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STATCON FINALS

Week 1: Introduction
Caltex v Palomar Definition of Statutory Construction:
·∙ Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the
given case is not explicitly provided for in the law
·∙ Inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein
People v Mapa When construction is necessary:
·∙ The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law
·∙ Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them
Alonzo v IAC Construction is necessary when legislative intent cannot be readily ascertained from the words used in the law as applied under a set
of facts:
·∙ Cardinal rule: In seeking the meaning of the law, judges should first discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
·∙ The law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. We presume the
good motives of the legislature which is to render justice.
·∙ There are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances.
·∙ In such a situation, find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
·∙ "The letter that killeth" versus "the spirit that vivifieth" to give effect to the law maker's will
o For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter
but not within the spirit is not within the statute
·∙ This is an exception to the general rule. Verba legis first before ratio legis!
Endencia v David Judicial function:
·∙ Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of
said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because
if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional
·∙ A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere. It shall be so construed as not
to violate the constitutional inhibition.
I. Characteristics of Construction:
1. Art or process
·∙ No silver bullet
o Intrinsic – words or phrases within the law
o Extrinsic – outside of the law (deliberations, news, etc.)
·∙ Basic principles:
o Principle of effectiveness – give full effect to the statute
o Constitutionality
o Avoid absurdity
o Presumptions (ex. Adoption – construe in favour of the benefit of the child)
o Construe as a whole (ex. Consti – relate articles to each other)
2. Involves determination of legislative intent
·∙ Check the purpose of the law
o Verba legis – letter of the law (Speech is the index of intention)
Words of the law and the source of legislative intent
Assume Congress knows what they were writing. Congress meant what it said. If it is clear, apply it!
o Ratio legis – spirit of the law prevails over letter of the law
·∙ Check the evil sought to be avoided (ex. Dinagat Island case, Philex v Floresca)
·∙ Courts can construe but not legislate
·∙ However, spirit must not be used as an excuse not to follow the letter of the law. Speech is the index of intention. Speech is manifest.
3. Necessary when legislative intent cannot be readily ascertained from the words used in the law as applied under a set of facts Ambiguity
·∙ When there are two or more reasonable interpretations
·∙ See  how  the  law  applies  to  the  facts;  don’t  just  apply  it  because the facts may be different
·∙ Two types:
o Patent – actual words are ambiguous
o Latent – as applied
4. Judicial function
·∙ There must be an actual controversy – judiciary  is  passive,  won’t  act  without  a  case
·∙ When there is an ambiguity of statute construction only necessary when there is ambiguity
·∙ Subject matter of construction: Constitution, statutes, executive issuances, and ordinances
·∙ Statute must not be in conflict with the Constitution
·∙ Legislative cannot interfere.
·∙ Executive is capable of contemporaneous construction out of necessity, such as in IRRs and Opinions issued. These are persuasive only.

II. Purpose of construction: ascertain true intent


III. Subject matter of construction: Constitution, statutes, executive issuances, and ordinances
IV. Related legal principles:
·∙ Separation of powers (legislative cannot interfere with judiciary re: interpretation, executive IRRs and opinions merely persuasive)
·∙ Checks and balances (constitutionality of the laws)
·∙ Hierarchy of laws
o Constitution statutes jurisprudence international law
o Congress has plenary power of laws. It can pass long as long as it is not contrary to the Constitution. (Art 7 Civil Code on subsequent provisions)
o Only a law can repeal a law.
·∙ Stare decisis
o Judicial decisions form part of the law
o Follow interpretation of the courts; uniformity and stability
Week 2
Parts of a Statute
Art. VI Sec. 26(1), 1987 Constitution: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Govt of the 1. Title
Philippine Islands ·∙ The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.
v HSBC ·∙ It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth
Eugenio v Drilon 2. Preamble
·∙ The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and
purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
·∙ Intent can be derived from the preamble.
