TIME PRESSURE AND DECISION MAKING

by

MICHAEL ANTHONY DEDONNO

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the Doctor of Philosophy

Dissertation Advisers: Heath A. Demaree & Douglas K. Detterman

Department of Psychology

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

May, 2009
 CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

We hereby approve the thesis/dissertation of

Michael Anthony DeDonno

_____________________________________________________

Doctor of Philosophy
candidate for the ______________________degree *.

Heath A. Demaree
(signed)_______________________________________________
(chair of the committee)

Douglas K. Detterman
________________________________________________

Joseph F. Fagan
________________________________________________

Robert L. Slonim
________________________________________________

________________________________________________

________________________________________________

May 7, 2008
(date) _______________________

*We also certify that written approval has been obtained for any
proprietary material contained therein.
 1

Table of Contents

List of Tables…………………………………………………………………...… 2

Abstract……………………………………………………………………...……. 3

Introduction………………………………………………………………...……... 4

Method…………………………………………………………………….……... 13

Results……………………………………………………………………..……... 16

Discussion………………………………………………………………………... 28

Appendix………………………………………………………………………… 36

References………………………………………………………………………... 42
 2

List of Tables

Table 1 – Good vs. Bad card selection block performance………………...……... 17

Table 2 – Good vs. Bad block performance based on Sufficiency………...……. 18

Table 3 – Analysis of Variance for Good vs. Bad card selection by block…...….. 18

Table 4 – Post-task questionnaire results grouped by Time ……....……………... 20

Table 5 – Explicit knowledge grouped by time……………………...…………. 20

Table 6 – Post-task questionnaire results grouped by Sufficiency..…..………….. 21

Table 7 – Explicit knowledge grouped by Sufficiency…………………...………. 22

Table 8 – Risky vs. Safe card selection block performance….…………...……… 23

Table 9 – Analysis of Variance for Risky vs. Safe card selection by block…........ 23

Table 10 – Regression analysis, Post-task questionnaire responses predicting

overall performance by Sufficiency…………………...………………………….. 25

Table 11 - Regression analysis, Post-task questionnaire responses predicting

overall performance by Time……………………...……………………………… 26

Table 12 - Regression analysis, Post-task questionnaire responses predicting

risk taking total by Sufficiency……………...……………………………………. 27

Table 13 - Regression analysis, Post-task questionnaire responses predicting

risk taking total by Time…...……………………………………………………... 27

Table 14 – Confidence level of knowing which decks were good or bad by group 28
 3

Time Pressure and Decision Making

Abstract

by

MICHAEL ANTHONY DEDONNO

The purpose of the present study was to determine if either time pressure or the

perception of the sufficiency of time affects performance on the Iowa Gambling Task.

One hundred and fifty four participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups.

The first group completed the gambling task without significant time pressure while the

second group completed the task under significant time pressure. Each group was further

divided into two sub-groups. One sub-group was told that the time allotted was sufficient

to complete the task while the second sub-group was informed the time allotted was

insufficient to complete the task. Task performance, defined as explicit knowledge of the

better decks and risk taking behavior, was explored under these time and sufficiency

constraints. The major findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Participants who were

advised that time was sufficient to complete the task outperformed those who were

advised that time was insufficient to complete the task. (2) Participants who were given

ample time to complete the task did not outperform those who were given less time to

complete the task. (3) Sufficiency and time had an impact on explicit knowledge of

which decks were good or bad. (4) Sufficiency and time did not have an effect on the

selection of cards from risky or safe decks. Developers of time management products

would be well advised to include exercises that would build the individuals confidence in

completing tasks under stressed time limits. The goal is not to maximize our time but to

optimize our abilities to make quality decisions within each moment of time.
 4

Introduction

In the 2006 World Cup Soccer Championships, a French player Zinedine Zidane,

head-butted his Italian opponent. As a result, he was ejected from the game possibly

costing his team the World Cup Title (Cone, 2006). Moments before the incident, Mr.

Zidane probably did not think through the ramifications of his action. Instead, his

emotions at that moment most likely instigated his decision. This past September, Floyd

Landis lost his case when arbitrators upheld the results of a test that showed that the 2006

Tour de France champion used synthetic testosterone to fuel his victory (Zalewiski, 2007).

Most likely, Mr. Landis had ample time to consider his decision. Unfortunately, even

with mental contemplation, he made a bad decision. In the first example above, emotions

at that moment in time swayed the decision. The second example suggests that even with

ample time for thought, a bad decision can be made.

Decision Making

The processes involved in decision-making can be separated into two broadly

defined components. The first component is the cognitive process frequently termed

“cold” processing. This is the purely rational component of decision-making.

Physiologically, cognitive processes are largely controlled by the dorsal executive system

which includes the dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex and the lateral parietal cortex. The

second component is emotional processing, which has been termed “hot” processing

(Goel, & Dolan, 2003). Research has shown that the ventral affective system –

comprised of the amygdala, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the ventromedial

 5

prefrontal cortex – show heightened activation when emotions are involved in decision-

making (Bechara, & Damasio, 2005).

Standard economic models of human decision making recognize the decision

maker as a purely rational “cold” cognitive machine (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom,

& Cohen, 2003). However, psychologists have found that emotional, or “hot,”

processing plays a role in decision making (Bechara, & Damasio, 2005; Ernst, et al.,

2002; Phelps, 2006). The interaction of the rational and emotional processes in decision

making can be effectively illustrated by a simple task known as the Ultimatum Game.

Designed by W. Guth et al. (1982), two players are randomly assigned to be a proposer or

responder. The proposer is given a sum of money, typically $10, and is instructed to

offer some of the money to the responder. Once the responder has received an offer from

the proposer, s/he can either accept or reject the offer. If accepted, the money is divided

accordingly. However, if the responder rejects the offer, then both players receive

nothing. The standard economic or rational solution would be for the proposer to offer a

small amount such as $1.00, and for the responder to accept the amount because

something is better than nothing. However, behavioral research has found that the modal

division of money is typically around 50% and offers below 20% are usually rejected

(Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). It appears that individuals in certain

circumstances are motivated to turn down monetary reward. Based on participant

reports, low offers are rejected because of anger felt from a perceived unfair offer

(Pillutla, & Murnighan, 1996). To study this further, Xiao & Houser (2005) gave the

responders an opportunity to write a message to the proposer in addition to accepting or

rejecting the offer. Results indicated that the responders tended to accept lower offers
 6

when they could write a note of disapproval to the proposer. It seemed that when the

responder could channel their negative emotions in a letter rather than a rejection, they

behaved more like the economic models would have predicted (Xiao & Houser 2005).

These results provide evidence that emotions play a role in the decision making process.

Later, the Somatic Markers Hypothesis, which more fully discusses how emotions guide

decisions, will be discussed (Bechara et al., 1999).

