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Gonzales v. Office of The President PDF
Gonzales v. Office of The President PDF
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* EN BANC.
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office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed
through impeachment, namely, “culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”—Being aware of the
constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the
Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts
of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the
President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the
removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance
of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid
down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph
1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy
Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds
that the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment,
namely, “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust.” Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the President
the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special
Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise the
constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is,
precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the
Ombudsman’s Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of
their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds
provided by law.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Administrative
decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be
set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of
law.—The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in
matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on
proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. In the
instant case, while the evidence may show some amount of
wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts
the correctness of the OP’s conclusion that the imputed acts
amount to gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive
of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner’s offenses, as
they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal
of public trust would be to ignore the significance of the
legislature’s intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes that,
theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations
that justify the removal by impeachment of the highest officials of
the land.
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does not warrant the conclusion that all bodies declared by the
Constitution as “independent” have exclusive disciplinary
authority over all their respective officials and employees. Unlike
the Judiciary where such exclusivity is expressly provided for in
the Constitution, there is no reason to read such provision in the
Ombudsman where the Constitution is silent. On the contrary,
the constitutional provision that non-impeachable officers and
employees “may be removed from office as provided by law”
removes any doubt that Congress can determine the mode of
removal of non-impeachable officers and employees of
“independent” bodies other than the Judiciary. An “independent”
body does not have exclusive disciplinary authority over its
officials and employees unless the Constitution expressly so
provides, as in the case of the Judiciary.
Same; Same; Checks and Balances; View that there is no office
that is insulated from a possible correction from another office.
The executive, legislative and judicial branches of government
operate through the system of checks and balances.—A completely
“independent” body is alien to our constitutional system. There is
no office that is insulated from a possible correction from another
office. The executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government operate through the system of checks and balances.
All independent constitutional bodies are subject to review by the
courts. A fiscally autonomous body is subject to audit by the
Commission on Audit, and Congress cannot be compelled to
appropriate a bigger budget than that of the previous fiscal year.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Ombudsman is not
constitutionally empowered to act alone. Congress can even
authorize the Department of Justice or the Office of the President
to investigate cases within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.—
Clearly, the Ombudsman is not constitutionally empowered to act
alone. Congress can even authorize the Department of Justice or
the Office of the President to investigate cases within the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Similarly, the Ombudsman can
investigate public officers and employees ho are under the
disciplinary authority of heads of other bodies or agencies. The
cases cited in the ponencia, i.e. Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, 251 SCRA
242 (1995), and Office the Ombudsman v. Delijero, Jr., 634 SCRA
135 (2010)—illustrate that concurrent jurisdiction does not impair
the independence of the Ombudsman. Dupli-
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PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Cases
These two petitions have been consolidated not because
they stem from the same factual milieu but because they
raise a common thread of issues relating to the President’s
exercise of the power to remove from office herein
petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence
of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong
the Office of the Ombudsman.
The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a
Petition for Certiorari (with application for issuance of
temporary restraining order or status quo order) which
assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision1 dated March
31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the President in OP Case
No. 10-J-460 dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III,
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on
the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust.
The petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the
President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
issuance of a temporary restraining order or status quo
order) seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the
undated Order2 requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-
Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to
alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave
offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement
(PLEBARA) entered into with Major Gen-
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1 Annex “A,” Rollo (G.R. No. 196231), pp. 72-86.
2 Annex “A,” Rollo (G.R. No. 196232), p. 26.
627
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3 Annex “C,” id., at p. 33.
628
The hostage drama dragged on even after the driver of the bus
managed to escape and told police that all the remaining
passengers had been killed.
Late into the night assault forces surrounded the bus and tried to
gain entry, but a pair of dead hostages handcuffed to the door
made it difficult for them. Police said they fired at the wheels of
the bus to immobilize it.
