G.R. No.
L-26341 November 27, 1968 of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word,
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed
PABLO, respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter
referred to as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and
ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea
M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of
P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial expenses and P300
as attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount of P46 as fees
pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was
employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot
to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a
private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was
not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was
and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for
Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez,
another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and
was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed,
there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and
a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere
stated in the record.
According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death
occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the
employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's
death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and
intendment of that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific",1 phrase The two
components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course of
employment."2 The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of"
and "in the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be
independently satisfied;3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept
"work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent
application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude
clearly work-connected injuries.4 The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or
cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the
course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident
takes place
As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the
course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at
a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties
or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.6
The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming
rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee
injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits
of workmen's compensation acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four well-
recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his
work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or
about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary
means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way
to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with
some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the
employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation
to and from the place of employment.8
We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the
second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but
while using a customary means of ingress and egress.
This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber
Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9 There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while
proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a
ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which he died
the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the
employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court
ruled in favor of the claimant thus:
The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner
intimated that "we do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never
recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the
nature of his employment." Considering the facts found by the Commission,
namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that his
1
assignment covered the entire working hours of the factory; that the first working
hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before
the machine operates at full speed or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch
fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate
to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred
within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course
thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928,
referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's Compensation Commission Act by
Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury received by a
laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a path or way owned
by his employer and commonly used by the latter's laborers.
In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which
concerned injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at
9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon
"after he stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2-½ meters
from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside
the compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was
bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that
these injuries were "not produced by an accident "arising out of and in the course
of employment," " this Court reasoned thus:
The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming
from his work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief
Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is
travelling to or from work on a public highway does not necessarily exclude
coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is
not enough to say that the employee would not have been on the public highway
had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be said of the general public
(Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect,
insures the employee against losses arising from the perils of his work. In other
words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as
such, must have a causative connection with something, not merely in common
with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-
the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very special danger,
some particular risk which the employer could have caused or allowed to exist.
Hence,
It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have involved
normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises
and therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should
have removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.)
It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June
30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who,
as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch
in front of the factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in
itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the employer
should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had
contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the accident.
In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no
particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and
either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from,
the record does not show that the company "had taken measures to make the
waiting place safe for the employees," neither does the record show either that the
accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the employees, or that said place
was particularly unsafe.
Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it
is not amiss to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise
area of law here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and
State precedents.
From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws
(1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations:
Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home
from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals.
The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not
"out of" the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks,
whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal
with the risk of injury or "out of" the employment. "In the course of" deals mainly
with the element of time and space, or "time, place and circumstances."
Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one
hundred feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the
question of "in the course of" the employment is flatly raised.
Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include
these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his
foot or person reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late.
These states find something sacred about the employment premises and define
"premises" very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but
also premises leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways
2
merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by many
states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and
streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are
protected premises.
There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a
reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable
distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme
Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn any state decision
that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad
tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises (but shown by his
superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was
held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen
minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal relation to the
employment is discernible, no federal question arises.
The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he
crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-
premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are
compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned
or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or
private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the
moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling
workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he
leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further
work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required
to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. Other exceptions
undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.
Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:
The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an
employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while
coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of his
employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an
appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary,
convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress either on land under the
control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied
consent of the employer.
On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:
The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in
case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which
the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a general rule
cover injuries received while going to or from work on public streets, where the
employee has not reached, or has left the employer's premises. The question
whether an injury arises out of and in the course of the employment, however, is
one dependent upon the facts of each case, and in some cases, where an injury
occured while the employee was going to or from work, but was in the street in
front of the employer's premises, it has been held compensable.
Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury
was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the
employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's
place of business, while on her way to report for duty, and just before entering by
the only entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the
general rule that, if an employee is injured while going to or from his work to his
house, or to or from some point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of
the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within
the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that there is an
exception to this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time
when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he
ceases, but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he
is at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at bar,
although the employee had not entered the employer's place of business, and the
sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in front of the employer's
place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in connection with the business,
and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the employer's
premises.
In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury
was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an employee,
about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an
automobile owned and driven by another employee, within a short distance from
the employer's plant, which was located at the dead end of a street maintained by
the employer from its plant to the intersection with another street, and, although
the street was a public one, it led nowhere except to the employer's plant, and all
of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their work. The court
stated that where the conditions under the control of an industrial plant are such
that the employee has no option but to pursue a given course with reference to
such conditions and environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied
obligation of the employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he,
for the purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone
controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which he has
3
no option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments of the plant of
his employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and that, when he
receives an injury attributable to such conditions and environments, there is a
direct causal connection between his employment and his injury, and the injury
falls within the class of industrial injuries for which compensation has been
provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law.
99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:
It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the
absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances,
and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while
going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded
by the weight of authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and
as not being, or not occurring, in the course thereof.
However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to
qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and
conditions of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular case,
and the cause of the injury.
Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for
extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries:
