● Royal grants prompted a significant change in the allocation of natural resources and introduced a
concept of private individual ownership of land (started a whole series of devastating socio-
economic practices)
● The Commoditization of land rights was one of the most important changes prompted by royal
grants
● During the 16th and 17th centuries, local native elites began to secure individually documented
land rights in southern Luzon and encroached on communal and Crown lands.
● The late 19th century saw the emergence of haciendas owned by native and mestizo landlords
linked to the economic development following the expansion of trade
V. Church Estates
● Religious institutions were initially prohibited from owning land but Manila bishop, Domingo Salazar
urged the Crown to revoke the prohibition (Letter to the Bishop from the Governor dated March 21,
1591)
● Ecclesiastical estates became the largest Spanish-owned uncultivated or poorly cultivated estates
(latifundia)
● Many of the lands were illegally acquired and expanded by native chiefs and datus by encroaching
on the adjoining areas
● The friars resorted to various methods to populate their estates:
○ Exemption from forced labor were provided to natives who worked on the estates
○ Cash advances were made to prospective tenants
○ Loaned crops, tools and works animals to actual tenants
● The monastical haciendas became a substantial source of income for the religious orders
● Some friars, motivated by Christian principles, would supposedly speak out against the illegal
acquisition of ancestral domains. However, this wasn’t a common occurrence and the larger portion
of the lands were most likely acquired by the religious orders illegally.
● By 1898 31 friar estates covered approximately 170,917.56 hectares. These areas included:
○ Bulacan: 24.3%
○ Laguna: 28.8%
○ Cavite: 82%
○ Rizal: almost 100%
● These places would provide the most important source of support for the Philippine Revolution in
1896.
● Audencia – responsible for seeing (1) that customary property rights were respected and (2) that
possession of ancestral domains illegally sold, donated, or otherwise usurped was restored
among the rightful owners.
o This was notoriously unsuccessful.
● The legal admonitions on behalf of indigenes were balanced against the prerequisite of sustaining
the colonial regime.
● Many traditional leaders, unilaterally or through collusion and coercion, sold alienable village
lands to each other or to Spanish Citizens.
● Colonial policies of exploitation involved “smaller landholdings owned by a native upper class who
were made responsible for delivering to the Spanish authorities labor and commodities.
● Colonial laws were ineffective in preventing indigenous communal holdings from being replaced
by concentrated and consolidated individual private properties under a feudal-like organization.
● Continuous expansion of friar estates encroached on surrounding native farms and villages.
● People threatened with usurpation – often resisted and those who lost their lands frequently
sought to regain them.
● German traveler Jagor (1866): Native people often presented their testimonies in court and assert
that they inherited these very lands from their father and have never ceased to work them
● In response to the rising clamor, the colonial regime sought at regular intervals and with varying
degrees of success, to make the orders prove title to the lands in the same manner that was
required of other corporations and individuals.
o The audienca commanded each alcalde mayor to examine the situation in his district.
● Natives continued to resist, and complaints continued to be heard in Madrid. The Crown’s
concerns were not only about the peace and order; but also to native control over land resources
– which resulted to native tributes or taxes in kind or in specie
● Complaints against Spanish usurpations were not usually successful. When confronted by clerical
opposition, oidores abandoned their commissions and recommended that the friars be left alone.
● Composicion de tierras
o Originated in late sixteenth century Mexico and Peru
o A way to prevent the illegal taking of land.
o Defective titles were legitimized upon payment of a fee to the insular regime.
o Conducted in the Philippines during periodic visits to private estates by insular Spanish
officials.
o If the actual size of landholding was larger than the stated per records, a fee was
exacted.
LYNCH, Chapter 6
Agricultural Intensification and the Theoretical Extinguishment of Ancestral Rights
(1745-1898)
1. Starting in 1700, the Spanish Bourbon monarchs ruled and placed less emphasis on
religious proselytization and the protection of native lands.
2. Royal Decree October 15, 1754
a. Outlined modes for acquiring and conveying land rights within Spanish colonies.
b. “Long and continuous possession” was sufficient basis for recognition of native
ownership and indigenes do not need to possess documentary titles for their land
rights to be recognized.
c. Ineffective and illegal usurpations of ancestral domains continued.
