ALBERT CASULLO

A FOURTH VERSION OF THE BUNDLE THEORY l

(Receivedin revisedform 1 June, 1987)

The bundle theory (BT) is usually glossed as the view that a thing (or a
particular) is nothing but a bundle of properties. This slogan is open to
a number of different interpretations but recent critics of BT ha~e
understood it in the following way:

(1) A thing is a complex of properties which all stand in some

contingent relation, call it co-instantiation, to one another. 2

James Van Cleve has recently argued that (1) is open to three objections
and, hence, BT should be rejected? The purpose of this paper is to
defend BT against these objections.
The defense will proceed in two stages. First, it will be argued that
two of the objections are misguided for (1) overlooks a crucial feature
of BT. Second, it will be shown that BT can be articulated in two
different ways. Although the traditional manner of articulating it is open
to Van Cleve's third objection, a novel articulation which is immune to
this objection will be introduced and defended.

Van Cleve's three objections can be summarized as follows:

(01) If a thing were a complex of properties, it would be incap-
able of change. For a thing could change its properties only
if the complex identical with it could change its members,
but that is impossible;
(02) If a thing were a complex of properties, all of its properties
would be essential to it. For it is essential to a complex that
it contains the very constituents that it does;

PhilosophicalStudies 54 (1988) 125--139.

9 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
126 ALBERT CASULLO

(03) If a thing were a complex of properties, it would be impos-

sible for two things to have all the same properties. Thus BT
requires the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII)
to be a necessary truth. But PII is not a necessary truth. 4

Let us begin by restricting our attention to (01) and (02), One might
atteNpt to defend BT by drawing attention to the fact that co-instantia-
tion is a c o n t i n g e n t relation which obtains among properties. Hence, a
given property or given group of properties can be co-instantiated with
different properties at different times. Furthermore, it is a contingent
fact that the properties which are constitutive of a thing enter into the
relation of co-instantiation at any given time. Van Cleve, however,
maintains that

in the bundle theorist's world there can be plenty of change of one sort, namely, change
in the relational characteristics of properties; a given property or group of them can be
co-instantiated now with one property, now with another. But this is not to say that any
individual can change. If F and G are co-instantiated first with H and later with K, so
that the complex FGH is superseded by the complex FGK, what we have is replace-
ment of one individual by another, not change in the properties of one and the same
individual.5

In a similar vein, he holds that

of any &dividual it will be true that it might not have existed at all, since the properties
constituting it might not have been co-instantiated. But it will not be true of any
individual that it might have-existed with properties other than the ones it actually has:
we cannot suppose that a complex whose constituents are F, G, and H might have
existed with F, G, and K.6

Thus, according to Van Cleve, the contingency of the relation of

co-instantiafion is not sufficient to insure either change or accidental
predication.
In order to evaluate (01) and (02) we need to draw attention to two
distinct problems which must be addressed by a p r o p o n e n t of BT: (a)
individuation; and (b) identity across time. The p r o b l e m of individua-
tion concerns the relationship between a thing and its proi~erties. In
order to provide a plausible account of a thing, one must explain two
features: (i) things have properties in c o m m o n with other things; yet (ii)
each thing is different f r o m every other thing. Proponents of B T hold
that properties are universals. 7 Since universals, by their very nature,
 A FOURTH VERSION OF THE BUNDLE THEORY 127

