Remembering (Short-Term) Memory. Oscillations of An Epistemic Thing

forthcoming in Erkenntnis as part of special issue about historical epistemology (guest editors: Thomas Sturm & Uljana Feest)
Remembering (Short-Term) Memory. Oscillations of an Epistemic Thing
May 30, 2011
Running Head: Remembering Memory
Uljana Feest
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN
Institut für Philosophie, Literatur-, Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte
Straße des 17. Juni 135, Sekr. H72
10623 Berlin, Germany
Phone: +49(0)30-314-79408
feest@mail.tu-berlin.de
Abstract
This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger‘s notions of epistemic things and
historical epistemology. I argue that Rheinberger‘s approach articulates a unique contribution to
current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose some modifications and extensions of this
contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger is right to
highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (―epistemic things‖) –
especially in the contexts of exploratory experimentation – namely our lack of knowledge about
them. I argue that this analysis needs to be supplemented with an account of what scientists do
know, and in particular, how they are able to attribute rudimentary empirical contours to objects
of research. These contours are closely connected to paradigmatic research designs, which in
turn are tied to basic methodological rules for the exploration of the purported phenomena. I
suggest that we engage with such rules in order to develop our own normative (epistemological)
categories, and I tie this proposal to the idea of a methodological naturalism in philosophy of
science.
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Remembering (Short-Term) Memory. Oscillations of an Epistemic Thing
1. Introduction
In chapter X of his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn suggests that after a
paradigm shift, ―familiar objects are seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as
well.‖ (Kuhn, 1962, p. 111) This statement is commonly taken to mean that paradigms provide
the conceptual structures that allow us to parse up the world in particular ways, and that
paradigm shifts involve changes of perspective, during which formerly familiar objects become
unfamiliar. The implication appears to be that during normal science, the objects of research
remain fairly familiar. Contrary to this picture I want to pursue the thesis that the line between
the familiar and the unfamiliar is much more fragile and dynamic than that: phenomena become
objects of research precisely because there is an unsettling sense of unfamiliarity associated with
them. At the same time they can become objects of research only insofar as some things about
them are taken for granted. To study the small-scale process whereby a phenomenon is
investigated empirically, therefore, is to study the productive interplay between what is
unfamiliar and what is taken for granted.
There are, by now, a few philosophical and historiographical accounts that focus on the
development of the conception of a specific object of research.1 While some characterize their
approach as ‗biographical‘ (e.g., Daston, 1999; Arabatzis, 2006), thereby (implicitly or
explicitly) assuming the existence of criteria that guarantee the identity of such ‗objects‘ through
their life span, others are more interested in describing a point in the investigative process where
the very identity conditions of the relevant objects or phenomena are not yet clear (e.g., Steinle,
1997), such that the question is how conceptualizations of the objects of research takes shape.
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Recognizing the epistemic situation in which scientists find themselves at such a moment, Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger has coined the expression ―epistemic thing‖ as a general term to describe such
‗objects.‘2 Of these things he says that ―paradoxically [they] embody what one does not yet
know‖ (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 28). This formulation is similar to my own above assertion that
there is a sense of ‗unfamiliarity‘ about research objects. Both formulations remain enigmatic,
however, and call for further unpacking.
This paper will make an attempt at such an unpacking by way of a case study that looks
at short-term memory as an object of empirical research. Section 2 will begin by sketching my
framework of analyzing the dynamics of memory research, and section 3 will argue that short-
term memory is a good example of an object of research that is both, familiar and ill-understood
(or unfamiliar). Section 4 will provide an analytical explication of Rheinberger‘s notion of an
epistemic thing to elucidate what it could mean for an object of research to be unfamiliar, while
section 5 will show that this construal dovetails with some of my own previous work about the
importance of operational definitions as temporarily fixing the identity conditions for particular
objects of research, thereby encoding what is treated as ‗familiar.‘
The type of analysis at stake in this paper – how to account for the dynamic processes by
which objects of research are conceptualized and investigated – is one that Rheinberger has
referred to as ―historical epistemology.‖ We will therefore (in section 6) turn to the question of
what warrants the label ―epistemology‖ to describe this kind of analysis. It will be emphasized
that Rheinberger‘s is not a general theory of knowledge, but rather a theory of the generation of
scientific knowledge within a specific domain. I will suggest, therefore, that what is at stake here
is not whether all epistemology should be historical, but rather how an analysis of scientific
knowledge generation can claim to be an epistemological analysis as well, given that historical
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studies are usually assumed to aim for descriptive accuracy, whereas epistemological studies are
usually assumed to aim for normative evaluations. Situating this question within the context of
recent debates about the possibility of an integrated history and philosophy of science, I will (in
section 7) argue that the seeming chasm can be bridged if we practice a kind of philosophy of
science that derives its normative criteria by way of a critical engagement with its historical
material. In the case at hand, this means that an analysis of memory research has to explicate and
critically engage with the methodological norms that are operative in the empirical individuation
and exploration of the phenomena in question.
2. Memory as an Object of Research
Psychologists commonly distinguish among several types of memory. Probably the oldest
distinction (within modern theories of memory) is one between short- and long-term memory,
where the former is thought of as the ability to keep material in mind for the duration of a few
seconds, whereas the latter is conceived of in terms of the ability to store and retrieve items over
a longer period of time. Something like this distinction is sometimes traced to William James‘s
―primary memory,‖ and found a prominent expression by Atkinson & Shifrin (1968). This
taxonomy was subsequently further broken down in different types of both short- and long term
memories. For example within the category of short-term memory, Baddley and Hitch (1974)
introduced a conception of short-term memory (which they called ―working memory‖) as a
system consisting of several modality-specific sub-units (such as the so-called ―phonological
loop‖ and the ―visuo-spatial sketch pad‖) on the one hand and an executive control unit with a
modality-unspecific storage unit on the other. Similarly, the past 30 years have seen a
proliferation of types of long-term memory: starting with a distinction between declarative and
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procedural memory (the former storing facts, the latter storing abilities) (e.g., Cohen & Squire,
1980), continuing with distinctions between several kinds of declarative memory (for example
semantic memory on the one hand and ―episodic‖ or autobiographical on the other; e.g., Tulving,
1983), and most recently positing a distinction between explicit and implicit memory, where one
is a conscious form of retrieval, whereas the other is an unconscious form of retrieval (e.g.,
Schacter, 1990).
The case of memory research is intriguing, because on the one hand it seems obvious
what we mean by the word ―memory,‖ while on the other hand there is still a lot of scientific
disagreement over what kind of ‗thing‘ memory is, and what kinds of memory there are. As
such, it lends itself for an exploration of the questions stated at the outset of this paper. We will
do so by taking a close look at some of the factors that contribute to the ways in which short-