3. Ordinance of Roan - Governor-General Jose Roan (1765-1770)
a. Declared that it was of great importance to the state that all Indians have the
necessary lands.
b. The territory of native reductions and villages is communal.
c. Expressly prohibited the sale of customarily-held lands, unless permission was
first secured from the fiscal of the Audiencia.
4. Governor-General Jose Basco y Vargas (1778-1787)
a. Concentrated on developing the natural resources of the country and attempted
to implant principles that would favorably affect agriculture and industry.
b. General Economic Development Plan
■ Designed to stimulate and encourage the involvement of private
enterprise and supported numerous projects geared towards agricultural
intensification, primarily by the issuances of monopoly licenses
c. Tobacco monopoly was Basco’s most significant achievement, while sugar also
contributed to the regime’s growing prosperity.
d. Considered indigenes to be an obstacle to his economic objectives.
e. Believed natives cheated landed proprietors who had invested time, capital and
energy to develop “land which was previously untilled and wasted.”
f. Appointed prosecutors, sheriffs and judges-extraordinary to assist in the
preservation of order due to increase in outlawry and highway robbery.
g. The commercial export-economy foreshadowed “an increase in the concentration
of land ownership and in the number of sharecroppers."
5. The preferred management strategy of the new breed of large landowners (hacenderos)
was to lease a portion of the estate to fixed-rent tenants (inquilines) who would sublet
the land to the sharecroppers (kasamas)
6. The emergence of production intermediaries was advantageous to estate owners,
making it easier to collect rent.
7. On most large estates, the sharecroppers and landless laborers occupied the bottom
rung on the hacienda social order. In the eyes of the judiciary, the subleasing agreement
had no binding effect on the haciendera administration.
8. Transformations in the character of rural societies was only felt in Southern Luzon and
Manila until the latter half of the 18th century.
9. Subsistence farming was displaced by production for foreign markets, while legal control
over agricultural land resources was increasingly concentrated in the hands of a
comparatively small number of people.
Absentee Ownership
1. Due to emergence of production intermediaries (e.g., Mestizos)
2. Originated in pre-contact institutions of debt-servitude
3. Replaced “face-to-face associations between superiors and inferiors” (Patron-client)
4. Recognized that owners no longer had personal contact with tenants
Landless Laborer
1. Most evident in the island of Negros - became the primary producer of PH sugar cane,
grown on large estates (324 documented landowners had rights to 62,162 hectares)
2. Negros hacenderos reaped enormous profits while tenants lived in squalor
3. 1880s - Hacenderos started to employ wage laborers to replace tenants as they did not
need to be supported during “slack time” (few tasks)
In 1784, Gov. Basco (champion of agricultural monopolies and large estates) publicly
condemned pacto de retro as evil.
By the second half of the 18th century, it was so common that it was impossible for the Spanish
judicial officialdom to determine in the piles of papers who actually had rights to the land in
question.
The Spanish regime eventually legalized the problem by officially sanctioning pacto de retro in
código civil (1889), renamed as the Code as a contract of “conventional redemption”. (This
might benefit small-scale owner-cultivators.)
1. This official documentation was considered a prerequisite for capital investment and
rapid expansion of agricultural production, especially for export.
2. Background:
a. No systematic/comprehensive registration scheme until 1880.
b. Many then started to have their property transactions notarized.
3. Property registration was motivated by the desire to secure the rights of creditors whose
loans were guaranteed by land.
4. In 1563, the king had ordered to establish escribania de cabildo offices (secretary of the
municipal council) in Spanish colonies, to register all repartimientos (apportionments)
made by municipal councils. Repartimientos were then presented to the colony’s
viceroy/president for approval.
5. On Feb 5, 1768, the Crown ordered to establish contadurias de hipoteca (mortgage
registration offices), manned by escribanos de Ayuntamiento (municipal secretaries).
6. In 1804: a mortgage office was established in Manila but the offices were not organized
and registries were not kept. Alcaldes mayores also had the function of escribanos
receptores de hipotecas (mortgage registrars).
7. Dec 13, 1838: Royal Order requiring all public documents be registered in the contaduria
de hipoteca, popularly known as oficio de hipotecas.
8. The church, and presumably other sectors of the land elite, opposed the establishment
of land registration offices and the issuance of documentary titles based on mere
possession.