are capable of multiple instantiation, (i) is readily explained. On the

other hand, (ii) is problematic. For if properties are capable of multiple
instantiation, then complexes of properties also appear to have this
feature. Hence, opponents of BT argue that in order to explain (ii) one
must countenance entities which are not properties as individuators of
things. It is crucial to recognize that the problem of individuation arises
for all things whether they are momentary or endure through time. The
problem is independent of the temporal span of things. The second
problem, however, arises only with respect to things which endure
through time. For it is only enduring things that are capable of change.
Since an enduring thing can change its properties while remaining tile
very same thing, identity across time cannot be explained in terms of
identity of properties. Hence, opponents of BT maintain that one must
countenance entities which remain unchanged through time despite the
changes in a thing's properties. Let us call these enduring, unchanging
entities continuants.
Since (a) and (b) are distinct problems, a theorist facing them has
two options: (i) offer the same solution to both problems; or (ii) offer
different solutions t o e a c h of the problems. Those opponents of BT
who introduce continuants to account for identity across time exercise
the first option, s For these entities' can also play the role of individuator.
On the other hand, those opponents of BT who favor bare particulars
exercise the second option. For they hold that such particulars are
momentary. Gustav Bergmann, the most prominent proponent of the
position, tells us that "a bare particular is therefore the single indi-
viduator, not of an ordinary thing but, rather, of a momentary cross
section of one. ''9 Bare particulars are individuators but not continuants.
What then of the problem of identity through time? In Bergmann's
theory, there are no continuants but "there are instead temporal series
of bare particulars, held together in the familiar fashion by the laws
connecting the cross sections of objects." 10 So Bergmann's solution is to
maintain that the identity of an object through time is to be explained in
terms of relations which obtain among its temporal cross-sections.
More generally, we might say that

(2) A n enduring thing is a series of momentary things all of

which stand in some contingent relation R.
128 ALBERT CASULLO

(2) bears an obvious structural similarity to (1). Furthermore, it is a

solution to the problem of identity through time which is consistent
with the bundle theory.
If we now turn to the theories of the major proponents of BT, all of
them endorse (2). Russell was primarily influenced by the developments
in physics which dispensed with matter in favor of a four-dimensional
manifold of events:
Thus matter and motion cease to be part of the fundamental apparatus of physics. What
is fundamental is the four-dimensional manifold of events, with various kinds of causal
relations. T h e r e will be relations making us regard the events concerned as belonging to
one piece of matter, . . . . 11

Thus, for Russell, an enduring thing is a series of events standing

in some complex causal relation. Goodman strikes a similar theme
although he is influenced more by nominalism ~ than by scientific
realism:
yet when we consider the table at different moments, we are sometimes told that we
must inquire what it is that persists through these temporally different cross sections.
The simple answer is that, as with the leg and the top, the unity overlies rather than
underlies the diverse elements: these cross sections, though they happen to be tempo-
rally rather than spatially less extensive than the whole object in question, nevertheless
stand to it in the same relation of element to a larger totality. And as before, because
these elements have certain characteristics and are related in certain ways, the totality
they make up is what we call a thing, and more specifically a table.~3

Hence, Goodman also rejects continuants in favor of temporal cross

sections standing in certain relations to one another.
Clearly, a proponent of BT cannot rest content with (2). For (2)
merely reduces enduring things to series of momentary things. But now
the bundle theorist is faced with the problem of showing that a
momentary thing is nothing but a complex of properties. And, clearly,
the solution to this problem cannot be the same as the solution to the
problem of identity across time. For (i) the constituents of momentary
things must be properties rather than things; and (ii) they must be
related at a time rather than over a period of time. It is at this stage of
their theory, that bundle theorists introduce the claim
(1") A momentary thing is a complex of properties which all
stand in the relation of co-instantiation to one another.
So the bundle theory, as traditionally articulated and defended, is a
 A FOURTH VERSION OF THE BUNDLE THEORY 129

two-tiered theory. It offers different solutions to the problems of

individuation and identity through time. Castafieda's recent formulation
of the theory brings this feature out explicitly:

Our view of physical objects is, thus . . . . a bundle-bundle theory. But our bundles are
not the classical ones. First, our basic bundles, namely, ontological guises, are com-
posed of properties processed so to speak by the individuator c. Second, our derived
bundles, namely, physical objects, are not bundles of properties, but bundles of guises
bundled up by a very special relation [i.e., consubstantiation]. 14

