MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

This chapter focuses on executive power; mainly the people and process that comprise
government in the UK.

Government at national level in United Kingdom includes monarchy; ministers; civil servants;
and people appointed to public office. A constitutional assessment of government needs to
consider both the legality of power and its legitimacy. The concept of accountability has become
a central aspect of legitimacy. In the absence of a written constitution it can be said that those
who govern have such powers as conferred by Acts of Parliaments, prerogative powers and the
common law. In a good constitution it is not enough for those who govern to say that the law
gives us power to govern; they must also implicitly or expressly make a claim as to why their
powers to govern ought to be accepted, and that claim must be accepted by most of the people
most of the time. This is the idea of legitimacy.

Legitimacy, in the context of government, implies a general degree of respect and confidence in
public authorities, without necessarily accepting every decision.
Conditions of legitimacy exist if, for good reason, people have confidence in administrative
processes and respect and accept decisions of public authorities, even though they may
disagree with some individual determinations (Andrew Le Sueur)

Accountability is an important aspect of legitimacy in modern constitution. It is a principle

which requires public authorities to explain their actions and be subject to scrutiny. It may also
entail sanctions such as resignation from office or censure. In a parliamentary system such as
UK, Parliament plays a central role in securing accountability.

Monarchy

UK is one of the several European countries to have a hereditary monarch as head of state. The
legitimacy claim for monarch now relies in the established usage of the institution: hereditary
monarchy enjoys continuity with the past and practical effectiveness and, perhaps, a belief that
the main alternative – a directly elected president of a republic – would be worse. The
significance of UK being termed a constitutional monarchy lies in the fact that the monarch’s
role as head of state is closely circumscribed by rules and practices and that the monarch can
only act according to the advice of ministers.

Bagehot summarized Monarch’s conventional role as the right to be consulted, to encourage and
to warn ministers. However Rodney Brazier is of the view that it is more accurate to say that the
Monarch has five conventional rights namely, the right to be informed, to be consulted, to
advise, to encourage and to warn.
When the monarch carries out an executive function she acts formally to confer legal authority
on a decision that, in reality, has been taken by someone else. However there is one vital act in
respect of which the monarch may not be able to rely on minister’s advice: this is where a Prime
Minister has to be appointed. Where the result of general elections gives one political party a
clear overall majority in the Commons, the convention is straightforward: the monarch invites
the leader of the party to become Prime Minister and form the government. The position is not so
clear where there is a Hung Parliament, in which no single party has an overall majority- as has
happened after the May 2010 elections. Rodney Brazier held that intervention by the Queen
should be the last resort and was of the view that the political crisis should, if possible, be
resolved by politicians. The monarch should stand back and let the elected politicians decide the
shape of government in a hung parliament. Only if political parties fail to produce a way forward
should royal action be necessary. Otherwise as Blackburn says “it is unreal politically and
inappropriate constitutionally to acknowledge- and indeed advocate- a personal discretionary
power for a hereditary monarch to operate as the means for determining the outcome of a
general election.”

Today the conventions to be applied in case of a hung parliament are laid out in the Cabinet
Manual;
in modern times the convention has been that the Sovereign should not be drawn into party
politics, and if there is doubt it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process
and, in particular, the parties represented in Parliament, to seek to determine and
communicate clearly to the Sovereign who is best placed to be able to command the
confidence of the House of Commons.
“Where an election does not result in an overall majority for a single party, the incumbent
government remains in office unless and until the Prime Minister tenders his or her
resignation and the Government’s resignation to the Sovereign. An incumbent government is
entitled to wait until the new Parliament has met to see if it can command the confidence of
the House of Commons, but is expected to resign if it becomes clear that it is unlikely to be
able to command that confidence and there is a clear alternative.”

The monarch, currently Queen Elizabeth II, has extremely limited freedom of action in relation
to constitutional affairs. The Queen has a number of key ceremonial and constitutional duties;

Appointing the Prime Minister in accordance with convention.

