64.

Borja- Manzano v Sanchez (Art 34) 2001

Facts:
- A complaint for gross ignorance of the law was filed against Judge Sanchez for solemnizing a bigamous
marriage. Complainant is the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, who married Luzviminda Payao
during the subsistence of the first marriage which was solemnized by Judge Sanchez.
- Judge Sanchez claims that he did not know that Manzano was legally married and that he merely relied on
the joint affidavit executed by Manzano and Payao that they had been living together as husband and
wife for 7 years without marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not long marital cohabitation (as contemplated under article 34 of the Family Code) will cure
the defect of a bigamous marriage. NO

Held:
- Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not
severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between
two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Void Marriages

65. Quianzon v Belen 2013

Facts:
- Eliseo died intestate. Elise, Eliseo’s natural child, filed a petition for letters of administration and therein
impugned the validity of the marriage of Eliseo to Amelia since Amelia has a pre-existing marriage to
Filipito.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Eliseo and Amelia is void due to a pre-existing marriage. YES
Held:

- The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less
than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the
Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence
of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said
marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein Consequently, in the absence
of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was
solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab
initio.
- In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

66. Castillo v Castillo 2016

Facts:
- Lea married Bautista in 1972. In 1979, Lea also married Renato. In 2001, Renato filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lea on the ground that it was bigamous. Lea opposed the
petition contending that her first marriage with Bautista was void for lack of marriage license and that
neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belongs. In 2002, the
 RTC declared the marriage between Bautista and Lea null and void. Nevertheless, RTC ruled that the
marriage between Lea and Bautista was also declared void for being bigamous under article 41 of the
Family Code (lack of judicial declaration for nullity of marriage). The CA reversed the RTC applying the Civil
Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage contracted by Lea with Renato (2nd marriage) is bigamous. NO
Held:
- The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at
the time of its celebration. The marriages in question were celebrated before the effectivity of the family
code. Under the Civil Code, in a void marriage, no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary.
- The subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage
was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement
under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the
nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to
Renato is valid.

67. Suntay v Cojuangco-Suntay 300 SCRA 760

Facts:
- Emilio and Isabel were married and 4 children were born out of it. After 4 years of marriage, Isabel filed a
criminal case of parricide against Emilio. Emilio was acquitted but their marriage was later on declared
null and void by the RTC pursuant to art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code, because Emilio was suffering from
Schizophrenia which rendered him psychologically incapacitated. Emilio later died and predeceased his
mother Cristina. Upon the death of Cristina, the daughter of Emilio seek to inherit by right of
representation. This was opposed by Cristina’s husband on the ground that the children of Emilio are
illegitimate as a result of their marriage being declared null and void and thus prohibited from succeeding
pursuant to the barrier rule.

Issue:
Whether or not the daughter (also named Isabel) of Emilio and Isabel are legitimate. YES

Held:
- Although the decision of the RTC reads that the marriage is declared null and void, it will be gleaned from
the decision that the basis for annulling the marriage was art. 85 of the civil code (which was the law
governing their marriage) which speaks of voidable marriages. Being conceived and born in voidable
marriage before the decree of annulment, their child is considered legitimate.
- The annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society formed by the
putative spouses, but it cannot destroy consequences which marital union produced during its
continuance.

68. Terre v Terre 211 SCRA 6

Facts:
- Atty. Jordan was single who met Dorothy who was then married to Merlito. Atty Jordan courted Dorothy
and married her after convincing her that her marriage to Merlito was null and void for being incestuous
because they are cousins and that no judicial declaration was needed for void marriages.
- When Dorothy gave birth to her child with Atty Jordan, Atty Jordan left them. She filed a case for
abandonment. She then discovered that Atty Jordan married Helina so she also filed a case for bigamy.
Atty Jordan’s defense is that he believed in good faith that his marriage to Dorothy was null and void ab
 initio (because Dorothy is still married to Merlito) and that no judicial declaration to declare such was
necessary.

Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of atty Jordan was valid. NO

Held:
- Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter
to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own
argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his
second marriage to Helina must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

69. Iwasawa v Custodio 2013

Facts:

- Petitioner is a Japanese National who met respondent in the Philippines. Respondent introduced herself
as single. They were married in 2002. In 2009, respondent confessed that she was previously married to a
Filipino who she learned to have passed away. Petitioner then sought to have his marriage with
respondent declared void for being bigamous.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is bigamous. YES
Held:
- The documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the
following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2)
that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in
Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with
Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only
on said date that private respondent’s marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and
(4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since
the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

70. Fujiki v Marinay 2013

Facts:
- Fujiki married Marinay in the Philippines. Marinay contracted a second marriage with Makaera, another
Japanese national during her marriage to Fujiki. Due to abuse, Marinay left Makaera and reconnected
with Fujiki. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared her
second marriage with Makaera void for being bigamous. Fujiki filed a petition before the Philippine courts
to recognize the foreign judgment to declare the second marriage of Marinay void. The RTC dismissed his
petition pursuant to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which states that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

Issue:
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. YES
Held:
- The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy."
- Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule
108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.
- There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises
the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his
property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
- Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the
validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that
"[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage
is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

71. Republic v Olaybar 2014

Facts:
- Respondent requested a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) from NSO as a requirement for her
upcoming marriage when she discovered that she is already married to a Korean national as appearing in
the marriage certificate bearing her personal circumstances. She presented several pieces of evidence to
show that she was not the one present during the marriage ceremony. The signature appearing in the
marriage certificate was also not hers. She then filed a special proceeding for correction of entries in the
marriage certificate on the wife portion thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of "all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract," is
in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio. NO

Held:
- Respondent did not seek the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak
of.
- Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and
that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
 established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already
been admitted and examined.

Psychological Incapacity
72. Santos v CA 240 SCRA 23

Facts:
- Leouel and Julia got married in 1986. A year after the marriage, the couple quarreled over a number of
things including the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs. On 1998, Julia finally left for
theUS. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had then
virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity alleged should be appreciated. NO

Held:
- Psychological incapacity should refer to mental and not physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be assumed under Art 68 of the Family Code. The
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere
abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.
- psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable,
or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).
-

73. Republic v De Gracia 2014

Facts:
- Rodolfo filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against her wife Natividad alleging that the
latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. He further alleged
that he was forced to marry Natividad barely 3 months into their courtship because of accidental
pregnancy. Natividad left their conjugal abode with their children and sold their house without his
consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain Engineer Terez and bore his child. After cohabiting with
Terez, she contracted a second marriage with another man. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and
Natividad were psychologically incapacitated finding that both parties suffered from “utter emotional
immaturity”

Issue:
Whether or not there is psychological incapacity. NO

Held:
- The testimony of Dr. Zalsos does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be
characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity
jurisprudence.
- Natividad’s refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity
that would justify the nullification of the parties’ marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
 incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one’s duties is another. To hark back to what
has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.

74.Ching Ming Tsoi v CA 266 SCRA 324

Facts:
- Plaintiff and defendant were married and is almost 1 year into the marriage sleeping in the same bed but
no sexual intercourse has taken place. Plaintiff filed for a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
claiming that the defendant is impotent, closet homosexual and that defendant only married her to
maintain his appearance as a normal man and for residency requirement.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated. YES
Held:
- Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
- Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which
to the mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
- One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

CIV 2 DIGEST ( N0. 75 – 84)

75. MALILIN VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: The petitioner Robert and the respondent Luz were married in 1972 and they have 3
children. Sometime in 1994 Robert filed a nullity of marriage case against his wife in the RTC of
Cagayan De Oro. The petition was denied. On appeal to the CA the CA reverse the decision of the
RTC due to the lack of participation by the State. The case was remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.
In his complaint Robert claimed that Luz was suffering from physical and mental incapacity and
she was unprepared to enter into a marital life and comply with its essential obligation as a mother
to their children.
Luz however claimed that it was Robert who has psychological incapacity in their marriage.
During the trial of the case only Robert appeared as Luz was already living in the US.
During the trial Robert reveal that while they were engage Luz continued to see and date other
men. And that she was remiss in her duty as a wife and as a mother.
During the pendency of the case in the RTC, Robert also filed a nullity case before the Metropolitan
Tribunal for the Archdiocese of Manila w/c declared that their marriage is void ab initio on the
ground of lack of due discretion of both parties.
The RTC declared that the marriage of Robert and Luz Null and void on the ground of
Psychological incapacity of Luz.
The OSG appealed to the CA, claiming that Robert failed to make a case of Psychological
incapacity. And that the real reason or cause of the marital discord between the parties is the sexual
infidelity of Luz. And that such ground is not a ground for nullity of marriage but for Separation.
The CA reverse the ruling of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON LUZ IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH
OBLIGATION OF MARRIAGE?
RULING: NO. The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as
well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of
psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity;
and render help and support.
psychological incapacity contemplates “downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations,” not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