9. Royal Decree of June 25, 1880
a. imposed limits on the size of the lands that could be acquired through purchase
or composición:
i. 1,000 hectares on arid lands
ii. 500 hectares on lands with trees
iii. 100 hectares on irrigable lands
b. Bona fide possesors of royal land for 10 years were considered owners.
c. Those in possession of royal lands but could not exhibit title deeds were
wrongfully withholding them, therefore are required to seek an adjustment of
them.
d. Provided one-year period to voluntarily register private property rights.
e. Ownership rights without registration were vulnerable to usurpation.
10. Dec 26, 1884: decree to decentralize the registration process of “expedientes”
(registration petitions).
a. Background: The backlog of expediente approval of the Inspección General de
Montes (Department of Forestry) was big and growing, and delays were
excessive.
b. Solution: Expedientes were classified into 3 categories:
i. under 10 hectares - free of charge. Under juntas local (municipal level):
parish priest as honorary president, gobernadorcillo as president, and
oldest resident of the barrio
ii. 10-50 hectares - under juntas provincial de composiciones de terrenos
realengos (provincial boards of royal land adjustments). Governor,
gobernadorcillo of the provincial capital, oldest member of the municipal
board, and a local priest.
iii. more than 50 hectares - forestry department retained jurisdiction
11. Registration scheme problem: shortage of licensed surveyors. The juntas enlisted
unlicensed surveyors but many are incompetent/dishonest. But not everyone suffered
from the incompetence and corruption as the large landholders are so well represented
in the boards.
12. 1888: the Spanish regime acknowledged again that the registration process was not
working. August 31, 1888: Royal Decree abolished juntas, narrowed the jurisdiction of
provincial boards to applications covering fewer than 30 hectares.
13. Registration process was impervious (delays, extortions). Many abandoned their efforts
to register.
14. Native and mestizo elites lobbied for a more efficient/effective means so that they could
use the land as collateral. Laws were enacted.
CARINO 1
OVERVIEW
Doctrine A parcel of land being of common origin, presumptively belonged to the State during
its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by
private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the
State.
RELEVANT FACTS
● February 23, 1904. Cariño filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration for him to be granted a
title of a parcel of land in Baguio, Province of Benguer consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are and 13
centares, together with a house erected thereon.
● Based on testimony of Cariño:
○ 1884. Cariño erected and utilized as domicile a house on a property situated to the north of
the current property in question. The property now belongs to Donal Sim.
○ 1893: Cariño sold the said house to Cristobal Marcos, who later on sold the same to
Donaldson Sim. Cariño then moved and lived on the adjoining property of H. Phelps
Whitmarsh.
○ 1898. Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh, and located and lived on the property in
question.
● A petition of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad was heard because they claim that a small
portion of land included in the petition of Cariño.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
● The Court of Land Registration dismiss the two (2) petitions. It declared that Cariño and his
predecessors have not possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said property prior to
the date on which Cariño constructed the house now there. In 1897 and 1898, Cariño held
possession for some years afterwards of only a small part of property in question.
NO.
Under the express provisions of Spanish law, a parcel of land being of common origin, presumptively
belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of
such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State.
There was no proof of title of egresion of the subject land from the domain of the Spanish
Government.
The land is not covered nor does it come within the three conditions required by the royal decree of
February 13, 1894 for the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. The
subject land was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions
thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain, it has apparently not been used by the petitioner
for any purpose.
Under the above-cited royal decree, a period of one year is allowable to verify the possessory
information. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession
to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state,
or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns
would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold
within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included
under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands
in accordance with common law.
In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be certain that
he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government
or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately.
Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, as basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The
petitioners claim the title under the period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well
as by reason of his occupancy and use from time immemorial. But said act admits such
prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands not exceeding more
than 16 hectares in extent."
Under Sec. 6 of Act No. 627, the land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into
consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares. Therefore, it follows that the judgment
denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked.
On the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same. According to
the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not determined. From
all of which, it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on
which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the
petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the intention of
Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his children have
already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in
different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration.
DISPOSITION
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is afrmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After
the expiration of twenty days from the notication of this decision let judgment be entered in accordance
herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper
action. So ordered.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
None.
CARINO 2
OVERVIEW
Ponente Holmes, J.
Provision
Summary Mateo Cariño applied for a title to a land that his family has occupied from the
Spanish times till the American period. The Insular government opposed the
application saying that their land is public land and they never had ownership. The
US Supreme Court ruled that Cariño has ownership over the land.
