Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007: 5-28

Homosexual marriage: the victory of the political

correctness and bad arguments

NeveN SeSARDić
Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
sesardic@ln.edu.hk

ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE / RECEIVED: 31-10-06 ACCEPTED: 16-02-07

Abstract: Many Western intellectuals, especially those in the humanities and social sciences, find it
easy to show that continuous and mass opposition to homosexual marriage is rationally
unsustainable and that it is the mere result of prejudice or religious fanaticism. However, a closer
analysis of some of these widely accepted arguments against the conservative view reveals that
these arguments are in fact based on logical errors and on a serious distortion of the conservative
critique of homosexual marriage. The conclusion is that philosophers should resist the pressure
of political correctness and should approach this

make a more open spirit than hitherto.

keywords: b cancer, homosexual marriage, conservatism, political correctness, practical ethics.

We will never know on what occasions people acted cowardly just

out of fear that they might not seem progressive enough.

Charles Péguy

1. One-party campuses?

A few years ago, I was at a philosophical conference in the United States that was
devoted to completely non-political topics. In a session on psychological
experiments on emotions, the lecturer at one point made a brief digression to
criticize a position he himself described as characteristic of the political left. But
immediately after that, almost apologetically, he added: “Let’s face it, me of course
too
6 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

I belong to the political left, as do all of you here. ” There were 30-40 people in the hall and it was quite
obvious that the lecturer did not know most of those present personally.

If you wonder how he could have guessed with such certainty the political
affiliation of his colleagues, it only shows that you are not very familiar with the
situation at American universities (especially in the humanities and social
sciences). Namely, it has long been known, and abundantly confirmed by empirical
research, that American professors are strongly concentrated in the left part of the
political spectrum (eg Ladd and Lipset, 1975; Redding, 2001; Klein and Stern,
2006; Klein and Western, 2006). At many universities, right-wingers belong to a
dangerously endangered species. I must emphasize that the word “right-winger”
here does not refer to people with Ku Klux Klan IDs or similar extremist
organizations but simply to ordinary people whose only sin is that they, like tens of
millions of other Americans,

Most research on which political attitudes dominate in American universities today

yields similar results, and for the sake of specificity, I will cite only a few indicative facts.
For example, according to a study based on the list of registered voters, it is shown that in
the departments of humanities and social sciences at Stanford the ratio between
Democrats and Republicans is 14: 1, at the University of Berkeley this ratio is 20: 1
(therefore the university even the professors there sometimes call it the “People's
Republic of Berkeley”), and on Cornell this disproportion climbs to an impressive 28: 1. In
a recently published article on the “shame of one-party campuses in America”
(Zinsmeister, 2002), we read that, judging again by the list of registered voters, there are
56 leftists in the sociology departments at Harvard, Brown, Cornell, Berkeley, and
Stanford universities.

But what does all this have to do with homosexual marriage, the subject of this text? Well,
right now we come to that.

2. Scientists against public opinion

Most people in the United States are very clearly and consistently opposed to the
introduction of homosexual marriage. According to a survey conducted by one of the most
reputable polling agencies in July 2006, as many as 56% of respondents were against the
introduction of homosexual marriage, and only 35% supported the idea. Also, in the last
decade or so since the debate flared up, support for homosexual marriage has always been
below 40%, and opposition has consistently been above 50%. About that
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 7

The extent to which the public opposes the proposed changes is also shown by the fact that as many
as 44 US states have enacted special legislation in order to protect traditional marriage as a
community of two people. the opposite gender.
On the other hand, university elites in America (but also in other Western countries) not only
usually unreservedly support homosexual marriage but often believe that victory in this debate has
actually already been achieved and that the opposition of those who do not share their opinion can
only be the result ignorance, irrationality, or religious fanaticism. Moreover, agitation goes so far
that even the scientific authority of entire academic disciplines is used as additional pressure on the
public in the struggle to redefine the notion of marriage as soon as possible and thus open space
for homosexual weddings. Already, three American professional associations (for psychology,
sociology, and anthropology) have published declarations claiming that it is precisely the
knowledge gained in these scientific fields that proves that there is no justification for limiting
marriage to heterosexual relationships.

It seems to me that there has been a serious overstepping of the legitimate interference
of science in politics. Namely, if the political decision on the issue of homosexual marriage
depended crucially and clearly on certain empirical facts that scientists are able to establish,
then indeed psychologists or sociologists or anthropologists could say: “Since we have just
discovered the truth about those key facts on which the outcome of the political debate
depends only, we inform the public that in the light of these new findings, the introduction of
homosexual marriage is the only right move. " But it is completely evident that in this political
debate there is no agreement even on what the main and most relevant arguments are, let
alone on what the role of empirical knowledge is in finding the best solution. So the idea to
make scientists

as scientists, and on behalf of their professional associations, should educate the public
on how to choose between several proposals to regulate such a complex and highly
controversial political issue as homosexual marriage shows a surprising dose of
arrogance but also mental confusion.

All these declarations of professional associations are nothing but an attempt

to impose those political views that most members of these associations share,
although the whole process is falsely presented as the result of some so-called
“objective” and “impartial” scientific analysis. Of course, if we keep in mind the
previously mentioned and well-documented absolute dominance of leftist ideology
in the social sciences and humanities, then it is easy to understand how
psychology, anthropology and sociology could “scientifically prove” that
homosexual marriage should be made exactly what most intellectuals on the
political left have long advocated.
8 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

3. What do philosophers say?

How are things with our profession - philosophy? Did ideological corruption occur there as well?

I do not know whether the American Philosophical Association sought to launch similar
actions in support of homosexual marriage as the aforementioned scientific association,
because I resigned from that organization a few years ago because of its unacceptable
politicization in another case. 1 In any case, there are many indications that philosophers have
already declared a winner in this debate and that they also see opposition to homosexual
marriage en masse and with disgust as a mere result of primitivism and intolerance.

