Collectivisation

Stalin 1928-1933 – Collectivization

In November 1927, Joseph Stalin launched his

"revolution from above" by setting two extraordinary
goals for Soviet domestic policy: rapid
industrialization and collectivization of agriculture.
His aims were to erase all traces of the capitalism that
had entered under the New Economic Policy and to
transform the Soviet Union as quickly as possible,
without regard to cost, into an industrialized and
completely socialist state.
 The very essence of the kolkhoz (collective
farm) system lay in the ease with which it
facilitated extraction of heavy tribute from the
land in the form of extremely cheap supplies
of foodstuffs and industrial crops. Thus, the rise of the Stalinist land system
was closely connected with the Party's program of break-neck
industrialization, massive capital investments, and strategic projects at the
expense of consumption. The ever-tightening hold of the regime over the
industrial working class made possible implementation of these policies
without the development of consumer goods facilities; and therefore the
regime could permit a drop in the levels of consumption without jeopardizing
its plan. The new agricultural program - designed primarily to redistribute
agricultural produce rather than to increase it - was consistent with this aspect
of the plan. Moreover, the political hold collectivization afforded over the
peasants assured State control of the rural labor supply and enabled the State
to channel manpower into non-agricultural occupation as it deemed
necessary.
 This was the general rationale behind collectivization. The immediate cause
for the first collectivization drive lay, however, in the mounting economic
tensions of the late 1920s. As early as 1925-26 the regime had sought to
reimpose many of the agrarian controls lifted in 1921, at the time of the
inauguration of NEP. To implement this policy, agricultural prices were once
again restricted and production itself subjected to heavy taxes. Retaliating in
kind, the peasants drove production downward, hoarded again, and
consumed what they could not hide or sell. As a consequence State grain
collections in 1928-29 dropped more than one-third below the level of two
years before. Tension in the countryside mounted. The means by which the
new monolithic party chose to meet this situation was of a magnitude equal to
the challenge.
Stalin's First Five-Year Plan, adopted by the party in 1928, called for rapid
industrialization of the economy, with an emphasis on heavy industry. It set
goals that were unrealistic -- a 250 percent increase in overall industrial
development and a 330 percent expansion in heavy industry alone. All
industry and services were nationalized, managers were given
predetermined output quotas by central planners, and trade unions were
converted into mechanisms for increasing worker productivity. Many new
industrial centers were developed, particularly in the Ural Mountains, and
thousands of new plants were built throughout the country. But because
Stalin insisted on unrealistic production targets, serious problems soon
arose. With the greatest share of investment put into heavy industry,
widespread shortages of consumer goods occurred.

The First Five-Year Plan also called for transforming Soviet agriculture from
predominantly individual farms into a system of large state collective farms.
The Communist regime believed that collectivization would improve
agricultural productivity and would produce grain reserves sufficiently large to
feed the growing urban labor force. The anticipated surplus was to pay for
industrialization. Collectivization was further expected to free many peasants
for industrial work in the cities and to enable the party to extend its political
dominance over the remaining peasantry.

The great offensive against the peasantry was launched late in 1928, but it
was not until one year later, when Stalin called for "liquidation of the kulaks
as a class," that its full weight was felt. Stalin focused particular hostility on
the wealthier peasants, or kulaks. Since the actual number of kulaks in post-
Revolutionary Russia was not very great, this slogan made it abundantly
clear that the frankly military offensive was directed against the peasantry as
a whole. About one million kulak households (some five million people) were
deported and never heard from again. Between 1929 and 1932 the Soviet
Communist Party struck a double blow at the Russian peasantry:
dekulakization, the dispossession and deportation of millions of peasant
families, and collectivization, the abolition of private ownership of land and
the concentration of the remaining peasants in party-controlled "collective"
farms.

The story is well known: the dispatch of Communist shock cadres to the
villages, the mass deportations, the herding of peasants into hastily formed
collective units, the calculated famine in the Ukraine, the wholesale slaughter
of livestock by the desperate peasants, the brief pause ordered by Stalin
early in 1930, the renewed offensive in 1931-32, the collapse of the
opposition, and the final establishment of a collective farm system in all
essential respects.

Why did Stalin want industrialisation and collectivisation

and how successful was it?
 Level: GCSE 
 Subject: History 
 Topic: Modern World History 
 Word count: 771
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Why did Stalin want industrialisation and collectivisation and