Doctrine
RELEVANT FACTS
● Applicant and plaintiff in error Mateo Cariño is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, is petitioning
for a title to be granted for a parcel of land he occupies in Baguio City.
● For more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go,
the plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners.
● For all intents and purposes. they had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had
inherited or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom.
● No document of title, however, had been issued from the Spanish Crown.
● In 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made an application for one under the royal decrees
then in force, nothing seems to have come of it.
● In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition with the Philippine Court of Land Registration, alleging
ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him.
● The application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904 but it only established a possessory
title.
Arguments (Petitioner/s) Arguments (Respondent/s)
● Their family has occupied and owned the ● Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to
land for generations. all the land in the Philippines
● There was no prescription against the
Crown, and
● If there was, a decree of June 25, 1880,
required registration within a limited time
to make the title good;
● The plaintiff's land was not registered, and
therefore became, if it was not always,
public land;
● The United States succeeded to the title of
Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no
rights that the Philippine government is
bound to respect.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
● An appeal was taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the
Insular Government of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, who allege that
the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never
acquired in any manner.
● The Court of First Instance found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds of law.
● This judgment was affirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case was then
brought to the US Supreme Court by writ of error.
YES.
The position of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had title to all the
land in the Philippines; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and that, if there was, a
decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the
plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land; that the
United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine
government is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the Crown of Spain
in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the Treaty of Paris, to which the United States
succeeded, then plaintiff's case is at an end.
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held
from the Crown. It is true also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute and that the United States,
as Spain, may assert absolute power. But it does not follow that the United States asserts that Spain
had such power against the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States.
Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose
of the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that the reason for our taking over the
Philippines was different. No one would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our
first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their
country for private gain.
By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are
to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that "no law shall be enacted in said islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws."
We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title a
trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat.
Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present.
As far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership. It will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been public land. If there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we
ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.
The older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly
that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. Spain did not
assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers, or even into tenants at
will.
The decree of June 25, 1880, provides that, for all legal effects, those who have been in possession for
certain times shall be deemed owners.
It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not without
difficulties for courts of a different legal tradition.
We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty
and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed.
Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be
deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a
refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
DISPOSITION
Judgment reversed.
NO SEPARATE OPINIONS.
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL LAND LAW AND KALINGA LAND LAW
Lourdes Sereno and Roan Libarios
Introduction
● 1521: The first wave of Spanish conquistadores arrived and subsequently, claimed
ownership of an archipelago of 7,100 islands, they also planted the initial seeds of
resistance
● Tribal Filipinos stood up and offered strong resistance:even against succeeding
waves of colonial conquest and domination
● This tradition of resistance has been the unifying thread of their history: defending
their land
● Today, land has remained at the center of the tribal Filipinos' struggle.
○ Government's failure to understand and recognize indigenous systems of
land ownership.
○ Communal ownership is Iooked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.
○ As a result, the issue of usurpation versus preservation of ancestral lands
has become the focal point of the interaction between national land laws
and policies and the indigenous forms of land ownership - the indigenous
Kalinga story.
● The Kalinga Struggle
○ an example of the unlimited capacity - of a people to defend their land; and
○ dramatized the inherent antagonism between the national and indigenous
systems and concepts-of land ownership.
● Objective of the Text:
○ To facilitate a deeper discussion of the interface between national land laws
and policies vis-a-vis indigenous Kalinga land laws,
○ First section: basic concepts underlying the national system of land
ownership and government policies on ancestral land.
○ Second section: indigenous Kalinga system of land ownership, the modes
of land use and classification, forms of land acquisition and the means of
settling disputes on land.
○ Third section: analyze the conflict between national land laws and policies
and indigenous Kalinga laws on land ((1) Ancestral land vs. Public domain;
(2) National vs. Indigenous Kalinga systems of ownership; and (3) National
development projects vs. Tribal land preservation)
All those lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by
Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him.
This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so
granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king
was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private
person had been in the adverse occupation of them.
By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are
required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be
fixed by them, their title papers.
(t was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of
time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by
them without any action
● The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754: reinforced the Recopilacion when
it ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order,
directing the publication of the instructions of the Crown:
Any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal
lands, whether or not ... cultivated or tenanted, may ... appear and
exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which
said lands are occupied.
