Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 8, December 2008, pp.

636–640

Perceived time pressure and the Iowa Gambling Task

Michael A. DeDonno∗ and Heath A. Demaree

Department of Psychology
Case Western Reserve University

Abstract

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effect of perceived time pressure on a learning-based task called
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). One hundred and sixty-three participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups.
The experimental group was informed that the time allotted was typically insufficient to learn and successfully complete
the task. The control group was informed that the time allotted was typically sufficient to learn and successfully complete
the task. Both groups completed the IGT and performance was recorded. The major finding was that participants who
were advised that the amount of time allotted was typically insufficient to complete the task performed significantly
worse than those who were advised that time was typically sufficient to complete the task.
Keywords: Iowa Gambling Task; decision making; time pressure.

1 Introduction two remaining decks — C and D — have smaller rewards

Research shows that real time constraints adversely influ-
ence IGT performance (Cella, Dymond, Cooper, & Turn-
bull, 2007). There remains a need, however, to deter-
mine how perceived time pressure affects IGT decision-
making. In essence, is IGT performance impaired by real
time constraints or simply the perception of time con-
straints? The present research was designed to deter-
mine how perceived time pressure influences IGT perfor-
mance.
1.1 The Iowa Gambling Task and the So-
matic Marker Hypothesis
The IGT is a well-established assessment tool, and its use
by researchers has helped reveal the value emotions play
in at least some forms of decision making (Evans, Kem-
ish, & Turnbull, 2004). Because the IGT involves uncer-
tainty, reward, and punishment, it is thought to simulate
real-world decision-making (Bechara, Damasio, Dama-
sio, & Lee, 1999). In the IGT, participants choose from
among fours decks of cards with the goal of making as
much money as possible. For each card selected, the par-
ticipant receives a reward (i.e., s/he wins money). On
some trials, however, an additional punishment is expe-
rienced (i.e., s/he loses money). Two decks — A and B
— have high gains but larger relative losses; that is, the
decks have negative utility (they are “bad decks”). The
∗ Address: Department of Psychology, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity, Cleveland, Ohio 44106. Email: michael.dedonno@yahoo.com
than decks A and B, but the wins outweigh the losses; that
is, the decks have positive utility (they are “good decks”).
The goal of the task is to maximize profit on a loan of play
money.
In one study using the IGT, Bechara et al. (1999) tested
three groups of people: healthy controls, people with le-
sions in the brain’s ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and
people with lesions in the amygdala of the brain. All par-
ticipants performed the IGT while their skin conductance
responses were measured. The healthy participants gen-
erated skin conductance responses at two different points
throughout the task. First, presumably because they were
having emotional responses to the rewards and punish-
ments received, participants generated skin conductance
responses after selecting each card. Second, within the
selection of the first twenty cards, normal participants be-
gan generating skin conductance responses prior to the
selection of cards, and these “anticipatory” skin conduc-
tance responses were most pronounced when selecting
cards from one of the two bad decks. Conversely, peo-
ple with ventromedial prefrontal cortex or amygdala le-
sions failed to generate anticipatory skin conductance re-
sponses before selecting bad cards and continued to se-
lect from the bad decks throughout the 100 card selec-
tions (Bechara et al., 1999). This observation, as well
as data from other studies (e.g., Bechara, Tranel, Dama-
sio, & Damasio, 1996; Bechara & Damasio, 2005: Ernst,
Bolla, Mouratidis, Contoreggi, Matochik, Kurian, Cadet,
Kimes, & London, 2002; but see Maia & McClelland,
2004), support the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH;
Damasio, 1994).