Time Pressure

Time pressure is a common feature in professional and personal decisions (Maule,

& Hockey, 1993). A project manager’s objective is to complete a project within budget,

on time, and to the satisfaction of the customer (Kerzner, 1995). In the field of

economics, time pressure can be felt when buying and selling stocks. Physicians working

with managed care organizations often have a time limit for examining a patient. Time

pressure can be felt in military situations where immediate decisions can have lasting

effects. In education, college bound participants deal with time pressure while taking

college entrance exams.

Managers judge time pressure to be a major constraint in the quality of their

decisions (Isenberg, 1984). Researchers have provided support for this belief by

demonstrating that time pressure reduces the quality of decision-making (Payne, Bettman

& Johnson, 1993, 1995), and that confidence in the quality of a decision declines under

time pressure (Bockenholt, & Kroeger, 1993). Complaints of insufficient time are the

most frequently reported everyday minor stressor reported by all except the elderly

(Chamberlain, & Zika, 1984).

 7

The Study of Decision Making & Time Pressure

Modern decision-making and time pressure studies use games with simple

behavioral solutions and ecologic validity (Haselhuhn, & Muellers, 2005). Researchers

incorporate time constraints to study the tradeoff of effort and accuracy in decision

making. Time constraints are used in an attempt to alter effort in a decision-making task.

Accuracy in the task is then analyzed for changes due to the altered level of effort. A

study performed by Svenson and Edland (1987), for example, asked participants to

choose between apartments under time pressure or no time pressure. The apartments

were characterized by three attributes – travel time to the university, size, and quality,

such as a step down living room. The no time pressure group preferred larger apartments

farther from school. The time pressured group preferred smaller apartments closer to

school. Since distance to school was considered the strongest negative aspect, the results

suggested that greater weight was given to negative information under time pressure

(Svenson, & Edland, 1987). In another study, Rubinstein (2004) investigated the

response time of participants in game situations on the Internet. Results showed actions

that were instinctive and derived from emotional responses required less response time

than actions requiring the use of thought (Rubinstein, 2004). The research described

above provides evidence that time pressure has an impact on various decisions.

Since most decisions have a degree of uncertainty, it’s important to consider the

effects of time pressure on risk taking. It has been demonstrated that time pressure

induces less extreme judgments (Kaplan, Wanshula, & Zanna, 1993), and reduces the

propensity to take risks (Ben-Zur & Breznitz, 1981). In one study, participants made
 8

decisions between gambles under three different levels of time pressure. Analysis of the

data found that participants made less risky choices under increased time pressure (Ben-

Zur & Breznitz, 1981). Further research has shown that time pressure actually causes

different decisions depending on the anticipated outcome. In one study, Busemeyer

(1993) found that individuals under time pressure exhibited increased risk taking when

the expected value of a decision was positive. When the expected value was negative

however, there was a decrease in risk taking (Busemeyer, 1993).

While the research described above highlights time pressure as being the force

that acts upon the decision maker, Maule and Hockey (1993) have suggested an

alternative hypothesis. The variable state activation theory (VSAT) suggests individuals

actively decide if the time available is sufficient to complete the task. For example, a

decision under time pressure will not be stressful if the individual believes s/he has the

resources to make a decision effectively within the allotted time. However, if the

individual believes the time allotted is insufficient, then stress will be felt resulting in an

impact to the decision making process (Maule, & Hockey, 1993). To test this theory,

Svenson & Benson (1993) gave two groups the same amount of time to complete a task.

One group was told that the time allotted was sufficient to complete the task while the

second group was told the time was insufficient to complete the task. Results showed

that only the group that was told time was insufficient showed decreased task completion

(Svenson, & Benson, 1993). Another study used two different time constraints. One

group was given half the time typically needed to solve a problem, while the other group

was given twice the time needed. Each group was further divided into either being told

the time was sufficient or insufficient to solve the problem. Results showed that the
 9

independent variable of sufficiency had a stronger impact on the dependent variable of

solving the problem than did the independent variable of time (Maule, & Maillet-

Hausswirth, 1995).

There are several conclusions that can be made from the research described above.

First, decision-making is an important aspect of our daily lives. Second, individuals use

rational “cold” processing and emotional “hot” processing during many decisions. Third,

time pressure has an impact on the degree of risk taking in certain decisions. Finally,

individuals differ in their perception to the amount of time needed to complete a task.

A Decision Making Task

The Iowa Gambling Task is a well established assessment tool and its use by

researchers has helped reveal the value emotions play in decision making (Evans, Kemish,

& Turnbull, 2004). The task simulates real-world decisions in terms of uncertainty,

reward, and punishment (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999). Participants choose

from among fours decks of cards. Two decks – A and B – have high immediate gains but

larger future losses, i.e., negative utility (bad decks). The two remaining decks – C and D

– yield lower immediate gains but smaller future losses, i.e., positive utility (good decks).

In addition, decks B and D have higher variance between wins and losses, making them

riskier decks. The other two decks A and C have smaller variance between wins and

losses making them safer decks. The goal of the task is to maximize profit on a loan of

play money.

The task has provided evidence that decision-making is guided by emotions. In

one study using the Iowa Gambling Task, Bechara et al. (1999) tested individuals with
 10

damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, lesions to the amygdala, and healthy

controls. The groups performed the gambling task while their skin conductance

responses were measured. The healthy individuals generated skin conductance responses

at two different points throughout the task. First, they immediately began generating skin

conductance responses after the selection of each card. This was due to the reward or

punishment depending on the card being good or bad. Second, as the healthy individuals

played the game, they began generating skin conductance responses prior to the selection

of a card. These anticipatory skin conductance responses were more pronounced when

selecting cards from the bad decks than the good decks. Further, based on self-report, the

healthy individuals did not explicitly realize which decks were good until about trial 50.

At around Trial 50, healthy individuals began selecting the good cards quite regularly

throughout the remainder of the game. Conversely, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex

and the amygdala patients failed to generate skin conductance responses before picking a

card and continued to select from the bad decks throughout the 100 card selections

(Bechara et al., 1999). This observation led to the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara

et al., 1998). The hypothesis attributes the inability to realize the better decks to a defect

in an emotional mechanism designed to rapidly signal the prospective consequences of an

action (Bechara, Damasio, 2005). In a healthy individual, body states evoked by the

experience of reward or punishment signal the potential consequences of an outcome.

These signals then guide the individual’s behavior in a manner advantageous in the long

term (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, 2000).

Time constraints have been used in conjunction with the Iowa Gambling Task.

Cella and colleagues (2007) for example, had participants complete the Iowa Gambling
 11

Task under one of three different conditions. A control group completed the task under

no time constraint. Another group was given two seconds to select a card while the third

group was given four seconds to select a card. Results showed a significant drop in

performance with the reduction in time (Cella, Dymond, Cooper, & Turnbull, 2007).

This study provides evidence of a link between time pressure and emotional based

learning in decision making as measured by the Iowa Gambling Task.