Opening each session of Parliament at which she reads the ‘Queen’s speech’ – written by
the Prime Minister – setting out the programme of legislation for that session.
 Where an early general election is to be ordered, under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act
2011, the Queen will set the date by proclamation on the advice of the Prime Minister.
 The Queen gives formal approval in the form of the royal assent to each Act of
Parliament once it has been approved by the Houses of Commons and Lords.
 The Queen also appoints the First Minister of Scotland and the First Minister of Wales in
accordance with the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998 and
subsequent legislation.
 The Queen has an important symbolic international role as head of the Commonwealth.
  All titles of honour are conferred by the Queen on advice of the government mostly,
although some are conferred on her own discretion.

The Privy Council is a formal body of advisers to the Sovereign. The council as a whole consists
of about 500 members; there is no limit on the membership. They include senior politicians,
retired politicians, senior judges and senior members of the Church of England. The Cabinet is a
committee of the Privy Council which is why all Cabinet members have to be a part of the Privy
Council.

Routine accountability of the British Monarchy is quite limited but does include publishing
financial information. As the Monarch must act on the advice of Ministers, it is the ministers
who are accountable (to the electorate and in Parliament) for the exercise of the Crown powers.

Ministers

This section will cover the role and responsibilities of the Prime Minister, the leader of the
government of the United Kingdom, and his Cabinet. Ministers exercise political power in the
UK constitution. Although the Prime Minister is not the Head of State, his status places him at
the pinnacle of political power. The Cabinet is made up of individual ministers who are
responsible for different areas of government whilst remaining active and power-hungry
politicians.
The Cabinet Manual:
Constitutional convention is that the executive power is exercised by the Sovereign’s
government, which has a democratic mandate to govern. Members of the Government are
normally Members of the House of Commons or the House of Lords and the Government is
directly accountable to Parliament. The government of the day holds office by virtue of its
ability to command the confidence of the Commons.

Senior Ministers consist of the Prime Minister; the Chancellor of the Exchequer; President of the
Council and the Lord Chancellor along with the Secretaries of State.
Each minister has a small team of other politicians, selected by the PM, working for him or her
to provide political leadership to a department. These Junior Ministers hold the title of Ministers
of State and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. Many ministers have a parliamentary private
secretary, these are other MP’s who act as the Minister’s eyes and ears in the Commons and
assist them in their Parliamentary work (arranging meetings with MPs for instance).

NOTE:  A Minister of State is a member of Her Majesty's Government, junior only to a

Secretary of State but senior to a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Parliamentary
Private Secretaries (PPSs).

The power of the Prime Minister, who is normally the leader of the largest political party in the
House of Commons, does not rest on many statutes. There are relatively few Acts of Parliament
which refer to the Prime Minister, although we have already seen how the Constitutional Reform
and Governance Act 2010 sets out the factors that must be considered by the Prime Minister
when appointing the Lord Chancellor. Office of the PM is therefore not a creature of law but
rather a convention. Most of the Prime Minister’s power rests on their political authority over the
cabinet and, ultimately, Parliament, as well as their powers exercised by convention on behalf of
the Crown, known as the royal prerogative. Prime Minister must appoint members of the House
of Commons or members of the House of Lords as his “ministers”. Where the Prime Minister’s
party has an overall majority, he or she will normally appoint only members of his or her own
party. Occasionally, independent non-party political members of the House of Lords may be
appointed as well.

The cabinet by itself has no legal personality or legal powers however from a broader
constitutional perspective it is of considerable importance. Much work is done through
committees or sub committees some of which include officials as well as ministers. Although the
Cabinet is composed entirely of members of House of Commons and Lords, more particularly
the leading members of the majority party in the Commons although, in the case of a coalition,
both governing parties will provide members; it is not a committee of the Parliament. Decisions
taken in Cabinet and its committees nevertheless exert significant control over Parliament as it is
Cabinet Committee that decides upon and manages the legislative agenda in each annual session
of Parliament.