Otherwise, within the term designated, without a just and valid reason
therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they
will be granted to others.
EXCEPTION: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds it shall be sufficient if they show ... ancient possession, as a
valid title by prescription;”
● The natives and Spanish and Chinese authorized the following to initiate
adjustment proceedings:
(1) good faith possessors for ten years, by virtue of a good title;
(2) good faith possessors for twenty years, of cultivated lands, or for thirty
years, if uncultivated, without title deeds;
(3) possessors of land without title deeds, who are willing to purchase
such land; and
(4) purchasers of "wild" land.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed
if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he
did that the State remained the absolute owner.
● In conclusion, the Court stated: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there
was no law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain
the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the
State."
US SC Spain SC
Lee Hong Hok, the petitioner, claimed the disputed parcel of land by way
of accretion.
Defendant, on the other hand, had a sales patent in his name, issued by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on the basis of which
a Torrens title was issued.
The petitioners claimed that the government never was the owner of the
land; hence it did not have the power to sell the same. The government
claimed otherwise, asserting that the land was the product of its
reclamation efforts.
The Court in Lee Hong Hok, did not bother to explain why it was
abandoning the Carihio doctrine.
What makes the position more difficult for skeptics of the Regalian
doctrine is the Court's pronouncement of the doctrine's integration into the
fiber of Philippine constitutional law.
3. Present Controversies
Owen Lynch: Regalian Doctrine was never clearly adopted in the
Philippines
The snub given the Carino decision is a blow to proponents of native title,
but there is a possibility that Carino might be adopted again by the Court.
The only way to reconcile Lee Hong Hok and Carino, is to view Carino as
having carved out an exception to the Regalian Doctrine.
Sir Robert Torrens, lobbied and carried it into operation. He got the idea
from the English Merchants Shipping Act which governed the
conveyancing and filing of interests in ships.
Before Torrens:
All transactions and claims were registered without distinction as to
superiority of rights or as to birth or extinguishment of liens. Anybody
who wanted to deal with land had to pore over tons of documents to
uncover the legal status of claims to it. A buyer in good faith had to
contend with the possibility that an adverse claim might threaten him in
the future.
With Torrens:
Ultimate proof as to ownership and description of land is immediately
revealed on the certificate, precluding any other unknown or undeclared
claim.
Cameron predicted that under the Torrens system, real estate will
become a liquid asset which banks may be expected to loan funds. He
was correct.
2. Guiding Philosophy
a) Land as Commodity
With the Torrens system, land would be as liquid as any asset, on
the security of which many financial transactions would transpire.
Land, by virtue of the Torrens. system can pass hands by the mere
exchange of money, execution of the requisite documents, and the
registration of such documents.
Anybody who wishes to deal with the land need look only at the
certificate of title. Transactions in good faith, entered into on that
basis, will be safeguarded by the State.
Aggrieved party can sue and seek indemnity from the State
Assurance Fund, but this is inadequate when a people relate to
land, not in the Western concept of land as 'commodity,' but as
something integral to their social existence. Then, money can never
approximate the loss.
b) Process of Registration
The premises upon which the whole registration proceedings rest are: (1) a high
degree of literacy-- are able to grasp the import of legal practices like publication
of notice, documentation requirements and judicial proceedings; (2) the
abundance of mass-circulated newspapers and (3) the financial capacity of most
Filipinos to avail themselves of national legal processes.
Kalingas live in the Cordillera mountain range which originally served as refuge
ground for upland and lowland inhabitants who resisted Spanish and American
colonial rule.
Kalingas were originally small bands of hunter-gatherer close kins. They began to
develop kaingin and settled down in scattered areas along mountain swiddents.
Clusters of close kin groups stabilized into subsistent villages called ili in Kalinga
with the development of irrigated farming. Basic
1. Land as sacred
● Every man has the right to enjoy the land and its resources, but
nobody can claim absolute ownership. Only Apo Kabuniyan - the
Supreme Deity owns them.
2. Land as source of life
● Land is not only sacred but is also the basis of their existence.
● Land is the most valued property since it is almost the basic
dependence on land that gives continuity and meaning not only to
economic production, but also to the socio-cultural system.
● Not only is land communal - even production is communal.
Without communal organization, it is difficult to sustain a self-
sufficient Kalinga community.
