Resources, Conservation & Recycling 164 (2021) 105216

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ACHIEVING SDGs in TANZANIA: Is there a nexus between land tenure

SECURITY, agricultural credits and rice PRODUCTIVITY?
Furaha Ndakije Rashid *
Department of Business Administration and Marketing, College of Business Education, P.O Box 3810, Mbeya, Tanzania

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This paper examined the nexus between land tenure security, credit access and rice productivity in Tanzania as a
Land tenure security route in achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs) 2030. The study used cross section data collected from
Agricultural credits 1188 farm households in eight districts of Tanzania in 2016. Descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and
Rice
conditional mixed process were used for data analysis. Descriptive results show that only 4% of the respondents
Productivity
had perceived land tenure security. Similarly, only 10% of respondents had access to credit and the level of rice
Tanzania
productivity was approximately 400 kg/ha. The correlation analysis show a positive association between land
tenure security, credit access and rice productivity. Education and family size positively affects land tenure
security while land survey and district location negatively affects land tenure security. Land tenure security
significantly and positively affects access to credit by farmers in the study area. Other factors that significantly
affect access to credit includes education level, sex of the household head, non-farm income and location
dummies. Access to credit have significant and positive effects on rice productivity. Farmers with access to credit
harvested about 2645 kg/ha (*p<0.05) more than farmers without access to credit. The results confirms the
existence of the nexus between land tenure security, agricultural credit and rice productivity. The results call for
improvement in farmers’ land tenure security through affordable and cost-effective land institutions that will
promote emergence of land markets, enhancement of credit markets which will further stimulate improved
agricultural productivity for the attainment of the 2030 sustainable development goals.

1. INTRODUCTION Sub-Saharan African countries, growth is occurring mostly in the con­

The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) 1 and 2 envisions to end World poverty and to have a World
without hunger, food insecurity and all forms of malnutrition. It is about
five years now since it was adopted by all UN member states in 2015, but
still more than 815 million people were estimated to be hungry in 2018
most of whom are found in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America
(FAO, 2019). Similarly, though the level poverty has decreased partic­
ularly in Sub-Saharan Africa from 54% in 1990s to 41% in 2015, more
efforts should be devoted if the SDGs are to be attained (FAO, 2019;
Africa Economic Outlook, 2019).
One of the major factor that accounts for the observed poverty rate in
SSA is the mismatch between where the growth is occurring and where
the majority of the poor people are found in the sub-region (Kabuya,
2015). In SSA, growth generated from Agriculture is argued to be eleven
times more effective in reducing poverty than GDP growth in other
sectors (World Economic Forum, 2016). Tanzania as in other
struction sector (12.9%), transport and storage (11.8%), information
and technology (9.1) while the agricultural sector which employs more
than 70% of all population and contributes to about 28.2% of GDP grew
by 5.3% in 2018 and averaged at 4% for the last decade and below the
recommended CAADP 6% annual growth rate (MoF, 2019).
Notwithstanding the major potential of land, agro-ecology and other
natural resources including water resources in Tanzania, productivity of
major cereals including rice, maize and sorghum has been low averaging
at 2.1, 1.5 and 1 ton/ha respectively for the last 18 years compared to
the World average of 4.3, 4 and 2 ton/ha respectively (FAOSTAT, 2019;
Zhou et al., 2013). The observed increase in cereal production in recent
years has been attributed by field expansion rather than an increase in
productivity (URT, 2016). Similarly, poverty has marginally decreased
from 28.2% in 2012 to 26.4% in 2018 (MoF, 2019).With an increase in
population in Tanzania estimated at 52.5 million people in 2018, pop­
ulation density of 61.2/km2 and urbanization programs, pressure on
productive agricultural land becomes a potential source of land tenure