The relative powers of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet have been the subject of much
analysis and debate. For some, the ‘central directing instrument of government, in legislation
as well as in administration, is the Cabinet...It is the Cabinet which controls Parliament and
governs the country.’ For another, the ‘post-war epoch has seen the final transformation of
Cabinet Government into Prime Ministerial Government’. Still others relate the role and
importance of the Cabinet to the leadership styles of particular Prime Ministers. (Andrew Le
Sueur)

In a committee the person who drafts the agenda and chairs the meeting has real power. The
Prime Minister chairs the crucial Cabinet committees and thus has the power to direct their
discussions and priorities. The Cabinet committees are intended to be the key forum at which
policy issues are discussed and decided upon. Often decisions may involve ministers from
several different government departments. An example might be a decision on an additional
runway for London Heathrow airport – the Department of Transport and the Department for the
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs would both be concerned and their ministers might as well
disagree.

Despite the powers of the chair of a committee, there is always a risk that the meeting will be
prolonged by unproductive and wordy debate which may make it hard to reach a consensus.
There is always a temptation for a Prime Minister to by-pass the committee process with more
informal and intimate discussions with ministers. Tony Blair’s use of such meetings was
subjected to considerable criticism by the ex- Head of the Civil Service Lord Turnbull in his
evidence to Iraq War inquiry.

Although the personality of the Prime Minister has grown more important in British politics in
recent years, the roles of government ministers remain very important politically. The Chancellor
of the Exchequer is always a powerful and influential member of the government, taking
responsibility for the overall finances of the country. Often the Chancellor will expand his role,
encroaching on the departments of the other Secretaries of State.

The Secretaries of State are the most senior ministers and will each have specific responsibilities
under legislation. Each department will also have more junior ministers of state and
parliamentary under-secretaries of state.

A minster’s role can be summed up as;

 Setting policy priorities- ministers are responsible for setting up policy and providing
leadership to their dept. to ensure that their objectives are met. Once policies are set it is
the civil servants job to ensure that the outcomes are delivered. At times the process of
designing and implementing policies requires further assistance from Ministers and it is
the job of civil servants to present the minister with options about how the policy can be
implemented. Once the course of action has been decided the civil servant will then apply
it!
 Negotiating on behalf of their government departments in cabinet committees and
meetings as well as with the Treasury about their spending programme. They must also
represent UK in intergovernmental meetings i.e. EU Council of Ministers.
 Ensuring that civil servants are competent to run their departments.
 Answering the Parliament- accountable to the legislature!
 Acting as the public face of Government- they must meet with stakeholders and ensure
that their policy decisions reflect the reality on the ground.

The abovementioned duties were highlighted by the House of Commons Select Committee on
Public Administration.

UK being a parliamentary system of government requires Ministers to be a part of either the

House of Commons or House of Lords. The rationale for this requirement is that Parliament is
able to exert accountability over the government.

The House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 caps the number of ministers who may sit
in the House of Commons at ninety-five. The Ministerial and Other Salaries Act 1975 limits
the number of ministers (across both Houses) who may receive salary to 109 including 21
Cabinet ministers plus the Lord Chancellor. In 2010 a Select Committee called for a reduction in
the number of ministers the reason behind this rationale was restricting government’s control
over the Commons. A cap on the number of ministers sitting in the Commons was not enough in
the view of many, to curb the influence of government on the operations of Parliament.

If the govt. is to thrive it is essential that it ensures that the members of its party in the Commons
and Lords support its policies and are not too critical. This means instructing party members
when and where to vote. A three line whip is the strongest requirement; a failure to comply will
lead to disciplinary action that in serious case can lead to expulsion or suspension from the party.
(Three line whip = attendance is compulsory)

Twenty or so MPs are appointed by PM as Whips to organize turnout at key votes. They differ
from other party whips because these are appointed to salaried posts and are thus members of the
Govt. The government Chief Whip whose official title is Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury
is a member of the Cabinet. Adam Tomkins was against this process of whipping and insisted on
removal of such procedures from Parliament.