how successful was it?
There were six key reasons for Stalin’s program of collectivisation. Firstly, Soviet agriculture
was backward. It was inefficient, almost entirely done by hand, the farms were too small, and
many farmers simply farmed just enough for themselves. With the growth in industry, more
food was needed for workers in towns, and this was essential if the Five-Year Plans were to
succeed. NEP would eventually lead to the overthrow of communism, as it would create a
capitalist middle class, known as Kulaks. Even with NEP, by 1928, the USSR was short of 20
million tons of grain needed to feed the towns. Collectivisation of small farms would also
free up workers for the towns. If the USSR was to industrialise, peasants needed to grow
crops which could be exported to raise money to buy foreign machinery and expertise.
Kulaks opposed Communism, however they were the minority among peasants, and were
really a propaganda myth created by Stalin to enable him to justify his attacks on the
peasants.
Initially, collectivisation was a failure. His request for voluntary collectivisation in 1927 was
largely ignored. In 1929, Stalin announced compulsory collectivisation, which was enforced
by the army and party officials. In response, peasants burned their crops and barns, and killed
their animals. Between 1932-33, there was extreme famine. Stalin blamed the Kulaks and
decided to “Liquidate the Kulaks”. Their land was taken and they were shot or sent to labour
camps in Siberia. Anyone who resisted collectivisation was simply denounced as a Kulak,
irrespective of wealth of beliefs. The Kulak myth simply gave Stalin free reign. However, by
1939, 99% of farmland was collectivised, and production was back up to the levels of 1913.
Almost all of the collectives (kolkhoz) were now mechanised, and used fertilisers and other
more modern methods of farming. Farming was now completely state run, and peasants
obeyed through propaganda inspired enthusiasm or fear.
This was at a severe cost however, between 7 and 10 million peasants were killed, deported
or starved. Also, many died in the 1932-33 famine.
Industrialisation was another key aim of Stalin. To industrialise Russia, he put into place two
5-year plans, 1928–33 and 1932–1937. He had four key reasons for this. Firstly, many
regions of the USSR were backward.   Stalin said that to be backward was to be defeated and
enslaved. He feared the West, and wanted to protect himself and Russia. He declared that
Russia was fifty years behind the West, and either, “we (Russia) make good the difference in
10 years or they crush us’.
 Secondly he followed Lenin’s belief that the USSR should overtake and outstrip the
capitalist countries.   He believed in ‘Socialism in one country’ –the USSR would become
strong enough to survive, then would take over the rest of the world.    
A strong economy would also ensure provide a strong power base for Stalin, which would
help to ensure his remaining in power. Finally, the 5-year plans were very useful propaganda,
both for Communism and for Stalin. If Russia really could catch up within ten years it would
provide a huge boost to communism. In order to achieve this, GOSPLAN drew up plans to
maximise working output. Targets were set for every industry, each region, each mine and
factory, each foreman and even every worker, and foreign experts and engineers were called
in. Workers were constantly bombarded with propaganda, posters, slogans and radio
broadcasts, urging them to work harder and telling them that they were building for the
future. They were also fined if they did not meet their targets. After the First 5-year plan
revealed a shortage of workers, new crèches and day-care centres were built so that mothers
could work also. There was also a concentration on heavy industry at the expense of
consumer goods or good housing. Again, overall it was successful. The USSR was
successfully modernised, and there was genuine Communist enthusiasm generated among the
young ‘Pioneers’. New purpose built industrial cities were constructed, along with dams for
hydro electric power, the Moscow Underground, and education and state benefit was also
introduced. However, this was also at an appalling cost. Workers were sacked if late. Slave
labour was often utilised, those who made mistakes were sent to labour camps, and there
were a huge number of accidents and deaths. Over 100000 workers died building the
Belomor Canal. There were few consumer goods, and the housing was poor. On top of this,
wages actually fell.
However, Stalin had actually succeeded in turning the USSR into a super power, and in a
remarkably short time.
How did collectivisation and industrialisation affect the lives of people in
the Soviet Union during the 1930s?

Collectivisation and industrialisation had profound effects on the lives of people in the
USSR during the 1930s. While industrialisation was beneficial for the nation as a whole, few
workers saw its benefits during the years of Stalin’s rule. Collectivisation, on the other hand,
had disastrous consequences for the peasants – in the short-term at least – particularly for the
wealthier ones, the so-called kulaks.

Collectivisation involved the elimination of private ownership of agricultural land, and its
replacement with a system of state-owned and collectively-owned farms. Stalin hoped it would raise
production, by consolidating small plots of land into large estates where tractors and other types of
farm machinery could be used more effectively. He also hoped it would hastened the march to
socialism by eliminating capitalism in the countryside.

While the poorer peasants tolerated collectivisation (because they had little land and few animals
to lose), the wealthier ones (the kulaks) bitterly opposed it. These farmers had supported NEP and
refused to accept its abandonment – not surprising, when one considered that land reform was one
of the Bolsheviks’ key promises in 1917.

When the time came to part with their land, many kulaks refused to comply, reducing production
to subsistence levels as a form of protest. Many also burned their farm equipment and killed their
cattle in preference to handing them over to the state.

At first Stalin reacted cautiously, fearing the fall in agricultural production would jeopardise his
industrialisation plans. As such, he called a halt to collectivisation, and allowed the peasants to
reclaim their land. The kulaks thought they had won the battle, and immediately began to replant.
However, once the harvest had been safely collected, Stalin accused them of being counter-
revolutionaries, and set about eliminating them as a class in society. Their possessions were
confiscated and they were prevented from joining collectives. Those who continued to resist were
exiled to Siberia or shot; whole villages were burned.