* Corresponding Author
E-mail address: rashidfuraha@gmail.com.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2020.105216
Received 25 April 2020; Received in revised form 6 September 2020; Accepted 6 October 2020
Available online 14 October 2020
0921-3449/© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
F.N. Rashid
insecurity for households leading to land use conflicts, low investments
in land improvements and ultimately low crop productivity (Joel and
Bergaly, 2020).
Land tenure security is defined as the perception of the land holder of
whether his/her land can be appropriated or not (Matchaya, 2010).
Tanzania land policy 1995 recognize the existence of customary tenure
system which is a dominant system and legal system but all land in
Tanzania is public land vested to the President of the United Republic of
Tanzania on behalf of the citizens. The policy aims at promoting secure
land tenure system to maximize land resource use since it is believed
that a secure land tenure can be used as a collateral for credit access
which in turn improves investment in agricultural technologies and
indirectly affecting agricultural productivity through adoption of mod­
ern technologies (URT, 2016; Twine et al., 2019). In implementation of
the policy, a property and business formalisation program known by a
swahili acronym “MKURABITA” was established aiming at providing
formal land titles to promote tenure security for the poor for freely
tradability, and use as collateral. Tenure security is recognized as a
major vehicle by which land management can be realized (Kusiluka and
Chiwambo., 2018).
Despite enactment of the policy and the importance of land tenure
security, high land insecurity persists among farmers in particular
women due to inherent customs that favor men, high costs of land for­
malisation to farmers, fear of being exposed to land related taxes, and
weak capacity of the state to invest in land formalisation (Ali et al.,
2014; USAID, 2016; Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2018). This has led to low
land markets and distribution where the Gini coefficient of owned land
distribution is estimated at 0.5 relative to the distribution of income
which is about 0.39 (Wineman and Liverpool-Tasie, 2016; NBS, 2014;
Melesse and Awel, 2020). It has also resulted into emergence of informal
sources of credit to farmers where about 69% borrow from family
members and friends, 18% from informal saving groups, 4% from mo­
bile money, 2% from money lenders, 2% from micro-lenders, 1% from
religious organisations and the remaining 1% from employers (Finscope,
2017). The informal credit system is however not well-developed caused
by relatively high interest rates, low amounts disbursed, and even short
repayment conditions (Joel and Bergaly, 2020).
Previous results from empirical studies on the impacts of land tenure
security on credit access and indirectly on crop productivity are still
mixed. Some studies concluded that land tenure security positively im­
pacts on credit access and agricultural investments (Sossou and Mbaye,
2018; Otsuka et al., 2003; Besley et al., 1995; Jacoby et al., 2002). For
example, a study by Sossou and Mbaye (2018) in Benin found that
farmers with land certificate as a perceived measure of tenure security
increased by 0.24 the likelihood of farm investment while the customary
tenure increased the likelihood by 0.27. Other studies including Nko­
moki et al. (2018) in Zambia, Bambio and Agha (2018) in Burkina Faso,
Kille and Lyne (1993) in South Africa, Paltasingh (2018) study in India
and Ma et al. (2013) in Northwest China on the impacts of land tenure
security and property rights on agricultural productivity found that
tenure security whether customary or legal increased adoption rate of
improved technologies, promotes diversification, promotes more input
use, short term and long term investments. In addition, Feder and
Noronha (1987) and Kusunose et al. (2019) argue that tenure security
increases the probability of household’s access to credit since it acts as a
collateral.
In their study in South Korea, India and Thailand, Feder et al. (1988)
found that land tenure security increased the amount of credit disbursed
from financial institutions by 43% more than unsecured lands. Similarly,
provision of land titles to farmers increased credit access by around 18%
to over 31.7% in Costa Rica (Seligson, 1982). Credit further increases
crop yield through increased investment given that credit is invested
(Feder et al., 1991). Contrary to these studies, empirical results from a
study by Matchaya (2010) in Malawi found that land tenure security had
no significant impact on investment and agricultural productivity.
Furthermore, several studies in SSA and the rest of the world
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Resources, Conservation & Recycling 164 (2021) 105216
(Migot-Adholla et al., 1991; Place and Hazell, 1993; Jacoby and Minten,
2007) found that property rights to land had no significant effects on soil
and water conservation and improvement, investment, credit access and
crop yield.
To date, there is limited empirical evidence base that link land tenure
security, credit access and agricultural productivity and the available
literature is inconclusive, results differ widely across various contexts
and by the measurement of land tenure security used. In addition, from
the evolutionary theory of property rights, there is a great link between
land tenure security, credits and agricultural productivity (Platteau,
1996). Most of the previous studies analyzed either of the two compo­
nents leaving the other. Some studies analyzed the effects of land tenure
security on credit access (Shewya and Burra, 2016; Field et al., 2006).
Other studies analyzed the impacts of credits on agricultural produc­
tivity (Kohansal et al., 2008). These approaches breaks the conditional
