Defence Studies

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Choosing Asymmetric Strategies: Attacking

National Will

Wing Commander A.S. Linstead RAF

To cite this article: Wing Commander A.S. Linstead RAF (2001) Choosing Asymmetric Strategies:
Attacking National Will, Defence Studies, 1:3, 1-24, DOI: 10.1080/714000044

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/714000044

Published online: 06 Sep 2010.

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ARTICLE

Choosing Asymmetric Strategies:

Attacking National Will
WING COMMANDER A. S. LINSTEAD, R AF

I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant

and fill him with a terrible resolve
Yamamoto1

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s thoughts, following the surprise Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor, revealed his understanding of the fundamental
asymmetry of the contest between Imperial Japan and the United States
(US). Moreover, they demonstrated his fears that the circumstances of the
attack would stimulate a reaction in the US that would ultimately lead not
only to Japan’s defeat but ultimate disaster. Although there were many
factors that shaped the course of the Pacific War, the strength of US
resolve to achieve victory was forged by the nature of what was considered
an ‘unprovoked and dastardly’2 attack. Yamamoto understood the danger
of stimulating the national resolve of a powerful enemy. He saw that
uniting a more powerful nation behind a distinct cause had the potential
to release it and its asymmetric advantage from both self-imposed and
external constraints.
However, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a ‘conventional’ contest
between major military powers. Today, leading thinkers assert that we have
witnessed a revolution in political affairs in which major powers are now
unlikely to go to war with each other. Rather, they are more likely to
intervene in conflicts involving weak states, militia groups, drug cartels
and terrorists.3 These discretionary ‘wars of choice’, are characterised not
only by obvious asymmetries of military and industrial capability but also
by those of self-interest and morality.
For states to enter into discretionary conflicts and accept the associated
risks, a degree of national will must be established and maintained even
when direct national interest is hard to recognise. However, national will

Wing Commander A.S. Linstead, RAF, Advanced Command and Staff Course Number 4
(2000–2001), Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham.
Defence Studies, Vol.1, No.3 (Autumn 2001), pp.1–24
PUBLISHED BY FR ANK CASS, LONDON
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2 DEFENCE STUDIES

not only provides the determining force behind the operation but is also
the primary target for the asymmetric adversary who cannot hope to defeat
his enemy force-on-force. National will is the superior power’s grand
strategic centre of gravity and the asymmetric warrior will conduct
operations with that target in mind.
The vulnerability of Western liberal democracies to the effects of
asymmetric warfare, particularly their presumed aversion to casualties,
implies that the West can be deterred, disrupted or otherwise coerced away
from involvement in conflicts by the use of lethal force. In general, until
recently the only opportunity for the asymmetric adversary to create
significant numbers of casualties was to attack military forces in theatre.
However, the changed international security environment allied to the
proliferation of military technology is providing an option to attack the
civilian populations of more powerful enemies. The emergence of this
alternative strategy begs a question; in terms of affecting national will,
which is likely to be more successful, attacking military forces in-theatre
(the indirect approach) or civilian populations in the homeland (the
direct approach)?
Each approach carries with it both covert and overt sub-strategies. The
overt strategy is one where the responsibility for an attack is clear or easy
to establish. Covert attacks are where responsibility cannot be firmly
established. While terrorist attacks are an example of a possible covert
strategy, ballistic missile (BM) attack exemplifies the overt method. The
eagerness with which some so-called rogue states, particularly North
Korea and Iran, are developing intercontinental BM technology would
indicate that they consider that these systems have some potential to
redress the asymmetry between their states and the West.
In response, the US is embarking on the National Missile Defense
(NMD) project to protect the continental US from the BM threat from
rogue states as well as other ‘accidental’ launches from more established
BM states. The project involves significant costs, both financial and
diplomatic. Setting aside the ubiquitous pressures applied by the defence
industrial lobby, the US appears convinced that the threat of BM attack
from these states is significant and worth defending against.
To challenge this conviction, this article will assert that in attacking
national will, direct overt asymmetric strategies generate unacceptable risk
to the perpetrator. Echoing Yamamoto’s fears, rational actors would not
use such strategies for to do so would court disastrous retaliation. Any
direct attack must be covert and the difficulties inherent in guaranteeing
anonymity suggest that the more reliable strategy is to attack national will
indirectly, whether overtly or covertly. The core assumption running
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 3

throughout this article is that while the issue of human cost profoundly
affects public support for discretionary operations, the nature of the
casualties affects the strength of public reaction to them.
This article does not seek to ignore the important possibilities that
Information Warfare (IW), particularly ‘cyber attack’, presents for the
asymmetric adversary. However, the article will focus solely on the use of
overt lethal force, principally BM attack.
This article will note the political basis for discretionary operations,
present a model for asymmetric warfare and discuss Western vulnerability
to it by addressing the core assumption, casualty sensitivity. The article
will then discuss the components of national will and their relationship to
the media, using Kosovo as an example. The central contention will then
be addressed by examining the relative merits of the indirect and direct
approach in the context of the Somalia intervention and the Second
Chechen War respectively.
Finally, North Korea will be examined to reveal issues of rationality in
decision making. It will conclude by drawing together the lessons of the
discussion and comparing them with the principal strategy the US is
adopting to counter the direct asymmetric threat – NMD.

Discretionary Operations, Asymmetric Warfare and Western

Vulnerability
The leading Western nations accept that they cannot ignore events around
the world that threaten international stability or the global economic
system, even if their immediate interests are not threatened. In the 1999
US National Security Strategy (NSS) the last Clinton administration
quoted Franklin D. Roosevelt to stress that, ‘our own [US] well being is
dependent on the well being of other nations far away’.4 While the NSS
was careful to discriminate between vital and other types of national
interest, it acknowledged that ‘when events half way around the earth can
profoundly affect our safety and prosperity, America must lead in the
world to protect our people at home and our way of life’.5
Despite the recent change in tone, indications from the presidential
election and since would suggest that the new Bush administration’s NSS
will not be markedly different.6
The United Kingdom’s (UK) 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR)
was more forthright and stated that: ‘Britain’s place in the world is
determined by our interests as a nation and as a leading member of the
international community. The two are inextricably linked because UK
national interests have a vital international dimension.’7 Furthermore, the
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4 DEFENCE STUDIES