Police used hammers to smash windows, door and windshield but
were met with intermittent fire from the hostage taker.
Police also used tear gas in an effort to confirm if the remaining
hostages were all dead or alive. When the standoff ended at
nearly 9 p.m., some four hostages were rescued alive while
Mendoza was killed by a sniper.
Initial reports said some 30 policemen stormed the bus. Shots also
rang out, sending bystanders scampering for safety.
It took the policemen almost two hours to assault the bus because
gunfire reportedly rang out from inside the bus.
Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus in the morning and took the
tourists hostage.
Mendoza, who claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police
service, initially released nine of the hostages during the drama
that began at 10 a.m. and played out live on national television.
Live television footage showed Mendoza asking for food for those
remaining in the bus, which was delivered, and fuel to keep the
air-conditioning going.
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Mendoza asked the driver to let him get on and ride to Quirino
Grandstand. Upon reaching the Quirino Grandstand, Mendoza
announced to the passengers that they would be taken hostage.
“Having worn his (police) uniform, of course there is no doubt that
he already planned the hostage taking,” Margarejo said.—Sandy
Araneta, Nestor Etolle, Delon Porcalla, Amanda Fisher, Cecille
Suerte Felipe, Christina Mendez, AP [Grandstand Carnage, The
Philippine Star, Updated August 24, 2010 12:00 AM, Val
Rodriguez].4
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4 Val Rodriguez, Grandstand Carnage, The Philippine Star, August 24,
2010 <http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=
605631&publicationSubCategoryId=63> (visited January 5, 2011).
5 Charge Sheet, Rollo (G.R. No. 196231), p. 87.
631
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6 Id., at p. 231.
7 Resolution dated August 26, 2008, id., at pp. 233-235.
8 Id., at p. 128.
9 Id., at pp. 153-158.
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10 Id., at pp. 203-216.
11 Annex “F,” id., at pp. 132-136.
12 Annex “N,” id., at pp. 244-249.
633
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13 The President issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010 creating
the IIRC.
14 As quoted in the Petition in G.R. No. 196231, Rollo, pp. 17-20.
634
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636
637
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15 Annex “Q,” id., at p. 322.
16 R.A. No. 3019.
17 Rollo (G.R. No. 196231), pp. 324-346.
18 R.A. No. 6713.
19 Annex “W,” Rollo (G.R. No. 196231), pp. 386-408.
638
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713,
the complaint is hereby be [sic] DISMISSED.
Further, finding no sufficient evidence to hold respondent
administratively liable for Misconduct, the same is likewise
DISMISSED.
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20 Annex “S,” id., at p. 377.
21 Petition, id., at p. 8.
22 Annex “V,” id., at pp. 380-383.
23 Annex “A,” id., at pp. 72-86.
639
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24 Annex “B,” Rollo (G.R. No. 196232), pp. 27-30.
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(A)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING
THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, HAS
NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR VALID STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO SUBJECT PETITIONER TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE
INVESTIGATION AND TO THEREAFTER ORDER HIS
REMOVAL AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN.
(B)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING
THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS,
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONDUCTED ITS
INVESTIGATION AND RENDERED ITS DECISION IN
VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
(C)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING
THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER
COMMIT-
641
(F)
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING
THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER
DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM MENDOZA.25
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25 Petition, Rollo (G.R. No. 196231), pp. 23-24.
26 Petition, Rollo (G.R. No. 196232), p. 10.
642
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27 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 396; 465 SCRA 437 (2005).
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28 Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing and Tayactac, G.R. No. 165416,
January 22, 2008, 542 SCRA 253.
643
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29 De Leon, 2 Philippine Constitutional Law Principles and Cases, 855 (2004).
30 Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 771 (1995).
644
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31 Id., at pp. 143-144.
