YNOT v.

IAC

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an
absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose)
and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given
to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6)
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order.
He sued for recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the
merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed the
confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of
want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar
as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether  EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of the public,
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626
complies with the above requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance
to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary
for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those
seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those
still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same
lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure
is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill
them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as
it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial
is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for
the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such
as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and
urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the disposition
of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned
(Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and
reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead,
they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even
corruption.