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Citations:

Bluebook 21st ed.

Angus Glennie, Lowndes & Rudolf: General Average and York-Antwerp Rules, 23 EDINBURGH
L. REV. 461 (2019).

ALWD 6th ed.

Glennie, A. ., Lowndes & rudolf: General average and york-antwerp rules, 23(3)
Edinburgh L. Rev. 461 (2019).

APA 7th ed.

Glennie, A. (2019). Lowndes & rudolf: General average and york-antwerp rules.
Edinburgh Law Review, 23(3), 461-462.

Chicago 7th ed.

Angus Glennie, "Lowndes & Rudolf: General Average and York-Antwerp Rules," Edinburgh
Law Review 23, no. 3 (September 2019): 461-462

McGill Guide 9th ed.

Angus Glennie, "Lowndes & Rudolf: General Average and York-Antwerp Rules" (2019) 23:3
Edinburgh L Rev 461.

AGLC 4th ed.

Angus Glennie, 'Lowndes & Rudolf: General Average and York-Antwerp Rules' (2019)
23(3) Edinburgh Law Review 461.

MLA 8th ed.

Glennie, Angus. "Lowndes & Rudolf: General Average and York-Antwerp Rules." Edinburgh
Law Review, vol. 23, no. 3, September 2019, p. 461-462. HeinOnline.

OSCOLA 4th ed.

Angus Glennie, 'Lowndes & Rudolf: General Average and York-Antwerp Rules' (2019) 23
Edinburgh L Rev 461

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Vol 23 2019 REVIEWS 461

these early emperors. Tuori is not afraid of discussing the alleged insanity of some of these
figures, and identifies the conflict between narrative treatments that expose violent disregard
for the senatorial elite while also maintaining the veneer of legal adjudication. There is much
to be gained from reading this section. Chapter four engages well with Aelius Aristides and
Suetonius, but the conclusion offered is not quite as persuasive. There is a good awareness of
the petitioning of the emperor and the developing nature of Roman legislative understanding,
but the reading on Hadrian is not quite as clear as the discussions of the earlier figures and
emperors. Chapter five is better, shining an important light on the relationship of jurists and
the image of imperial adjudication (282-290). The examination of Cassius Dio is fluent and
compelling (273-281). Both chapters four and five reflect upon a wider image of the "good
emperor" as someone who took their legal responsibility seriously. However, the extent to
which those sending the petitions were truly reinforcing this legal dimension of imperial power
is not quite as clearly explored or argued as needed. More was needed here to fully examine the
various rhetorical efforts of contemporaries, and the formulaic nature of some of the writings.
The final conclusion reiterates the argument of the introduction, and closes the piece in a
clear and focussed manner (292-297). This is followed by an extensive appendix of instances of
imperial adjudication, which offer value for future study.
To close, this is an impressive and important work, and one that needs to be engaged with
and in parts challenged. There is much to praise here, and the first two chapters are deeply
persuasive and compelling. This is a work that asks more questions than it answers, but that is
no bad thing. It challenges the reader, with great subtlety, to rethink the role of the emperor,
to look again at what we think we know, and to recognise the artificial remembering of later
Roman historiography. We accept Roman imperial adjudication because the Romans did, and
if Tuori's argument holds, that is the most important thing about it.
Anthony Smart
York St John University

EdinLR Vol 23 pp 461-462

DOI: 10.3366/elr.2019.0591

LOWNDES & RUDOLF: GENERAL AVERAGE AND YORK-ANTWERP RULES. Ed

by Richard R Cornah, Richard C G Sarl and Joseph B Shead
London: Sweet & Maxwell (www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk), 1 5 th edn, 2018. viii + 827 pp. ISBN:
9780414057043. E335.