C. Classification of Lands and Their Modes of Usage
1. Residential areas
● Irregular, but largely equal in size.
● Lies at the hear of the ili
2. Rice terraces
● small , irregular parcels of land near river banks and mountain
hillsides
● Each family generally cultivates an just enough to sustain the
family
3. Swidden farms
● Areas allotted for dry rice or kaingin agriculture
4. Forest areas
● Virgin forests covering deep mountain ranges
● For hunting and building materials
5. Pasture or grazing ground
● Communal grazing grounds for domesticated animals
6. Tree farms
● Where pine trees are grown.
● Materials for house construction
D. System of Ownership
Ownership is transmitted orally according to well-established unwritten
customary rules.
The right to enjoy benefits under the two systems of ownership is determined by
an individual’s relationship to the community
1. Communal ownership
● Everybody shares
2. Limited individual ownership
E. Modes of Settling Land Disputes
III. Dimensions of the Interface
A. Public Land vs. Ancestral Land
B. National v. Indigenous System of Land Ownership (page 29)
Ownership to land was established by indigenous law, and disputes were
resolved by customary procedures.
Indigenous Kalinga land laws and national land laws tend to operate
independently of each other; inherently antagonistic, their history is colored with
a struggle for dominance. This is because they are drawn apart by entirely
different historical origins and economic bases.
Numerous and vigorous government campaigns have been led to introduce the
Western system of land ownership into the Kalinga life. Individual ownership of
land is more marked in areas where exposure to the school system, commercial
enterprises, and the cash economy is greater. But this introduction is often
accompanied by tension and even violence, the strongest of which offered by the
papangat and the village elders.
Despite the government’s claim that ancestral Kalinga land belongs to the “public
domain”, this is contradicted by recognizing tax receipts as proof of private
ownership and as ground for mortgages and foreclosures of allegedly “public”
land.
Disputes are also harder to resolve as educated Kalingas refuse to recognize the
papangat’s authority with customary rules.
The government drew widespread hostility and its efforts to dampen the
Kalingas’ anger only widened the rift. They did not only offend tribal
custom but also rekindled the spirit of struggle inherent in their traditions.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
The antagonism between national and indigenous Kalinga land laws is nurtured by the
government ignoring the latter.
If the Kalinga struggle has escalated in recent years, this is because the occupation of
their ancestral lands has also intensified.
Any solution to the problem will fail unless it is grounded on a holistic view of the
Kalingas’ indigenous concepts, system of land ownership, and relationship to their socio-
economic cultural life.
Recommendations:
1. Recognition of ancestral land rights
2. Recognition and protection of indigenous system off land ownership
3. Recognition and promotion of the indigenous mode of settling land disputes
CRUZ V SECRETARY OF DENR
OVERVIEW
Provision Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
Summary Petitioners Cruz, et al seeks to assail the constitutionality of certain provisions of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) or RA 8371, and its implementing
rules and regulations
RELEVANT FACTS
● Petitioners argue that the following provisions of the IPRA and its IRR are unconstitutional in that
they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain
as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
○ "(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
defines ancestral lands;
○ "(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;
○ "(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;
○ "(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
○ (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
○ "(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and
○ Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.
● In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction
of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due
process clause of the Constitution:
○ (1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
○ "(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the
following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary
of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
○ "(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property
rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation
○ "(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
○ "(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."
● Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998,
which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes
upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
● In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),
the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
● On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
● On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
● On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae
and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
● On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation
for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the
Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
WHETHER OR NOT The Assailed Provisions of the IPRA and its IRR are Unconstitutional Commented [1]: for the main opinion, sinabi lang nila
nag vote sila. 7 voted to dismiss, Kapunan filed an
NO. opinion joined by 4 other Justices. So I might as well put
Kapunan's opinion here since the "main opinion" does
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands not really say anything.
and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.
According to the petitioners, the King of Spain, by virtue of international law, acquired exclusive
dominion over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King
under the theory of jura regalia, which was introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in
1521, acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago. This means that the Philippine State, as a
successor of Spain, owns all ancestral domains and lands.
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership
since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular Government.
Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held
in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
Furthermore, Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect the
rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary sense, the term "right"
refers to any legally enforceable claim. Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of
public lands, mineral lands and other natural resources should be read together with the other
provisions thereof which firmly recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples.
