Social Cognition, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2017, pp.

395–414
MORGAN AND WISNESKI

IDEOLOGICAL VARIABILITY

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY VARIES

BETWEEN AND WITHIN PEOPLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THEORIES ABOUT IDEOLOGY’S CAUSES
G. Scott Morgan
Drew University

Daniel C. Wisneski
Saint Peter’s University

Prominent theories about the link between threat and political ideology
are grounded on two assumptions. First, popular threat and ideology theo-
ries assume that people typically use the liberal–conservative continuum
as their ideological framework. Second, theorists construe ideology as
characterized by intraindividual homogeneity (individuals are identified
as inhabiting one deeply ingrained position on the liberal–conservative
continuum that shapes their positions across issues). Working from these
assumptions, theories posit that people’s responses to threat causally in-
fluence their deeply ingrained liberal–conservative political ideology. In
this review, we question these assumptions. We describe evidence that the
structure of ideology varies between people (i.e., some people use the lib-
eral–conservative continuum and some use other ideological frameworks)
and within individuals across issues (e.g., a person may use the liberal–
conservative continuum for some issues but other ideological frameworks
for other issues). Theories about ideology’s causes must account for the
meaningful between- and within-person variability in ideology.

Keywords: political ideology, political orientation, liberalism,

conservatism, threat, rigidity of the right, negativity bias

The notion that threat shapes people’s political views is a popular one, and poli-
ticians have attempted to harness the power of threat to shift people’s political
preferences. During the Cold War, President Reagan’s re-election campaign ran
an advertisement that personified the U.S.S.R. as a potentially vicious grizzly

Correspondence should be addressed to G. Scott Morgan, Department of Psychology, 36 Madison

Ave., Madison, NJ 07940; E-mail: smorgan@drew.edu.

© 2017 Guilford Publications, Inc.

395
396 MORGAN AND WISNESKI

bear and described Reagan as the candidate who would ensure safety and peace
(Raine, 2004). President George W. Bush echoed this strategy 20 years later in a
campaign ad that portrayed terrorists as wolves lurking in the forest “waiting to
do America harm” (Borger, 2004). In perhaps the most famous ad in U.S. politics,
President Lyndon B. Johnson raised the specter of nuclear war. His “Daisy Girl”
ad depicted a young girl picking flowers, followed by the sound of a countdown
and the image of a nuclear explosion. A voiceover intoned, “These are the stakes:
To make a world in which all of God’s children can live or to go into the dark….
Vote for President Johnson….The stakes are too high for you to stay home” (No-
wicki, 2014). Politicians—both conservative (e.g., Reagan and Bush) and liberal
(e.g., Johnson)—have invoked threat to win votes.
The notion that threat shapes people’s political views is also prevalent in psy-
chology and political science. In particular, theorists posit that threat and height-
ened sensitivity to threatening and negative stimuli are linked to the development
of conservative (rather than liberal) political ideology (e.g., Hibbing, Smith, &
Alford, 2014; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). A well-known meta-
analysis, for example, found that measures of conservatism were correlated with
increased intolerance of uncertainty, fear of threat and loss, and death anxiety
(among other things; Jost et al., 2003). Accordingly, some have theorized that con-
servatism is a form of motivated cognition wherein individuals who are troubled
by insecurity and threat are likely to adopt conservative rather than liberal ideol-
ogy. This prediction has come to be a centerpiece of theories advocating “the rigid-
ity of the right” (e.g., Jost el al., 2003; Jost, Napier, Thórisdóttir, Gosling, Palfai, &
Ostafin, 2007). Others have similarly argued that “differences in negativity bias
underlie variations in political ideology” (Hibbing et al., 2014, p. 297). That is,
some people are more sensitive to negative stimuli than others and heightened
threat sensitivity (or negativity bias) causes people to adopt a conservative rather
than liberal political ideology. For the remainder of our review, we refer to this lat-
ter perspective as the “negativity bias theory of ideology.” Collectively, rigidity of
the right and negativity bias theories of ideology, and research grounded in these
theories make up what we refer to as “threat and ideology theories.”
Taken together, threat and ideology theories make claims that people’s responses
to threat, broadly defined, causally shape their political ideology. As we describe
in greater detail in the next section, these claims are often implicitly or explicitly
grounded on two assumptions. First, threat and ideology theories assume that
people typically use the liberal–conservative continuum to organize their social
and political attitudes. Second, threat and ideology theories assume that individu-
als inhabit one specific position on the liberal–conservative continuum that shapes
their positions across issue domains. These assumptions, however, fail to account
for meaningful variability in ideology and therefore provide a shaky foundation
upon which to build theories about ideology’s causes.
The goal of this review is to document variability in the structure of political
ideology, and the implications of that variability for theories that treat threat as a
primary cause of political ideology. We begin by describing and documenting the
assumptions underlying threat and ideology theories. We then review evidence
IDEOLOGICAL VARIABILITY 397

that provides important corrections to those assumptions. In our review of this

evidence, we first describe the well-known debate about the number of dimen-
sions that people use to organize their attitudes, beliefs, and preferences (that is,
whether ideology is unidimensional or multidimensional). Our review then goes
beyond the usual calls for multidimensional approaches to ideology by reviewing
evidence that there is between-person variability in the structure of ideology (i.e.,
the liberal–conservative continuum describes ideology for some people but not
others), and within-person variability in ideology (i.e., a person may use ideology
in one way for some issues but in other ways for other issues). Throughout our
review, we discuss the implications of ideological variability for theories about
ideology’s causes. Because threat and ideology theories do not fully account for
between- and within-person variability in the structure of ideology, they provide
inherently limited answers to the question “Where does ideology come from?”

IDEOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THREAT

AND IDEOLOGY THEORIES

Political ideology (alternatively referred to as political orientation) has been the

focus of considerable scholarly attention during the last 50 years (Knight, 2006),
and especially over the last few decades (Jost, 2006). Despite disagreement about
the specific nature of ideology, almost all conceptualizations define ideology as
a framework that organizes or “constrains” individuals’ social and political at-
titudes (see Gerring’s 1997 review). In other words, ideology can be thought of
as a knowledge structure or schema that people use to process and organize so-
cially and politically relevant information (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Larson, 1994). For
the purposes of this review, we use this broad definition of ideology and do not
define ideology based on any specific structure or content. For example, we do
not presuppose that ideology is characterized by a single dimension with liberal–
conservative content (or that ideology is inherently characterized by any other
specific structure or content). This approach differs from the specific and content-
laden conceptualization of ideology underlying prominent threat and ideology
theories—a topic we turn to next.

THE ASSUMPTION THAT UNIDIMENSIONAL IDEOLOGY IS TYPICAL

Among threat and ideology theorists (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2003)
and many other researchers (see Knight, 1999, 2006), a unidimensional approach
has become the dominant conceptualization of ideology. According to this ap-
proach, ideology is a single dimension with liberalism and conservatism at op-
posing poles. This continuum is sometimes described using a spatial metaphor,
with the terms “left” and “right” as synonyms for liberalism and conservatism, re-
spectively (Knight, 1999). The unidimensional approach to ideology is widespread
in popular discourse, and in the field of psychology more generally. Among nu-
merous other examples, psychologists have explored the liberal–conservative con-
398 MORGAN AND WISNESKI

tinuum in the context of attributional processes (e.g., Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka,
2010), morality (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), and personality (e.g., Hirsh,
DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010; McCrae, 1996).
The popularity of the unidimensional approach has led threat and ideology the-
orists to make strong claims about the generalizability of the liberal–conservative
continuum. The liberal–conservative continuum has been described as “the most
powerful and parsimonious way of classifying political attitudes” (Thórisdóttir,
Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007, p. 176). Some have asserted that people can gener-
ally be described as liberal or conservative (or somewhere in between) and that
“most…do think, feel, and behave in ideologically meaningful and interpretable
terms” (Jost, 2006, p. 667). Indeed, the unidimensional approach lies at the foun-
dation of research grounded in rigidity of the right and negativity bias theories of
ideology (e.g., Block & Block, 2006; Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella, 2011; Castelli &
Carraro, 2011; Chirumbolo, Areni, & Sensales, 2004; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Inbar,
Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Joel, Burton, & Plaks, 2014; Jost et al., 2007; Napier & Jost,
2008; Shook & Fazio, 2009). Hibbing and colleagues (2014) summarize this position,
stating that “the antagonism between two primal mindsets certainly pervades hu-
man history” (p. 297), and that the liberal–conservative continuum is “ancient and
universal” (p. 297) and “probably in our DNA” (p. 298). Taken together, prominent
threat and ideology theories reify the liberal–conservative continuum, describing
it as a typical, general, or even universal variable with meaning across individuals.
Although rigidity of the right and negativity bias theories of ideology are
grounded in the assumption that unidimensional ideology is typical, it is impor-
tant to note that this assumption does not underlie all ideology research. As we de-
scribe in depth below, some theories posit alternate ideological frameworks (e.g.,
Duckitt, 2001) and some research has explored the impact of threat sensitivity and
insecurity on alternate ideological frameworks (e.g., Crowson, 2009; Malka & Soto,
2015). We argue that these theories and findings offer an important check on the
assumption of unidimensionality that is popular in psychology in general and in
prominent threat and ideology theories in particular. Before we review such litera-
ture in greater depth, we document evidence for a second assumption underlying
threat and ideology theories.

THE ASSUMPTION OF INTRAINDIVIDUAL HOMOGENEITY

Threat and ideology theorists tend to characterize ideology as marked by “intrain-

dividual homogeneity.” The assumption of intraindividual homogeneity consists
of two, interrelated components. First, building on the assumption that ideology is
unidimensional, a person is categorized as inhabiting one, deeply ingrained loca-
tion along the liberal–conservative continuum. A person is a liberal, is a conserva-
tive, or is somewhere in between (Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2007). Second, a
person’s single location along the liberal–conservative continuum is characterized
as powerfully shaping attitudes, preferences, and even behaviors across a wide
variety of domains—political and non-political alike. The possibility that an indi-
IDEOLOGICAL VARIABILITY 399