3. Enacting clause
4. Body
5. Repealing Clause
(Everything defined on p. 6 of reviewer) Text
Antonio v Miranda 6. Separability Clause
and Tatad v DOE ·∙ The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in statute creates the presumption that
the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity, of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that
it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out
the legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the act in a
manner contrary to the intention of the legislature. The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal effect or
efficacy for any purpose whatsoever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the
court has no power to legislate.
·∙ The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole
the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another,
the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if
some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
Tanada v Tuvera 7. Effectivity Clause
1985 and 1986 ·∙ Ignorantia legis non excusat
·∙ It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
·∙ The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensible.
Limitation on the Power of the Courts to Construe
Tanada v Yulo ·∙ By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language use, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing them are able
to find their true meaning.
·∙ There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something
that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced.
o The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power.
o The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the
executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
Week 3
Verba Legis v Ratio Legis
Tanada v Yulo ·∙ If a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
(supra); Globe- ·∙ Plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid
Mackay Cable and presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from
Radio Corp v NLRC construing it differently.
and Salazar ·∙ The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute.
·∙ Verba legis non est recedendum or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Alonzo v IAC ·∙ Courts must exercise vigilance in examining statutes because some of them may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
(supra); Salvacion ·∙ Examine when the law was enacted, during what circumstances, and see the intent of the law in the whereas clauses.
v Central Bank ·∙ The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. If verba legis would cause injustice, then apply ratio legis.
People v Purisima ·∙ When there is ambiguity, check the preamble or the whereas clauses for the intent or spirit of the law. They are strictly not a part of
the law but they can be resorted to.
·∙ Presumption is that undesirable consequences were never intended by the Congress.
·∙ Construe also with the presumption that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favour of the accused and strictly
against the state.
·∙ Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict
adherence to the letter will result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.
·∙ Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular
provision alone.
Ambiguity
Del Mar v PAGCOR ·∙ A statute admitting of different interpretations is the best evidence that it is vague and ambiguous.
·∙ When it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses
·∙ Thus it is open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the connotation of its terms is uncertain but also
when it is uncertain in its application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar.
·∙ In the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative body,
except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute itself.
Week 4 and 5
General Policies on Construction
Philippine Ejusdem Generis
American Drug Co ·∙ Rule: general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily
v CIR be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation, class or nature as those specifically enumerated
o General words are presumed to be restricted by enumeration
o X, Y, Z, etc X, Y, Z
NAPOLCOM v De Doubt Legislative deliberations
Guzman ·∙ In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may
be adopted. (ex. Bicameral Conference Committee records)
Tanada v Tuvera Construe consistent with the Constitution
(supra) ·∙ To give rise to ignorantia legis non excusat, laws must be published in full
City of Naga v Pari material harmonize; except when there is an express repeal or conflicting provisions
Agna ·∙ A statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the same subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there is an
irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand
and to compromise itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject.
·∙ Pari materia – when statutes relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose
or object when statutes are in pari materia, they should be construed together
o Supposed to form part of a uniform system
o Latter ones are supplementary or complimentary
General Principles/Presumptions on the Interpretation of Certain Statutes: 1) Penal Laws
Centeno v Villalon Express mention excludes the others
Pornillos ·∙ Express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence exclude all others expression unius est exclusion alterius
·∙ When a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not be extended to others by interpretation or construction
·∙ Legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine
its terms to those expressly mentioned.
US v Go Chico Spirit of the law; Preamble
·∙ When there is ambiguity, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the
intention of the statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter. A thing which is within the letter of the statute is
not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers.
·∙ Preamble is not a part of the state but it is considered in the constructionof an act as it sets out the object and intention.
·∙ Preamble may be used when there is doubt or ambiguity.
2) Tax Laws
Marinduque Iron Explicit
Mines v Municipal ·∙ Taxes imposed must be clear, expressed, and unambiguous.
Council ·∙ General rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions
of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.