For example, Canadian philosophers have collectively supported the

legalization of homosexual marriage in that country. After the petition was signed
by as many as 324 philosophy teachers at Canadian universities and colleges, it
was distributed to all Canadian MPs before a key vote in July 2005. The petition's
organizer, Norman Swartz (Simon Fraser University professor of philosophy), said
is that of all the philosophers contacted, only two refused to sign, not because they
would support traditional marriage but because they were against marriage at all.
So while public opinion polls roughly every other Canadian opposes the
introduction of homosexual marriage, literally none of the several hundred
Canadian philosophers have expressed a similar opinion. For them, the discussion
is obviously over. Moreover,

In a similar way, the author of arguably the most visited philosophical blog resolutely
claims: “It is impossible to give rationally an explanation of why some people oppose
homosexual marriage ”(leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2005/11/ on_gay_marriage.html). So
any opposition is irrational.
On the popular “Ask the Philosophers” website, organized by a group of very famous
philosophers to bring philosophy closer to the general public, someone asked, “Is there any
argument against homosexual marriage that is not the result of either religiosity or
intolerance, or those two things together? ” The answer offered by the eminent British
philosopher and head of the Department of Philosophy at King's College London was very
short: "There are no such arguments." In other words, if you don’t fully support a
homosexual marriage, it means you are either religiously dumb or intolerant (or both).

1A rewarding question for readers: can you guess whether this politicization was directed left or right?
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 9

It is interesting to mention by the way that, despite so openly denying any legitimacy to the
position de facto defending most people in that debate, the philosopher in question has never
published a single work on ethics, an area that is totally outside the circle of his philosophical
interests. Therefore, the question of how well he knows the relevant literature at all must really
arise. The fact that he may have an interest in the subject as a private person, follows public
debates in newspapers and has a very definite position on the justification of homosexual
marriage certainly does not entitle him to as a philosopher

enlightens people about it ex cathedra.

Well, you will say, these are isolated anecdotes that say something about individual
philosophers, but almost nothing about the state of philosophy as a discipline. Everything must look
a lot different, you will add, if we look at the works of those philosophers who have seriously dealt
with precisely this problem. In this dispute, they could not decide so hastily and without a careful
analysis of the strongest arguments for and against. This sounds like a perfectly reasonable
assumption, but I suggest we check it anyway.

A good source of information can be a recently published philosophical encyclopedia on

the issues of sex, which aims to present some of the stronger insights that have led to
philosophical discussions in this area. And of course, bad guesses come true because in the
article on same-sex marriage we come across ad hominem attack on opponents of that idea.
They are claimed to be “primarily motivated by animosity towards homosexuals and lesbians”
(Calhoun, 2006, pp. 652–653). Well, if even one philosophical encyclopedia believes that the
position of those who defend traditional marriage (as a link between persons of the opposite
sex) can so easily be written off as a sign of irrational homophobia, it best shows how much
political correctness has lowered the level of philosophical discussion of this sensitive and a
complex issue.

Probably the most cited philosopher in the discussion of homosexual marriage is

Richard Mohr, a great proponent of the idea and author of a book on the subject that the
best philosophical journal of ethics said should provide guidance to judges, the legislature,
and society at large. Mohr was recently a guest on a popular radio program Philosophy
Talk, led by two famous philosophers from Stanford. At the very beginning of the interview,
Kenneth Taylor asked him, "Richard, is there a single argument by opponents of gay
marriage that will make you stop for a moment and think you should strengthen your
position a little bit in that position?" Mohr replied, "No, what is interesting about opponents
of homosexual marriage is that they don't really have any arguments." But what kind of
debate is this in which only one side has arguments? And why did Mohr even consider it
worth the effort to write a large number of philosophical articles and one whole book on the
debate in which one of the two sides has no
10 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

arguments, then about a debate that doesn’t really exist? Such a debate is essentially an oxymoron,
something like "one-handed applause."
In the philosophical literature, the problem of homosexual marriage belongs to the field
of practical ethics or (as already seen) sexual ethics. One of the experts in this field is Igor
Primorac, the author of a book entitled Ethics and Sex ( Primorac, 1999), which reviewers
rated as “carefully argued”, “thoughtful”, “competent” and “convincing” and which was even
recommended as “mandatory reading for interested lay people”. What makes this book
especially relevant to our purpose is that it is defended in it mainstream views on various
moral issues related to sex, so that in many respects it quite faithfully represents the opinion
of a large number of philosophers. As one narrator well remarked, “This book does not open
up any new space, but it does trace the space of what is known in a clear and useful way”
(Burgess-Jackson, 2000).

This is especially true of Primorac's views on homosexual marriage, which largely

correspond to what could almost be called a philosophical consensus on the issue, but of
course with the exception of those religiously inspired philosophers who oppose
homosexual marriage because of its strong influence. their religious beliefs. Primorac
says that although the church, mosque and synagogue must act according to their own
criteria, these criteria cease to be legitimate when deciding on civil marriage. Therefore, in
both the book and a recent article (Primorac, 2004), he first analyzes the standard
non-religious arguments against homosexual marriage (which he considers the strongest)
and finally concludes that none of these arguments are convincing. The whole discussion
concludes that if the state continues to deny homosexuals the right to marry, it constitutes
"arbitrary and unjust discrimination that testifies to unreasonable conservatism or
prejudice, or both" (Primorac, 1999, p. 132). Thus, we are again confronted with the
insistence that the discussion no longer makes sense because the arguments have
reportedly already ruled and any further opposition to homosexual marriage can only be
the result of blindness and apparently unacceptable discrimination.

Here we are faced with a dilemma. Or Primorac is right, which would mean that the
political dispute over the introduction of homosexual marriage still continues only because of
the deep irrationality of all those hundreds of millions of people (including many extremely
smart, highly educated and intellectually sophisticated individuals) who are completely
unreasonable and without any good reason they oppose that idea. Or Primorac is wrong,
which would mean that something is fundamentally wrong with his express and total rejection
of the conservative position as mere prejudice. I will try to show that the latter is true.
Primorac's "refutation" of several major conservative arguments against homosexual
marriage is completely ignorant.
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 11

faithfully because it rests on serious errors of reasoning and on the distortion of the point
of view it criticizes.