The term "bundle theory" has served to mask the richness of the theory
and Castafieda's felicitous "bundle-bundle theory" is a more apt label.
Furthermore, Van Cleve's (1) glosses this crucial feature of the theory.
For it identifies enduring, rather than momentary, things with com-
plexes of co-instantiated properties. So it is not at all surprising that he
makes the startling claim that, on Castafieda's account, the relation of
consubstantiation plays the role of bundling properties into complexes.l 5
Hence, (1) must be replaced with (1").
We are now in a position to deal with (01) and (02) expeditiously.
Clearly, both objections rest on the assumption that temporally enduring
things are complexes of properties. Once we reject (l) in favor of (1"),
the objections founder. For if the complex FGH, to use Van Cleve's
example, stands in relation R to the complex FGK then one and the
same enduring thing has changed its properties. It is, of course, also
true that we have replacement of one momentary thing by a different
momentary thing. But, presumably, even a proponent of continuants
will grant that (i) the temporal parts of a thing are also things; and (ii)
whenever a thing changes its properties, one temporal part is replaced a
different one. The fact that both temporal parts "belong" to a common
continuant does not make the parts identical. Similarly, even if we grant
that each momentary complex of properties has its constituent pro-
perties essentially, it does not follow that an enduring thing which
contains the complex as a temporal part has those properties essen-
tially. In order to appreciate this point one must bear in mind that BT
offers distinct solutions to the problems of individuation and identity
across time. Although momentary things are complexes of co-instan-
tiated properties, enduring things are not. An enduring thing is a
temporally extended series of momentary things. Furthermore, it is a
130 ALBERT CASULLO

contingent fact that any particular momentary thing belongs to the

temporal series which constitutes some particular enduring thing.
Let us once again use Van Cleve's example to illustrate this point.
He begins with the premise

0?1) A complex whose constituents are F, G, and H might not

have existed with F, G, and K as its constituents
from which it follows that
(C1) H is an essential property of the momentary complex
FGHJ 6
Now suppose we add to 071) the additional premise

0?2) Some enduring thing a has F G H as a temporal part at time

t.
Does it follow that
(C2) a has the property H essentially?
Clearly, it does not. For the complex FGH is just one temporal part of
the enduring particular a and it is possible that a have other temporal
parts which do not contain H as a constituent. But this response
appears to open the door for a modified version of Van Cleve's
objection. 17Does it not follow from 071) and 0?2) that
(C3) a has the property of being H at t essentially?

Clearly this conclusion does not follow unless one adds the further
premise

0?3) If FGH is a temporal part of a then a has that part

essentially.
0?3) is a form of mereological essentialism (ME). But why accept ME?
On the one hand, ME appears to be logically independent of BT. There
are proponents of ME, such as Chisholm, 18 who are not proponents of
BT as well as proponents of BT, such as Russell, who reject ME. On
the other hand, Van Cleve does not offer any independent support for
ME. Hence, (02) ultimately rests on one of the following unsubstan-
tiated claims: (1) BT entails ME; or (2) ME is true independently
of BT.
 A FOURTH VERSION OF THE BUNDLE THEORY 131

II

(03) cannot be answered merely by distinguishing between momentary

and enduring things. For if PII is a necessary truth, it applies to
momentary as well as enduring things. Russell and Goodman were
sensitive to this objection and appealed to the spatial structure of the
visual field to individuate momentary phenomenal things. L9 According
to their view, things in the visual field have their location by virtue of
monadic positional properties. Since no two things can occupy the same
position in a visual field, they always differ in their positional pro-
perties. Whatever the merits of this view, it cannot be applied to
physical objects since the structure of physical space differs from that
of perceptual space. 2~ Can the bundle theorist offer a plausible account
of the individuation of physical objects?
Let us begin by noting that the theory can be developed in both a
strong and a weak form:

(SBT) A (momentary physical) thing is necessarily identical to a

complex of mutually co-instantiated properties

(WBT) A (momentary physical) thing is contingently identical to a

complex of mutually co-instantiated properties 21

The difference between (SBT) and (WBT) parallels the difference

between the views of the logical behaviorists and recent proponents of
the identity theory regarding the relationship between mind and body.
The former regarded the identity of mind and body as a necessary truth
whereas the latter hold it to be only a contingent truth. Similarly,
(WBT) is a view about the ontology of the actual world. It holds that
the things of this world are complexes of properties. But it does not
endorse the stronger claim that things in all possible worlds are
complexes of properties. The primary advantage of (WBT) over (SBT)
is that it is not committed to the necessary truth of PII. For the thesis
that

(03) It is possible that two different things have all properties in

common

is consistent with the claim of (WBT) that things are in fact complexes
132 ALBERT CASULLO

of properties. Hence, although (SBT) is open to Van Cleve's third

objection, (WBT) is not.
One might respond that this move is of little consolation to the
proponent of BT. For (WBT) is committed to the claim that

(3) No two things &fact have all properties in common.