SDR pointed to the UK’s permanent membership of the United Nations

Security Council to contend that she has a responsibility to play an active
role in promoting international security.
France views her international role in similar terms.8 The paradox is
that such laudable activism, aimed at international stability, is the prime
source of Western vulnerability in that it invites attack by those whose
aspirations are frustrated by Western power.9
The comprehensive defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War is likely to lead
future adversaries to conclude that any attempt to ‘confront the West’s
military and technical superiority “force-on-force” will result in defeat
even if they possess considerable conventional military forces’.10 Inferior
powers must adopt an alternative style of warfare if they are to resist
western interventionism. The term ‘asymmetric warfare’, although not
new, is increasingly being used to describe such a style.11
For the West’s part, the belief that the much-heralded Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA) will allow discretionary operations to be
conducted with a high degree of efficiency and a low casualty rate (on both
sides) is compelling. Politicians have seized upon this belief to reassure the
public that if promoting ‘international stability, freedom and economic
development’12 requires the use of military force the task can be completed
at minimum cost.
Therefore, it is common sense for the potential adversary to seek to
develop asymmetric strategies that will shatter this belief and impose a cost
that is intolerable for his enemy. The effectiveness of the strategy
developed will depend on how the underlying asymmetries of
Configuration, Legal Compliance and Stake13 interact (see Figure 1).
Configuration asymmetry defines the military, technological and
industrial imbalance between the highly developed Western alliance states,
principally the US, and the less developed states that characterise potential
asymmetric adversaries. This asymmetry is inherently unstable as
technology proliferation provides opportunities for adversaries to develop
niche capabilities such as BM.
The asymmetry of Legal Compliance defines the constraints on the
behaviour of states produced by Western inspired ethical or moral codes
that are enshrined in international treaties and conventions.
Finally, the asymmetry of stake defines the degree of self-interest
inherent in a conflict. It is this asymmetry that is most important in
judging the vulnerability of Western states to either asymmetric threats or
actions. For the intervener, issues of stake are likely to be vague and
difficult to generate. Conversely, the stake for an adversary is likely to be
much greater and easy to appreciate.
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 5

FIGURE 1
CONFLICT ASSYMETRIES

CONFIGURATION
Military/Technology/Industrial

Western Possible
Interventionist STAKE Asymmetric
States Adversaries

LEGAL COMPLIANCE
Moral/Ethical ‘Codes’

Fundamentally, it is this asymmetry that enables an asymmetric

opponent to challenge the national will of a superior power, rather than
having to defeat its military forces. The potential combination of high
stake, low requirement for legal compliance and limited, but significant,
configuration produce a dangerous cocktail where weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) can be added to the potential use of BM.
Western vulnerability to asymmetric warfare is inherent in what
Professor Lawrence Freedman and others have termed the ‘Western Way
of Warfare’. This approach has three key features, the professionalism of
Western armed forces and intolerances of both casualties and collateral
damage.14
Setting aside the professionalism question, Western vulnerability to
asymmetric warfare is centred on the two intolerances. Beginning with
the casualty question, the degree to which Western countries are casualty
averse is open to debate. Certainly, many argue that a society’s tolerance to
casualties reduces as it becomes more developed. While this would suggest
that such intolerance would be most pronounced in Western countries,
the trend is reflected in all modernised societies that ‘offer a large and
growing space for non-militarised life’.15
Furthermore, such societies have seen a great expansion of the
economy and culture in which individuals and social groups have gained
strong interests independent of the nation-state. Added to this is the
technological advance in warfare that has reduced the military demands
that the state makes on society. The results of these factors are that
‘modernised societies, particularly in the West, are seen as enjoying a ‘new
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6 DEFENCE STUDIES

peace’, where the threat of conflict is perceived as low and tolerance to war
casualties is correspondingly low’.16
Notwithstanding the above, the acceptance of casualties is still related
to perceptions of stake. In the Falklands War of 1982, the loss of British
servicemen did not significantly undermine British public support for the
campaign.17 Indeed, as Max Hastings observed, ‘The British public’s
resilience in the face of bad news and casualties proved far higher than
many people – and many politicians – would have predicted.’18 However,
the Falklands campaign was portrayed as a defence of the ‘homeland’,
albeit 8,000 miles from the British Isles. In that sense, the perception of
stake was kept at a high level.
In interventionist operations where the issues of stake are even less
clear-cut than the Falklands, casualties are less acceptable and the subject
of heightened media attention. Added to this is the popular experience of
the 1991 Gulf War, which has led to an unrealistic expectation of near zero
casualties. Griffith observed that the 150,000 casualties estimated before
the Gulf War was a ‘realistic expectation for a war against what was
heralded as the fourth largest military power in the world’.19 The fact that
these casualties were not realised has led to ‘a massive devaluation in the
acceptability of casualties’.20
However, human cost does not equate simply to numbers of casualties.
Society’s tolerance of casualties is dependent on circumstance; it is different
for every conflict and changes depending on the type of casualties sustained,
the nature of their deaths and the stage of the conflict in which they were
killed. Casualty tolerance is a manifestation of public opinion, which is
inherently fickle and subject to political and media manipulation.
The issues of human cost extend beyond friendly casualties to the
second intolerance identified by Freedman, collateral damage. While
damage to property and non-military infrastructure is part of this, the
issue of human cost remains pre-eminent. Western society’s intolerance of
friendly casualties has extended to include all violent deaths, enemy as
well as friendly. This factor points to the moral and ethical codes
embodied in the key asymmetry of legal compliance.
At first glance the 1991 Gulf War seems to provide support for this
argument. Concern for negative public reaction to wanton killing was the
main factor in the first President George Bush’s direction that the Gulf
War was to be halted after 100 hours, before it had achieved its objective
of disabling the Iraqi Republican Guard. This reflected a political
perception of the potential impact of casualties.21
However, other indications are that the public stomach for the realities
of war is more robust. Indeed, during the Gulf War, Kellner observed that
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 7

‘the US public was not going to be deterred in its desire for a US victory
by mere Iraqi casualties’.22 This is important, as it would suggest that, even
in an age of discretionary operations, base issues of stake can still offset
more sophisticated ideals of legal compliance.