4. Rebuttals that are not

In this section, I will show that Primorac failed to refute any of the following four conservative
arguments against homosexual marriage that he criticized: an argument from tradition, an
argument from the state interest in having children, an argument from child welfare, and an
argument from threatening heterosexual marriage. To avoid possible misunderstandings, I will
state explicitly that I do not intend to defend these arguments here from all possible
objections, but only to show that Primorac's critique of these arguments is unsustainable.

4 .1. An argument from tradition

Primorac summarizes the argument from tradition as follows: “Throughout history, marriage has
always been a heterosexual institution; homosexual marriage has never been recorded. So, marriage
should remain heterosexual. ”
His basic objection is that in this argument the factual premise directly shifts to
normative conclusion, which is evidently logically inadmissible: "The fact that something has
always been regulated in a certain way is not a conclusive argument that it must remain so"
(Primorac, 1999, pp. 130; cf. Primorac, 2004).

According to Primorac, it turns out that the argument from tradition is based on an
elementary logical error, deriving “should” from “is”. But since, as is well known, conservative
thinkers resort to the argument from tradition not only in the discussion of homosexual
marriage but also in controversies on almost all other political issues, why not generalize
Primorac's refutation and establish it in the spirit of his criticism. how is the whole of
conservative thought from Burke to Scruton simply the result of the unfortunate circumstance
that none of these philosophers noticed the logical inaccuracy of the conclusion from “is” to
“should”?

Of course, that suggestion is absurd. But for the same reason, Primorac's criticism is
absurd and unsustainable. Namely, conservatives do not defend an argument from tradition
because they are logically so unrefined that they believe that it is possible to draw a normative
conclusion from purely factual premises. No, what they think is that one should be extremely
careful with proposals for drastic changes in traditional social institutions, because in their view
these institutions incorporate distilled human experience accumulated over the centuries. Due to
the organic nature and huge complexity of existing institutions, it is very difficult to anticipate all
the consequences that would lead to
12 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

their elimination or radical transformation, and from all this the conservatives draw the conclusion
that sudden and revolutionary interventions are much more likely to lead to deterioration than to
improvement.
That is why they also oppose homosexual marriage. The fact that marriage throughout human
history has generally taken place between persons of the opposite sex is taken as confirmation that it
is not wise to change this important social institution quickly from the ground up and without
knowledge of possible very far-reaching and potentially harmful consequences.

Primorac is also wrong when he claims that the very existence of historical exceptions
proves that the argument from tradition is wrong. If these exceptions are historically very
rare (as are indeed those cultures in which homosexual marriage was institutionalized), the
conservative argument can still have great force. In addition, the big question is whether
there are any authentic historical examples at all that in any society in the past, homosexual
marriage has ever had the same social status and recognition

as heterosexual marriage. And it is precisely this total equalization that is being attempted in many
Western countries today. It is not at all clear whether a historical precedent can be found for such a
radical reorganization of the institution of marriage.

Primorac further distorts the conservative position and facilitates its refutation by
imputing to the conservatives the unplausible attitude that the argument from tradition is for
them conclusive proof that it should be preserved status quo. However, there is no need for
conservatives to take such a rigid view, that by the very fact that a social tradition is
historically rooted, it should therefore automatically be preserved. Indeed, they respect the
reasons against some traditional institutions (if such reasons exist) and sometimes even
support the abolition of these institutions, but they nevertheless, as conservatives, retain the
general belief that such measures should in principle be approached slowly, with great
caution and not without adequate knowledge of the dangers of possible side effects of these
measures. In other words, conservatives may be against change not because they have conclusive
proof that it is status quo always the best solution than simply because the argument from
tradition is seen as prima facie reason against change. They may resonate that introducing
radical change is too risky until it is possibly shown in a convincing way that the overall
impact of these changes will be positive.

The argument from tradition, applied to the issue of homosexual marriage, boils down
to the claim that heterosexual marriage has been a virtually universal norm throughout
human history and that it is not wise to rush into social experimentation with such a
long-standing institution whose nature, role and importance for normal functioning societies
we may still not understand enough. That argument can, of course, be challenged on
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 13

in various ways, but certainly not in such a way that it is declared an elementary logical mistake that
would be difficult for a bad student in the first year of philosophy to make.

4 .2. An argument of national interest for the birth of children

Can the restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples be justified by the fact that only these relationships
can result in the birth of children? Since the birth of children enables the reproduction of society, is it not
entirely legitimate in the interest of the state to support, by special measures, an institution that contributes
precisely to this goal?
Again, only one sentence is enough for Primorac to reject this justification:

If the state were to look at the birth of children and nothing else at the institution of marriage, it
would then make marriage impossible for all couples who cannot or do not want to have children;
not only to homosexual couples but also to heterosexual couples who cannot have children due to
sterility or some other defect, to those who are too old to have children and to those who for any
reason choose not to have children. (Primorac, 1999, p. 130)

Elsewhere, he similarly argues, “If [in relation to marriage] the most important concern of the
state were the birth of children, then the law would prohibit any marriage that cannot lead to the birth
of children” (Primorac, 2004).
Primorac's argument may seem very convincing at first glance. But only at first glance.
In fact, if we think about it at least a little, it’s easy to see that it’s reasoning not sequitur. Namely,
even if the sole reason for state support for heterosexual marriage was that species as a
rule leads to the birth of children, it does not follow at all that the state should therefore
necessarily refuse to recognize the right to marriage in each individual case which is known
in advance to will not lead to the birth of children. Thus the direct connection of these two
things is the result of a mixture of different levels and the erroneous assumption that the
reason why a practice

at the general level it must also be present as a justification for that practice and at the level of
each individual case.
Let's take the following analogy. The administration of a school concludes that its
students should learn to speak English better, and to this end organizes their one-month visit
to a school in England. Now imagine that someone, using Primorac's logic, states: “If the
school administration really looked at the students to improve their English and nothing else
when organizing the visit, then those students who already know English well should be
excluded from that visit (for example, two -three children of foreign diplomats). ” Obviously,
there is no need to act in that way. Despite the fact that the purpose of the visit is to improve
English and nothing else (say, the visit would not be if this consequence was not expected),
the school administration
14 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

may decide that he does not want to create unnecessary complications by excluding several students
and that the general goal (improvement of English) will be achieved in a completely satisfactory way
even if several participants of the excursion will not improve English at all.