76. MARCOS VS. MARCOS

FACTS: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos. Were both members of the
AFP. They met while assigned in malacanang palace as PSG. They were eventually married.
married twince 1 in pasig by judge and by the PSG chaplin)
After they were married and have several children, they resided in a housing unit which she obtain
while she was still single. ( married twince 1 in pasic by judge and by the PSG chaplin)
After the downfall of Pres. Marcos. He left the military and engage in business but it was not
successful. While she remain in the military service. Due to his business failure they would always
quarrel and as a consequence he would beat her and also inflict harm to their children.this happened
several times during their cohabitation. In 1992 they were already separated.
When she left the military She started her own business and became a supplier for the AFP.
In 1994, they have a bitter quarrel, he turned violent and inflicted harm, upon her and her mother.
Alleging that respondet failed to give support and resorted to abuse and violence. The petitioner
filed for nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.
The RTC declared that the marriage is void. Due to P.I. failure to find work and support his family.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, P.I . has not been established, the CA ruled that The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
PETITIONER was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
ISSUE: WON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION IS A REQ. FOR
DECLARATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY?
RULING: NO. the personal medical or psychological Examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity
The guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated— what is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition, for indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
In the Case at bar, , the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation,not for declaring a marriage void.

77. VINAS VS. PAREL-VINAS

FACTS: The petitioner Glen Vinas and respondent Mary Grace Vinas were married in a civil
rights in Batangas. Respondent ws already pregnant then, however the child died at birth. Petitioner
alleged that the cause of death was due to respondents smoking and drinking.
In 2006, she left and went to Dubai to work w/o informing the petitioner. In 2009 petitioner filed
for declaration of nullity of marriage and claimed that she was insecure, jealous, outgoing and
prone to leaving the house, enjoyed night life, drink and smoke heavily, refuse to perform
household chores like cleaning and cooking.
He submitted himself to a psychologist and it was found out that he was aware of his marital roles.
While respondent base on his cousin who knew the respondent since college was suffering from
narcissitic personality disorder.
The RTC declared that the marriage of Glen and mary grace is null and void on the ground of
Psychological incapacity.
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC
ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED?
RULING: NO. evidence presented provides inadequate basis to conclude that Mary Grace is
indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
In the case at bar, glen tried to prove the mary grace was carefree, outgoing, immature and
irresponsible, which made her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He likewise
alleged that she refused to communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually left him to
work abroad. The above actuations of Mary Grace do not make out a case of psychological
incapacity on her part. No evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of Mary
Grace was characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

78. REPUBLIC VS. HAMANO

FACTS: Respondent Filipina citizen (LOLITA HAMANO) filed for declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against her Japanese Husband. Respondent claimed that she and her husband started their
relationship in 1986 and were later married in 1988. They have 1 child. 1 month after their marriage
Toshio returned to Japan but promised to return by Chirstmas.
After sending money for 2 months he stopped giving support. Thus a declaration for nullity of
marriage on the ground of Psychological incapacity was filled in 1996. The summons Toshio failed
to appear.
The RTC ruled in favor of Lolita. And declared that the marriage was null and void.
OSG appealled but was denied by the CA.
ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE JAPANESE HUSBAND?
RULING: NO. the totality of evidence presented fell short. of proving that toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital obligation.
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability
As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness.
In the case at bar, Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.