We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-
premises injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on public
streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-premises
injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon the
narrow ground of private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an
employee is on public highway he is always there as a member of the public and in
nowise in the exercise of any right conferred by his contract to employment; nor is
it a complete answer to say that while he is on his employer's premises his
presence there is by contract right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The
question of whether or not one is a covered employee should not be resolved by
the application of the law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by law of
trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.
A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment
beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks
and hazards associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on
the premises of the employer and for this reason there is no justification to
distinguish between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In
fact it is at most a distinction without a difference. Under the better reasoned cases
the technical status as public or private is obviously of no moment or in any event
in and of itself is not conclusive.
Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:
We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is
not nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas
with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a
distinct "arising out of" or causal connection between the conditions under which
claimant must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it
may hold that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions
extend. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)
We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered
an "accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury
shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally
responsible."12
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected,
compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged
in hauling the ship's cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed
of one of the passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared his
ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way
and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words
with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach.
At this point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death.
The death was adjudged compensable.
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which
Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The
latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few
minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver then disembarked
from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him
there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the
finding that the death arose out of and in the course of employment.
In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of
another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor
union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede
for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended
4
employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the
injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his
employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of
the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job
previously occupied by the assailant."
In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the
assailant.
In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while
driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by
the Commission. However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the
employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.
In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was
raised. While the employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and
sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the
passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger
shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the
cause of the assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose from a
personal grudge. The majority decision17 ruled the death compensable. The
bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died in the course of the
employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law"
(sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment.
(2) Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and
his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on the work-connection might
be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the risk of
assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm
sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the
increased risk to assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the
employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a)
jobs having to do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to
do with keeping or carrying of money which subject to the employee to the risk of
assault because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the
employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the
community, like that of a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street
car conductor.
It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of
its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind
of employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving
dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of
carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or
irresponsible members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or
indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a street car conductor or
taxi-driver;18 (2) jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous
environment;19 and (3) jobs of employees whose work takes them on the highway.
On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-matter of a dispute
leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired,
or where the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or
the like, or where the violence was due to labor disputes.20
In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have
arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of employment.
This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for the
enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the
Act.21 According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New
York." Concerning the corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to
say:
In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory
presumption in favor of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases. The
Massachusetts statute provides:
In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is
physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of
substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of
this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been given, and that the injury
or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill
himself or another.
This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions,
except that the New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely
those involving an employee's death or inability to testify.
The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean
that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long
as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts
courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary
to establish some kind of preliminary link with the employment before the
presumption can attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow would have merely to say,
"My husband, who was one of your employee, has died, and I therefore claim
death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon the
employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the
environment.
5
It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will
give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which
claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor
that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to
show where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of
employment, the presumption will usually supply the "arising-out-of-employment"
factor." Larson's Workmen Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.
We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs.
Gunderman & Sons:22
The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of
showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the
course of his employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without
other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's
Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the
course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly
and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the conclusion can be
drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the employment." Proof
of the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption only where some
connection appears between the accident and the employment.
Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:
The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of
employment," was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising"
were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the
two factors should be observed in the various categories discussed.
A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have
not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged into a
single concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of
quantum theory of work-connection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-
connection must be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but the
"arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it
will also when the "arising" quantity is very small but the "course" quantity is
relatively large.
But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum
will not be met.
As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one
may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment
premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from
work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a traffic
jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock flying through the air
from a blast on the premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards,
there would be no award, since the employee was not on the premises while
coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal relation of the injury
to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the "course"
factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of
cases dealing with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or
bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases that, although the
"course" factor is on the borderline when the employee is sound asleep at the time
of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the conditions of employment —
as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's
throat from the mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning hotel —
will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak causal connection, as
where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course"
factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the employer at the
time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too
small to support an award. It was also shown that when the "course" element is
strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of
compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee, although living
on the premises is not on call.
A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline
course-of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from
work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable
and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the direct performance of the
work.
As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak
"arising" element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as
well as the unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of
employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the
midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very
weak, since the source of the injury — whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic,
and unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken assault by a stranger — is not
distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and is tied to the
employment only by the argument that the injury would not have occurred to this
employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position
to be hurt. Yet, since the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming
increasingly common on these facts.
Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick
for measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding compensation
6
coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is
weak both on course of employment and on causal connection, one can conclude
that the court is capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an award
was made in Puffin v. General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest
period) and the causal element was weak (setting fire to own sweater while
smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in O'Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon
Inc., where the course of employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted
by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel
where decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of
employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning) and the causal
factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York.
But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and
arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In
Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while
combing her hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the
comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor,
we have a lunch period; as to the course of employment activity factor, we have
care of personal appearance; and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of
the employee. Each weakness standing alone — lunch period, care of
appearance, negligence — would not be fatal; there are many awards in which one
or another of these is present. But when all are present, while an award is not
impossible and could be defended on a point by point basis, it cannot be relied
upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's
Compensation Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100.
In resume:
1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which
arise out of and in the course of employment.
2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is
weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors
are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come
within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link