636
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 8, December 2008
The SMH postulates that decision making is influenced
by emotion-based biasing signals (somatic markers) that
occur during the consideration of options in the decision
making process (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). For every
decision option available, a somatic state is generated ei-
ther by physiological changes within the body proper (the
“body loop”) or the brain’s mental representation of the
anticipated physiological responses that would take place
in the body (the “as if body loop”) (Dunn, Dalgleish, &
Lawrence, 2006). These somatic states are thought to
aid in rapid choice selection under time pressure (Pfis-
ter & Bohm, 2008). When making decisions, impairment
of these emotional signals can adversely affect speed of
deliberation and cause people to make sub-optimal deci-
sions (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). For example, Manes
and colleagues (2002) found that patients with emotional
processing deficits resulting from orbitofrontal lesions in
the brain evidenced prolonged deliberation and impaired
IGT performance.
1.2 IGT in the real-world
Although research involving the IGT has frequently fo-
cused on clinical populations (e.g., Bechara et al., 1999;
Levine, Black, Cheung, Campbell, O’Toole, & Schwartz,
2005; Best, Williams, & Coccaro, 2002), researchers
have also uncovered daily life factors that affect IGT per-
formance in healthy individuals. Cella and colleagues
(2007), for example, found that people who were given
less time to select a card performed worse relative to
those who were given more time to select a card. de
Vries, Holland, and Witteman (2008) found that, com-
pared to people in negative mood states, people in posi-
tive mood states selected more cards from the good decks
during the second block (i.e., cards 21–40) of the game.
These studies provide evidence that time pressure and
mood can affect IGT performance.
A question then arises as to the potential effect of
perceived time pressure on IGT performance. Although
most studies have treated time-pressure as a task charac-
teristic, researchers have also found that the mere percep-
tion of time pressure may affect cognitive performance
(e.g., Maule & Maillet-Hausswrith, 1995). One model
linking perceived time pressure to task performance, the
Variable State Activation Theory, suggests that impaired
decision making performance can occur when the indi-
vidual feels time is insufficient to successfully perform
the task at hand (Maule & Hockey, 1993). One reason for
this is that people change the strategies they use to make
decisions when they feel time pressure. For example, the
sequential comparison approach posits that people con-
sider fewer variables when they feel a need to make faster
decisions (Aschenbrener, Albert, & Schmalhofer, 1984;
Busemeyer, 1985).
Perceived time pressure and the IGT 637
Because perceived time pressure may affect both
strategies employed and emotional experiences while
people make real-life decisions, it is important to as-
sess how perceived time pressure affects performance
on a realistic decision-making task such as the IGT. In-
terestingly, opposite results are possible. When time is
perceived as insufficient, participants’ IGT performances
may be improved if they rely more heavily on emotional
processes, which are thought to be integral to good IGT
performance (e.g., Bechara et al., 1999). Conversely, be-
cause IGT performance is also based on cognitive pro-
cesses (e.g., Maia & McClelland; 2004; Yechiam, Good-
night, Bates, Busemeyer, Dodge, Pettit, & Newman,
2006), the perception of time pressure may impair IGT
performance because people might reduce the number of
variables they consider when selecting cards.
1.3 The present study
The purpose of the present study, then, was to explore the
effect of perceived time pressure on IGT performance.
The experimental group was informed that the time al-
lotted was typically insufficient to successfully complete
the task while the control group was informed that the
time allotted was typically sufficient to complete the task.
Although Cella and colleagues (2007) found that actual
time limits impaired IGT performance, the present study
explored how the perception of time pressure affects IGT
performance. The differences between these two stud-
ies are as follows: First, Cella and colleagues (2007) did
not provide any information to their participants regard-
ing whether the time allotted was sufficient or insuffi-
cient. Rather, they instructed their participants by say-
ing, “Your task is to select one card at a time as fast as
you can. . . ” (Cella et al., 2007). Second, in Cella et al.’s
(2007) study, the message “Too slow!” was displayed on
the screen whenever a participant failed to make a card
selection within the specified time limit. Finally, card se-
lections were not recorded on trials that the participant
was too slow; this resulted in fewer than 100 trials per
participant (Cella et al., 2007). In the present study, the
only instructions involving the perception of time pres-
sure were provided at the start of the task and all 100
trials for every participant were used in the analysis. As a
result of these differences in experimental design, the fo-
cus in the present study shifted from exploring how actual
time pressure affects IGT performance to how perceived
pressure affects it1
1 The present study also manipulated the amount of time each sub-
ject had to make decisions on each trial of the IGT. However, because
the effectiveness of the manipulation was questionable and because the
manipulation did not significantly influence IGT performance, these re-
sults are not discussed.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 8, December 2008
2 Methods
2.1 Subjects
Participants were undergraduate students attending a pri-
vate Midwest university enrolled in an introductory psy-
chology course. A total of one hundred and sixty-three
participants completed the study.
2.2 Apparatus and Materials
The present study included three standard personal com-
puters running Windows 98. Additional software in-
cluded the IGT application. Each computer was placed in
a separate room with a door to minimize external noise.
Standard 15-inch monitors were used and placed about
15 inches from the participant.
In the IGT, participants were presented four decks of
cards on a computer screen. The decks were labeled A, B,
C, and D. Using a mouse, the participant was allowed to
select a card from any of the four decks. The participant
selected one card at a time from any of the four decks
and was free to switch from one deck to another at any
time. After selecting a card, a message was displayed
indicating the amount of play money won (reward). On