linkage between agricultural productivity and land tenure security.
Finding the link between access to credit and investment in agricultural
production without firstly taking into account if credit access is facili­
tated by land tenure security does not permit us to confirm that the
longstanding functional link between land tenure security and crop
productivity exists (Joel and Bergaly, 2020). Therefore, this paper aims
at helping in addressing the knowledge gap through an assessment on
the link between land tenure security, access to agricultural credits and
rice productivity in Tanzania, specifically on the determinants of land
tenure security, effects of land tenure security on credit access and the
effect of credit access on rice productivity. The next sections of this
paper are arranged as follows: section two presents the theoretical
framework; section three presents the methodology, while section four
and five presents the results and discussion as well as the conclusion and
policy recommendations.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. The link between land tenure security, agricultural credits and crop
productivity
From the evolutionary theory of property rights (Platteau, 1996), if the
population increases, land scarcity increases, this gives rise to agricul­
tural intensification, and promotion of high market integration which in
turn leads to a rise in land tenure insecurity. The resultant problems of
land tenure insecurity including land use conflicts and low agricultural
investment can thus be solved by private appropriation through land
titles. This permits emergence of land markets which is further used as a
collateral in the credit market when land is titrated (Joel and Bergaly,
2020). The credit received (if it is oriented towards agricultural pro­
duction), stimulates agricultural investment which further enhances
agricultural productivity through adoption of improved inputs and
technologies (Feder et al., 1990; Matchaya, 2010; Place and Hazell,
1993; Kusunose et al., 2019). modeling the link between land tenure
security, credit access and productivity involves a system with three
equations: i) the decision function – determinants of household’s
perceived land tenure security, ii) the link between land tenure security
and credit access, and iii) effect of credit access on agricultural pro­
ductivity. This necessitates the use of a multi-equation model following
Heckman (1976) as shown by Eq. (1)–3.
Y1i = X1i β1 + ε1i (1)
Y2i = X2i β2 + Y1∗ ωi + ε2i (2)
Y3i = X3i β3 + Y2∗ ωi + ε3i (3)
Where; Y1i= perceived land tenure security for the ith household taking
the value of 1 if a household perceive having land tenure security and
0 otherwise, X1i= Is a vector of variables that determines the perceived
land tenure security, Y2i= Credit access for the ith household taking the
F.N. Rashid
value of 1 if a household had access to credit and the value of 0 other­
wise, X2i = vector of variables affecting access to credit, Y1∗ = predicted
value of land tenure security from Eq. (1), Y3i = rice productivity
expressed in kg/ha, X3i= is a vector of variables affecting rice produc­
tivity, Y2∗ = is the predicted value of cerdit access derived from Eq. (2), ε1i
ε2i, and ε3i are disturbance terms. The first equation on the determinants
of land tenure security is involves a qualitative and binary dependent
variable estimated by a probit model. Similarly, the second equation
involves a qualitative dependent variable (access to credit) usually
estimated by probit model. It is a selection equation formed on the basis
of the predicted values from the first equation. Equation three involves a
continuous dependent variable formed from the values predicted from
the credit function. A quadratic production function was used to esti­
mate the third equation on yield due to its flexibility showing both
increasing and diminishing returns to resources employed Kouka et al.,
1994).
The system of Eqs. (1)–3 is recursive involving both qualitative and
quantitative dependent variables. When we have two equations with an
endogenous input from the first equation entering into the second
equation as an exogenous variable, a two – step estimation based on the
minimum estimate of chi-square is used (Rivers and Vuong, 1988). Such
system of recursive equations can be estimated by a multivariate probit
Fig. 1. Study Area.
Source: ASPIRES Project – Tanzania Survey 2016.
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Resources, Conservation & Recycling 164 (2021) 105216
model that takes into consideration the probable correlation among the
pairs of equations. The introduction of predicted variables in equation
two and three helps in dealing with the endogeneity problem though
there may still be some biases caused by the introduction of the pre­
dicted variables.
Hence, a conditional mixed process (cmp) technique devised by
Roodman (2011) which perfectly takes into account the bias was used to
jointly estimate the three equations. The cmp’s advantages include its
ability to adapt to seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) instrumental
variable and simultaneous equations in conjunction with the ability to
take into account the cross-relationships existing between several
equations of the model (Roodman, 2011). Thus, this study used the cmp
model for analysis of the hypothesized direct effects of land tenure se­
curity on credit access and indirect effect on rice productivity.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Description of the study area, sampling and the source of data
The study is based on the household survey data collected in 2015/
16 agricultural season by ASPIRES Tanzania project. The data was
collected from 1188 randomly selected sample households from eight
F.N. Rashid Resources, Conservation & Recycling 164 (2021) 105216

