Criminal Law in General

a. Crime - is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law forbidding or commanding it.
b. Criminal law - branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their punishment.
c. Sources of Philippine Criminal Law
Note: court decisions are not sources of criminal law because they merely explain the meaning of, and apply the law as enacted by the legislative branch of the government.
c.1. RPC
c.2. Special Penal Laws
c.3. Presidential Decrees issued during martial law
d. P v. Santiago: The State has the authority under its police power to define and punish crimes
d.1. Limitations on the power of the lawmaking body to enact penal legislation
d.1.1. No ex post facto law shall be enacted
d.1.1.1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
d.1.1.2. aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was, when committed
d.1.1.3. changes the punishment and inflicts greater punishmen than the law annexed to the crime when committed
d.1.1.4. alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense.
d.1.1.5. deprives a person accused of acrime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal or a proclamation ofamnesty.
d.1.2. No bill of attainder shall be enacted (inflicts punishment without trial - P v. Ferrer)
d.1.3. Art. 3, Sec . 14 (1) - due process in criminal proceedings
e. Constitutional rights of the accused
e.1. Art. 3, Sec . 16 - speedy disposition of cases
e.2. Art. 3, Sec . 13 - right to bail
e.3. Art. 3, Sec . 14 (2) - right to be presumed innocent, etc.
e.4. Art. 3, Sec . 17- right against self-incrimination
e.5. Art. 3, Sec . 19 (1) - right against excessive fines and cruel punishment
e.6. Art. 3, Sec . 21 - right against double jeopardy
e.7. Art. 3, Sec. 11 - right to legal assistance
e.8. Art. 3, Sec. 14 (2) - right to be heard, right to be informed of the nature and accusation against him (cannot be waived), right to speedy trial, right to compulsory attendance of witnesses and production of
evidence,right to meet the witnesses face-to-face
f. Statutory rights of an accused under Sec. 1 of Rule 115
f.1. right to appeal
f.2. right to cross-examine the witness
g. Characteristics of Criminal Law
g.1. General - criminal law is binding on all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine territory (Art. 14, NCC)
g.1.1. P v. Galacgac: American citizen argued that he should not be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms because it is granted in their constitution; SC: No foreigner enjoys in this country
extra-territorial right to be exempted from its laws and jurisdiction, with the exceptionof head of states; it has general jurisidction to punish persons for offenses committed within its
territory,regardless of the nationality of the offender.
g.1.2. US v. Sweet: Si A US army nga naka base sa Pinas, naka comit ug physical injuries against POW, he argued that he should not be troed in Phil.courts kay US armyman siya; SC: No, ang jurisdiction sa court is not affected by the military character of the accused.
g.1.3. Valdez v. Lucero: Ang civil courts kay naay concurrent jurisdiction with court martial over AFP soldiers (even in times of war)
g.1.3.1. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff: if ang military court takes cognizance of the case, RPC or other penal law will not apply but Articles of War.
g.1.3.2. Jurisdiction of military courts (Sec. 1, RA 7055): Members of AFP, reservists, Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU) who commits crimes penalized under the RPC, SPL or oridnances, which are service-connected
g.1.3.3. Cantos v. Styer: offenders accused of war crimes are triable by military commission
g.1.3.4. Marcos and Concordia v. Chief of Staff: the prosecution of an accused before a court martial is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
g.1.4. Exceptions to the general application of criminal law:
g.1.4.1. Treaties or treaty stipulations
g.1.4.1.1. Military Base Agreement (1947) - the Philippines consents that the US have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the following offenses:
g.1.4.1.1.1. any offense committed by any person within any base. . . . . .
g.1.4.1.1.2. any offense committed committed outside of the base by any member of the USAF . . . .
g.1.4.1.1.3. any offense committed committed outside of the base by any member of the USAF against the security of US . . . .
g.1.4.1.2. VFA (1998)
 g.1.4.1.2.1. US has jurisdiction within the Philippines over criminal casescommitted by US personnel
g.1.4.1.2.2. US has jurisdiction within the Philippines over cases relating to security against the US
g.1.4.1.2.3. US has jurisidiction: 1. against the property or security of US or its personnel; 2. any offenses done in performance of duty
g.1.4.2. Law of preferential application
g.1.4.2.1. RA 75: ambassador, public minister, or domestic servant of the ambassador or the public minister is immune from arrest, imprisonment or his goods/chattel be seized (3 years imprisonment)
g.1.4.2.2. Exceptions: 1. domestic servant is a Filipino; 2. domestic servant is not registered with DFA; 3. country has no same protection
g.1.4.3. Exempted under international law
g.1.4.3.1. Sovereign - kings and queens
g.1.4.3.2. Chief of state - president
g.1.4.3.3. ambassadors - representative of one head of state to another
Note: A consul (commercial representative of a foreign nation) is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister.
g.1.4.3.4. ministers plenipotentiary - an Envoy is a diplomatic representative with full authority to represent the government
g.1.4.3.5. minister resident - a government official required to take up permanent residence in another country. A representative of his government, he officially has diplomatic functions which are often seen as a form of indirect rule.
g.1.4.3.6.charges d' affaires - is a diplomat who heads an embassy in the absence of the ambassador
g.2. Territorial - criminal laws undertake to punish crimes committed within the Philippine territory; enforceableonly within the Phil. Territory (see Art. 1 of the 1987 Consti for the Phil. Territory)

g.2.1. Exception is Art. 2 of RPC

g.3. Prospective - a penal law cannot make an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when committed. As provided in Art. 366 of the RPC, crimes are punished under the laws in fore at the time of their commission.
Note: Please see Art. 22 for the explanation
h. Construction of penal laws
h.1. US v. Santos - Penal laws are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (only where the law is ambiguousand there is doubt of its interpretation, P v.Gatchalian)
h.2. P v. Manaba - Spanish text is controlling because it was approved by the legislature in its Spanish text.

Preliminary Title (Act 3815)

a. History of RPC- old penal code took effect on July 14, 1887 and was in force up to December 31, 1931; RPC was approved on December 8, 1930 and took effect on January 1, 1932

Art. 1. Time when Act takes effect (RPC is based mainly on principles of the classical school)
a. 2 theories in criminal law
a.1. Classical- basis of criminal liability is human free will (has the choice good or evil); purpose of penalty is retribution because penalty must fit the crime;
a.2. Positivist- man is constraint by a morbid phenomenon to commit wrong; penalty must fit the criminal because the law cannot treat him but by psychiatrist or social scientists.

Art. 2. Application of its provisions

a. RTC has jurisdiction
1. When the offender should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
1.1. although outside of Phil. Territory- still can be tried in our jurisidiction
1.1.1. must be registered under the BOC but under RA 9295 MARINA has the duty to register the vessel; for airship is CAAP
1.1.2. registration of the vessel not the citizenship of the owner that controls if not registerd Art. 2 will not apply
1.2. Rules as to jurisidction over crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel:
1.2.1. French Rule - such crimes are not triable in our court unless it affects the peace and security of the territory or thesafety of the state is endangered.
1.2.2. English Rule - such crimes are triable in that country unless they merely affect things within the vessel or they refer to the internal management thereof (observed by Phils.)
1.2.2.1. US v.Fowler- if the foreign merchant vessel is in the high seas - we have no jurisidiction but in….
 1.2.2.2. US v. Bull - has jurisdiction if it is a continuing offense (failing to provide stalls for animals in transit from Formosa (Taiwan) to Phils.) regardless while it was committed in high seas.
1.2.2.3. US v. Bull - offenses committed on board a foreign merchant vessel while on Philippine waters is triable before our court.
1.2.2.4. P v.Wong Cheng: Philippine courts have jurisdiction over crime ofhomicide on board a foreign merchant vessel by a meber of the crew against another.
1.2.2.5. US v. Look Chaw: mere possession of opium aboard a foreign merchant vessel in transit is not riable in Philippine courts because it does not constitute a breach of public order,
however, when the tins of opium are landed from the vessel on the Philippine soil, our courts has jurisdiction over it. Landing or using opium is an open violation of the laws of the Philippines.
1.2.2.6. P v. Wong Cheng: Here the foreign merchant vesselis anchored in the Phil. waters - smoking opium constitutes a breach of public order because our law against drugs protects the inhabitants against the effects of drugs and
1.3. Warships
1.3.1. Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over offenses committed on board foreign warships in territorial waters because they are an extension of the territory of the foreign country
2. When the offender should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippines or obligations and securities issued by the government.
2.1 thus any person who violates Art. 163 and Art. 166 (forgery of bank notes) even in a foreign country may be prosecuted before our courts
3. When the offender should be liable for atcs connected with the introduction into the Philippines of the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number.
3.1. because it is dangerous to the economical interest of our country.
4. When the offender while being a public officer or employee should commit an offense in the execise of his functions.
4.1 Crimes involved- bribery, malversation, flasification and etc.
5. When the offender should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations
b. Extra-territorial application of RA 9372

Title 1: Felonies and Circimstances Which Affect Criminal Liability

Chapter 1: Felonies (Note: there are 3 classes of crimes - 1. dolo; 2. culpa; 3. SPL (mala prohibita)
Art. 3. Definitions
1. That there must be an act or omission
a. P v. Gonzales: The act refered to is any bodily movement ending to produce some effect in the external world, it being unnecessary that the same be actually produced, as the possibility of its production is sufficient.
but the act must be one which is defined under the RPC or at least an overt act of that felony, that is, an external act which has direct connection with the felony intended to be committed.
a.1. only external act is punished because internal acts are beyond the sphere ofpenal law.
b. By omission is meant inaction, the failure toperform a positive duty which one is bound to do.
b.1. ex.: Art. 275 (1); Art. 213 par. 2 (b); Art. 116
b.2. There must be a law requiring the doing or performance of an act.
b.3. P v. Silvestre and Atienza: the omission must be punishable by law; if you do not report an incident/crime, you cannot be criminally liable.
2. That the act or omission must be punishable by the RPC
a. based on the maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege" - there is no crime where there is no law punishing it.
3. That the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa
a. Either the act or omission is dolo or culpa, the law presumed it at it was done voluntarily.
b. Reasons why the act/omissionmust be voluntary - 1. human free will under Classical School; 2. man is a rational being
3.1. Dolo - in intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious; he has the intention to cause an injury to the person, property or right of another.
a. Requisites of Dolo/Malice:
a.1. Freedom - without it, he is no longer a human being but a tool; ang taw mura ra siya ug utsilyo nga maoy nakasamad; or yawe nga maoy gigamit pag-abli sa pirtahan para kawat...
a.2. Intelligence - without this, morality of human acts cannot be determined.
a.3. Intent - being a mental process, it is presumed and the presumption arises from the unlawful act.
Note: Criminal intent is necessary in feloniescommitted by means of dolo because the legal maxims:
"actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea "- the act itself does not make amman guilty unless hisintention were so
"actus me invito factus non est meus actus" - an act done be me against my will is not my act (US v. Ah Chong)
a.3.1. Soriano v. P: The existence of intent is shown by the overt acts of a person; Facts: Si A nangawat ug butang gitagoan niya and gi-deny niya nga naa niya = presumed withintent to gain
a.3.2. P v. Sia Teb Ban: Si A nangawat ug relo then gifilan ug kaso nga theft, iya defense is ang prosecution failed to prove that he had intent to gain; SC: Sayop ka! from the felonious act
of unlawful taking,you executed it freely and voluntarily, thus in the absence of evidence to the contrary the presumption ofintent arises conclusively.
a.3.3. US v. Catolico - Presumption will not arise if the act is not unlawful: Si A kay judge. Naa siyay gi-decidan nga case (breach of contract so damages), si C (defendant sa civil case) ni-appeal and gi-parequire ni A nga modeposit ug bond
but ang surety company insolvent diay so gi-paresent ug another bond but si C failed to so in the proper time, so si A, gi-dismiss niya ang case and ordered nga ang bond e-attach as
maoy payment for damages; karon gi-filan si A ug malversation….; SC: the act of A was not unlawful because he acted in good faith under the belief that he acted correctly;
a.3.4. US v. Catolico - The act of a person does not make him a criminal, unless his mind be criminal; the maxim is: actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - a crime is notcommitted if the mind of the person performing to act complained be innocent.
a.3.5. US v. Mendoza: Intent to kill is difficult to prove but it can be deduced from the external acts performed by a person.
a.3.6. The presumption of criminal intent from the commission of an unlawful act may be rebutted by proof of lack of such intent.
a.3.6.1. P v. Taneo - somnambulism and killed his wife - not criminally liable because he had nointent his acts were not voluntary
a.3.6.3. P v. Formaran: Si A ni-sumpa sa CSC form thru notary public na wala siyay kaso pending but naa diay (unjust vexation) so gi-filan siya ug perjury, iya defense is iya gi "NO" lay
engon man ang fiscal ngaang UV is not involving moral turpitude; SC: the NO answer is an error of judgment and did not indicate an intention to commit perjury.
a.3.7. Mistake of fact - is a misapprehension of facts on the part of the person who caused injury to another (no criminal liability); destroys the presumption of criminal intent
Note: Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith; but ignorance or mistake of fact relieves the accused from criminal liability
a.3.7.1. Requisites of MOF as a defense:
a.3.7.1.1. That the act done would have been lawful(not a felony) had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
a.3.7.1.1.1. In MOF,the act done by the accused would have constituted:
a.3.7.1.1.1.1. a justifying circumstance under Art. 11
a.3.7.1.1.1.1.1. US v. Ah Chong: Si A kay cook. Hadlokan siya anang mga bad elements. Before siya matug iya alihan ang door ug chair. Nakamata siya kay naay mo-try ug
open sa dor, ug nag ask siya kaduha. Kinsa na?, pero walay nitubag, ninaog siya sa iyang higdaanan ug niengon ug balik, if mosud gani ka, patyon tika, but pag-engon niya
naigo siya sa chair nga gi-ali gatuo siya nga gi-atake siya so iya gikuha ang kutsilyo ug gi strike niya ang intruder nga iya diay ka board mate; SC: MOF; ufg tinuod pato ang
pagtuoni Ah Chong ma fall unta to ug self-defense (discuss the requisites and relate the same to the facts)
a.3.7.1.1.1.1.2. US v. Bautista - No crime of resistance when there is MOF; Facts: Ni sukol siya while gi-arresto siya kay nagtuo siya nga mga rebelde ang gadakop niya but after nag-paila nga pulis nisubmit dayon.
a.3.7.1.1.1.2. an absolutory cause
a.3.7.1.1.1.3. an involuntary act
a.3.7.1.1.1.3.1. Nagtuo siya nga legal ang order...P v. Beronilla - Si A is major sa Army, naka reciv siya ug order sa iya comander nga kasuhan si B for treason ug mag appoint ug 12 ka taw nga maoy mohukom ni B, ang mga
jurado nakadecide nga sad-an si B ang recommendation sa jury is patyon si B as approved daw sa HQ, so si A gipatay niya si B, karon gikasohan siya ug murder, illegal diay ang order;
as a military subordinate, he could not question the orders of his superior, he obeyed in GF without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence; SC: Acquitted.
criminal intent was not established no negligence also.
a.3.7.1.2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful; and
a.3.7.1.2.1. Thus in error in personae, the principle of MOF will not apply.
a.3.7.1.3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.
a.3.7.1.3.1. P v. Oanis: Si Oanis kay Hepe sa pulis, gimandoan sila nga dakpon ang nag-ngalan ug Balagtas, usa ka notorious criminal ug eskapo nga piniriso and if ma-overpower
gani sila kwaon dead or alive. Pag-abot nila sa balay, nilahos sila sa usa ka kwarto and nakakita ug usa ka taw nga natulog nga nagkub, so ila girakrakan without ascertaining his
identity. Ang namatay diay kay si Tecson innocente nga taw; SC: Murder, even if it be true that the victim was a notorious criminal the killing would not be justififed;
apprehending even the most notorious criminal the law does not permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive is determined to fight the officers of the law who are
trying tocapture him that killing him would be justififed.
a.3.7.1.3.1.1. Ah Chong and Oanis case distinguished - AC = no fault or carelessness because there was no time or opportunity to make any further inquiry and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately; O = they had ample time to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves and could even effect a bloodless arrest because the victim
was unarmed, they were not pressed to act immediately.
a.3.7.1.3.2. P v. De Fernando: When the accused is negligent, MOF is not a defense; Facts: Si A gi-inform nga naay 3 ka convicts nga naka-escapo. While padung siya uli unya dark,
nakakita siya ug usa ka taw nga nisaka sa hagdan sa usa ka balay gadala ug sundang while naay gitawag sa sud sa balay (kita si A nga naay babaye, anak sa tag-iya). Nagpasalba si A kay gatuo siya nga usa siya sa mga eskapo
and si B nipadayon ug saka sa hagdan, but gipusil ni A ang namatay diay kay pag-umangkon sa tag-iya sa balay; SC: Homicide thru reckless negligence. The victim called for
someone in the house. That fact indicated that he was known to the owner of the house. He should have inquired first to the daughter of the owner of the identity of the victim.
a.3.8. Distinction between general and specific intent; GI = 3rd element of dolo; SI = particular felonies,proof of specific intent is required, i.e., Property - gain, homicide - kill, abduction - lewd designs
a.3.9. INTENT VS. MOTIVE - M = is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result; I = is the purpose touse a particular means to effect such result; M = not an
essential element of crime hence need not be proved for purposes of conviction.
a.3.9.1. KANUS-A IMPORTANTE ANG MOTIVE?
a.3.9.1.1. Motive is relevant when the identity of aperson accused of having committed a crime is in dispute.
a.3.9.1.2. Motive is important in ascertaining the truth between 2 antagonistic theories or versions of the killing.
a.3.9.1.3. Where the identification of th accused proceeds from an unreliable source and the testimony is inconclusive and not free from doubt, evidence of motive is necessary.
a.3.9.1.4. Where there are no eyewitness to the crime and where suspicion is likely to fall upona number of persons, motive is relevant.
a.3.9.1.5. If the evidence is merely circumstantial, proof of motive is essential.
a.3.9.2. KANUS-A DILI IMPORTANTE ANG MOTIVE?
a.3.9.2.1. Where the defendant admits the killing, it is no longer necessary toinquire into his motive for doing the act.
a.3.9.2.2. It is immaterial when the accused has been positively identified.
a.3.9.3. UNSAON PAG-PROVE ANG MOTIVE? It is established by the testimony of witnesses or the statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of thecrime.
 a.3.9.4. PROOF OF MOTIVE DILI SUFICIENT PARA MACONVICT - P v. Pisalvo: Even a strong motive to commit the crime cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence.
a.3.9.5. IF WALAY MOTIVE, AIDS THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED -P v.Taneo: katong somnambulism gipatay niya iya asawa nga love kaayo niya….
3.2. Culpa - in culpable felonies,the act or omission of the offender is not malicious; the injury caused by the offender to another person is unintentional/without malice; the wrongful act result from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
Note: Reason for punishing acts of negligence - 1. a man must use his common sense; 2. man must be cautious,carefuland prudent; because he is responsible for such results otherwise his own
person, rights and property and those of his fellow beings would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
1. Freedom
2. Intelligence
3. He is imprudent, negligent, lacks foresight or lack of skill
a. Imprudence - is a deficiency of action; negligence - is a deficiency of perception
b. US v. Divino: A person who caused an injury without intention to cause an evil, maybe held liable for culpable felony; Facts: Si A dili doctor or nurse, gihigot ang babaye, giputos ang iya teel ug trapo nga gi-humol ug gas human gidagkutan as a result naka-caus
kay para maau ang ulcer sa baye and was made in good faith to the best of his ability; SC: SPI resulting to imprudence
c. P v. Lopez: Acts executed negligently are voluntary even without malice; Facts: Si A nakaligis ug bata nga nilabang sa street while nagdrive siya; engon siya I had no intent of causing injury
thus dili ko liable; SC: RI resulting in homicide; walay nagpugos nimo nga ligsan siya or walay nagpugong nimo sa paglikay nga di ka makaligis niya...
d. KELANGAN WALA GITUYO - P v. Guillen: Gi-etsa ang granada para mamatay ang presidente pero ang namatay kay mga civilian, iya intent is patyon ang President but engon niya wala daw
diference if mamatay ang mga civilian nga nakapalibot sa Pres kaymura ra gihapon ug na-attain niya ang iya purpose; SC: Dili siya liable for Homicide thru reckless negligence sa pagpatay sa
mga civilian because the throwing of hand grenade at the President with the intent of killing him, he acted with malice, he is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act;
in criminal negligence the injury caused to another should be unintentional.
e. MISTAKE IN IDENTITY IS NOT RECKLESS IMRUDENCE - P v. Guillen
f. NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY IF THERE IS NO FAULT OR MALICE - US v. Catangay: Facts: 3 ka taw, si A, B ug C kay naghunt ug deer. Si B nagbutang ug sulo nga naka-atach sa iya ulo. Si A ug C
nagsunod niya. Kita sila ug deer. Ang pusil ni C is naka-cock na daan and gition sa deer ug napandol sa usa ka canal. Ang iyang pusil, kay naa accidentally discharged nga maoy nakaigo ug nakapatay ni B;
SC: Not criminally liable because he was not negligent and had no intent; the act of aiming the gun at the deer while hunting is lawful, it not being prohibited by law; but discharging a gun at public place is unlawful, thus, if there is injury as a result of discharge, h
3.3. Special Penal Law
a. IF SPL, DOLO (INTENT) IS NOT REQUIRED - US v. Go Chico: It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
a.1. DISTINCTION - Intent to commit the crime = there must be criminal intent; intent to perpetrate the act = it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
a.2. ELECTION GUN BAN - P v. Bayona: Nagdala siya ug gun sa electoral precinct, and nadakpan sa pulis; SC: Although he had no intent to intimidate any elector but when he carried the gun
in a polling place, he committed the act complained of wilfully; Election Code prohibits and punishes the carrying of a firearm inside the polling place.
b. REASON WHY IT IS PROHIBITED - US v. Go Chico: Facts: Si A kay gi-chargan ug violation sa Act 1696 (displaying flag usd by previous insurrection); SC: Liable, reasons: 1. the display of aflag
tends to incite resistance against the govt., 2. when the doing of the act is prohibited by a special law,it is considered that the act is injurious to public welfare and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
c. GOOD FAITH AND ABSENCE OF CRIMINAL INTENT ARE NOT VALID DEFENSES - P v. Orquijo: Unlicensed firearm (in my own opinion: GF because he borrowed it and assumed it that it was licensed)
c.1. Exceptions: In these cases, the accused had no license to possess firearms, but in view of the facts and circumstances, the absence of intent to violate the law was considered in their favor.
c.1.1. GI-AUTHORIZED SA MAYOR - P v. Landicho: Mga PC niadto sa balay ni A ug nag-ask if naa ba siyay UFA,si A ni-engon nga naa siyay usa ka UFA kay wala pa niya naturn-over sa Mayor kay naay
program nga e-collect ang mga loose firearms. Gipakita pud niya ang letter of authority ni Mayor sa mga PC; SC: Not liable, to implement the policy of the govt. on loose firearms,it is
imperative that the person collecting must have temporary and incidental possession, for how can one collect and deliver without temporarilylaying his hands onthe firearms?
c.1.2. CIVILIAN GUARDS - P v. Asa and Balbastro: Limpyo iyang pagtoo nga as civilian guard sa usa ka konsehal (dakog rank sa civilian guard organization).
c.1.3. CIVILIAN SECRET AGENT - P v. Lucero: Si A kay gi-appoint as civilian confidential agent entrusted nga e-surveillance ug e-capture ang mga wanted person and gi-authorize nga mag carry ug revolver
d. MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA DISTINGUISHED - MIS = are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation; MP = violations of mere rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulations of the affairs of the society; MIS = intent governs; MP = the only inquiry is has the law been violated?; MIS = regers generally to
felonies defined under RPC; MP = generally to acts made criminal by SPL
d.1. MALA IN SE BASTA IMMORAL ANG ACT EVEN SPl - P v. Sinco: Si A kay election inspector ang iyang duty is to ebalhin niya ang sobra nga mga voters sa other precincts. Daghanmga voters
wala naapil sa lista sa new precinct and as a result wala sila ka votar. Karon gi-filan siya ug kaso for violation of Election Law. Iya defense is ang omission was in good faith but ang court ni-
decide nga liable siya kay what he violated was a special law and GF is not a defense; SC: NO, Not MP but mala in se. The omission isnotonly wrong becauseit is prohibited but it is wrong
per se because it disenfranchise a voter and violates one of hisfundamental rights. It was not shown that the accused intentionally omitted or failed to include in the registry list of voters.