To summarize, time pressure and decision making are part of daily life. The

fields of economics and psychology have explored the aspects of time pressure and

decision making. The variable state activation theory suggests the perception of time

pressure affects decision making. Finally, the somatic marker hypothesis suggests

emotions guide decision making.

The present study investigated the effects of time pressure or the perception of the

sufficiency of time on “cold” rational processing and “hot” emotional processing in

decision making. As described earlier, most studies in this area focus on the effect time

pressure has on the rational strategies in decision making and have not parsed the

emotional and cognitive components (Svenson, & Edland, 1987; Payne, Bettman &

Johnson, 1993; Rubinstein, 2004; Cella, Dymond, Cooper, & Turnbull, 2007). As with

previous research (Cella et al., 2007), the present study used the Iowa Gambling Task

with time constraints. However, the present study added instruction as to the time

allotted being sufficient or insufficient to complete the task. In addition, the study

included a self report questionnaire designed to parse the emotional and cognitive

components of decision making. Finally, risk taking behavior under time pressure was

investigated. These components provided the foundation for the following questions: 1)
 12

does a time limit have an impact on emotional and/or cognitive processing in decision

making, 2) does the perception of the sufficiency of time have an impact on emotional

and/or cognitive processing in decision making, 3) does a time limit or the perception of

the sufficiency of time have an impact on risk taking?

The value of the present study is significant. Decision making strategies can be

modified to include steps that consider the individuals perception of time and emotional

state. Being aware of the effects time pressure has on risk taking can allow individuals to

avoid unwarranted risk taking. Finally, future research can explore the emotional and

cognitive components separately, to understand in more detail their impact on decision

making.

The purpose of the present study was to determine if either time pressure or the

perception of the sufficiency of time affect “cold” (rational) or “hot” (emotional)

processing important to many decisions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of

two groups. The first group completed a decision making task without significant time

pressure. The second group completed the task under significant time pressure. Each

group was further divided into two sub-groups. One sub-group was told that the time

allotted was sufficient to complete the task while the second sub-group was informed the

time allotted was insufficient to complete the task. Task performance was compared

under the time and sufficiency constraints.

 13

Methods

Subjects

Participants were undergraduate participants attending a private Midwest

university. Participants were volunteers from introductory psychology courses. A total

of one hundred and sixty three participants participated in the present study. A total of

nine participants were removed from the study due to excessive response time, as defined

as three standard deviations above the mean. As a result, the total number of participants

included in this analysis was one hundred and fifty four. (N=154). The remaining

participants were within the two second required response time, as outlined in the game

instructions. All participants were at least 18 years of age.

Apparatus and Materials

The present study included three standard personal computers running Windows

98. Additional software included the Iowa Gambling Task application. Each computer

was placed in a separate room with a door to minimize external noise. Standard 15 inch

CRT monitors were used and placed about 15 inches from the participant.

In the gambling task, participants are presented four decks of cards on a computer

screen. The decks are labeled A, B, C, and D. Using the mouse, the participant can click

on a card from any of the four decks. Upon selection, a message is displayed indicating

the amount of play money won (reward). On some cards, the win message is followed by

a message indicating the amount of play money lost (punishment). At the top of the

screen is a green bar that changes according to the amount of money won or lost. Below
 14

the green bar is a red bar that shows the amount of money initially borrowed ($2,000.00).

The difference between the two bars is the total amount of play money won or lost.

The goal of the task is to maximize profit on a loan of play money. The

participant selects one card at a time from any deck they choose. They are free to switch

from any deck to another at any time, and as often as they desire. The participant’s

decision to select from one deck versus another is influenced by various schedules of

immediate reward (wins) and future punishment (losses). The schedules are set so that

two decks of cards (A and B) yield high immediate reward but larger future losses, i.e.

negative utility (bad decks). The other two decks (C and D) yield lower immediate gain

but smaller future losses, i.e. positive utility (good decks). In addition, decks B and D

have higher variance between wins and losses, making them riskier decks. The other two

decks A and C have smaller variance between wins and losses making them safer decks.

The time interval between selections of cards is divided into two periods (Bechara

& Damasio, 2005). After the participant selects a card, there is a period of approximately

3000msec where the win money and in some instances lose money is displayed on the

screen. Following the presentation of the reward and punishment is an inter-trial interval

period when a “Please wait” is displayed on the screen. Following the inter-trial interval

period, the phrase “pick a card” is displayed on the screen to notify the individual that

they can now select their next card. During this period the participant makes their next

card selection. On average, the task of selecting 100 cards takes 18-20 minutes to

complete (Bechara & Damasio, 2005).

The task allows certain variables to be manipulated. For the present study, the

inter-trial interval between two consecutive card selections was manipulated depending
 15

on the group. For the relaxed time groups, the inter-trial interval was set to 5000msec.

The stressed time group’s inter-trial interval was set to 1000msec. When “pick a card”

was displayed on the screen, the participant was instructed to select a card within

2000msec. Based on these time settings, the relaxed time groups would finish the game

within 19 minutes while the stressed time groups would require approximately 12

minutes to complete the game. Each deck contained 60 cards with a total of 100 card

selections by the participant.

Upon completion of the task, the participant completed a brief post-task

questionnaire. The purpose of the questionnaire was to obtain ratings of explicit

knowledge and how the participant felt during the game.

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. The first group

completed the Iowa Gambling Task without significant time pressure. The second group

completed the task under significant time pressure. Each group was further randomly

divided into two sub-groups. One sub-group was told that the time allotted was sufficient

to complete the task while the second sub-group was informed the time allotted was

insufficient to complete the task.

Once the participant was seated in the experimental room, they were given

consent forms to review and sign. Upon consent, the experimenter distributed

instructions to the participant. The gambling task instructions were the same for all

groups. These standard instructions have been used in other gambling task experiments
 16

(Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, 2000; Bechara, Damasio, 2005). Appendix A includes the

basic instructions distributed to all participants.

In addition to the standard game instructions, time constraint instructions were

also provided. The sufficient time groups were advised that the timing within the game

was sufficient to consider game activities and determine which decks were better than the

others. The insufficient time groups were advised that the timing within the game was

insufficient to consider game activities and determine which decks were better than the

others. All groups were instructed to select a card within 2000msec of seeing the “pick a

card” on the display. Participant time constraint instructions are included in Appendix B

Once the participant indicated s/he understood the instructions, the experimenter

started the gambling task game. After the participant completed the gambling task,

results were saved. The gambling task results included the order of every card selected,

the total amount of money won or lost and total time. The final requirement of the

participant was to complete the post-task questionnaire. This ended the participant’s

participation in the study.