districts (Njombe, Kilombero, Mvomero, Magu, Mkuranga, Moshi Rural, Table 1

Liwale and Kiteto) of Tanzania representing both southern highland Variable definition and their Descriptive Statistics.
zone (Njombe), eastern zone (Kilombero, Mvomero and Mkuranga), Variable Variable description Mean Standard
Lake zone (Magu), southern zone (Liwale) and Northen zone (Kiteto) as Dev.
shown in Fig. 1. The districts were selected since their main economic Perceived Land tenure Dummy (1 =yes, 0=no) 0.044 0.205
activity is agriculture particularly cereal crops including rice and maize. security
Furthermore, they represent diverse climatic conditions, socioeconomic Land ownership Dummy (1 =yes, 0=no) 0.852 0.355
infrastructures, population density and land management institutions. Surveyed land Dummy (1 =yes, 0=no) 0.091 0.287
Availability of land use Dummy (1 =yes, 0=no) 0.426 0.495
The Eastern zone is hot -humid, Lake zone is a high rainfall zone while plan
the rest is cool-temperate highlands regions. With the survey, informa­ Presence of land conflicts Dummy (1 =yes, 0=no) 0.200 0.398
tion was collected by means of a questionnaire whereby a household Access to credit Dummy (1 =yes, 0=no) 0.100 0.300
head was a unit of analysis. Investment in SWCP Dummy (1 =yes, 0=no) 0.371 0.483
Farm size (ha) Continuous variable in 3.03 12.208
hectares
3.2. Description and measurement of key outcome variables Sex of household head Dummy (1 =Male, 0.934 0.249
0=female)
Key variables used in this study include land tenure security, in­ Education of household Number of years of 4.040 32.206
head education
vestment, access to credit, productivity, farm level and household
Family size Number of members in a 6.918 3.838
characteristics. The choice of variables used in this study was based on family
literature review and economic theory. silt soil Proportion of silt in the soil 7.200 6.036
(%)
3.2.1. Land tenure security clay soil Proportion of Clay in the 23.015 13.254
soil (%)
In this study, land tenure security is the individual’s perception on
Sandy soil Proportion of sand in the 69.783 16.900
the full ownership of land, exclusivity to the use of land, the proof of soil (%)
land ownership, transferability and duration of land rights. Part of the Improved seed use Dummy (1=yes, 0=no) 0.249 0.433
proof of land ownership can be a documented land information (size, Frequency of fert. No. of times a farmer 1.617 0.772
application applied fert
boundaries and location) based on land survey (McKenna and Urban-
Fertilizer application Dummy (1=yes, 0=no) 0.233 0.423
Karr, 2008; Sossou and Mbaye, 2018; Place and Hazell 1993). Value of all assets Value of all assets in Tsh 1700 11,400
(“0000′′ )
3.2.2. Access to agricultural credit, rice productivity and farm investment Gross value of harvest Value of all harvest in Tsh 426.73 2000
Access to credit is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the (“0000′′ )
Non-farm income Tanzania shillings 188.20 804.75
household had access to credit and the value of 0 otherwise. Similarly,
(“0000′′ )
land productivity was measured as the level of output obtained given the Rice commercialization Proportion of rice output 4.900 19.774
quantity of land used in producing the output. Total factor productivity index sold (%)
was not used in this study since missing input prices particularly of Rice Productivity Output per hectare (Kg/ha) 399.82 1289.11
Njombe (District) Dummy (1=Njombe, 0.253 0.435
manure, labor, storage and transportation costs was a constraint as
0=Otherwise)
noted by Kelly’s study (2005) on Africa. Investment in this study was Kilombero District Dummy (1=Kilombero, 0.063 0.243
represented by a dummy variable of whether the household invested in 0=Other)
soil and water improvement and conservation practices including canal Mvomero District Dummy (1=Mvomero, 0.092 0.289
construction, micro-water harvesting, fallowing, manuring, and stone 0=Other)
Kiteto District Dummy (1=Kiteto, 0.261 0.439
cordons for soil and water run-off control. The description of other
0=Otherwise)
variables is shown on Table 1. Magu district Dummy (1=Magu, 0.072 0.258
0=Otherwise)
3.3. Econometric model estimation Liwale District Dummy (1=Liwale, 0.142 0.349
0=Otherwise)
Moshi Rural District Dummy (1=Moshi, 0.022 0.146
Eq. (1) – 2 corresponds to binary response choice models. In Eq. (1), 0=Otherwise)
the farmer’s perceived land tenure security is determined by a number of Mkuranga District Dummy (1=Mkuranga, 0.095 0.294
factors including social economic (sex, education level, presence/ 0=Other)
absence of land use conflicts, presence of village land use plan, whether Source: Author calculations from field survey.
the land was surveyed, family size, farm size and geographic/agro-
ecological zone. This poses a binary choice decision on the probability
captures the unobserved covariates that influence the choice of the
of accessing credit. Similarly, Eq. (2) involves a binary choice whether a
dependent variables (Land tenure security, credit access). The latent
farmer had access to credit or not.
variable is a linear combination of both observed covariates represented
Access to credit is hypothesized to be influence by factors including
in Eq. (4) and the unobserved covariates captured by the disturbance
perceived land tenure security, land ownership, sex, education level,
term. In estimating the relation between access to credit and produc­
value of total assets, level of crop commercialization, presence of land
tivity in Eq. (3), an ordinary least square was applied. In practice, esti­
use conflicts, non-farm income, and agro-ecological zones. Following
mating each of the equations above individually assumes that the error
Gujarat (2004), binary probit models specified in Eq. (5) were used to
terms of the individually estimated equations are independent of each
estimate Eqs. (1)–2.
other which is not always the case. Assuming all factors can be observed
′
Yi∗ = Xi β + εi = β0 + β1 Xi1 + β2 Xi2 + … + βn Xin + ε1 , Where i by the researcher, Eq. (3) could be re-estimated as;-