some cards, the win message was followed by a message
indicating the amount of play money lost (punishment).
At the top of the screen was a green bar that changed
according to the amount of money won or lost. Below the
green bar was a red bar that showed the amount of money
borrowed; this amount was $2,000.00 at the beginning of
the game. The difference between the two bars was the
total amount of play money won or lost. The goal of the
task was to maximize profit on a loan of play money.
The sample in the present study was randomly divided
into two groups. Both groups were instructed to select a
card within two seconds of seeing “pick a card” on the
computer screen. Perception of time was manipulated by
informing the experimental group that the time allotted
was typically insufficient to learn and successfully com-
plete the task while the control group was informed that
the time allotted was typically sufficient to learn and suc-
cessfully complete the task.
2.3 Procedure
After each participant signed a consent form, the exper-
imenter gave written instructions for the IGT, informed
the participant that s/he had 2 seconds to select each card
and that the time provided was either sufficient (con-
trol group) or insufficient (experimental group) to learn
and successfully complete the task. The gambling task
instructions used for both groups were the standard in-
structions used in other IGT experiments (e.g., Bechara,
Perceived time pressure and the IGT 638
12
IGT Performance ( [C+D] - [A+B] )
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
1 2 3 4 5
Block
Insufficient Sufficient
Figure 1: IGT performance as a function of perceived
time pressure and block.
Tranel & Damasio, 2000; Bechara & Damasio, 2005).
Once the participant indicated s/he understood the in-
structions, s/he was allowed to start the IGT.
3 Results
The dependent variable for data analyses was the number
of selections from good decks C and C minus the num-
ber of selections from bad decks A and B (i.e., [C+D]–
[A+B]). If a participant selected more bad relative to good
decks, s/he would have a negative score. As is typical in
research involving the IGT (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000),
the 100 card selections were separated into five blocks of
twenty cards (i.e., Block 1 = Trials 1–20, Block 2 = Tri-
als, 21–40 . . . Block 5 = Trials 81–100). This allowed
for the tracking of changes in performance as the partici-
pants played the game.
Figure 1 shows the results. A 2 (Sufficiency: Insuffi-
cient, Sufficient) x 5 (Block: 1–20, 21–40, 41–60, 61–80,
81–100) ANOVA found that main effect for the between-
subjects factor of Sufficiency was significant F(1,161) =
8.404, p = .004. Collapsing across Blocks, the Sufficient
group (M = 22.49, SD = 30.53) selected more cards from
the good decks than the Insufficient group (M = 9.14,
SD = 27.90). The Block by Sufficiency interaction was
not statistically significant, F(4,644) = 1.877, p = .113.
In addition, the within-subjects factor of Block was sig-
nificant F(4,644) = 73.810, p = .000. As can be seen
in Figure 1, collapsing across both groups, participants
increasingly sampled from good decks as the game pro-
gressed. Post-hoc analyses using the least significant dif-
ference (LSD) test revealed significant differences (p <
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 8, December 2008
.05) in performance between each individual block and
all other blocks.
4 Discussion
The present study was the first to investigate the rela-
tionship between perceived time pressure and IGT per-
formance. Participants who were advised that the time
allotted was insufficient performed worse than those who
were advised that time was sufficient. This finding further
supports the Variable State Activation Theory by demon-
strating that perceived time pressure impairs performance
on a real-life decision-making task.
It is worth noting that the perception of time pressure
impaired IGT performance over an extended period of
time. Other manipulations have been found to cause tran-
sient changes in IGT performance. For example, de Vries
et al. (2008) found that negative mood was associated
with fewer good card selections during Block 2 of the
IGT only. In the present study, the perception of time in-
sufficiency did not interact with block thereby suggesting
that the mere perception of time pressure may be a more
robust factor in IGT performance than mood. It is also no-
table that, compared to the Cella et al. (2007) study which
reminded participants throughout the task that they were
under real time pressure, the present study informed par-
ticipants only once (prior to IGT administration) that the
time allotted was either sufficient or insufficient. It ap-
pears that the communication of time insufficiency – even
when announced only once — can have a long-lasting ef-
fect on real-life decision-making.
There are specific real-world benefits to understand-
ing the effects of perceived time pressure on decision
making performance. For example, research has found
that members of project teams who perceived a high de-
gree of time pressure had lower job satisfaction and felt
that overall project objectives were less often attained
(Nordqvist, Hovmark & Zika-Viktorsson, 2004). This
finding, taken together with the present research, sug-
gests that employee performance and overall project suc-
cess may benefit from building a sense of adequacy in a
project’s time-line.
Perhaps nowhere can the impact of increased time
pressure be seen than in the practice of medicine. The
advent of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) ap-
pears to have reduced the amount of time physicians
spend with patients. In fact, one study found that HMO
physicians were allotted significantly less time for new
patients (31 minutes) than those practicing either solo
(39 minutes) or in academic settings (43 minutes), and
83% of HMO family physicians felt their allotted time
was insufficient to provide appropriate diagnosis (Linzer,
Konrad, Douglas, McMurray, Pathman Williams, et al.,
Perceived time pressure and the IGT 639
2000). Not surprisingly, Tamblyn and colleagues (1997)
found that physicians tend to prescribe inappropriate
medications during shorter office visits. Although more
time may be needed to optimize diagnostic accuracy, it
may also be beneficial for managers of HMO’s to work
more closely with their physicians in instilling a sense of
sufficiency in current time allotments.
To conclude, we believe perceived time pressure can
affect the quality of real-life decisions. The present study
demonstrated that a belief of time being insufficient can
impair IGT performance throughout the task. It remains
to be determined why this happened.
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