The result of these changes was a precipitous decline in agricultural production. The number of
sheep and goats in Russia fell from 146 million in 1928 to 42 million in 1933. Cattle numbers fell from
70 million to 34 million over the same period. The amount of grain produced also fell.

Because of this the USSR was hit by famine in 1932-33. The worst hit region was the Ukraine,
where resistance to Soviet rule had been strong. Stalin was furious that the area had failed to meet
its grain requisition targets, and decided to use the famine as a means of punishing those he held
responsible. All grain was confiscated by the state, and troops were stationed on the Ukraine’s
borders to prevent people from leaving. The peasants were then left to starve. About 7 million
people died in the USSR during the famine, 5 million of them being in the Ukraine.

Total agricultural production did not recover to the 1928 level until 1938.

While collectivisation had a disastrous effect on the lives of large numbers of Russians, the impact
of industrialisation was more ambiguous.

At an economic level, the three Five Year Plans succeeded in transforming Russia from a backward
semi-developed nation to one which could match the West in industrial output. For example, by
1933 output levels were four times that of 1913. Production of oil and gas rose by 130 percent
between 1929 and 1938. Over that same period, production of coal and iron ore rose by 230
percent, steel by 267 percent, electricity by 540 percent, and chemicals by almost 1000 percent.

However, these successes were achieved by great sacrifices on the part of the working class. Most
production was of capital goods, and did not raise living standards of the common people. Similarly,
wages were kept in check in order to generate the high savings needed to finance investment. And
even where workers did have money to spend, there was little to buy in the shops. Money simply
had to be banked, where it could be used to finance further investment. Hence, by 1937 living
standards (as measured by the availability of consumer goods) were lower than they had been in
1928. Even so, the more productive workers were rewarded with higher wages, bonuses or special
privileges; their living standards did rise. So too did the quality of life of the 17 million peasants who
moved to the cities to find work in the factories. They were now allocated apartments which, though
small, were far superior to anything they had experienced before.

Working conditions, however, were harsh. People were required to labour for seven days a week
in many factories, and were not permitted to leave their jobs without permission. Internal passports
were introduced as a means of controlling the movement of labour around the country. There were
also harsh penalties for breaches of discipline, such as damage to tools or theft of state property.

For some, the conditions were far worse. These were the inmates of the labour camps, who were
forced to work for only their daily ration of food. During the 1930s, there were 8 million people
working as slave labourers at any one time, performing some of the hardest, most dangerous jobs in
the country like logging and mining. Not surprisingly, many died of cold, malnutrition, disease and
overwork.

Hence, both industrialisation and collectivisation had profound effects on the lives of
workers and peasants during the 1930s. Both were part of Stalin’s program to build a strong,
developed, socialist nation that could defend itself against attack. In this he undoubtedly
succeeded, but a terrible price was paid in terms of lives.

To what extent did collectivisation and industrialisation change Soviet society by the end of
the 1930s?

Collectivisation and industrialisation had profound effects on Soviet society during the
1930s. Indeed, by 1939 they had transformed the country from a predominantly
agricultural economy, based on the private ownership of land, to an industrialised
society, based on the principles of command socialism.

Collectivisation involved the elimination of private ownership of agricultural land, and its
replacement with a system of state-owned and collectively-owned farms. This policy represented
the greatest transformation of Russian society since emancipation (in 1861). It changed who owned
the land, how the land was worked, and how the peasants lived.

While the poorer peasants tolerated collectivisation (because they had little land and few animals
to lose), the wealthier ones (the kulaks) bitterly opposed it. These farmers had supported NEP and
refused to accept its abandonment.

When the time came to part with their land, many kulaks refused to comply, reducing production
to subsistence levels as a form of protest. Many also burned their farm equipment and killed their
cattle in preference to handing them over to the state.

At first Stalin reacted cautiously, fearing the fall in agricultural production would jeopardise his
industrialisation plans. As such, he called a halt to collectivisation, and allowed the peasants to
reclaim their land. The kulaks thought they had won, and immediately began to replant. However,
once the harvest had been safely collected, Stalin accused them of being counter-revolutionaries,
and set about eliminating them as a class in society. Their possessions were confiscated and they
were prevented from joining collectives. Those who continued to resist were exiled to Siberia or
shot; whole villages were burned.

The result of these changes was a precipitous decline in agricultural production. The number of
sheep and goats in Russia fell from 146 million in 1928 to 42 million in 1933. Cattle numbers fell from
70 million to 34 million over the same period. The amount of grain produced also fell.

Because of this the USSR was hit by famine in 1932-33. The worst hit region was the Ukraine,
where resistance to Soviet rule had been strong. Stalin was furious that the area had failed to meet
its grain requisition targets, and decided to use the famine as a means of punishing those he held
responsible. All grain was confiscated by the state, and troops were stationed on the Ukraine’s
borders to prevent people from leaving. The peasants were then left to starve. About 7 million
people died in the USSR during the famine, 5 million of them in the Ukraine.

By 1933, all agricultural land had been collectivised. Peasants now worked for state farms or
collective farms, sharing their land and equipment. The government exercised significant control
over their lives, telling them what to produce and how to produce it, and enforcing strict penalties
for those who failed to comply.