= 1………n (4) Yi = β0 + β1 Xi1 + β2 Xi2 + … + βn Xin + ε1 , (6)

{
1 if Yi∗ > 0 Where Yi is rice productivity of household i, Xi1 is a set of observable
Y= (5) household and farm level characteristics, Xi2 is a binary variable for
0 Otherwise
access to credit, β0 ,β1 ,β2 …βn are parameters to be estimated while ε1 is
In this model, a rational farmer poses a latent variable Yi∗ that a disturbance term containing factors that cannot be observed by the

4
F.N. Rashid
researcher. Given that, the factors (such as entrepreneurial ability of the
credit borrower that can be used by credit lenders to determine whether
to lend credit or not) contained in the disturbance term cannot be
observed by the researcher and can correlate with access to credit
leading to selection bias due to correlation between independent vari­
ables and the error term (Hausman and Wise, 1976; Khandker and
Faruqee, 2003), estimating Eq. (3) with OLS may lead to biased
estimates.
For robustness of the regression results as well as dealing with the
selectivity bias, this study employed the instrumental variable (IV)
approach. The IV is appropriate in dealing with endogeneity problem
resulting from reverse causality, omitted variables and measurement
errors (Kennedy, 2003; Greene, 2008). The instrumental variables are
variables that influence the selection variable (access to credit) but have
no direct influence on the outcome variable (rice productivity). In this
study and based on literature, group/cooperative membership of
members of household, sex of household head and perceived land tenure
security were used as instruments for credit access. Group membership
helps in creation of social network and social capital formation which is
important for credit access by farmers (Martey et al., 2012; Joel and
Bergaly, 2020). Secured land is also used as a collateral for accessing
public utilities including credit (Melesse and Awel, 2020). Similarly, sex
of the household head plays an important role since in most African
societies, ownership to land and other resources favours men than
women based on customary laws which in turn has effect on credit ac­
cess (Ali et al., 2014; Joel and Bergaly, 2020). To test whether the use of
IV was important in this study, the Durbin-Wu- Hausman test (Durbin,
1954; Wu, 1973 and Hausman, 1978) was employed. Furthermore, the
Basmann over identification test for correct model specification was
used to test if the model was correctly specified.
4. RESULTS and discussion
4.1. Household and farm level characteristics
Table 1 shows the summary of selected household and farm level
characteristics. The results show that, rice farming in the study area is
largely a smallholder activity where farmers cultivate on average less
than 5 ha. About 93.4% of the respondents were males signifying un­
equal access to resources between men and women. On average, a
household had 7 people and the respondents’ level of education was four
years which implies that respondents had at least primary education.
Although about 85.2% of respondents owned land, only 4.4% of the
respondents perceived their owned land to be secure. This could be
attributed by limited land survey, presence of land use conflicts, and
weak land use plan. Credit access is also limited as only about 10% of the
respondents had access to credit. Similarly, inorganic fertilizer appli­
cation and improved seed use in the rice field was low since only about
23% and 25% applied inorganic fertilizer and improved seed
respectively.
The frequency of fertilizer application was about two times during
the growing season. Furthermore, investment in soil and water conser­
vation practices (SWCP) was low since only 37.1% of the sampled
farmers used the practices. The sampled farms’ soils was primarily
characterized by sandy soil (69.8%) followed by clay (23%) and a small
amount of silt. The level of rice commercialization was low at about
4.9% in the study area implying that most of the produced rice was
enough to for household consumption. The average land productivity in
the study area was found to be low at about 400 kg/ha. Low perceived
land tenure security, low developed credit market, low investment in
soil and water conservation practices, and low use of inputs among
others could be the cause of the observed low rice productivity.
Furthermore, on average, a typical household had a total assets
valued at 17,000 thousand Tanzania shillings, gross value of harvest
valued at 426.730 thousand Tanzania shillings with an annual non-farm
income of 188.200 thousand Tanzania shillings. These might also be
5
Resources, Conservation & Recycling 164 (2021) 105216
used as sources for both farm investment and access to formal and
informal credit markets.
4.2. Correlation analysis between the outcome variables
Table two presents the degree of association between the outcome
variables of interest (land tenure security, access to credit and rice
productivity). The results shows the existence of weak and positive
correlation between land tenure security and credit access (0.076, p =
0.05) as well as between credit access and rice productivity (0.1044,
p<0.05). This could be explained by the reason that land tenure security
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for promotion of credit ac­
cess, investment in agriculture and ultimately on crop productivity
(Migot-Adholla et al., 1991). Similarly, land acquisition costs is high in
Tanzania and even if land has been registered, the law does not give
power for the land holder to sell the land since the land holder has the
ownership right of occupancy while the land is vested to the president on
behalf of citizens and it cannot be mortgaged for accessing agricultural
credit.
Similarly, a weak and positive correlation between credit access and
rice productivity might be a reflection of low undeveloped agricultural
credit markets in Tanzania as verified on Table 1 where only 10% of
respondents had access to credit. In addition, the amount of credit ac­
quired might be invested in non-farming activities leaving agricultural
investments low and thus translating into low productivity. The results
implies that, even though the degree of association is weak, there is a
positive association between the outcome variables.
4.3. The nexus between land tenure security, credit access and rice
productivity
Tables 3–5 presents the estimated results of the three – step
modeling. Table 3 shows the determinants of perceived land tenure se­
curity in the study area. Table 4 assesses the effect of land tenure se­
curity on credit access while Table five appreciates the effect of credit
access on rice productivity.
4.3.1. Determinants of land tenure security
From Table 3, results show that education level of household head,
family size, whether land is surveyed and agro-ecological zones signif­
icantly affect land tenure security in the study area. Education level of
the household head and family size positively affects land tenure secu­
rity while surveyed land and agro-ecological zones negatively affects
land tenure security.
The positive education coefficient implies that educated farmers
might have higher propensity of tenure security than non-educated
farmers. This is due to the reason that education provides them with
timely and efficient access to information about land policies and
importance of securing land (Rao et al., 2020; Kusiluka and Chiwambo,
2018). Similarly, family size forming a share of agricultural labor force,
is positive and significantly influences the perceived land tenure security
in the study area since agricultural labor influences land adjustments
whereby families with more agricultural labor force have a higher
likelihood of obtaining more land since no land will be left idle as idle
land is susceptible to eviction. Furthermore, the results in Table 3 in­
dicates that surveying land significantly promotes land tenure insecurity
which is contrary to expectation. The plausible reason for this is that
land owners in Tanzania consider surveying land and provision of legal
property rights not important mainly due to the high costs of land
surveying, obtaining and sustaining title deeds and the fear of being
likely exposed to land related taxes (Ali et al., 2014; Kusiluka and Chi­
wambo, 2018). This is also signified by the descriptive statistics in
Table 1 where only 9.1% out of 941 respondents reported their land to
be surveyed. District dummies indicates that farmers located in Mvo­
mero, Kilombero and Kiteto districts are more likely to face land tenure
insecurity than the rest of the districts possibly due to the fact that land is
F.N. Rashid Resources, Conservation & Recycling 164 (2021) 105216