must first be shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the
injury occurred in the course of employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of
the employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is
present if the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where
the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing
something incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from
his place of work, is not of the employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but
while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and
egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-
premises injuries is that there is a causal connection between the work and the
hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of
assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the
assault.
From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar,
having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity,
that the particular facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and
that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn
beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be
usually one of fact.
We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo
was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where
the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and
led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it
belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the
ownership of the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private
character was obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own
business to such an extent as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension
of its premises," so that the "shooting of the deceased may be considered to have
taken place on the premises, and therefore within the employment;" and that "while
respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for the
ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary
precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."
But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the
Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work
as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the
road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to
the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was
dismissed from work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20)
meters from the gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO
emphasized that "the place where the incident happened was a public road, not
less than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate of the compound, and
therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again,
7
the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged
outright that the "road where the incident took place, although of private ownership,
does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows
IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have
been no question that the assault arose "in the course of employment."23 But if it
did indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and place its main
gate at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was
using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road
leads directly to its main gate.24 Its right to use the road must then perforce
proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is
either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically
and properly be charged with security control of the road. The IDECO owed its
employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the
IDECO should have seen to it not only that road was properly paved and did not
have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted measures for the proper
policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty
meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw
therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises.
Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime
work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work, the
Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the
place where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place
of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone
of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our
principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment.
We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment,
even though the said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.
In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable
margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the
express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to
be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out
of and in the course of employment as much as though it had happened while the
employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words,
the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in
point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably,
as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches
the entrance to the employer's premises where the work is to be done; but it is
clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the
employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of
the employer.
The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and
twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and
space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The
IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied.
Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's
premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of employment.
In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of
coverage to employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until
they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this might
be accomplished within a reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional
circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may be extended by
allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises
but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."
The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it
would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine
Sales,27 it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end
of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the
employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the general public used
the street only in connection with those premises, and the employer actually stored
boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In that
case there were even two business establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it
is exclusively the IDECO premises which appear to be at the end of the private
road.
We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the
obligation of the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak,
a duty of 'safe passage' to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper
arrival or departure from his work seems without question."
We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29
The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an
employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from
the place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in
8
most instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to
which all members of the travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards
having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer....
Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access"
cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the
employer for use as a means of ingress or egress to and from the actual place of
the employee's work has been held to be in the course of his employment. The
courts have said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer's
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises. We shall
discuss the principal authorities dealing with this exception to the general rule.
The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we
think is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken,
112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was
employed by Hartburg Lumber Company, which company operated and owned a
sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the
employer's facilities. A railroad track ran through the town and a part of the lumber
company's facilities was situated on either side of the right-of-way. A public road
ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on the property
of the lumber company. This crossing was used by any member of the public
desiring to go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question
the decedent quit work at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the
lumber company plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck
and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance company contended
(as it does here) that the decedent's death did not originate in the work or business
of his employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the
furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an
extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from other states and especially
Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion
that the injury and death under such circumstances were compensable under the
Texas Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to
the lumber company's premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a
part of the premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company had rights in
and to the crossing which was used in connection with the lumber company's
business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In announcing the
"access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:
Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the
crossing provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an
employee. He encountered the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that
he might perform the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting
himself to such dangers he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of
the lumber company's business. He had reached a place provided and used only
as an adjunct to that business, and was injured from a risk created by the
conditions under which the business was carried on. To hold that he was not
acting in furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber company would be to
give a strict interpretation to this remedial statute, which should be liberally
construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote justice.
xxx xxx xxx
In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr.
ref., this court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the
employee was killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of
employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney
said:
Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced
his safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with
which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the
reason and necessity for his presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the
pathway leading over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to
do with, originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury
received at the time, place and under the circumstances, necessarily was in
furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer.
Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327,
err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief
Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed.
507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows:
An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable
margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the
express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to
be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out
of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while
the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other
words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon
and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached.
9
The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the assault and the
where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is employment.
an "access area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly
treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from
intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring
IDECO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it Pablo's death within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked:
extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after
legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but
using the road as a means of access to his work solely because he was an quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which
employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe answered a question arising from an ingenious hypothetical question put forth by
for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might the defendant therein:
encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having
failed to take the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw,
IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death. "that which is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the
considerably older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34),
As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly
himself killed before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not
statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown be suppressed because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which
that there is a causal connection between the employment and the hazard which if it does, will be decided in the light of then existing law.
resulted in the injury.30 The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis
Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:31 Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed
to afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for
While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be which it was enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends
peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise Pablo's death. The Commission did not err in granting compensation.
out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek,
36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121]; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.
Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more liberal,
saying that, "to be compensable, injuries do not have to arise from something
peculiar to the employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga.
App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an employee entail his
presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be
barred because it results from a risk common to all others ... unless it is also
common to the general public without regard to such conditions, and
independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v.
Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v.
MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley
Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.