·∙ Construed strictly and against the subjection to a tax liability
NPC v City of Implicit
Cabanatuan ·∙ Tax exemptions construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly and categorically and supported
by clear legal provisions.
·∙ “unless  otherwise  provided  herein”   implied and express at the same time
o It would be tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions
or privileges
o Express albeit general
3) Social Legislation
Intl Pharma Inc v Resolve in favour of the laborer
Secretary ·∙ The rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favour of labor.
4) Rules of Court
Office of the Court Liberally construed in order to promote objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition
Administrator v ·∙ Strict compliance to rules is mandatory and imperative. Nevertheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of
Garong justice.
·∙ If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, then the former should yield
to the latter
·∙ Decide on merits and not on technicality
·∙ Rule may be relaxed if rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
·∙ Rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice
*sir does not agree with the case
Provincial Sheriff Strict reglementary period; sound discretion of the court
of Rizal v CA ·∙ While the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied as they are deemed
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
·∙ Same is true with rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals
·∙ Period to appeal may be extended subject to sound discretion of the court
·∙ Mere filing and pendency of motion for extension does not suspend running of reglementary period

5) Law on Adoption
Duncan v CFI In favour of the child; not dura lex sed lex
·∙ Dura lex sed lex to be softened in adoption cases. Apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding.
·∙ All efforts to provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children.
·∙ Give all chances for human life to exist.
6) Local Government/Local Autonomy
San Juan v CSC Favor local autonomy
·∙ Where a law is capable of 2 interpretations, one in favour of centralized power in Malacanang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, scales must be weighed in favour of autonomy.
7) Constitution
Bagong Bayani v Verba legis, spirit, extraneous
COMELEC ·∙ Verba legis – speech is the index of intention
·∙ Words in Constitution is couched in its objective
·∙ Primary source of intent: provision itself; so look at the law first
·∙ If words are unclear resort to extraneous aids like ConCon, but those are opinions and persuasive only
·∙ Safer to construe from what appears on its face. How it was understood by the people adopting it than what is the understanding of
the framers
Manila Prince Self-executing
Hotel v GSIS ·∙ Complete in itself and becomes operative without aid of supplementary or enabling legislation
·∙ In case of doubt, Consti should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing; unless the contrary is intended
Francisco v HR ·∙ Verba legis – words used in their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed
o Begin with the ordinary meaning
·∙ Ratio legis est anima – in accordance with the intent of its framers
o Reason which induced framers to enact provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
·∙ Ut magis valeat quam pereat - interpret as a whole; in conjunction with all other provisions; harmonize
·∙ May resort to other aids if meaning of the word is not clear
o Ex. Debates and proceedings of ConCon
o But they are powerless when the meaning of the provision is clear. So safer to construe provisions on its face.
De Castro v JBC ·∙ Avoid conflict, harmonize and reconcile
·∙ Each provision has a reason; conflict can be cleared up
·∙ What is favourable is a construction that will leave every word operative
·∙ Provisions were meticulously organized
·∙ Had the framers wanted to extend prohibition they could have explicitly said it
·∙ This was dependent on the deliberations, as opposed to the ruling in Valenzuela; Valenzuela did not take heed of the intentions
Chavez v JBC ·∙ Provision is clear and ambiguous apply plain and literal meaning; no need for spirit and deliberations
·∙ Verba legis except when there are technical terms
·∙ Verba legis non est recendendum – from words of a statute there should be no departure
·∙ Noscitur a sociis – if ambiguous, consider the company of words in which it is founded
·∙ Harmonize
Week 6 to 8
Intrinsic Aids of Construction
Caudal v CA 1) Law construed as a whole and in relation to other laws
·∙ Legislative intent ascertained from the whole statute. Clauses and phrases of statutes should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
City of Baguio v 2) Title of the Law
Marcos ·∙ When engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression in the law or where exact or literal rendering of the words would not
carry out the legislative intent, the title may be resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will.