Results

Data Analysis

Data for these analyses were gathered from two sources, the gambling task

application and a post-task questionnaire. For the gambling task, there were two distinct

types of data. The first set of data was the participant’s selection of good decks vs. bad

decks. The selections from bad decks A and B were subtracted from the number of times

the participant selected from the good decks C and D. For example, if a participant

selected more from the bad decks, s/he would have a negative score. The second set of
 17

data was the selections from risky decks vs. safe decks. The selections from risky decks

B and D were subtracted from the number of times the participant selected from the safe

decks A and C. Therefore, higher positive scores would be the result of selecting more

from the safer decks. The 100 card selections were separated into five blocks of twenty

cards each. This allowed for the tracking of trends in performance as the participants

played the game.

The second set of data was the participant’s responses to a post-task questionnaire.

Of primary interest was the participant’s explicit knowledge of which decks were good

and bad, and risky and safe. The questionnaire also included questions relating to the

participant’s feelings of being rushed and having enough time to complete the task. How

much the participant was able to think before selecting a card, and how much the

participant listened to their gut were additional questions asked. A copy of the post-task

questionnaire can be found in Appendix C.

Before addressing each of the three questions separately, a 2(Time: 1sec, 5sec) x

2(Sufficiency: Insufficient, Sufficient) x 5 (Block: 1-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 81-100)

ANOVA was conducted. The purpose of this analysis was to explore any effects the

independent variables of time and sufficiency had on the dependent variable of good and

bad card selections by block. The analysis indicated that the within-subjects factor of

block was significant F(4,600) = 66.116, p < .01. Table 1 provides detailed good vs. bad

card selection block performance. As can be seen, the participants selected more from

the good decks as they played the game. Post-hoc analysis using the least significant

Table 1. Good vs. Bad card selection block performance

Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total

N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

154 -4.49 6.85 2.71 7.89 4.84 9.12 6.77 9.71 7.92 10.39 3.55 5.89
 18

difference (LSD) test revealed a significant difference (p < .005) in performance between

each individual block, except the difference in performance from block four to block five

(p = .108) which failed to reach significance. The main effect for the between-subjects

factor of sufficiency was also significant F(1,150) = 5.184, p <.05. The sufficient group

selected more cards from the good decks than the insufficient group. Table 2 provides

detailed block performance data by sufficiency level. The main effect for the
Table 2. Good vs. Bad block performance grouped by sufficiency

Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total

Sufficiency N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

Insufficient 79 -4.66 7.5 1.32 7.43 4.58 9.15 5.42 9.59 5.85 10.2 2.90 5.52

Sufficient 75 -4.32 6.13 4.19 8.14 5.12 9.14 8.19 9.69 10.11 10.2 4.65 6.10

Total 154 -4.49 6.85 2.71 7.89 4.84 9.12 6.77 9.71 7.92 10.39 3.55 5.89

between-subjects factor of time was not significant. Additionally, there was no

interaction of block by time or sufficiency. Time or sufficiency did not influence the

selection of good and bad deck performance by block. Finally, there was no time by

sufficiency by block interaction. Table 3 provides details of the Analysis of Variance.

Table 3. Analysis of Variance for Good v. Bad card selection by block

Source df F p
Between subjects
Time 1 0.000** 0.991
Sufficiency 1 5.184** 0.024
Time x Sufficiency 1 0.256** 0.614
Error 150 (171.05)

Within subjects
Block 4 66.116** 0.000
Block x Time 4 0.624** 0.645
Block x Sufficiency 4 1.824** 0.123
Block x Time x Sufficiency 4 1.180** 0.318
Error 600 (54.98)
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
 19

1) Does time have an impact on emotional and/or cognitive processing in decision

making?

While the initial analysis did not show any effects of time on good and bad card

selection performance, a single analysis was conducted on time and performance in the

fifth block. As with many studies of the Iowa Gambling Task, researchers focus on

performance in the fifth block alone (Bechara, et al., 2000; Evans, et al., 2004). This

block tends to show if the participant successfully learned the task or not. Time did not

effect performance in the fifth block F(1,153)=1.390, p = .240. This suggests that time

did not have an effect on the participants ability to learn the task.

Time did have an impact on the participants feeling rushed and having enough

time to complete the task. As presented in Table 4, participants who were given one

second felt more rushed than participants who were given five seconds to complete the

task, t(152) = -2.979, p < .005 level. There was also a significant difference in the two

groups feelings about having enough time. Participants who were given one second felt

they did not have enough time as compared to the participants who were given five

seconds to complete the task at a t(152) = -2.637, p < .05 (see Table 4). A significant

difference was also found between time and how much the participant was able to think

before selecting a card, t(152) = -2.644, p < .05 (see Table 4). Specifically, participants

who were able to think more before selecting a card, performed better on the Iowa

Gambling Task. Finally, there was a marginally significant difference between time and

how much the participants listened to their gut, t(152) = 1.782, p = .077 (see Table 4).

The more participants listened to their gut, the worse they performed on the Iowa

Gambling Task.
 20

Table 4. Post-task questionnaire results grouped by time

Did you Have enough Able to think before How much did you
feel rushed? time? selecting a card? listen to your gut?
Time N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
a b c d
1 second 78 6.92 2.08 6.59 2.06 7.33 1.79 6.18 1.85
a b c d
5 seconds 76 7.86 1.78 7.42 1.84 8.05 1.56 5.59 2.23

Note . Ratings based on 9-point scale.

a
1 = very rushed, 9 = not rushed at all. b1 = not enough time, 9 = more than enough time. c1 = unable to think at all,
9 = enough time to think before selecting a card. d1 = not at all, 9 = entirely gut decisions

The investigation of time on cognitive processing was obtained by the post-task

questionnaire that asked the participants which decks were good and bad. There was a

significant difference between groups in recognizing deck A as a bad deck. The group

given one second did not explicitly realize deck A was bad as well as the group given

five seconds, χ2(1, N = 154) = 6.001, p=.014. Interestingly, the group given one second

did not differ in selecting deck A during the task (M = 13.50, SD = 5.249) from the group

given five seconds (M = 13.00, SD = 6.000), t(154) = .551, p = .583. Finally, as

presented in Table 5, there was no significant difference by time between groups in

explicit awareness of decks B, C, and D.

Table 5. Explicit knowledge grouped by time

Deck A Deck B
2 2
Group Good Bad Total X p Good Bad Total X p
1 Second 14 64 78 23 55 78
6.001 0.014 0.208 0.648
5 Seconds 4 72 76 25 51 76
Total 18 136 154 48 106 154
Deck C Deck D
1 Second 56 22 78 67 11 78
0.202 0.653 0.174 0.677
5 Seconds 57 19 76 67 9 76
Total 113 41 154 134 20 154
 21

2) Does perception of the sufficiency of time have an impact on emotional and/or

cognitive processing in decision making?

Analysis was again conducted on the sufficiency group’s performance on good

and bad card selection in the fifth block. Sufficiency did have a significant effect on

performance in block five F (1,153) = 6.703, p < .05. As presented in Table 2, the group

advised that time was insufficient selected fewer cards from the good decks than the

group advised that time was sufficient to complete the task.