National Will and its Relationship with the Media

Governments must both build and sustain national will if they are to
undertake discretionary operations. However, the concept of national will
is not easy to grasp. For the classical strategic theorists, particularly
Clausewitz, discussions of will tend to be at the lower operational and
tactical levels.23 Therefore, the focus is on the will of the fighting forces
and is wrapped up with equally difficult concepts of morale and ‘moral
factors’. Indeed, Clausewitz himself wrote: ‘Unfortunately, “moral
factors” will not yield to academic wisdom. They cannot be classified or
counted. They have to be seen or felt.’24
Concepts of national will are equally diffuse. On an individual level, a
dictionary definition would describe will as ‘the faculty by which a person
decides on or initiates action’. However, if the state is substituted for the
individual, the definition becomes inadequate as it concentrates on
decision and initiation but does not acknowledge any determination to
continue with a course of action. Such ‘determination to continue’ is often
that aspect of will that is most severely tested during sustained military
operations, particularly where there is no direct threat to the homeland.
Therefore, national will should be defined as ‘the resolve of the state to
both initiate and persevere with a particular course of action’. Asymmetric
strategies that target initial decision making are deterrent in nature; those
that target continuance are compellent.
However, national will in modern democratic states is not a single,
indivisible entity but a blend of two fundamental ingredients, political will
and public opinion. The inter-relationship between these two constituents
is crucial in determining the overall strength of national will. In the short
term, political will may be the dominant factor when a government
perceives actions to be vital to the national interest. Indeed, initially, a
government may benefit from a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect. However, in
the longer term, actions without widespread public support court political
disaster if the public cannot be convinced of the needs and benefits of
involvement. Therefore, discretionary operations, no matter what the
moral imperative and high-minded political will, hinge on the fast-
moving battle for public opinion between the intervener and his
asymmetric adversary.
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8 DEFENCE STUDIES

Within modern societies the link between politicians and public is the
media. The media seek to reflect public opinion but also influence it by
their own analysis of an issue. This analysis is itself shaped both by
commercial necessity as well as by the activities of politicians. This
complex relationship was characterised by the battle for public opinion
during the 1999 NATO intervention into Kosovo. At the beginning of
Operation ‘Allied Force’, NATO was well aware of the pitfalls it faced as
the ‘intervening power’. Nevertheless, intervention was presented as a
moral imperative. The then NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana
subsequently wrote:
For the first time in NATO’s history there would be sustained
military action outside NATO territory against a sovereign state.
Everyone involved knew about the risks: there would be inadvertent
civilian casualties no matter how meticulous our planning, the
operation would inevitably burden our relationship with Russia, and
finally, we would end up with a long and expensive commitment to
the future of Kosovo. We decided that these risks were worth taking,
for not to have acted would have meant that the Atlantic community
legitimised ethnic cleansing in its immediate neighbourhood.
Having remained passive in the face of a conflict that, as British
Prime Minister Tony Blair put it, seemed like ‘a throwback to the
worst memories of the twentieth century’ would have undermined
the whole value system on which our policies were built. Inaction in
the face of the Kosovar plight would have undermined our policies,
the credibility of Western institutions, and the transatlantic
relationship.25
This attitude owed much to the previous experience of Bosnia where
inaction had left the West looking ‘ineffectual and weak’.26 However, the
political will on which the operation was founded was not nearly as clear
in terms of its focus as Solana’s statement would suggest. Although public
concern had been stimulated by media images of previous ethnic cleansing
episodes in Bosnia, political leaders within the alliance were not convinced
of the ethical and legal basis for intervention or that public support could
be maintained for any extended period. The war was therefore initiated by
political will but ‘fought with a constant concern for public opinion’.27
While it could be asserted that most wars are fought this way, it was the
level of concern for public opinion and the direct effect it had on the way
the war was run that make it significant and point to the future pressures
on the employment of discretionary military force. Concern for public
support resulted in NATO’s original focus on a limited and short
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 9

campaign and the rejection of the use of ground troops. Indeed, on the
subject of ground troops, Richard Haas commented, ‘the White House is
allowing its strategy to be dictated by public opinion, or what they
perceive public opinion to be’.28
If the conflict had been resolved swiftly then these factors would have
had little significance. Whether the exposure of NATO strategy made it
easier for Milosevic to calculate the risks is not certain; however, when it
became apparent that he was not going to capitulate quickly the need to
lengthen the campaign became clear. For that to be possible, the politicians
had to lead public opinion and ‘sell’ the war to the public.
Initially, the NATO media operation had been unable to cope with the
demands placed on it. Concern was based on a belief that Milosevic was
exploiting NATO ‘mistakes’, particularly the bombing of the refugee
convoy, to set the media agenda. The lack of a clear NATO message over
such incidents hinted at confusion and incompetence. Alliance morale
and cohesion suffered as the poor media coverage had a negative effect on
public opinion. In response, additional specialist staff were dispatched to
enhance the NATO media operation. The more robust organisation that
resulted mounted a sophisticated ‘battle for public opinion’.29
As the conflict dragged on and it became increasingly likely that air
power alone would not be sufficient to force Milosevic’s hand, the issue
of ground troops was revived; this became the focus of the wider media
campaign. Few of the NATO leaders wished to contemplate ground
troops believing that this would be a step too far for public opinion.
Indeed, both Clinton and Blair had ruled out the use of ground troops at
the beginning of the military offensive in March 1999, and maintained this
line until the middle of April, arguing that ‘the difficulties of such an
undertaking, in the face of organised Serb resistance, are formidable … the
potential loss of life among our service men and women, … would be
considerable’.30 Therefore the challenge was to shift public opinion just
enough to allow the leaders to at least contemplate the use of ground
troops.
Prior to the NATO Summit in Washington in late April, American and
British officials began to prepare the ground by hinting at a reversal in
NATO policy. By the end of the Summit the combination of the media
campaign and private lobbying had resulted in a revised line that although
NATO did not agree to a ground war, it did not rule it out. In both the
US and the UK, opinion polls indicated a steadily growing acceptance of
the possibility of the use of ground troops as the media presented nightly
images of desperate Kosovan refugees.31 This was all that was required to
instigate a build up of forces in Macedonia and Albania suggesting that a
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10 DEFENCE STUDIES

ground intervention was being prepared. The build up indicated (in

NATO terms) renewed national will, which was political will supported by
public opinion. Whether this was the decisive factor that encouraged
Milosevic to back down is unknown; however, it is unlikely that it was
insignificant.