It is similar with marriage. The state can support heterosexual marriage only
because it expects it to result in the birth of children as a rule, but it may
nevertheless choose not to create unnecessary complications by denying the right
to marry to a relatively small number of such couples who for various reasons
cannot have children. The state goal can be achieved quite effectively with such not
too precise regulation that allows marriage even in many individual cases where it
is known that this general goal will not be achieved. Such imprecise regulation has
its practical advantages because it achieves the basic intention in a simple way,
and at the same time minimizes the intrusive interference of the state in the private
sphere. As someone said a bit vulgarly but wittily,

What is most surprising in Primorac's mixing of two levels (justification of the general
rule and justification of the individual case) is that this distinction has long been very well
known in the philosophical literature, and especially in his field, ethics. For example, in one
of the classic texts John Rawls warns: “… a distinction should be made between the
justification of a practice as a system of rules to be applied and the justification of an
individual procedure falling under those rules…” (Rawls, 1955, p. 1).

5). Rawls notes that this distinction is part of the philosophical tradition and that its importance has been
emphasized by numerous authors from Hume, Austin, and Mill all the way to Mabbott, Urmson, Quinton,
Toulmin, and Nowell-Smith.
To recapitulate: Primorac, of course, agrees when would the sole purpose of marriage as an
institution was to support the birth of children, then there would indeed be a legitimate reason for
homosexual couples to be excluded. But in the next step, he wants to show that the birth of
children it can not be purpose of marriage. Why not? Because some heterosexual couples are
allowed
marriage despite the fact that they cannot have children either. This is an objection
consistency: it is suggested that if R (childbirth) is the only reason why the state supports the
institution of marriage, then R should be present in each individual case (or group of cases) as
a justification for why the state allows marriage in these situations. It is here that Primorac
makes a logical mistake and, ignoring Rawls's warning, jumps from one level to another. He
loses sight of the fact that even if R only the reason why the state supports marriage
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 15

as an institution, she can have some other reason ( different from R) because it allows marriage in
some specific cases where R does not exist.
This second reason for allowing marriage, which is pragmatic in nature and not related to the
goal of the marriage institution, may be present in one group (heterosexual couples who cannot
have children) and absent in another group (homosexual couples). This asymmetry could then
justify the different treatment of the two groups, and it could still be true that the state supports
marriage as an institution just for the sake of having children.

4 .3. An argument out of concern for the welfare of children

Primorac presents this argument of the opponents of homosexual marriage as a claim that
allowing homosexual marriage would be bad for children. This initial formulation is already too
strong because it shifts the burden of proof too quickly and without an adequate reason to the
opponents of homosexual marriage. Many of them reject that role because they think so onus
probandi here it lies with the revolutionary advocates of redefining marriage and that they are the
ones who actually have an obligation to convince the public that this radical reform of family law
will not have detrimental consequences for children. (As, for example, the approval of new drugs
requires a reasonable assurance that there will be no harmful effects, and it is certainly not
enough that their harmfulness cannot be proven.)

Primorac considers only one potentially negative consequence of homosexual marriage:

if it is important for optimal development and socialization that children have parents of the
opposite sex, then children in homosexual marriages will lack this key psychological influence.
In the next step, Primorac completes to the end what he considers to follow logically from this
argument:

This would mean banning single-parent families whenever possible. The law would allow
neither artificial insemination nor adoption to those persons who do not have a partner.
Moreover, the law would not allow divorce for persons with minor children. Would anyone
seriously advocate such measures? (Primorac, 1999, p. 131; cf. Primorac, 2004)

It is difficult to understand here why Primorac believes that all these consequences
follow from the mentioned argument. If the state grants special privileges to couples in
heterosexual marriage because it believes that this type of family creates optimal
conditions for child development, why would it follow that the state should prohibit any
other arrangements it deems suboptimal? I see no minimally convincing reason to
justify that conclusion. Even if heterosexual marriage is set as a model and the best
solution for raising children, in those situations where this ideal is unattainable,
suboptimal arrangements can still be quite
16 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

an acceptable option and it would be completely irrational to ban them. So why can't the state
take special measures to support the kind of family arrangement it deems optimal for children,
and at the same time allow (but not particularly encourage) some solutions that are worse, but,
in the absence of better, still satisfactory?

Does it not follow from this that homosexual marriage should then be allowed, as a
suboptimal, but, in the absence of a better, satisfactory arrangement? In fact, no. In order to be
acceptable, the suboptimal arrangement must first and foremost be at least minimally
satisfactory, ie there must be a certain degree of certainty that it is a type of family that will not
have any significant negative consequences for the children. Empirically, the question is
whether homosexual communities meet this condition, but even if they do, it still does not follow
that they should automatically be placed under the institution of marriage and treated. on the
same way as heterosexual communities.