But (03) can simply be weakened to

(04) There is little, if any, reason to believe that no two things in

fact have all properties in common.

In support of (04), one could argue that (3) is a sweeping inductive

generalization based on a very slim body of experiential evidence which
is restricted to a small spatio-temporal region of the universe. Further-
more, some have claimed that there are actual counterexamples to (3).
Armstrong, for example, argues that there are good scientific reasons
for holding that elementary particles of the same species do not differ
in their properties. 22 Hence, it appears that (WBT) is not much of an
improvement over (SBT).
It is crucial to recognize, however, that (04) derives its plausibility
from a restriction critics of BT place on admissible properties. They
acknowledge that if a thing's properties include its spatio-temporal
location then (3) is unobjectionable. Armstrong's elementary particles,
for example, do not occupy the same place at a time. The critics go on
to argue that the bundle theorist cannot consistently invoke such
properties. Van Cleve is no exception:

Anyone who countenances 'impure' properties (properties such as being identical with
individual A) could maintain that PII is a necessary truth after all, since such properties
are obviously unshareable. But not much reflection is needed to see that this defense is
not available to proponents of the bundle theory. Impure properties, if such there be,
are ontologically derivative from individuals; individuals, if the bundle theory is true,
are ontologicaUy derivative from properties. One cannot have it both ways. Hence, the
bundle theory cannot admit impure properties, and is committed to the consequence
that no two individuals can have all the same pure properties. 23

If it is granted that (WBT) is committed to

(4) No two things in fact have all pure properties in common

then the critic can follow Anthony Quinton and argue that
 A FOURTH VERSION OF THE BUNDLE THEORY 133

to ascribe a position to an individual in space or time involves an essential and

ineliminable reference to another individual or position ... That I cannot state the
position in space and time of a particular thing without stating its spatial and temporal
relation to some other particular thing is obviously true of the positional locutions
of ordinary speech: 'east of Suez', 'under the clock at Waterloo', 'pre-Columbian',
'medieval'. The situation is not altered, though it is to some extent concealed, when
positions are assigned to things in terms of a co-ordinate system. But here, too, a
further individual is involved, or more properly a further position, namely the' point of
origin of the co-ordinate system.24
Hence, if (WBT) is committed to (4), it faces grave difficulty. The
theory, however, can be developed in a manner which avoids this
commitment.
Let us begin by considering in a general fashion the manner in which
physical objects are assigned a spatio-temporal location. Such assign-
ments take place within a co-ordinate system or some other frame of
reference. Some familiar examples of such frames of reference are the
Gregorian calendar and the system of longitude and latitude. As
Quinton stresses, a frame of reference involves reference to at least one
individual, its point of origin. We shall refer to these individuals, such
as the point of origin, which define a spatio-temporal framework as
landmarks. Within a spatio-temporal framework, the landmarks have
the following distinctive features: (1) all other things have their spatio-
temporal location by virtue of standing in certain relations to the
landmarks; (2) the landmarks do not have their spatio-temporal
location by virtue of standing in certain relations to any other things.
Although the landmarks have a unique spatio-temporal location within
the framework, this location cannot be analyzed in terms of their
spatio-temporal relations to other things. This distinctive feature of
landmarks can be exploited in a natural way by a proponent of (WBT).
A proponent of (WBT) can maintain that there exists a group of
privileged things which are not individuated by their spatio-temporal
location. Instead, they are individuated'by the fact that they do not have
all properties in common with any other things. These privileged things
can then serve as the landmarks by which a frame of reference is
defined for assigning a spatio-temporal location to all other things.
All the remaining things would then be individuated by their spatio-
temporal location -- that is, by their spatio-temporal relations to the
landmarks. This approach offers a proponent of (WBT) two significant
advantages: first, one can appeal to spatio-temporal location to individ-
134 ALBERT CASULLO