vidual person might be ideologically heterogeneous—liberal in some regards, con-

servative in others regards, ideological in ways that do not fit the unidimensional
continuum in other regards, and even non-ideological in still other regards—is not
sufficiently addressed.
The notion that individuals adopt a singular, characteristic position on the lib-
eral–conservative continuum is more frequently implied than explicitly stated by
threat and ideology scholars. Although threat and ideology theorists recognize
that situational variables matter (e.g., they posit a person’s position on the lib-
eral–conservative continuum might shift in response to situational threats, societal
changes, or across the lifespan; see Jost et al., 2003 as well as Bonanno & Jost, 2006;
Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Inbar et al., 2009), ideology is commonly treated primarily
as if it is an individual difference variable. Individuals themselves are referred to
as “liberals” or “conservatives” and threat and ideology theories refer to individu-
als’ ideological “predispositions” and “dispositions” (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014).
Further, an individual difference approach to ideology is apparent in the hy-
potheses at the very heart of threat and ideology theories. These theories posit
deep-seated and dispositional psychological explanations for differences between
“liberals” and “conservatives.” Rigidity of the right theories claim, for example,
that liberals and conservatives differ based on “individual differences in person-
ality, cognitive style, and motivational needs” (Jost et al., 2007, p. 989). Likewise,
negativity bias theorists posit that liberals and conservatives differ based on
“deeply embedded individual-level variations in orientations to negative stimuli”
(Hibbing et al., 2014, p. 334). Consistent with an approach that largely treats ideol-
ogy as an individual difference variable, researchers have sought to ground differ-
ences between liberals and conservatives in basic physiological and neurological
processes (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011;
Oxley et al., 2008; Schreiber et al., 2013), and have argued for the liberal–conserva-
tive continuum’s genetic basis (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005). In sum, threat and
ideology theorists assert that individuals occupy a single deeply ingrained, even
trait-like liberal–conservative ideological position.
The assumption of intraindividual homogeneity is also apparent in claims that a
person’s specific position on the liberal–conservative continuum has a far-reaching
impact on a variety of attitudes, preferences, and behaviors across a variety of do-
mains. Consistent with a long tradition of research that has investigated the ways
that ideology lends consistency to and even determines a person’s positions (e.g.,
Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Converse, 1964; Federico & Schnei-
der, 2007; Jennings, 1992), threat and ideology theorists emphasize “the power of
ideology—even when measured with a single self-placement item—to predict the
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals” (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008,
p. 134). Although threat and ideology theorists sometimes concede that the lib-
eral–conservative continuum does not perfectly constrain people’s attitudes and
preferences, they posit that liberal–conservative ideology “helps to explain why
people do what they do; it organizes their values and beliefs and leads to political
behavior” (Jost, 2006, p. 653), and “reliably predict(s) voting intentions and many
other important outcomes, including beliefs, opinions, values, traits, behaviors,
400 MORGAN AND WISNESKI

and perhaps even mental health characteristics” (Jost, 2006, p. 667). Theorists have
even argued that liberal–conservative ideology shapes people’s preferences far
outside of the political domain—it not only influences “how we think about and
what we value in terms of government and society as a whole, but it also appears
to leave its mark on how we behave toward others, travel, decorate our walls,
clean our bodies and our homes, and on how we choose to spend our free time”
(Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008, p. 836). Taken together, threat and ideology
theorists construe a person’s position on the liberal–conservative continuum as a
“powerful” psychological force with sweeping effects throughout many aspects of
the person’s life.
In summary, threat and ideology theorists operate from an assumption of in-
traindividual homogeneity. It is assumed or asserted that individuals inhabit a
single, specific, deeply ingrained location on the liberal–conservative continuum
that shapes their functioning across a wide variety of domains. Although theorists
recognize that people may shift their positions along the continuum, threat and
ideology theories do not confront the possibility that individuals might simulta-
neously use different ideological frameworks for different issue- or life-domains.
That is, individuals might express meaningful intraindividual heterogeneity. Be-
low, we discuss growing evidence that calls the assumption of intraindividual ho-
mogeneity into question.

SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS

Prominent theories about the causes of ideology, including rigidity of the right and
negativity bias theories, rest on two assumptions. These theories and related work
assume that unidimensional, liberal–conservative ideology is typical, and assume
that people’s specific location on the liberal–conservative continuum is deeply in-
grained and exerts a powerful influence across a wide variety of domains. There
are, however, numerous reasons to doubt these assumptions. In the remainder
of our article, we review evidence that ideology is more complex than these as-
sumptions allow. We begin by describing reasons to question the assumption that
unidimensional ideology is typical: there is no consensus about a typical number
of ideological dimensions and, moreover, different people vary in their number of
ideological dimensions (i.e., ideology varies at the between-person level). We then
describe reasons to question the assumption of intraindividual homogeneity: in-
dividuals use different ideological dimensions for different attitude domains (i.e.,
ideology varies at the within-person level). Throughout our review, we discuss
implications for theories that propose threat as a cause of ideology.

QUESTIONING THE ASSUMPTION OF UNIDIMENSIONALITY

There are a number of reasons to question threat and ideology theorists’ assertion
that ideology is typically structured along a single liberal–conservative continu-
IDEOLOGICAL VARIABILITY 401

um. First, researchers who have sought to identify a “typical” ideological structure
have arrived at little consensus (and there is abundant evidence for alternative
ideological structures). Second, there is not a “typical” ideological structure in the
first place—different people use different ideological structures and dimensions to
organize their attitudes, preferences, and beliefs.