Rural life in Russia had been transformed – socially, economically and politically. Socially, the
human cost was undeniable. However, the socialist experiment in agriculture was also a failure
economically, as total production did not recover to the 1928 level until ten years later.
Collectivisation did not bring with it increased production. But it did give Stalin increased political
control – enough to allow him to exploit the peasants sufficiently to permit rapid industrial
expansion.

The impact of industrialisation on Soviet society, while nowhere near as profound as that of
collectivisation, was still significant.

At an economic level, the three Five Year Plans succeeded in transforming Russia from a backward
semi-developed nation to one which could match the West in industrial output. For example, by
1933 output levels were four times that of 1913. Production of oil and gas rose by 130 percent
between 1929 and 1938. Over that same period, production of coal and iron ore rose by 230
percent, steel by 267 percent, electricity by 540 percent, and chemicals by almost 1000 percent.

At a social level, rapid industrialisation created a large working class, as millions of people left the
land to work in the new industrial complexes that were appearing.

However, working conditions were hard and living standards low. People had to work for seven
days a week in many factories, and were not permitted to leave their jobs without government
permission. Internal passports were introduced as a means of keeping controlling the movement of
labour around the country. There were also harsh penalties for breaches of labour discipline, such as
damage to tools or theft of state property.

Unfortunately, workers received few rewards for their efforts. Living standards remained low,
since few consumer goods were produced; instead, resources were channelled into heavy industry
and the expansion of infrastructure. Only the most productive workers received wage increases,
bonuses or special privileges. Even so, the quality of life of the 17 million peasants who moved to the
cities did rise, as they were given apartments which, though small, were far superior to anything
they had lived in before.

Unfortunately, industrialisation and collectivisation created a new social class in Russia – slave
labourers. During the 1930s, there were 8 million people working in the labour camps, performing
some of the hardest, most dangerous jobs in the country. Not surprisingly, many died of cold,
malnutrition, disease and overwork.

Another important social change in Russia during the 1930s was the increased pride people took in
their nation’s achievements. Literacy and numeracy increased dramatically, as did the number of
university graduates – developments that was necessary to facilitate industrialisation. Most Russians
were proud of their social and economic successes – something which gave credence to the Stalinist
propaganda they were fed on a daily basis.

Finally, industrialisation helped transform Russia politically, giving Stalin justification for
centralising power in his own hands and unleashing a reign of terror on those he perceived to be his
enemies.

Both collectivisation and industrialisation transformed Soviet society in the 1930s. Russia
became a strong, developed, socialist nation. But it also became a rigid, totalitarian regime, led by
a brutal, heartless dictator with messianic vision for the future

Collectivization of Agriculture in the USSR

 