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the State’s ownership over the natural resources
within the ancestral domains.
Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain
and other natural resources, as well as the State’s full control and supervision over the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources.
However, Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral
domains belong to the State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the
NCIP with respect to ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to the lands
and not to the natural resources therein.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional.
The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural
resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation
and utilization of these resources, and to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of such
natural resources.
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources must be under the full control and supervision of the
State, which may directly undertake such activities or enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements. This provision, however, should not be read in isolation to avoid a
mistaken interpretation that any and all forms of utilization of natural resources other than the foregoing
are prohibited.
In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources
stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third paragraph of the
same section that Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its
citizens. Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the State, in the disposition and utilization of natural
resources, to apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship. Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII
mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine and
fishing resources. Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-
poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony with the other provisions of the
Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement,cannot be construed as a prohibition
against any and all forms of utilization of natural resources without the State’s direct
participation.
Petitioners contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous peoples, but not
those who are not members of such communities. Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section
56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject
to the vested rights of the same communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such
interpretation is obviously incorrect.
The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether
indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic
origins of the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes and respects
"vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples.
Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.163 What IPRA only
requires is that these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.
As regards the primacy of customary law pertaining to all conflicts related to ancestral domains and
lands, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes concerning
ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization
of customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through
legislation passed by Congress.
DISPOSITION
Judgment reversed.
SEPARATE OPINIONS.
PUNO
COLONIAL ERA
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium. This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian
Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the
country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.
In simple terms, the Regalian Doctrine provides tha t all lands of the public domain as well as all
natural resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. In
addition, this doctrine also holds that all private titles of land emanate from the State.
In the American Era, the SC decided a case in Valenton, which answers the question of which is the
better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or paper title. The Court ruled that there was no
law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by
prescription, without any action by the State. Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued
to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of
the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of
public land.
This Doctrine has been carried on under the Torrens system, which regulates the disposition of public
land.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating objectives
of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources
of the country.28 There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of
state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of
natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state.
The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions likewise reiterated the same doctrine.
THE IPRA
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which t races
its origin to native title.
The Indigenous People have lived in the Philippines since time immemorial. Their laws were either
customary or written. They had no concept of private ownership of land and the right of usufruct was what
was regulated at the time.
Then the Muslims came and introduced an asiatic form of feudalism where the land was still held in
common but private in use.
Then the Spaniards came and settled permanently in the Philippines. All lands lost by the barangays
were now declared to be under the ownership of the Crown. The abrogation of the Filipinos'
ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public domain were the most
immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law.
The infiels (indigenes) resisted the Spanish rule, and they were driven out to the hinterlands. The Spanish
could no longer pursue them so deep in the jungle, so their culture, and political, social and economic
systems were relatively preserved.
When the Americans came, they wanted to adopt the same policy they did with the Native American
Indians -- assimilation. They created the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT) to aid in this objective.
The 1935 Constitution did not carry out a policy on Non-Christian Filipinos. In 1957, the Commission on
National Integration was established. The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT
during the American regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial
policy of assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.
It was only in the 1973 Constitution that the highest law of the land recognized the indigenous people.
Marcos promulgated the Ancestral Lands Decree which provided for the issuance of land occupancy
certificates to members of the national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their
claims.
The Aquino Government took a different approach to indigenous people, from a policy of integration to
that of preservation.
CONCEPT OF LAND
There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of
land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the
secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his
claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary
owners.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND ANCESTRAL LANDS ARE THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OF THE
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes:
(1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land
Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
NATIVE TITLE
Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches,
have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are
thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conques t. (REFER TO
CARINO V INSULAR GOV)
TORRENS TITLE
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by
the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of
registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts
ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary
implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land
simply for registration purposes.
The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not
Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their
Development and Exploitation.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domains
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate
small-scale utilization of natural resources.
Large-scale utilization of natural resources is likewise allowed. The IPRA provides that the ICCs/IPs shall
have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources
within the ancestral domains.
HOWEVER
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the
IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural Commented [2]: Only the State owns Natural
resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These Resources
rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to
consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural
resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or
vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
C. CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious
differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through the
imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. Largely unpopulist, the
present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous
peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and
are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made
by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common
experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the
decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to
truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing
democratization, it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in
the country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.