IDEOLOGY:

 LECTURE  ONE  
 
Daryl  Glaser  
 
 
Why  a  course  on  ideology  as  part  of  First-­‐Year  (i.e.  introductory)  Political  
Studies?  
 
The   reason   is   because   of   the   manifest   importance   in   political   life   of  
ideologies.    
 
By   ideologies   I   mean,   essentially,   the   competing   ‘isms’   that   organize  
political  thought  and  guide  collective  political  action.  
 
‘Isms’  like  liberalism,  socialism,  conservatism,  to  name  first  the  great  competing  
classical   ideologies   of   modernity;   but   also   some   of   their   offshoots   and   early   or  
later  competitors,  like  anarchism,  fascism,  feminism,  ecologism,  postcolonialism,  
Islamism.  
 
Not   all   agree   that   ideologies   are   as   important   as   I   imply.   To   be   sure,  
ideologues  have  oftentimes  fought  each  other  to  the  death.  But  at  various  other  
points,  they  may  have  lost  their  importance,  at  least  as  competing  belief  systems.  
Thus  writers  have  talked  of  the  ‘end  of  ideology’  (ideology  being  superseded  by  
consensus,   management,   pragmatism,   technocracy)   or   (after   the   Cold   War)   of  
the  ‘end  of  history’  (which  perhaps  amounted  not  so  much  to  end  of  ideology  as  
the   victory   of   just   one   ideology,   namely   capitalist   liberal   democracy).   Some  
would  consider  us  to  be  in  a  post-­‐ideological  age  now.  But  it  was  easier  to  think  
that   in   the   1990s,   when   liberalism   seemed   universally   triumphant,   than   it   is  
post-­‐2001,  in  a  world  where  liberal  democracy  is  being  challenged  by  Islamism  
ad  by  populisms  of  the  left  and  right.    
 
Others   are   skeptical   about   whether   ideologies   –   here,   in   the   sense   of  
systems  of  ideas  -­‐  are  what  actually  determine  our  action,  as  opposed  to  our  
actions   being   determined   by   (say)   material   interests   (as   opposed   to   ideas),   or  
emotions   (as   opposed   to   organised   systems   of   ideas).   Some   see   ideologies   as  
simply  manifestations  of  power  relations,  or  as  ways  of  rationalizing  them  (this  
is   true   of   Marxism,   for   which   ideologies   belong   to   the   ‘superstructure’   of   an  
economy,   or   discourse   theory,   for   which   ideologies   are   in   effect   discourses    
congealing  patterns  of  domination).    
 
For  many  such  theorists,  the  substantive  logical  and  moral  content  of  ideologies  
–   whether   they   are   coherent   or   attractive   –   matters   less   than   the   social   and  
historical  role  they  perform.  
 
And   then   not   all   subscribers   to   the   various   ‘isms’   agree   that   what   they  
believe   constitutes   an   ‘ideology’.   In   fact,   they   often   do   not;   they   believe   that  
what  certain  others  believe  is  ideological,  but  that  what  they  believe  is  somehow  
outside   of   ideology   –   not   ideology,   but   something   else.   This   is   because   many  

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subscribers   to   particular   ‘isms’,   and   many   who   do   not   consciously  
subscribe  to  any  ‘ism’,  attach  a  negative  connotation  to  ideology.  That  is  to  
say,  they  use  the  term  pejoratively  (as  a  form  of  insult).    
 
For  those  who  use  the  term  ideology  pejoratively,  the  term  conveys  one  or  
some  combination  of  the  following:  
 
• Dogma   (inflexible   commitment   to   some   perceived   absolute   truth,   as  
opposed  to  practical,  flexible  or  open-­‐minded  thinking)  
• Falsehood  (as  opposed  to  truth,  scientific,  revealed  or  otherwise)  
• Rationalist   social   engineering   (as   opposed   to   respect   for   historical  
wisdom,  local  knowledge,  tradition)  
 
Thus   for   many   liberals,   Marxism   and   fascism   are   ideologies   because   they  
proclaim   and   enforce   singular   absolute   truths,   whereas   liberalism  
accommodates  competing  standpoints,  and  thus  stands  above  ideology.    
 