Many people believe that, in general, it is best for children to be raised and cared for by their
own biological parents (although this, unfortunately, is not always achievable). If this is accepted
as ideal, the claim that heterosexual and homosexual relationships should not have the same
status gains plausibility. Namely, why should the state absolutely the same to support two types of
relationships that are so different in terms of how close they are to that ideal? On the one hand, in
heterosexual relationships children generally they are raised precisely by their biological parents,
so that here the reality, statistically speaking, is indeed in great accord with the said ideal. In
homosexual relationships, on the other hand, it is biological necessity that the child (whether he or
she entered that family through adoption, artificial insemination, or even cloning) will have interrupted
a family relationship with at least one of their biological parents. In this one species relationships
are simply natural laws of obstacles to the said ideal being achieved. So, if the optimum is the
statistically expected result in the first case, and the biologically impossible outcome in the second
case, does not this difference provide a possible justification for the state to treat these two types
of relationship differently? (I emphasize again that I do not want to defend this argument here, but
only to point out its legitimacy.)

Let us now return to Primorac and say that it is impossible to take seriously his
idea that from what would possibly be best for children to have two parents of the
opposite sex, it logically follows that divorce should be prohibited for parents with
minor children. I guess it is unnecessary to explain what his mistake is, but here's
just in case: what is good for children as a rule and under normal circumstances may
not be good even in those situations where continuing the life of two parents together
becomes hell for all family members.

Hardly anyone will deny that marriage is in some way connected to children. At the very least there
is a strong statistical relationship because most couples who are
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 17

some time in marriage they have children, and also most children are born and raised
within marriage. Then it seems perfectly legitimate to ask how the eventual introduction of
homosexual marriage will affect the children in these families (because it is usually
assumed that homosexual marriage will include the right to adopt children).

Proponents of homosexual marriage are often criticized for taking more into
account the wishes and interests of adult same-sex partners in their agitation for
gay rights than for the well-being of children, which could be significantly affected
by this decision. This objection has the greatest force when addressed to those
who see the whole issue of homosexual marriage primarily as a matter of
homosexual rights. While this is an important dimension of the whole discussion, it
still seems that reasonable people will seek to consider other aspects, and
especially the possible implications of homosexual marriage on children. Since
empirical knowledge about this is still quite unreliable,

The extent to which some philosophers are willing to go far in their support for gay and lesbian
rights without showing too much concern for the much more important interests of children is best
illustrated by the example of Philip Kitcher, a well-known philosopher of science.

In an article on the ethical aspects of genetic engineering, Kitcher (1997)

compares two imagined situations in which attempts are made to justify cloning. In the
first case, a terminally ill child can survive only if his kidney is transplanted within a few
years. But since there is no compatible donor, the parents want to clone the sick child
and save his life by having his clone kidney transplanted later. The idea is, of course,
that after surgery each of these two children with only one kidney will continue to live
happily and contentedly.

In the second case, it is about two lesbians who "love each other" and who want to
have a child that is biologically related to each of them. They therefore require that the cell
nucleus of one of these women be inserted into the egg of the other (after its cell has been
previously removed from that egg) and that the embryo be implanted in the uterus of the
woman who donated the egg.

In which of these two situations does it seem to you that a request for cloning is more
morally justified? If you have chosen the case of a dying child, Kitcher will frown and explain
to you that the case of lesbians is actually morally “cleaner” and that there is a stronger
moral justification for cloning in that situation. Thus, according to one of America's leading
philosophers today, indulging the desires of two "loving" lesbians has a greater moral
urgency than saving a child's life.
18 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

Obviously, I cannot go into a more detailed analysis and critique of Kitcher’s

reasoning here that ends with this paradoxical conclusion, so here are just a few words.
Kitcher's moral reservations in the first case are based on the claim that the parents would
use the second child there as a mere means of rescuing the first child and that this is
contrary to the basic principle of Kant's ethics. Interestingly, this objection had been widely
discussed before in connection with one actual case where the parents of a girl named
Anissa decided to have another child, and only because they hoped that the bone marrow
of that newborn child could be used to to help Anissa, who was dying of leukemia. (She
was indeed finally saved in this way.) However, some philosophers at the time strongly
condemned Anissa's parents' decision, using practically the same Kantian argumentation
as Kitcher (which he himself applies to Anissa's case). A conclusive refutation of this
argument can be found in an excellent article by James Rachels (Rachels, 1991) which
shows how much the philosophical critique of a perfectly legitimate parental action has lost
all connection with reality and common sense here. Rachels was so revolted by the
misplacement of these philosophical sermons that he finally stated: “ Anissa

and her family will forever after think that ethicists are jerks. ”

4 .4. An argument from the threat of heterosexual marriage

Many people fear that the introduction of homosexual marriage could undermine
heterosexual marriage in the form in which it exists today, and lead to unforeseeable
detrimental consequences for this entire social institution. Primorac's comment: "This is a
very general and really unusual statement:
never we are not told how this would happen ”(Primorac, 2004
- italics added).
Never? That’s a pretty strong and incredibly reckless claim. It collapses even after
only a cursory look at the literature on homosexual marriage. Of the many potential
consequences that skeptics have long and consistently warned about, I will list only two
ways “to make it happen”: first, eliminating all gender differences in the family law code,
and second, opening space for other types of marriage.

4 .4 .1. ELIMINATION OF SEX DIFFERENCES

Ten years ago, when the whole discussion about homosexual marriage was in its
infancy, the conservative David Frum crossed spears with the well-known defender of
the idea, Andrew Sullivan. Already at that time, addressing his interlocutor, Froome
offered a rather detailed scenario so that the proposed reform could undermine the
institution of marriage:
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 19

Homosexual marriage is not a mere addition to the existing marriage law. It entails a
reconstruction of the whole structure of family law, all in the direction of neutralizing gender
differences. The remaining links between marriage law and human nature will have to be
severed. You can't say, and I don't believe you'll say, “Let's leave the old rules in force for those
97% of marriages that will be heterosexual, and invent some new rules for those 3% of marriages
that will be between people. same sex. ” The law doesn’t work that way. Someone will have to go
through a corpus of family law and social customs with a fine comb and remove all mentions of
“mothers” and “fathers” and eliminate all existing distinctions between “husbands” and “wives”.
(Frum, 1997)

Continuing the controversy, Frum went a step further, making the following prediction:
"Andrew, three years after we allow homosexual marriage, it will be illegal for schools to
send students forms with one blank space for the mother's name and another blank space
for the father's name."
At the time, many probably wrote off this prediction as a paranoid phantasmagoria of
the right-wing mind and as stirring up completely irrational fears. But today things look
different. Less than three years have passed since the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
legalized homosexual marriage in that US state, and a strong campaign has already been
organized there to change the forms of birth certificates. It is suggested that in order to
equalize the status of heterosexual and homosexual couples, the words “father” and “mother”
should be replaced by the terms “parent A” and “parent B”.