·∙ Title of the law properly regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative intent.
·∙ Courts must consider both title and body to arrive at the intent.
People v Purisima 3) Preamble
(supra) ·∙ When there is ambiguity, resort to the preamble.
Florentino v PNB 4) Punctuation marks
·∙ Positioning of punctuation marks is crucial to determine meaning of the provision
·∙ But even disregarding grammatical construction, there are still other ways to determine its meaning
·∙ Doctrine of last antecedent
People v Yabut 5) Headnotes or epigraphs
·∙ When the text is clear, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section for
interpretation of a text, especially where such epigraphs or headings are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general
nature of the text that follows.
·∙ Headings – catchwords, convenient index, cannot in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words
·∙ Body > Title when body is not ambiguous; titles are just indexes
Manila Railroad Co 6) Conflicting provisions
v Collector ·∙ It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of
the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favour of the
citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import.
·∙ The particular enactment must be operative and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general
language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.
·∙ General < Special
David v CA 7) Meaning of word qualified by purpose of the statute
·∙ Two or more meanings adopt which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted.
·∙ Uphold intention or purpose; construe in favour of the deprived party
Collector v Manila 8) Words construed in their ordinary sense
Lodge ·∙ Use plain and ordinary meaning dictionaries
Gatchalian v 9) General words construed generally
COMELEC ·∙ Use plural
·∙ When the context so indicates, the word may be construed to mean, and indeed it has been frequently used in its enlarged and plural
sense,  as  meaning  “all,”  “all  or  every,”  “each,”  “each  one  for  all,”  “every,”  without  limitation;  indefinite  number  or  quantity, an
indeterminate unit or number of units out of many or all, one or more as the case may be, several, some.
Geotina v CA 10) Use of generic words include things that arise after enactment of the law --- progressive interpretation
·∙ Doctrine of progressive interpretation – obtaining at the time of its enactment but also designed to comprehend those that may
normally arise after its approval
Claudio v 11) Words and phrases construed in relation to other provisions
COMELEC ·∙ Look at other provisions that can shed light to the matter when there is ambiguity
Pilar v COMELEC 12) Where the law does not distinguish
·∙ Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. --- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos
·∙ No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated.
Manila Herald 13) Use of technical terms
Publishing v ·∙ Technical if statute itself defines it. Before you look in the dictionary, examine the statute first.
Ramos
Buenaseda v Sec. 14) Use of associated words
Flavier ·∙ Noscitur asociis – the word should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated
·∙ Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Mutuc v COMELEC 14) Use of associated words
·∙ Ejusdem generis – general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to
Cagayan Valley 14) Use of associated words
Enterprises v CA ·∙ Ejusdem generis is to be resorted only to determine the intent. However, if that intent clearly appears from other parts of the law and
such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached by the appreciation of the rule of ejusdem generis
then the latter must give way.
Sarmiento III v 15) Express mention and implied exclusion
Mison ·∙
Pepsi Cola 16) Necessary implication
Products Phils Inc ·∙ Doctrine of necessary implication – what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed
v Sec of Labor ·∙ There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation in the future gaps of the law
·∙ Doctrine of necessary implication to fill in the gaps as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms, which is necessary to
achieve object and purpose
·∙ Ex necessitate legis
People v 17) Cassus Omissus
Manantan ·∙ Means case omitted
·∙ What is omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally
·∙ Operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established (not applicable in this case)
People v Tamani 18) Each to each
·∙ Reddendo singular singulis – referring each to each
·∙ Referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object
·∙ Let each be put in its proper place; the words should be taken distributively
Mapa v Arroyo 19) Relative and qualifying terms
·∙ Ad proximum antecedens fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia – relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be
prevented by the context
·∙ Ex.  “and”is  not  meant  to  separate words but is a conjunction to join them
Paras v COMELEC 20) Context and related clauses
·∙ Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context; construed together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment
·∙ Statutes are to be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution
·∙ Avoid a situation wherein a provision construed is defeated
US v Hart 21) Use of punctuation marks
·∙ Punctuation marks if  it  is  the  same  with  the  legislative  intent,  it  can  be  used  as  an  argument;  don’t  use  it  if  otherwise
·∙ If punctuation gives a meaning in accordance with the legislative will, use it as argument
Mercado et al v 22) Words and phrases: Proviso
NLRC ·∙ Office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that
it immediately follows
·∙ Proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached and not to the
statute itself or even the statute as a whole
Sterling v LLDA 22)  Words  and  phrases:  “Including”
·∙ Include – to take in or comprise as a part of a whole
·∙ Conveys the idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration
·∙ Expressio unius est exclusion alterius does not apply here
McGee v Republic 22) Words and phrases: Negative vs affirmative words
·∙ Negative words and phrases prevail over affirmative words.