But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held
liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed,
because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's premises.
Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and there automatically arises
the presumption — invoked in Rivera — that the injury by assault arose out of the

10
G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989
ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a
source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing
the employees' compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles
of 94 presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct
Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present
compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees'
compensation decisions.
The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of
"proof of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it
cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an
occupational disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions. The one
espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary
work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be
presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On
the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work
connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says so.
The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by
the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional
office on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe
and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves
every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a
Mining Recorder in the Bureau.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from
brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power
had been lost.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly
denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the
Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.
The following issues are raised in this petition:
1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during
employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.
2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the
present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease.
(p. 17, Rollo)
The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science
cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a
disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment
appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly
paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It
makes the difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar
employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of
a rural area.
It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of
occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as
compensable, namely —
Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment
xxx xxx xxx xxx
16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and
blood forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and
employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills.
17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic workers.
(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)
The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the
Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be
compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably
considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in
Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain
chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally
accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law
requires for others is proof.
The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.
Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines
defines "sickness" as follows:
11
ART. 167. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease
listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by
the employee that the risk of contracting the same is by working conditions. For
this purpose, the Co on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and
work- related illnesses that may be considered compensable sable based on
hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly
defines who are entitled. It provides:
SECTION 1.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex A of these
rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that
the risk of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions.
(Emphasis supplied)
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the
illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available,
therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal
requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent
proof cannot be presumed .
In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27,
1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin
which strikes; people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be
shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e.
g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that
it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease .
To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of
decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment"
provision of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go
into the distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the present
scheme.
On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel
scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a
system based on social security principles. The present system is also
administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service Insurance
System and Social Security System — under the Employees' Compensation
Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to
receive reparation for work- connected death or disability.
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer,
we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by
employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can
prove entitlement.
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the
validity of the new law by explaining the present system as follows:
We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the
constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that
the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only
when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law
on appeal by certiorari.
The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and
rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the
worker's constitutional rights.
xxx xxx xxx
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of
employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not
have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim There is
no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a
claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then
determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical
evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is
more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has
also been doubled.
12
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly
premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden
demands for compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these
contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or
long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under
its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation
process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open
ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules
on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance.
The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for
equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now
absent.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is
no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that
should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or
not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions,
controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the
present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law
was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice
and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women.
Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is
to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)
The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to
an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception
that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich
corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions.
This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if
benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer
joins its employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared
the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by
employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity
of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The
employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive
proposition, that the risk of contracting the is increased by working conditions.
The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which
distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.
Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered
employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and
regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are
paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed,
actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers
who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the
stability of the said fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when
due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.
We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to
be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State
Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not
covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to
winch the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation
whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if
increased contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those
who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper
actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a
complex subject with such far reaching implications.
We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are
continually evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In
this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in
the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to
Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit
payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are
beyond the powers of this Court to accomplish.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned,
this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984]; Nemaria v. Employees'
Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with
conclusions different from those stated above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the
public respondents is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
13
G.R. No. L-64802 September 23, 1985
VENUSTO PANOTES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of
Education and Culture), respondents.
RESOLUTION
MAKASIAR, C.J.:
On March 29, 1984, WE rendered a decision in this case granting compensation
benefits (pursuant to P.D. 626, as amended) to petitioner Venusto Panotes for the
death of his wife, Agustina Garfin Panotes. The fatal disease, colonic malignancy
or cancer of the colon, was considered by this Court as having been contracted
due to or at least the risk of contracting the same had been increased by the
working conditions to which the deceased had been subjected as a public school
teacher, and accordingly, ordered respondent Government Service Insurance
System:
1) to pay petitioner the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefits;
2) to reimburse the petitioner's medical and hospital expenses, duly supported by
proper receipts;
3) to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,200.00 as funeral expenses; and
4) to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,200.00 as attorney's fees.
On May 2, 1984, respondent GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration based on the
following grounds:
1) reasonable work-connection is required by the law for an employees’
compensation claims, the alleged fact of impossibility of proof notwithstanding;
2) the legal requirement of work-connection should prevail upon the general
liberality of the law;
3) award of attorney's fees is not within the contemplation of the law and which this
Court had previously reduced to 5% (p. 82, rec.).
WE find the motion of respondent GSIS devoid of merit.
In this motion before US, respondent GSIS brings up the issue of the relation
between the standard of reasonable work connection established by this Court in
compensation cases and the Court's statement in the case at bar that the cause of
the fatal disease is unknown (Emphasis supplied). Respondent's theory that, by
granting petitioner's claim, the standard of reasonable work-connection for
compensation cases was rendered meaningless because this Court's findings in
the present case that the cause of the fatal disease cancer of the colon is still
unknown, belies the finding that said fatal disease was caused by the nature of the