Sufficiency trended to have an impact on the participants feeling rushed to select

a card t(152) = -1.817, p = .071. Specifically, as presented in Table 6, the insufficient

group felt more rushed than the sufficient group. Sufficiency did not affect the

participants feeling about having enough time to complete the task t(152) = -.1.052, p

= .295. A significant difference was found between sufficiency and how much the

participant was able to think before selecting a card, t(152) = -2.023, p < .05. The

insufficient group did not feel they were able to think before selecting a card as well as

the sufficient group (see Table 6). Finally, the difference between sufficiency and how

much the participants listened to their gut was not significant, t(152) = .525, p = .600.

Table 6. Post-task questionaire results gouped by time

Did you Have enough Able to think before How much did you
feel rushed? time? selecting a card? listen to your gut?
Sufficiency N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

a b c d
Insufficient 79 7.10 2.08 6.84 2.02 7.42 1.84 5.97 2.11

a b c d
Sufficient 75 7.68 1.86 7.17 1.96 7.97 1.55 5.80 2.01

Note . Ratings based on 9-point scale.

a
1 = very rushed, 9 = not rushed at all. b1 = not enough time, 9 = more than enough time. c1 = unable to think at all,
9 = enough time to think before selecting a card. d1 = not at all, 9 = entirely gut decisions

The investigation of sufficiency on cognitive processing was obtained by the post-

task questionnaire that asked the participants which decks were good and bad. There was
 22

a marginally significant effect in the explicit recognition of deck A as bad χ2(1, N = 154)

= 3.572, p=.059. As can be seen in Table 7, the insufficient group did not explicitly

realize that deck A was bad as well as the sufficient group. In addition the group advised

that time was insufficient to complete the task selected significantly more from deck A

(M = 14.27, SD = 6.44) than the group instructed that time was sufficient to complete the

task (M = 12.19, SD = 4.389), t(152) = 2.328, p = .021. Sufficiency made a significant

difference in the explicit knowledge of deck D being good. As presented in Table 7, the

insufficient group surprisingly better recognized deck D as good than the sufficient group

χ2(1, N = 154) = 6.363, p=.012. However, the insufficient group did not select from deck

D (M = 31.35, SD = 12.40) any more than the sufficient group (M = 33.97, SD = 11.21),

t(152) = -1.372, p = .172. Finally, as can be seen in Table 7, there was no significant

difference by sufficiency between groups in explicit awareness of decks B and C.

Table 7. Explicit knowledge grouped by sufficiency

Deck A Deck B
2
Group Good Bad Total X p Good Bad Total X2 p

Insufficient 13 66 79 26 53 79
3.572 0.059 0.230 0.632
Sufficient 5 70 75 22 53 75

Total 18 136 154 48 106 154

Deck C Deck D

Insufficient 58 21 79 74 5 79
0.001 0.991 6.363 0.012
Sufficient 55 20 75 60 15 75

Total 113 41 154 134 20 154

3) Does a time limit and/or the perception thereof have an impact on risk taking?

A 2(Time: 1sec, 5sec) x 2(Sufficiency: Insufficient, Sufficient) x 5 (Block: 1-20,

21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 81-100) ANOVA was conducted. The purpose of this analysis was

to explore any effects the independent variables of time and sufficiency had on the
 23

dependent variable of risky and safe card selections by block. The analysis indicated that

the within-subjects factor of block was significant F(4,600) = 4.934, p < .001. Table 8

provides detailed risky vs. safe card selection block performance. As can be seen, the

participants improved their performance as they played the game. Post-hoc analysis

using the least significant difference (LSD) test revealed blocks one, two, & three had

Table 8. Risky and Safe card selection block performance

Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total

N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

154 -4.61 5.12 -4.62 6.47 -4.68 7.74 -2.57 8.64 -2.24 9.67 -3.74 4.87

more risky card selections than blocks four and five at a p < .05 level. The main effect

for the between-subjects factor of sufficiency or time were not significant. Additionally,

there was no interaction of block by time or sufficiency. Time or sufficiency did not

influence the selection of risky or safe deck performance by block. Finally, there was no

time by sufficiency by block interaction. Table 9 provides details of the Analysis of

Variance.

Table 9. Analysis of Variance for Risky v. Safe card selection by block

Source df F p
Between subjects
Time 1 0.010** 0.921
Sufficiency 1 0.118** 0.732
Time x Sufficiency 1 0.883** 0.349
Error 150 (120.13)

Within subjects
Block 4 4.934** 0.001
Block x Time 4 0.438** 0.781
Block x Sufficiency 4 0.436** 0.783
Block x Time x Sufficiency 4 0.221** 0.927
Error 600 (45.076)
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
** p < .01.
 24

Exploratory analyses. Two additional analyses were conducted to explore (1) potential

relationships with task results and post-task questionnaire responses and (2) any group

differences between the degrees of confidence in stating which decks were good and bad.

Regression analyses were conducted to see if any of the post-task questionnaire

responses were associated with Iowa Gambling Task performance within the sufficiency

group. With respect to the insufficient group, regression analysis revealed a number of

interesting findings. As presented in Table 10, the feeling of being rushed was associated

with Iowa Gambling Task performance and explained a significant proportion of the

variance in Iowa Gambling Task performance (R2 = .054, β = .231, p < .05). Specifically,

the participants who felt more rushed did not perform as well as those who felt less

rushed. Next, how much the participants listened to their gut was associated with Iowa

Gambling Task performance and explained a significant proportion of the variance in

Iowa Gambling Task performance (R2 = .060, β = -.246, p < .05). The more the

participants listened to their gut, the worse they performed. How much they were able to

think their decision through was also associated with Iowa Gambling Task performance

and explained a significant proportion of the variance in Iowa Gambling Task

performance (R2 = .057, β = .240, p < .05). Specifically, the more the participant were

able to think their decision through, the better they performed on the Iowa Gambling

Task.

With respect to the sufficiency group, how much the participants listened to their

gut was associated with Iowa Gambling Task performance and explained a significant

proportion of the variance (R2 = .082, β = -.286, p < .05. The more the participants

listened to their gut, the worse they performed. The feeling of having enough time was
 25

also associated with Iowa Gambling Task performance and explained a significant

proportion of the variance (R2 = .058, β = .240, p < .05). Specifically, the more

participants felt they had enough time, the better they performed on the Iowa Gambling

Task. Ability to think their decisions through was associated with Iowa Gambling Task

performance while explaining a significant proportion of the variance (R2 = .127, β = .357,

p < .005). Specifically, the more the participant were able to think their decision through,

the better they performed on the Iowa Gambling Task.