Strategies for Attacking National Will

Asymmetric strategies targeted at national will are essentially Clauswitzian
in that they seek to attack the centre of gravity and the recognition of
national will as a target for attack is hardly new. Despite this, national will has
proved to be an elusive target particularly in the context of full-scale
warfare. Notwithstanding naval blockades and the besieging of fortified
cities, national will as a discreet target, along with the means to attack it
directly, arrived with the advent of air power. In Command of the Air,
General Giulio Douhet laments on the prospect of aerial warfare against
national will, ‘Tragic, too, to think that the decision in this kind of war must
depend upon smashing the material and moral resources of a people
caught up in a frightful cataclysm which haunts them everywhere without
cease until the final collapse of all social organization.’32
In the modern context, US Air Force Colonel John Warden observes,
‘This objective is tenuous because it is difficult to get at “will” without
destroying either armed forces or economy. In other words, the will to
resist collapses when the armed forces no longer can do their job or when
the economy no longer can provide essential military – or civilian –
services.’33 However, in full-scale conflicts issues of stake are clearly
defined and as the strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War
demonstrated, national will has proved to be resilient in the face of direct
attack as well as supportive of direct retaliation.
In discretionary operations where the issues of stake are less clear,
national will has proved to be a more fragile target, particularly when the
attack has been indirect. For the American people embroiled in the
Vietnam War, the issues of stake were vague, the configuration advantage was
indecisive and the legal compliance issues became increasingly dubious as
the war progressed. The North Vietnamese were able to undermine
public opinion by fuelling this self-doubt with a high US military casualty
rate. This indirect method of prosecuting asymmetric warfare has long
been held up as the model for all asymmetric opponents and is at the root
of the belief that Western countries are highly casualty sensitive. However,
at the time of the Vietnam War, this was the only practical strategy open to
the North Vietnamese.
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 11

In the post-Cold War era, the proliferation in technology is adding to

the conventional and unconventional, military and non-military options
open to the asymmetric opponent and providing a direct alternative.
Indeed, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons added to BM
technology provide what many consider the ideal asymmetric arsenal and
an ‘optimum counter to intervention’.34 Today, and increasingly in the
future, the asymmetric opponent will have a choice of indirect and direct
strategies, the question is, which type is likely to bring more success and
why?
In the post-Cold War period one conflict stands out as an example of
how the loss of comparatively few military personnel can have a profound
effect on national will when the asymmetries of stake are pronounced. At
the end of 1992 the first United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM I) was in crisis. The UN was attempting to mount a
humanitarian famine relief programme in the midst of a vicious civil war
between rival militia groups. It was into this cauldron that the US agreed
to lead a military task force into Somalia. President George Bush Senior
outlined the mission as follows: ‘Our mission is humanitarian, but we will
not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their own people, condemning them
to death by starvation. General Hoar and his troops have the authority to
take whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the lives of our
troops and the lives of Somalia’s people … the outlaw elements in Somalia
must understand this is a serious business.’35
The United Task Force (UNITAF) began landing in the early hours of
the morning of 9 December 1992. Within a few months Somalia had been
transformed. UNITAF, a demonstrably powerful and determined force,
adopted a strategy of cooperation, avoiding direct confrontation if
possible, and gradually increasing pressure on all factions. There were
problems and some casualties during UNITAF’s five-month life but the
situation, on the surface at least, had been calmed considerably.
However, the underlying problems, particularly the proliferation of
weaponry among the militias, had not been addressed. The militias knew
that the UNITAF mission would come to an end and the UN, when they
took over once again, would present less of an obstacle to their power
struggles. When UNITAF formally ceased to exist and the UN mission
was reconstituted as UNOSOM II, the situation quickly began to
deteriorate. Despite the considerable military force deployed with
UNOSOM, the perception among the Somalis, particularly the Somali
National Alliance (SNA) headed by General Muhammad Farah Aideed,
was that the ‘operation was probably weak and could be pushed around’.36
Aideed did not trust the UN who, in turn, were convinced that his
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12 DEFENCE STUDIES

ambitions to be national leader could never be satisfied by genuine power-

sharing and compromise and that he should be politically marginalised.
Fighting erupted on 5 June 1993 and 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed
and many were injured by the SNA. Over the next four months the
confrontation between the Aideed and the UN escalated steadily.
Following heavy Moroccan casualties in a battle with the SNA on 17 June
a warrant was issued for Aideed’s arrest. On 12 July the UN mounted a
raid on Aideed’s headquarters, using US helicopter gunships, which
resulted in heavy Somali casualties. Following the death of four US
soldiers and the wounding of six more, President Clinton ordered an
independent force of Rangers and Delta Force commandos into
Mogadishu. Their orders were to capture Aideed and senior SNA officials
whenever they could. On 3 October 1993 the force mounted a raid on the
Olympia Hotel – it was a disaster. Two US helicopters were shot down
and the US forces became involved in a huge firefight. Although Somali
casualties were estimated at between 500 and 1,000, the strategic
significance lay in the fact that 18 US soldiers were dead and 78 were
wounded.
Almost immediately, there were calls for the withdrawal of US forces
as the issues of stake came to the fore. Although President Clinton resisted
calls for an immediate withdrawal, US policy over Somalia was
unsustainable. To all intents and purposes, Aideed had won his
confrontation with a superpower. However, the degree to which his
success was the result of a conscious strategy is open to debate.
Contemporary newspaper articles certainly gave him the credit. An article
in the Washington Post quoted ‘American and UN officials and Somalis
sympathetic to Aideed’ as saying that Aideed, in the wake of the 12 July
attack, ‘made a calculated decision to kill American soldiers’. SNA
spokesman Abdi Abshir Kahiye was quoted as saying that after the 12 July
attack ‘there was no more UN, only Americans. If you could kill
Americans, it would start problems in America directly.’37 Despite the fact
that these statements were made after the events of 3 October, Hirsch and
Oakley sum up the situation as ‘There is little doubt that the militia
leaders had studied not only Operation Desert Storm but Vietnam and
Lebanon to understand the domestic political impact of American
casualties.’38
Conscious strategy or not, the events that unfolded in Mogadishu
crippled US national will to continue with their intervention in Somalia.
The sight of US high-technology helicopter gunships firing missiles into
the comparatively primitive Mogadishu suburb during the 12 July raid
made the Somalis look like helpless victims rather than vicious warlords
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 13