work and/or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working
conditions of the deceased. Respondent further submits the proposition that "if the
cause of the ailment is unknown, then it cannot also be said that the ailment is
work-connected under the increased risk doctrine" (p. 73, rec., italics supplied).
"To declare as compensable all ailments whose causes are unknown would be to
place the claimants with such types of ailments in a far better or superior position
than those whose causes are known but cannot be proved as work-connected",
respondent adds (p. 71, rec.).
WE ruled in the case of Cristobal vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (L-
49280, Feb. 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 329, 335336), thus:
The deceased died of rectal cancer on May 27, 1977. Concededly the exact cause
or etiology of this disease is still unknown. Even respondent ECC's own medical
officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, certified that the cause of rectal carcinoma as of
any other malignancies is still unknown' (p. 9, ECC rec.). Its cause and
development are insidious, imperceptible to the naked eye, and defies expert
analysis. Therefore, whether or not the disease rectal cancer was caused or the
risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions
remains uncertain This uncertainty, of course, cannot eliminate the probability that
the ailment was work- connected as it had been established that the deceased
was exposed to unhygienic working conditions, various chemicals and intense heat
which are generally considered as predisposing factors of cancer. At this point,
there is need to reiterate that when the deceased started working in 1964, he was
free from any kind of disease.
In ruling on this claim, this Court also applied the theory of increased risk under
Section 1 (b) Rule III of PD 626 which states that:
For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions (Emphasis supplied).
aside from the possibility that the disease might have been contracted prior to the
effectivity of the new Labor Code. To establish compensability of the claim under
the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the
degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means 'such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion' (Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor
14
Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it
must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for
compensation. ... (Emphasis supplied).
Under the employees' compensation law, there are two categories of occupational
illness or disease deemed compensation; a) those listed as occupational disease
by the Commission, and b) any illness caused by the employment, subject to a
showing by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the
working conditions (Jarillo vs. ECC, L52058, February 25, 1982). In defining the
increased risk doctrine, Larson states: "the distinctiveness of the employment risk
can be contributed by the increased quantity of a risk that is qualitatively not
peculiar to the employment" (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, S
6.30, pp. 3- 4 [1978]).
An occupational disease is thus discussed further as follows:
An occupational disease generally providing compensation therefor, is a disease
which is caused by, or especially incident to, or the natural consequence of, the
particular employment in which the workman is engaged, which results from
exposure therein to hazards greater or different than those involved in ordinary
living, which generally develops gradually over a considerable period of time in the
employment, and which industry has not learned to fend against or eliminate.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining the cause of disability, and whether the cause was an occupational
disease within the provisions of the statute, all factors must be taken into
consideration; and whether a disease is compensable must be determined on the
basis of the particular facts involved in each case and the peculiar characteristics
of each employment. Thus, while an occupational disease is generally one which
from common experience is recognized to be necessarily incidental to the usual
and ordinary course of the employment it has also been held that if the disease is
one that results from employment it is an occupational disease, even though the
risk of disease was not generally known. Accordingly, the disease need not be a
natural and common result rather than an unexpected one.
While there is some authority to the effect that ordinary diseases of life are not
compensable unless they follow as an incident of an occupational disease, a
disease, to be compensable as occupational, is generally not required to be an
extraordinary disease, and one to which the general public is not exposed, and it is
not essential that the disabling occupational disease should arise solely out of the
occupation in which the employee is engaged, in order to make it compensable.
Moreover, the fact that an employee's disease may be of a class or nature which
members of the general public may acquire under ordinary and usual conditions
and circumstances will not exclude it from the benefits of the act if the disease was
in fact occasioned as a result of being subjected to the risks afforded by the
unusual conditions of work in his employment (99 CJS Workmen's Compensation,
S 169, pp. 566-569 [1958], (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent GSIS further alleges that the evidences presented tended to prove a
mere case of aggravation and not reasonable work-connection, thus, the following
allegations:
In the case at bar, this Honorable Court went on to describe in detail the physical,
mental and emotional pressures undergone by the deceased public school teacher
who entered the service in perfect health was not confined in the classroom but
engaged in other school activities, was exposed to the elements, missed her meals
because of workloads, etc.—all of which factors weakened her body resistance
and made her susceptible to diseases.
These conditions are invariably present in different types of employment. In fact,
even among teachers, these conditions are unavoidably present but there has
been no showing that many teachers have succumbed to cancer of the colon.
Thus, we humbly ask for clarification as to whether aggravating conditions
unconnected to the ailment contracted, are enough to establish reasonable work
connection, though the doctrine of aggravation, as stated by this Honorable Court,
has already been removed under the present law (Ibañez vs. ECC, L-47008,
March 8, 1978) [p. 73, rec.].
Assuming arguendo that the evidences cited in the case at bar were mere
aggravating conditions, this Court, in the case of Acosta vs. ECC (109 SCRA 210)
had occasion to discuss the matter as follows:
The GSIS itself was inclined to believe that the ailment of the deceased was
aggravated by the nature of her work when it stated in the comment that it has no
relation at all to the work of the deceased as a public school teacher except by way
of aggravation.' if this is so, there would be no consistency in respondent denying
the claim for compensation on the ground that the risk of contracting the disease
was not increased by her working conditions. It is more in keeping with reason to
hold that once a situation of aggravation arises, there exists a causal relation
between her work and her ailment which caused her death, as shown respondent
GSIS has conceded the possibility of aggravation being present. (Emphasis
supplied).
It is apparent from respondent's arguments that what it seeks is a direct, actual
proof of the causal connection between the fatal disease and the working
15
conditions of the deceased. WE, however, rule in this case as WE did in the other
cases that actual proof of causation is not necessary to justify compensability. The
degree of proof required to establish proof of work-connection between ailment
and the deceased's employment is only substantial evidence or reasonable work
connection (Cristobal vs. ECC, L-49280, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 329; Neri
vs. ECC 127, SCRA 672). Where cause of the employee's death is unknown, the
right to compensation subsists (Najera vs. ECC, 122 SCRA 697). Proof of causal
connection between claimant's disease of tumor and his employment as a
condition of compensability, the causes of which disease cannot be explained,
would render nugatory the constitutional principles of social justice and protection
to labor (Poral vs. ECC, 131 SCRA 602; Mercado Jr. vs. ECC 127 SCRA 664).
In the case of Cristobal vs. ECC (Ibid.) cited earlier, this Court ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
... As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee
secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a
more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is
some basis in the facts for inferring a work- connection. This should not be
confused with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been
abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation
may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still
subsists. All these factual and legal grounds were considered in relation to each
other constituting substantial evidence clearly convincing US to resolve that rectal
cancer is compensable.
Let it be pointed out too that the deceased's ailment was one of those falling under
the borderline cases and in connection therewith, this Court has ruled in the case
of Sepulveda vs. ECC (84 SCRA 771) as cited in the case of San Valentin vs. ECC
(118 SCRA 160), that:
... (T)he respondent Commission under Resolution No. 223, dated March 16,
1977, adopted, as a policy, the institution of a more compassionate interpretation
of the restrictive provisions of P.D. 626, as amended, by its administering
agencies, the SSS and the GSIS, with respect to, among others, Myocardial
Infarction and other borderline cases. ... (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, the following diseases were deemed compensable: rheumatic heart disease
(Panangui vs. ECC 121 SCRA 65), lung cancer (Dator vs. ECC, G.R. No. 57416,
January 30, 1982), senile cataract (Jarillo vs. ECC, L-52058, February 25, 1982),
liver cancer (Abadiano vs. GSIS, L-52254, January 30, 1982), pancreatitis
(Villavert vs. ECC 110 SCRA 274), rectal cancer (Cristobal vs. ECC, L-49280,
February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 29).
The very fact that the cause of a disease is unknown, creates the probability that
the working conditions could have increased the risk of contracting the disease, if
not caused by it, thus, the increased risk doctrine was applied in the present case.
The situation obtaining in the case at bar generates doubts, which by principle and
in keeping with the law, should be resolved in favor of labor. To warrant the
arguments of respondent would render futile the provision of Article 4 of the New
Labor Code, expressly providing that:
All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor
(Emphasis supplied).
The preceding law is a direct implementation of the constitutional mandate on
social justice and protection to labor as embodied in Article II, Sections 6 and 9,
herein quoted as follows:
Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to ensure ... the dignity, welfare, and
security of all the people ... .
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race,
or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State
shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide
for compulsory arbitration (Emphasis supplied).
Social justice in workmen's compensation cases is not equality but protection of
the laborer as against the employer (De los Santos vs. WCC 120 SCRA 730).
Respondent GSIS refuses to appreciate the evidence substantiating the claim of
petitioner. It cited the evidences in the decision which allegedly are, at most,
aggravating conditions only. Respondent, however, failed to take these evidences
in the light of other equally compelling factors. The deceased worked as an
elementary school teacher from 1949 until she contracted the fatal disease in
1979. She was in perfect health when she entered the government service. She
was not only teaching and confined within the protection of the classroom, but she
was saddled as well with other outdoor activities. This Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that public school teachers are made to take up the burden of attending to
various activities, both for the school and the community, aside from and in
16
addition to their duties as a teacher. This is a fact obvious and known to everyone
familiar with our public school system and yet, ironically, we close our eyes to it.
Finally, with respect to the award of attorney's fees, respondent argues that the
award is not proper or should have been reduced to only 5% of the compensation
claim. The argument is devoid of merit. There is no prohibition against imposing
attorney's fees on the employer, for the benefit of the counsel for the claimant
(Marte vs. ECC, L-46362, January 30,1982).
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION DATED MARCH 29, 1984 IS HEREBY
AFFIRMED. THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS HEREBY DENIED FOR
LACK OF MERIT, AND THIS DENIAL IS FINAL AND EXCUTORY LET ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT BE MADE.
SO ORDERED.