For   many   Marxists,   liberalism   and   fascism   are   both   ideologies   serving   particular,  
in  these  cases  capitalist,  ruling  classes,  in  liberalism’s  case  claiming  to  be  above  
ideology   but   consciously   or   unconsciously   giving   expression   to   the   interests   of  
property-­‐owners;   these   ideologies   moreover   convey   false   or   partial   views   of  
reality,  whereas  scientific  Marxism  reveals  the  objective  truth.    
 
For   conservatives   of   a   particular   kind   (dispositional   conservatives,   a   term   I   will  
explain   later),   liberalism   (especially   progressive   reformist   liberalism)   and  
Marxism  are  both  ideologies,  because  they  impose  an  abstract  set  of  ideas  on  a  
recalcitrant  empirical  world,  in  defiance  of  tradition,  human  nature  or  common  
sense,   and   in   pursuit   of   a   utopian   illusion   of   human   perfection,   whereas  
conservatism  respects  both  the  wisdom  of  the  past  and  human  limitations.      
 
Thus,  everyone  else  is  ideological,  but  not  me!  
 
Not  everyone  refuses  the  label  of  ideological.    
 
Some   insist   that   everyone   is   ideological,   whether   they   know   it   or   not,  
because   ideological   assumptions   consciously   or   unconsciously   structure   how   we  
act  in  the  world;  there  is  no  value-­‐free,  neutral,  non-­‐ideological  standpoint.  For  
them  ideology  governs  our  thinking  and  action,  not  only  in  collective  public  life  
but   even   in   everyday   interaction   (e.g.   in   family   relations).   Indeed   ideology   is  
what   constitutes   us   a   particular   kind   of   human   being   and   actor,   or   ‘subject’.  
Liberal   ideology   may,   for   example,   give   us   the   illusion   that   we   are   individuals  
who  exercise  free  choice,  as  opposed  to  products  of  history  or  cultural  context.  
The  belief  that  one  can  be  non-­‐ideological  is  itself,  in  these  terms,  an  ideological  
belief.  
 
Others   may   concede   that   it   is   possible   to   be   more   or   less   ideological,   but  
insist   that   an   ideology-­‐free   political   order   would   be   a   bad   thing.  It  would  be  
more   bland,   less   passionate;   it   would   offer   fewer   real   political   choices,  
weakening   democracy;   it   would   proclaim   a   false   neutrality,   concealing   power  

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relations  and  interests;  it  would  benefit  the  status  quo  by  ruling  out  imaginative  
or  radical  thinking.  
 
So  what  is  ideology,  and  what  is  an  ideology?  
 
It  is  a  belief  system  that  guides  action  (or  is  meant  to).    
 
A   political   ideology   guides   political   action,   which   means,   at   a   minimum,  
collective   political   action   –   via   states,   parties,   lobby   groups,   social   movements,  
community   organisations,   NGOs,   and   so   on   –   although   (of   course)   some   extend  
the   field   of   the   political   to   cover   a   much   wider   range   of   action,   including   any  
involving   the   exercise   of   power   or   contestation   over   it.   This   sort   of   politics  
occurs  in  the  conduct  of  private  organisations,  families,  friendship  networks,  and  
so  on.  
 
It  is  political  ideologies  that  concern  us  here.  
 
A  political  ideology  usually  contains  some  sort  of  diagnosis  of  the  world  as  
it   is,   and   some   sort   of   prescription   for   the   world   is   it   can   and   ought   to   be.  If  
the  two  correspond,  the  ideology  will  defend  the  status  quo;  if  they  do  not,  it  will  
seek  to  change  the  status  quo.    
 