the transformation of small individual peasant farms into large commonly owned socialist farms throug
h the formation ofcooperatives.
In the period of transition from capitalism to socialism the socialist transformation of agriculture—that i
s, the establishment ofsocialist production relations in the countryside—is a very important link in the 
socialist reconstruction of the economy. Itpresupposes the creation of large-scale state enterprises, o
n the one hand, and the gradual amalgamation of individualpeasant farms into collective farms. State 
agricultural enterprises (sovkhozes), most of which grew out of large estates thathad been nationalize
d, were established on state-owned lands. The major producers of agricultural products, the sovkhoze
salso helped the peasant farmers to assimilate the latest agronomic techniques, provided them with s
eed and with breedingstock, and rented technical equipment to them. For the peasantry the sovkhoze
s were convincing examples of theadvantages of socialist organization in production. However, during 
the transitional period these farms accounted for arelatively small share of the overall agricultural outp
ut, and millions of tiny peasant farms prevailed in agriculture.
Inasmuch as small-scale commodity production could serve as the foundation for the reappearance a
nd flourishing of thebourgeoisie, its existence posed the constant threat of the restoration of capitalis
m. It was impossible for any great length oftime to base the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist 
construction on such disparate foundations as socialist industryand individual peasant farming. Only l
arge-scale commonly owned agricultural production organized on socialist principlescould serve as a 
reliable support for the proletarian dictatorship.
There was a deep contradiction between socialist industry, which was developing according to the law
s of extendedreproduction, and the predominantly small-scale commodity agriculture, which did not al
ways achieve even simplereproduction. Based primarily on small-scale private ownership and manual
ly operated equipment, agriculture lagged behindindustry and was less and less capable of meeting th
e growing needs of the urban population for food products or the needsof industry for agricultural raw 
materials. Only by replacing small-scale commodity peasant agriculture with large-scalemechanized p
roduction, which would be capable of marketing large quantities of products, could the backwardness 
ofagriculture be overcome and its output raised to the level required by the country.
The transition to large-scale production in agriculture answered the fundamental interests of the peas
ants, for it provided achance to solve the problem of raising their standard of living. Although the socia
list state had provided assistance to therural poor and to the middle peasants (seredniaks), the applic
ability of machinery and the latest scientific advances to verysmall farms could only be extremely limit
ed. Labor is not expended productively on the smallest farms, and the peasant isvery much at the mer
cy of the elements. Only the transition to large-scale socialist production could secure a systematicim
provement in the material and cultural conditions of life for the toiling farmers, eliminate rural overpop
ulation, and lightenthe burden of agricultural labor.
The question of how to carry out the śocialist transformation of agriculture was raised and resolved in 
principle by thefounders of scientific communism. Lenin worked out a concrete plan for the socialist re
organization of rural life and forinvolving the peasantry in building socialism through cooperatives, fro
m the most primitive to the highest forms (productioncooperatives). The nationalization of the land an
d its transformation into the property of all the people were the mostimportant preconditions for setting 
the peasantry on the road to socialism.
Immediately after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, the Communist Party and the Soviet 
government began toimplement a policy aimed at the gradual socialist transformation of the countrysi
de and the creation of large-scale agriculture.In the decree On the Socialization of the Land (January 
1918) the All-Russian Central Executive Committee set the task ofdeveloping collective farms, which 
were to be guaranteed certain advantages over small individual farms. Between late 1917and early 1
919 the first collective farms were established in the countryside—in particular, the agricultural comm
unes, theassociations for the joint cultivation of the land (TOZ), and the agricultural artels. Lenin and t
he Communist Party studied theexperience of socialist construction in the countryside very attentively. 
The decree of the All-Russian Central ExecutiveCommittee On Socialist Land Management and Meas
ures for the Transition to Socialist Farming (Feburary 1919) outlinedthe tasks of collective farms and c
ontained specific instructions on such fundamental questions as their operation, theorganization of the
ir management, their relations with government bodies, and the use of their goods.
The party program adopted at the Eighth Congress of the RCP (Bolshevik) in 1919 stated that Soviet 
power, havingcompletely abolished private ownership of the land, would introduce a series of measur
es to organize large-scale socialistfarming.
As a result of the consistent implementation of Lenin’s cooperative plan and of the government’s subs
tantial organizationaland financial aid, the condition of the toiling farmers noticeably improved during t
he period of national economic recovery. Inthe countryside the proportion of middle peasants increase
d considerably. Before the revolution 65 percent of all peasanthouseholds were poor, whereas by 192
8–29 the proportion of poor peasants had dropped to 35 percent, middle-peasanthouseholds had rise
n from 20 percent to 60 percent, and the proportion of kulaks had fallen from 15 to 5 percent. Howeve
r,the kulak households owned a substantial proportion (15–20 percent) of the means of production, in
cluding approximatelyone-third of the agricultural machinery.
At the same time, there were major successes in developing consumer and agricultural cooperatives, 
which grew into amighty organism which, together with the state trading agencies, played a decisive r
ole in the exchange of goods betweentown and countryside. In 1929 the agricultural cooperatives had 
13 million members—more than 55 percent of the poorpeasant and middle peasant households. Appr
oximately 14 million shareholders belonged to the consumer cooperatives.The agricultural cooperativ
es played a very important role in the procurement of farm products (both crops and livestock). In1929 
they supplied about 36 percent of the grain that was marketed, 60 percent of the flax fiber, all of the m
arketed cotton,sugar beets, and tobacco, 65 percent of the animal fats, and 50 percent of the eggs. P
easants were drawn into collectiveforms of agriculture by many means, including the widespread prac
tice of contracting for agricultural products, under whichthe Soviet government gave support to the po
or peasant and middle peasant households and cooperatives. Under thecontracts the farms received 
seed, monetary advances, the guarantee that the state would market their produce, and asupply of ne
eded manufactured goods. In 1929 approximately 8 million peasant households were involved in the c
ontractsystem, as compared to 2 million in 1927. A cultural revolution was an important precondition f
or the collectivization ofagriculture.
However, at the beginning of the first five-year plan in 1928, small individual peasant households conti
nued to prevail inagriculture, with as many as 25 million households. (See Table 1.) Manual labor prev
ailed in farm production. In 1928, 74.4percent of the summer grain crop was sown by hand, 44.4 perc
ent of the grain crop was reaped or mowed by sickle orscythe, and 40.7 percent of the grain was thres
hed by flails or other manual methods. The backwardness of agricultureslowed down the country’s rat
e of industralization. The building of socialism demanded that agriculture be put on the path oflarge-
scale socialist mechanized production, in order to increase the productivity of labor and the marketabl
e surplus,eliminate the breeding ground for capitalist elements, and put an end to kulak exploitation.
 Table 1. Number of agricultural enterprises and farms before mass collectivization

  Percentage  of  all  cultivated  are Average  cultivated  area  per  farm  (ha
a )
Individual . . . . . . . . 97.3 4.5