uate non-landmarks without circularity since reference to the landmarks

is not ineliminable. The landmarks are complexes of properties.
Second, the number of things necessary to establish a spatio-temporal
framework is small relative to the total number of things in the world.
In the case of a spatial framework, the essential requirements appear to
be an object which will serve as a point of origin along with a sufficient
number of objects to define direction with respect to the origin. A
temporal framework will also require a point of origin but if being
earlier than and being later than are accepted as basic unanalyzable
temporal relations no further objects will be required to define direc-
tion with respect to the point of origin. The exact number of objects
and the technical details of the construction of the spatio-temporal
framework go beyond the scope of the paper. What is clear, however, is
that (WBT) is not committed to (4) but only to the much weaker
empirical claim
(5) There exist a small number of things which do not have all
pure properties in common with any other thing.
But what can be said in favor of (5)? Critics of BT have been hard
pressed to offer actual examples of things which are identical in their
pure properties. The only plausible cases appear to be the elementary
particles of physical theory and phenomenal objects like color spots.
Qualitatively identical macroscopic physical objects are hard to come
by. Perhaps mass produced items like pins and ball bearings are
possible examples. But these are hardly the sorts of items likely to be
chosen as landmarks for establishing a spatio-temporal framework.
Therefore, (5) is supported by the available empirical evidence. So we
can conclude that (WBT) is a version of the bundle theory which is
immune to Van Cleve's objections and has strong empirical support.

III

In conclusion, let us briefly consider (SBT). Since we have shown that

(01) and (02) fall short of their mark, (03) remains as the only
objection to (SBT). The standard defense of the claim that PII is not a
necessary truth is to maintain that one can conceive of two objects with
 A FOURTH VERSION OF THE BUNDLE THEORY 135 ~

all pure properties in common. But, in order to evaluate this position,

we need to know the relevant sense of 'conceivable'. Van Cleve
proposes the following account:
(6) A proposition p is strongly conceivable for S iff S sees that
p is possible; 25
(7) Whatever is strongly conceivable for S is something S is
prima facie justified in believing to be possible. 26

There are two problems with (6) which should be noticed. Consider the
following proposition
(8) (3x) (3y) [(x r y) & (P) (Px -- PY)I

When one attempts to determine whether (8) is possible, one does not
reflect on the general proposition in question. Instead, one attempts to
conceive of particular instances of the proposition. One tries to
conceive of two distinct things with all properties in common. Max
Black's well known article on 'The Identity of Indiscernibles' 27 has been
influential because it provides a recipe for conceiving of such instances.
(6), however, provides no role for the conceiving or seeing of particular
instances in determining the possibility of a general proposition. Fur-
thermore, the notion of "seeing" is left unexplained apart from the claim
that it is a kind of "intellectual vision". So we not in a position to
determine whether instances of (8) are conceivable. Now although there
undoubtedly exist intuitions of possibility and one can be justified in
one's beliefs about what is possible without being able to articulate the
relevant sense of "seeing" involved, one cannot show that counterexam-
ples to PII are conceivable unless one can show that instances of (8)
can be "seen" in the requisite sense. Consequently, without some
indication of what "seeing" consists in, we are not in a position to assess
the claim that counterexamples to PII are conceivable.
This impasse can be broken by recognizing that we have available a
clear and well understood sense of 'conceivability' which is relevant to
determining whether a perceivable state of affairs is possible. This is the
traditional Humean sense of unimaginability. According to this account
(9) A perceivable state of affairs p is conceivable for S iff S can
form a mental image of p.
136 ALBERT CASULLO