79. DEDEL VS. DEDEL.

FACTS: Petitioner David and Sharon met while working in the Advertising business of his father.
Hey have a romantic affair and were married in 1966 civilly and were married in church in 1967.
The marriage produced 4 children.
During the marriage it turned out that Sharon was irresponsible and immature and has extramarital
affairs with several men. She was later confined in a hospital for treatment, but despite her
treatment she did not stop her illicit relationship with a Jordanian national, whom she married and
had 2 children.
When the Jordanian left the country she returned to the petitioner bringing her 2 children and
petitioner qaccepted her back and even considered the 2 children as his own.
In 1995, Sharon abandoned the petitioner to join the Jordanian in Jordan.
Thus in 1997 petitioner filed a petition for declaration of Nullity of marriage on the ground of P.I..
he presented a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological evaluation of the petitioner and found
him hardworking, conscientious and diligent. While the psychiatrist declared that Sharon is
suffering from anti-social disorder (exhibited by her infidelity)
The RTC declared that their marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligation of marriage.
On appeal to the CA, the CA reverse the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for nullity
of marriage.
ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED.
RULING: NO. RESPONDENT IS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders.
It must be shown that the disordered personality completely unable respondent to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state.
In the case at bar, respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity.

80. SIAYNGCO VS. SIAYNGCO

FACTS: Petitoner Juanita and manuel were married in 1973. They did not have any child so they
adopted a baby.
In 1997 petitioner filed for Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and
alleged that during the marriage she exhibited domineering and selfish attitude towards him, she
complained about everything, that she shows no respect or regard for his office na dposition as
MTC Judhe. She would scream and throw objects around the house. That her Psychological
incapacity arose marriage.
Petitioner denied the allegation of her husband and claimed that he invented malicious stories
about her. And that she was a loving and caring mother and wife. That it was the respondent that
was remiss in his marital and family obligation. It was respondent who philandering
During the trial the petitioner presented a psychiatrist and base on the test consucted the
psychiatrist claimed that the petitioner was psychologicvally capacitated. And so those the
respondent.
The RTC denied the respondents petition for nullity of marriage.
On appeal the CA, reverse the ruling of the RTC, and held that both are psychologically
incapacitated. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON BOTH PARTIES ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY
WITH MARITAL OBLIGATIONS?
RULING: NO, they are not psychologically incapacitated
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses; Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.—
Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.

81. VILLALON VS. VILLALON

FACTS: Sometime in 1996 the petitioner filed a petition for annulment of his marriage to
Respondent Corazon in RTC of Pasig on the ground of psychological incapacity which he claimed
existed even prior to his marriage.
Petitioner claimed that his psychological incapacity were 1) refusdal to maintain harmonious
family relationship; 2) his immaturity;3) his desire for other women.
Respondent denied the allegations of the petitioner and claimed that their marriage is a fruitful one
and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards.
During the trial petitioner presented a psychologist and testified that he is Suffering from
psychological disorder (cassanova complex)
The RTC declared that the marriage of pet. And respondent as null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
On appeal the CA reversed the decision of the RTC on the ground that petitioner failed to prove
the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: WON PETITIONER IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATEED TO FULFILL HIS
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS?
RULING: NO, Jaime failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological
disorder.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be
characterized by juridical attendance, gravity and incurability
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity; It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.
In the case at bar, although the Jaime engaged in marital infidelity in 2 occasion, the same does
not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder, which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations.

82: FERRARIS VS. FERRARIS

FACTS: Petitioner Amy Perz filed a petition for nullity of marriage in the RTC of Pasig. The RTC
denied the petition and held that brix Ferraris is suffering from epilepsy and that epilepsy does not
amount to psychological incapacity under art. 36 of the civil code and that the evidence presented
is insufficient to prove infidelity.
MR was denied due to fact that no evidence to prove that respondent is mentally an dphysically
ill.
On Appela to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE: WON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXIST IN THE GIVEN CASE?
RULING: NO. P.I. in the given case
“psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage.
A husband’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever the
spouses quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than
his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage; It is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons —it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.—
In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the petitioner did not establish that respondent was
suffering from Psychological Incapacity. There is no showing that his defects were alreasdy
present at the time of marriage or that they are incurable,