It is not just party politics that enables government to exert control over the Par. but the
government also effectively controls the parliamentary timetable as specified in the House of
Commons Standing Orders. Standing Order 14 gives government the upper hand despite
allotting a few days to the leader of Opposition and second largest opposition respectively.

Civil Service

Clearly ministers cannot personally make all the hundreds of thousands of individual
determinations that have to be made every day in the exercise of executive functions. Politically
neutral, professional civil servants (a servant of the Crown working in a civil capacity who is not
the holder of a political (or judicial) office; the holder of certain other offices in respect of
whose tenure of office special provision has been made i.e. they remain in office when the
government changes after a general election) are therefore an important element of the
government system. Some decision making is also thought better kept at arm’s length from
political partisan ministers and are instead taken by people appointed to senior public offices.

Civil servants are employees of the Crown and not the British Parliament. They have some
traditional and statutory responsibilities which to some extent protect them from being used for
the political advantage of the party in power. Senior civil servants may be called to account to
Parliament. As per the Cabinet Manual the role of the civil servants is to develop and implement
government policies and to deliver public services, they are accountable to ministers who in turn
are accountable to Parliament. It is also required of the ministers that they uphold the political
impartiality of the Civil Service and not ask civil servants to act in any way that would conflict
with the Civil Service Code or the requirements of the Constitutional Reform Act 2010 (the
2010 Act has put the regulation of Civil Service on a statutory footing and removed it from the
ambit of prerogative powers). Ministers should also give fair consideration and due weight to
impartial and informed advice of civil servants and civil servants should not be asked to engage
in activities likely to call into question their political impartiality.
Scott L. Greer summarized the key features of British Civil Service as

 Nonpartisanship: the entire civil service hierarchy up to its apex is traditionally non
partisan.
 Meritocracy: examination based entrance followed by promotion through performance
evaluations carried out within civil service.
 Ministerial Responsibility: ministers are responsible for the decisions of their
departments thus detaching the civil service from ultimate responsibility for decisions.
 Unity: civil servants are identified by membership in the UK civil service rather than
their territorial or departmental affiliations.

Appointees to Public Office

Senior professional people who are appointed to some specific offices carry out a variety of
governing functions. These are high profile roles that require the office-holder to work
independently from ministers because their actions need to be politically neutral e.g. chair of
the Civil Aviation Authority or chair of the commission for Equality and Human Rights. For
holders of public office such as these a legitimacy claim can rest on the fact that they have
profession and technical expertise. Their work is subject to irregular scrutiny from select
committees and to a limited extent they are accountable to Parliament. Their appointment is
mostly done by a minister (on advice by experts) which led to a further type of scrutiny being
introduced in 2007 which required all public office holders, appointed by ministers, to appear
before relevant HOC select committee for questioning, before their appointment was
confirmed. Another process of scrutiny was introduced whereby HOC committees hold
public sessions ‘pre-appointment hearing’ with people recommended by the government for
appointment to major offices.

One of the reasons for having this office is to ensure that ministers cannot dictate how the
office holders should approach their roles and what decisions they should reach.
 ACCOUNTABILITY

One of the central features of a good constitution is that it provides opportunities for those
who hold executive power to be held accountable for their decisions and conduct.
In the 21st century, the legitimacy of the monarchy seems to rest on historical continuity,
affection for the Queen as a person and, perhaps, a belief that the main alternative – a directly
elected president of a republic – would be worse. An important aspect of accountability is
openness. The Monarch’s financial papers are submitted on a regular basis.

Accountability can be explanatory i.e. the person held to account is called to explain their
decisions or conduct or it could and it can entail the imposition of sanctions. Two
constitutional conventions operate to encourage accountability namely,

 Individual ministerial responsibility

 Collective ministerial responsibility

INDIVIDUAL MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Although the cabinet draws its power from its political authority and convention, individual
ministers have duties and responsibilities which are laid down in statutes. A key issue in a
parliamentary democracy is how they are individually responsible to Parliament for the failure of
their departments in fulfilling these duties.