Don’t think this is about the demands of some marginal group. The seriousness of the
whole situation is best evidenced by the fact that Mitt Romney, the then governor of
Massachusetts, considered it necessary to address the national media and seek the
support of the American public in its fight against the newly proposed unisex terminology.
He also informed all members of the United States Senate in a dramatic tone. (By the way,
Romney is one of the most influential American politicians and is a serious candidate for
the next American president.)

Well, I already hear some readers protesting, the proposal is drastic, but that
is why it has no chance of being accepted anywhere. It is ridiculous to even think
that in a modern western country, the words "father" and "mother" could be
dropped from legal documents issued by state offices at the birth of a child due to
homosexual marriage.

Alas, there is no more room for such optimism because the Orwellian language reform has
already been implemented in Spain. Last year, by a decision of Prime Minister Zapatero's socialist
government (which came to power after the terrorist attacks in Madrid), the words "father" and
"mother" were replaced in the birth certificates by the terms "parent A" and "parent B", and the
ministry the judiciary explained that, just as Froome had predicted, the aim of that decision was to
20 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

mineralogical adaptation to the new phenomenon of homosexual marriages ”. But Froome

made a mistake in the timing. He anticipated that three years would pass from the
legalization of homosexual marriage to the introduction of asexual new speech. It took Spain
less than a year to make this “terminological adjustment”.

But why limit terminological adaptation only to the sphere of state regulations and official
forms? If words like “father” and “mother” have become undesirable because their very
heterosexual connotations offend the subtle feelings of homosexuals, would it not be
consistent to go a step further and proscribe these “discriminatory” expressions more broadly,
and demand that for the purpose of equality, then, and in public use in schools, newspapers
and other media, only an “inclusive”, gender-neutral vocabulary is used? In this linguistic terror
of the minority over the majority, even the most innocuous mention of the real and biologically
undeniable difference between heterosexual and homosexual relationships becomes morally
incriminating and should be eliminated. 2

Proponents of homosexual marriage show their extremism and intolerance

precisely in the fact that any solution other than complete equalization status of the
homosexual and heterosexual community. That this is not really just a fight for the
rights of homosexuals is best evidenced by the fact that they are not satisfied even
with the proposal to give homosexual couples all rights belonging to heterosexual
couples in marriage, but with the word “marriage” being limited to heterosexual
relationships. Although according to this proposal (on the so-called civil unions) homosexual
couples get absolutely equal rights like others, yet they still perceive this remaining,
nominalist difference as an insult, discrimination and injustice that cries to heaven.

In this spirit, Primorac claims that if society denies homosexual ties the recognition and support
it provides for relationships between heterosexual partners, they will rightly interpret this as a
“declaration of inequality, exclusion and contempt” (Primorac, 1999, p. 129). ). Why "despise"?
Which here justifies the logical leap from the fact that society does not give the same recognition and
support to a relationship as some other relationships to the conclusion that society does that
relationship despise? That leap may have rhetorical but not logical justification.

2 In fact, the terms "parent A" and "parent B" are still not neutral enough because they are
grammatically masculine, so because of this "sexist" tone, they will probably not be to the liking of many
feminists. So will the terminological adjustment continue? Is there any acceptable solution that will not
offend one's language sensitivity and will not be perceived as discrimination based on gender or sexual
orientation? Is perhaps the solution that “mom” and “dad” in an egalitarian utopia will become “parent
being A” and “parent being B”?
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 21

After all, perhaps society may have some reason why by reserving the word “marriage” for
heterosexual relationships it really wants to demonstrate that it has a special interest in supporting
such relationships, even if it decides identical rights also given to partners in homosexual
relationships. Why would that be a sign of contempt for anyone? Imagine a state that has a birth rate
problem deciding, among other measures, to introduce a special honorary title for families with more
than three children. Would families with fewer children have the right in that situation to complain to
the state despise?

4 .4 .2. OPENING THE SPACE OF ANOTHER TYPE OF MARRIAGE

The basic argument in favor of homosexual marriage boils down to the claim that it is
discriminatory to deny a couple the right to marry solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of
the partner. If two people love each other and want to vow in a solemn state ceremony that they
want to live together, why would they be forbidden to do so just because those two people are of
the same sex? This "argument of love" has convinced many people. If homosexuals want to get
married, why not let them? What does it concern us (heterosexuals) at all? What harm can there
be from that?

Sounds acceptable. But let’s examine a little more carefully the consequences of that
argument out of love. The fact that people love each other and want to publicly declare their
mutual commitment and intention to live together becomes a key criterion here for recognizing
the right to marriage. But what if three people love each other? Or four? Does this mean that a
polygamous marriage should be allowed? For example, if a man lives with three women and at
one point the four of them want to legitimize their community in which, say, there is great
mutual love, isn't it discriminatory to deny them that right just because they have four, and not
as is usual, two? Isn’t this discrimination based on the number of partners who love each other
just as arbitrary and morally unjustified as discrimination based on sexual orientation?

Wait a minute, someone will say, how did we go from discussing homosexual marriage to
polygamy? Quite simply: if love becomes a crucial criterion for the right to marry, which is the
basic argument in favor of homosexual marriage (see, for example, the best defense of this
position so far in Rauch,
2004), it is difficult to deny that this argument works well for the purpose of legalizing
polygamy.
Let's take the following provisional definition of marriage, which, I hope, at least
roughly reflects the common understanding of this institution in modern Western
societies: marriage is a legitimate intimate community of two people of the opposite
sex, who are not too closely related and life together.