Art. 4. Criminal Liability

Par. 1 Requisites: (P v. Ural: Rationale - "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" he who is the cause of the ause is the cause of the evil caused)
1. That an intentional felony has been committed; and
a. LIABLE KA SA TANAN MAHITABO - One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
a.1. RAPE AND NAMATAY ANG BIKTIMA - P v. Mariano: Gi-rape ang 6 years old and namatay as a result kay naparok iya ulo sa cemento while nisukol siya; SC: Accused is liable for the death even without hisintention beause he performed a felony (rape).
b. the act committed must be an intentional felony, if culpa go to Art. 365.
 b.1. GI-IBOT ANG SUNDANG KAY GANAHAN LANG SIYA MOTAN-AW - US v. Villanueva: Unya pag-ibot kay nagunitan sa tag-iya ang blade sa sundang kay iya gipugngan; SC: Not liable for
physical injuries caused because there is no provision in the RPC which punishes the act of snatching the property of another just to satisfy the curiosity.
b.2. NA-AMONG ANG LAIN TAW PAG-INILOGAY SA SUNDANG - P v. Bindoy: Nag-inom sa tubaan, si A gitagayan niya ug tuba ang asawa ni C but nibalibad so iya githreat. Ni-abot si C para
defensa-an iya asawa unya gi-atempt ug kuha ang sundang ni A nga iya gidala-dala. Gubot na and nag-inilogay sa sundang, aw niabot si B (chismoso) niduol kay nag check nganong gubot. Na ilog ra gyud
ni A ang sundang kang C and pag-inilogay ang tumoy sa sundang naigo ni B nga naa sa luyo ni A. Si A wala kabalo nga naa diay si B sa luyo; SC: A is not liable because the law allows a person to use
necessary force to retain what belongs to him; if iya pato nasamad si C he would be liable for the death of B because the said act would constitute as a felony (SPI or homicide)
b.3. NADAT-UGAN ANG BABY - P v. Salinas: Si A ug P niadto sa balay ni X kay ang ilang kabayo kay nakaguba sa tanom ni X. Si P gitawag niya si X para mogawas kay iya daw tigbason,
pagkadungog ni X ninaog siya but gigunitan iyang hawak ni A, hantod nagunitan ni A ang leog ni X. Karon niabot si M, asawa ni X nga naa ra sa sala ug gadala ug bata (1 month old) iya gi
bunlot ang kamot ni A but gikuha rapudni A ang kamot ni M nga maoy cause sa pagkatumba ni M and nadat-ugan ang bata and namatay (hemorrhage); SC: A was not liable because 1. A
was just trying to prevent the bloody encounter between his father and X by holding X, and the same is not considered as a crime; 2. the death of the child was not the direct result of the act committed by A.
c. No felony is committed:
c.1. when the act or omission is not punishable by the RPC
c.1.1. Attempting to commit suicide is not a felony under RPC
c.2. when the act is covered by any of the justifying circumstances enumerated under Art. 11
Note: The act of defense or fulfillment of duty must be exercised with due care; otherwise the accused will be liable for culpable felony.
2. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct,natural and logical consequences of the felony committed by the offender.
a. The causes which may produce a result different from that which the offender intended are:
a.1. Mistake in identity (error in personae) - see P v. Oanis
a.2. Mistake in blow (aberratio ictus) - P v. Mabugat: Iya intent nga pusilon is si C but kay dili man hingigo ang naigo kay si B
a.3. injurious result is greater than that intended (praeter intentionem) - P v. Cagoco: Si A walay intent nga patyon si B, iya gi sumbag sa tangkogo and natumba unya iya ulo naigo sa cemento and namatay as a result.
a.3.1. GA SELOS ANG BANA - P v.Tomotorgo: Ang bana nikuha ug kahoy ug gibunalan iya asawa until natumba, nakonsensya gi tabang niya but namatay; SC: parricide
a.3.2. ANG ANAK TAPULAN - P v. Monleon: Gibunalan ang asawa kay nilaban sa anak (wala gilawgan ang kabaw), namatay ang asawa; SC: parricide
a.3.3. NILAYAT PAG TULIS - P v. Page: Tulis sajep and engon sa tulisan nga if mo shagit patyon,karon ang pasahero nilayat and namatay kay naparok sa cemento nga dan; SC: Any person who
creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger which causes the latter to dosomething resultingin the latters injuries,is liable for the resulting injuries; Note: the robber was committing a felony (attempted robbery with intimidation)
b. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury
b.1. PROXIMATE CAUSE - Bataclan v.Medina: that cause whichin natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
b.1.1. NATURAL - refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events; LOGICAL - means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage.
b.1.2. There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the felonious act of the offender and the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim.
b.1.2.1. The cause and effect relationship is not changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim, the concurrent conditions, such as the
negligence or fault of the doctors or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus,pulmonary infection or gangrene.
b.1.3. UNSAON PAG DETERMINE SA PROXIMATE CAUSE - Bataclan v. Medina: Alas 2 sa kadlawn, kusug au ang dagan sa bus and ang atubangan nga ligid ni-buto ang bus nidagan pa zigzag
until nahagbong sa canal and nagtuyok-tuyok. 4 ka pasahero dili ka gawas sa bus. Ang gas ni start na ug leak. Ni-abot ang 10 ka taw nagdala ug sulo giduol ang bus para motabang but ang
kayo kay gidakop sa gasolina as a result nasunog ang bus; Issue: Unsay PC sa death of 4 passengers? Negligence of the driver nga maoy resulta sa pagka-overturn sa bus or katong fire?
SC: PC is the overturning of the bus - 1. the leaking of the gasoline when the bus was overturned is natural or expected; 2. the coming of men with lighted torch was due to the response
for help which was so very dark (2:30 am) and usually in rural areas no flashlight or lantern is available; 3. the coming of men with torch was a natural sequence of the overturning of bus
and the call for help; 4. driver was roaming around and did not cautioned the rescuers of the leak.
b.1.4. The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
b.1.3.1.there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused.
b.1.3.1.1. GILAYATAN SA KABAYO - P v. Rockwell: Gikulata si B ni A and nahigda and analayatan siya sa kabayo as a result namatay siya - SC: active force is the horse jumping
b.1.3.1.2.GISUMBAG BUT ANG CAUSE SA DEATH WAS FEVER NGA USO SA LOCALITY - Pv.Palalon
b.1.3.1.3. IF GIPASAGDAN LANG ANG SAMAD OR SAYOP ANG PAGKA TAMBAL? P v. Morallos: natural consequence; may be an active force but not a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the criminal act.
b.1.3.2. the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.
b.1.3.2.1. ANG SAMAD GITUYO UG HUMOL SA SEPTIC TANK - US V. De los Santos
b.1.3.2.2. IF AT FAULT OR NEGLIGENT ANG INJURED PARTY? 1. US V. Monasterial: exception of natural consequence; 2. US v.Navarro: the fault or carelssness msut be malicious as
when the injured party desires toincrease the criminalliability of the offender.
b.1.5. KANUS-A MA-NATURAL CONSEQUENCE ANG DEATH CAUSED BY PHYSICAL INJURIES - P v. Tammang: Ang bata during sa time of incident kay himsug pa, gibunalan siya sa maestra ug
gi-labay sa poste sa maestra and na-igo iyang dughan, ni-complain siya sa iyang mama nga sakit au iyang pamati and gasuka ug dugo until namatay siya after 3 days; SC: teacher is liable
for homicide - If the following facts are established:
b.1.5.1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were inflicted was in normal health.
 b.1.5.2. That death may be expected from the physical injuries inflicted.
b.1.5.3. That death ensued within a reasonable time.
b.2. In the following cases,the wrongdone is considered the direct,natural and logical consequence of the felony committed:
b.1.1. NALUMOS - US v. Valdez: Gigukod ang biktima ug kutsilyo, nilayat sa sapa nga lawm andnalumoskay dikabalo molangoy.
b.1.2. GIKUHA ANG PLASTER - P v. Quianson: Si B iya gi-kuha ang plaster sa iyang samad nga maoy resulta sa pag developug peritonitis nga maoy cause saiyang death. It appears that the
wound cuased by the accused ni-produce ug grabe kasakit ug restlessness which made the victim remove it.
b.1.3. ANG SUKMAG MAOY EFFICIENT CAUSE OF DEATH - P v. Illustre: Si B kay gi- TB and gisumbag siya ni A sa kilid and as a result nabun-og iyang atay and namatay; SC: Homicide
b.1.4. ANG SUKMAG MAOY NAKAPADALI SA IYA KAMATAYON - P v. Rodriguez: Si B kay naay sakit daan. Gisumbag siya ni A sa buko2 ug tiyan and as a result nihubag iyang spleen and causing his death; SC: Homicide
b.1.5. ANG DINUNG-GABAN MAOY PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH - P v. Reyes: Si B naay sakit sa heart,. Gidung-gab siya ni A but ang kutsilyo naigo sa iya bukog, walanaka penetrate sa chest
cavity but ni produce ug shock (kakugang) nga maoy cause sa death; SC: Liable
b.1.6. WALA NAG-PA-OPERA - US v. Marasigan: Si A kay gidunggab niya si B. Nilihay siya and nasamad iyang kamot. And s a result ang iyang middle finger of the left hand was rendered
useless; SC: The OP is not obliged to submit a surgical opeartion to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime.
b.1.7. ANG SAMAD NA-INFECTED - P v. Red: Si A gitigbas niya si B. Pag-abot niya sa hospital, wala nahutdan ug anti-tetanus and as a result na infected ang samad pag-gawas niya sa ospital;
SC: An accused is liable for all the consequences of hiscats, and theinfection of a wound he has caused is one of the consequences for which he is answerable.
Note: But the infection should not be due to the malicious act of the OP (US v. De los Santos)
b.1.7.1. PAG-AYO SA SAMAD, NAG-INOM UG TUBA - US v. Bayutas: After 58 days naayo na ang samad but si B na-adik sa tuba and as a result na infected; SC: This fact doesnot mitigate the liability of the accused.
b.1.7.2. NAMATAY SA TETANUS - P v. Cornel: Gitigbas and gilabay ug bato. After 1 wek, namatay tungod sa tetanus; SC: liable
b.1.7.3. NI-COMPLICATE AND NAMATAY - P v. Reloj: Gidung-gab ug ice pick and gidala sa ospital and gi-operahan. Paghuman ug opera si B was in the process of recovery but after 5 days
namatay kay naay complications sa iyang tinae (paralysis of the ileum); SC: cause of death was paralysis of the ileum but the accused is responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts.
b.1.8. PAGSUKMAG NAKUYAPAN AND NAMATAY - P v. Luces: Gisumbag ni A si B sa tiyan and nakuyapan. After 5 minutes namatay siya, cause of death was cardiac arrest, A the fist blow
not PC; SC: the blow was the PC, the gravity of the crime does not depend on the more or less violent means used but on the result of the same and if the accused had not ill-treated
the deceased she would not have died. Note: Ill treating without causing injury is a felony under A.266.
c. ANG SUPERVENING EVENT MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF AMENDEMNET OF ORIGINAL INFORMATION - P v. Petilla:
Par. 2. Requisites: Impossible Crime
Note: Purposeof the law in punishing is 1. to suppress the criminal propensity; 2. he has not acommitted a felony but he is a criminal
1.That the act performed would be an offense against persons or property
2. That the act was done with evil intent
a. If he knew that said person is already dead and then he stabbed the dead, no impossible crime because he knew that he cannot cause an injury.
3. That its accomplishment isinherently impossible, or that the means employed is neither inadequate or ineffectual.
a. Inherent impossibility of its accomplishment - there must be either 1. legal impossibility or 2. physical impossibility
a.1. If you shoot a person notknowing it was already dead - there is legal and physical impossibility because the dead is not considered a person; 2. you cannot produce injury of a dead
a.2. If you steal a watch and after taking it you realized that the watch was yours which was lost - there is legal impossibility bec. In theft the property must belong to another
a.3. An employee who knew the combinations of the safe and when he tried to open it, the money was lost
a.4. ANG CHEKE NGA PARA SA COMPANYA KAY GI-DEPOSIT NIYA SA IYANG ACCOUNT - Jacinto v. People: Impossible crime of theft because 1. the check was worthless because it as
dishonored and 2. the felony was not produced because the check was dishonored
a.5. GI TADTAD ANG BALAY UG BALA BUT WALA ANG TUYO NGA PATYON - Intod v. CA: Impossible crime of murder/homicide
b. Employment of inadequate means
b.1. A put an arsenic to the food of B, believing that the small amount will kill him but did not.
b.2. But if the amount was adequate to kill an ordinary person but the victim has developed strong resistance to poison because he has been working in a mine, the crime is frustrated murder.
c. Employment of ineffectual means
c.1. A tried to kill B by putting in his food he thought as arsenic but in fact it was sugar.
c.2. A with intent to kill B aimed his gun at the back of B but he did not know that it was loaded.
4. That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the RPC