LITTLE CONSENSUS ABOUT THE TYPICAL NUMBER OF IDEOLOGICAL

DIMENSIONS

There is a long and well-documented debate about the number of ideological di-
mensions that people typically use to organize their views of the social and politi-
cal world. To investigate ideological structure, researchers often use a family of
empirical strategies including, for example, factor analysis (e.g., Fleishman, 1988;
Kerlinger, 1984; Krauss, 2006; Saucier, 2000), structural equation modeling, and
related techniques (Duckitt, 2001; Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981; Moskowitz &
Jenkins, 2004; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985). In each case, participants report their at-
titudes about a variety of social and/or political issues, and investigators then use
one of these statistical techniques to identify the latent ideological dimensions that
explain covariances between people’s responses.
Despite common goals and similar analytical strategies, research provides
mixed evidence regarding the number of dimensions that underlie people’s social
and political attitudes. On the one hand, some studies do find support for the
notion that a single liberal–conservative continuum underlies people’s attitudes.
For example, structural equation models have indicated that specific attitudes are
organized into numerous lower-order clusters (e.g., racial, economic, and social)
that are ultimately constrained by a single liberal–conservative dimension (Judd
et al., 1981; Moskowitz & Jenkins, 2004; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985). On the other
hand, a number of studies have found that ideology is multidimensional; that is, at
least two dimensions organize people’s social and political attitudes. For example,
Kerlinger (1984) found that people’s attitudes were ultimately constrained by two
dimensions corresponding to liberalism and conservatism (rather than a single
continuum). These two factors were weakly negatively correlated, suggesting that
liberalism does not necessarily increase as conservatism decreases. Still others
have found that ideology is best explained by distinguishing between social and
economic liberalism–conservatism, and treat these as potentially correlated but
discrete dimensions (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Treier & Hillygus, 2009). Several
others have identified ideological dimensions that do not correspond to liberalism
and conservatism including: beliefs about economic welfare and individual liberty
(Fleishman, 1988); beliefs about governmental interference in the economy and
traditional positions on social and cultural issues (Carmines & D’Amico, 2015); ra-
cial, cultural, and social welfare attitudes (Layman & Carsey, 2002), and attitudes
about authority/tradition, self-motivation/control, the government/nation, and
mysticism/spirituality (Krauss, 2006; Saucier, 2000). In sum, studies have yielded
evidence for a variety of ideological structures.
402 MORGAN AND WISNESKI

Perhaps the best-known theoretical alternative to the unidimensional assump-

tion underlying rigidity of the right and negativity bias theories is the dual-process
model of ideology (Duckitt, 2001). This theory posits that people do not use a sin-
gle, abstract continuum but instead use broad social beliefs and value orientations
to guide their specific attitudes and positions (see also Feldman, 1988). Specifically,
ideology is characterized by two dimensions related to people’s broad social ori-
entations: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation
(SDO). These dimensions are posited to map on to social and economic attitudes,
respectively. The dual process model of ideology has generated substantial re-
search attention (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum,
2002; Sibley & Duckitt, 2013), and serves as an important check on the unidimen-
sional assumption underlying prominent threat and ideology theories as well as
ideology’s relationship with threat and threat-related needs such as those for se-
curity and certainty. For example, longitudinal research has found that whereas
external (but not internal) threat predicts both greater RWA and SDO downstream,
only greater RWA (and not SDO) predicts greater perceptions of external threat
(Onraet, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014). Furthermore, analyses of cross-cultural data
from the World Values Survey has found that the relationship between conser-
vative social and economic attitudes and needs for security and certainty varies
across countries (Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014).
Although the debate about unidimensional versus multidimensional ideology is
well known (and there is substantial evidence for multidimensional approaches),
threat and ideology theorists have tended to ignore, under-emphasize, or dismiss
multidimensional conceptualizations of ideology. Rigidity of the right theorists
have, for example, hinted at the possibility that ideology may be more complex
than the unidimensional liberal–conservative continuum. Much of the research
grounded in the rigidity of the right perspective posits that there are “two core as-
pects of the left-right dimension” (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, p. 311): people’s
positions on resistance to change and acceptance of inequality (Jost et al., 2003;
Jost et al., 2008). These two core aspects, however, are theorized to “be generally
psychologically related to one another for most of the people most of the time”
(Jost et al., 2003, p. 343). Higher degrees of each are construed as conservative
responses whereas lower degrees are conceptualized as liberal. In other words,
these two core aspects determine placement along a single, ultimately constrain-
ing, liberal–conservative continuum. Indeed, resistance to change and acceptance
of inequality are theorized to be the definitional components of “conservatism.”
In a related vein, threat and ideology researchers sometimes explicitly dismiss
evidence that ideology might be multidimensional. In response to evidence for
ideological complexity, Hibbing and colleagues (2014) state that “although names,
labels, and issues may change, disputes surrounding tradition and innovation, as
well as progressivism and stability…have always surfaced wherever politics are
discussed openly” (p. 305). Likewise, scholars have dismissed ideological com-
plexity (and asserted unidimensionality) because the dimensions that make up
multidimensional approaches are sometimes correlated (an argument developed
in Jost et al., 2009). Evidence does suggest, however, that these dimensions are not
IDEOLOGICAL VARIABILITY 403