and primed US public opinion against the conflict. During the build-up
to the 3 October raid, the media increasingly focused on ‘Aideed’s self-
portrait as SNA David versus UN-US Goliath’.39
Within Somalia, this portrayal both consolidated his own power base
and generated a degree of sympathy from his Somali enemies. Externally,
while it may not have gained him outright sympathy, it did not harden or
alienate public opinion against him. Essentially, the US was never able to
generate any real issues of stake and the circumstances of the confrontation
tended to balance out the asymmetry of configuration. Moreover, the
configuration asymmetry produced negative images in its own right.
Consequently, when the US public was subjected to media images of two
dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu the calls
were for withdrawal rather than retaliation with the attendant cost of
further American lives.
While the Somalia debacle provides a good example of the merits of
the indirect approach to attacking national will within asymmetric conflicts,
examples of the direct approach are harder to find. Arguably, some low-
intensity internal terrorist campaigns have a motive to break national will in
one form or another and some are successful. However, the casualty rates
are relatively low and such conflicts are not analogous with the mass
casualty aims of inter-state BM/WMD attacks. Yet, in 1999, Russia
ostensibly responded to Chechen ‘terrorism’ by launching the Second
Chechen War. This reaction may have something to offer to an
understanding of a powerful state’s reaction to direct overt attack. The key
question then is this: how was the national will generated that allowed the
Russians to respond so disproportionately?
Despite the clear asymmetry of configuration, the First Chechen War
ended in 1996 with a humiliating stalemate for the Russian forces. Russian
tactics played into the hands of the Chechens, both militarily and in their
inability to generate public support for their action. The Economist
described Russia’s news management as derisory, saying, ‘large chunks of
the Moscow media fiercely opposed the war, amplifying public distaste for
it’.40 Russia withdrew its forces without even attempting to retain the
northern part of Chechnya, which had been Russian territory for
centuries.
This withdrawal was partly a result of fatigue, partly as a response to
Chechen incursions into neighbouring territories41 and partly a calculated
political strategy. The Kremlin took the pragmatic decision that the
Chechen leader, Aslan Maskhadov, would be able to stabilise the country
and cooperating with him would limit any further problems while the
issues of independence could be dealt with in slow time.
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However, Maskhadov failed and Chechnya quickly descended into

anarchy. His leadership was challenged by other Chechen commanders
particularly those with ties with radical Islamists within Chechnya and
neighbouring Dagestan. In August 1999 these forces occupied several
villages in Dagestan along the Chechen border. The initial incursions of
these forces were contained by Russian federal troops. Most withdrew
after a fierce bombardment by Russian aircraft and artillery, only to
invade again in September. These exchanges revived a distant and
unpopular conflict that most Russians considered had ended three years
previously.42
On 31 August 1999 the conflict took a new and dramatic turn when a
bomb exploded in a shopping centre in Moscow. This was followed on 4
September by a truck bomb detonated outside a building occupied by
military families in Dagestan. On 8 and 13 September bombs demolished
two apartment blocks in Moscow and on 16 September a second truck
bomb exploded outside an apartment block in Volgodonsk. The attacks
cost the lives of nearly 300 people.
Bomb attacks on Russian troops and civilians in the Caucasus had been
a feature of the enduring conflict since November 1996.43 However, the
attacks on apartment blocks, particularly those in Moscow, brought the
conflict home to mainstream Russia. The Russian authorities were quick
to put the blame firmly on Chechen and Islamist militants although
conspiracy theorists have suggested it may have been the work of the
secret services, the Russian mafia or even some plot to gain advantage in
the presidential elections.44
The perpetrator of the bombings is, however, less important than the
results. The bombings provoked outrage in Russia. Newspaper reports
spoke of a ‘mounting sense of panic’45 as Russian authorities searched for
bombs in residential apartment blocks in Moscow and a ‘clamour for
retribution’46 following the explosion in Volgodonsk. Whoever was
responsible, the bombing was exploited as a pretext for the launching of
the Second Chechen War.
If the Chechens were responsible then the action was ultimately self-
defeating; if they were not, then the bombings were a highly effective way
of galvanising public support for a second Chechen war whatever the
underlying reasons for it. The media, so condemning of the first Chechen
war, switched to ‘cheer-leading’ for the second.47
To make matters worse for the Chechens, the Russians were
determined not to repeat either their military or propaganda mistakes of
the first war and the comparative success achieved in both fields bolstered
public support further. By March 2000, opinion polls still suggested that
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 15

73 per cent favoured further advance over negotiations and the figure fell
to only 61 per cent if heavy losses were likely to be incurred.48
Russian involvement in a second Chechen conflict was discretionary; it
may have been portrayed as an internal ‘anti-terrorist’ action but it was, in
reality, a ‘war of choice’. Prior to the apartment block bombings the Russian
stake was limited. Although Russia has significant security and economic
interests in the Caucasus, her national security was not seriously threatened
by Chechen nationalism. Indeed, the Russian government had tacitly agreed
to independence by withdrawing after the First Chechen War.
Most significantly, prior to the bombings, there was little public support
for further involvement. In terms of configuration, Russia may not be a leader
in the RMA but its military capability dwarfs that of the Chechen rebels. In
the short term, the effect that the apartment block bombings had on Russian
national will was disastrous for the Chechen cause. The targeting of the
civilian population in their homeland increased the Russian public’s stake
and allowed the politicians to exploit the full weight of their configuration
advantage while having little concern for legal compliance.

Critiquing the Somali and Chechen Examples

Assuming the Chechens were responsible for the apartment block
bombings, a superficial analysis would suggest that they failed to
appreciate the risks inherent in the direct approach to attacking Russian
national will. The indirect method characterised by the Somalia example
would appear to remain the more effective strategy. However, the value of
a single example is limited and it is debatable as to what extent the events
of the Second Chechen War can be translated into Western-style
discretionary operations. Certainly, care should be taken to resist the
temptation to assume that all actors in the international system will act in
the same way when faced with the same situation. However, it would be
equally wrong to assume that there will be no similarities between the
actions of those faced with similar dilemmas, even when those actions are
performed by non-Western states.49
The US experience in Somalia can be seen as a reaffirmation of past
experience that adds to a body of evidence that could confidently predict a
similar outcome given a similar set of circumstances. However, it should
be pointed out that, unlike the Gulf War immediately beforehand,
American public opinion had not been prepared for the possibility of US
casualties. Moreover, the US public had been lulled into a false sense of
security by the low casualty rate in the Gulf War and the apparent ‘success’
of UNITAF.
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16 DEFENCE STUDIES

When the situation deteriorated rapidly following the withdrawal of

UNITAF, Washington failed to shape the media analysis or explain the
role of the remaining US forces. This could be why the events of 3
October 1993 had such a profound effect on American public opinion.
That said the fact remains that the indirect method has proved to be
effective on several occasions and it is reasonable to hypothesise that the
UK and France might react in similar ways if confronted with a
comparable situation.
As an example of a direct attack on national will, both the Russian
apartment bombings and the Russian reaction to them are unique.
Moreover, they were but one factor in a complex conflict.
Notwithstanding those reservations, the campaign did enjoy widespread
domestic support despite heavy casualties on both sides. Clearly, the
strength of Russian national will outweighed the reasonable assumption
that the Russian people have no greater wish than those of the West to
sustain casualties or to cause unnecessary suffering to others.
Russian actions in Chechnya were less well received in the West. Since
becoming a member of the Council of Europe in 1996, the Russian
Federation has been obliged to resolve ‘internal as well as external disputes
by peaceful means and to respect strictly the provisions of international
humanitarian law….[and] the European Convention on Human Rights’.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reported in January
2000 that: ‘As a result of the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of
force, innocent non-combatants in Chechnya are suffering the most serious
violations of fundamental human rights.’50 President Clinton rebuked
Russian tactics when he said: ‘Russia has to find the right balance between
the use of effective force and decent respect for individual rights and
international norms; in Chechnya that balance has not yet been found.’51
Russia’s savage onslaught against the Chechens and the West’s reaction
to it suggests that there is an asymmetry of legal compliance between them.
This is a potential weakness with using the Chechen example to
demonstrate the risks of directly attacking the national will of Western
states. Certainly, the US had shown a degree of antipathy towards Iraqi
casualties during the 1991 Gulf War and has also tacitly threatened both
Iraq and North Korea with nuclear retaliation if WMD were used against
then.
However, adherence to the principles of legal compliance make it
uncertain that the US would politically be able to retaliate to a WMD
attack with the only WMD option now open to it – nuclear weapons.
Indeed, James Baker the former US Secretary of State maintains that
President Bush had decided prior to the Gulf War, ‘that US forces would
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 17