term (or working) memory has taken shape as an object of research over the last several decades.
Such an analysis will have to explain what makes memory so familiar and elusive at the same
time. There are any number of factors that could be taken into account as part of a thick
historical description of the processes alluded to here. Providing such a comprehensive account
is not my aim in the current paper, however. Instead I will focus my analysis on one factor: the
function of specific experimental designs in empirically individuating the object in question.
While I do not claim that such a focus can provide us with an exhaustive account of knowledge
generation in memory research, I argue that it provides a vital part of the story.
To a first approximation, let us consider the basic rationale that underlies most
experimental memory research. During the so-called study phase, human subjects are exposed to
items, usually under an instruction to engage with the material in some way (the subjects may or
may not know that they are participants in a study of memory). Following an intermediary
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phase, there is a test phase in which the learned material is elicited by means of some kind of
memory test (again: the subject may or may not be aware of the purpose of the test) (Lockhart,
2000). This way of proceeding, I would argue, is based on a systematized and tidied-up version
of a very broad notion of memory as being connected to the ability to display some kind of
behavior that indicates the recollection of something that was previously experienced (Roediger
& Goff, 1999).
It may be objected that this characterization of memory is too broad, and that a basic
requirement of memory should be conscious recollection.3 In response, it must be pointed out
that if we accepted this definitional constraint, then the above mentioned category of implicit
memory (memory in the absence of a conscious recollection or recognition) would be an
oxymoron. The objection points to an intriguing fact about memory research, however (and, I
would argue, about empirical research in general), namely that the ways in which scientists
choose to classify a given empirical effect (in this case, empirical evidence of recollection in the
absence of consciousness) as instantiating – or not instantiating – a particular kind of
phenomenon (in this case, a memory phenomenon) importantly relies on particular
presuppositions about the phenomenon.
What is at stake here are the very contours of the phenomenon, in that the question is not
―how can instances of memory phenomena be scientifically explained?‖, but ―on what grounds
are we to identify and classify empirical data, or patterns of data, as instances of memory
phenomena to begin with?‖ One thesis of this paper is that while this question cannot be decided
a priori, the empirical research that may ultimately provide an answer to it has to start out by
taking a stance, typically informed by some prior conceptual assumptions about the subject, such
as the one mentioned above. To put this differently: memory researchers assume that they can
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gain epistemic access to this object of research by virtue of the fact that memory (regardless of
how it is otherwise characterized) is closely tied to the disposition to retain information and to
exhibit behavior that provides evidence of that retention. This understanding is constitutive of
memory as an object of research insofar as it enables researchers to ask empirical questions
about memory. Notice that the claim is not that memory can be reductively defined as a
disposition. What I have in mind here, rather, is something akin to Reichenbach‘s notion of a
constitutive a priori (see Reichenbach, 1965 [1920]), that is, a structure which – in some sense –
provides the conditions of the possibility of collecting data about the (presumed) phenomenon.
As will be explained below (section 5.1), such constitutive assumptions become operative in
research insofar as they enter particular experimental set-ups thought to generate data that exhibit
the phenomenon in a particularly clear form.
3. The Case of Short-Term Memory
With this background in mind, I turn to the case of short-term (or working) memory.4 This
presumed phenomenon was investigated by Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968; 1971) and popularized
especially by Allan Baddeley and his colleagues (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). There are two
characteristic features that are thought to distinguish short-term memory from long-term
memory: duration, and capacity. The first characteristic is supposed to answer to the question of
what is the time span of short-term memory, and the answer is usually taken to be something like
20 seconds. The second characteristic is supposed to answer to the question how many items can
be kept in short-term memory. It is commonly assumed that the answer to this question is 7
plus/minus 2 (Miller, 1956). Both of these answers, however, are fraught with methodological
problems and theoretical disagreements. For example, with respect to duration, psychologists
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frequently assume that this has something to do with decay. But aside from the theoretical
question of how to characterize decay, there are also significant methodological problems in
figuring out how to get a ―pure‖ measure of decay, that is, one that is not contaminated by other
factors, such as rehearsal effects or retrieval from long-term memory (Cowan, 2008, p. 326 ff.).
With respect to the capacity of short-term (or working) memory, again, there is some
disagreement. It is by now widely held that Miller‘s original 7 +/- 2 figure overestimated the true
capacity. In an influential article in Behavioral and Brain Science, Nelson Cowan argued that 3
+/- 1 is more likely to be accurate (Cowan, 2000). However, there is also a competing account
that holds the capacity of short-term memory to be 1 (McElree, 2001). As in the case of duration,
there are several different aspects to be considered in this debate. On the theoretical side, both of
the above-mentioned authors subscribe to a so-called ―unitary store‖ model, according to which
short-term memory is not a separate storage space, but is rather characterized by the fact that
items in long-term memory become the focus of attention. The disagreement, then, is over the
question of how many pieces can be the focus of attention at once. As Jonides et al (2008, p.
201) point out, even if one were to agree that only one piece can be the focus of attention at any
one time, one would need an account of what constitutes one piece, which is also not a
straightforward empirical question and is closely related to questions about the nature of
―chunking,‖ a strategy long thought to improve short-term memory.
As implied by some of the above, the question of how to characterize short-term memory
empirically is bound up with theoretical and methodological, even terminological issues. They
concern the relationship between short- and long-term memory, the relationship between short-
term memory and working memory, and the relationship between behavioral and
neurophysiological evidence. With respect to the divide between long- and short-term memory,
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this distinction was initially made plausible by neurophysiological data, which suggested that
certain kinds of brain damage can lead to differential deficits, in that patients with medial
temporal lobe damage fared poorly on tests for long-term declarative memory formation and
retrieval, while less affected on short-term memory tasks (e.g., Baddeley & Warrington, 1970).5
This picture was soon elaborated by way of the idea of a working memory system, comprised of
multiple component systems. Given the neuropsychological evidence, it was long assumed that
the distinction between long- and short-term memory refers to two separate architectures in the
brain. However, this assumption has come to be challenged by recent psychological theories of
memory (Cowan 2000), and by re-evaluations of the neuropsychological evidence (Jonides et al.,
2008). According to these accounts, short-term memory is not a special storage space in the
brain, but rather a specific kind of mental state that occurs when items in long-term memory
become activated by virtue of being at the focus of attention. In the light of this, one might
wonder whether short-term-memory has effectively been eliminated as an explanatory category
or otherwise useful theoretical concept. In considering this question, several issues need to be
kept apart. First, even if short-term memory is not a brain system, there might still be specific