The classic version of this doctrine would be that ministers are responsible to Parliament for all
that happens in their departments, though they will only be regarded as culpable in respect of
their own decisions and failures. They must give an account to Par and they are expected to make
amends if something has gone wrong. To preserve public trust in the cabinet ministers and to
respond to perceptions of the erosion of ministerial accountability we now have a ministerial
code highlighting the code of conduct for ministers. These codes of conduct can be traced back
to the 1980’s and a formal publication of this code was in the John Major Government when
Questions of Procedure for Ministers (QPM) (the name then) was published for the first time.
These QPM’s were confidential until John Major’s government.

The Ministerial Code, which was issued in May 2010, sets out the convention as follows:

(a) Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for the policies,
decisions and actions of their departments and agencies;

(b) It is of paramount importance that Ministers give accurate and truthful information to
Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest opportunity. Ministers who knowingly
mislead Parliament will be expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister;

(c) Ministers should be as open as possible with Parliament and the public, refusing to provide
information only when disclosure would not be in the public interest which should be decided in
accordance with the relevant statutes and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (gives a statutory
right of access to official information subject to major exceptions) ;

(d) Ministers should similarly require civil servants who give evidence before Parliamentary
Committees on their behalf and under their direction to be as helpful as possible in providing
accurate, truthful and full information in accordance with the duties and responsibilities of civil
servants as set out in the Civil Service Code;

The general understanding of the ministerial code is that it is the PM’s guidance to his ministers
on how he expects them to undertake their official duties and it is for the PM to determine the
code. If an allegation of breach is made the PM will revert the matter to a single adviser
appointed to provide advice and handle any investigations that may be required.
NOTE: it is normal practice for the code to be revised or updated after an Election.

In relation to ministers the ultimate political sanction is to be sacked-or to be forced to tender

resignation-by the PM. The interpretation of ministers’ responsibilities under the convention has
however varied over the years.

An early example is the resignation of the government minister Sir Thomas Dugdale who
resigned in 1954, following revelations of maladministration of his agriculture department in the
Crichel Down affair. In 1982, Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, resigned following the
unanticipated invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina. It was held that the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office ought to have anticipated the attack. In contrast, in 1994 the Home
Secretary, Michael Howard, refused to resign following the escape of prisoners from a prison.
He argued that the failure was an operational one on the part of the director-general of prisons.
He retained the support of his fellow Conservative MPs and, crucially, the Prime Minister and
was not forced to resign. In 2004 Beverly Hughes (Minister of State for Immigration,
Citizenship and Counter-terrorism) resigned when it emerged that she had known that visas were
being issued on the basis of false documents, but had earlier told the House of Commons that,
had she known about this, she would have done something. The Work and Pensions Secretary
David Blunkett resigned office for the second time in 2005. He had first resigned his post as
Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2004, having had an affair with a married woman
and having intervened to have her nanny’s application to remain in Britain fast-tracked through
the system. The second resignation was due a three-fold breach of the rule that former ministers
should consult the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments about any Business
appointments they intend to take within two years of leaving office. Mr. Blunkett said he
misunderstood the rule and thought that consultation was voluntary. Further allegations were
made concerning previously undisclosed financial interests which came to light on the day he
resigned.
In 2010, the Liberal Democrat Treasury Minister David Laws was forced to resign following
a breach of the rules on claiming expenses. Sometimes, though, the error is made by civil
servants. The circumstances of the error or failure may result in the relevant minister accepting
individual responsibility and resigning. Charles Clarke, who was Home Secretary in 2006,
came under very heavy political pressure when it was revealed that large numbers of foreign
prisoners had been released rather than considered for deportation at the end of their sentences.
He refused to resign, but was sacked by Tony Blair.

Ministers have resigned somewhat more often due to personal misconduct or misjudgment.