32 Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero, Jr., G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010,
634 SCRA 135.
645
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33 Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(MEWAP) v. Executive Secretary Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007,
528 SCRA 673, 682.
34 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 461, citing Land Bank
of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation, 569 SCRA 154, 183 (2008)
and Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello, 520 SCRA
515, 535 (2007).
647
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35 See Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, Rollo (G.R. No.
196231), pp. 709-710.
648
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36 321 Phil. 604; 251 SCRA 242 (1995).
649
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37 Id., at pp. 613-614; pp. 251-252.
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38 Id.
39 Supra note 31.
40 Section 23. Formal Investigation.—
x x x x
(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain
complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of
appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public
officers or employees, which shall be determined within the period
prescribed in the civil service law. x x x
650
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41 Supra note 31, at p. 146.
651
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42 Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA
264.
43 Id.
652
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44 Sec. 2. The President, the Vice President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
45 As quoted in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
146486, 493 Phil. 63, 77-80; 452 SCRA 714, 728-730 (2005).
653
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46 Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 26,
1986, pp. 273-274.
47 Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 26,
1986, p. 305.
654
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48 Aguirre, Jr. v. De Castro, 378 Phil. 714; 321 SCRA 95 (1999).
49 Cruz, Carlo L., The Law of Public Officers, 154-155 (1992).
655
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50 Sec. 13, Article XI; De Leon, Hector, 2 Philippine Constitutional Law, 860
(2004), citing Concerned Officials of the MWSS v. Velasquez, 310 Phil. 549; 240
SCRA 502 (1995) and Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, 344 Phil. 323; 278 SCRA 769
(1997).
51 Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 773-774 (1995).
656
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52 De Leon, 2 Philippine Constitutional Law Principles and Cases, 857
(2004), citing Del. R.D. ROBLES, The Ombudsman, in C.R. Montejo, On
the 1973 Constitution, 232.
53 Id., at pp. 859-860.
658
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54 397 Phil. 829, 831; 343 SCRA 744, 746 (2000), cited in Angeles v. Desierto,
532 Phil. 647, 656; 501 SCRA 202, 211 (2006).
659
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55 Cayago v. Lina, 489 Phil. 735; 449 SCRA 29 (2005).
56 Libres v. NLRC, 367 Phil. 180; 307 SCRA 675 (1999).
660
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57 Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, 310 Phil. 549; 240 SCRA
502 (1995).
58 AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520,
June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 633, 654 citing Casimiro v. Tandog, 498 Phil.
660, 666; 459 SCRA 624, 631 (2005).
59 OP Decision, p. 7, Rollo (G.R. No. 196231), p. 78.
60 Funa, Dennis B., The Law on the Administrative Accountability of
Public Officers, 509 (2010), citing Office of the Court Administrator v.
Bucoy, A.M. No. P-93-953, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA
661
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588; Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, 234 Phil. 28; 150 SCRA 26 (1987),
Biak na Bato Mining Co. v. Tanco, 271 Phil. 339; 193 SCRA 323 (1991).
61 Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 5; Nicolas v. Desierto, 488 Phil. 158;
447 SCRA 154 (2004); Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil.
635 (1940).
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662
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64 Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the
President v. Court of Appeals, 251 Phil. 26; 169 SCRA 27 (1989), citing
Lovina v. Moreno, 118 Phil. 1401; 9 SCRA 557 (1963).
663
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65 Joaquin G. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 992 (1996).
664
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68 Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, pp. 283-
284.
665
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69 Id., at p. 286.
666
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70 Annex “2” of the Supplemental Comment on the Petition, Rollo
(G.R. No. 196232), p. 212.
71 Annex “1,” id., at pp. 210-211.
72 Annex “3,” id., at pp. 213-215.
670
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73 Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008, 550
SCRA 233, citing People v. Villarama, Jr., 210 SCRA 246, 251-252 (1992).
671
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74 People v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA
246; People v. Parohinog, 185 Phil. 266; 96 SCRA 373 (1980); People v.
Kayanan, 172 Phil. 728; 83 SCRA 437 (1978).