unevenly distributed in the three districts relative to the other, which Table 3
gives rise to the possibility of land re-allocation and appropriation in the Determinants of Land Tenure Security.
future. Similarly, the three districts are more fertile thereby attracting Perceived Land Tenure Security Coefficient Z-
more population which ultimately increases the competition over the Statistic
use of land and in some cases resulting into land use conflicts. Education level of household head 0.107* 1.99
Other explanatory variables including presence of village land use (0.0537)
plan, investment in soil and water conservation practices (SWCP), farm Availability of Village land use plan (1=yes, 0= no) − 0.0000515 − 0.29
size, land ownership and presence of land use conflicts had no signifi­ (0.000179)
Family size (ha) 0.0793* 2.29
cant effect on tenure security. This could be possibly due to the fact that (0.0346)
most surveyed respondent villages had no land use plans. Investment in Land surveyed (1=yes, 0=no) − 0.000844*** − 4.65
the soil and water conservation practices is also low in the area since (0.000182)
only 37.1% out of 941 respondents reported having invested in the soil Land ownership (1=yes, 0=no) 0.0501 0.31
(0.162)
and water conservation practices despite its importance in strengthening
Gross value of harvest (Tshs) 9.77e-08 1.91
land tenure security (Rao et al., 2020; Ma, 2013; Brasselle et al., 2002). (5.12e-08)
Similarly, the coefficient of land ownership was not significant since the Investment in SWCP (1=yes, 0=no) 0.121 0.76
land is 85% customarily owned. Customary land ownership is argued to (0.158)
have low perceived tenure security since it lacks legal protection to Farm size (ha) 0.0260 1.33
(0.0196)
government agencies (Joel and Bergaly, 2020; Rao et al., 2020). Farm Presence of Land use conflicts (1=yes) 0.322 1.59
size was also not significant. Households with greater land holding leave (0.203)
part of the land uncultivated exposing the land to the possibility of Njombe (1=yes, 0=no) − 0.790 − 1.74
eviction and the related risks including land grabbing by urban elites (0.454)
Kilombero (1=yes, 0=no) − 1.246** − 2.58
(Brasselle et al., 2002). Hence, household characteristics and nature and
(0.482)
location of agro-ecological zone are the crucial determining factors for Mvomero (1=yes, 0=no) − 1.486** − 3.19
the perceived land tenure security in the study area. (0.466)
Kiteto (1=yes, 0=no) − 0.912* − 2.01
4.3.2. Effects of land tenure security on credit access (0.455)
Magu (1=yes, 0=no) − 0.811 − 1.54
Most farmers in developing countries are faced by liquidity con­
(0.527)
straints that in turn prevent them from making major investment in Liwale (1=yes, 0=no) 0.0497 0.09
farming activities. In this context, access to credit by farming- (0.582)
households is a crucial instrument that could help them to reduce the Moshi Rural (1=yes, 0=no) − 0.876 − 1.25
(0.701)
level of liquidity constraints (Patriciah and Wario, 2016; Chandio et al.,
Constant 1.561** 3.22
2018). However access to credit from financial institutions by farming (0.486)
households is determined by a number of factors. Table 2 shows the
factors that affect access to credit in the study area. Standard errors in parentheses, *p = 0.05, **p = 0.01, ***p = 0.001, N = 1188.
Source: Author’s calculations from field survey data.
Perceived land tenure security, non-farm income, number of years of
education of the household head, sex of the household head, level of
agricultural commercialization and district dummies representing agro- stability relative to farm income which is susceptible to more risk due to
ecological variations significantly influence credit access in the study over dependency on weather and market forces of demand and supply
area. The coefficient of perceived land tenure security was positive (Lemessa and Gemechu, 2016; and Chauke et al., 2013). Rural non-farm
implying that farmers with perceived tenure security had the odds of 1.5 income is crucial since across the developing countries, rural economies
times of accessing credit compared to those with no tenure security. The do not depend purely on agricultural activities but a substantial of
plausible reason for this is that perceived land tenure security in­ farming households earn a share of income from non-agricultural ac­
centivizes the emergence of land markets which in turn provides a tivities (Imai et al., 2015). The share of rural non-farm income to the
farmer with collateral for accessing both short term and long term credit total income has been increasing and varies from 51% in Asia, 37% in
(Kusiluka and Chiwambo, 2018; Borras et al., 2015; Joel and Bergaly, Africa and 47% in America signifying its importance (Thapa et al.,
2020; Nkomoki et al., 2018). It also reduces competition and conflict 2013).
over land use thereby increasing allocative efficiency and the reduction Furthermore, education has positive and significant influence on
of inequalities in the use of land resources (Chandio et al., 2018; Melesse smallholder farmers’ access to credit. As the number of years of edu­
and Awel, 2020; Fenske, 2011). cation of the household head increases by one year, the likelihood of
Household income in particular non-farm income has positive effect farming household to access credit increases. The plausible reason for
on the likelihood of farmers’ access to agricultural credit. This indicates this result could be that education improves higher degree of financial
that farmers with more income are likely to have access to credit than literacy, innovation, adoption of new technologies, risk evaluation, ac­
those with low income. This can be explained by the fact that higher cess to both production and market information and helps in responding
levels of income increases repayment capacity and it is mostly used by to market signals (Isaga, 2018; Temesgen et al., 2018). Furthermore,
financial institutions as a measure of credit worthiness (Baiyegunhi and education increases awareness of credit availability and managerial
Fraser, 2014). Non-farm income is also a measure of household income skills including resource allocation, book keeping skills, provides en­
terprise direction and financial decision making (Andoh et al., 2015;
Patriciah and Wario, 2016; Mitra et al., 2018).
Table 2 The coefficient of sex of the household head significantly and
Correlation Analysis between Tenure Security, Credit Access and Productivity. negatively affects credit access. This implies that, in the study area, a
Variable Land Tenure Security Access to Credit Rice Yield female household head has a low likelihood of accessing formal credit
than their male counterpart. This could be attributed by inherent African
Land Tenure Security 1.0000
Access to Credit 0.076* 1.0000 traditions and customs that favor men than women in accessing pro­
Rice Productivity − 0.0439 0.1044* 1.0000 ductive resources including land which in turn can be used as collateral
to access credit (Mitra et al., 2018, 2016). In addition, the farmers’ level
*p = 0.05.
Source: Author’s calculations from field survey. of rice commercialization significantly and positively affects credit