·∙ They are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory.
Bersabal v 22) Words and phrases: Mandatory v permissive
Salvador ·∙ “May”  – general rule: connotes a permissible thing; merely permissive; operates to confer discretion
·∙ “Shall”  – imperative; operating to impose a duty which may be enforced; court left with no choice
Diokno v 22) Words and phrases: Mandatory v permissive
Rehabilitation ·∙ The  presumption  is  that  the  word  “shall”  in  a  statute  is  used  as  an  imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different
Finance Corp interpretation is sought, it must rest upon something in the character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a different
meaning.
·∙ In  the  ordinary  signification,  “shall”  is  imperative  and not permissive though it may have the latter meaning when required by the
context.
RMBSA v HDMF 22) Words and phrases: “and/or”
·∙ “and/or”  – the  word  “and”  and  “or”  are  to  be  used  interchangeably
·∙ Effect  is  given  to  both  conjunctive  “and”  and  the  disjunctive  “or”
·∙ Or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by Congress
·∙ Used  to  avoid  a  construction  which  by  the  use  of  the  disjunctive  “or”  alone  will  exclude  the  combination  of  several of the alternatives
or  by  the  use  of  the  conjunctive  “and”  will  exclude  the  efficacy  of  any  one  of  the  alternatives  standing  alone
Week 9
Extrinsic Aids of Construction
Manila Jockey 1) Contemporaneous Circumstances
Club Inc v GAB ·∙ On the principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and practice under the statute, or a course of conduct indicating a
particular undertaking of it, will frequently be of great value in determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has been
acquired in by all parties concerned and has extended over a long period of time
Commissioner v 2) Legislative History
Esso ·∙ Where a statute is ambiguous, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters that
may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as:
o History of enactment
o Reasons for passage of the bill
o Purposes to be accomplished by the measure
·∙ Courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts
which affect their derivation, validity and operation
·∙ Others: Antagonism between the Act to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the
intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication
·∙ Repeal by implication is not favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it was not
intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter act fully embraces the subject matter
of the earlier
Filipinas Life 2) Legislative History
Assurance ·∙ A purely syntactical approach is hardly a safe guide to the meaning of a statute. Thus, the position of a proviso, although posses of
Company v Court considerable influence, is not necessarily controlling, as the proviso may apply to sections or portions thereof which follows it or even
of Tax Appeals to the entire statute. In the ascertainment of intention, the legislative history of statute is extremely more important than position.