75 Annex “7” of the Supplemental Comment on the Petition, Rollo
(G.R. No. 196232), pp. 225-268.
76 Leviste v. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA
575, 608; Cabrera v. Marcelo, 487 Phil. 427; 446 SCRA 207 (2004).
672
CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
Our Constitution does not impart a fixed and rigid
concept of independence among the offices that it creates.
While it declares certain bodies as “‘independent”, we
cannot assume that the independence of the Ombudsman1
is the same as the
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1 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 5: There is hereby created the independent
Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one over all Deputy and at least one
674
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I.
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Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for
the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
2 These are the bodies that the 1987 Constitution considers as
“independent.” See CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-A, Sec. I; Art. XII, Secs. 9 and 20:
Art. XIII, Sec. 17.
3 See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2002).
675
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4 As amended and consolidated by the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
5 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 263 (26 July 1986).
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676
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6 Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 499; 177 SCRA 668, 689 (1989); Vera v.
Avelino, G.R. No. L-543, 31 August 1946, 77 Phil. 192; Ople v. Torres, G.R. No.
127685, 23 July 1998, 354 Phil. 948; 293 SCRA 141.
677
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7 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 356-357 (28 July 1986).
8 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 13(1): Investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
9 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 13(3): Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
678
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10 See notes 8 and 9.
11 R.A. No. 6770, Sec. 21.
12 Valera v. Tuason, Jr., 80 Phil. 823, 827 (1948). See also Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello, G.R. No. 162288, 4 April
2007, 520 SCRA 515, 535, citing Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.,
G.R. No. 154674, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 773, 786.
679
II.
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13 Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546; 272 SCRA 18 (1997); Manila
Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 335 Phil. 82; 267
SCRA 408 (1997); Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652; 246 SCRA 540
(1995).
14 Id.
680
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15 CONSTITUTION, Art. XII, Secs. 9 and 20; Art. XIII, Sec. 17.
16 See CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-A, Sec. 3 (the salaries of the Chairman
and the Commissioners are fixed by law but shall not be decreased during
their tenure), Sec. 4 (appointment of other officials and employees in
accordance with law) and Sec. 8 (the constitutional commissions may
perform other functions as may be provided by law).
17 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-A, Sec. 5.
18 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-A, Sec. 6.
681
(Republic Act No. 7653), the President also has the power
to remove a member of the Monetary Board on specified
grounds.22 There
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19 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 6 (“The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.”) and
Sec. 11 (“x x x The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.”).
20 Supra, note 2.
21 Id.
22 R.A. No. 7653, Sec. 10. Removal.—The President may remove any
member of the Monetary Board for any of the following reasons:
(a) If the member is subsequently disqualified under the provisions of
Section 8 of this Act; or
(b) If he is physically or mentally incapacitated that he cannot
properly discharge his duties and responsibilities and such incapacity has
lasted for more than six (6) months; or
(c) If the member is guilty of acts or operations which are of
fraudulent or illegal character or which are manifestly opposed to the
aims and interests of the Bangko Sentral; or
(d) If the member no longer possesses the qualifications specified in
Section 8 of this Act.
See also III RECORDS, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 611 (22 August 1986):
682
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THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, may I ask a question for
clarification? The section says, “The Congress shall establish an
independent central monetary authority.” My question has reference to
the word “independent.” How is independence of this authority supported
by the Constitution?
In the case of the judiciary, the Members are independent because they
have a fixed term and they may not be removed except by impeachment or
some very difficult process. This applies to the different constitutional
commissions. But in the case of this central monetary authority which we
call “independent”, how is this independence maintained?
MR. VILLEGAS. The thinking is: Congress, in establishing that
independent central monetary authority, should provide a fixed term.
Actually that was contained in the original Davide amendment but we
thought of leaving it up to Congress to determine that term—a fixed term
of probably five years or seven years serving in the monetary board.