Kolkhoz . . . . . . . . 1.2 42.0

Sovkhoz . . . . . . . . 1.5 800.0

The decisions of the Fifteenth Congress of the ACP (Bolshevik) in 1927, which set the country on a co
urse toward thecollectivization of agriculture, were historically important. On the basis of them a numb
er of measures were implemented in1928 to strengthen state aid to kolkhozes (for example, credit, pr
ovision of machinery and tools, and tax exemptions) and todevelop a broad campaign to propagandiz
e the ideas of collectivization.
Collectivization was a new and very complex task. It was necessary to overcome the age-old force of 
habit among smallproprietors, to change their psychology, and to convince them of the advantages of 
collective labor. The entire party andSoviet government concentrated its attention on collectivization. 
Party, soviet, and cooperative organizations became thefirst-hand organizers of kolkhozes. By the su
mmer of 1928 the number of kolkhozes had risen to 33,300, and by the summerof 1929, to 57,000. (In 
1927 there were 14,800 kolkhozes.) The central figure in the kolkhoz movement of 1928–29 was thep
oor peasant, whose economic situation improved considerably with the formation of cooperatives. A v
ariety of types ofkolkhozes continued to exist in this period, including the TOZ, which was the most wi
despread form (60.2 percent of allkolkhozes). In the TOZ a considerable portion of the means of prod
uction continued to be privately owned.
The stage of total collectivization, which was characterized by the mass influx of peasants into the kol
khozes, was reachedby the end of 1929.
In its resolution On the Results and Further Tasks of Kolkhoz Building (November 1929) the Plenum o
f the ACP(B) noted thatthe USSR had entered the phase of the advanced socialist transformation of t
he countryside and of the creation of large-scale socialist agriculture and that the growth of the kolkho
z movement had made total collectivization the task of certainregions. In the leading grain-producing r
egions the rural poor and the middle peasants began to join the kolkhozes on a massscale. However, 
the development of the kolkhoz movement revealed a number of difficulties: the low technical level of 
thefoundation for the kolkhozes, the low productivity of labor, insufficient organizational know-how, the 
serious shortage oftrained cadres, and an almost total absence of the necessary experts. The Plenum 
stipulated basic measures designed toprovide increased support to the socialist reorganization of agri
culture, strengthen its material and technical base, andimprove the training of cadres. Twenty-five tho
usand advanced workers were sent from the cities on permanent assignmentto kolkhoz work (the Tw
enty-five Thousanders). Factory collectives sponsored particular kolkhozes.
The party emphatically condemned the position of the leaders of the right-wing deviation, N. I. Bukhari
n, A. I. Rykov, and M.P. Tomskii, who advocated slowing the rate of industrialization, opposed the acc
elerated formation of kolkhozes, and calledfor an end to extraordinary measures to combat the kulaks
.
It was vitally important that the kolkhoz movement in the USSR find an organizational form in which th
e interests of socializedagriculture and those of the individual peasants would coincide. The practical 
experience of socialist construction in theUSSR had brought the agricultural artel to the fore as the m
ain form of kolkhoz. In the artel, land, labor, and all the basicmeans of production were socialized, but 
kolkhoz members retained as personal property their homes, small tools, someproductive livestock (a 
maximum number was established in the Regulations for Agricultural Artels), and a small plot of landa
djacent to their homes for personal use.
In a decision of 1930, On the Pace of Collectivization and State Measures to Assist the Development 
of Kolkhozes, theCentral Committee of the ACP(B) oriented local party organizations and Soviet agen
cies toward the substantial completion ofcollectivization by the end of the five-year plan in 1932. The 
pace of collectivization outlined in the decision took into accountthe diversity of conditons in different r
egions of the country and the extent to which the peasants were prepared to enter thekolkhozes. It wa
s noted that collectivization in such major grain-growing areas as the lower and middle Volga regions 
and theNorthern Caucasus could be basically completed by autumn 1930 or spring 1931. The decisio
n emphasized the need tocombat all attempts to delay the development of the kolkhoz movement on t
he grounds of shortages of tractors and complexmachines. At the same time, the Central Committee 
warned party organizations against any “decreeing” of the kolkhozmovement from above.
In the winter of 1929–30 in the race to achieve rapid rates of collectivization, violations of the principle 
of voluntary entry intothe kolkhoz were committed. Often, communes were established instead of artel
s. In some cases, middle peasants weresubjected to dekulakization. Excesses and distortions provok
ed dissatisfaction among the peasantry, who began to slaughtercattle on a massive scale. The hastily 
formed kolkhozes had no stability and quickly fell apart.
The Communist Party and Soviet government took decisive steps to correct the situation in the countr