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties
Par. 1. is based on the legal maxim - NULLUM CRIMEN, NULLA POENA SINE LEGE
Par. 2. is based on the legal maxim - DURA LEX SEDLEX - requisites:
Note: Does not apply to SPL - mala prohibita
1. The court after trial finds the accused guilty;
 2. The penalty provided by lawand which the court imposes for the crime committed appears to be clearly excessive because:
2.1. the accused acted with lesser degree of malice and/or;
a. NAPATAY NIYA IYANG ASAWA - P v. Monleon: Si A gikulata niya iyang asawa without intent to kill kay gipugngan siya sa iyang asawa nga dili mabunalan iyang anak; SC: Parricide
b. NANGAWAT UG LUBI SA PLANTATION PARA PANG-KAON - P v. Espino: Mag-ama gi-convikto ug QT; SC:
2.2. there is no injury or the injury caused is of lesser gravity.
a. GI-FALSIFY ANG POLICE RECORDS PARA ENGNON NGA WALAY DELAY SA PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION - P v. Cabgsan- SC: there was no injury and lack of malice
3. The court should not suspend the execution of the sentence;
a. NAGPAKILOOY SA KORTE NGA DILI RP ANG PENALTY - P v. Amigo: Courts are not the forum for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity
b. Judge has the duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court even though the doctrine promulgated is gainst his way of reasoning (P v. Santos)
4. The judge should submit a statement to the Chief Executive through the SOJ, recommending executive clemency.
a. NAPATAY SA ASAWA ANG IYANG BANA KAY MANGULATA, SALBAHIS UG PALAHUBOG; SC: The wife is deserving for an executive clemency

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies

Attempted felony Elements:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; requisites:
a. DIRECTLY - suggests that the offender must commence the commission of the felony by taking direct part in the execution of the act
1.1. That there be external acts;
a. Overt acts - a physical activity or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
a.1. PREP V. OVERT ACTS - P = buying poison (even if you will use it in the crime,youmay argue that it is for rats); O = placing the poison on the food intended for the victim
a.2. ANG PAGBUNOT SA PISTOL, IS NOT AN OVERT ACT OF HOMICIDE - P v. Tabago: Si A gibunot niya iya armas pero gigakos siya ni B. So si A iya gi-engnan iya mga kauban nga tirahan si B
but nag-gakus man si B ug A. Nitira iyang kauban but wala naka-aim ni B; SC: not attempted homicide because it was not fired with intent to kill; the drawing of the pistol is susceptible of
different interpretations, pwde man pagbunot niya mo voluntarily desist na siya
a.3. ANG PAGHANA SA PAGTIGBAS IS NOT AN OVERT ACT OF HOMICIDE - US v. Simeon; SC: not homicide because there was no blow struck and no proof that threats to kill was made
a.4. OVERT ACT DILI NECESSARY NGA ACTIVITY - US v. Gloria: Proposal in making an offer of money to a public officer for the purpose of corrupting him is an overt act of corruption of public officials.
1.2. Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.
a. Ex. ATTEMPTED TRESPASS TO DWELLING NOT ROBBERY WITH THE USE OF FORCE UPON THINGS - P v. Lamahang: There was no evidence that the offendertake possession for the purpose of gain, personal property belonging to another.
b. They should not be mere preparatory acts because they have no direct connection with the crime which the offender intends to commit.
c. THE INTENTION OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE VIEWED FROM THE NATURE OF THE ACTS EXECUTED BY HIM, AND NOT FROM HIS ADMISSION - P v. Lizada
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
a. Because If he performed all the acts of execution - frustrated if felony is not produced or consummated if felony is produced
b. Thus in P v. Lamahang, only attempted trespass to dwelling because there was something yet forhim todo, that is, tocommence entering the dwelling through that opening in order to perform all the acts of execution.
3. The offender's act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.
a. CAUSE - WALA KADAYONG UG KAWAT KAY NAGUNITAN ANG KAMOT
b. ACCIDENT - NI JAM ANG BALA
c. OTHER THAN HIS OWN SPONTANEOUS DESISTANCE - there is no attempted felony and the law does not punish him
c.1. REASON - reward granted by law to those who heed the call of their conscience; desistance may be through fear or remorse
c.2. THE DESISTANCE SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE ALL THE ACTS OF EXECUTION ARE PERFORMED
c.2.1. NANGAWAT UG MANOK AND GIBALIK - The offender is not relieved of his criminal liability because the crime of theft was already consummated.
c.2.2. GIDUNG-GAB HUMAN DUNG-GABON NAPUD UNTA BUT NALUOY - When he desisted he had already inflicted a mortal wound, thus, FH
c.3. THE DESISTANCE MUST BE TO THE CRIME INTENDED NOT THE ONE ACTUALLY COMMITTED
c.3.1. GIPUSIL BUT WALA MAIGO, PAG-ACTION UG LAIN NGA TIRA WALA GIPADAYON - P v. Lizada: When he desisted he already committed grave threat (not attempted homicide bec it requires non-fatal wound)
he intended to commit homicide but he committed grave threat already thus, desistance had no effect
Note: In attempted felony, the offender never passess the subjective phase (he has still control over his acts,including their natural course) of the offense (because he has an opportunity to desist
it). If passed the subjective phase (no control anymore) attempted, if performed all the acts of execution, frustrated or consummated.
1. SP (has still control - can still prevent B of taking in to his mouth, the poison mixed by VD by telling B that it has poison - -- 2. Attempted (no control - poison is now in the stomach) ---------------
3. (Objective Phase) - Frustrated (intervention of aphysician and did not die) ----- 4. Consummated (died)
Frustrated Felony Elements:
 1. The offender performs all the acts of execution.
a. Performs all the acts of execution- nothing more is left to be done by the offender because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.
a.1. Example: If pagpusil wala naigo or ang samad is not mortal = attempted (not performed all the acts of execution because wala paman niya napatay); ifang samad is mortalbut wala namatay = frustrated
b. Belief Theory
b.1. P v. Sy Pio - NAKAKITA NGA NAKA-ESKAPO ANG SAMDAN; SC: Not frustrated murder but only attempted because the fact that B was able to escape, which the accused saw, must have
produce in the mind of the accused the belief that he was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of the body. IOW, the accused knew that he had not actually performed all the acts of execution.
a.3. P v.Dagman - NAGPAPATAY-PATAY ANG BIKTIMA; SC: Frustrated Murder - 1. deadly weapons were used and blows were directed at the vital parts of the body; 2. the accused believed that he had performed all of the acts necessary to consummate the crim
c. Mortal Wound Theory
c.1. P v. Guihama - Belief of the accused should not be considered because what should be considered is whether all the acts of execution would produce the felony as a consequence. In
homicide, it is necessary for the frustration of the same that a mortal wound be inflicted.
c.2. P v. Honrada - GIDUNG-GAB SA TIYAN, NGA NILAPOS SA ATAY; SC: Frustrated
c.3. P v. David - GIPUSIL SA LUYO AND NILAPOS SA BAGA; SC: Frustrated
c.4. P v. Kalalo - GIPUSIL BUT WALA MAIGO; SC: Attempted
c.5. P v. Domingo - DOCTOR NI-TESTIFY NGA DILI MORTAL WOUND; SC: Attempted
c.6. P v. Somera - NATAPSINGAN ANG ULO - SC: Attempted
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence.
a. GIDUNG-GAB PALUYO BUT ANG NAIGO IS ANG BANGKO; SC: Attempted murder only because without inflicting a deadly wound upon a vital spot of which B should have died,thecrime of murder would not be produced as a consequence.
3. But the felony is not produced.
a. Because if produced, it will be consummated.
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
a. If the crime isnot produced because of the timely intervention of a 3rd person,it is frustrated.
b. If the crime is notproduced because the offender himself prevented its consummation (his own and exclusive will), there is no frustrated felony beause the 4th element is not present.
b.1. Problem: GIHILO-AN NIYA IYANG ASAWA BUT AFTER NAKA-INTAKE GITAGAAN DAYON NIYA UG ANTI-DOTE - Ans. 1. Not Frustrated Parricide bec. the cause which prevented the
consummation must be independent of the will of the perpetrator; 2. Not attempted parricide bec. He already performed all the acts of execution; 3. Crime will be physical injuries
because the intent to kill in the beginning disappeared when he prevented the poison from producing the death of his wife.
Consummated Felony - all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.
a. Allthe elements - every crime has its own elements. Thus, all the elements of the felony for which the accused is prosecuted must be present inorder to hold him liable therefor in its consummated stage.
b. To determine whether the crime is consummated, frustrated or attempted -
b.1. Nature of the offense
b.1.1. Ex. Arson
b.2. elements constituting the felony
b.2.1. Theft - consummated when the offender is able to takeor get hold of the thing belonging to another
b.2.1.1. US v. Adiao - CUSTOMS INSPECTOR NANGUHA UG BAKUS SA BAGGAGE; SC: Consummated theft not frustrated
b.2.2. In estafa with abuse of confidence, to consummate the crime there must be damage
b.2.3. Robbery with the use of force upon things - consummated when he must be able to carry out of the building the thing taken
b.2.4. Robbery with violence/intimidation - consummated the moment the offender gets hold of the thing taken and/or is in a position to dispose it freely
b.3. the manner of committing the same
b.3.1. Formal crimes - consummated in one instant, no attempt (slander, false testimony)
b.3.2. Crimes consummated by mere attempt or proposal orby overt act - ex. Flight to enemy's country, corruption of minors,
b.3.3. Felony by omission - no attempted stage
b.3.4. Crimes requiring the intervention of 2 persons to commit them are consummated by mere agreement - i.e., betting in sports contest and corruption of public officer but in P v.
Diego Quinn SC ruled that there is frustrated bribery and in US v. Te Tong SC also ruled that there is attempted bribery
b.3.5. Material crimes - there are 3 stages of execution
b.3.5.1. Consummated rape, Frustrated rape (P v. Erina ruling was wrong decision) and attempted
b.3.5.2. Consummated homicide, frustrated homicide and attempted homicide
Note: There is no attempted or frustrated impossible crime because ; No attempted because the offender in IC has already performed all the acts of execution; No frustrated because his acts are considered as constituting a consummated offense.

Art. 7. When light felonies are punishable

a. General Rule: Light felonies are punishableonly when they have been consummated - Reason: So slight that there is no need of providing a penalty
 a.1. Exception: Light felonies committed against persons or property are punishable even if attempted or frustrated - Reason: there is moral depravity

Art. 8. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felony

Conspiracy as a felony (because mere conspiracy is a violation of RPC)
a. General Rule: Conspiracy to commit felony are not punishable.
a.1. Reason - they are just preparatory acts and the law regards them as innocent or at least permissible.
b. Exception: They are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.
b.1. Art. 115 - Conspiracy to commit treason, Art. 136 - Conspiracy to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection, Art. 141 - Conspiracy to commit sedition
b.2. Treason, coup d'etat, rebellion or sedition should not be committed.
c. Requisites of Conspiracy:
1. That 2 or more persons came to an agreement
a. Agreement presupposes the meeting of the minds
2. That the agreement concerned the comission of a felony; and
a. It must be anagreement to act, to effect to bring about what has already been conceived and determined.
3. That the execution of the felony be decided upon.
a. There must be a determination to commit the crime of treason, rebellion or sedition.
Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability
a. Conspiracy to commit murder is not a crime under the RPC, but if they carried out the plan and personally took part in its execution which resultedin the killing of the victim they are all liable because of the conspiracy.
b. Indications of conspiracy:
b.1. P v. Geronimo - Aimed at same object; acts are concerted and concurrence of sentiments
b.2. P v. Cantuba - Unity of purpose and execution
b.3. P v. Hernandez - At the time of aggression all of them actedin concert, each doing their part to attain their objective - to kill the victim A
b.4. P v. Dorico - The acts of the defendants must show a common design, obedience to a coomad does not necessarily show concert of design.
b.5. P v. Pugay - GIKABUANGAN ANG NAAY GAMAY (GISUNOG); SC: No conspiracy but individual responsibility because they were just making fun of the deceased
b.6. P v. Monroy - Period of time to afford opportunity for mediation and reflection is not required in conspiracy.
c. Pv.Buntag - Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy because it may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of the crime.
c.1. P v. Camadre - elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, evidence of actual cooperation is required, it must be established by positive and conclusive evidence
Requisites of Proposal (because mere proposal is a violation of RPC, i.e., Art. 115 - Proposal to commit treason, Art. 136 - Proposal to commit coup d'etat , rebellion or insurrection)
Except: One who offers (proposal)money to a public officer to induce him not to perform his duties, but the offer is rejetced by the public officer, is liable for attempted bribery (corruption of public officer).
1. That a person has decided to commit a felony; and
a. No proposal when the person who proposes is not determined to commit the felony.
2. That he proposes its execution to some other person or persons.
a. No proposal when there is no decided, concrete and formal proposal.
b. No proposal when it is not the execution of a felony that is proposed.
c. It is not necessary that the person to whom the proposal is made agrees to commit treason or rebellion.