In Cristobal vs. ECC (supra), this Court has ruled that:

xxx xxx xxx

A close examination of the aforequoted provision reveals that the intent of the law
is to free the award from any liability or charge so that the claimant may enjoy and
use it to the fullest. It is the claimant who is exempt from liability for attorney's fees.
The defaulting employer or government agency remains liable for attorney's fees;
because it compelled the claimant to employ the services of counsel by unjustly
refusing to recognize the validity of the claim of petitioner. This actually is the
rationale behind the prohibition. Nothing is wrong with the court's award of
attorney's fees which is separate and distinct from the other benefits awarded.
Besides, in the instant case, the participation of petitioner's counsel was not limited
to the preparation or filing of the claim but in appealing petitioner's case before this
Court necessitating submission of pleadings to establish his cause of action and to
rebut or refute the arguments of herein respondents. Fairness dictates that the
counsel should receive compensation for his services, otherwise, it would be
entirely difficult for claimants, majority of whom are not teamed in the intricacies of
the law, to get good legal service. To deny counsel compensation for his
professional services, would amount to deprivation of property without due process
of law ( Emphasis supplied).

There is a clear difference, from the standpoint of legal policy, between attorney's
fees to be paid by the laborer and fees awarded by the court to be paid by the
employer. The plain intent of the statute is that the compensation to be received by
the injured workman should not be reduced by more than 10% on account of
lawyer's fees. This purpose is attained where the fees are to be paid by the
employer, since the compensation receivable by the workman is then in no way
diminished. In the latter eventuality, all that the law requires is that the counsel's
fees should be reasonable (NDC vs. WCC, L-19863, April 29, 1964, 10 SCRA
696). Thus, the award of 10% attorney's fees is proper. There is no prohibition in
the law as to such an award nor as to the proper amount that should be awarded.
The amount is actually discretionary upon the Court so long as it passes the test of
reasonableness.