types of (explanatory) storage-, maintenance-, and retrieval mechanisms responsible for the
empirical effects attributed to short-term memory (Jonides et al., 2008). Second, even if we were,
for the time being, to remain neutral with respect to the question of what ‗underlies‘ the
empirical effects that gave rise to ideas about short-term memory, the concept might still
continue to be of theoretical value if it turned out that the effects it describes play a role in other
research contexts as well. As we will see shortly, this is indeed the case.
In the psychological literature, the terms ―short-term-memory‖ and ―working memory‖
are sometimes used interchangeably, and sometimes (though not consistently) used to mark
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theoretical and empirical differences. One thing that is clear is that today‘s interest in this
phenomenon is primarily driven by the recognition that working/short-term memory is crucial to
a variety of other cognitive functions (e.g., Ricker et al., 2010). For example, we could not so
much as understand the end of a spoken sentence if we were not able to remember its beginning.
Likewise, we would not be able to solve the simplest math problem if we were unable to keep
the individual digits in consciousness. By viewing our most basic cognitive functioning as
closely linked to short-term memory, contemporary researchers highlight an aspect that was
already present in Baddley‘s original multi-component proposal, namely the importance of
executive control function, as managing the information that is temporarily represented in short-
term or working memory. One intriguing feature of this research is that the question is no longer
simply how many items can be kept active for how long (capacity and duration), but rather, how
many items can be kept active for how long, given the demands of another task that is carried
out at the same time. It is by now known that there is an empirical dissociation between the two
abilities, in that the latter is highly correlated with measures of intelligence, whereas the former
is not (Conway et al., 2005). This in turn has prompted many researchers to treat them as two
distinct phenomena, referring to the former as ―short-term memory‖ and the latter as ―working
memory‖ (Cowan, 2008). Much of the current research is about the latter phenomenon, which
possibly accounts for the fact that the term ―working memory‖ has come to be much more
widely used.6 However, some continue to use the term ―short-term-memory‖ to refer to this
phenomenon (e.g., Jonides et al. 2008), some treat working memory as including short-term
memory (Cowan, 2008), and yet others refer only to attention-related aspects (as opposed to
modality specific storage) of short-term memory as ―working memory‖ (Conway et al., 2005).
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Despite these confusing terminological and theoretical issues, there is some agreement
about the existence of two types of empirical effects: those that are, and those that are not,
correlated with other cognitive abilities like intelligence. For our purposes, the important thing to
keep in mind is that the research just alluded to pretty much follows the experimental design
outlined above (learning phase – testing phase), and that the distinction between two types of
phenomena is essentially tied to a distinction between two types of tests used in such designs.
We will return to this in section 5 below.
4. On the Idea of an Epistemic Thing as „Blurry‟
The case study just outlined gives us some sense of the equivocality and ambiguity of taxonomic
categories in memory research along several dimensions: The term ―short-term memory‖ is used
by some to refer to a specific type of empirical regularity, by some to refer to encoding or
retrieval mechanisms, and by some to refer to a storage system in the brain. Moreover, the term
is by some used synonymously with ―working memory,‖ and by some to mark important
empirical and theoretical differences, having to do with simple vs. complex uses to which the
memory-type in question can be put. Even if we try to characterize the empirical regularities in
purely descriptive terms, it turns out that there is room for uncertainty and disagreement about
even the most basic characteristics, such as duration and capacity. Another feature of this
research is that while capacity is still a central area of research, there has been a shift in focus, in
that the research is often motivated by the desire to understand the role of capacity and duration
in relation to other cognitive abilities and traits, such as reasoning and intelligence. Even though
researchers in this field continue to refer to the phenomenon of interest as a memory
phenomenon, there is a sense in which working memory capacity, in this literature, is treated
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more as a feature of the attention span. This is consistent with the currently dominant model,
according to which there is only one storage location, which is activated by attention.
Given these discrepancies in terminology, extension, and theoretical assumptions, one
may wonder about the status of short-term memory as an object of research. When philosophers
discuss such cases, they typically refer to them as cases of conceptual change, and they typically
ask whether such shifts can be reconstructed as rational. By contrast, my interest here is not so
much in such diachronic shifts in the classification of phenomena, but rather in the synchronic
variations in the ways in which research programs, theoretical assumptions, and classificatory
practices interpret what appears to be a common object of research. In other words, it is not only
the case that scientific concepts are fluid in the (well-known) sense that their intensions and
intended extensions can change over time. They are also fluid in the (less often discussed) sense
that at any given time different groups of scientists who take themselves to be investigating the
same thing can have different conceptions of what that thing is and what kinds of empirical data
instantiate it.7 The overall impression one gets from reading this literature is that while
psychologists working on this field work with rigorous experimental methods, and while at least
some of them are at pains to define their terminology, they do not seem to be able to get their
object of research into clear focus. This notwithstanding, there are interesting theoretical and
empirical developments in this area of research.
The metaphor of not being able to get the object of research into clear focus resonates
with Hans-Jörg Rheinberger‘s concept of an epistemic thing as an object or phenomenon that
attracts our scientific curiosity. As Rheinberger suggests, such objects present themselves ―in an
irreducible vagueness‖ (Rheinberger 1997, p. 28). According to Rheinberger, this is not a sign of
the deficient nature of epistemic things, but rather contributes productively to the research
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process. For reasons that will become apparent below, I prefer the term ―Verschwommenheit‖
(blurriness), which Rheinberger uses in the German version of his book (Rheinberger, 2001, p.
27), over the term ―vagueness.‖ The very fact that he seems to regard the two words as
interchangable points to a feature of his thinking that is confusing to many readers, namely his
reluctance to draw a clear distinction between concepts and objects. (We tend to attribute
vagueness to concepts, not to objects). In the following analysis, I will argue that (contrary to
Rheinberger) the distinction between objects and concepts remains essential since it allows us to
distinguish between (a) questions about the limits of our knowledge about material objects or
phenomena and (b) questions pertaining to the (semantic or methodological) functions played by
the ways in which we conceptualize such objects. We will begin to elucidate this distinction by
turning to an analysis of the metaphor of blurriness.
Discussing Rheinberger‘s work, Marcel Weber (2006) has addressed the question of
whether we are to interpret the ―blurriness‖ of an epistemic thing as a feature of an object or of a
concept. Weber quickly rules out the former reading, since most objects are simply not blurry.
This leaves him with the second reading, of which he distinguishes two possible interpretations:
According to one, a concept can be blurry in the sense of being vague. According to the other, a
concept can be blurry in the sense of being referentially indeterminate. First, a concept is vague
if it refers to a property that exists on a continuum, such that there are clear cases and a gray zone
in between, with no definite answer to the question of where to draw the line. Since short and