not retaliate with [chemical or] nuclear weapons if the Iraqis attacked with
chemical munitions’.52
A shrewd asymmetric opponent will surely view such a ‘moral code’ as
a weakness when US freedom from attack from WMD depends on a
credible retaliatory counter threat. If the US responded with a massive
conventional attack, it would surely be constrained by ‘normal’ concerns
over collateral damage and innocent civilian casualties. The same constraints
would apply equally to other Western nations in similar situations.
Any state’s observance of a moral code can be put under strain and
potential asymmetric adversaries must factor this into their calculations. If
a biological attack was mounted against the US, UK or France that
resulted in several thousand civilian deaths and the culprit could be
reliably identified, it is arguable that the restraint shown by Bush before
the Gulf War would be difficult to maintain against the public and political
clamour for retribution. It would be like saying that the US can be
attacked with WMD, but will not respond with similar destruction. Even
if the US did not resort to nuclear weapons, it has an abundance of
conventional weaponry with which to punish any asymmetric adversary.
On the subject of legal compliance, perhaps the former Speaker of the
Iranian parliament, Hojiat o-Eslam Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, summed
up the realities of the situation when he commented that: ‘Although the
use of such [chemical and biological] weapons is inhuman, the
[Iran–Iraq] war taught us that international laws are only drops of ink on
paper.’53 In essence, the willingness to strike back will depend on the
strength of national will stimulated by the nature of the original attack and
the damage it has caused.
Although, in the sense of this article, written prior to 11 September
2001, the West has not yet had to respond to direct attacks on national will,
the US in particular has shown a willingness to retaliate rather than retreat
when its non-combatants are attacked.54 The cruise missile attacks into
Afghanistan and Sudan following the car bomb explosions at the
American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998
demonstrate a degree of political will to strike back. That more was not
done is perhaps a reflection of the fact that the attacks did not occur in the
US, comparatively few US citizens were killed and the sheer difficulty of
finding something worthwhile to target.

Rogue States and Rationality

If one accepts the assertion that the risk of a direct assault on national will
is unreasonably high, it follows that rational governments would be
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18 DEFENCE STUDIES

unlikely to attempt it. However, the popular perception of rogue states is

that they act irrationality out of a desire for status or vengeance.55 To
Western eyes the actions of Iraq or North Korea often make little sense
when viewed within a Western-centric paradigm of normal international
relations. But, as Dunn maintains, ‘the rogue state label blurs the extent to
which leaders such as Saddam Hussain and Kim Chong-il pursue
carefully calculated stratagems for threatening or using nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons to achieve their political and military ambitions’.56
Although the goals of such states may not be substantively rational, they
are, nonetheless, ‘rational actors’. In terms of decision-making theory, they
attempt to ‘maximise expected benefits relative to costs’.57
Similarly, their actions illustrate aspects of organisational theory in
which elements of bureaucracies compete for survival while operating
within bounded or limited rationality. Furthermore, decisions may be
based on cultural and historical experiences where the ‘national interest is
conceived through a lens that both simplifies and distorts reality’.58
The actions of North Korea, which have sparked much of the BM
debate, are a good case in point. North Korea has been developing its
WMD capability over the past 45 years and has achieved a chemical,
biological and possibly, a nuclear capability.59 The Report of a Commission
to Assess the BM Threat to the US (The Rumsfeld Report) issued in July
1998 highlighted the growing BM threat and the capacities of such
missiles to deliver WMD.60 North Korea, along with Iran, was accused of
leading efforts to pursue BM capabilities, in particular by developing the
long-range (up to 6,000 km) Taep’odong 2 ballistic missile. The fact that
North Korea subsequently launched a three-stage Taep’odong 1 missile
(with a range of 2,500 to 4,000 km) less than two months after the release
of the report served as a major catalyst for the US NMD effort.61
However, the North Korean state is in crisis. Years of communist
economic mismanagement allied to a series of natural disasters have
resulted in widespread famine. According to the World Food Programme
(WFP), millions of people continue to suffer from chronic food shortages
and malnutrition. In the autumn of 1998 the WFP estimated that 62 per
cent of North Korean children were severely malnourished.62
Yet despite internal shortages and suffering, the North Korean regime
continues to allocate a vast proportion of its resources to the military, some
14.3 per cent of its gross domestic product in 1999. Such expenditure is
unparalleled in the region and has inflicted enormous damage on the
economy.
From a Western perspective such behaviour is irrational. North Korea’s
perspective, however, is no less logical it is just radically different. North
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 19

Korea faces the US-led Combined Forces Command to the south.