Table 10. Regression analyses, Post-task questionniare responses predicting overall performance by sufficiency

Insufficient Sufficient
Post-task question R2 β p R2 β p
Did you feel rushed? 0.054 0.231 0.040 0.001 0.037 0.754

How much did you listen to your gut? 0.060 -0.246 0.029 0.082 -0.286 0.013

Did you feel you had enough time? 0.033 0.181 0.111 0.058 0.24 0.038

Ability to think your decision through? 0.057 0.240 0.033 0.127 0.357 0.002

Note: Ratings based on 9 point scale

Feeling rushed, 1=very rushed, 9=not rushed at all. Listening to gut, 1=not at all, 9=entirely gut decision
Enough time, 1=not at all, 9=more than enough time. Think decision through. 1=unable to think at all,
9=plenty of time to think

Regression analyses were conducted to see if any of the post-task questionnaire

responses predicted gambling task performance within the time groups. With respect to

the one second group, how much the participants were able to think their decision

through was associated with Iowa Gambling Task performance and explained a

significant proportion of the variance in the Iowa Gambling Task. (R2 = .096, β = .310, p

< .05). Specifically, the more the participant were able to think their decision through, the

better they performed on the Iowa Gambling Task.

In the five second group, how much the participants listened to their gut was

associated with Iowa Gambling Task performance and explained a significant proportion

of the variance in Iowa Gambling Task performance (R2 = .095, β = -.309, p < .05). The
 26

more the participants used their gut, the worse they performed on the Iowa Gambling

Task. The feeling of having enough time, was also associated with Iowa Gambling Task

performance and explained a significant proportion of Iowa Gambling Task performance

(R2 = .083, β = .289, p < .05). The more time the participants felt they had, the better

they performed. Ability to think their decisions through was associated with and

explained a significant proportion of Iowa Gambling Task performance (R2 = .121, β

= .347, p < .005). Specifically, the more the participants were able to think their decision

through, the better they performed on Iowa Gambling Task. See Table 11 for details of

post-task questions grouped by time.

Table 11. Regression analyses, Post-task questionniare responses predicting overall performance by time.

1 Second 5 Seconds
Post-task question R2 β p R2 β p
Did you feel rushed? 0.034 0.184 0.107 0.018 0.133 0.252

How much did you listen to your gut? 0.049 -0.221 0.520 0.095 -0.309 0.007

Did you feel you had enough time? 0.027 0.164 0.152 0.083 0.289 0.011

Ability to think your decision through? 0.096 0.310 0.006 0.121 0.347 0.002

Note: Ratings based on 9 point scale

Feeling rushed, 1=very rushed, 9=not rushed at all. Listening to gut, 1=not at all, 9=entirely gut decision
Enough time, 1=not at all, 9=more than enough time. Think decision through. 1=unable to think at all,
9=plenty of time to think

Regression analyses were conducted to see if any of the post-task questionnaire

responses were associated with card selection from risky or safe decks. As presented in

Table 12, within the insufficient group, the feeling of being rushed was associated with

card selection from risky and safe decks and explained a significant proportion of the

variance in selection of risky and safe cards (R2 = .152, β = .390, p < .005). Specifically,

the more the participants felt rushed, the more they selected from risky decks. Feeling of

having enough time was also associated with risky and safe card selections and explained
 27

a significant proportion of the variance (R2 = .053, β = .229, p < .05). The feeling of not

having enough time also caused participants to select more from the risky decks.

Table 12. Regression analyses, Post-task questionnaire responses predicting risk taking total by sufficiency

Insufficient Sufficient
Post-task question R2 β p R2 β p
Did you feel rushed? 0.152 0.390 0.000 0.005 -0.068 0.561

How much did you listen to your gut? 0.022 -0.148 0.192 0.006 -0.081 0.492

Did you feel you had enough time? 0.053 0.229 0.042 0.002 -0.044 0.705

Ability to think your decision through? 0.040 0.199 0.079 0.064 0.253 0.029

Note: Ratings based on 9 pint scale

Feeling rushed, 1=very rushed, 9=not rushed at all. Listening to gut, 1=not at all, 9=entirely gut decision
Enough time, 1=not at all, 9=more than enough time. Think decision through. 1=unable to think at all,
9=plenty of time to think

With respect to the one second group, regression analysis revealed the feeling of

being rushed was associated with risky and safe card selections and explained a

significant proportion of the variance (R2 = .073, β = .269, p < .05). Specifically, the

more the participants felt rushed, the more they selected from risky decks. Feeling of

being able to think decisions through was also associated with risky and safe card

selections and explained a significant proportion of the variance (R2 = .051, β = .225, p

< .05) Being able to think decisions through caused participants to select more from the

safe decks. Table 13 provides detail to the relationship of post-task questions to risky and

safe card selections by time group.

Table 13. Regression analyses, Post-task questionnaire responses predicting risk taking total by time

1 Second 5 Seconds
Post-task question R2 β p R2 β p
Did you feel rushed? 0.073 0.269 0.017 0.008 0.089 0.445

How much did you listen to your gut? 0.000 0.013 0.908 0.048 -0.220 0.056

Did you feel you had enough time? 0.066 0.004 0.564 0.018 0.136 0.243

Ability to think your decision through? 0.051 0.225 0.048 0.061 0.247 0.032
Note: Ratings based on 9 point scale
Feeling rushed, 1=very rushed, 9=not rushed at all. Listening to gut, 1=not at all, 9=entirely gut decision
Enough time, 1=not at all, 9=more than enough time. Think decision through. 1=unable to think at all,
9=plenty of time to think
 28

An independent samples t-test was conducted to see if there were any group

differences between the degrees of confidence in stating which decks were good and bad.

Specifically, I wanted to see if time or sufficiency had any impact on the participant’s

confidence in their post-task questionnaire responses to decks being good or bad. Results

indicated that there was no difference (p = .141) in the degree of confidence in which

decks were good and bad. Table 14 provides mean confidence results by group.

Table 14. Confidence level of knowing which decks were good or bad by group

Based on Time
A Confidence B Confidence
Time N Mean SD t p Mean SD t p

1 second 78 6.74 1.54 7.08 1.82

-0.075 0.940 -1.152 0.251
5 seconds 76 6.76 1.69 7.39 1.58

C Confidence D Confidence
Time N Mean SD t p Mean SD t p

1 second 78 6.90 1.82 7.05 1.92

-1.480 0.141 -0.606 0.545
5 seconds 76 7.29 1.44 7.22 1.58

Based on Sufficiency
A Confidence B Confidence
Sufficiency N Mean SD t p Mean SD t p

Insufficient 79 6.81 1.54 7.15 1.61

0.448 0.655 -0.607 0.545
Sufficient 75 6.69 1.69 7.32 1.82

C Confidence D Confidence
Sufficiency N Mean SD t p Mean SD t p

Insufficient 79 7.16 1.55 7.24 1.77

0.567 0.571 0.752 0.453
Sufficient 75 7.01 1.75 7.03 1.74

Note : df = 152

Discussion

The major findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Participants who were

advised that time was sufficient to complete the task outperformed those who were
 29

advised that time was insufficient to complete the task. (2) Participants who were given

ample time to complete the task did not outperform those who were given less time to

complete the task. (3) Sufficiency and time had an impact on explicit knowledge of

which decks were good or bad. (4) Sufficiency and time did not have an effect on the

selection of cards from risky or safe decks.