Accountability of Civil Servants:

The cabinet manual asserts that Civil Servants are accountable to Ministers who in turn are
accountable to Parliament. This however does not paint a full picture and increasingly civil
servants can be seen giving evidence to parliamentary select committees. (Refer to Guide and
audio lecture on accountability and civil service)

COLLECTIVE MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Ministers are expected or required to present a united front. This collective loyalty is
underpinned by the crucial constitutional convention of collective ministerial responsibility
which provides that, once the cabinet has made the decision, all government ministers must
publicly support and defend it. If an individual minister cannot, for any reason, do so, the
convention requires them to resign.

The Cabinet Office Ministerial Code describes the convention as follows:

 The principle of collective responsibility, save where it is explicitly set aside, requires
that Ministers should be able to express their views frankly in the expectation that they
can argue freely in private while maintaining a united front when decisions have been
reached. This in turn requires that the privacy of opinions expressed in Cabinet and
Ministerial Committees, including in correspondence, should be maintained...
 The internal process through which a decision has been made, or the level of Committee
by which it was taken should not be disclosed. Decisions reached by the Cabinet or
Ministerial Committees are binding on all members of the Government. They are,
however, normally announced and explained as the decision of the Minister concerned.
On occasion, it may be desirable to emphasise the importance of a decision by stating
specifically that it is the decision of Her Majesty’s Government. This, however, is the
exception rather than the rule.
 Matters wholly within the responsibility of a single Minister and which do not
significantly engage collective responsibility need not be brought to the Cabinet or to a
Ministerial Committee unless the Minister wishes to inform his colleagues or to have
their advice. No definitive criteria can be given for issues which engage collective
responsibility. The Cabinet Secretariats can advise where departments are unsure. When
there is a difference between departments, it should not be referred to the Cabinet until
other means of resolving it have been exhausted. It is the responsibility of the initiating
 department to ensure that proposals have been discussed with other interested
departments and the outcome of these discussions should be reflected in the
memorandum or letter submitted to Cabinet or a Cabinet Committee.

The rules apply even if a Minister in question was not actually involved in making the decision.
Examples of ministerial resignations over decisions include Robin Cook who resigned as Leader
of the House of Commons in 2003 over the decision to invade Iraq. Note that the convention
applied here, even though foreign policy and defence issues were not part of the responsibilities
of the Leader of the House of Commons. In 1986, Michael Heseltine, the Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry, resigned over the Westland Helicopters contract. Sir Geoffery Howe
resigned as Deputy Prime Minister in 1990 over government policy on European single currency
and the general approach to the EU.

Sometimes government does not have a collective view on a particular proposal, this is an
instance where free vote may be allowed.

Free votes
Free vote simply means that Whips do not instruct members of the governing party on where and
how to vote. An example is the controversial issue of abortion where governments have not
instructed their MPs (including ministers) on how to vote. This approach has applied to all votes
on abortion since the Abortion Act 1967 legalised it in the United Kingdom. It is usually
politically easier for a Prime Minister to grant a free vote if the opposition is also granting a free
vote to its shadow ministers and MPs.

EXCEPTIONS TO COLLECTIVE MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

In some circumstances, a Prime Minister may choose to suspend the convention in relation to a
particularly controversial issue on which their government is divided. On a couple of occasions
in the 1970’s the Prime Ministers of the day were obliged to suspend the full operation of
collective responsibility because of intractable internal differences within the government.
Harold Wilson permitted ministers, subject to conditions, to take different views in the 1975
referendum over UK’s continued membership of EC. Similarly in 1977, James Callaghan
allowed ministers to take different views on direct elections to the European Parliament.

 Coalition government and collective ministerial responsibility

The formation of coalition government after the May 2010 Elections required negotiation
between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats to create a joint programme of government to
be implemented over the following five years. The agreement that emerged recognized that
collective responsibility will generally apply to agreed government policy- so ministers, whether
Conservative or Liberal Democrat, are expected to defend policy in Parliament and public.