Although fewer in number than the North’s troops, those in the Republic
of Korea (ROK) have a configuration advantage in that they are better
equipped and trained and benefit from the US lead in the RMA. North
Korea has also seen how Saddam Hussain used his modest, ambiguously
armed BM arsenal to frustrate the US-led coalition in the Gulf War. From
the North Koreans point of view, missile development is a relatively
inexpensive way of maintaining deterrence by enhancing WMD delivery
capabilities. Such systems are viewed as essential for national survival, as
Bermudez observes:
This perception has its origins in the Japanese use of chemical and
biological weapons and the US bombing of Japan during World War
II. This perception has been further reinforced by North Korea’s
years of confrontation with the US and the ROK and the lessons it
has learned from various conflicts in the Third World. Although
often viewed as ‘irrational’, ‘illogical’, or simply ‘crazy’ by Western
standards, North Korean leaders have acted in a rational manner
given their experiences.63
Furthermore, in exporting missile technology to Iran, Syria, Iraq and Libya,
North Korea has secured much needed foreign currency as well as further
frustrating its primary enemy. Therefore, it would be wrong to characterise
North Korea’s actions as irrational and more correct to describe North
Korea as a rational actor with a radically different perspective.
In July 1993, when North Korean efforts to develop nuclear weapons
was causing serious alarm within the US, President Clinton declared, ‘It
is pointless for them [North Korea] to develop nuclear weapons because
if they ever use them, it would mean the end of their country.’64 This
highlights the dilemma for asymmetric states. While BM/WMD could
conceivably be used as a ‘last gesture of defiance’, possession of WMD/BM
should not necessarily mean that North Korea or other so-called rogue
states would conduct acts that would be prejudicial to the survival of their
countries or ruling elites. The threat of WMD/BM development is
providing North Korea with an effective bargaining lever with the US
only while it remains in a deterrent posture.
Whether North Korea or other rogue states would attempt to compel
the US to alter its intended course of action by actually striking targets in
the continental US is an entirely different matter. Indeed, Waltz argues
that the risks of costly retaliation will mean that states will be cautious
about using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons for purposes other
than basic deterrence.65
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20 DEFENCE STUDIES

An alternative argument is that WMD provides a ‘shield behind which

to launch conventional attacks with less fear of enemy escalation’.66
Clearly, both of these arguments could apply to North Korea. However, if
it views the US deterrent threat as credible and performs a simple cost
benefit analysis, North Korea will not attack the US, for fear of the
backlash that would result.
If this argument is extended to other rogue states whose actions are just
as logical, then the conclusion must be that the continental US does not
face a meaningful threat of WMD/BM attack from rogue states and
neither does any other state with a credible military deterrent. The
decisions of President Bush before the 1991 Gulf War would appear to
suggest that WMD/BM attacks on deployed forces may be somewhat less
risky for the perpetrator. However, for the rational actor there remain too
many imponderables to make even this act anything but one of last-ditch
desperation.

Conclusion
Discretionary operations rely on the generation and sustainment of
national will. National will, is therefore a critical vulnerability that will
inevitably be attacked by those seeking to deter, compel or otherwise
coerce the intervener away from involvement. Western public concern
with the human cost of war offers the asymmetric adversary an effective
mechanism with which to influence public opinion and weaken national
will. However, the dilemma for the asymmetric strategist is how best to
exploit casualty sensitivity to attack the national will of a more powerful
adversary. The possibilities for attacking national will are expanding in an
international security environment free of the confines of the Cold War
and where weapons proliferation has multiplied the mechanisms of attack.
The ability to cause mass civilian casualties within the homeland of the
intervener with the use of conventional explosives or WMD delivered
either by terrorist methods or by BM is being pursued by those unwilling
to conform to the norms of a Western-dominated international
community.
For an asymmetric strategy to be successful it must ensure that the
enemy’s stake is kept to a minimum and contribute positively to the battle
for public opinion. Attacking military personnel in the theatre of
operations, the indirect approach, achieves this and highlights the
intervener’s lack of stake rather than increasing it. This is particularly
important if the political will is not there to shape public opinion to the
contrary. Public opinion, certainly in the US, appears to choose
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 21

withdrawal and accept a degree of national humiliation rather than risk

further loss of life for what it considers a ‘worthless cause’. How such
public opinion would react to the use of WMD on troops in theatre is less
certain. Certainly, there has been little adverse reaction to the thinly veiled
threats of nuclear retaliation issued by the US to Iraq prior to the 1991
Gulf War and to North Korea in 1993. However, uncertainty equates to
added risk and the lower risk strategy would be to employ conventional
means of attack.
Conversely, the direct approach alienates public opinion and increases
the stake for the intervener. It is therefore a high-risk strategy for
asymmetric opponents that either attack openly or whose responsibility
can be reliably determined. State actors, even rogues, are essentially
rational and will calculate the risk before opening themselves up to the
possibility of disastrous retaliation implicit in their enemy’s configuration
advantage. The perpetrator of a BM attack could not hope to remain
anonymous and the US has at its disposal formidable conventional forces
as well as a diverse nuclear arsenal with which to deter BM/WMD attack
on its homeland. The real threat would appear to come from covert
conventional or WMD attacks either by states or sub-state actors who
believe that they can be sufficiently anonymous to frustrate a more
powerful enemy’s attempts to press home its configuration advantage.
If this deduction has any merit it calls into question the US decision to
pursue NMD. At a basic level, governments have a clear duty to defend
their country and its citizens. However, defence spending is merely
insurance by another name and it is difficult to see how the premium for
NMD equates to the risk. In fairness, the level of BM threat to the
continental US is difficult to determine. Wilkening sums up the dilemma
thus: ‘unless one can determine whether accidental or unauthorised
attacks are more likely than a catastrophic collision between an asteroid
and the earth (which can be estimated with some confidence), it is not
clear that more money should be spent on NMD than on asteroid
defence’.67 While his comments are aimed primarily at accidental or
unauthorised launches, the same is true of defending against deliberate
launches from rogue states. Provided resources can be found to defend
against both overt and covert direct threats such concerns are academic.
The US along with the UK faces decreasing defence budgets in real terms
and decisions will have to be made on priorities.
If the balance of risk favours covert threats then that is where the
emphasis should lie. Following the logic of this article, the case for theatre
missile defence is easier to make as indirect strategies have proven to be
more effective and are lower risk for the perpetrator. The use of BMs by
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Iraq in the Gulf War introduced a level of uncertainty and was an effective
means of introducing confusion for both political and military decision
makers even if the actual military threat was slight.
The true value of NMD may lie elsewhere. Certainly, such a system
could give political leaders the prospect of being able to take a more
reasoned and statesmanlike line following an attempted attack. The
successful interception of incoming missiles may enable them to resist
demands for instant retaliation that, in itself, could prove more dangerous
for international security than the initial attack. In essence, NMD might
enable restraint, an example of where national will might be dominated by
reason rather than passion.
Equally, the US may not believe that its forces present a credible
deterrent threat to non-nuclear WMD in that the fundamental asymmetry
of legal compliance will render its nuclear deterrent unusable. Certainly,
General Charles ‘Chuck’ Horner had serious reservations following the
1991 Gulf War (in which he was air force commander) when he stated:
Nuclear weapons are such a gross instrument of power that they
really have no utility. They work against you in that they are best
used to destroy cities, and kill women and children. Now first, that’s
morally wrong; second, it doesn’t make sense; and then, of course,
there is the real threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of
irresponsible or desperate powers. If you own them, you legitimise
them just by your own ownership.68
Finally, the truth may be that the US is not seriously worried about so-
called rogue states or accidental launches but is more concerned, despite
assurances to the contrary, with ensuring its freedom of operation with
respect to the old enemy, Russia, and the new, China.