yside. In the secondhalf of February 1930 the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued instr
uctions that undue haste in carrying outcollectivization was impermissible, that dekulakization must be 
stopped where total collectivization had not yet begun, andthat special consideration must be given to 
local conditions in the national republics. On Mar. 14, 1930, the CentralCommittee of the ACP(B) ado
pted a resolution, On the Struggle Against Distortions of the Party Line in the KolkhozMovement, whic
h had an enormous influence on the development of collectivization. In August 1930 the kolkhozes inc
luded21.4 percent of peasant households. State aid to the kolkhozes was increased. By the end of 19
30, the kolkhozes surpassedthe individually owned farms in area cultivated and in yield and were able 
to provide their members with more grain and otherproducts than the individual farmers had. This help
ed to change the attitude of the mass of the peasants toward the kolkhoz.
In Soviet history 1930 has gone down as the year when socialism unfurled an offensive on all fronts. 
The essence of theoffensive in agriculture was the formation of production cooperatives among the pe
asantry and the liquidation, on that basis,of the last exploiting class, the kulaks. Total collectivization a
nd the development of the sovkhozes created the necessarymaterial base for replacing the agricultura
l products provided by kulak households with the products of the kolkhozes andsovkhozes, making th
e liquidation of the kulaks as a class economically possible. Total collectivization was accompanied by
a bitter class struggle in the countryside. The kulaks actively resisted the formation of kolkhozes, terro
rized and even killedactivists in the kolkhoz movement, ruined equipment, slaughtered livestock, and 
burned down buildings. In the course ofcollectivization the kulaks were expropriated.
The Sixteenth Congress of the ACP(B), which was held in 1930, evaluated the results of the first stag
e of total collectivizationand made plans for the next stage. The resolutions of the congress declared t
hat the basic conditions for the furtherdevelopment of collectivization were broad organizational, mate
rial, and financial aid to the kolkhozes, the organization of theMTS (machine and tractor station) syste
m, the training of kolkhoz cadres, the strengthening of the kolkhozes, and increasedproduction by the
m.
The joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the ACP(B), which wa
s held in December1930, resolved that the basic collectivization of agriculture (that is, the bringing of 
at least 80 percent of the peasantry intokolkhozes) would be completed in 1931 in the Northern Cauc
asus, the lower and middle Volga regions, and the stepperegions of the Ukrainian SSR. In the other g
rain-growing regions, the kolkhozes were to include 50 percent of thehouseholds, and in the consumi
ng regions, 20–25 percent of the grain-growing households. In the cotton-growing and sugar-beet-
growing regions and, on the average, in all branches of agriculture throughout the country, at least 50 
percent of thepeasant households were to be drawn into the kolkhozes.
By June 1931 there were 211,000 kolkhozes made up of 13 million peasant households (52.7 percent
). The June 1931Plenum of the Central Committee observed that “the kolkhoz peasant has already be
come the central figure in agricultureand the kolkhoz has become the main  producer not only of grain 
but also of the most important agricultural rawmaterials”(KPSS ν  rezoliutsiiakh, 8th ed., vol. 4, 1970, p
. 526).
The successes in collectivization and in the organizational and economic consolidation of the first kolk
hozes were achievedowing to the creation of a strong tractor and agricultural machinery industry in th
e USSR. Assembly-line production ofwheeled tractors was organized in 1924 at the Krasnyi Putilovets 
Plant (now the Leningrad Kirov Plant). Other tractor plantswere put into operation in Stalingrad in 193
0, in Kharkov in 1931, and in Cheliabinsk in 1933. When collectivization was firstundertaken, tractors f
or Soviet agriculture came primarily from abroad, but in 1932 the USSR stopped importing tractors.Du
ring the first five-year plan alone (1929–32), Soviet agriculture was equipped with 153,900 tractors, of 
which 94,300 weremade in the USSR. At the same time, major agricultural machinery plants were est
ablished, such as the Rostsel’mash Plantin Rostov-on-Don, which began production in 1930, and the 
Kommunar Combine Plant in Zaporozh’e, which opened in1931.The opening of these plants made it p
ossible to reequip the kolkhozes and sovkhozes during collectivization. In 1932,148,000 tractors (15-
horsepower units) and 14,000 combine harvesters were being used in Soviet agriculture, and in 1940,
648,000 tractors and 182,000 combine harvesters.
In 1929 the government established the MTS system, which played an extremely important organizati
onal role in the strugglefor the socialist reorganization of rural life and in strengthening the alliance bet
ween the working class and the peasantry. Formany years the MTS system served the production an
d technology needs of the kolkhozes and helped them to strengthenthe socialized economy. Numerou
s cadres specializing in the mechanization of agriculture were trained in the MTS system.(See Table 2 
on the course of collectivization in the USSR.)