long are on a continuum, one might suspect that the distinction between short- and long-term
memory is vague in this sense. However, while psychologists do indeed discuss the question of
how to measure the duration of long-term memory, such debates typically do not turn on the
question of how to draw a line between long and short. Rather, they are concerned with issues
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like how to identify clear-cut criteria for measuring the duration of short-term memory (i.e., how
to identify and control variables that might contaminate such a measure).
If the concept of short-term memory is not blurry in the sense of being vague (or at least
not in a way that has much significance for scientific practice), then perhaps it is blurry in the
sense of being referentially indeterminate? Within linguistics, the expression ―referential
indeterminacy‖ means that different subjects vary in the ways in which they name objects. This
appears to come closer to characterizing the situation of our case study. Within philosophy, the
expression ―referential indeterminacy‖ typically means something stronger, namely that there is
no fact of the matter as to what a term refers to (what is the class of objects in the extension of
the corresponding concept). There are two typical arguments in support of the idea of referential
indeterminacy. One derives from a verificationist theory of meaning, according to which the
semantic properties of a term are exclusively determined by the linguistic behavior of speakers,
and according to which such linguistic behavior is compatible with infinitely many
interpretations (see Nimtz, 2005). The other draws on the history of science to show that both
meaning and reference of certain scientific terms changed over time, and that there is no theory-
neutral way of settling which one in fact picked out the true referent. This latter version of
referential indeterminacy is commonly associated with the incommensurabilty thesis (Kuhn,
1962).
Both arguments for indeterminacy give rise to worries about anti-realism and relativism.
To counter these threats, advocates of causal theories of reference have challenged a central
premise of the above-mentioned approaches to meaning, namely the premise that reference is
fixed solely by facts about speakers (facts about their linguistic behavior or their beliefs). In this
vein, they argue that reference is fixed – at least in part – by the objects that are in the extension
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of the terms in question. This implies that while reference is not indeterminate, knowledge about
the nature of the referent of a term can be limited and incomplete. This, then, would get us to a
second second reading of ‗blurriness,‘ according to which this metaphor describes not a feature
of a concept, but our lack of knowledge about its referent.
It seems to me that we can be skeptical of the kind of essentialism implied by causal
theories of meaning, while still appreciating the difference between the semantic issue of
whether reference is determinate and the epistemic issue of whether we have knowledge about
the referent.8 In this vein, I suggest that we read talk of the ‗blurriness‘ of epistemic things as
referring to a purely epistemic predicament; a predicament that arises out of (a) assuming that
there is a material ‗thing‘ (entity, process, phenomenon) out there, to be studied by empirical
means, while (b) having only limited understanding of the nature of this object of research.
By construing the notion of the blurriness of an epistemic thing neither as describing an
actual object or phenomenon with fuzzy contours, nor a vague or indeterminate concept of an
object or phenomenon, but rather in terms of lack of knowledge about the class of objects that a
given scientific term refers to (if it refers to anything at all), we can remain neutral not only with
respect to semantic, but also to scientific realism. The question asked in this paper is not whether
facts about the meanings of scientific concepts are settled by the way the world is. Nor is it
whether scientific concepts succeed in correctly describing the world. Instead, the question
addressed here is simply what are the dynamics by which scientific ideas about objects of
research are formed and developed. The whole point of the notion of an epistemic thing-term is
that the issue of what exactly it refers to has not yet been settled. However, this does not mean
that anything goes or that there are no material circumstances constraining the kinds of things
one can say about the purported objects of research (Rheinberger, 2005).
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My analytical reconstruction of the notion of an epistemic thing departs significantly
from Rheinberger‘s own exposition (which is cast in the tradition of French thinkers like
Bachelard and Derrida). However, I maintain that it captures at least some of the essential issues
and insights he emphasizes, i.e., to analyze the microprocesses of scientific developments by
paying close attention to the very specific combinations of factors that have an impact on the
ways in which objects of scientific research are conceptualized and investigated, and to do so in
a way that radically adopts the scientists‘ perspective, particularly acknowledging the extent to
which scientists don‘t ‗know‘ their objects of research.9
5. Experimental Paradigms, Operational Definitions, and Norms of Research
If we take the notion of the blurriness of an object of research to refer to the fact that it is ill-
understood, it still seems that at least some minimal assumptions must be made about it.
Otherwise scientists would not be able to identify instances of ‗it.‘ The question is (a) what are
the origins of the minimal assumptions in question, and (b) how do they affect the process of
experimental knowledge generation. A different way of phrasing the question is to ask what
enables the relatively stable use of basic concepts as picking out, and investigating, the purported
(if ill-understood) objects of research. One prominent attempt in the literature to answer these
two questions was provided by Thomas Kuhn, who argued that the tools for both the
individuation and investigation of research objects are provided by paradigms.10 Such paradigms
provide shared exemplars, which enable scientists to identify their objects of research, while also
providing some of the methods used to study them. The question, then, is how paradigms do this.
5.1 Putting the Paradigm Back into “Paradigm”
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We don‘t have to look very far to find examples of shared exemplars in the context of
experimental research. They are even called ―paradigms.‖ For example, in psychology and
cognitive neuroscience, scientists refer to standard ways of producing effects of a given kind as
―experimental paradigms” (Sullivan, 2009, p. 513). The key phrase here is ―of a given kind,‖
since it suggests that the experimental paradigm already shapes our interpretation of the resulting
data as instantiating a particular kind of effect. Hence, it appears that they have rudimentary
concepts built into them. To better understand this, we need to take a closer look at the notion of
an experimental paradigm. Sullivan (op cit, p. 514) suggests an analysis that distinguishes
between production procedures on the one hand, and measurement- and detection procedures on
the other. On her account, production procedures are the experimental interventions,
measurement procedures specify the response variable to be measured, and detection procedures
specify under what conditions a response can be treated as instantiating the effect in question.
Applied to our example, if I wanted to study the effects of a particular intervention on short-term
memory, I would have to specify not only the kind of intervention, but also the procedure by
which I was planning to empirically detect its effects. In memory research, such procedures are
typically memory tests.
In experimental psychology, when scientists talk about their ―experimental paradigm,‖
they sometimes use this expression to include the way in which an experimental intervention is
conducted. However, they more often are simply referring to the measurement and detection
procedures they use, i.e., the tests (e.g., Owen et al., 2005).11 For the case at hand, this means
that if we want to understand the role of paradigms in the empirical individuation and
exploration of short-term and/or working memory, we need to take a close look at the
measurement and detection procedures (memory tests) at play. We can roughly distinguish
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between two classes of tests, simple span tests and complex span tests, where the former is