17
G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990
MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady
school teacher which the public respondents disallowed on the ground that the
cause of death was not work-connected.
Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a
classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at
the Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had
been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years. Her
husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher.
On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties
as a classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy,
accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she
complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she
continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her
stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of
absence, she continued to report to the school because there was much work to
do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident, she went into labor
and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).
Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever
and headache. She was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on
February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia
post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from
the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she
died three (3) days later. The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She
was 33 years old, survived by her husband and four (4) children, the oldest of
whom was 11 years old and the youngest, her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo).
On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On
February 14, 1984, it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post partum the cause of death, is not an
occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment
was contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned
could not have precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the
infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).
On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued
Resolution No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding:
We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal.
Postpartum septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting
from the entrance into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins
which cause dissolution of the blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the
symptoms of intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant case was the
infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child
which took place at home. The alleged accident in school could not have been the
cause of septicemia, which in this case is clearly caused by factors not inherent in
employment or in the working conditions of the deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
Hence, this petition for review.
After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the
comments of the public respondents, we are persuaded that the public
respondents' peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse
of discretion.
Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
enumerates the grounds for compensability of injury resulting in disability or death
of an employee, as follows:
Sec. 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying
all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him
to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
18
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the
resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.
The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania
Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line
of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death
from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the
conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the
classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result.
The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in
the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her
fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the
development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore
was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of
events, leading to her demise.
. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however,
as might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time or relation, but
rather, [is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative
chain. It must be that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished
from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates, and
must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without the
intervention of an independent cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 166,171.)
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)
Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:
. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease
supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable
injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the
course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury
likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I
Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the
medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury are
compensable. (Ibid.)
Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her
employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing
from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her
septicemia post partum and death, are compensable.
There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the
decedent's post partum septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting
from the decedent's delivery of her child at home" for the incident in school could
not have caused septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid
infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).
The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is
a disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did
not accidentally fall in the classroom.
It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital
operating room instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if
she had been attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably
would not have suffered lacerations of the vagina and she probably would not have
contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5)
days in the hospital to complete the treatment of the infection, she probably would
not have died. But who is to blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and
the services of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of
the meager salaries that the Government pays its public school teachers. Forced
to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford expensive hospital care,
nor the services of trained doctors and nurses when they or members of their
families are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at
home instead of in a hospital.
The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely
blameless for her poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to
free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a
decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973
Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and
underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until
Government adopts measures to ameliorate their economic condition and provides
them with adequate medical care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for the
poor is an imperative of every humane society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164
SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits arising from
19
the death of his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of
Government, and thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees

Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are
ordered to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late
Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully
paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and costs
of suit.

SO ORDERED.