Art. 9. Grave, Less grave and light felonies (Note: Amended by RA 10951 (2017)
a. Capital punishment is death penalty.
b. "or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive" - Ex. PC - PM is an afflictive penalty; PC min - PM min is an afflictive penalty
c. "penalties which in their maximum period are correccional" - Ex. Arresto Menor - Destierro is a correcional penalty
d. Sec. 1, RA 10951 - light felonies fine of not exceeding 40,000

Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this code

a. 1st clause - means that RPC cannot supersede SPL based on StatCon rule, special lawshall prevail over general law"
a.1. Art. 6, 13, 14, 18, 19, 50-57, 64 does not apply to SPL because SPL do not provide for a scale of penalties as provided under Art. 71 of RPC, where a given penalty can be lowered and that the penalty of SPL does not contain 3 periods
a.2. P v. Respecia - the term imprisonment and not prision correcional should be usedin SPL because Pconly applies to RPC
a.3. P v. Panida - RPC not suppletory when the penalties under the SPL (RA 6539)are different from those under the RPC; even the penaltywas 14Y and 8 M - 17Y and 4M equivalent to RT medium
b. 2nd clause - RPC suppletory in character (only when the provisions of the special law are silent on the particular matter)
b.1. Where the special law adopted penalties from the RPC, the rules for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Ex. RA 7610
 b.2. Some provisions of the RPC are held by the SC to be applicable in SPL, i.e., Art. 17, Art. 22, Art. 39, Art. 45
b.3. P v. Moreno - Indemnity (Art. 100) and subsidiary imprisonment (Art. 39)in the RPC applied to violation of Motor Vehicle Law
b.4. P v. Chowdry - the SC applied suppletorily Arts. 17, 18,and 19 of the RPC to RA 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act) because the said law mentioned the said terms but did not define.
b.5. Ladonga v. People - the SC applied the principle of conspiracy to BP 22
b.6. Tan v. Spouses Tan - Art. 8 of RPC was applied to RA 9262 because of Sec. 47 of the latter law
b.7. Abarquez v. CA and People - Art. 39 of RPC applied in BP 22 cases
b.8. P v. Macatanda - Special laws amending the RPC are subject to its provisions (RPC), i.e., PD 533 (Anti-cattle rustling law)

Chapter 2: Justifying Circumstances and Circimstances which Exempt From Criminal Liability
a. Imputability - an act which may be ascribed to a person as its author or owner. It implies that the act committed has been freely and consciously done and may, therefore, be putdown to the doer as his very own.
b. Responsibility - the obligation of suffering the consequences of crime.
c. Guilt - an element of responsibility, for a man cannotbemade to answer for the consequences of a crime unless he is guilty.
Art. 11. Justifying Circumstances - acts are considered in accordance with the law, thus, exempt from civil and criminal liability;
Reason: 1. impossible for the State in all cases to prevent the aggresion upon its citizens including foreigners and offer protection to the person unjustly attacked; 2. man has a natural instinct to
protect, repel and save his person or rights fromimpending danger or peril based on the impulse of self-preservation born to man
Note: burden of proof is on the accused; prove by clear and convincing evidence (he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weaknesses of the prosecution.
Par. 1. Self-defense
Note: Rights included in self-defense - right to life, right to property and right of honor
1. Unlawful aggression.

2. Reasonable necessity of the menas employed to prevent or repeal it.

3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability

Chapter 3: Circumstances Which Mitigate Criminal Liability
Art. 13. Mitigating Circumstances
Chapter 4: Aggravating Circumstances
Art. 14. Aggravating Circumstances
Chapter 5: Alternative Circumstances

Title 2: Persons Criminally Liable For Felonies

Art. 16. Who are criminally liable.
Art. 17. Principals
Art. 18. Accomplices
Art. 19. Accessories
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability

Title 3: Penalties
Chapter 1: Penalties in General
a. the suffering that is inflicted by the State for the transgression of the law
b. Constitutional limits: 1. excessive fines shall not be imposed; 2. no cruel and unusual punishment be inflicted
Art. 21. Penalties that may be imposed
a. No act will be considered as criminal until the government has made it so by law and has provided a penalty.
b. US v. Yam Tung: Si A gikasohan ug infringement of literary rights kay iya gibaligya ang mga copies nga gibuhat sa lain taw, but wla pay copyright law…SC: Dili pwde kay wla pay balaod
c. US v. Macaset: Si Macaset kay gikasohan ug violation sa Internal Revenue Law, punishable by fine pero ang kaning balaora wla ng provide ug Subsid imprisonment
 while pending ang kaso, naay bag-o nga balaod nga pwde na mapriso bsta di kabayad sa multa, ang korte ni impose ug fine ug SI; SC: dili pwde
d. ex. Helmet law, voyeurism law
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws
a. P v. Changco: General Rule is to give criminal laws prospective effect; Sauna ang Slight PI thru imprudence not punishable but when a new law, nag provide nga punishable (RA1790)
na; SC: dili pwde kay ang act nabuhat nahitabo dugay na sa wla pa ang 1790 dili pwde mobalik paatras ang balaod;ang new law (1790) dili pwde moatras abante ra gyd na…
so if naka-commit ka ug crime video voyeurism sauna nga wla pay balaod dika pwde filan ug kaso karon….remember hayden kho ug halili case? May 2009 nahitabo and
naapprove ang balaod pag 2010 kay in aid of legislation nangau ug tabang si halili ni sen. bong revilla; ang gi-file nga kasoni kho is 9262
b. Exception: if favorable to the accused- Lapuz v. CA: 2 ka kaso ang gi-file sa driver, dayon na convicto ug H with Serious PI thru RI ug damage to property thru RI, karon naa may new law (RA 587)
nga ng provide nga if naay negligence, sa RPC ra punishable; SC: bisan pa ang new law ni-efecto human na nahitabo ang act, pwde eapply kay favorable sa accusado
c. Reason for the exception: P v. Moran; ang govt nka realize nga bug-at ug dili sakto ra ang karaan nga balaod so nag buhat ug bag-o
d. Giving a law retroactive effect, if unfavorable to accused will violate the consti inhibition of ex post facto laws
e. Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons: ang karaan nga Penal Code (spanish) if mopleadguilty ka dili MC, gi-kasohan ug estafa unya ni-plead guilty so convicto, while naa sa prisohan ang
RPC ni took effect; SC: gi consider ang POG as MC so na decrease iya penalty
f. When applied? Escalante v. Santos: ang favorable retroact effect ma apply sa 3 ka situation: 1. prosecution begins; 2. naa nay sentence but wla pa ni serve; 3. gi serve na ang sent.
g. GR: forward; Exc: paatras if favorable; exc. to exc.: forward if HD; the exception has no application if the new law is expressly madeinapplicable to pending actions
h. ang civil liab di maaply, bisan pag favorable sa A, so if ang new law gi-reduce ang bayranan sa 1,000 ang old law is 3,000 ang A kelangan bayad sa 3k;
Reason: dili ma dispose sa State ang right sa offended party; pero if ang new law mopataas sa bayranan dili mo retroact
i. RA 9346 given retroactive effect; gihimo nalang RP
j. Art. 22 and Art. 366 compared: pasabot katong felonies nga nabuhat sa wla pa ang RPC, dili maaply ang RPC so adto sa karaan di ba Prospective? But if unfavorable gani maaply ang RPC
k. P v. Lagrimas: Gisagpa nag maestra (public) sa estudyante so gi filan ug assault upon public official under sa karaan nga RPC ug na convikto karon niabot na ang RPC (Art. 149)
nga wla ng hatag ug penalty if managpa ug maestra (Agent), Q. pwde ba makagawas ang A nga wla nmn penalty under sa RPC?; SC: Dili nagpasabot nga if wla nay penalty pwde na
epardon ang guilty persons nga ng serve na ug sentence, pero tan-awa ang P v. Tamayo: Ang A na convikto sa pag violate sa usa ka ordinance, while pending pa iyang appeal gi repeal
ang ordinansa nga ng result nga dili na crime. Karon ang A ni file ug motion to dismiss; SC: Dili pwde ma convikto ang usa ka taw for acts no longer criminal.
l. Lagrimasa and Tamayo case compared: sa Lagrimasa gi-reenact ang Art. 251 pinaagi sa Art. 149 kaso sa 149 dili silotan ang assault upon a teacher,so wla gi absolutely repeal ang
Art. 251 while sa Tamayo gi-repeal gyud
m. Criminal liability under repealed law subsists: 1. when the provisions of the former law are reenacted; 2. repeal is by implication; 3. when there is a saving clause
n. Repeal by implication: When a penal law, which impliedly repealed an old law,is itself repealed, the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior penal law; 3 ka balaod tanan;
RA 1, gi-repeal sa RA 2, RA 3 gi repeal ang RA 2 so ang RA 1 mabalik/marevive
o. Different effects of repeal on penal law: 1. if penalty lighter sa new law, apply new law; 2. if new law heavy - old law; 3. if newlaw totally repeal the existing law (not punishable anymore) = crime is obliterated
o.1.P v. Pegarum: No retroactive effect of penal laws as regards jurisdiction of court; A nka comit ug estafa, sa old law ang penalty ma fall sa RTC pero pag file sa kaso na timing
nga na enact pd ang RPC sa RPC fall na sa MTC ang penalty; Q. Asa mn ang naay jurisdiction?; SC: MTC kay ang jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal action is to be determined
by the law in force at the time of instituting the action not at the time of the commission of the crime.
p. P v. Sindiong and Pastor: When the repealing law fails to penalize the offense under the old law, the accused cannot be convicted under the new law; Facts: A prosecuted for neglecting to
make a return of the sales of news papers within the time prescribed under RAC, RAC was repealed by Internal Revenue Code which did not state the act anymore.
q. P v. Baesa: Aperson erroneously accused and convicted under a repealed statute may be punished under the repealing statute.
r. P v. Almuete: A new law which omits anything contained in the old law dealing on the same subject, operates as a repeal of anything not so included in the amendatory act.

Art. 23.Effect of Pardon by the Offended Party

a. Does not extinguish because a crime is anoffense against the State; OP are limited only as witness for the prosecution (P v. Despavellador)
b. P v. Benitez: Compromise does not extinguish criminal liability even complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the OP; there may be compromise
on the civil liability
c. crimes under Art. 344: aduletry, concubinage, seduction, AOL, abduction
d. Pardon under Art. 344 must be made before institution of criminal prosecution; if laready filed in the court, itt will be denied by the court; but marriage extinguishes the criminal action even after
the case is filed in court
e. civil liability is extinguished by express waiver: ang ofense maka cause ug 2 kainjuries: 1. social - State has interest and reapired by the imposition of penalty; 2. personal - caused to the
victim, but pwde ra niya ma-waive which ang State di ka buot

Art. 24. Measures of prevention or safety which are not considered penalties
a. not penalties because it s notimposed by the court in ajudgement of conviction; pars. 1,3 and 4 are merely preventive measures before conviction of the offenders;
 b. fines mentioned here are admin fines like CSC

Chapter 2: Classification of Penalties

Art. 25. Penalties which may be imposed
a. US v. Avillar: a sentence of "5 yrs. In Bilibid"; SC: defective because it does not specify the penalty in RPC; US v. Mendoza: hard labor + imprisonment; SC: not authorized under RPC
b. RP vs. LI: 1. RP = RPC; LI = SPL; 2. RP = has accessory penalties; LI = no accessory penalties and no exact duration
c. Art. 25 classifies penalty into 2: principal and accessory; P = expressly imposed by court; A = deemed included in the imposition of prin. Penalties
d. Principal penalties are classified as: Divisible (has fixed duration and are divisible into 3 periods) and Indivisible (no fixed duration)

Art. 26. Fine (Note: Amended by RA 10951 (2017)

Chapter 3: Duration and Effect of Penalties

Section 1: Duration of Penalties
Art. 27. Reclusion Perpetua - Bond to keep the peace

Art. 28. Computation of penalties

a. Rule 1: if na priso na + temporary penalties (suspension or TA/SD) = start sa day when the judgment became final kay under A. 24 arrest and temporary detention not a penalty
b. Rule 2: if wala pa na priso (nakapiyansa) + penalty is imprisonment = start sa day when the convict is placed under the disposal of judicial authorities, meaning reading of judgment
c. Rule 3: if na priso (detained) + penalty is imprisonment = start on the day which the convict starts to commence the sentence but he is entitled to deduction under A. 29

Art. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment (Note: Amended by RA 10592 (2013)
a. Kanus-a naay PI? 1. If non-bailable ang offense; 2. Or bailable but dili ka post bail
b. Not bailable if penalty is D, RP or LI
c. Ex. A gi-chargan ug homicide and wla siyay kwarta para bail so detain after 2 years guilty ang decision sa court and indeterminate penalty is say 12-16 years…
d. Credit is given only to penalty which consist of deprivation of liberty: ex. A was charged with violation of Art. 143 penalty is PC or a fine; while pending detained for 10 days
and was sentenced to pay a fine of P 500.00; can his fine be reduced? A: NO
e. Destierro although not animprisonment is also a deprivation of liberty so crdited (P v. Bastasa)
f. released immediately if penalty imposed is less than the time of preventive imprisonment: P v. Quiosay: A is detained for 5 mos. Pending his trial for LSPI and after trial is sentenced
to 4 mos. = release immediately
g. released immediately if PI is equal/more than the possible maximum imprisonment: Ex. A accused of LSPI punishable by AM; he has been detained for 6 mos.; so release but the trial of the
case will continue
h. if the max penalty is destierro: ex. A is accused of a crime punishable by Amenor to Destierro (6m-6y) and has been detained for 30 daysso released immediately ; note in
destierro penalty not serve in prison
i. not entitled: 1. recidivist (including HD bec. convicted twice - P v. Gona); 2. failed to surrender voluntarily when being summoned for the execution of their sentence
not after the commission of the crime; ex. Out on bail but was convicted so summoned to execute his sentence but did not appear so the court issued a WOA and confiscation of his bond

Section 2: Effects of the penalties according to their respective nature

Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporay special disqualification for the exercise of right of suffrage
Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office,profession, or calling or the right of suffrage
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction
Art.35. Effects of bond to keep the peace
a. Q: Can a prisoner has the right to vote? A: note deprived the right to vote - PAD even after the service of sentence; TAD - during the termof the sentence; see also PSD and TSD
b. see effects civil interdiction

Art. 36. Pardon; its effects

a. Effects: 1. not restore unless; 2. not exempt civil liability
b. Limitations on granting pardon: 1. only after conviction by final judgment; 2. not applicable to impeachment
 c. Pardon granted in general terms does not include accessory penalty; ex. PM with the accessory pen of PSD so only PM is extinguished except: when an absolute pardon is
granted after the term ofimprisonment has expired, it removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction (Cristobal v. Labrador)
d. Pardon by P v. OP: P = extinguish, OP = x; P = notinclude civil,OP = may waive; P = after conviction,OP = beforeinstitution

Art. 37. Cost.

a. If convicted: expenses of the litigation are chargeable to him
b.If acquitted: each party bearing his own expenses

Art.38.Pecuniary Liabilities (courts must strictly follow the order)

ex. In Robbery with violence or intimidation
1. Reparation of the damage caused - watch and ring
a. There is reparation in the crime of rape when the dress of the woman was torn (US v. Yambao)
2. Indemnification of the consequential damages - hospital bills and salary
3. Fine
a. Domalaon v. Yap: ang judge nisugot nga ang bayaran una sa A is ang fine nga P 500.00 kay mao ra iya kwarta unya ang indemnity sa sunod nalang nga buwan;
SC: Sayop pwde man unta siya mg SI; dili pwde ma disregard ang order of payment
4. Cost of the proceedings

Art. 39. Subsidiary penalty

a. Subsidiary imprisonment must be imposed in the judgment of conviction (Ramos v. Gonong); P v.Fajardo: SI is not an accessory penalty, thus, the judgment of convictionmust expressly state
a.1. P v. Concepcion: bisan ang penalty is not higher than PC but HD siya, walay SI mahitabo
a.2. If the prin penalty imposed: even PM but there are 2 MC, SI applicable
b. Rule 1: Applicable only when the penalty imposed is imprisonment not exceeding 6 yrs. (PC)
b.1. example: Falsificationby private individual (A. 172) and sentenced to indeterminate penalty of 4Y, 9M, 10 D and topay a fine of P 4,000
b.1.1. kwaa sa ang number of days sa penalty para maka determine ka sa 1/3 sa penalty, so 1, 740 days tanan
b.1.2. 1740/0.3 = 580 days mao ni ang 1/3 sa penalty
b.1.3. sunod kuhaa pila ka days ang 4,000 para mkakuha kapila ka days niya eserve ang SI; so 4000/P 8.00 = 500 days
b.1.4. so if dili siya ka bayad sa fine in addition sa iya penalty is 500 days; note: wala ni exceed sa 1/3
b.1.5. but ang ned niya eserve kay only 365 days lang kay dapat dili molapas ani
b.2. ex. Penalty is 3 years and fine 2,000
b.2.1. so 1,095/0.3 = 328 days mao ni ang 1/3; 2,000/8 = 250 d
b.2.2. so in addition sa penalty is 250 days
b.3. No SI if fine is below P 8.00 (P v. Abad)
c. Rule 2: Applicable when the penalty imposed is fine only
c.1. ex. Sentenced to pay a fine of P 800.00
c.1.1. P 800 is a penalty for less grave felony
c.1.2. 800/8 = 100 d; so mao ni iya eserve sa prisohan kay wala man nilapasug 6 mos.
c.2. if fine is P 160.00? Only 15 days ra instead 20
c.3. if fine is exactly 200? Apply A.9 because it sates "not exceeding P 200" so light felony only; if more than P 200 apply A.26
d. Rule 3: No SI if penalty is PM, RT, RP, Death and LI
d.1. 6 yrs. and 1 day is PM
e. Rule 4: Under Art.236 penalty is suspension and fine of 200-500 (suspension here as principal penalty is fixed because of the word "until complied)
e.1. so if he cannot pay the fine although he had complied the formalities his suspension shall continue until the amount of fine is covered
e.2. has no fixed duration: ex. Penalty is fine not exceeding 200 and censure (A. 365 par. 4), if the acused cannot pay the fine no SI because the penalty of censure is not fixed
e.3. same deprivation: if penalty imposed is imprisonment, subsidiary liability is imprisonment; if destierro=dstierro; if suspension = suspension

Section 3: Penalties in which other accesory penalties are inherent

Art. 40. Death
Art. 41. Reclusion Perpetua and temporal-their accesory penalties
 Art. 42. Prision Mayor - its accessory penalties
Art. 43. Prision Correcional - its accesory penalties
Art. 44. Arresto- Its accessory penalties

Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime
a. Philips v. Municipal Mayor (1959): slot machines were confiscated by virtue of SW but no criminal case was filed

Chapter 4: Application of Penalties

Section 1: Rules for the application of penalties to the persons criminally liable and for the graduation of the same
Art.46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general.
a. GR: penalty prescribed by law in general terms shall be imposed: 1. upon the principals; 2. for consummated felony; ex. Homicide penalty is RT intended for the principal in consummated satge
b. Exception: When the law fixes a penalty for Frustrated or Attempted felony; see A. 297

Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic Review of Death Penalty Cases

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crime

a. only 1 crime in the eyes of law,thus, 1 information should be filed only
b. Compound crime requisites: - penalty of abberatio ictus belongs here!
b.1. That only a single act is performed by the offender
b.1.1. P v. Ang Cho Kio: Ang A gipugos niya ang pilot nga eblahin ang destination sa eroplano,wala nisugot ang piloto,iya gipatay; SC: 2 separate crimes; grave coercion and murder;
1. Ang pagpugos is a separate act and ang murder is a separate act; 2. ang coercion is also not a means to commit murder kay pwde raman gyud unta niya patyon detso
b.1.2. P v. Lawas (1955): Si Lawas (PC) nagsugo sa iyang mga taw nga ihigot ang mga Moros, ang uban nibalibad ug pahigot so si Lawas iya gipusil ang Moro and nag order
sa iya mga taw nga pamusilon sila apil tong nang-eskapo, human ni-order siya ug cease fire as a result 50 persons died; SC: CC of multiple homicide; 1. kay if ang act (shooting)
resulted from a single criminal impulse or motive it only constitute a single offense; 2. wlay klaro nga evidence ug pilaka taw ang napatay sa tagsa2 nga mga akusado
b.1.3. P v.Abella: 16 members of OXO gang who were prisoners ni-atake sa usa kaselda and gipangpatay ang 14 ka members sa Sige-sige gang andleaving others also injured; SC: CC ofmultiple murder
and frustrated murder; for the attainment of 1 single purpose which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed,such acts must be considered only as 1 offense
b.1.4. Note: The single criminal impulse theory or same motive or single purpose theory has no legal basis for A. 48 because it speaks of a single act; however the theory is acceptable
when it is not certain who among the accused killed orinjured each of the several victims
b.2. That the single act produces: 1. 2 or more GF; 2. 1 or more grave and 1 or more LGF; 3. 2 or more LGF
b.2.1. P v. Guillen: Si G nilabay ug granada ni Pres. Roxas resulting 1 dead and multiple attempted murder of which Roxas and 4 others are injured parties
b.2.2. P v. Largo: Ang A nagbutang ug time bomb sa eroplano and nibuto whilenaa sa langitcausing 13 deaths;constitutes CC of multiple murder and destruction of property
b.2.3. P v.Desierto: Si A nagpabuto sa iyang Thompson sub-machine gun sa daghan nga taw. First shot naigo 3 ka taw.Human nag pabuto napud siya ug lain wounding others.
SC: Not CC; although single act only (pressing the trigger because automatic continue firing) but it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing several
felonies but thenumber of bullets which actually produced pero tan-awa ang P V. Lawas
b.2.4. US v.Ferrer: Si A gipabuthan si B and after ni B si C gamit ang revolver; SC: not CC because not single act since it was directed at 2 different persons
b.2.5. P v. Turlav-several light felonies resulting from one single act is not CC; ex. Nag-bang-ga 2 ka sakyanan kay ang usa ka driver ng dang-hag so nicause ug slight PI sa mga pasaheroug
damage to property (all light felonies)
b.2.6. P v. Vilamora: Ang A naka bang-ga iya sakyanan ug bike as a result 2 patay and daghan injured; SC: CC of homicide and several Serious PI thru reckless driving; the deaths and injury
were caused by a single act of driving
b.2.7. P v. Pama: gipusil ang bala nilapos sa lain nga taw nga nagbarog sa luyo; SC: CC
b.2.8. US v. Montiel: Ang judge nagbasa sa sentence sa A, ang A nagkuha ug kutsilyogidunggab ang judge sa luyo, ang samad naka incapacitate sa judge more than 30 d; SC:
CC ofdirect assault with serious PI
b.2.9. P v. Lopez: ang A gidunggab patay ang mabdos as a result namatay pud ang fetus; SC: CC of murder with abortion
b.2.10. rape with homicide is a special complex crime not covered by A. 48
b.2.11. P v. Castro - applicable to crimes thru negligence: Ang mayor who accidentally discharged his revolver during a school program, killing a girl andinjuring a boy;
SC: CC of homicide with LSPI thru RI because A. 48 speaks of felonies (either dolo or culpa)
b.2.12. P v. Pacson: Gisunog niya ang bus and nikatay sa usa ka balay resulting to 1 death nasunog and injuries; SC: CC of arson, homicide, serious PI and damage to property
b.2.13. P v. Remerata: Theft of firearm and illegalpossession of same firearm do not form a complex they are 2 distinct crimes; because A. 48 speaks of felonies thus SPL are excluded
c. Complex crime proper requisites:
 c.1. That at least 2 offenses are committed
c.1.1. P v. Barbas: Ang A gi falsify niya ang cedula (gi-erase ang name and gi-elisan ug lain name) and den iya gibaligya sa lain taw; SC: falsification was a necessary to commit the crime of malversation
c.1.2. US v. Hernandez: Nagsabot ang mga A nga para ma seduce nila ang minor girl, ang usa nila mg pa pretend nga pastor para makasal sila; SC: the crime of usurpation
of official function was a necessary means for committing the crime of simple seduction.
c.1.3. P v. Manguiat: Ang girl padung uli sa ilang balay kay gidagit sa 2 ka A, gidala sa kaumahan and sa lain nga lugar didto gi-rape; SC: Abduction was a necessary means tocommit rape
c.2. That one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other
c.2.1. P v. Bohos: 1 ka girl gidagit ug 4 ka laki, while naa sasakyanan ang usa sa A girape ang gurl, pag-abot sa balay2 gi rape napud nila ang gurl 3 times each (12 times); pag kabuntag
giusban napud sa 4 ug rape (4 times); SC: crimes committed are forcible abduction with rape and 16 counts of separate rapes; reason: in the first act of rape in the truck
the forcible abduction was already consummated and the subsequent acts of intercourse in the house are separate acts of rape
c.2.2. No CC when one offense iscommitted to conceal the other
c.2.2.1. P v. Bersabal: para dili masakpan nga iyang gipatay ang B iya gisunog ang patayng lawas
c.2.2.2. P v. Cid: Ang A is treasurer sa munisipyo karon gimugo niya ang 741.00 nga panag-iya sa govt., karon, iya gi falsify ang payroll sa mga maestra nga moappear nga nkadawat
sila sa ila sweldo whereinfact wala sila kadawat; SC: 2 separate crimes of malversation and falsification; the falsiifcation was a means tocover the crime of malversation
Note: In Barbas case nag-una ang falsification and den malversation, sa Cid case, nauwahi ang falsification; in addition in Barbas case, the A need to falsify the document
inorder to acquire the money
c.2.2.3. Regis v. People: Ang mayor, treasurer ug usa ka private person ni sign ug 2 ka payrolls to appear nga naay nitrabaho sa usa ka ghost project.Gigamit nila ang kwarta for
personal use; SC: 2 crimes of malversation and falsification because F was not a necessary means since they have the funds and they can misappropriate it at any time;
the F was a means to conceal the M
c.2.3. P v. Rodriguez: Illegal possession of FA absorbed in rebellion
c.3. That both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute
d. Art. 48 is intended to favor the offender; imagine if wala pa ang A. 48 if 2 ka homicide on the same bullet, 2 pud ka RT
e. Art. 48 applies only to cases where the Code doesnot provide a definite specific penalty for a CC, like special complex crime
f. P v. Maribung: When a CC is charged and one offense is not proven, the accused can be convicted of the other
g. Plurality of crimes
g.1. Plurality of crimes consists in the successive execution by the same individual ofdifferent criminalacts uponany of which noconviction has yet been declared
g.2. 2kinds: 1. formal orideal plurality; 2. real or material plurality
g.3. Formal - provided in Art. 48; Real - there are different crimes in law as well as in the conscience of the offender (liable for each and every offense)
g.4. Types of formal crimes:
g.4.1. Art. 48
g.4.2. Special complex crime
g.4.3. When the offender commits continued crimes (continuous or continuing crime) is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution.
Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime committed. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.
g.4.3.1. Pv. De Leon: Ang A nangawat ug 2 ka manok para tari nga owned by different persons; only 1 crime because there is a unity of thought in the criminal purpose of the offender
g.4.3.2. P v.Enguerro: Ang mga kawatan gi-chargan ug robbery in band in 3 separate informations, robbed the 1st house, after that robbed the 2nd house and lastly robbed 3rd house
gi-invoke nila ang De Leon case; SC: dili maaply ang De Leon case kay in that case ang mga kawatan nisud ug yard sa balay and den gikuha ang 2 ka manok sa imoha 3 ka balay nga lain
g.4.3.3. P v. De la Cruz: 7 ka mga kawatan unya armado nisung sa sugarmill nga gitrabahoan sa mga B,ang 2 gitionanang mga empleyado ang 5 nangawat sa ilang mga balay; SC:
only 1 crime of robbery because all robberies of different persons are components of a 1 general plan
g.4.3.4. P v. Moreno: Si A ng padalaug suwat ni B demanding 5k under threats of death and burning the latter's house, si B nagpadala ug 1k, after 2 kabuwan nidemand napud sa kuwang nga 4k, si
B nibayad ug 2k, after 4 ka buwan, ni demand napud ug 2k nga kulang,siB nipadalaug 1k,lastly after 6 months nidemand kuwang nga 1k and making the same threat but at this time
gi-arrest na cya; SC: the different acts of demand and threats constitute only one and the same crime of grave threats born of a single criminal impulse
g.4.3.5. P v. Ramos: Ang A after nag defame gi-atake ug gikulata ang iya kontra as a result naay PI; SC: 2 separate crimes because the act of insulting is entirely different from that
of inflicting injuries since insult is crimes against honor and Pi is crimes against persons
g.4.3.6. Continued crime is different from a transitory crime (moving crime) - is in criminal procedure filing of case like in kidnapping

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended - penalty of error in personae belongs!
a. P v.Albuquerque: A. 49 has noapplication to cases where a more serious consequence notintended by the offender befalls the same person - so praeter intentionem does
not apply.
b. A. 49 is applicable only when the intended crime and the crime actually committed are punished with different penalties; ex. Both strangers are killed in error in personae
 Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principlas of a frustrated crime
Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principlas of attempted crime
Art. 52. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in a consummated crime
Art. 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony
Art. 54. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices of a frustrated crime
Art. 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime
Art. 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crime
Art. 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crime
a. see table; note "0" refers to penalty precribed by law

Art. 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories

Art. 59. Penalty tobe imposed in case of failure tocommit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible

Art. 60. Exceptions to the rules established in Arts. 50-57

Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties

a. 1st rule - when the penalty is single and indivisible: Penalty for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art. 270 is RP,so next lower in degree is RT
b. 2nd rule - when the penalty is composed of 2 indivisible penalties: Penalty for parricide is RP-death, so next of RP (lesser than D) is RT, so next lower in degree is RT
c. 2nd rule - when the penalty is composed of one divisible penalty to be imposed to their full extent: ex. RT so penalty immediately following RT is PM
d. 2nd rule - when the penalty is composed of 2 divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent: ex. PCtoPM so penalty immediately following PC is AM
e. 3rd rule - when the penalty is composed of 2 indivisible penalties and the maximum period of a divisible penalty: before RA 7659, the penalty of murder is RT max to death,
so the penalty of murder is consist of 2 indivisible penalty and a divisible penalty, so penalty next lower in degree is PM max to RT med
f. 3rd rule - when the penalty is composed of 1 indivisible penalty and the maximum period of a divisible penalty: same answer as (e)
g. 4th rule - when the penalty is composed of several periods: ex. PM med - RT min, so penalty next lower in degree is PC med - PM min
h. 5th rule - (by analogy) when the penalty has 2 periods; ex. PC min -PC med (abduction), so, penalty next lower is AM med -AM max; ex. AM max - PC min, so, AM med - AM min
i. 5th rule - (by analogy) when the penalty has 2 periods; ex. PM max, so, PM med
Note: MC and AC are disregarded in the application of the rules for graduating penalties;only after the penalty next lower in degree is already determined

Section 2: Rules for the application of penalties with regard to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and habitual delinquency
Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency
Par. 1.
1.1. AC which in themselves constitute a crime: by means of fire under (A.14) is not aggravating in arson
1.2. AC which are included by law in defining a crime: dwelling is not aggravating in robbery with the use of force upon things; grave abuse of confidence is not aggravating in QT
1.3. maximum period: a. organized crime group; b. advantage was taken by a public officer
Par. 2
2.1 AC which are inherent in the crime: evident premeditation is inherent in robbery and theft
Par. 3
3.1. AC/MC which arise from the moral attributes of the offender: Si A ug B gipatay nila si C, Si A iya giplano (EP) ug si B napatay niya tungod sa kasuko niya (passion and obfuscation)
so, EP shall only affect A while passion shall only affect B because their state of minds are different
3.2. AC/MC which arise from his private relations with the offende party:
3.2.1. P v. Bucsit: Si A ni-assist sa pagpatay sa asawa ni B, so, A = murder or homicide; B = parricide
3.2.2. P v. Valdellon: Si A usa ka clerk sa bangko, naka discover sa combination sa safe unya gikawat ang sud sa safe together with B his friend; A = QT; B = ST
3.3. AC/MC which arise from any other personal cause: A and B committed a crime. A was under 16 and B a recidivist.
Par. 4.
4.1. Material execution of the act: Si A,B ug C agreed to kill D. Si A kay principalby inducement. B and C killed Dwith treachery,which mode of committing the offense had not
been previously agreed upon by them with A. A was not present when B and C killed D with treachery. Thus,the AC of treachery should not be taken against A but against B and C
only (P v. De Otero). But if A was present and hadknowledge of the treachery with which the crime was committed by B and C,he is also liable for murder, qualified by treachery.
4.2. Means to accomplish the crime: A ordered B tokill C. B invited C to eat with him. B mixed poison with the food of C, who died after he had eaten the food. A did not know that B
 used poison to kill C.Thus, the AC of poison is not applicable to A.
Par. 5 ( note: I noticed that there must be at least 3 crimes committed by the offender but Reyes book did not state this….)
1. That the offender had been convicted of any of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification.
2. That after that conviction or after serving his sentence,he again committed, and, within 10 years from his release or first conviction, he was again convicted of any of the
said crimes for the second time; and
3. That after his conviction of, or after serving sentence for, the second offense, he again committed, and, within 10 years from his last release or last conviction, he was again
convicted of any said offenses, the third time or oftener.
ex. 1 Crimes Committed Date of Conviction Date of Release
Theft June 1915 July 1916
Estafa May 1920 - - - Oct. 1922 - - -
Robbery July 1928 Aug. 1930
Note: ---basis of the 10 year period; so now charged with robbery + additional penalty for being HD
ex. 2. Crimes Committed Date Committed Date of Conviction
Theft Jan. 1920 Oct. 1921
Estafa Sept. 1921 Dec. 1921 (note: when estafa was committed not yet convicted of theft)
Robbery Jan. 1930 Mar. 1931
Falsification Feb. 1931 Dec. 1931 ( note: when falsification was committed not yet convicted of robbery)
Note: In order that an accused maybe a HD, it is necessary that he committed the 2nd crime (estafa) after his conviction or after service of sentence for the 1st crime (theft);
that he committed the 3rd crime (robbery) after hisconviction of or after service of sentence of the 2nd crime (estafa); the 4th crime (falsification) after his conviction
of or after service of sentence for the 3rd crime (robbery).
a. 10 year period computed either from last conviction or last release.
b. 10 year periodiscounted not to the date ofcommission ofsubsequent offense,but to the date of conviction thereof in relation to the date of his last release or last conviction.
c. When an offender has committed several crimes mentioned in the definition of habitual delinquent, without being first convicted of any of them before committing the others,
he isnot a habitual delinquent.
d. Convictions on the same day or about the same time are considered as one only.
e. Crimes committed on the same date, although convictions on different dates are considered only one.
f. Previous convictions are considered every time a new offense is committed.
g. The commission ofany of those crimesneed not be consummated.
h. Habitual delinquency applies toaccomplices andaccessories.
i. Ifone crime was committed during the minority of the offender,such crime shouldnot be considered for the purposeof treating him as a habitual offender,because the proceedings as regards that crime were suspended,
j. The impositionof the additionalpenalty prescribed by law forHD is mandatory.
k. Modifying circumstances applicable to additional penalty.
l. Habitualdelinquency isnot a crime.It issimply a circumstane which if present in a given case give rise to the imposition of additional penalties.
m. Penalty for Hd is a real penalty that determines jurisdiction.
n. A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist.
o. But in imposing the additional penalty, recidivism is not aggravating because inasmuch as recidivism is aqualifying or inherent circumstancein habitualdelinquency,it cannot beconsidered as an AC at the same time.