redundant and correlations are sometimes weak. Kerlinger (1984), for example,
found that separate liberalism and conservatism dimensions were weakly corre-
lated at -.20—a correlation indicating that each dimension explains only 4% of the
variance in the other. Thus, relying on the unidimensional approach requires ones
to make an assumption that is especially perilous given substantial evidence that
a liberal–conservative continuum potentially discounts, ignores, and collapses
across meaningful ideological complexity.
The tendency for threat and ideology theories to ignore multidimensional ideol-
ogy risks missing important information about the causal processes underlying
ideology. If one takes seriously the possibility that ideology is multidimensional,
then one must address the possibility that different causes likely underlie distinct
ideological dimensions. Consistent with this claim (and consistent with a dual
process model of ideology; Duckitt, 2001), recent work has indicated that different
psychological variables predict economic and social conservatism. A finding that
is especially problematic for predominant threat-ideology theories is that variables
related to threat sensitivity (e.g., death anxiety, need for security and certainty) are
positively related to social conservatism, but unrelated or inconsistently related
to economic conservatism (Crowson, 2009; Malka & Soto, 2015). Evidence, in fact,
suggests that needs for certainty and security may predict left-wing economic at-
titudes (Malka et al., 2014). Such findings lend credence to the notion that there
are different ideological dimensions, and that different causal processes (including
threat sensitivity) underlie distinct dimensions.
Taken together, when researchers ask “How many ideological dimensions do
people typically use to make sense of their social and political worlds?” the data
yield a variety of answers. Despite the assumption of unidimensionality that un-
derlies threat and ideology theories, there is a lack of consensus about the typical
number of ideological dimensions and far from universal or even converging sup-
port for unidimensionality. The abundant evidence for alternative, multidimen-
sional structures—and the different relationship of threat with each—serves as an
important correction to the assumption that people use a single liberal–conserva-
tive continuum to organize their social and political attitudes.
Related to the lack of consensus about the typical number of dimensions that
make up ideology, there is also reason to think that ideology will take different
forms for different people. We discuss evidence for such between-person varia-
tion, and implications, next.

DIFFERENT PEOPLE USE DIFFERENT IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURES

One possible reason why past research has come to different conclusions about
the typical structure of ideology is that people vary in the number of ideological
dimensions they use—a finding that belies the assumption that unidimensional
ideology is typical. In other words, there is considerable between-person variabil-
ity in the structure of ideology and such variability requires complex explanations
for the roots of ideology.
404 MORGAN AND WISNESKI

Although factor analytic studies provide information about ideological dimen-

sions collapsing across people, such analytic techniques do a poor job of capturing
between-person differences in the number of ideological dimensions that people
use. Because the goal of such techniques is to produce factor solutions that under-
lie entire samples’ patterns of responses, they mask the possibility that the fac-
tor solutions may vary for different people. Consistent with this claim, Molenaar
(1997) conducted a simulation by generating responses for hypothetical partic-
ipants: some participants’ responses conformed to a one-factor structure, some
participants’ responses conformed to a two-factor structure, some participants’
responses conformed to a three-factor structure, and some conformed to a four-
factor structure. Although most participants’ responses were multidimensional,
a standard factor analysis yielded a simple one-factor solution. In other words,
one might erroneously conclude that a one-factor solution was “typical” when,
in truth, there was substantial between-person variability. Thus, standard factor
analyses do not capture differences in the factor structures among distinct subsets
of individuals (see also Borsboom, Keivet, Cervone, & Hood, 2009). When it comes
to ideology research, factor analyses likely obscure between-person differences in
the structure of ideology.
Recent work using analytic techniques more sensitive to between-person vari-
ability have provided support for the notion that different people use different
ideological dimensions. Feldman and Johnston (2014) examined ideological di-
mensions among participants in a nationally representative sample using latent
class analysis, a technique that allows factor solutions to differ for subsets of par-
ticipants. Results indicated that there were six subsets of participants, and that
participants in each subset structured their social and political attitudes in ways
that were distinct from participants in other subsets. Some participants (approxi-
mately 40%) could be described as adhering to the liberal–conservative continu-
um, but the majority (60%) adhered to ideological structures that were inconsistent
with a single liberal–conservative continuum. In short, people are ideological in
different ways; they vary in the ways that they use ideology to structure their at-
titudes and beliefs.
The finding that people vary in their number of ideological dimensions begs
the question, “What variables shape how people use ideology to make sense of
their social and political world?” Past research converges on at least two answers.
First, studies in the United States have indicated that political engagement plays
an important role in whether people’s attitudes adhere to the liberal–conservative
continuum. As early as 1964, Converse famously found that some people (“elites”)
but not others (“the mass public”) express liberal–conservative ideological con-
straint. Likewise, factor analytic studies that have separately examined responses
for people high and low in engagement indicate that those high in engagement use
fewer ideological dimensions than those low in engagement (Layman & Carsey,
2002). In short, the politically engaged tend to use the liberal–conservative con-
tinuum whereas the non-politically engaged do not. Second, culture plays an
important moderating role in whether the unidimensional or multidimensional
approach best describes people’s ideology. Consistent with this claim, societies
IDEOLOGICAL VARIABILITY 405

differ in terms of their use and recognition of the liberal–conservative continuum.