MR. RODRIGO. Does this include that they may not be removed except
by impeachment by the Congress?
MR. VILLEGAS. Exactly.
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683
III.
This Court has no business limiting the plenary power of
Congress unless the Constitution expressly so limits it. The
fact that different constitutional bodies are treated
differently under the Constitution shows that
independence is a broadly delineated norm. With this level
of generality, the constitutional meaning of independence is
only that of independent decision-making that is free from
partisanship and political pressures. It does not even mean
fiscal autonomy unless the Constitution says so.23 Thus, it
is generally left to Congress to particularize the meaning of
independence, subject only to specific constitutional
limitations. Nothing in the Constitution tells us that an
“independent” body necessarily has exclusive disciplinary
authority over its officials and employees.
A completely “independent” body is alien to our
constitutional system. There is no office that is insulated
from a possible correction from another office. The
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government
operate through the system of checks and balances. All
independent constitutional bodies are subject to review by
the courts. A fiscally autonomous body is subject to audit
by the Commission on Audit, and Congress cannot be
compelled to appropriate a bigger budget than that of the
previous fiscal year.24
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is consistent with
our system of checks and balances. The provision is a
narrow form of delegation which empowers the President to
remove only two officers in the Office of the Ombudsman,
i.e. the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.
The proposition that an external disciplinary authority
compromises the Ombudsman’s independence fails to
recognize that the Constitution
_______________
23 Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association v.
Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 155336, 21 July 2006, 496 SCRA
226.
24 See CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 3; Art. IX-A, Sec. 5; Art. XI, Sec.
14.
684
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25 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 13, par. (3). Emphasis supplied.
26 R.A. No. 6770, Sec. 23(2).
27 The Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)
provides that the heads of agencies are generally empowered to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against
officers and employees under their jurisdiction. ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter7, Secs. 47, par. (2) and 48, par.
(1).
28 G.R. No. 108072, 12 December 1995, 251 SCRA 242.
29 G.R. No. 172635, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 135.
685
BRION, J.:
The present case consists of two consolidated petitions,
G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232.
I concur with the ponencia’s main conclusion that
petitioner Emilio Gonzales III (in G.R. No. 196231, referred
to as Gonzales or petitioner Gonzales) is not guilty of the
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687
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4 See Department of Justice v. Hon. Liwag, 491 Phil. 270, 283; 451
SCRA 83, 96 (2005); and Deloso v. Domingo, G.R. No. 90591, November
21, 1990, 191 SCRA 545, 550-551.
5 Atty. Aguirre, Jr. v. De Castro, 378 Phil. 714, 726; 321 SCRA 95, 101
(1999); Hon. Bagatsing v. Hon. Melencio Herrera, 160 Phil. 449, 458; 65
SCRA 434, 440 (1975); and Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740, 749 (1949).
689
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6 Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.—
x x x x
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor may be removed from office
by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman, and after due process.
7 Ponencia, p. 22.
8 Id., at pp. 22-23.
690
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9 Bautista v. Senator Salonga, 254 Phil. 156, 179; 172 SCRA 160, 182 (1989).
10 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Sections 1 and 5(2).
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691
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11 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, July 26, 1986, p. 294.
692
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12 Id., at p. 294.
693
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13 Ponencia, p. 22.
14 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 2.
15 R.A. No. 6770, Section 27.
16 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65.
17 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 10 and 11.
18 Id., Article IX(A), Section 1.
694
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19 Id., Article XIII, Section 17(1).
20 Id., Article XII, Section 20.
21 Ibid.
22 Id., Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX(A), Section 5; and Article XI,
Section 14.
23 Id., Article VIII, Section 5.
24 Id., Article XI, Section 2.
695
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25 G.R. No. 103524 and A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA, April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133,
150.
696
law will not serve the interest of the people but only the personal
interest of the few and the enhancement of family power,
advancement and prestige.26
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26 Speech, Session of February 18, 1972, as cited in “The 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary” by Joaquin Bernas, 2003 ed., p.