Collective responsibility (Coalition: agreement for stability and reform (2010))

The principle of collective responsibility, save where it is explicitly set aside, continues to apply
to all Government Ministers. This requires:

(a) An appropriate degree of consultation and discussion among Ministers to provide the
opportunity for them to express their views frankly as decisions are reached, and to ensure the
support of all Ministers;

(b) The opinions expressed and advice offered within Government to remain private;

(c) Decisions of the Cabinet to be binding on and supported by all Ministers;

(d) Full use being made of the Cabinet Committee system and application of the mechanisms for
sharing information and resolving disputes set out in this document.

On some areas however the Coalition agreement allows ministers to speak against government
policy or for MPs of one party to be given permission to abstain from key votes on Parliament.
The programme expressly recognized fiver areas where there was agreement to disagree,

 transferable tax allowances for married couples (a Conservative manifesto commitment)

 the referendum on the alternative vote electoral system for the House of Commons – in
the actual referendum campaign the Liberal Democrats argued in favour of the reform
while the Conservatives opposed it
 an alternative nuclear defence system to the Trident system – no final decision is to be
made until 2016 (the Liberal Democrats oppose the Trident system)
 student fees increases – Liberal Democrat MPs were free to abstain (although 21 voted
against) but all the ministers supported the legislation
 Nuclear power policy.

Collective cabinet responsibility is as much a maxim of political prudence as it is a convention

of the constitution. It is in general sensible for a government to observe it, just as it is sensible
for any collective executive ,such as, for example, the board of a company, to maintain a united
front, so as not to weaken its position by publicly displaying differences of opinion. On certain
occasions, however, where there are deep seated differences of opinion which cannot easily be
reconciled, it may be the lesser evil to suspend the principle. (Vernon Bogdanor)
SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTIVE MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Collective ministerial responsibility is important in terms of ensuring accountability to

Parliament. The government as a whole needs to defend its policies- and if the Commons were to
lose confidence in the government, as a whole, then the PM would be obliged under
constitutional convention to ask the Monarch to exercise her prerogative power and dissolve
Parliament, triggering a new general election.

Earlier the defeat of any substantial bill was regarded as a loss of confidence however the current
practice is far more relaxed and there have been occasions on which government’s proposed
policy in a Bill has been defeated on a vote and withdrawn, and it has not been suggested that the
government should resign. For instance in November 2005, the proposal of government to detain
suspected terrorists without trial or charge for 90 days was voted down by the Commons.

HOW

There is a broad political consensus about the need to subject the government to effective
scrutiny. In 1979 the Margaret Thatcher government introduced the system of departmental
select committees. Under the Labour Government of 1997-2010, further attempts were made to
strengthen the parliamentary accountability, including the introduction of pre-appointment
hearings, introducing formal requirements for some government decisions taken under
prerogative power, to be approved by Parliament, and a Backbench Business Committee, which
decides what, is debated in the House of Commons on a few days each month.

 Select Committees

Every department has a corresponding select committee, comprising between 12 and 15 MPs
reflecting the party political composition of the commons. Membership of select committees
lasts for the life of Parliament thus providing stability of membership and giving the members
the opportunity to develop an expertise. M/ship is largely limited to back benchers; only
ministers who are members are the leader of the house, govt. deputy chief whip and financial
secretary to the Treasury. The strength of each political party overall in the House is reflected,
largely but not totally accurately. Select committees may be chaired by a Member of any
political party. The decision as to which party should chair a particular committee is a matter of
negotiation between the govt. and the opposition. The significance of these negotiations is to
minimise party political conflicts in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of scrutiny
to be brought to bear on govt. dept’s! Distinct from these Departmental Select Committees is the
influential Public Accounts Committee which scrutinizes the public expenditure.