Cross-cultural studies reveal substantial variability in whether people from East
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania (a) self-identify using the liberal–conservative
continuum, and (b) recognize political parties as organized along this continuum
(Jou, 2010). Likewise, a study of 14 countries from five continents found that the
use of the continuum is more common in older democracies and countries with
more open media than in younger democracies and countries with less free media
systems (Freire & Kivistik, 2013). In summary, the use of a unidimensional contin-
uum seems to be especially pronounced among those who are politically engaged
in Western democratic societies, but does not describe those who are less engaged
and/or from non-Western societies.
Taken together, between-person variability in the structure of ideology has im-
portant implications for how we think about the causes of ideology in general, and
threat and ideology theories in specific. Ideology is not only shaped by bottom-up
psychological processes such as threat sensitivity, but also by top-down processes
(including socio-cultural differences in political systems and engagement in those
systems). A consideration of top-down processes is necessary to form a complete
theory of the causal process that shape ideology. Although threat and ideology
theorists sometimes note the influence of top-down factors (Jost et al., 2009), these
influences are not well integrated into theory. Rather, threat and ideology theories
tend to (a) focus narrowly on the unidimensional approach and (b) seek bottom-
up psychological processes such as threat sensitivity for people’s identification
along the liberal–conservative continuum (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al.,
2003). These theories are silent about the causal processes underlying ideology
for those who do not adhere to the liberal–conservative continuum. Nonetheless,
evidence that people use different ideological frameworks suggests that the causes
of ideology must also vary for different people.
Consistent with the possibility that different causal processes shape ideology for
different people, psychological orientations related to threat more strongly pre-
dict placement on the liberal–conservative continuum for those high in political
expertise than low in expertise (Federico, Hunt, & Ergun, 2009). In a similar vein,
analysis of cross-national data from 51 countries reveals that needs for safety and
security predict increased conservatism for those who are politically engaged in
developed, non-Eastern European nations but not for those low in engagement,
from less developed nations, or from Eastern European nations. Further, when one
examines social and economic conservatism separately, needs for security have
different relations with these two dimensions depending on people’s levels of po-
litical engagement and their country of origin (Malka et al., 2014). Taken together,
a growing body of research suggests that the relation between threat and ideology
is complex, and varies for different people.
Thus far, we have reviewed evidence counter to the assumption of unidimen-
sional ideology. There are also reasons to doubt the assumption of intraindividual
homogeneity. Specifically, there are reasons to believe that there is meaningful in-
traindividual heterogeneity in the ways that people use ideology.
406 MORGAN AND WISNESKI

QUESTIONING THE ASSUMPTION OF INTRAINDIVIDUAL

HOMOGENEITY: A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL MAY USE IDEOLOGY IN
DIFFERENT WAYS FOR DIFFERENT ISSUES

As we document above, threat and ideology theories largely assume that ideology
is characterized by intraindividual homogeneity. These theories identify individu-
als as inhabiting a specific and deeply ingrained position on the liberal–conserva-
tive continuum (i.e., individuals are categorized as liberal or conservative but not
both) with powerful effects both inside and outside of politics. Threat and ideol-
ogy theories do not meaningfully tackle the possibility that a person may simulta-
neously use different ideological frameworks to organize his or her attitudes and
beliefs.1
In contrast to the assumption of ideological homogeneity, we argue that peo-
ple may be characterized by ideological heterogeneity. Specifically, we argue that
there is meaningful within-person variability in the ways that individuals use ide-
ology (liberal–conservative or otherwise) to make sense of their social and politi-
cal world. A person may use one ideological framework (e.g., the unidimensional
liberal–conservative continuum) to think about some issues, and a different ide-
ological framework (e.g., any of the multidimensional ideology frameworks we
discussed previously) or no ideological framework to think about other issues.
This variability does not suggest that people lack consistency or are not “ideologi-
cal.” Rather, it suggests that the nature of ideology is richer than the assumption
of intraindividual homogeneity allows, and people use ideology in complex and
personally meaningful ways. Accordingly, it may be inaccurate to refer to a person
as dispositionally ideological or non-ideological, or as dispositionally liberal or
conservative.
Libertarians provide, perhaps, the most obvious example of within-person ideo-
logical heterogeneity.2 Libertarians make up a sizable portion of the U.S. popula-
tion (approximately 11%; Kiley, 2014) and exhibit intraindividual heterogeneity in
the organization of their social and political attitudes along the unidimensional
continuum. Specifically, libertarians adopt “liberal” positions on social issues
1. A useful way to think about intraindividual homogeneity versus heterogeneity is through the
lens of statistical language related to variance. We suggest that the ideology not only varies between
different individuals, but also meaningfully varies within individuals. Ideology researchers, however,
have long treated within-person variability as error variance that signals inconsistency and as
evidence that people are not ideological. This logic underlies the statistical analyses that researchers
commonly use to investigate the structure of ideology, including factor analysis. These analyses not
only fail to capture differences between different subsets of participants (as we described above), but
also fail to capture variability within individuals (see Borsboom et al., 2009). Importantly, we argue
that within-person variability does not merely reflect noise or “error variance,” but is meaningful
when it comes to understanding ideology.
2. To be clear, we suggest that libertarians exhibit within-person variation in ideology when viewed
through the lens of the unidimensional, liberal–conservative continuum. That is, one could argue
that libertarians follow a single “libertarian ideology” on all issues rather than saying that they are
“liberal on social issues and conservative on economic issues.” Although this would be accurate,
libertarianism is an example of an ideology not captured by the unidimensional continuum in
that there is no single point that reflects their beliefs. As a result, libertarians exhibit within-person
variation in ideology when viewed through the lens of liberalism–conservatism.
IDEOLOGICAL VARIABILITY 407