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties

a. Ex. Of single and indivisible penalty: Art. 270 - kidnapping and failure to return a minor is RP;
a.1. as is regardless of MC or AC present
b. Ex. Of 2 indivisible penalties: Robbery with homicide is RP to death
b.1. only 1 AC = greater penalty applied
b.2. no MC and no AC = lesser penalty applied
b.3. there is MC and no AC = lesser penalty applied
b.3.1. US v. Relador: When there are 2 MC and no AC, the court cannot proceed by analogy the provisions of A. 64 Subsection 5 and impose the penalty by 1 degree.
b.3.2. Exception: When a privileged MC is present under A. 68 and A. 69
b.4. there is MC and there is also AC = offset

Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain 3 periods (ex. Homicide - RT)
 a. Rule 1: No AC and no MC = medium period
b. Rule 2: only MC = minimum period
c. Rule 3: only an AC = maximum period
d. Rule 4: when there are MC and AC = offset
d.1. say,1 AC -nighttime and 2 MC - voluntary surrender and plea of guilty; thus, 1 MC willoffset the AC of night time, the remaining will make the penalty into minimum period
e. Rule 5: 2 or more MC but no AC = penalty next lower
f. Rule 6: No penalty greater than the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law shall be imposed, nomatter howmany AC are present.
f.1. Thus, even 4 AC are present without any MC in the commission of homicide, the court cannot impose a penalty of RP
g. Rule 7: The court can determine the extent of the penalty "within the limits of each period, according to the number" and "nature" of the AC and MC and the greater or lesser
"extent of the evil" produced by the crime.
g.1. P v. Recto: The penalty precribed for the felony he committed was PC but the court imposed him an indeterminate penalty of 8 yrs and 1 day as the max period, karon nipalag ang
lawyer sa defense kay y daw 8; SC: Sayop ka. The court has discretion in the imposition of penalty as long as it is within the limit fixed by law.

Art. 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of 3 periods
a. Iluustrationof the computation when the penalty id notcomposed of 3 periods (ex. A. 255 (2) PC med and max period is the penalty
6 years - 6 months = 5 years and 6 months/3 = 1 year and 10 months
Min. = 6M and 1D - 2Y and 4M
Med. = 2Y, 4M and 1D - 4Y and 2 M
Max. = 4Y 2M and 1D- 6Y
So, PC med and max is: 2Y, 4M and 1D - 6Y, the time included in that penalty should be divided into 3 equal portions. Thus -
5Y and 12M - 2Y and 4M = 3Y and 8M/3 = 1Y, 2M and 20D
So, minimum of minimum is 2Y, 4M and 1D + 1Y, 2M and 20D = 3Y, 6M and 20D (maximum of the minimum)
So, minimum of medium is 3Y, 6M and 21D + 1Y, 2M and 20D = 4Y, 9M and 10D (maximum of the medium)
So, minimum of maximum is 4Y, 9M and 11D + 1Y, 2M and 20D = 6Y (maximum of the maximum)
b. Illustration of the computation when the penalty has 3 periods - say PM
12Y-6Y = 6Y/3 = 2Y
So minimum is 6Y and 1D - 8Y
So medium is 8Y and 1D - 10Y
So maximum is 10Y and 1D - 12Y
Note: See A. 76. The computation is not followed in the division of arresto mayor

Art. 66. Imposition of fines

Art. 67. Penalty tobe imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the 4th circumstance of Art. 12 are present
a.The penalty provided under A. 67 is the same as in A. 365

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 years of age

a. A. 68 is repealed by RA 9344
a.1. 15 years under at the time of commission of offense = exempt fromcriminal liability
a.2. 15 years above but below 18 at the time of commission of offense = exempt from criminal liability except he acted with discernment

Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime comitted is not wholly excusable
a. US v. Navarro: Si A gihagad ug sinumbagay ni B human gi-atake dayon ni A si B ug kutsilyo unya si B nibaws pud ug dunggab sa iya kutsilyo but napildi ni A si B nga namatay;
Issue: entitle ba si A sa A.69?; SC: Dili kay walay UA kay ni-agrre man si A sa away pina-agi sa pag atake dayon ni B. UA is an indispensable requisite in SD, DOR, DOS
b. P v. Alvarez: Victim was the unlawful aggressor and accused was the one who provoked and means employed not reasonable; SC: not entitled
c. The court has the discretion to impose 1 or 2 degrees lower than that prescribed by law taken into consideration the number and nature of the conditions of justification present or lacking.

Art. 70. Successive service of sentence

a. Gordon v. Wolfe: Ang A gi-convikto pag Oct. 1905 ug 6 months, pag Nov. 1905 gi-convikto ug 4 months sa lain nga caso; SC: eserve niya ang 2 ka terms successively and ang ikaduha
 nga sentence dili modagan unless nahuman na niya ug serve ang uns nga sentence.
b. P v. Dola: Ang A gi hatolan nga guilty ug 3 ka case nga frustrated homicide, less serious PI ug trespassing; SC: the order of severity of penalty must be followed
c. 3-fold rule: (requires at least 4 sentences)the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than 3x the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him.
Note: Kelangan gamay ang result sa times kaysa add para ma-apply ang 3FR (The 3FR appliesonly when the total of all the penalties imposed exceed the most severe multiplied by 3)
c.1. Ex. 4 separate cases convicted: 1. Homicide - 14Y, 8m and 1d, 2. another case - 17Y, 4M and 1 d, 3. another case - 14 y and 8m, 4. last case - 12Y, so total is 59Y, 8M and 2D;
so 17Y, 4M and 1 d (most severe of the penalties) x 3 = 52Y and 3D versus 59Y, 8M and 2D, thus, the 3-fold rule applies but the law provides that only up to 40 years
c.2. The 3-fold rule applies only when the convict has to serve at least 4 sentences
c.2.1. 3FR does not apply: A was convicted of 3 crimes of homicide for each he was sentenced to 12Y and 1D (adding or multiplying has the same result)
c.2.2. 3FR does not apply: 1. 12Y and 1D, 2. 14Y,8M and 1D, 3. 17Y, 4M and 1D = 44Y and 3D versus 52Yand 3D
c.2.3. 3FR applies: say 4 crimes of homicide with 12Y and 1D penalty each = 48Y and 4D versus 36Y and 3D
d. P v. Geralde: 3FR applies irrespective of the fact that: 1. different offenses are charged in several informations; 2. different offenses are included in a single prosecution; 3. several
cases are tried before the same court or in different courts
d.1. Torres v. Supt.: 3FR applies although the penalties were imposed for different crimes, at different times x x x
e. 3FR applies only when the convict has to serve continuous imprisonment for several offenses. If the convict already served sentence for 1 offense, that imprisonment will not be
considered for the purpose of 3FR, if after his release he commits again and is convicted of a new offense
f. Bagtas v. Director of Prisons: Subsidiary imprisonment forms part of the penalty; A was found guilty in 17 crim cases (estafa) the most severe of the 17 sentences being 6M and 1D
plus a fine of P 8,000. After serving 18M and 3D in prison, A filed a petition for writ of HC invoking 3FR and further contended that the SI for non-payment of the fine should be eliminated because of A. 70 (4); SC: The imposition of the 3FR does not preclude SI for failu
g. P v. Salazar: Court must impose all the penalties for all the crimes of which the accused is found guilty; nowhere in the law (A. 70) mentioned that the court should make a computation and, in its
decision, sentence the culprit to not more than 3 fold the most severeof the penalties imposable upon him. Computation is for the prison authorities to undertake.
h. Different systems of penalty:
h.1. material accumulation system - all the penalties for all the violations are imposed even if they reached beyond the natural span of human life (Pars. 1, 2 and 3 of A.70)
h.2. juridical accumulation system - limited only to 3/4 (pars. 4, 5 and 6 of A. 70)
h.3. Absorption system - complex crimes, continuing crimes and special complex crimes

Art. 71. Graduated scales

a. Uy Chun Hua v. Dingalasan: The penalty next lower in degree of Arresto Mayor is Destierro.
b. Destierro although a correctional penalty under (A.27) is considered not higher than arresto mayor, thus, fall under the jurisdiction of MTC.
c. Must destierro be applied only when it is specifically imposed by law? NO, because it may be imposed when it is next lower in degree
d. Arts. 25, 70 and 71 compared:
25 - classifies penalty into 2; D is above A menor because it is a correctional penalty
70 - classifies the penalty for the purposeof successive service of sentence accoridng to their severity; D is under A menor because it is more lighter
71 - classifies the penalty for the graduation of the same under A. 61; D is above A menor because it is a correctional penalty

Art. 72. Preference in the payment of civil liabilities

Section 3: Provisions common in the last two preceding sections

Art. 73. Presumption in regard to the impositionof accessory penalties

Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases

a. Reason: Because DP must be specifically imposed by law as a penalty for a given crime
b. Death cannot be the penalty next higher in degree when not provided by law

Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees ( note: reduced according to the stage and/or degree of participation)
a. Example of reducing fine by 1 or 2 degrees
Say fine is 200-2,000; Do not touch the minimum (200); divide 2000 by 4 (1/4) = 500
So 1 degree lower will be 200 (minimum) to 1,500 (maximum) so on and so forth
b. Example of increasing fine by 1 degree
Say fine is not less than 200 and not more than 6000
So 1 degree higher will be 200 (minimum) to 7,500 (maximum) so on and so forth
 c. P v. Quinto: When the minimum is not fixed by law, the determination is left to the sound discretion of thecourt without exceeding the maximum authorized by law.
d. last par.: Ex. De los Angeles v. People: Direct Bribery (A. 210) which involved a bribe of 2,300, so fine is 3x = 6,900; thus,if attempted the fine will be 2,300-3,450

Art. 76. Legalperiod of duration of divisible penalties

a. Example Reclusion Temporal - to determine the maximum of minimum; maximum of medium; maximum of maximum
20Y - 12Y = 8Y/3 = 2Y and 8M; thus minimum is 12Y and 1D to 14Y and 8M; so on and so forth

Art. 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of 3 distinct penalties
a. Complex penalty - a penalty prescribed by law composed of 3 distinct penalties, each forming a period; the lightest of them shall be the minimum, the next medium and the most severe the max period.
b. Ex. Art. 114 penalty is RT-Death; Death= max period, RP=medium;RT=minimum

Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225)

Purpose: P v. Ducosin: "to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness"
a. (mandatory) The court must determine 2 penalties, the maximum and minimum terms - purpose: 1. if have served the min he may be qualified for parole; 2. if violated the parole condition,
serve the remaining max sentence, 3. even if served minimum but not qualified,continue serve imprisonment until the end of max term.
a.1. When the crime is punished by SPL
a.1.1. minimum - shall not be less than the the minimum prescribed; maximum - shall not exceed the maximum fixed
a.1.2. Ex. Illegal possession of FA's (1Y and 1D to 5Y): So the court can impose an indeterminate sentence from 2Y and 1D to 4Y, or 2Y and 1D to 3Y or 3Y and 1D to 5Y
a.1.3. the minimum confers upon the courts in fixing the penalties the widest discretion that the courts may have
a.2. When the crime is punished by the RPC
a.2.1. minimum - shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;
a.2.1.1. The rules of the Code are not applicable in fixing the minimum term
a.2.1.2. The fixing of the minimum isleft to the sound discretion of the court based on the age, health, conduct, education, demeanor during trial, gravity of the offense
and circumstances in which the crime was committed.
a.2.2. maximum - shall be that which,in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of RPC
a.2.2.1. The maximum term is determined according to the rules of the Code (Arts. 46, 48, 50-57, 61, 62,64,65, 68,69 and 71)
a.2.2.2. P v. Garbes: The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
a.2.3. Ex. Falsification of official doc penalized by PM with 1 MC of plea of guilty; so max is PM minimum (why? Because of A. 64 (2)); minimum will be PC in any of its periods
a.3. Illustrations of indeterminate penalty based on Articles 48, 61, 64,68, 69 and etc., of the RPC
a.3.1. Art. 64 (1): Homicide is RT, no AC or MC present, so, maximum is RT med while minimum is anywhere of PM
a.3.2. Art. 64 (2): Homicide is RT, with 1 MC of plea of guilty, so maximum is RT min while minimum is anywhere of PM
a.3.3. Art. 64 (3): Homicide is RT, with 1 generic AC (disregard of rank), so maximum is RT max while minimum is anywhere of PM
a.3.4. Art. 64 (4): Homicide is RT, with 1 generic AC (nighttime) and 2 MC (voluntary surrender and plead guilty), so maximum is RT min while minimum is anywhere of PM
a.3.5. Art. 48: Frustrated Homicide with assault upon PIA is PM max, so maximum is PM max while minimum is PC max (P v. Dosal); Lontoc v. People: estafa thru falsification
of public document - same as penalty in P v. Dosal but minimum is anywhere in PC
a.3.6. Indeterminate penalty when the penalty is next lower by 2 degrees than that prescribed by law for the crime threatened and there is 1 AC (grave threat,threatened tokill the OP if
money not given, so RT (homicide man) but 2 degrees lower is PC; SC: P v. Kho Choc - PC max (1AC) or 4Y, 2M and 1D to 6Y; it can be argued in other way that max is PC max, min is AM
a.3.7. Complex crime with 2 MC (Art. 48 and A. 64 (5)): estafa thru falsification by a public officer so, penalty is PM max but there are 2 MC (plead guilty and voluntary surrender)
although the penalty prescribed by the Code is PM in its full extent, it should not be the starting point for determining the minimum because there is a privileged MC.
This is the exception to the general rule. Thus, PC will be the starting point and AM will be the penalty next lower. So max is PC MAX and min is AM.
a.3.7.1. P v. Gonzales: the accused committed homicide and was a minor, so privileged MC, and 1 MC of plea of guilty. So RT minus 1 degree lower = PM + complex crime =
PM max minus 1 MC = PM minimum period; Thus max is PM min and minimum is PC
a.3.8. Indeterminate sentence when there are privileged MC and ordinary MC: PMC (minority or incomplete self defense) + OMC = RULE: lower first the penalty prescribed
by the Code for the offense by 1 degree because of the PMC and make the penalty next lower as the starting point for determining the minimum of the indeterminate penalty.
a.3.9. Indeterminate penalty when there are 2 PMC and OMC (Arts. 68 and 69): P v. Maula - 2 PMC (minority and incomplete self defense) and 1 OMC (voluntary surrender);
so, if he committed homicide penalty is RT, thus , maximum is PC minimum (2 degrees lower + 1 OMC) while minimum is A Mayor
a.3.10. Indeterminate penalty when there is incomplete self defense without OMC or AC: P v. Jaurigue - 1 PMC (incomplete self defense), thus, AM med - PC med
a.3.11. Indeterminate penalty when there is incomplete defense with 2 OMC and without any AC (Arts. 69 and 64 (5)): P v. Nicolas - 1 PMC + 2 OMC = A mayor med
a.4. The ISLAW as a rule is intended to favor the defendant in a criminal case particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment depending upon his behavior, etc.
 a.5. Take note who are disqualified (10)
a.5.1 "Persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment":
a.5.1.1. A is convicted of murder punishable with the penalty of RP to death with 2 OMC, Is he entiltled to ISLAW? A: Yes, ISLAW used the word "punished" not "punishable".
It would seem that it is the penalty actually imposed,not the penalty that may be imposed, that should be considered.
a.5.1.2. The application of ISLAW is based on the penalty actually imposed; Ex. P v.Dimalanta, felony punishable is PC but the court imposed him only 6M, thus, not exceed 1 yr.
a.5.2. P v. Yu Lian: ISLAW is applicable to a recidivist for the first time
a.5.3. "Those who have evaded the service of the sentence": Sentenced to destierro and entered the prohibited area and committed robbery,thus,if convicted of robbery
not entitled
a.5.4. "Those who shall have escaped from confinement": Guilty of robbery and was found out that an escaped prisoner - not entiled; P v.Perez: a minor who escaped the Phil.
Training School is not excluded from the benefits of ISLAW because his confinement is not considered as an imprisonment; P v. Co; escaped from mental hospital and committed homicide
is not excluded from the benefits of ISLAW because it is not a form of imprisonment, thus, did not acquire the status of an escaped prisoner.
a.5.5. "does not exceed 1 year": A is convicted of 8 months - not entitled
a.5.6. ISLAW doesnot apply to destierro

Probation Law (PD 968)

a. Probation may be granted even if the sentence imposed a fine only, but with subsidiary imprisonment
b. Upon application by defendant for probation, the court may suspend the execution of the sentence. Note: The convict is not immediately placed on probation, for no person shall
be placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the probation officer and a determination by the court (Sec. 5)
b.1. Probation is filed in court
b.2. Convict who filed an application for probation cannot appeal because it is a waiver of the right to appeal.
b.3. An order granting or denying probation is not appealable.
b.4. Nature of order granting probation - Baclayon v. Mutia: not a sentence but a conditional order placing the convict under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by
a final judgement of discharge,if the conditions of the probation are complied with or by a finaljudgement of sentence if the conditions are violated.
b.4.1. Amandy v. People: Even if a convicted person falls within the classes of those qualified forprobation, the grant thereof is not automatic or ministerial. Probation is a privilege abd its
grant rests upon the discretion of the court. The discretion is exercised primarily for the benefit of the society as a whole and only secondarily for the personal advantage of the accused.
b.5. Baclayon v. Mutia: Accessory penalties are deemed suspended once probation is granted.
b.6. Budlong v. Apalisok: Probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case. The court must hear the civil aspect.
c. Probation officer to submit the investigation report not later than 60 days and the court to resolve the application for probation not later than 15 days after receipt of the report.
c.1. pending submission of report and resolution of the petition, defendant may be released under his bail filedin the criminal case or if cannot post bail through recognizance.
d. Criteria for placing an offender on probation.
d.1. When probation shall be denied.
d.2. Who are the offenders disqualified for probation
d.3. Purpose of the probation system (Sec. 2)
e. Conditions of probation
e.1. General or mandatory (a) and (b)
e.2. Special or discretionary are those additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the law; the enumeration however is not inclusive, there are innumerable conditions
which may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer which shall be realistic,purposive and geraed tohelp the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual.
f. Duration of probation.
g. When may a probationer be arrested,and what is the dispositon once he is arrested? Sec. 15
h. Termination of probation - Sec. 16
h.1. Bala v.Martinez: The expirtaionof the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation. Probation isnot coterminous with its period. here must first be issued by the court
,an order offinal discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probationofficer. Only fromsuch issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.