6
F.N. Rashid Resources, Conservation & Recycling 164 (2021) 105216

Table 4 Table 5
Effect of Land Tenure Security on Credit Access. Effects of Agricultural Credit Access on Rice Productivity.
Access to credit Coefficient Z-Statistic OLS IV
Dependent Variable: Rice Coefficient Z Coefficient Z
Education level of household head 0.0788*** 3.37
Productivity (kg/ha)
(0.0234)
Non-farm income (Tshs) 1.09e-08* 2.15 Access to Credit (1=yes, 0=no) 1079.4*** 4.25 2645* 1.66
(5.07e-09) (− 254) (1592.9)
Sex of the household head (1=female) − 0.686*** − 3.82 Education level of household − 1.319 − 0.83 − 66.77 − 1.06
(0.180) head (years)
Perceived land tenure security (1=yes, 0=no) 1.5201*** 7.61 (− 1.584) (62.87)
(0.1997) Non-farm income (Tshs) − 1.91E-06 − 0.26 − 1.62e-6 − 0.21
Value of all assets (Tshs) − 1.64e-10 − 0.23 (− 7.22e-6) (7.62e-6)
(7.02e-10) Investment in SWCP (1=yes, 8.33 0.04 − 122.1 − 0.41
Gross value of harvest (Tshs) 5.77e-09 1.48 0=no)
(3.91e-09) (− 218.4) (300.3)
Rice commercialization index 0.00583** 2.60 Improved seed use (1=yes, 679.7 1.28 930.4 1.45
(0.00224) 0=no)
Presence of Land use conflicts(1=yes, 0=no) 0.167 1.30 (− 531.6) (642.0)
(0.128) Value of all assets (Tshs) − 7.27E-06 − 1.22 − 7.50e-6 − 0.87
Njombe (1=yes, 0=no) 0.709** 2.78 (− 5.97e-6) (8.59e-6)
(0.255) Value of all assets (Tshs) 5.57e-14** 3.24 5.52e-14* 2.02
Kilombero (1=yes, 0=no) 0.682* 2.23 squared
(0.305) (− 1.72e- (2.73e-14)
Mvomero (1=yes, 0=no) 0.927** 3.26 14)
(0.285) Farm size (ha) 7.275 0.35 15.85 0.62
Kiteto (1=yes, 0=no) 0.197 0.74 (− 20.6) (25.56)
(0.267) Farm size (ha) squared 0.0171 0.07 0.0132 0.05
Magu (1=yes, 0=no) 0.234 0.74 (− 0.249) (0.280)
(0.315) Improved seed use * fertilizer − 650.6* − 2.25 − 814.4* − 2.32
Liwale (1=yes, 0=no) 0.00923 0.03 frequency of application
(0.290) (− 289.7) (351.1)
Moshi Rural (1=yes, 0=no) 0.134 0.30 Clay soil * fertilizer frequency 9.177* 1.85 17.90** 2.82
(0.452) of application
Farm size (ha) − 0.00901 − 1.44 (− 4.971) (6.356)
(0.00627) Sandy soil * fertilizer frequency − 1.296 − 0.52 1.143 0.35
Constant − 2.707*** − 8.19 of application
(0.330) (− 2.494) (3.309)
Silt soil * fertilizer frequency of 34.45** 2.75 10.99 0.56
Standard errors in parentheses, *p = 0.05, **p = 0.01, ***p = 0.001, N = 1188. application
(− 12.53) (19.57)
access in the study area. This could be explained by the reason that crop Njombe (1=yes, 0=no) − 998 − 1.45 − 1544.6 − 1.22
(− 687.7) (1270.4)
commercialization lead to an increase in improved input use, increased
Kilombero (1=yes, 0=no) 1048.6 1.48 727.5 0.57
profitable production which further improves household’s income that (− 710.2) (1284.5)
may improve farmer’s creditworthiness (Von Braun et al., 1993). Mvomero (1=yes, 0=no) 5198.1*** 5.86 5406.6*** 3.51
Similarly, location of the household head represented by Kilombero, (− 887) (1541.9)
Njombe and Mvomero district dummies significantly and positively Kiteto (1=yes, 0=no) − 304.7 − 0.39 − 450.3 − 0.34
(− 788) (1336.2)
affected credit access relative to the rest districts under study. This could Magu (1=yes, 0=no) 671.3 0.83 172.2 0.13
be explained by diversity in potentiality of the agro-ecological zones in (− 804.2) (1373.1)
promoting agricultural production which attracts the emergence of Liwale(1=yes, 0=no) − 138.5 − 0.19 − 381.1 − 0.32
more financial institutions compared to districts with less rice produc­ (− 737.4) (1204.6)
Moshi rural (1=yes, 0=no) 737 0.7 380.3 0.19
tion potential and developed rice markets. Kilombero and Mvomero are
(− 1047.9) (1968.2)
among the highly rice producing districts in Tanzania with direct link to Constant 61.88 0.09 28.84 0.02
major food markets including Dar es salaam which promotes exchange. (− 708.5) (1313.1)
This is consistent with previous studies (Lemessa and Gemechu, 2016; R-square 0.3547
Ma et al., 2013; Sossou and Mbaye, 2018). Thus, enhancing land tenure LR Chi2 (48) 340.61 Wald chi2 149.95
(20)
security, education to farmers, equality in access resources between men Prob>Chi2 0.0000 Prob>chi2 0.0000
and women, and agricultural commercialization which in turn improves Durbin 5.256
household’s income are crucial factors that determine access to credit in (0.0219)
the study area. Access to credit has a bearing on farm investment (if Wu-Hausman 4.695
(0.0319)
invested) through acquisition of farm inputs and machinery (Ali et al.,
Basmann chi2(2) 0.450
2014; Temesgen et al., 2018; Abdallah, 2016). (0.7985)

Standard errors in parentheses, *p = 0.05, **p = 0.01, ***p = 0.001, N = 1188.

4.3.3. Effects of credit access on rice productivity
Table 5 presents the factors that affect rice productivity in the study
area. Rice productivity (kg/ha) is significantly affected by access to
credit, interaction between the use of improved seed and the frequency
of fertilizer application as well as the interaction between clay soil and
the frequency of fertilizer application, Silt soil and fertilizer application
and based on agro-ecological zone. The coefficient for credit is signifi­
cant and positive implying that credit access increases farm productiv­
ity. Using OLS, a farmer with access to credit in the study area had
1079.4 kg/ha of rice more than those with no access to credit relative to
when an IV was used where farmers with access to credit had 2645 kg/
ha of rice more than those with no access. The coefficient obtained by
the IV approach was larger than that in OLS since the variance of the IV
estimator is obtained by incorporating a measure of the strength of
linear association between credit access and the instruments into the
denominator of the variance formula (Greene, 2008).
The plausible reason for this result could be that credit is used to
purchase farm inputs in the short –run and the promotion of investment