(e.g., abortion, same-sex marriage) and “conservative” positions on economic is-

sues (e.g., tax policy, government intervention in the economy). These individuals
arguably use the liberal–conservative continuum to think about their social and
political world, but adopt different ideological positions for different issues. Lib-
ertarians are, as a result, “cross-pressured” and often self-identify as moderates
when asked to report their ideology using the unidimensional liberal–conserva-
tive continuum (Treier & Hillygus, 2009). Although libertarians are “inconsistent”
in placement on the single liberal–conservative continuum across issue domains, it
would be inaccurate to describe them as moderate or non-ideological.
Libertarians are only one example of individual-level ideological heterogeneity.
It is also possible that individuals use one ideological framework (liberal–conser-
vative or otherwise) for some issue domains and (a) another ideological frame-
work or (b) no ideological framework for other issue domains. Let’s imagine that
Sylvia, for example, sees the liberal–conservative continuum as relevant to her
attitudes about same-sex marriage, abortion, and immigration. She might adopt
consistently liberal or conservative positions on each of these issues. Conversely,
Sylvia might see the liberal-conservative continuum as unrelated to her attitudes
regarding taxes, capital punishment, and healthcare reform. She may use other
ideological frameworks to make sense of these issues (e.g., those proposed by the
dual process model of ideology; Duckitt, 2001), have no positions on these issues
at all, or might base her positions on such considerations as economic self-interest,
her personal moral beliefs, or religious doctrine.3 Similar to the libertarian exam-
ple, it would be inaccurate to describe Sylvia as dispositionally “non-ideological”
or even as “only somewhat ideological” simply because all of her attitudes do not
conform to one specific ideological framework. The liberal–conservative dimen-
sions of ideology might be very meaningful to her for some issue domains, but
irrelevant for others.
We need not rely on thought experiments to support the claim that there is in-
traindividual heterogeneity in the ideological basis for people’s attitudes. Even
ignoring other possible ideological frameworks, empirical evidence suggests that
there is meaningful within-person variability in the application of the liberal–
conservative continuum. A recent study that used factor-mixture model analyses
found that some participants (45%) in a nationally representative sample saw the
liberal–conservative continuum as relevant to both social and economic issues,
others (33%) saw the liberal–conservative continuum as relevant to social but not
economic issues, and others (22%) saw the liberal–conservative continuum as rel-
evant to economic but not social issues (Feldman & Johnson, 2014). More than 50%
of participants varied in their application of liberal–conservative ideology across

3. We are not arguing that attitudes based on religion, morality, self-interest, or other concerns
are never related to political ideology—only that they are not inherently ideological. For example,
variables such as religiosity, authoritarianism, and egalitarianism sometimes predict people’s
ideology and sometimes do not (Feldman & Johnson, 2014). Furthermore, theories that make claims
about differences in liberal and conservative morality do not claim that ideology and moral beliefs are
redundant (e.g., Graham et al., 2009). Finally, research has found that people’s economic self-interest
is a poor predictor of their political attitudes (Sears & Funk, 1990).
408 MORGAN AND WISNESKI

different subsets of issues. As in the above examples, it would be inaccurate to de-

scribe these individuals as non-ideological (they use ideology to organize at least
some of their beliefs). Nonetheless, it would also be inaccurate to describe these in-
dividuals as dispositionally liberal, conservative, or moderate. Future work might
explore not only intraindividual variability in the liberal–conservative continuum,
but whether and when people employ other ideological dimensions for subsets of
issues.
Although the above examples highlight people’s distinctions between social and
economic issues, we posit that individuals might distinguish between issue do-
mains in numerous ways, and therefore apply ideological frameworks in diverse
ways. One compelling possibility, for example, is that individuals might distin-
guish between issues based on the degree to which they experience that issue as
important (either personally or socio-politically) or the degree to which they have
knowledge about that issue. In that vein, individuals might use ideological frame-
works (especially those common in their society) to guide their thinking about is-
sues that they deem subjectively important or for which they are knowledgeable,
but not to guide their thinking about non-important or low-knowledge issues (see
Judd & Krosnick, 1989). Such a hypothesis is consistent with differences in ideo-
logical structure between individuals low and high in political expertise and engage-
ment (Layman & Carsey, 2002; Lodge & Hamill, 1986), but theorizes that similar
processes might operate within individuals for different attitude domains.
Of all of our claims about the nature of ideology, the notion that there is intrain-
dividual heterogeneity in the use of ideology across subsets of issues may have the
most sweeping implications for threat and ideology research. Seeking psychologi-
cal processes that underlie individuals’ deeply ingrained liberal–conservative ide-
ologies makes little sense if, for example, individuals are liberal in some domains,
conservative in others, and somewhere else on the liberal–conservative continuum
in still other domains. Future research exploring how threat underlies ideology
should therefore attend to intraindividual heterogeneity with greater sensitivity.
Rather than looking for simple causes of dispositional conceptualizations of ideol-
ogy, a full understanding of ideology requires an ambitious research agenda. In
the next section of our article, we outline several promising avenues for such a
research program.

PATHS FORWARD: STRATEGIES TO INCORPORATE IDEOLOGICAL

VARIABILITY INTO INVESTIGATIONS OF IDEOLOGY’S CAUSES

An axiom about scientific theories often attributed to Albert Einstein recommends

that “Everything should be made as simple as possible but no simpler.” We agree
that prominent threat and ideology theories have simplicity on their side, but the-
oretical simplicity is desirable only when it “fits the data.” In our review, we have
shown that the conceptualization of ideology used by prominent threat and ideol-
ogy theories does not fit the data. Although threat and ideology theories treat the
liberal–conservative continuum as typical, the data suggests little consensus about
IDEOLOGICAL VARIABILITY 409