Table 2. Collectivization of agriculture in the USSR

year Percentage  of  households  collectivized  as  of  July 

1
1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1

1927 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8

1928 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7

1929 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.9

1930 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.6

1931 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52.7

1932 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.5

1937 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93.0

1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96.9

1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99.6

“The introduction in the Soviet countryside of large-scale socialist farming meant a great  revolution  in 

economic  relations,  inthe entire  way of life  of  the peasantry. Collectivization forever delivered the co
untryside from kulak bondage, from classdifferentiation, ruin, and poverty. The real solution of the eter
nal peasant question was provided by Lenin’s cooperative plan”(Program of the  CPSU, 1972, p. 14).
During collectivization the rational organizational forms of production, labor, accounting, and distributi
on were clarified. Inevaluating the experience of the kolkhozes an important role was played by all-
Union conferences on the organization ofproduction and labor in the kolkhoz (1931–32), whose recom
mendations laid the basis for the resolutions of the SixthCongress of Soviets of the USSR in March 19
31. Also important were the decision on the organizational and economicconsolidation of the kolkhoze
s, which was issued on Feb. 4, 1932, by the Central Committee of the ACP(B), and the First All-Union 
Congress of Kolkhoz Shock Workers in 1933. As a result, the basic principles and forms of kolkhoz or
ganization andlabor accounting were arrived at, including permanent work brigades and the piecewor
k system, with labor costs andremuneration determined on the workday unit (trudoden ’ ).
As early as January 1933 a joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commissio
n of the ACP(B) notedthat problems of great importance in the country’s agriculture had been solved. 
For example, the kulaks had been liquidated,the roots of capitalism had been extirpated, thus ensurin
g the victory of socialism in the countryside, and the kolkhozes hadbecome a solid support for socialis
t construction. Socialist enterprises (kolkhozes and sovkhozes) were producing the bulk ofalmost all ty
pes of agricultural produce, and in fact, the socialist system had become the only form of organization 
in Sovietagriculture. The Model Regulations for the Agricultural Artel adopted by the Second All-Union 
Congress of Kolkhoz ShockWorkers in 1935 generalized and gave legal form to the new relations in t
he countryside, establishing the legal foundationsfor the kolkhoz sector of the economy and the main 
principles for the orgaization of production and public life in thekolkhozes. With the adoption of the ne
w regulations by the kolkhozes (1935–36), the kolkhoz system became fullyestablished. A new class
—the kolkhoz peasantry—was formed, and gradually the new psychology of the peasant-worker o
fsocialist society took shape. The socialist transformation of agriculture opened the way for increased 
agricultural output andfor a steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of the p
easantry.
The kolkhoz system that was created through the collectivization of agriculture made it possible to sup
ply the army and thepopulation with food and industry with raw materials without interruption during th
e Great Patriotic War (1941–45). Becauseof the kolkhoz system the damage done to agriculture durin
g the war was quickly repaired, and the 1940 level of productionwas matched as early as 1949.
Between 1949 and 1950 a collectivization policy was implemented in the western parts of the Ukraine, 
Byelorussia, andMoldavia and in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had become part of the USSR 
before the war.
In the early 1950’s a great deal of work was done to strengthen the kolkhozes organizationally by com
bining them into largerunits. As a result, the number of kolkhozes decreased, but their economic powe
r increased. Thus, in 1950 there were123,700 kolkhozes in the country; in 1953, 93,000; and in 1971, 
32,800.
The kolkhozes and sovkhozes have demonstrated their viability through many years of experience an
d development. Theyhave accumulated a great deal of experience in large-scale mechanized agricult
ural production. Contemporary kolkhozes arelarge-scale agricultural enterprises equipped with advan
ced technology and provided with skilled cadres. Guaranteedminimum payments for labor have been i
ntroduced in the kolkhozes, and a pension insurance system has been establishedfor older, retired m
embers. Intensive agricultural production, mechanization, electrification, and the use of chemicals hav
efundamentally changed the conditions of labor, so that they now approximate the conditions of labor 
in industry. In 1970 morethan 2 million skilled machine operators and approximately 400,000 specialis
ts with higher or secondary education wereworking on the kolkhozes.
The Third All-Union Congress of Kolkhoz Workers, which was held in 1969, discussed important probl
ems related to thefurther development of the kolkhozes and to the acceleration of the increase in agri
cultural production. The congress adoptednew Model Regulations for the Kolkhozes, which reflected t
he great social and economic changes that had taken place in thekolkhoz village since the Second Co
ngress of Kolkhoz Shock Workers. The regulations marked a new stage in thedevelopment of the kolk
hoz system and pointed the way toward developing kolkhoz democracy, improving the forms andmeth
ods of management in the socialized economy, making the kolkhozes more economical, and making 
better use of theland, the chief means of production in agriculture.
Collectivization in the USSR was the first socioeconomic effort in the world aimed at fundamentally ch
anging the conditionsof labor and existence and the entire way of life of many millions of peasants. Fr
om a political point of view the kolkhozsystem strengthened the Soviet state and its main foundation— 
the alliance between the workers and peasants. From aneconomic point of view, it made it possible to 
develop agriculture on a modern industrial basis. From a social point of view, itfreed the toiling peasan
try from exploitation and poverty and made possible the establishment in the countryside of a newsyst
em of social relations, which will lead to the complete transcendence of class differences in Soviet soc
iety. Thus, thekolkhoz system contains vast potential for developing the productive forces of the count
ryside, transforming agricultural laborinto a variety of industrial labor, and overcoming the essential di
stinctions between town and countryside. The collectivizationof agriculture has created the necessary 
conditions for the transition from socialism to communism.
By putting into practice Lenin’s cooperative plan, the CPSU achieved a fundamental revolution in the 
age-old economicorder, way of life, and consciousness of millions and millions of peasants. The victor
y of the kolkhoz system in the USSR hasworldwide historical significance, for the experience of the so
cialist transformation of Soviet agriculture in the USSR has beencreatively applied in the other socialis
t countries, as well as in developing countries following a noncapitalist path. The idea ofestablishing c
ooperatives has also become very attractive to the toiling peasants in capitalist countries, encouragin
g them tointensify the revolutionary struggle for emancipation from the yoke of the monopolies.
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