assumed to tap short-term recollection in the absence of any interfering other tasks, and the latter
is assumed to tap the way short-term recollection works while one is attending to a different
problem (as already mentioned, this is often referred to as working memory). In recent times, the
so called N-back tests have come to replace complex span tests as a measure of working memory
(see Kane et al., 2007). In this vein, researchers, when describing their choice of methods, often
mention that they used this or that version of a span-paradigm or the N-Back paradigm.
Simple span tests – of which Ebbinghaus‘s nonsense syllable method is probably the
most well-known example – present subjects with lists of items and then take some measure of
their recollection. Complex span tests are basically simple span tests with some additional task.
The aim of such tests is to determine working memory capacity (WMC). As outlined by Conway
et al. (2005), three common complex-span tests are the especially wide-spread: the reading span
test, the counting span test, and the operation span test. In the simplest reading span test,
subjects are asked to memorize words, but are in addition given some other task, related to the
words. For example, in the original version, subjects had to read sentences with the instruction to
remember the last words, while also judging the logical accuracy of the sentence (Daneman &
Carpenter, 1980). As Conway et al (2005) lay out, however, there are by now any number of
variations of the reading span test. Moreover, while the items and the test in the reading span test
are related, other tests were soon developed, in which they were not. For example, the so-called
operation span test requires subjects to judge the correctness or incorrectness of a simple
equation while trying to remember a word (Turner & Engle, 1989). Lastly, counting span tests
involve the counting of particular shapes, while being asked to ignore other shapes (e.g., Engle,
Tuholsky et al (1999). By contrast to the complex span tests just outlined, N-back tests presents
18
subjects with series of stimulus, with the instruction to report whether any given stimulus
matches the one that appeared N items ago. Here, too, it is assumed that this taps working
memory, since subjects have to focus on new stimuli, while keeping past stimuli active in
memory.
This brief sketch of experimental paradigms will at best provide a rough idea of short-
term (or working) memory research. What matters for our purposes is that the number of
experimental paradigms is fairly limited and that they function as points of reference for
researchers across the board. By emphasizing the importance of experimental paradigms, I do
not mean to downplay the role of theoretical considerations. To the contrary, the design of
experiments that make use of specific experimental paradigms are often guided by theoretical
hypotheses. In turn the empirical findings they produce can contribute to theoretical speculations,
concerning, for example, the function of executive control as underlying not only performance
on working memory tasks, but also other complex cognitive tasks. Lastly, the classifications that
are enabled by experimental paradigms are productive of further research. For example, once
complex span tasks were designated as a paradigm for producing working memory effects, it
became possible to empirically investigate questions like whether the capacity of working
memory changes with age (Wingfield et al., 1988), what is the relationship between working
memory capacity and the accuracy of recollection (Peters et al., 2007), what are neural correlates
of access to working memory (Nee & Jonides, 2008), what is the relationship between working
memory and ADD and schizophrenia, what is the relationship between pain experience and
working memory (Sanchez, 2011), among others.
5.2 Operational Definitions and Norms of Research
19
The account just hinted at gives some idea of how research objects about which we lack
knowledge are empirically identified such that scientists can proceed to investigate them. To
avoid misunderstanding, I would like to emphasize again that even though there is a sense in
which paradigms fix the conditions of application for specific epistemic-thing-terms in an
investigative context, this is not to be understood as reference-fixing in any semantically more
substantial sense. The ability of the experimental paradigm to indicate or instantiate a stable
phenomenon of scientific interest is as defeasible as other, more ‗theoretical,‘ claims associated
with the concept (see Feest, 2009). To relate this to our case study: while complex span tasks can
be used to investigate the presumed phenomenon of working memory, it is quite conceivable that
in the end the experimental effects produced by this task will be treated as effects of attention or
executive control rather than short-term memory. It is also conceivable that we will still refer to
instances of this empirical effect as memory-effects, but will no longer use it to empirically
investigate some presumed underlying memory system or processes. Therefore, the experimental
effects produced by particular experimental paradigms cannot be appealed to when trying to fix
the reference of a particular theoretical term. In this respect I part ways with approaches in the
literature that argue that the continued use of particular experimental techniques suggests
continuity of reference through theoretical change (Arabatzis, 2006; Arabatzis, this issue; Chang,
this issue).
By contrast to a semantic reading of the ways in which an experimental paradigm can fix
the reference of a term, I endorse a methodological reading. According to it, scientists use
experimental paradigms as tools to temporarily fix the reference of a given epistemic object
term. I call this reading ―methodological‖ for two reasons. First, it makes reference to a scientific
method, the method of exploring phenomena by means of specific experimental paradigms.
20
Second, this method is suggested by a methodological maxim in psychology, namely the maxim
of operationism (Feest, 2011). Operationism urges scientists to ―operationally define‖ their basic
concepts in terms of paradigmatic experimental conditions of application. As we just saw, such
paradigmatic conditions of applications are typically provided by experimental paradigms, which
in turn have as a central component a measurement procedure or test. Operational definitions,
thus, are specifications of how to empirically measure the (presumed) object of interest,12 and
operationism emphasizes the importance of using operational definitions as tools for the
empirical exploration of purported or ill-understood objects of research (or, in the terminology
adopted in this paper, of epistemic things), thus highlighting the pragmatic and temporary
character of such ‗definitions‘ (Feest, 2010). Moreover, by urging scientists to explicate their
operational definitions, the maxim of operationism emphasizes the importance of making
transparent some of the implicit conceptual presuppositions engrained in an experimental design.
The account just laid out is only a rough sketch. For the purposes of this article, the
crucial point is that methodological rules and maxims, such as those demanded by operationism,
formulate norms of adequate scientific practice. Those norms in question are operative on two
levels. First, operational definitions formulate norms for the application of central scientific
concepts. Second, the methodological maxim of operationism stands for a more general norm,
which calls for an explication of the conceptual assumptions implicit in a given research setting,
thereby making them accessible to critical assessment and making it possible to spot possible
sources of error. As I argued in section 2 above, norms about the use of the term ―memory‖
derive from a basic understanding of memory as being linked to an organism‘s ability to display
behavioral evidence of previously learned material and are quite directly reflected in the
rationale for the experimental study of memory. When it comes to the classification and
21
experimental exploration of specific types or subdivisions of memory, such as short-term
memory, the relevant concepts are tied to the ways in which ‗behavioral evidence of previously
learned material‘ is detected, i.e., to specific experimental paradigms and testing procedures.
6. The History of Epistemic Things as Historical Epistemology
In the previous sections, I provided an analysis of the type of research process where relatively
ill-understood or unfamiliar purported objects or phenomena are empirically investigated.
According to my analysis, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger‘s concept of an epistemic thing captures a part
of the intuitions we may have about such ill-understood objects of research. However, I argued