Let's break down this definition into four important elements:

22 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

(a) two people,

(b) of the opposite sex,
(c) are not closely related,
(d) have decided to make a public vow to live together.

Love is essentially related to element (d) because it is precisely love between partners that,
as a rule, is why they decide to make a public vow to live together. Love has only an accidental
connection with the other three elements. People of the same sex can love each other, contrary to
element (b), but love (in a sexual sense) is also possible between more than two people, contrary to
element (a), and also between very close relatives (such as a brother or sister, or mother). and
son), contrary to element (c).

Proponents of homosexual marriage want to eliminate element (b) from the definition of
marriage, arguing that it is irrelevant to love and the desire to live together whether they are
partners of the same or different sex. But isn’t it equally irrelevant to love whether it’s about two
or more people? In other words, if we eliminate element (b) as accidental and irrelevant for the
basic purpose of marriage (institutionalization of the partner's love community), does not
consistency dictate that we also support the requirement to eliminate element (a) with the same
justification, that is, as equal accidental and irrelevant? It is this very short and logically forced
step from a certain defense of homosexual marriage to a defense of polygamy. 3

The next step is evident: why not eliminate element (c) as well? For example, if a
mother and an (adult) son develop a mutual sexual attraction and fall in love and decide to
legitimize their deep emotional connection (while ensuring that they do not have children
and thus avoid the obvious problem of incestuous relationships), would it not be
discriminatory to forbid such love to be crowned with marriage? Let’s face it, I don’t think
this is a conclusive refutation of the demand for homosexual marriage. But isn't the fact
that one of the strongest arguments in favor of homosexual marriage can be so well
replicated in another context and used in defense of incestuous marriage a great reason to
pause and think carefully about what we're getting into before we decide to open the
carnival door new marriages?

Interestingly, even proponents of homosexual marriage themselves cannot

agree on how to respond to criticism that their position opens up space for legalizing
polygamy. Some strongly protest that it is

3 It does not follow from this, of course, that this would immediately prove the general justification of polygamy,
because it is quite possible that there are other and stronger reasons. against those types of marriage. But I recall that
this section discusses only one argument (out of love), and in particular whether accepting that particular argument in
favor of homosexual marriage leads to the defense of polygamy. The answer is yes.
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 23

linking these two things is completely unjustified, while others very cheerfully accept this
implication and argue that the introduction of homosexual marriage is only the first step in a
process in which the institution of marriage will be transformed beyond recognition. This second
current (to which, by the way, belongs Cheshire Calhoun, author of an essay on same-sex
marriage in the above-mentioned philosophical encyclopedia) agrees completely with
conservative critics that the "argument of love" extends to the case of polygamy. The only
difference is that conservatives are horrified by the consequences, and Calhoun and her
like-minded people can’t wait for it to happen.

In July last year New York Times published a proclamation entitled “Further Steps after
Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families and Relationships,” signed
by more than three hundred LGBT activists, 4 artists, journalists, lawyers, and professors from
America’s most prestigious universities. The proclamation explicitly states that advocating for
homosexual marriage is only part of a broader effort to introduce and legitimize other, even
more diverse types of families. It is argued that the various modes of family organization can
in no way fit into just one existing mold and that ways in which families can be formed they
know no boundaries. It is therefore required to allow a thousand flowers to bloom and for the
state to recognize alternative forms of family, from those with more than two sexual partners
to a truly innovative family arrangement in which “a gay couple decides to create and raise a
child with another gay person. or in pairs, in two separate households ”.

If, therefore, as we see, many prominent proponents of homosexual marriage even

publicly proclaim themselves that their position consistently leads to such extreme demands,
then should it be surprising that many people oppose this whole movement and see
homosexual marriage as a serious threat to the family institution in the current form?

The notion of marriage, as we have defined it, implies that this institution includes two
persons. So far, I have considered the possibility of deviating from that standard by a
number greater than two (polygamy). But, logically speaking, that number can be less than
two, that is, one. Take the case of a man who has no friends but is deeply attached to some
domestic animal or pet and who wishes to manifest in a public ceremony that special
connection with his faithful life companion. Why wouldn't he be allowed to? After all, his
emotional relationship can be much more intense and lasting than the relationship that
characterizes many married couples. If love is the only measure, it is really not clear why it
would be excluded. 5

4 “LGBT” is the English abbreviation for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender ”.
5 For example, there is no reason to exclude it if we accept the conceptual content of marriage as
defined by one of the main proponents of homosexual marriage among philosophers, Richard Mohr: “Marriage
is the development and maintenance of intimacy through the medium of everyday life, a day for day ”(Mohr,
2005, p. 61).
24 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

If someone complains that what is missing here is sexual intercourse, that is not really a problem
either. Some people have sexual contact with animals. And especially after Peter Singer, a
professor of ethics at Princeton University and “the most influential living philosopher” (as the
magazine called him) New Yorker),
recently explained that zoophilia as a sexual orientation is perfectly fine and that you should
not hesitate at all if you are attracted to sex with animals, nothing stands in the way of
developing deeper and more meaningful relationships with pets, which, why not, could end in
marriage .
This one reduction to the absurd the argument carries some weight, at least in some contexts
of the homosexual marriage debate.

Conclusion

Many people oppose the introduction of homosexual marriage and have different reasons for it.
Primorac wanted to summarize these reasons in a short procedure and show that opposition to
homosexual marriage is irrational. We have seen that this venture has completely crashed. Due
to the desire to reach the finish line as soon as possible, there was too much speed, so the train
jumped off the rails right at the beginning and Primorac's arguments cracked along all lines.