Consider the state of affairs of being a round triangle. This state of

affairs is perceivable since its constituent properties -- being round and
being triangular -- are both perceivable. To determine whether this
state of affairs is possible, one must determine whether the properties
in question are compatible or exclude one another. Success at forming
an image which is both round and triangular shows that the properties
do not exclude one another. What about failure to form such an image?
Here we must distinguish two different ways in which one might fail in
attempting to form an image. Suppose that S lacks the concept of
triangularity and, as a result, cannot form triangular images. Clearly,
this type o f failure does not provide S with good reason for believing
that being round excludes being triangular. Let us call this type of
failure conceptual failure. This type of failure must be contrasted with
the case where S can form both a round image and a triangular image
but cannot form an image which instantiates both properties. Let us call
this type of failure co-instantiation failure. It is only the latter type of
failure which provides S with reason for believing that round triangles
are not possible. 28
Let us now apply (9) to the question of whether counterexamples to
the PII are possible. On the face of it, it is quite easy to imagine two
spheres identical in color, size, shape and other perceivable properties.
So (9) appears to support the claim that PII is not a necessary truth.
This is not the case, however. For proponents of the counterexamples
overlook the crucial issue of the structure of visual space. Recall that,
according to Russell and Goodman, the position of an object in a visual
field is determined by monadic positional properties. I have argued
elsewhere that this is the most plausible account of the structure of
visual space. 29 The implications of this account for the purported
counterexamples are clear. In order to imagine two objects, one must
imagine them as occupying different positions in the visual field. But if
they occupy different positions, they differ in their monadic positional
properties. Hence, the objects do not have all pure properties in
common and the counterexamples fail. There are two lines of reply
open to a proponent of the counterexamples: (1) reject entirely the view
that conceivability is relevant to determining possibility; 3~ or (2) pro-
vide an alternative sense of 'conceivability' and show that, in this sense,
the counterexamples are genuinely conceivable21 Until one of these
 A F O U R T H VERSION OF THE BUNDLE T H E O R Y 137

o p t i o n s is exercised successfully, there is n o basis for a d v a n c i n g (03)

a n d rejecting (SBT).
T h e b u n d l e theory has fallen into disfavor in recent years. T h e
following a r g u m e n t is the p r i m a r y r e a s o n for its demise: (1) B T is
c o m m i t t e d to the necessary truth of PII; a n d (2) Black-style c o u n t e r -
examples show that PII is n o t necessarily true. O u r goal has b e e n to
articulate a v e r s i o n of the theory which avoids c o m m i t m e n t to the
n e c e s s a r y truth of PII a n d to argue that the c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s to the
p r i n c i p l e are inconclusive. If o u r results are cogent, t h e n n e i t h e r (SBT)
n o r ( W B T ) has b e e n d i s p r o v e d ? 2

NOTES

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Gustav Bergmann who died on April 21,
1987 after a prolonged period of illness. His work has shaped the contemporary
discussion of the fundamental metaphysical problem of substance and, for this, we are
all indebted to him.
2 This formulation is due to James Van Cleve, 'Three Versions of the Bundle Theory,'
PhilosophicalStudies 47 (1985), p. 97.
3 Ibid.,pp. 98--102.
4 Ibid.,p. 96.
5 Ibid.,p. 98.
6 Ibid.,p. 99.
7 Following Van Cleve, I shall ignore the view that the elements of bundles are
particularized properties rather than universals.
8 Such accounts typically involve the traditional Aristotelian notion of substance. See,
for example, M. J. Loux, Substance and Attribute (Dordrecht, 1978), Chapter 9. Van
Cleve also endorses this approach but does not elaborate his view of substance. See
'Three Versions of the Bundle Theory,' p. 105.
9 Gustav Bergmann, Realism (Madison, 1967), p. 34.
io Ibid.,p. 120.
11 Bertand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York, 1948), p.
290.
12 Recall that on Goodman's definition of the term 'nominalism', this position is
compatible with the existence of abstract entities provided that they are individuals.
Hence, Goodman rejects classes but not qualia. See Nelson Goodman, The Structure of
Appearance, 3rd ed. (Dordrecht, 1977), pp. 104--106.
13 Ibid., pp. 93--94.
14 Hector-Neri Castafieda, 'Perception, Belief, and the Structure of Physical Objects
and Consciousness,' Synthese 35 (1977), p. 322.
15 Van Cleve, 'Three Versions of the Bundle Theory,' p. 97.
16 It is worth noting that even if we restrict our attention to momentary individuals,
Van Cleve's claim about essentialism does not survive critical scrutiny. His basic
argument takes the following form:
(1) (Momentary) individual a has the property H.
(2) (Momentary) individual a = the (momentary) complex FGH.
138 ALBERT CASULLO

(3) A complex has its constituents essentially.