that the idea of an epistemic thing needs to be supplemented by an analysis of how such objects
of research are empirically individuated, such that they can be explored by experimental means,
and I put forth such an analysis, which emphasizes that empirical investigations of epistemic
things rely on shared norms for their empirical individuation. Such norms, I argued, are provided
by operational definitions, which in turn rely heavily on paradigmatic experiments.
As is well known, Rheinberger has referred to his theoretical framework for analyzing the
small-scale dynamics of experimental research as ―historical epistemology.‖ In this section, we
will subject this expression to close scrutiny. More specifically, the question is what warrants the
term ―epistemology‖ for this type of historiographical project. This section will argue that (a) the
research project in question is best understood as a specific attempt to integrate historical and
philosophical analyses of scientific knowledge generation, and (b) one of the problems that
notoriously haunt such an integration can be overcome by supplementing Rheinberger-style
historical epistemology with a focus on the methodological considerations that shape the
research in question.
22
6.1 Towards an Integrated History and Philosophy of Science
There are several research programs that go by the name of historical epistemology. 13 In this
paper we have focused on Hans-Jörg Rheinberger‘s understanding since the question he pursues
– how to account for the dynamics of knowledge generation by experimental means – resonates
with the one pursued here. Rheinberger‘s unit of analysis is what he calls an ―experimental
system.‖ By this he means a hybrid constellation of material, technical, and cognitive factors that
give rise to new questions, generate surprising insights, and contribute to the formation of an
epistemic thing (Rheinberger 2001, p. 25). My focus on operational definitions is compatible
with some version of this notion of an experimental system, but emphasizes the conceptual work
that goes into designing and implementing such systems. This gives a specific spin to the idea of
an epistemic thing, distinguishing between (a) the guiding (if fallible) assumption that there is an
object or phenomenon out there about which we currently lack knowledge, and (b) the dynamics
at work in conceptualizing and investigating such a purported object.
Clearly, Rheinberger‘s version of historical epistemology is not a universal theory of
what constitutes knowledge or how our knowledge claims can be justified,14 but rather is a
specific theory of the development of scientific knowledge within the domain of 20th-century
molecular biology. However, even if it is ‗merely‘ a theory of the development of a specific type
of scientific knowledge, the question remains by what standards the results of those
developments can be characterized as ―knowledge.‖ A different way of putting this is to ask what
is the relationship between Rheinberger‘s historical epistemology and the epistemological
question raised by his historical cases: Is historical epistemology merely a specific way of
practicing the history of science, to be supplemented with a genuinely (universal)
23
epistemological analysis; or is the epistemological analysis meant to result (‗locally,‘ as it were)
from the historical investigation itself? Rheinberger himself aims for the latter. But how can we
explicate this?
The question just raised concerns the relationship between the history of science and the
philosophy of science, insofar as the latter, but not the former, is primarily interested in the
epistemic status of scientific results. The nature of this relationship has repeatedly received
attention in the literature over the past 50 or so years (see Schickore, forthcoming, for a
comprehensive overview). As Schickore lays out, one answer that has been prominent within
philosophy of science since the 1970s is what she calls a ―confrontational‖ model, according to
which the history of science provides case studies, which philosophers draw on to illustrate (or
provide evidence for) their own epistemological points. The underlying vision, then, is one of a
division of labor, whereby historians of science provide descriptively accurate accounts of
specific historical episodes, whereas philosophers subject these episodes to epistemological
scrutiny. Assuming that this kind of division of labor was possible, the envisioned project is one
in which the historical account in and of itself makes no philosophical contribution. It is only in
the light of the philosophers‘ normative categories that the historical material becomes
philosophically illuminating.
I suggest that we interpret Rheinberger-style historical epistemology as a particular
proposal of how to integrate history and philosophy of science. His historical narratives of the
dynamics of research is „philosophical‟ insofar as it challenges philosophers to pay attention to
the kinds of questions that arise if we take seriously the perspective of the scientists with their
epistemic limitations. The notion of an epistemic thing highlights this perspective, raising the
question of what an analysis of the exploration of objects of research might look like that is not
24
skewed by knowledge of ‗how things turned out.‘ On the account just presented, Rheinberger‘s
historical epistemology exemplifies a way in which historical work can give rise to a
philosophical question. However, what is still missing is an account of how the historical
analysis itself can contribute to the development the analytical tools used to answer, or at least
address, this questions. This is another way of asking how the descriptive results of an historical
analysis can contribute to a normative philosophical project. In response to this question, I
suggest that we center our historical narrative on the methodological categories that scientists
themselves employ, and that this can provide a starting point for our own normative analysis. In
this vein, this article is concerned with experimental designs, paradigms and operational
definitions typically used to explore particular (purported) objects of research. I argue that
scientists choose such experimental designs with the aim of operationally defining their central
concepts, and that this is part of a methodological strategy, which aims at temporarily fixing the
identity conditions of a given object of research, and making conceptual presuppositions
available to critical discussion.
In supplementing Rheinberger‘s focus on experimental systems with one on
methodological norms and norms of concept use, my approach takes an insight from
Rheinberger‘s historical epistemology, while departing from it in one significant respect: As
Rheinberger has emphasized repeatedly, he aims at (a) practicing epistemology by practicing the
history of science, and (b) doing so in a way that does away with traditional epistemological
categories, such as the concept of justification and the dichotomy between objects and concepts
or world and mind. With respect to the first aim, I interpret Rheinberger as proposing some
version of an integrated history and philosophy of science, in that the philosophical analysis is
supposed to inform his historical work and vice versa. It is this part of his approach that I am
25
sympathetic to. With respect to the second aspect, however, I maintain that for analytical
purposes the distinction between objects and concepts remains crucial, and that ultimately any
epistemological analysis is going to have to employ some normative analytical vocabulary. As
already indicated above, my proposal is that the normative analytical vocabulary we use as
philosophers of science is to be developed out of (rather than superimposed on) the scientific
cases we study historically.
Several questions immediately arise, however. First, the fact that the scientists who figure
in our historical or contemporary case studies employ particular norms of concept use and
investigative practice does not mean that we as philosophers have to accept them as adequate.
Second, if the aim is to derive epistemological questions and analyses locally from specific
historical cases, this raises concerns about the scope of the analyses. We now turn these
questions, elucidating them with our case study, and making a few suggestions about further
philosophical work on these issues.
6.2 Methodological Naturalism and the Case of Short-Term Memory
The fact that scientists sometimes express a commitment to specific methodological norms does
not mean (a) that they in fact follow those norms, or (b) that the norms are adequate for the
purposes scientists put them to. In this latter vein, the methodological maxim of operationism has
a history of being quite severely attacked by philosophers, who criticized it on semantic and