7
F.N. Rashid
in the sustainable soil and water conservation practices in the long run
(Chandio et al., 2018; Akudugu, 2016; Sekyi et al., 2017; and Abdallah,
2016). Furthermore, credit facilitates the efficient performance of other
factors of production which in turn enhances agricultural productivity
(Parry et al., 2004). It helps farmers particularly in rural areas in
adoption of productivity promoting technologies (Christen et al., 2005;
Ali et al., 2014).
Investment in soil and water conservation practices improves soil
organic matter, soil quality, reduces soil erosion, increases water
retention and motivates a farmer to invest in short term-inputs including
fertilizer which in turn promotes an increase in productivity due to
reduced risk of loss (Reardon et al., 1996). Similarly, when biophysical
factors are controlled, inputs especially inorganic fertilizer will tend to
increase the level of productivity. As pointed out by Vigani et al. (2015)
and Reardon et al., al.(1996), under natural resource constraints situa­
tion, an increase in crop productivity can be achieved through input use
efficiency by means of mechanization, improved fertilizer, plant pro­
tection and the use of improved seed with traits for abiotic and biotic
tolerance as well as characteristics that promote nutrient uptake
efficiency.
Similarly, significant dummies for districts indicates that district
disparities in terms of agro-ecology, soil characteristics, precipitation
and institutions plays a great role in determining the level of rice pro­
ductivity. For the studied districts in this study, the level of rice pro­
ductivity was higher in Mvomero (5406.6 kg/ha) relative to the rest of
the districts and the results were significant (p<0.001). The results are
consistent with the expected prior since Mvomero district is well
endowed with suitable agro-ecology for rice production including the
Kilombero and Rufiji river basins which provides an avenue for rice
production.
The results are consistent with previous studies by Sossou and
Mbaye (2018) in Benin and Epule et al. (2018) in Uganda who both
found that farm investments particularly long-term investments im­
proves crop productivity. Furthermore, from Table 5, the results shows
that there is significant and negative effect of the frequency of fertilizer
application in the presence of improved rice seed. This might reflect the
low use of improved seed in the study area as shown in the descriptive
statistics in Table 1. Similarly, soil physical properties (clay soil and silt
soil) plays a great role in determining the level of rice productivity in the
presence of fertilizer application frequency. The Durbin and
Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity were found to be significant
implying that access to credit by rice farmers in the study area was
endogenously determined. This further indicates that the process of
allocating credit to farmers was not random. This may lead to the
problem of endogeneity and selection bias when an independent vari­
able is not exogenous (Baum et al., 2007; Heckman, 1976; Khandker and
Faruqee, 2003; Antonakis et al., 2010). The relevancy of the instruments
were assessed using the Basmann test (Baum et al., 2007; Greene, 2008).
The non-significant F and Basmann chi-square tests suggests that the
instruments and the disturbance term are uncorrelated. This justifies the
use of IV results as robust results to OLS results.
5. CONCLUSION, policy implications and future research
direction
5.1. Conclusion
As the World and in particular Tanzania population continues to
increase relative to food supply under constrained resources including
land, preventive checks as proposed by Malthus in the book “An Essay on
the Principles of Population” should be advocated if the sustainable
development goals are to be attained. This study aimed at investigating
the nexus between land tenure security in the context of growing pop­
ulation, agricultural credits and rice productivity in Tanzania as a means
of achieving World sustainable Development Goals 2030 particularly
goal 1 (No poverty) and goal 2 (Zero hunger). The study is built on the
8
Resources, Conservation & Recycling 164 (2021) 105216
priori that secure land tenure influences access to agricultural credits
which in turn affects agricultural productivity through investment in
both short-term and long-term farming activities. Investment acts as a
stimulus for demand of more inputs that ultimately lead to increase in
yield. Specifically, the study aimed at examining the determinants of
land tenure security, effects of land tenure security on access to credit,
and the effects of credit access on rice productivity.
The study used a descriptive analysis, correlation analysis, and
conditional mixed process (CMP), using cross –sectional data collected
by ASPIRES Tanzania project in 2016 from 1188 farm households in
eight districts of Tanzania. Results show that there is low perception of
land tenure security in the study area since only about 4% of the re­
spondents perceived their land to be secure. Only 10% of respondents
had access to credit and the level of rice productivity was low approx­
imately 400 kg/ha. The level of perceived land tenure security is
determined by farmers’ level of education, family size, land survey and
locality/agro-ecological zone. Similarly, the study finds a positive link
between perceived land tenure security, agricultural credits and rice
productivity though the association was weak. Land tenure security
significantly and positively affects credit access. Furthermore, credit
access affects rice productivity through promotion of investment in
agricultural inputs and adoption of technology. Hence, this study affirms
existence of a nexus between land tenure security, agricultural credits
and rice productivity.
5.2. Policy implication
Policy implications for this result calls for improvement in farmers’
level of perceived tenure security through affordable and cost-effective
land institutions that will promote emergence of land markets particu­
larly in rural areas that will further stimulate credit markets. This calls
also for a gendered promotion of access to resources, farmers access to
education particularly extension education and land institutions for
effective management of land resources that will in turn reduce land use
conflicts, stimulate agricultural commercialization, increased household
income and food security for sustainable development.
5.3. Limitations of the study
This study aimed at assessing whether there is a nexus between land
tenure security, agricultural credit and rice productivity in achieving the
United Nations sustainable development goal 1 and 2 in Tanzania.
Focusing on only the link between land tenure security, agricultural
credits and rice productivity as measures in achieving sustainable
development may be a necessary but not sufficient condition since
sustainable development is multidimensional. Future research should
further explore more variables including morality, environmental, cli­
matic, behavior, culture and technology among others.
Credit author statement
Furaha Ndakije Rashid, this paper consists of a single author. The
author was responsible from conceptualization, methodology, software,
analysis, investigation, data curation to writing and submission of this
paper.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
The Author would like to extend sincere thanks to ASPIRES Tanzania
project for accepting this study to be undertaken using the data collected
F.N. Rashid
by the project.
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