(1) The finding that participants who were advised time was insufficient

performed worse than the participants who were advised time was sufficient to complete

the task supports the variable activation theory (VSAT). The VSAT states that ability is

impacted by an individual’s perception of time being sufficient or insufficient to

complete a task. In the present study, difference in performance on the gambling task

was found in blocks two, four, and five. This difference in performance over several

blocks is important because past research (Maule, & Maillet-Hausswirth, 1995; Maule, &

Hockey, 1993) has focused on a single decision point where the quality of that decision is

impacted by the individual’s perception of time. The present study shows that the

perception of time impacts performance over a period of time. Many jobs in Corporate

America require individuals to work on a specific project for a period of time. Results

from the present study suggest that an individual’s performance throughout a task can be

impaired if s/he believes time is insufficient to complete the task.

Regression analyses were conducted to see if any of the post-task questionnaire

responses predicted gambling task performance within the sufficiency groups. With

respect to the insufficient group, regression analysis revealed a number of interesting

findings. First, participants who felt more rushed did not perform as well as those who

felt less rushed. The feeling of rushed did not predict performance in the one second, five
 30

second, or sufficient groups. These results suggest that it is not the actual time limit that

causes a feeling of being rushed, but the perception of time being insufficient that causes

a feeling of being rushed. Next, the more participants stated they used their gut to make

decisions, the worse they performed. Additionally, the more the participants were able to

think through their decisions, the better they performed. While gut decisions can be of

value in various tasks, the present study suggests that performance in the Iowa Gambling

Task may be based more on thought than on gut feelings.

(2) The null results of time on Iowa Gambling Task performance were a surprise.

Research by Cella et al. (2007) found that a time constraint impacted Iowa Gambling

Task performance. The difference in results could be due to the way time constraints

were set within the task. The time constraint in the present study was adjusted at the

inter-trial interval. In the stressed time limit group, the inter-trial interval was set to one

second while the relaxed time group’s inter-trial interval was set to five seconds.

Research has found that it is during this interval period that physiological changes such as

skin conductance response from winning and losing are most pronounced (Bechara et al.,

1999). Participants were then asked, not forced, to select a card within two seconds of

seeing “pick a card” on the screen. Cella and his team fixed the inter-trial interval at two

seconds and then adjusted the time interval during the period where the individuals had to

pick a card. Cella separated the participants into one of three groups, a one second group,

four second group, and a no time limit (control) group. Once “pick a card” was displayed

on the computer screen, individuals in the two second group were forced to select a card

in two seconds while the four second group was forced to select a card in four seconds.

The control group did not have any forced time limit. In the time limited groups, if the
 31

individual did not select a card in the time allotted, the screen would alert them of being

too slow and then move to the next card selection. The number of time-outs where

individuals did not select a card in time ranged from six to twelve per block in the two

second group. The four second group had a range from one to thee time-outs per block.

Cella found a significant difference in Iowa Gambling Task performance between the two

second group and control group. Upon review of figures in Cella’s paper, the average

score in block five for the two second and four second groups was approximately 2. The

no forced time limit group had an average score in block five of approximately 7.5. In

the present study, the average score in block five for the one second and five second

groups were 6.9 and 8.9 respectively. It appears the present study participants performed

more like the control group in Cella’s study. It may be that the time outs themselves

caused individuals to feel that time was insufficient to complete the task, resulting in

decreased performance. If this was the case, then the difference in performance between

the forced time groups and the non-forced time group would not be due to time but the

individuals feeling or belief that time was insufficient to complete the task. The present

study clearly found evidence to this effect.

To further analyze results within the time groups, regression analyses were

conducted to see if any of the post-task questionnaire responses predicted gambling task

performance within the time groups. With respect to the one second group, participants

who were able to think their decision through outperformed those who were unable to

think their decision through. When time is limited, performance appears to be impacted

by the individual’s ability to think. In a time sensitive situation, an individual’s speed of

processing may play a role in successful task completion. Research has shown that
 32

processing speed is related to an individuals IQ (Fink, Neubauer, 2004). Therefore, it is

possible that individuals with higher IQ’s may be more successful at completing the Iowa

Gambling task under stressed time limits.

(3) The finding that sufficiency impacted explicit knowledge of which decks were

good or bad was surprising. The insufficient group surprisingly better recognized deck D

as a good deck when compared to the sufficient group. However, the insufficient group

did not select from deck D any more than the sufficient group. Analysis of means also

showed that the two groups did not differ in the degree of confidence in the deck being

good. The strategy of probability matching could shed light on this result. Probability

matching suggests that individuals select a choice based on their belief in the probability

of that choice being optimal. The probability matching strategy is in lieu of a

maximization strategy which is always selecting the choice that is occurring most often

(West, & Stanovich, 2003). For example, suppose there is a study where a participant is

asked to predict whether a red or blue light will flash over a series of trials. The red light

is programmed to flash 70% of the time while the blue light is programmed to flash 30%

of the time. Within a few trials, the participant realizes the red light flashes more often

than the blue light. A maximization strategy is followed when the participant always

selects the red light over the blue giving them in the example above a hit rate of 70%. A

probability matching strategy would be followed when the participant selects the red light

70% of the time and the blue light 30% of the time (.7 * .7 + .3 * .3) resulting in a hit rate

of 58%. Based on participant’s decisions and questionnaire responses, it appears they

may have adopted a probability matching strategy.

 33

As predicted, the one second group did not explicitly realize deck A was a bad

deck as well as the five second group. However, it was a surprise that the one second

group did not select any more from deck A as the five second group. This appears to be

another example of probability matching since both groups did not differ in their degree

of confidence in deck A being a bad deck.

(4) There was no significant difference between sufficiency or time groups in

selecting from risky or safe decks.

Regression analyses were conducted to see if any of the post-task questionnaire

responses predicted card selection from risky or safe decks. With respect to the

insufficient group, regression analyses revealed two interesting findings. First, the more

participants felt rushed, the more they selected from risky decks. Second, the feeling of

not having enough time caused participants to select more from the risky decks. With

respect to the one second group, regression analyses revealed that the more participants

felt rushed, the more they selected from risky decks. It appears that under a perceived or

real time constraint, individuals tend to become more prone to taking risks or do not have

as good a judgment about what is risky.

Study strengths. As mentioned earlier, most time-based studies used a single task

and then measured the effects of time on that single decision point. The present study

used a task that required 100 decisions with each decision used to make subsequent

decisions. By doing this, performance was measured over a period of time rather than a

single moment. In addition, the present study also incorporated a sufficiency variable

that allowed for the analysis of the individuals perception of time. As with time, the

effects of sufficiency were also measured over a period of time. The measuring of time
 34

and sufficiency in a multiple decision task is significant because it better resembles real-

life experience where outcomes are based on multiple decisions rather than a single

decision.