Chapter 5: Execution and Service of Penalties

Section 1: General Provisions
Art. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed
a.The judgment must be final (Rule 120, Sec. 7)

Art. 79. Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in case of insanity
 a. An accused personmay become insane:
a.1. at the time of the commission of the offense - exempt from criminal liability
a.2. at the time of trial - suspend the trial and confine him to the hospital until he recovers
a.3. at the timeof final judgment - execution of the penalty is suspended with regard to the personal penalty only
a.4. while serving sentence - execution of the penalty is suspended with regard to the personal penalty only
b. Civil liability may be executed even in case of insanity of convict.

Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents

a. repealed by 9344

Section 2: Execution of principal penalties

Art. 81. When and how death penalty is to be executed
Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit
Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence
Art. 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same
Art. 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the persons executed and its burial
a. In view of the enactment of RA 9346, death penalty may not be imposed. Thus, Articles 81-85 of the RPC have no application.

Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua - Arresto mayor

Art.87. Destierro
a. Destierrois imposed: 1. Art. 247, 2. When a person fails to give bond for good behavior (A. 284); 3. As a penalty for the concubine in the crime of concubinage; 4. When after lowering the
penalty by degrees, destierro is the proper penalty.
b. Entering the prohibited area is evasion of service of the sentence.

Art. 88. Arresto Menor

a. P v.Torrano: wonam of 50 years of age, respectable member of the community and has a store as their means ofliving; SC: Not a plausible reason
b. P v. Dayrit: suffering from TB; SC: serve the penalty in the house of defendant is okay

Title 4: Extinctionof Criminal Liability

Chapter 1: How criminal liablity is totally extinguished
Art. 89. How criminal liablity is totally extinguished.
a. does not necessarily mean that the civilliability is also extinguished (Petralba v. Sandiganbayan).
b. Extinction of criminal liability is a ground for motion to quash (Sec. 3(g),Rule 117).
c. Grounds:
c.1. Death of the convict (P v. Misola: Death of offended party does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender)
c.1.1. whether before or after finaljudgment is extinguished because it is personal, alang2 imo anak or asawa ang prisohon….
c.1.2. Note: dies before FJ = criminal and civil liability is extinguished; dies after FJ = only criminal liability is extinguished
c.1.3. GR: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability based solely on the offense committed.
c.1.3.1. Exception: The claim forcivil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict,
such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts (P v.Bayotas).
c.1.3.2. Ex. Belamala v. Polinar: The claim for civil liability based on law may also be made in the offense of physical injuries, since Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil
action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Note: the separate civil must be filed against the executor or administrator
of the deceased in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 87 of ROC
c.1.3.3. Ex.Torrijos v. CA: Claim for civil liability based on contract may also be made in the offense of estafa when the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself
but from a civil contract of sale (as when accused had swindled the vendees of the property of the sale); Note: The separate civilaction must be filed against the estate of the
deceased in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 86.
c.1.3.4. P v. Bayotas: Right of offended party to file a separate civil action is not lost by prescription when accused dies pending appeal because under the A. 1155 of the
Civil Code prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court.
c.2. Service of sentence
 c.2.1. Salgado v. CA: Service of sentence does not extinguish civil liability
c.3. Amnesty
c.3.1. Amnesty - is an act of the sovereign power granting oblivion or a general pardon for a past offense, and is rarely, if ever, exercised in favor of a single individual, and is usually exerted
in behalf of certain classess of persons, who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted (Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 602)
c.3.2. Amnesty completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects but do not extinguish the civil liability (US v. Madlangbayan)
c.3.3. Amnesty maybe granted after conviction.
c.3.4. Examples of Amnesty: 1. 1948 - Pres. Roxas granted amnesty to thosewho collaborated with the enemyduring WW II thru Proc. 51; 2. 1948 - Pres.Quirino granted amnesty thru
Proc.76 to HUKS (against the Phil.Govt during Japs occupation) who committed rebellion; 3. 1987 - Pres. Aquino granted amnesty thru Proc. 80
c.4. Absolute pardon
c.4.1. Pardon - an act of grace proceding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punsihment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.
c.4.2. 1. A = political offenses, P - any crime; 2. A = before trial, P = convicted; 3. P = looks forward (accessory penalties may not be removed unless expressly stated, A = looks backward
(obliterates the offense as if he had not committed it); 4. both do not extingusih civil liability; 5. P = need be proved by the personpardoned becauseit is a private act of the CE, A = no need because
the court takesjudicialnotice becauseit is a public act - law (CE makes a Proc and approved by Congress)
c.5. Prescription of crime and penalty
c.5.1. Prescription of crime - forfeiture or the loss of the right of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time.
c.5.2. Prescription of penalty - is the loss or forefeiture of the right of the government to execute the final sentence after the lapse of acertain time.
c.5.2.1. 2 conditions necessary in PP - 1. finaljudgment; 2. the period of time prescribed by law for its enforcement has elapsed.
c.6. Marriage of the offended woman
a. P v. Santiago: The marriage contracted by the offender must be in good faith not to avoid criminal liability.

Art. 90. Prescription of Crime (penalty prescribed by law is the basis)

a. P v. Del Rosario: In computing the period of prescription, the first day is to be excluded and the last day included;Facts: the accused committed Slight PI on May 28, 1953.
An information was filed on July 27, 1953. The MTC sustained the motion to quash holding that it was filed on the 61st day; SC: the information shoud be considered as filed on the 60th day.
a.1. Namarco v. Tuazon: But as regards the month of February of a leap year (every 4 years), February 28 and 29 should be counted as separate days in computing periods of prescription.
Thus, where the prescriptive priod wassupposed tocommence in Dec. 21, 1955,the filing of the action on December 21, 1965 was done after the 10 year period had elapsed - since 1960 and 1964
were both leap years,and the case was thus filed 2 days late; Note: 1960 - 29 days; 1964 - 29 days; Art. 13, Civil Code - months is equals to 30D
b. Yapdiangco v. Buencamino (1983): Where the last day of the prescriptive period for filing an information falls on a Sunday or holiday, the information can no longer be filed on the next
day as the crime has already prescribed.
c. Slander - simple = 2 months; grave = 6 months
c.1. P v. Rarang: The accused cannot be convicted of an offense lesser than that charged if the lesser offense had already prescribed at the time the information was filed; Facts: A was charged with
grave salnder in an information filed on Oct. 19, 1962, which he allegedly committedon July 18, 1962. The court convicted him with simple slander but insteadof dismissing the case
he was sentenced to pay a fine of P 50.00; SC: The accused cannot be convicted of slight slander because it already prescribed when the info was filed.
d. P v.Canson: Crimes (gambling, Art. 195) punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P 200 prescribe in 2 months
e. Destierro is a correctional penalty.
f. Prescription of crimes punishable by fines - see A.26; Note: a fine of P 200 is a light felony not correctional
f.1. P v. Basalo: When fine is an alternative penalty higher than the other penalty which is by imprisonment prescription of the crime is based on the fine; ex. The penalty is arresto menor or a
fine double the value of the property involved, in this case, the accused sold 80 cavans of palay with a total value of 320, so, 640…correctional 10 years prescribed
f.2. P v. Crisostomo: The ruling in the Basalo case applies even if the penalty is arresto mayor and fine.
g. Precriptive period of offenses punsihed under special laws and municipal ordinances. Act 3763 amending Act 3326 (P v.Ramos: not applicable if the special provides for its own prescriptive period)
g.1. fine, not more than 1 month or both = 1 year
g.2. more than 1 month but less than 2 years = 4 years
g.3. 2 years or more but less than 6 = 8 years
g.4. 6 years or more = 12 years
g.5. Internal Revenue Law = 5 years
g.6. municipal ordinances = 2months
g.7. violations of the regulations of certificate of convenience by the LTFRB = 2 months
h. P v.Balagtas: Prescription although not invoked during trial may be invoked on appeal.

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses (Note: Relate it in traffic light);

 Note: (my opinion)2 scenarios: 1. lahos na - di na pwde filan ug caso kay napan-os na kay dugay gi-report sa pulis para filan ug complaint; 2. putol-putol - say light felony (6 mos.); 4 mos. after na gi-report sa pulis and ni
consume ug 15 days pag file ug complaint sa PO (interrupt), gi-dismiss sa court ang case kay naay defect ang complaint, and it took 2 mos. Sa prosecutor to file the amended complaint...
GO! a. The period ofprescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered (if not known to him)by the OP, the authorities or their agents.
Note: Rationale (my opinion): nagpabaya man aw, mo prescribe gyd, dapat unta gireport dayon sa polis….
a.1. The period of prescription commences to run from the date of commission of the crime if it is known at the time of the commission of the offense.
a.1.1. Cabral v. Puno: The offended party had constructive notice of the forgery after the deed of sale , where his signature had been falsified was registered in the office of RD.
a.1.2. Arches v. Bellasillo: Period of prescription of continuing crime never runs.
a.1.3. If a witness of a crime saw the crime (murder) prescription will not run. Ex. W saw A killed B. W kept silent until 25 years he revealed it to the police. It was discovered by the authorities only when W revealed it.
a.2. It is discovery of the crime, not discovery of the offender. Thus, it is not necessary that the accused be arrested (P v. Joson).
STOP! b. It is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.
Note: Rationale (my opinion): Imagine if dili mo-interrupt kadugay mahuman anang PI, arraignment, trial ….., niprescribe nalang wala pamahuman ang trial sa kaso
b.1. Sec. 1, Rule 110 - Filing of complaint with the prosecutor'soffice interrupts running of period of prescription of offense charged.
b.2. P v. Olarte (1967): The filing of the complaint in the MTC, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary investigation,interrupts the period of prescription.
b.3. P v. Abuy (1962): The complaint or information that will interrupt the period ofprescription must be the proper information orcomplaint corresponding to the offense; Facts: A was charged
with trespassing on April 1, 1959 against B but the case was dismissed. On Nov. 13, 1959 (6 months and 12 days later) he was charged with unjust vexation against C. A filed MQ contending that the
it already prescribed; SC: NO, because his basis of counting prescription is trespassing which is not correct. They are separate crimes, thus, the filing of one (trespassing) does not interrupt the prescriptive
period as to the other (unjust vexation).
b.4. P v. Galano (1977): The filing of the information in court of Batangas for estafa, even if erroneous,because it hadno territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged, tolls (interrupts) the running
of the prescriptive periodof the crime, since the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information (Batangas) and proof.
not by the result of proof (after determination that it had nojuris) Facts: Judge sustained the ground of prescription because it did not interrupt since no jurisdiction thus dismissed it; SC: NO,
GO! c. It commences to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted (so dismissed) or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
c.1. Termination of proceedings:
Note: The termination of a criminal case refers to a termination (acquittal) that is final as to amount a jeopardy that would bar a subsequent prosecution.
c.1.1. accused is convicted = not run anymore because proceedings already terminated, humana he is already adjudged as guilty so he will be put in prison
c.1.2. accused is acquitted = not run anymore because proceedings already terminated he is already adjudged as innocent; it will also constitute DJ if it be allowed that the prescription
will run; the State cannot appeal if acquitted
c.1.3. proceedings dismissed = run because not yet terminated, the prosecutor can still re-file the information; so if nagpabaya ang prosecutor, aw…mabahaw na gyud
c.1.3.1. P v. Aquino: A petitioned for dismissal of case and was granted by court - period of prescription runs again; Facts: A was charged with grave oral defamation (6 M prescribe) which was discovered on
Dec. 15, 1973. The information was filed in court on Jan. 24, 1974 (39 days after). On March 14, 1974 (79 days later) the court dismissed (failure to comply the PI reqts.).
Si A wala pa na arraign. Gi-refile ang info pag March 3, 1975 (354 days after dismissal); SC: prescribed already…..Although he can still be prosecuted but already prescribed pag file sa new info
c.2. Reason not imputable to him (accused): if the reason (evaded arrest so trial cannot proceed) is imputable to him = prescription does not run
STOP! d. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines.
d.1. Ex. Si A nag publish ug libelous newspaper and immediately left for Hong Kong where he remained for 3 years. Later,nibalik ug Pinas - Pwde pa filan ug kasokay wala man ni prescribe.
e. Prescription of the offense of false testimony (against defendant)- from time the principal case is finally decided.

Prescription of Election offenses

a. If discovery of offense is incidental tojudicial proceedings, prescription begins when such proceedings terminate;otherwise,
b. from date of commission of offense.

Prescription of violations penalized by special laws and ordinances (Act No. 3326)
a. Begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceddings for its investigation and punishment.
b. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shal begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting DJ.

Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe.

a. The penalties must be imposed by final sentence.
b. In prescription of crimes, it is the penalty prescribed by law that should be considered; in prescription of penalties, it is the penalty imposed that should be considered (in view of the circumstances).
b.1. Ex. A was convicted of falsification and the court imposed the penalty of PC (in view of 2 MC), after 1 month in prison, he escaped and remained at large for 12 years, Q: In case he is captured,
can he be required to serve the remaining period of his sentence?A: NO, already prescribed
c. P v. Hu Hai @ Haya - if the fine is exactly 200: Where the question at issue is the prescription of crime and not the prescription of penalty art. 9 should prevail over Art. 26 because the latter
 has nothing to do with the definition of offenses but merely classifies fine when imposed as principal penalty.
c.1. Ex. A committed a crime for which the law provides a fine of P 200 as a penalty. What is the prescriptive period of the crime? 2 months; but supposing A was convicted and he could not
pay the fine of P 200 and was made to suffer SI but escaped while serving. What is the prescriptive period? 10 years

Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties

Note: Reason why evasion of service of sentence is taken in favor of the convict in prescription of penalties - the escaped convict is a hunted animal, hiding mostly in the mountains and forests
, his life is lived with fear or discomfort loneliness and misery; he has to utilize every ingenuity and means to outwit the government agencies looking for him, with these, the government extends thecondonation or amnesty.
1. That the penalty is imposedby final sentence.
a. Pangan v. Gatbalite (2005): serving sentence which consist of deprivation of liberty.
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
a. Infante v. Warden: Evasion of service of sentence is an essential element of prescription of penalties - Facts: A was convicted of murder and was sentenced to 17 years. On March 6, 1939 (15 years later) he was
granted conditional pardon on the condition that he will not violate any crime in the future. On April 25, 1949 he was found guilty of driving without license. He was committed toprison for violation of
the pardon. Now, engon siya ni prescribe na ang iyang penalty (2 years so correcional = 10 years); SC: NO, because there was no evasion of service of sentence.
b. Period of prescription that ran during the time the convict evaded service of sentence is not forfeited upon his capture. Ex. Si A na convict for a crime punishable by PC. While naa sa
prisohan for 1 month,ni escapo siya ug nagtago for 5 years. Nadakpan balik so gibalik prisohan and nitakas napud ug nagtago for 6 years. Q: Prescribe? A: yes because 11 years na
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty,or committed another crime;
a. Committed another crime (must be before the expiration of the period of prescription). Ex. A sentenced to Arresto Mayor (5 years prescribed) and escaped and gatago for 4Y, 11M and 28D,
but on the next day (4Y, 11M and 29 days) committed theft. Q. Prescribe? A: NO…interrupted because theft was committed before the expiry of 5 years...
b. Evading the service of sentence is not committing a crime before the expiration of the prescription of penalties because the crime referred to must be committed when the prescription
has already commenced to run.
c. P v. Puntillas: Acceptance of conditional pardon interrupts the prescriptive period.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of timefrom the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.

Chapter 2: PartialExtinctionof Criminal Liability

Art. 94. Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability
1. Conditional pardon
a. Conditional pardon - delivered and accepted is considered a contract between the sovereign power of the executive and the convict that the former will release the latter upon compliance with the condition.
a.1. Usual condition imposed upon the convict is that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
2. Commutation of the sentence
a. It is a change of the decision of the court made by the Chief Executive by reducing the degree of the penalty inflicted upon the convict, or by decreasing the length of the imprisonment or the amount of the fine.
b. Art. 83, is acase or exampleof commutation.
c. Biddle v. Perovich: In COS, consent of the offender is not necessary. The public welfare,not his consent, determines what shall be done.
3. GCTA (Note: Amended by Sec. 2, RA 10592 (2013)
a. "3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence."
4. Parole (should be added)
a. Definition - The suspension of the sentence of a convict after serving the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty, without granting a pardon,prescribing the terms upon which the senetence shall be suspended.
b. Pardon v. Parole: Pardon - granted by the Pres. after final judgment in accordance with RAC, Parole - granted by BPP agter serving minimum penalty in accordance with ISLAW; Pardon - may
be prosecuted of A. 159 (violation of the condition), Parole - serve the remaining portion ofhis original penalty

Art. 95. Obligation incurred by a person garnted conditional pardon

a. Infante v. Warden: Condition of pardon is limited to the unserved portion of the sentence,unless an intention to extendit beyond that time is manifest.