o Position cannot override intention
o General rule was: a proviso is deemed to apply only to the immediately preceding clause or provision. changes if intent
shows otherwise
Manila Jockey 3) Legislative Debates and Committee Reports
Club Inc v GAB ·∙ Appellants: legislative debates and explanatory statements may be resorted to to throw light on the meaning of the words
·∙ Appellees: legislative debates are expressive of views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides
·∙ Court: in view of these conflicting authorities, no appreciable reliance can be safely placed on any of them
·∙ The purpose of the inquiry is to know what the author meant by the language he used and also to see that the language used
sufficiently expresses that meaning. So there are two elements:
o Internal – originates in intention
o External – perfected by expression
o Failure of the latter may defeat the former
Astorga v Villegas 3) Legislative Debates and Committee Reports
·∙ Journals can be resorted to by the courts in this case since the enrolled bill passed had problems
·∙ The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the
journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate
but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him
Gaanan v IAC 3) Legislative Debates and Committee Reports
·∙ On the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of
the law. Legislative debates and committee reports are extrinsic aids to find the intent and spirit of the law
·∙ Additional: It is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused
League of Cities v 3) Legislative Debates and Committee Reports
COMELEC ·∙ Legislative debates were resorted to in order to determine the intent of the law
Bengzon v 4) Executive/Contemporaneous Construction
Secretary of ·∙ While contemporaneous is not decisive for the courts, yet where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative
Justice department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great respect. Where legislative intent
and executive purpose is evident, it devolves upon the judiciary to give deferential attention to the attitude assumed by the other two
branches of the government.
Navarro et al v 4) Executive/Contemporaneous Construction
Executive ·∙ It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the Exec and Legis
Secretary departments. The IRR made amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, but
to legislative construction as well, esp with the inclusion of representatives from the 4 leagues of local government units as members
of the Oversight Committee
Philippine Global 4) Executive/Contemporaneous Construction
Communications, ·∙ The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to
Inc v Relova execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly
embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.
·∙ Additional: pari materia – when they relate to the same person or thing, or same class of persons or things, or same purpose or object
o Statutes in pari materia should be construed together
o Also said to be overlapping statutes
Escosura v San 5) Reference to other statutes
Miguel Brewery ·∙ “to pay” – normally construed to mean full payment based on several other laws
Inc ·∙ Other statutes may be looked into to ascertain the legislative meaning behind the term being construed since it is assumed that they
use the terms similarly (except nalang siguro if technical term?)
US v De Guzman 6) Statutes borrowed from foreign jurisdictions
·∙ In construing the statutes which the courts are called upon to administer and apply, judicial notice may be taken of their origin and
history, and of the facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation.
·∙ For proper construction and application of the borrowed terms and provisions, it is proper and oftentimes essential to review their
legislative history and to find an authoritative guide for their interpretation and application in the decisions of the courts in those
countries.
Week 10
Clerical Error
Lopez & Sons Inc v ·∙ Courts can correct clerical errors.
CTA ·∙ It is not the letter but rather the spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature that is important and which matters.
·∙ When the interpretation of the statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to absurdity or would contravene the clear
purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed accordingly to its spirit and reason
·∙ Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal meaning of the terms.
·∙ Also, in this case, the clerical error is plain and obvious.
Construction of Conflicting Statutes/Conflicting Provisions
Gordon v General Rule
Veridiano II ·∙ Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavour to reconcile the same instead of declaring
outright the invalidity of one against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if
this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the
same time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government. It is this policy that the court will apply in
arriving at the interpretation of the laws above-cited and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.
Lopez Jr v CSC ·∙ A special law prevails over a general law, regardless of their dates of passage.
·∙ The special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general.
PNB v Asuncion ·∙ A substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural law.
·∙ Sec 5 Art 10 of the Constitution says that rules of the SC should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
PNB v Cruz ·∙ Statutes of equal theoretical application or in equal standing like general laws – the one enacted in a later date must prevail being a
later expression of the legislative will
People v Palma ·∙ A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication.
·∙ The repeal must be express and specific.
Bagatsing v ·∙ The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
Ramirez of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation
where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. The exactly is the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar.
·∙ Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the
Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing
taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls.
·∙ Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs. This is especially true where the
law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision.
City of Manila v ·∙ Special provision in a general law > general provision in a special law
Teotico
Arenas v City of ·∙ The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable repugnancy between the
San Carlos proviso and the body of the statute, the former is given precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the latest expression of the
intent of the legislature.
·∙ Proviso > body

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