20
G.R. No. L-57889 October 28, 1987
FLAVIANO NEMARIA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry
of Education and Culture), respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1398 affirming the
decision of respondent government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's
claim for compensation benefits.
Petitioner Rosario Nemaria was appointed classroom teacher in November, 1948.
She was first assigned in the poblacion of Badian, Cebu. Later she was transferred
to the municipality of Ronda, Cebu. From September 8-25 1978, Rosario Nemaria
was confined at the Southern Islands' Hospital, Cebu City, for on and off severe
abdominal pains, anorexia, weight loss and jaundice, indicative of cancer of the
liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of the breast. These ailments did not respond to
medications and she died on October 16, 1978. She was at the time of her death
58 years of age (Rollo, p. 31). The service record of the decedent shows that she
rendered government service for about thirty years (Rollo, p. 4).
Alleging that the cause of his wife's death was due to her employment as a
classroom teacher, herein petitioner filed with the respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree
No. 626 as amended.
Subsequently, the GSIS through its medical evaluation and underwriting denied
the claim. Upon receipt of the order of denial, petitioner appealed his case to the
now respondent Employees Compensation Commission for review.
On August 13, 1980, respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed
the decision of respondent GSIS denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits
under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
For all the foregoing, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed
and the instant case dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
In a letter-appeal dated October 13, 1980 the petitioner expressed his desire to
appeal his case to the Supreme Court, but he could not come to Manila nor could
he hire a lawyer because he was very poor (Rollo, p. 1).
In the resolution of November 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court referred
petitioner's case to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, Ministry of Justice, for
possible legal assistance (Rollo, p. 12).
Hence, this petition.
Upon manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the latter was allowed to litigate as
pauper in the resolution of August 26, 1981 (Rollo, p. 5). In the resolution of
September 21, 1981, this Court without giving due course to the petition required
the respondents to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 52). In compliance therewith,
respondent Government Service Insurance System filed its comment on
November 19, 1981 (Rollo, pp. 65-77), and respondent Employees Compensation
Commission on February 2, 1982 (Rollo, pp, 84-91).
Acting upon the petition for review on certiorari as well as all subsequent,
pleadings filed, the Court resolved in the resolution dated August 30, 1982 to give
due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 97). Petitioner's brief was filed on January 20,
1983 (Rollo, pp. 105-108) while the Solicitor General's brief as counsel for
respondent Employees Compensation Commission was filed on April 8, 1983
(Rollo p. 110). Finally, petitioner filed his reply-brief on June 1, 1983 (Rollo, pp.
120-126).
The sole issue in the instant case is whether or not petitioner's wife's death is
compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626.
The petition is impressed with merit. A careful review of the records shows that the
question must be answered in the affirmative.
It is not disputed that the ailments of the deceased were not listed/enumerated
under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation with respect
to public school teachers but petitioner anchors his claim under the theory of
"increased risk," that is, when said illness is caused by employment subject to
proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions
(Brief for Petitioner, pp. 3-4).
Respondents, however, insist that the causes of the decedent's death, which are
cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of the breast, had nothing to do with
her work as a teacher and, therefore, do not fall within the compensable coverage
of the law. They pointed out in particular that hepatoma is not an occupational
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disease in the decedent's particular employment (Rollo, p. 87). They further claim
that the predisposing factors deemed largely responsible for the development of
the decedent's ailments which resulted in her death were not inherent in or
peculiar to her employment as a classroom teacher. Cancer of the liver has
something to do with liver cirrhosis while predisposition to duodenal ulcer is
traceable to one afflicted with cancer of the liver (Rollo, p. 89).
To establish compensability of the claim under the theory of increased risk under
Section 1 (b) Rule 111 of P.D. 626, the claim must show proof of reasonable work
connection and not necessarily a direct casual relation. Impliedly, the degree of
proof required is merely substantial, which means "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Cristobal v.
Employees Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 330 (1981)). Strict rules of
evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. There are no stringent
criteria to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626 is merely substantial
evidence (Sarmiento v. E.C.C. et al., G.R. No. 68648, Sept. 24, 1986). Thus, it has
been ruled that a reasonable work-connection is all that is required or that there
was a showing that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions (San Valentin v. E.C.C., 118 SCRA 160 [1982]).
The Court ruled further, that the uncertainty as to whether or not the disease was
caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's
working conditions cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work-
connected (Cristobal v. E.C.C., supra),
Both petitioner and respondents are in accord that although the cause of liver
cancer is not known, still it has been found to be mostly associated with liver
cirrhosis which in turn is caused by alcoholic ingestion plus impaired nutrition; that
a high percentage of hepatoma has been discovered also in Asia and Africa which
was found to be due to certain hepatic carcinogens digested in food stuffs (Brief of
Petitioner, p. 3).
The decedent, a public school teacher assigned in a municipality several
kilometers away from the provincial capital, rendered her services for more or less
twenty-nine (29) years. She started in November 1948 as classroom teacher
assigned in the poblacion of Badian, Cebu and from thence she was assigned to
the Municipality of Ronda, Cebu, which is a blighted area, where she continued to
discharge her duties as classroom teacher (Rollo, p. 68). Under those
circumstances, the possibility would not be remote, that she suffered impaired
nutrition and while working in a farflung rural area where foodstuffs are not closely
examined before being eaten, it is not too far-fetched to consider that she was
exposed to hepatic carcinogens which reportedly were ingested therein (ibid).
Corollary thereto, it is undisputed that the deceased was in good health when she
entered the government service, otherwise, she would not have been accepted for
insurance purposes by the Government Service Insurance System. The conclusion
is therefore inevitable, that the decedent's ailments developed during her
employment while working under conditions which predisposed her thereto.
It is enough that hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable.
Medical opinion to the contrary may be disregarded especially where there is some
basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability not certainty is the
touchstone (Sarmiento v. E.C.C., et al., supra).
Respondent Employees Compensation Commission in its decision based its
conclusion merely on the findings of the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting
Group and the medical opinion on references in medical etiology (Rollo, p, 38),
concluding that no direct cause factors triggered the contraction of her ailments
resulting in death (Rollo, p. 42). What the law requires is a reasonable work-
connection and not a direct causal relation (Sagliba v. E.C.C., 128 SCRA 723;
Guevara v. E.C.C., 146 SCRA 64-72).
In the case of Marte v. E.C.C., 96 SCRA 884, the Court ruled: "... . The findings,
however, of the doctors and the Chief Medical Officer of the GSIS and ECC
respectively are not binding on this Court as they are not considered experts.
Opinion of the Medical Rating Officer who did not physically examine the claimant
cannot be relied upon" (Nuguid v. WCC, 93 SCRA 374).
The Labor Code is clear that it does not only confine compensable diseases to
those enumerated therein as occupational. It also contemplates illness caused by
employment where the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working
conditions thereof (2nd paragraph, Art. 208, P.D. 626). The Court has ruled that
cancer of the liver though not an occupational disease, may be deemed work-
connected (Abadiano v. GSIS, 111 SCRA 509, Jan. 30, 1982). Moreover, in the
case of Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1279, the Court held that under the law, it
is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth development
or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is
enough that his employment had contributed even in a small degree.
The Supreme Court applied a liberal interpretation in the case of Mercado, Jr. v.
Employees Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC,
103 SCRA 329, as follows:
While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused
under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have abandoned under the New
22
Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of
significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists. compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended.

... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and SO ORDERED.
secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more
liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some
basis in the facts for inferring a work connection (103 SCRA 329, 336).

... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined
even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the
ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have
less in life will have more in law ... .

... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of
compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment — the cause or origin
of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science — was, in fact
caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions.
Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said
claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical
science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ
medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the
disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes,
the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or
imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276).

... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until
his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him
the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law. (Ibid,
p. 277).

Thus the measurement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the
employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined
or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the
link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility.

Moreover, cancer being a disease which is often discovered when it is too late, the
possibility that its onset was even before the effectivity of the New Labor Code
cannot be discounted. As a consequence the presumption of compensability and
the theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be
totally disregarded.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the

respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another is

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