1009.
27 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, July 15, 1986, pp. 532-533.
28 G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358, 361.
697
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29 Section 17(1), Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called the
Commission on Human Rights.
698
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30 Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, August 27, 1986,
pp. 748-749.
699
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31 Section 20, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central
monetary authority, the members of whose governing board must be
natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity, integrity, and patriotism,
the majority of whom shall come from the private sector.
32 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, August 13, 1986,
p. 268.
33 Section 9, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 9. The Congress may establish an independent economic and
planning agency headed by the President, which shall, after consultations
with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local
government units, recommend to Congress, and implement continuing
integrated and coordinated programs and policies for national
development.
700
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Until Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development
Authority shall function as the independent planning agency of the government.
34 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, August 13, 1986, p. 263.
701
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35 Id., at pp. 263-264.
36 321 Phil. 604; 251 SCRA 242 (1995).
37 G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 135.
38 Supra note 9.
702
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39 Id., at pp. 183-184.
40 453 Phil. 586, 658-659; 405 SCRA 614, 695 (2003).
41 Supra note 5. Section 17, Article VII, and Section 4, Article X of the
Constitution likewise provide that:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments.
703
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42 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 9.
43 Id., Article IX(B), Section 1(2); Article IX(C), Section 1(2); Article
IX(D), Section 1(2); and Article XI, Section 9.
44 Id., Article XI, Section 2.
45 Id., Article IX(A), Section 1 and Article XI, Section 5 read:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed.
704
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46 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, July 28, 1986, p.
356 reads:
MR. REGALADO. xxx The reason for the amendment is this: While
Section 2 enumerates the impeachable officers, there is nothing that will
prevent the legislature as it stands now from providing also that other
officers not enumerated therein shall also be removable only by
impeachment, and that has already happened.
Under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan Decree, justices
of the Sandiganbayan may be removed only by impeachment, unlike their
counterparts in the then Court of Appeals. They are, therefore, a
privileged class xxx
xxxx
MR. REGALADO. xxx But the proposed amendment with not prevent
the legislature from subsequently repealing or amending that portion of
the law [PD No. 1606]. Also, it will prevent the legislature from providing
for favored public officials as not removable except by impeachment.
706
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47 CONSTITUTION, Article IX-B, C, and D, Section 1(2).
48 Id., Article XI, Section 9.
49 Supra note 9.
50 Supra note 39.
51 Supra note 27.
707
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709
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
This case is not too complicated. Section 8(2) of Republic
Act (R.A.) 6770 gave the Office of the President (OP) the
power to investigate and remove from office the Deputies
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor who work directly
under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.
Using this power, the OP investigated and found petitioner
Emilio Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
and Other Law Enforcement Offices, guilty of gross neglect
in handling the pending case against a police officer who
subsequently hijacked a tourist bus. Using the same power,
the OP initiated a similar investigation of a case against
petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit, the Special Prosecutor,
for alleged corruption, she having allowed her office to
enter into a plea-bargaining agreement with Major General
Carlos F. Garcia who had been charged with plunder.
Gonzales and Sulit filed separate petitions, the first in
G.R. 196231 and the second in G.R. 196232. Gonzales
assails the correctness of the OP decision that dismissed
him from the service. Both challenges the constitutionality
of Section 8(2) of
710
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1 Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution—
“The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall
hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years
or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The
Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges
of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.” (Emphasis ours)
2 254 Phil. 156, 183-184; 172 SCRA 160, 187 (1989).
3 Sec. 47, par. (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title IX.
712
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4 The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Section 21.
5 Department of Justice v. Liwag, 491 Phil. 270, 283; 451 SCRA 83, 96
(2005).
6 Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman, 528 Phil. 42, 48; 495 SCRA
461, 466 (2006).
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713
_______________
7 Id.
714
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8 Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
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