Art. 96. Effect of commutation of sentence

Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct (Note: Amended by RA 10592 (2013)
a. Sec. 3, RA 10592 - "preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail"
a.1. "1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
a.2. "2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during detention;
a.3."3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during detention
 a.4. "4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention; and
a.5. "5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.
a.6. "An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct."
b. P v. Martin: No allowance for good conduct while prisoner is released under conditional pardon.

Art. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty (Note: Amended by RA 10592 (2013)
a. Sec. 4, RA 10592, "having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence"
b. "A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code."
c. "This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence."

Art. 99. Who grants time allowances (Note: Amended by RA 10592 (2013)
a. the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail

Title 5: Civil Liability

Chapter 1: Persons civilly liable for felonies (Note: An offense causes 2 classes of injuries - 1. social - against the State (repaired by penalty) ; 2. personal - against the private person (repaired by civil
indemnity) except in the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured in the crime.
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony (Note: Pertinent rules on prosecution of civil action isnotincluded because it is under criminal procedure subject)
a. Basis of civil liability - Occena v. Icamina (1990): to repair the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
b. The civil liability arising from negligence under the RPC is entirely separate and distict from the responsibilty for fault or negligence called quasi-delict (Art. 2176, NCC).But the prty claiming payment
for the damage dine cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant (Art. 2177, NCC)
c. P v. Velez: the dismissal of the information or the criminal action does not affect the right of the OP to institute or continue thw civil action already instituted arising from the offense
because such dismissal does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
c.1. Petralba v. Sandiganbayan: Only the criminal liability,including the fine, which is pecuniary, but not civil, of the acused is extinguished by his death,but the civil liability remains.
d. Civil liability may exist, although the acused is not held criminally liable, in the following cases:
d.1. Acquittal on reasonable doubt - civil action for damages may still be instituted (Art. 29, NCC)
d.1.1. But in Maximo v. Gerochi: Award of civil liability if proven may still be ordered in the judgment of acquittal. To require a separate civil action would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation.
d.2. Acquittal from a cause of non-imputability - does not include exemtion from civil liability (Art. 101, RPC)
d.3. Acquittal in the criminal action for negligence - does not preclude the OP from filing acivilaction based on the theory that the act is also a quasi-delict (Art. 2176)
d.4. When there is only civil responsibility - still you can file a civil case
d.5. In cases of independent civil actions - violation of constitutional rights, defamation, fraud, physical injuries, police fails to render aid (Arts. 31-34, NCC).

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases

a. Exemption from criminal liability (justifying and exempting) does not include exemption from civil liability.
a.1. Art. 12: Par. 1 (imbecile/insane)
a.1.1. persons having legal authority (primarily liable) - if at fault or negligent
a.1.1.1. They can avoid liability by proving that they were not negligent.
a.1.2. property of the minor, insane or imbecile - if not negligent, insolvent, no persons having legal authority
a.1.3. US v. Baggay: If insane is exempted from criminal liability, the court must fix the civil liability and sentence him as to the civilliability to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim.
a.2. Par. 2 (minor) - same as imbecile or insane but with additions
a.2.1. PD 603, Art. 201 and Civil Code: offenders father, mother, guardian
a.2.2. Paleyan v. Bangkili: Father was made civilly liable
a.2.3. The final discharge of a CICL does not obliterate his civil liability (Sec. 39, RA 9344)
a.2. Art. 11: Par. 4 (causing damage while avoiding an evil or greater injury)
a.2.1. General Rule: There is no civil liability in justifying circumstances
a.2.2. Exception: Par. 4 - the one liable is the one benefited by the act which causes damage to another (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil)
a.2.2.1. Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil (1952): Si Domingo driver sa usa ka oil company. Gimandoan siya nga mag deliver gamit ang gas tank truck ug 1,900 liters nga gas sa usa ka transit company.
While nagbalhin sa gas (gikan sa truck padung sa underground gas tank (transit company) naay nahitabo nga sunog. Gidali dayon ug drive ni Domingo ang truck padung sa kalsada (gawas
sa garage) unya pga -abot sa tunga sa kalsada iya gi-abandon ang truck,nagpadayon ug dagan ang truck hantod maabot sa pikas kalsada nga maoy hinungdan nga nasunog ang buildings
pati ang balay ni Anita (OP). Gi filan sila ug kaso nga recklessimprudence resulting in arson pero na dismiss; SC: Ma fall sa par. 4, Art. 11. engon ang SC: Domingo to avoid greater evil or
 harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the tank-truck trailer to the middle of the street, for then the fire would have caused the explosion of the gasoline deposit of the company
which would have resulted in a conflagration of much greater proportion and consequences to the houses nearby or surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this company is one of those for whose
benefit a greater harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the purview of said penal provision.
a.3. Art. 12: Par. 5 (under compulsion); Par. 6 (under impulse)
a.3.1. Primarily liable - persons using violence or causing the fear
a.3.2. Secondarily liable - those doing the act

Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishments
a. Elements under paragraph 1:
1. That the innkeeper, tavernkeperor proprietor of establishment or his employee committed a violation of municipal ordinance or some general or special police regulation.
2. That a crime iscommitted in such inn, tavern or establishment.
3. That the person criminally liable is insolvent.
a.1. If all are persent, the innkeeper, tavernkeeper or any other person or corporation is civilly laible for the crime committed in his establishment. This is known as subsidiary civil
liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers or proprietors of establishments.
a.2. Ex. If homicide is committed in an inn or bar on a Sunday which according to the ordinances should be closed. Since the innkeeper violated the ordinance he shall be subsidiarly
liable (if the offender is insolvent) for the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
b. Elements under paragraph 2:
1. The guests notified in advance the innkeeper or the person representing him of the deposit of their goods within the inn or house.
1.1. De los Santos v.Tam Khey
2. The guests followed the directions of the innkeeper or his representative with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods.
3. Such goods of the guests lodging therein were taken by robbery with force upon things or theft committed within the inn or house.
b.1. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against orintimidation of persons, unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons (Note: Art. 103 is applicable to violations of Revised Motor Vehicle Law - RA 4136, because of Art. 10.)
1. The employer, teacher, person or corporation is engaged in any kind of industry.
a. Carpio v. Doroja: The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action.
b. Telleria v.Garcia: Industry is any department or branch of art, occupation or business; especially one which employs so much labor and capital and is a distinct branch of trade. Hence a
person who owns a truck and uses it in the transportation of his own products is engeged in industry.
c. Clemente v. Foreign Mission Sisters: An enterprise not conducted as ameans of livelihood or profit does not come within the meaning of the term "business," "trade" or "industry".
d. Clemente v. Foreign Mission Sisters: A hospitalis not engaged in industry thus nurese are not servants because they are employed to carry out the orders of the physician,to whose
authority they are subject.
e. Steinmetz v. Valdez: Private persons without business orindustry,not subsidiarly liable. Ex. Your driver nakabang-ga ug lain car and insolvent siya….
2. Any of their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees commits a felony while in the discharge of their duties.
a. Baza Marketing Corp v. Bolinao Security and Investigation Service: The law does not say that the crime of the employee must be the one committed "while in the discharge of his duties".
Facts: Guard asigned sa usa ka establishment nakig conspire sa usa ka taw and gi-unay ug kawat ang mga butang (aircon) sa company nga iya gi-guardan,gifilan ug kaso insolvent man siya,
iya agency maoy pabayron sa civil liability kay during sa time nga pag kawat on duty ang SG; SC: NO, The duty of the security guard was to guard the premises assigned to him; It is clear that
this connivance was not in the discharge of his duties as security guard. It could not be contemplated that an employer will be held responsible for any misdeed that his employee could
have done while performing his assigned tasks.
b. Marquez v. Castillo: Driver nag drive nga wala ang tag-iya (amo) ug wala pud kabalo nga gikuha ang car and na-accident ang driver; SC: not in the performance of duties because his duty is to drive his master
c. Jamelo v. Serfino: There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of the defendant employer, the employee must be first convicted of the felony with which he was charged in the criminal case.
d. Miranda v. Malate Garage and Taxicab: Employer has the right to take part in the defense of his employee.
3. The said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability.
a. Gonzales v. Halili: R driver sa bus, B driver sa jeep, nagbangga thru their respective negligence which caused injuries to G, both convicted of serious PI. Both R and B insolvent. G sued the owner of the bus (amo ni R).
Q. How much does the owner pay? A: full amount but without prejudice to the right of action against B for the contribution.
b. Arambulo v. Meralco: It is not provided under A.103 that the employment of the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his employees will exempt the employer for damages
c. Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc.: Arts. 102 and 103 of the RPC are not repealed by Art. 2177 of the NCC.The latter only provides for prohibition of double recovery.

Chapter 2: What civilliability includes

Art.104. What is included in civil liablity
 a. P v. Mostasesa: The first remedy granted by law is restitution of the thing taken away by the offender; if restitution cannot be made by the offender or by his heirs, the law allows the PR a reparation. In either
case, indemnity for consequential damages may be required.
b. P v. Fortuno: When property taken away is not recovered, the court must order the accused to restore it to its owner or,as an alternative, to pay its just value.

Art. 105. Restitution - usually applies to crimes against property

a. P v. Mostasesa: Facts: the property involved is a fungible thing (tobacco) and invoked A. 1953 of NCC (return the same amount of the same kind, species and quality); SC: The civil liability of the appellants is not governed
by the Civil Code but by Arts. 100-111of the RPC. The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible. The purpose of the law is to place the OP as much as possible in the same
condition as he was before the offense was committed.
b. The general rule is that the owner of the property illegally taken by the offender can recover it from whomsoever isin possession thereof even it was acquired by lawful means. Thus, even
if the property stolen was acquired by purchase without knowing that it had been stolen,such property shall be returned to the owner.
b.1. If the thing is acquired by a person who knows it to be stolen, he is an accessory and he is also criminally liable (see also PD 1612).
b.2. Art. 559 of NCC: The person who has lost any personal property or has been unlawfully deprived thereof cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor, only when the
possessor thereof acquired it in good faith at a public sale.
b.2.1. Varela v. Finnick: Si A na convicto ug estafa kay iya gprenda ang alahas nga gihatag sa iya para baligya. Karon ni file ug petition si B sa owner sa pawnshop para makuha iyang alahas.
SC: The owner of the pawnshop may be obliged tomake the restitution of the jewels because although he acted in GF, he did not acquire it thru public sale.
b.2.2. Reyes v. Ruiz: The court may summon the owner of the pawnshop and after hearng him order the return of the jewels pawned to him without reimbursement. The pawnshop owner may seek his
remedy from the person who pawned the jewels.
b.2.3. US v. Soriano: Carabao is involved. Said purchaser may sue the thief for the recovery of what he had paid.
b.2.4. Chua Hai v. Kapunan: restitution cannot be ordered before final judgment. So the mere filing of criminal action for estafa is no proof that estafa was in fact committed.
b.2.5. US v.Barambangan: If dili party sa case, dili pwde maka-recover; Facts: Si A gikawat niya ang kabaw ni B and gibaligya niya ni C. Gi-filan si A ug theft. Si C gi-mandoan sa korte nga ihatag ni B ang kabaw ug si A bayaran niya si C.
Q: Pwde ba maka-recover si C sa same case(theft)?; A:NO, because separate crimes (A committed theft against B and A committed estafa against C) and the offended parties are different.
b.2.6. P v. Pantig: If liability based sa contract (utang), no restitution.
b.2.7. P v. Alejano: If ma-acquit ang accused, pwde pa ba makarecover? Yes, provided the offense is proved (theft) and it is shown that the thing belongs to somebody else.
c. Ang restitution is limited raba sa crimes against property? Yes, (De las Penas v. Royal Bus Co., Inc.)
c.1. P v. Logo: gi-apply sa treason - the defendant was ordered to return the money to the person from whomhetook the same when he committed the treason
c.2. US v.Banila: gi-apply sa abduction case - ordered to return the P 10.00 he took from the girl
c.3. P v. Caldito: gi-apply sa usurious interest

Art. 106. Reparation - usually applies to crimes against property

a.If dili mahimo ang restitution, reparation will be ordered by the court.
b. P v. Dalena: if walay igong ebidensya sa value sa thing, pwde ba ang reparation? NO
c. Ex. US v.Yambao: nagisi nga sanena apil panty tungod sa rape; naguba imong pirtahan kay tungod kay gilungkab plus sa value sa thing nga gikuha;
d. US v. Dionisio: Apil ba sa renta ang reparation? NO; Facts: Si A na convicto ug estafa kay wala niya gi-uli ang bike nga iya gi-rentahan (1.50 per day); SC: dili pwede civil damages are limited to
those caused by and flowingfrom the commission of the crime. The unpaid hire arose under a contract of hire and did not resultin the commissionof the crime. He can recover it in a civil action.
e. P v. Reyes: Pwde naba dili mobayad ang accused if gibayaran na ang OP sa insurance company? NO, pwde gihapon mo-recover ang OP if naay kuwang sa kang A.

Art. 107. Indemnification - crimes against persons

a. Unsay coverage? Ex. In physical injuries, the injured party is entitled to be paid for whatever he spent for the treatment of his wounds, doctor fees, medicine or his salary or wage because of his inability to work.
a.1. Araneta v. Arreglado: Pwde baka maka-claim sa doctors fee bisan wala pa nimo mabayari? Like gi-operahan ka and bayad sa doctor is 100k wala pa nimo bayari and den ni bill naa ng doctor sa imo…YES
b. Copiacio v. Luzon Brokerage: Driver sa amo nakabangga and as a result patay 4 ka taw (2 igsoon), gi-filan ang amo ug damages(kay subsidiarily liable); Q: Pilay bayaran saamo sa brothers binagsa or tibo?; SC: Binagsa, so if tag 1,500each bayaran niya is 3,000
binagsa or tibo?; SC: Binagsa, so if tag 1,500 each bayaran niya is 3,000.
c. Note: Kinds of damages will be explainedin Torts and Damages subject (see p. 945-963) include these pages in Torts and Damages subject

Art. 108. Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages,or indemnification for consequential damages and action to demand the same
a. The heirs of the person liable has no obligation if restoration is not possible and the deceased left no property.
b. Civilliability is possibleonly when the offender dies after final judgment.
c. If the case was dismissed because the accused was granted amnesty, indemnity is not proper in the same criminal proceeding; the heirs of the deceased must file the same in a civil action.
 Art. 109. Share of each person civilly liable (Murag ga chi-in2 ug magtagay mo - ang datu maoy dako ug amot ang way trabaho libre/gamay ra amot)
a. P v. Tampus (2009): The persn with greater participation in the commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played aminor role in the crime or those
who had noparticipation in the crime but merely profited fromits effects.
a.1. Each principal should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory
a.2. Care should also be taken in considering the number of principals versus that of accomplices and accessories.
b. Ex. Civil liability is 6,000 with 1 principal and 3 accomplices; so 1P = 3000; 3A = 1,000 each

Art. 110. Several and subsidiary liablity of principlas, acomplices and accessories of felony
a. Self-explanatory

Art. 111. Obligation to make restitution in a certain case

a. Must not be an accessory, otherwise he will be criminally and civilly liable.

Chapter 3: Extinction and Survival of Civil Liability

Art. 112. Extinction of Civil Liability
a. Art. 1231 of NCC, civil liability is extingusihed:
a.1. payment or performance
a.2. loss of the thing due
a.3. condonation or remission of the debt
a.3.1. Balite v. People: If the OP executed an affidavit withdrawing or condoning any claims, it was ruled that the affidavit of the OP necessarily wiped out the civil indemnity of P 5,000.
a.4. confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor
a.5. compensation
a.6. novation
a.6.1. P v. Tablante: Civil liability is extinguished by subsequent agreeement between the accused and the offended party.
a.7. prescription of crime - Tejuco v. ER Squibb (libel case)
b. US v. Mambang: Offender is civilly liable even if stolen property is lost by reason of force majeure.

Art. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability

a. US v. Madlangbayan: Grant of amnesty does not extinguish civil liability.
b. Art. 36 of RPC - pardon doesnot exempt from civil liability.
c. Budlong v. Apalisok: Application for probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case.
e military character of the accused.
modeposit ug bond

ng to act complained be innocent.

ukom ni B, ang mga
of foresight or lack of skill.

uman gidagkutan as a result naka-cause ug injuries. Iya engon gibuhat to niya

here is injury as a result of discharge, he is liable.

e he performed a felony (rape).

bery with intimidation)
acts necessary to consummate the crime of murder

ng a consummated offense.
of the 3FR does not preclude SI for failure to pay fine; if he will not be able to pay the fine his total penalty is 2Y and 4D (18M and 3D + 6M and 1D of SI)
le 158 of this Code."
00each bayaran niya is 3,000