The wide ranging powers of these select Committees have been outlined in the Standing Order,
stating that these Committees have the power to send for papers and persons along with the
power to appoint specialist advisers, if necessary. They have the authority to determine what
subject matter needs to be examined and the evidence that the Committee needs to assist in its
examination. They also have the authority to establish sub-committees. The select committee on
procedure suggested that committees should have the power to compel the ministers to attend
and give evidence however this was rejected; the power to issue orders to ministers belongs to
the House alone. There is no formal requirement that ministers should cooperate however the
Leader of the House has undertaken that;

‘..Every minister....will do all in his or her power to co-operate with the new system of
committees and to make it a success.’
Hence the role of these committees is advisory and their methods of work inquisitorial. The
relevant department is not obliged to accept their findings but they must respond to committee
reports. Each committee is assisted by a clerk who will normally be drafting the report and a
small number of other staff. Specialist advisers may also be appointed to help with identifying
key witnesses or drafting questions. The questions put before the minister are far more rigorous
than those asked on the floor of the Commons. The role of the chairman can be a demanding one
hence MP’s appointed to this role receive salary over and above their salary as an MP.

The methods of working will vary according to the requirements of the particular inquiry, but
usually include a public call for written evidence and several oral evidence sessions with key
witnesses- including the relevant ministers and senior civil servants. Most of the time select
committees are able to work in a consensual cross party manner; they provide an oasis of non
party activity. The role of the party whips is not as political as in the Parliament they do not tell
their political party members on how to vote and their active role in membership of select
committees has also been replaced with active negotiations between MPs.

These select committees are influential but not all the time. A study shows that only 40% of
committee recommendations are accepted and implemented by government. Moreover too little
time is allowed for committee reports to be debated on the floor.

Like House of Commons Select committees there are select committees in the House of Lords as
well. But these committees do not shadow departments they cover general topics i.e. EU
committee or the House of Lords Constitutional Committee scrutinizing Bills or the committee
on relationship between executive, judiciary and parliament.

 Parliamentary Question

Parliamentary Questions to ministers may be asked orally or in written form by MPs and peers.
All questions must conform to certain guidelines and MPs and peers may seek advice from
Parliamentary officials to ensure that they comply with these guidelines.

In the Commons the first hour of business in the chamber on weekdays is devoted to ministers
answering oral questions from MPs. Ministerial team from each department has to appear before
the chamber every few weeks. There are a lot of MPs wanting to ask questions and not enough
time therefore there is a ballot and whoever wins asks questions followed by one or more
supplementary questions. Ministers have advance notice of some questions but time is also set
for topical questions on any relevant subject.

A superficial observation of Question Time may prompt skepticism about its value. It often
argued that this mode of scrutiny is no more than a ‘theatrical occasion’ with ministers fully
briefed by the civil service, giving prepared answers to questions put forward which have been
brought to their notice. Moreover they are not limited to the opposition and thus may come from
the supporters of the Ministers/ govt. in order to boast about the achievements or promote the
current view. However it must also be noted that these records are public and the govt’s work is
open to public scrutiny and judgment as well.
Around 40,000 questions per par. session!

Since 1961 the practice of PM answering oral questions started. Now the PM appears before the
Commons for 30 minutes at noon on Wednesday (when Parliament is sitting).

Many written PQ’s are also put forth by MPs ministers responses are published in Hansard.
There are criticisms of delays and irrelevant or incomplete answers being given. The Speaker has
advised the MPs, who do not receive satisfactory answers, that their only recourse is to either
press the concerned minister or to raise the matter with the Public Administration Select
Committee.

 Debates

Debates on the floor of the Commons and Lords are another way in which government is called
to account for its action and for Parliament to discuss matters of public interest. Although much
debating time is utilized on discussion of Bills there is still some room for debates to focus on
how the government is conducting its executive functions. Debates may be initiated by the
government, opposition (20 days every year are allotted for this) or by Back Bench Members
(final 30 mins every day). Since 1999 in order to give more time to Back Bench MPs and Select
committees for debates on topics of their choosing a parallel chamber (in which the House of
Commons may sit simultaneously in the main chamber) and another debating room known as the
Westminster Hall, have been set up.