Why did this happen? Primorac is certainly not a bad philosopher. When writing about other
topics, he is usually well-informed, fair to opponents, and careful in his conclusions. Then why did
everything turn out so differently here?
I don’t want to indulge in speculation about possible answers. Fortunately, it is
much easier, and more interesting, to consider a similar question that concerns not
one man but the general tendency among philosophers. Why are they usually
inclined to defend homosexual marriage without any reservation, and at the same
time often use cardinally bad arguments that would not be tolerated in most other
philosophical discussions? It seems to me that the best explanation for this trend
lies in the previously mentioned ideological pressure that is felt in this matter in
many environments, and especially in academic circles. Although there is great
disagreement in all Western societies today about whether the introduction of
homosexual marriage is a good idea, university elites do not have too much
tolerance for different opinions here. only reasonable solution. Opposition is
automatically explained as the result of religious stupidity or irrational prejudice
against homosexuals.

Should we then be surprised that in such a spiritual constellation even philosophers do not
approach the subject of a completely open spirit? Is there anything
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 25

unusual in that under the pressure of political correctness many of them also, consciously or
unconsciously, prefer to take the position that most colleagues will pat them on the shoulder rather
than opt for the opposite side and thus run the risk of those same colleagues turning their backs
on them?
A concrete example can best illustrate how this pressure works in reality.
Margaret Somerville is a highly respected Canadian lawyer and ethicist and a
highly regarded scientist who has already been awarded an honorary doctorate by
five universities. When Ryerson University in Toronto recently joined the series,
announcing that it had decided to give Professor Somerville an honorary doctorate,
things began to get complicated. Mass protests erupted as it emerged that
Somerville, to her horror, had written several texts opposing the introduction of
homosexual marriage. Although these articles do not contain a shred of
homophobia but offer one of the most sober and well-argued challenges to
homosexual marriage, the mere fact that she defended the position was enough to
provoke the anger of teachers and students.

In translation: "We admit that we made a mistake, but now it is too late to withdraw
the decision." Although this case probably deserves to be entered in the Guinness Book
of Records as the most reluctant award of an honorary doctorate in history, Somerville
nevertheless decided to attend the official ceremony. Some teachers from the protest
refused to participate in the event at all (which included the promotion of their own
students), and some of the professors present unfurled a banner in support of
homosexuals or demonstratively turned their backs as she received the honor.

Of course, if a person with the status and scientific reputation of a Margaret Somerville is
treated this way, the message cannot be clearer to those who have not yet fought for a safe
place in the jungle of the university hierarchy. How much will they, when they see what is
happening, be willing to publicly express their opinion on homosexual marriage if it deviates from
the position of the militant majority? Won't many of them try to convince themselves as soon as
possible that opposition to homosexual marriage is only the result of prejudice and irrationality,
even if their "classification on the right side" was achieved with the help of logical errors and
distortion of the opponent's position? And won't those who still keep an "undesirable" opinion
conclude that it's better
26 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

keep quiet 6 and not run the risk of being branded by their enraged colleagues as homophobes,
political troglodytes, and violators of basic human rights? As Somerville herself warned, “Many
younger teachers are terribly afraid to say what they think because they don’t want to jeopardize
their careers. We should all be reminded, however, that we still live in a democracy. ”

It is particularly disappointing that many philosophers have also engaged in presenting this
unfinished debate, in which both opposing views have strong arguments and where the ultimate
winner is not yet clearly foreseen, as a struggle between reason and prejudice, between light
and darkness. It is precisely philosophers who would be expected to avoid such black-and-white
depictions and to make an extra effort to better understand exactly the side with which they may
not personally agree. Is it not their duty to consider each of the rival positions by careful logical
reconstruction and conceptual analysis? in

its strongest and best formulation and thus facilitate the

national commitment? Instead, we are witnessing them eagerly joining a movement of
completely uncritical support for homosexual marriage and rushing to reject the
opposite view before being able to at least present it faithfully, without even talking
about any deeper understanding or objective judgment.

Unfortunately, this tendency to turn philosophy into political activism is not limited to the
discussion of homosexual marriage. It is also manifested today in "philosophical" debates on
many other socially sensitive topics. Thus, philosophers not only miss the opportunity to bring
more clarity and rationality to disputes that are already sufficiently poisoned by ideological
animosities, but also damage the reputation of their profession. Namely, if, in order to
advocate for some of their ideals of justice and equality, they continue to compromise their
distinctly philosophical task of impartial analysis of argumentation, no one will take them
seriously anymore. as philosophers. What can one think of the relevance of what philosophers
do if they see that they themselves are in such a hurry to engage in the struggle for
“progressive” political goals, rather than doing correctly what is the basic description of their
own work? It is therefore appropriate to end this text with a warning to lovers of wisdom by
Steve Sailer: “Philosophers of all countries, add up! You have nothing to lose but your
irrelevance. ”

6 The well-known political philosopher Harry Brighouse recently in his ethics course tried to encourage students
to express their opinions completely freely in the discussion of homosexual marriage, no matter what pro or against. But
in vain. It turned out that in the end, not a single student was ready to say anything against homosexual marriage,
despite the fact that an anonymous survey previously showed that 15% of them strongly oppose that idea!
 N. SeSARDić: homosexual marriage: the victory of bad arguments 27

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28 Prolegomena 6 (1) 2007

homosexual marriage: The Victory of Political Correctness

and Bad Arguments

NeVen SeSardic

abSTracT: Many Western intellectuals, especially those in humanities and social sciences, think that it
can be easily shown that the persistent and massive op- position to same-sex marriage is rationally
indefensible and that it is merely a result of prejudice or religious fanaticism. But a more detailed
analysis of some of these widely accepted arguments against the conservative position reveals that
these arguments are in fact based on logical fallacies and serious distortions of conservative
criticisms of homosexual marriage. It is concluded that philosophers ought to resist the pressure of
political correctness and that they should approach

the debate with a more open mind than before.

keywordS: Marriage, same-sex marriage, conservatism, political correctness, practical ethics.