Even for the professional lawyer, the law of general average is particularly esoteric and abstruse.
The name gives no hint of what the law is about. Its origins are ancient and obscure. But it is
well established. It finds its first mention in the Digest of Justinian, referring back to the laws
of the Rhodians, where, as the authors remind us, the basic principle is succinctly set out: "if,
in order to lighten a ship, merchandise has been thrown overboard, that which has been given
for all should be replaced by the contribution of all" (para 00-01). So, despite the difficulty of
language and uncertainty of origin, the rule is clear in its essentials. It appears to have been
adopted as part of the law of the sea both in the Mediterranean and in the Baltic as well as on
the Atlantic coast of France, where the Rolls of Oleron, of uncertain date, record judgments
of the courts in Bordeaux in connection with the already flourishing trade in wine. As to the
problem of the name, one theory is that the word "average" probably derives from the Italian
"avere", meaning the having of property, and was used to denote the basis of contribution
or contributory value according to which the owner of property deliberately discharged or
jettisoned in the interests of all was to be compensated. But whatever its origin, the term
462 THE EDINBURGH LAW REVIEW Vol 23 2019

"average" has been used in England since the end of the eighteenth century and brooks no
further discussion.
Differences inevitably arose in the way in which the principle, albeit widely accepted, was
applied. Some of these differences were differences only of detail. Others, such as whether
(after the ship had reached a place of safety) expenses incurred to enable it to resume the
voyage were also to be treated as general average, were more fundamental. It was to resolve
such differences that international conferences were held from 1860 onwards which resulted
in the agreement of the York-Antwerp Rules. From the Glasgow Resolutions in 1860, the York
Rules in 1864, the York and Antwerp Rules in 1877 and the first York-Antwerp Rules in 1890,
the Rules have undergone revision on five further occasions, excluding the 1990 amendment
which is not counted for this purpose, as difficulties have arisen or differences of opinion have
been expressed. The latest version is the York-Antwerp Rules 2016 and it is the promulgation
of this latest edition of the Rules which has prompted the issue of this new edition of Lowndes
and Rudolf.
Despite the frequency with which circumstances have arisen calling for general average
sacrifices to be made or expenditure incurred, case law on the problems thrown up by the Rules
has been relatively sparse, at least by comparison with other areas of shipping law. That is in
part due to the general willingness to revise the Rules when practice or case law reveals some
previously unforeseen problem. It is also a reflection of the fact that general average is dealt
with primarily by expert average adjusters who have in the main agreed upon the principles
and practices to apply without the need for costly court action. For that reason, a book such
as Lowndes and Rudolf is particularly valuable to practitioners in the field, with its detailed
explanation of the Rules, changes to the Rules and the rationale behind the changes, and its
analysis of the practice of average adjusters and of such case law as there is on the topic.
The present edition of Lowndes and Rudolf is particularly timely Not only does it follow
closely on the publication of the 2016 edition of the Rules and explain in detail the changes that
have been made and the reasons for them; but it also picks up and discusses two significant
recent additions to the case law on the subject, viz. the decision of the Court of Appeal in
Metall Market 000 v Vitorio Shipping Co Ltd (The Lehmann Timber) [2014] 1 QB 760 and
the decision of the Supreme Court in Mitsui v BeteiligungsgesellschaftLPG Tankerflotte mbh
& Co KG (The Longchamp) [2017] UKSC 68. Both cases arose out of actions of Somali pirates
and the negotiation and payment of a ransom for the release of the vessel. The Lehmann Timber
raised the question of whether, where the shipowner had accepted an average guarantee
from cargo insurers but consignees of the cargo had refused to provide an average bond,
the shipowner had waived his lien on the cargo for general average expenses; and, if not,
whether the costs incurred by him in enforcing that lien were recoverable. The Longchamp
raised the question of whether vessel operating expenses incurred while the pirates' original
ransom demand was negotiated down to what was eventually paid were recoverable as general
average expenditure. Both are important decisions and are discussed fully, and not uncritically,
in the text.
This fifteenth edition of Lowndes and Rudolf is both timely and welcome. The commentary
is lucid, the changes in the Rules are well explained, and the impact of the recent case law well
analysed. One might have hoped for a little more care in the provision of case references - for
example, the Lehmann Timber is reported in Queen's Bench Reports for 2014, but this citation
is omitted from the Table of Cases and the wrong year is given in the footnote at para
30.62 -but this is a minor blemish. The editors are to be congratulated for maintaining the
high standards traditionally associated with this work.
Angus Glennie
Court of Session, Edinburgh