(4) Therefore, (momentary) individual a has the property H essentially.
If this argument were sound, substance theory (ST) would be open to an analogous
objections. For according to ST
(2*) (Momentary) individual a ~ the (momentary) complex FGHSa where
'Sa' stands for individual a's substance. Both BT and ST are reductive theories. Both
theories hold that individuals, momentary as well as enduring, are complex entities
consisting of ontologically more basic constituents'. But if we replace (2) in the original
argument with (2*), the resulting argument is as good as the original.
A proponent of ST would correctly respond at this juncture that the phrase 'indi-
vidual a' is ambiguous for it can be used to designate either
(a) a thing together with its properties
or
(b) the bearer of a thing's properties. ,
The argument from (1), (2*) and (3) to (4) is invalid because 'individual a' is used in
sense (b) in (1) but in sense (a) in (2*).
The problematic conclusion can be avoided by recasting (1) as
(1') Sa exemplifies the property H
and adding the further premise
(5) The relation of exemplification is contingent
from which it follows that
(6) Individual a (in sense (b)) has H contingently.
The key point to note here is that we get the appropriate result in ST only if 'individual
a' is taken in sense (b).
The crucial question which now arises is whether this result can be duplicated with
BT. Clearly, BT cannot endorse (1") since it denies that there are irreducible sub-
stances which exemplify properties. Nevertheless, it must provide some account of what
it is for an individual in sense (b) to instantiate a property. Property instantiation is
analyzed by BT in terms of the relation of co-instantiation rather exemplification.
Furthermore, for a property H to be instantiated, it must be co-instantiated with some
property other than itself or else uninstantiated properties would be impossible. Hence,
the analogue of (1") in BT is
(1"*) H is co-instantiated with F and G.
If we now add to (1"*) the analogue of (5)
(5*) The relation of co-instantiation is contingent
(6) also follows. Hence, the commonly accepted view that accidental predication is
more of a problem for BT than ST is mistaken.
~7 This point was brought to my attention by the Editor.
is R.M. Chisholm, Person and Object (La Salle, 1976), Appendix B.
~9 Russell, Human Knowledge, pp. 298--299; Goodman, The Structure of Appearance,
3rded.,p. 139.
2o The two leading accounts of the structure of physical space, the relational theory
and the substantival theory, both differ from the view that objects have their location in
virtue of monadic positional properties.
 A FOURTH VERSION OF THE BUNDLE THEORY 139

21 In the subsequent discussion, I shall refer to momentary physical things simply as

'things'. The differences between (SBT) and (WBT) are discussed in more detail in my
'The Contingent Identity of Particulars and Universals,' Mind 93 (1984): 527--541.
22 D.M. Armstrong, Nominalism andRealism (Cambridge, 1978), p. 94.
23 Van Cleve, 'Three Versions of the Bundle Theory,' p. 96. A similar argument is
offered by M. J. Loux in Substance and Attribute, pp. 131--134 and by D. M.
Armstrong in Nominalism and Realism, pp. 94--95.
24 Anthony Quinton, TheNature of Things (London, 1973), pp. 17--18.
~5 James Van Cleve, 'Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism,' Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983), p. 37.
26 1bid., p. 38.
27 Max Black, 'the Identity of Indiscernibles,' reprinted in M. J. Loux (ed.) Universals
and Particulars(Garden City, N.Y., 1970), pp. 204--216.
28 One might raise sceptical questions at this point about whether failure of co-instan-
tiation provides good reason for believing that a state of affairs is impossible. For an
attempt to address these questions, see my 'Conceivability and Possibility,' Ratio 17
(1975): 118--121; and my 'Reid and Mill on Hume's Maxim of Conceivability,'
Analysis' 39 (1979): 212--220.
29 Albert Casullo, 'The Spatial Structure of Perceptual Space,' Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research 46 (1986): 665--671.
30 I have argued that the counterexamples do not fare any better on the only other
available alternative, the logico-linguistic theory, in my 'Particulars, Substrata, and the
Identity of Indiscernibles,' Philosophy of Science 49 (1982): 591--603.
3~ John Pollock, in Knowledge and Justification (Princeton, 1974), provides an account
of a priori justification in terms of "a special kind of logical conceiving" which is
different from imagining (p. 327). But he does not offer a positive characterization of
this distinctive kind of conceiving.
3z This paper was written while the author held a National Endowment for the
Humanities Summer Stipend. My thanks to NEH for its financial support and to
Panayot Butchvarov and Joseph Mendola for their helpful comments on an earlier
version of the paper.

Department of Philosophy,
University of Nebraska, Lincoln,
Lincoln, N E 68588--0321,
U.S.A.