a typical ideological structure and provides evidence that different people use dif-
ferent ideological structures. And although threat and ideology theories treat in-
dividuals as inhabiting one deeply ingrained location on the liberal–conservative
continuum that colors their positions across a variety of domains, emerging data
suggests that individuals may use ideology in different ways across different do-
mains. In light of evidence that ideology varies between and within people, it is
important that researchers investigate the complex causal processes underlying
complex political ideology.4 In the final section of our review, we suggest some
paths forward—specifically, we suggest research strategies that recognize mean-
ingful ideological variability while seeking insights about the causal processes un-
derlying ideology.
Perhaps the most basic take-home message of our review is that ideology theo-
rists must not treat the liberal–conservative continuum as an ideological default.
The liberal–conservative continuum is part of popular discourse, plays a central
role in contemporary U.S. politics (e.g., McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006), and is
incorporated into mainstream psychology (e.g., Graham et al., 2009). These factors
may make it tempting to reify the liberal–conservative continuum as a psychologi-
cal variable with meaning across people—a typical or even universal feature of
human psychological functioning that is embedded in biology and genetics. The
evidence we have described in this review, however, suggest that a narrow focus
on the liberal–conservative continuum is perilous. This insight is not new. It is re-
flected in the longstanding debate regarding unidimensional versus multidimen-
sional ideology and is underscored by evidence for multidimensionality (Duckitt
& Sibley, 2009). This insight, however, has not been incorporated and meaning-
fully addressed by rigidity of the right and negativity bias theories of ideology
(e.g., Block & Block, 2006; Carraro et al., 2011; Castelli & Carraro, 2011; Chirumbolo
et al., 2004; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Inbar et al., 2009; Joel et al., 2014; Jost et al.,
2003; Jost et al., 2007; Napier & Jost, 2008; Shook & Fazio, 2009). A goal for future
research must be to explore the causal processes underlying a larger variety of
ideological dimensions, and to build on work that has already shown that threat
(and perhaps other psychological variables) has distinct relationships with differ-
ent ideological dimensions (e.g., Crowson, 2009; Malka & Soto, 2015; Malka et al.,
2014; Onraet et al., 2014).
Another take-home message of our review is that theorists who seek causal
processes underlying ideology must confront the reality that different people use
different ideological structures. In particular, theories must fully incorporate the
insight that ideology is shaped by top-down processes: people who are politically
engaged in Western, democratic societies are likely to use the liberal–conserva-
tive continuum, whereas people who are not politically engaged and those from
non-Western, non-democratic societies are unlikely to use the liberal–conserva-
tive continuum. The implication of these findings is that it only makes sense to

4. It should be noted that, similar to ideology, threat is a complex and multifaceted construct (e.g.,
Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013). A logical implication of this insight is that different kinds
of threat may have different connections to distinct ideological dimensions. A complete discussion of
that possibility, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
410 MORGAN AND WISNESKI

investigate the processes that shape whether a person is liberal or conservative to

the extent that the person uses the liberal–conservative continuum in the first place. To be
clear, it is appropriate to seek psychological causes of liberalism–conservatism for
those who express unidimensional ideology—it is plausible that there are psycho-
logical differences between those who hold consistently liberal positions and those
who hold consistently conservative positions. This approach may be particularly
useful in the political climate of the contemporary United States, in which people
increasingly see the liberal–conservative continuum as having personal relevance
to their lives (see Layman & Carsey, 2002). Nonetheless, theories that seek the psy-
chological processes underlying liberalism–conservatism in specific should not be
characterized as theories that provide insights about the psychological processes
underlying ideology writ large. These theories do not address the diversity of po-
litical systems throughout our world (Gunther & Diamond, 2003, list a taxonomy
of 15 different types), the ideological structures that people use in diverse political
systems, nor the psychological processes that shape people’s ideology in the con-
text of diverse political systems. A goal for future ideology research should be to
build on existing studies that have begun to incorporate between-person variabil-
ity in ideology, and have sought different causal processes for different people and
different contexts (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Federico et al., 2009; Malka et al.,
2014). We suggest that people’s ideology is likely shaped by a complex interaction
of their political system, their engagement in their political system, and bottom-
up psychological processes (responses to threat being only one example). Future
studies might test this interaction, specifically.
A final take-home message of our review is that theories must better account
for within-person variability in ideology. The insight that there is intraindividual
ideological heterogeneity has substantial implications for the ways we think about
ideology. This insight requires a shift away from approaches that treat ideology
as akin to an individual difference variable, and thus a shift away from only seek-
ing differences between “liberals” and “conservatives.” The first step for future
research should be to continue documenting within-person variability in ideology.
Next, future studies should explore the processes that shape people’s ideology
across different domains. In the American context, for example, people may be
more likely to adopt liberal–conservative positions for issue domains (a) that they
deem subjectively important, (b) for which they are knowledgeable, or (c) that
they see as relevant to politics in the first place (Judd & Krosnick, 1989). Similarly,
people’s ideology may be more likely to reflect the liberal–conservative continuum
if they live in a society where the political structure also reflects that continuum
and they are highly politically knowledgeable and engaged (e.g., Lodge & Hamill,
1986). Such a possibility suggests that different bottom-up psychological processes
might shape people’s positions across discrete domains.
As a final note, we offer a clarification. Readers should not interpret our argu-
ments as suggesting that ideology “does not exist.” People do indeed use ideologi-
cal frameworks to guide the way they think about their social and political world.
We do not discount the existence of ideology, but champion its complexity. At the
IDEOLOGICAL VARIABILITY 411
heart of our review is the claim that a single, deeply ingrained liberal–conserva-
tive continuum is not synonymous with the term “ideology” and does not capture
ideology in its entirety. Rather, people use ideology in ways that are diverse and
personally meaningful. If our goal is to understand the processes that lead people
to adopt different ideological perspectives, then we must recognize the full rich-
ness of ideology.
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