Study limitations. The sample was restricted to healthy undergraduates within a

limited age range. The Iowa Gambling Task is a play money game and therefore there

was no real incentive for participants to do their best in the game. While research has

found that real money does not impact Iowa Gambling Task performance (Bowman, &

Turnbull, 2003), some type of incentive could impact behavior under perceived or real

time limitations. The Iowa Gambling Task itself does not provide a broad scope to the

impact of perceived or real time limits in real life decision making. Since post-task

questionnaire was distributed after the participants completed the game, their responses

may have been biased based on the knowledge of how well they performed on the task.

Finally, risk taking results could have been affected by participants being bored or not

concerned about their final score.

Future directions. The Iowa Gambling Task has provided evidence to the impact

of perceived and real time limits on decision making. However the study is limited to the

task itself. Future research could use other decision making tasks such as Hold’em poker

to study the effects of perceived and real time limits on decision making. The use of

different tasks could provide further evidence that perceived or real time limits have an

impact on a broader scope of decision making beyond the Iowa Gambling Task.

There also would be some benefit to continuing the use of the Iowa Gambling

Task. A processing speed task could be added to a study that continues the use of

stressed time limits on the Iowa Gambling Task. The inter-trial interval for the present
 35

study was set at either one second or five seconds. It is possible to completely remove

the inter-trial interval causing one group to have no time between receiving the notice of

wins and losses, and picking another card. This could result in a larger variance between

the stressed time group and the non-stressed time group. Finally, some type of incentive

could be added to the study to ensure participants remain motivated throughout the task.

Conclusion. Time management can refer to all the practices that individuals

follow to maximize the use of their time. Author of First Things, First, Stephen Covey

discussed many products designed to aid in time management. These products include

the use of an alarm clock, appointment books, and personal digital assistants (Covey,

Merrill, & Merrill, 1994). In addition, there are many processes designed to aid in time

management. They include tasks lists, prioritization, and even matrices that categorize

based on level of importance and degree of urgency. The present study suggests that the

perception of time is important in the decision making process. Developers of time

management products would be well advised to include exercises that would build the

individuals confidence in completing tasks under stressed time limits. The goal is not to

maximize our time but to optimize our abilities to make quality decisions within each

moment of time.
 36

Appendix A

Gambling Task Instructions

• In front of you on the screen, there are four decks of cards: A, B, C and D.

• I want you to select one card at a time by clicking on the card, from any deck you

choose.

• Each time you select a card, the computer will tell you that you won some money.

I don’t know how much money you will win. You will find out as we go along.

Every time you win some money, the green bar gets bigger.

• Every so often however, when you click on a card, the computer tells you that you

won some money, but then it says that you lost some money too. I don’t know

when you will lose, or how much you will lose, you will find out as we go along.

Every time you lose, the red bar gets bigger.

• You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to the other at any time, as often

as you wish.

• The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible, and if you can’t win,

avoid losing money as much as possible.

 37

• You won’t know when the game will end. You must keep on playing until the

computer stops.

• I am going to give you this $2000 credit, the green bar, to start the game. The red

bar here is a reminder of how much money you borrowed to play the game, and

how much money you have to pay back before we see how much you won or lost.

• It is important to know that just like in a real card game; the computer does not

change the order of the cards after the game starts. You may not be able to figure

out exactly when will you lose money, but the game is fair.

• The computer does not make you lose money at random, or make you lose money

based on the last card picked. Also, each deck contains an equal number of cards

of each color, so the color of the cards does not tell you which decks are better in

the game. So you must not try to figure out what the computer is doing.

• All I can say is that some decks are worse than the others. You may find all of

them bad, but some are worse than others. No matter how much you find yourself

losing, you can still win if you stay away from the worst decks.

• Please treat the play money in this game as real money, and any decision on what

to do with it should be made as if you were using your own money.

 38

Appendix B

Time and sufficiency constraints

Instructions for 1 second time group:

You will have approximately 1 second between viewing the amount of money

won / lost and the display of “pick a card” on the computer monitor. Please select a card

within 2 seconds once you see the “pick a card” on the screen.

Instructions for 5 second time group:

You will have approximately 5 seconds between viewing the amount of money

won / lost and the display of “pick a card” on the computer monitor. Please select a card

within 2 seconds once you see the “pick a card” on the screen.

Instructions for Insufficient time group:

The time allotment in your game is typically IN-SUFFICIENT to successfully

identify the better decks and successfully complete the task. Do the best you can!

Instructions for Sufficient time group:

The time allotment in your game is typically SUFFICIENT to successfully

identify the better decks and successfully complete the task. Do the best you can!
 39

Appendix C

Post-task questionnaire

1 How much were you able to think you decision through

O O O O O O O O O
Unable to Enough time to
think at all think before
selecting a card

2 How much did you listen to your gut (intuition) before selecting a card?

O O O O O O O O O
Not at all Entirely gut
decisions

3 Were the majority of your decisions based on gut feelings or thought?

O O O O O O O O O
Gut feelings Thought

4 Do you feel there was enough time to successfully complete the task?

O O O O O O O O O
More than
Not at all enough time

5 Did you feel rushed to select a card?

O O O O O O O O O
Very rushed Not rushed at all

6 Was Deck A an advantageous (good) deck or disadvantageous (bad) deck

Circle one Good Bad

 40

7 How confident are you in your answer to number 6

O O O O O O O O O
10% sure 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% sure

8 Was Deck B an advantageous (good) deck or disadvantageous (bad) deck

Circle one Good Bad

9 How confident are you in your answer to number 8

O O O O O O O O O
10% sure 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% sure

10 Was Deck C an advantageous (good) deck or disadvantageous (bad) deck

Circle one Good Bad

11 How confident are you in your answer to number 10

O O O O O O O O O
10% sure 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% sure

12 Was Deck D an advantageous (good) deck or disadvantageous (bad) deck

Circle one Good Bad

13 How confident are you in your answer to number 12

O O O O O O O O O
10% sure 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% sure

14 Was Deck A a relative risky or safe deck?

Circle one Risky Safe

 41

15 How confident are you in your answer to number 14

O O O O O O O O O
10% sure 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% sure

16 Was Deck B a relative risky or safe deck?

Circle one Risky Safe

17 How confident are you in your answer to number 16

O O O O O O O O O
10% sure 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% sure

18 Was Deck C a relative risky or safe deck?

Circle one Risky Safe

19 How confident are you in your answer to number 18

O O O O O O O O O
10% sure 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% sure

20 Was Deck D a relative risky or safe deck?

Circle one Risky Safe

21 How confident are you in your answer to number 20

O O O O O O O O O
10% sure 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% sure
 42

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