Thus   classical   Marxists   diagnose   our   capitalist   world   as   exploitative   and  
alienating,   and   prescribe   a   socialist,   ultimately   communist   future   that   is  
desirable   (because   non-­‐exploitative,   non-­‐alienating)   and   possible,   in   their   view  
(because   the   advance   of   human   productive   powers   creates   the   conditions   in  
which  socialism  and  communism  become  possible).  
 
But   beyond   this,   there   is   much   disagreement   about   what   ideology   entails  
and  encompasses.  We  can  capture  some  of  this  disagreement  by  relating  it  
to  other  terms  to  which  it  bears  a  family  resemblance.  
 
An  ideology  may  be  viewed  as  a  doctrine  or  creed.  Here  it  offers  an  elaborate  
and   encompassing   set   of   ideas,   typically   set   out   (at   lest)   in   texts   (e.g.   Das  Kapital  
in  the  case  of  Marxism,  or  JS  Mill’s  On  Liberty  in  the  case  of  liberalism).  As  such,  it  
may   issue   in   a   programme   or   manifesto   (such   as   the   Communist   Manifesto,   or  
American  Declaration  of  Independence,  or  indeed  the  programme  or  manifesto  of  
any   Marxist   or   liberal   party).   These   ideas   (which   may   include   critiques   of   the  
present   order,   visions   of   the   future,   calls   to   action,  methods   of   analysis,   accounts  
of   historical   development,   philosophical   principles)   are   openly   declared,   and  
openly   debated,   refined,   developed   or   altered   by   others   within   the   same  
ideological   tradition.   Often   different   schools,   tendencies   or   currents   develop  
within  ideological  traditions.    
 
An   ideology   may   also   be   said   to   resemble   a   philosophy   or   a   theory.  This  is  
what   many   ideologues   might   themselves   prefer   to   call   their   own   ideology,  
because   it   sounds   more   elevated:   less   like   a   religion   or   dogma,   more   like   a  
carefully  worked-­‐out,  plausible  and  legitimate  set  of  claims  (perhaps  in  principle  
contestable,   and   testable)   about   what   is   true   and   what   is   not.   It   appeals   to   the  

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vocabularies  of  academic  disciplines,  including  those  of  philosophy  and  science.  
It  also  implies  a  logical  and  coherent  set  of  beliefs.    
 
But  a  belief  system  need  not  be  fully  logical  or  coherent  in  order  to  be  a  powerful  
force   in   the   world;   to   be,   as   it   were,   a   ‘thing’.   It   may   succeed   by   appealing,   for  
example,   to   emotions,   or   to   everyday   intuitions   or   prejudices.   Besides,  
ideologies,   in   particular   as   they   evolve,   become   internally   differentiated,   are  
applied   to   different   situations   and   come   to   be   adopted   by   different   groups   of  
people,   usually   possess,   or   develop,   internal   tensions   or   contradictions.   An  
analytic  political  philosopher  may  object  to  internal  contradictions,  but  absolute  
consistency   is   not   a   requirement   of   ideology,   either   in   terms   of   definition   or  
effectiveness.   For   some   writers,   successful   politics   is   less   about   implementing  
coherent  ideologies  than  about  bringing  together  different  ideological  elements  
(including   elements   from   different   ideologies)   in   ways   that   knit   together  
coalitions  around  some  contemporary  demand  or  need.  
 
Indeed,  one  of  the  things  I  will  emphasise  in  the  lectures  ahead  is  the  fluidity  and  
internal  variety  that  characterizes  ideological  traditions.  
 
This   is   not   to   say   that   ideologies   do   not   possess   core   or   anchor   ideas;   if   an  
ideology  loses  these,  it  arguably  ceases  to  exist  as  an  ideology.  Liberalism  cannot  
be   liberalism   without   the   idea   of   individual   freedom.   But   not   all   of   liberalism’s  
adjacent,  and  especially  not  all  of  its  peripheral  concepts  (to  use  the  vocabulary  
of  what  is  called  morphological  analysis),  are  necessarily  consistent  with  its  core  
concepts.  And  this  may  be  partly  because  the  core  concepts  are   open   to   different  
interpretations   (see   e.g.   negative   and   positive   liberty   in   the   case   of   liberal  
freedom).    
 