epistemological grounds. As I have shown elsewhere, however, with respect to psychology, these
criticisms rely on historical and conceptual misunderstandings about what the methodological
maxim of operationism in fact claimed, what function it was supposed to play in the research
process, and how its advocates responded to some obvious problems with it (Feest, 2005).15 This
26
case is thus a good example of the advantages of historical scholarship in correcting
philosophical misconceptions about the nature and aims of scientific methods.
Nonetheless, of course I do not want to claim that methodological norms and the kind of
research they enable are above reproach. Our question, then, concerns the vantage point from
which critical philosophical discussions of scientific methodologies and scientific results can be
conducted. The answer I suggest is informed by a commitment to a particular vision of
philosophical method, methodological naturalism. According to it there is no in principle
distinction between the methods employed by philosophers and scientists. This is so because
there is no area of knowledge that is the exclusive domain of philosophy (Papineau, 2009),
though philosophers are likely to focus on different questions than scientists.16 It follows that a
philosophical discussion of the epistemic status of scientific methods or results is on a continuum
with scientific discussions about those questions. Consequently, we can evaluate scientific
processes in two ways, i.e., (1) by holding scientists accountable to their own norms (i.e., to
discuss their practice relative to those norms), and (2) by discussing the adequacy of those very
norms themselves.
Let me illustrate each of these points by means of my case study on short-term memory.
The norms in question concern the conditions under which central concepts are to be applied and
the explication of these conditions in terms of so-called operational definitions. As I argued
earlier, experimental memory research is intimately connected to a particular understanding of
memory as tied to the ability to display behavior that indicates the recollection of something that
was previously experienced. Moreover, specific types of memory (such as short-term memory)
are closely tied to specific experimental paradigms, which contain operational definitions. Now,
in engaging with this type of research, a philosopher of science might inquire whether a given
27
experimental protocol really implements a given operational definition (Feest, 2011). Or she
might question whether a given experimental result, even if reliable, really warrants certain
extrapolations (Sullivan, 2009). This type of critical discussion can be formulated by engaging
with the scientific methods operative in the research, as reconstructed by our historical work. In a
similar vein, though at a more fundamental level, one might also cast doubt on the operational
definition at play, for example by arguing that a given experimental paradigm does a poor job at
indicating or exemplifying the research object under investigation. Other scholars, such as Kurt
Danziger (2008) even question the very assumption that a phenomenon like memory can be
adequately captured by the types of operational definitions that are encouraged by the demand of
experimentation.
Given the kind of empirically grounded approach to epistemological analysis suggested
here, the question remains whether such bottom-up analyses will result in a fragmentation of
‗local‘ philosophical accounts at the expense of more unified analyses of science. It need hardly
be pointed out that the history, philosophy, and social studies of science of the past 15 or so years
has seen a proliferation of debates about disunity and pluralism in science. In the present context,
however, I choose to stay neutral with respect to these debates. Suffice it to point out that even if
it is the case that the different subject matters and research questions of various fields of study
call for different methodologies, this does not imply that the methodologies in question have
nothing in common that might still be described from a more abstract philosophical point of
view. With respect to our case study, for example, we may ask whether the analysis of
operationism and operational definitions – if valid – is useful only for this particular case, or also
for other cases of memory research, other cases of psychological research, of research in the
special sciences, etc. For the time being, I choose to restrict the analysis of operationism to cases
28
where the term is actually used by scientists, though I am inclined to argue that it is in general
applicable to domains that are characterized by exploratory research. It is probably no
coincidence that the maxim of operationism has in the 20th century been especially popular
within novel and complex domains of research, such as psychology, neurobiology, and the social
sciences, where researchers are often quite acutely aware of the intangible character of their
objects.
7. Conclusion
This paper started out with the question of how to characterize the dynamics of empirical
inquiries into specific objects of research, where our knowledge of such knowledge is limited.
Using an example from memory research, I explicated the notion of an ‗ill-understood‘ object of
research in terms of Rheinberger‘s concept of an epistemic thing, supplementing it with an
analysis of the ways in which such ‗things‘ are empirically individuated by means of temporary
(operational) definitions, which in turn are engrained in experimental paradigms. I emphasized,
however, that what is taken for granted can itself be revised or discarded.
One possible response to the project of analyzing the dynamics of research in this way is
that this is a historical project, which has little bearing on questions concerning the epistemic
status of the research results. I have attempted to answer to this objection by placing my analysis
within the context of discussions about the nature of the relationship between history and
philosophy of science. I argued in favor of an integrated model whereby the historical narratives
does not illustrate some prior philosophical thesis, but rather informs the very philosophical
questions we ask. With this construal in mind, I argued that Rheinberger‘s approach points our
philosophical curiosity in the direction of accounting for the processes of knowledge generation
29
in situations of epistemic uncertainty, especially in the realm of exploratory research.
Acknowledging that an epistemological analysis requires some kind of normative perspective on
the research processes under investigation, I suggested that such a normative stance be developed
in close contiguity with the methodological norms operative in the sciences. In the case study at
hand, the norms in question concern the application of particular (if preliminary) rules for the
application of concepts thought to individuate the object under investigation, and the more
general maxim to explicate those rules. I argued that by virtue of being closely tied to
experimental paradigms, the rules in question literally shape the exploration and
conceptualization of the objects of research. Analyzing them therefore not only allows us to
construct a particular type of historical narrative of the investigative process, but also puts us in a
position to develop our own evaluative categories by engaging critically with the normative
underpinnings of the research.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that even though the approach of this paper was
developed by way of an analysis of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger‘s conception of historical
epistemology, I am not committed to using this label for my own analysis. For one thing, I do not
claim to have done justice to the philosophical tradition that informs Rheinberger‘s approach. 17
My aim here has been to highlight some features of this approach, suggesting that it presents us
with a thought-provoking framework not only for the investigation of experimentation, but also
for practicing an integrated history and philosophy of science.
30
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the participants of the conference ―What (Good) Is Historical
Epistemology?‖ for helpful questions and suggestions. In particular, I thank Chrysostomos
Mantzavinos for his insightful comments at the conference, as well as Thomas Sturm, Carl
Craver and an anonymous referee for this journal, whose valuable criticisms prompted me to
make some significant changes to the paper.
31
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1
The term ―object‖ is in scare crows here to indicate that what is meant are objects of research, which can include
phenomena, processes, mechanisms, or whatever scientists choose to investigate.