NOTES

The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the UK MOD or any other
government agency.

1. This paraphrase, used in the final scene of the film Tora! Tora! Tora! (1970), is an accurate
synthesis of Yamamoto’s thoughts. See Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto
and the Imperial Navy (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd 1979) p.285.
2. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt quoted in John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and
Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936–1945 (London: Cassell 1970) p.238.
3. Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs (Oxford: UP 1998) Abstract.
4. National Security Strategy for a New Century, Dec. 1999 (www.fas.org/man/docs/
nssrpref-1299.htm) preface p.1.
5. Ibid.
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ATTACKING NATIONAL WILL 23

6. Sebastian Mallaby, ‘The Irrelevant Election’, Foreign Policy (Sept.–Oct. 2000) pp.74–80.
7. UK Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays (London: HMSO 1998)
p.2.1.
8. A. Ladrange, ‘The French Armed Forces 2001’ (unpublished handbook, JSCSC) pp.5–6.
9. Richard K. Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs 77/1 (Jan./Feb.
1998) p.28.
10. Nicholas J. Newman, Asymmetric Threats to British Military Intervention Operations (London:
RUSI 2000) p.2.
11. Freedman (note 3) p.32.
12. SDR (note 7) p.2.1.
13. Newman (note 10) pp.3–4.
14. Freedman (note 10) p.14–17.
15. Martin Shaw, Post Military Society (Oxford: Polity Press 1991) pp.184–5.
16. J.M. Kingdom, ‘Casualties – The Achilles Heel of Modernised Nations at War’
(unpublished Defence Research Paper, JSCSC) p.5.
17. Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War (Oxford: Blackwell 1998) p.99.
18. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Pan Books 1999,
orig. 1983) p.357.
19. Paddy Griffith, ‘The Politics of Getting Hurt’, Command (Summer 1994) p.8.
20. Ibid.
21. Norman Schwartzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (London: Bantam Press 1992) p.469.
22. Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War (Oxford: Westview Press 1992) p.310.
23. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London and Portland, OR:
Frank Cass 2001) p.85.
24. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (trans. and ed.) Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton
UP 1976) p.184.
25. Javier Solana, ‘NATO’s Success in Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs 78/6 (Nov./Dec. 1999) pp.117–18.
26. Rhiannon Vickers, ‘Blair’s Kosovo Campaign: Political Communications, the Battle for
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy’, Civil Wars 3/1 (Spring 2000) p.56.
27. Ibid. p.57.
28. Richard Haas, US National Security Council 1987–93 quoted in Vickers (note 26) p.58.
29. Vickers (note 26) p.64.
30. Ibid. p.65.
31. Ibid. p.66.
32. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air [1921] (Washington DC: Air Force History and
Museum Program 1998) p.61.
33. John A. Warden, The Air Campaign (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s 1989) p.113.
34. Newman (note 10) p.33.
35. Walter Clark and Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention’,
Foreign Affairs 75/2 (March/April 1999) pp.74–5.
36. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace Press 1995) p.114.
37. Keith B. Richberg, ‘In War on Aideed, UN Battled Itself ’, Washington Post, 6 Dec. 1993,
quoted in Hirsch and Oakley (note 36) pp.121–2.
38. Ibid. p.122.
39. Ibid. p.123.
40. ‘Can Russia win in Chechnya’, The Economist, 6 Nov. 1999, p.49.
41. Chechen ‘terrorist’ actions in the First Chechen War, particularly the attack at Budionovsk,
are discussed in Stasys Knezys and Romanas Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya (College
Station: Texas A&M UP 1999) pp.158–78.
42. Bill Powell, ‘Russia’s War Hits Home’, Newsweek, 27 Sept. 1999, p.24.
43. ‘The Chechen Ulcer: War and Terrorism in the Caucasus’, Strategic Comments 5/8 (Oct.
1999) p.2.
44. C.W. Blandy, ‘Moscow’s Failure to Comprehend’ in A. Aldis (ed.) The Second Chechen War
(Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Occasional Paper No. 40, 2000) p.12.
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24 DEFENCE STUDIES

45. ‘Russia’s Shockwave of Terror’, The Guardian, 14 Sept. 1999 (www.guardianunlimited.

co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3901593,00.html).
46. Derek Brown, ‘Islamist Terror in Russia’, The Guardian, 16 Sept. 1999
(www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3902595,00.html).
47. ‘Can Russia win in Chechnya’ (note 40).
48. M.A. Smith, ‘The Second Chechen War: The All Russian Context’ in Aldis (note 44) p.9.
49. Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems’ in
P.R. Lavoy et al. (eds.) Planning the Unthinkable (NY: Cornell UP 2000) p.17.
50. T.R.W. Waters, ‘Human Rights in Chechnya – a Lost Cause?’ in Aldis (note 44) p.140.
51. Ibid. p.145.
52. James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy (NY: Putnam’s 1995) p.359 in 1998 Strategic
Assessment (www.ndu.edu.inss/sa98/sa9811.html) p.7.
53. Lewis A. Dunn et al, ‘Conclusions: Planning the Unthinkable’, in Lavoy (note 49) p.240.
54. ‘Target: America’, The Economist, 15 Aug. 1998, pp.13–14.
55. Richard A. Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles Heel (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1999)
p.236.
56. Dunn (note 53) p.232.
57. Jessica Stern, ‘Terrorist Motivations and Unconventional Weapons’, in Lavoy (note 49)
p.211.
58. Ibid. p.221.
59. Joseph S. Bermudez, ‘The DPRK and Unconventional Weapons’, in Lavoy (note 44)
p.191.
60. Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the US (The Rumsfeld Report) (www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm).
61. S. Snyder, ‘Pyongyang’s Pressure’, The Washington Quarterly 78/3 (Summer 2000) p.165.
62. M. Aaltola, ‘Emergency Food aid as a Means of Political Persuasion in the North Korean
Famine’, Third World Quarterly 20/2 (April 1999) p.374. Also, World Food Programme Field
Operations (www.wfp.org.dprkorea).
63. Bermudez (note 59) p.201.
64. Ibid. p.189.
65. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (NY: Norton 1995)
pp.1–45.
66. Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine’, in Lavoy (note 49) p.26.
67. Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic Missile Defence and Strategic Stability (Oxford: OUP for IISS
2000) p.14.
68. Jonathan Schell, ‘The Gift of Time’, Nation, 2 Feb. 1998 in 1998 Strategic Assessment
(www.ndu.edu.inss/sa98/sa9811.html) p.7.