And  then  there  are  accounts  that  move  away  from  the  notion  of  ideology  as  
an   explicit   doctrine,   creed   or   programme,   towards   an   understanding   of   it  
as  something  more  implicit,  perhaps  even  unconscious.    
 
For  example,  we  may  think  of  an  ideology  as  constituting  less  a  substantive  
and   worked-­‐out   programme   than   a   paradigm   or   lens.   Here   it   constitutes   a  
particular   way   of   looking   at   the   world:   a   particular   set   of   assumptions   about  
what   is   possibly   true,   a   particular   method   of   analysis,   a   particular   set   of  
questions,   and   a   particular   set   of   criteria   for   deciding   what   constitutes   correct  
answers.   Typically   an   ideology   will   belong   to,   entail   or   favour   a   particular  
paradigm  or  lens.  But  there  can  also  be  different  paradigms  and  lenses  employed  
within   a   particular   ideological   tradition   (one   source   of   their   internal  
differentiation)   and   different   ideologies   may   share   the   same   paradigm   or   lens  
(e.g.   they   may   be   arguing   over   the   same   questions   and   issues,   and   they   may  
share  certain  assumptions  about  what  is  true  or  what  counts  as  a  plausible  truth  
claim).  Thus  you  could  argue  that  liberalism  and  Marxism  are  both  arguing  about  
the   desirable   form   of   modernity   and   progress,   not   over   the   very   ideas   of  
modernity  and  progress.    
 
A   worldview,   however,   may   be   more   ideologically   specific,   since   it   seems   to  
imply   something   more   than   a   paradigm   or   lens,   a   substantive   set   of   beliefs   in  

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addition   to   a   way   of   looking   at   things.   You   would   not   say   that   liberals   and  
Marxists  share  the  same  worldview.    
 
We  may  also  think  of  an  ideology  as  a  particular  kind  of  value  system,  or  a  
particular   kind   of   cultural   or   symbolic   order.   Here   it   is   less   about   explicit  
doctrine  and  more  about  socially  embedded  values  and  beliefs.  It  can  extend  to  
an  assortment  of  everyday  views  about  what  life  is,  even  to  way  of  life.  In  these  
terms   it   also   encompasses   a   type   of   paradigm,   lens   or   worldview,   but   one   that   is  
so  taken-­‐for-­‐granted  or  apparently  commensensical  that  we  don’t  even  think  of  
it  as  a  particular  paradigm,  lens  or  worldview.  It  is  just  what  we  think  or  believe,  
without,   as   it   were,   even   thinking   about   it.   It   may   involve   also   a   particular  
language  or  grammar  that  itself  structures  rather  than  merely  represents  reality.  
It  may  constitute  a  discourse,  a  system  of  knowledge  that  embodies  less  universal  
scientific  truths  than  particular  systems  of  social  power.  And  it  may  be  embodied  
not   only   in   ideas   but   also   in   practices,   including,   say,   aesthetic   or   material  
practices.  
 
In   the   lectures   that   follow   I   will   try   and   accommodate   a   diversity   of   such  
meanings,   but   I   will   be   considering,   in   the   first   instance,   explicit   sets   of   ideas  
intended  to  guide  public  political  action.  
 
 
 
Recommended  further  reading:    
 
Michael  Freeden  (2003),  Ideology.  A  Very  Short  Introduction  [on  SAKAI].  
 
 
 
QUESTION  TO  THINK  ABOUT:    
 
The  late  Chinese  leader  Deng  Xiaoping  said  that  "[i]t  doesn't  matter  
whether  a  cat  is  black  or  white,  as  long  as  it  catches  mice."    
 
Should  we  get  over  ideology  and  just  do  ‘what  works’?
 
 

 
Deng  Xiaoping  
 

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