2
The expressions ―epistemic objects‖ or ―epistemic thing‖ are mostly used by historians of science, but there are
some recent attempts to broaden their scope to objects of non-scientific knowledge (e.g., Abel, 2010).
3
I owe this objection to one of the referees of this article.
4
I am using the terms synonymously here, but will shortly explain different usages that exist in the literature.
5
More information about standard short-term and working-memory tasks will be provided in section 5.1 below.
6
According to Cowan, 2010, the term ―working memory‖ first showed up in Miller, Pribram & Galanter‘s seminal
work about the planning of behavior (Miller et al., 1969).

7
To my knowledge, this type of situation has not received much attention in the philosophical literature, but see
Stotz et al (2004) with respect to the gene concept.

8
I would like to thank Thomas Sturm for drawing my attention to the fact that I glossed over this distinction in a
previous version of this paper.

9
According to Joseph Rouse, it is a misunderstanding to construe the blurriness/vagueness of epistemic objects as
―merely‘ epistemic‖ (Rouse, 2002, p. 338). His argument is part of an interesting and ambitious project to study the
relationship between normativity, naturalism, and scientific practices. Space does not permit me to discuss his
approach in more detail at this point.

10
See Kuhn‘s clarification of the concept in the postscript to his Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
37
11
This is compatible with the above definition since the application of psychological tests typically involves an
intervention (for example, an instruction to perform a task), to be distinguished from the fact that tests are often run
in experiments in order to determine the effects of another intervention (the independent variable of the test).
12
See Feest (2005) for an analysis of historical origins of, and common misconceptions about, operationism.
13
See the editors‘ introduction to this volume.
14
He explicitly rejects the very idea of such a theory (Rheinberger, 2006).
15
Chang (2005) makes a similar case in defense of Bridgman‘s operationism.
16
While there are some parallels between this idea and Chang‘s (2004) notion of ―complementary science‖ and
Kitcher‘s ―pragmatic naturalism‖ (this issue), they cannot be followed up here.

17
For an informed and original account of this tradition, readers are referred to a recent article by Pierre-Olivier
Methot (forthcoming), which also focuses on the operational character of concepts in an experimental context, but
does so by way of a comparative analysis of Rheinberger and Canguilhem.
38

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forthcoming in Erkenntnis as part of special issue about historical epistemology (guest editors: Thomas Sturm & Uljana Feest)

Remembering (Short-Term) Memory. Oscillations of an Epistemic Thing

May 30, 2011

Running Head: Remembering Memory

historical epistemology. I argue that Rheinberger‘s approach articulates a unique contribution to

highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (―epistemic things‖) –

Remembering (Short-Term) Memory. Oscillations of an Epistemic Thing

investigated empirically, therefore, is to study the productive interplay between what is

unfamiliar and what is taken for granted.

approach as ‗biographical‘ (e.g., Daston, 1999; Arabatzis, 2006), thereby (implicitly or

however, and call for further unpacking.

at short-term memory as an object of empirical research. Section 2 will begin by sketching my

(or unfamiliar). Section 4 will provide an analytical explication of Rheinberger‘s notion of an

objects of research, thereby encoding what is treated as ‗familiar.‘

and exploration of the phenomena in question.

2. Memory as an Object of Research

introduced a conception of short-term memory (which they called ―working memory‖) as a

system consisting of several modality-specific sub-units (such as the so-called ―phonological

function of specific experimental designs in empirically individuating the object in question.

& Goff, 1999).

requirement of memory should be conscious recollection.3 In response, it must be pointed out

memory (memory in the absence of a conscious recollection or recognition) would be an

absence of consciousness) as instantiating – or not instantiating – a particular kind of

phenomenon (in this case, a memory phenomenon) importantly relies on particular

presuppositions about the phenomenon.

memory as an object of research insofar as it enables researchers to ask empirical questions

the phenomenon in a particularly clear form.

3. The Case of Short-Term Memory

―chunking,‖ a strategy long thought to improve short-term memory.

wonder whether short-term-memory has effectively been eliminated as an explanatory category

In the psychological literature, the terms ―short-term-memory‖ and ―working memory‖

phenomenon is primarily driven by the recognition that working/short-term memory is crucial to

already present in Baddley‘s original multi-component proposal, namely the importance of

We will return to this in section 5 below.

4. On the Idea of an Epistemic Thing as „Blurry‟

by some to refer to a specific type of empirical regularity, by some to refer to encoding or

researchers in this field continue to refer to the phenomenon of interest as a memory

Given these discrepancies in terminology, extension, and theoretical assumptions, one

empirical developments in this area of research.

with Hans-Jörg Rheinberger‘s concept of an epistemic thing as an object or phenomenon that

turning to an analysis of the metaphor of blurriness.

whether we are to interpret the ―blurriness‖ of an epistemic thing as a feature of an object or of a

to identify and control variables that might contaminate such a measure).

sense of being referentially indeterminate? Within linguistics, the expression ―referential

referential indeterminacy is commonly associated with the incommensurabilty thesis (Kuhn,

of a concept, but our lack of knowledge about its referent.

It seems to me that we can be skeptical of the kind of essentialism implied by causal

By construing the notion of the blurriness of an epistemic thing neither as describing an

My analytical reconstruction of the notion of an epistemic thing departs significantly

and insights he emphasizes, i.e., to analyze the microprocesses of scientific developments by

which scientists don‘t ‗know‘ their objects of research.9

5. Experimental Paradigms, Operational Definitions, and Norms of Research

5.1 Putting the Paradigm Back into “Paradigm”

typically memory tests.

In experimental psychology, when scientists talk about their ―experimental paradigm,‖

researchers across the board. By emphasizing the importance of experimental paradigms, I do

working memory (Sanchez, 2011), among others.

5.2 Operational Definitions and Norms of Research

which paradigms fix the conditions of application for specific epistemic-thing-terms in an

investigative context, this is not to be understood as reference-fixing in any semantically more

phenomenon of scientific interest is as defeasible as other, more ‗theoretical,‘ claims associated

method, the method of exploring phenomena by means of specific experimental paradigms.

concepts in terms of paradigmatic experimental conditions of application. As we just saw, such