83. ANTONIO VS. REYES

FACTS: The petitioner Leonilo Antonio and respondent met in 1989, barely a year after
their first meeting they got married civilly then subsequently were married in church at
Pasig City.
In 1990, their child was born buit died several months later.
In 1993 the petitioner filed a petition for nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and claimed that the incapacity existed at the time of marriage.
Petitioner claimed that respondent is a pathological liar. She lied about herself, the people
around her , her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events.
In support of his claim he presented a psychiatrist and based on the report petitioner was
essentially normal. While respondent is a pathological liar.
Respondent denied the allegtions and that she performed her marital obligations by
attending to all the need of her husband and the stories against her were fabricated.
The RTC ruled that marriage is null and void.
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, evidence presented was insufficient to established
respondents P.I.
ISSUE: WON CAN CLAIM PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY FOR DECLARING HIS
MARRIAGE VOID?
RULING: YES. SINCE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS MEDICALLY
SHOWN TO BE PERMANENT AND INCURABLE.
The root causes of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified and proven by experts as perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories and
inventing personalities and situations, of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment and family background, among
others.
A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.
In the case at bar, the petitioner had sufficiently overcome the burden of proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse.

84. PAZ VS. PAZ

FACTS: Petitioner Jordan and Respondent Jeanice met in 1996 . they become a couple and were
married in 1997. They have as son who was born in 1998.
Sometime in 1999, they have a big fight and respondent left their home. She eventually filed a
petition for nullity of marriage against Jordan.
In her petition respondent alleged that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming
esswential obligation of marriage. Which was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be self
preoccupied and self indulgent, as well as abusive and violent. He lied about his whereabouts and
preferred hanging out with friends. In addition respondent claimed that petitioner has not provided
any financial support or visited their son since she left their home.
She presented a psychologist and testified that Jordan has a borderline Personality disorder.
Jordan denied the allegations. And claimed that respondent exaggerated her statements against him
and that it ws respondent who has personal insecurities and showed lack of maturity.
The RTC declared that Jordan is Psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential
obligations of marriage.
On Appeal , the CA dismissed the appeal of Jordan
ISSUE: WON Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations?
RULING: NO, Respondent Janice failed to prove the Psychologicla incapacity of Jordan.
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c)
incurability
It must be confined “to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity is downright
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will—the mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” does not constitute psychological
incapacity.
In the case at bar the totality of the evidence presented by Jeanice failed to show that Jordan was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations and that such
incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage.

85. Suazo v Suazo

Angelito and Jocelyn married each other in their early age. They are 16 yrs. old when they met each other.
They were gone for three days and after their parents found them they arranged their marriage. Angelito and
Jocelyn do not have any means to support themselves thus they lived with Angelito’s parents after their marriage.
They did not finish their studies. Jocelyn took odd jobs such as working as a household helper in the relatives of
Angelito, while the latter refused to work and instead preferred to be a drunkard. They had several quarrels and as a
consequence of whichJ, ocelyn left Angelito. After 10 yrs, Jocelyn filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 of the family code. She contends that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Angelito did not answer to the petition and complaint. Neither
did he submit himself to a psychological examination with a psychologist Tayag who was hired by Jocelyn. In her
testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the alleged incidents of physical
beating she received from Angelito. The RTC Annulled the marriage. The CA Reversed.
Issue:
Whether there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito underArticle 36 of the family code.

Ruling:
No, there is no basis. Jurisprudence provides that there is no need to be declared a psychologically incapacitated to
be personally examined if the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Accordingly emphasizing that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity. Jocelyn’s testimony was insufficient. She merely testified on Angelito’s
habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to seek employment does not show psychological incapacity. As to
physical beating, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

86. Domingo v CA
Delia Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had
been previously married to Emerlinda Dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage
when the latter filed a suit for bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi
during her 1 month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman
and had been disposing some of her properties which was administered by Roberto. The latter
claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is
unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insist the declaration of the nullity of
marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.

Issue:
Whether the petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.
Ruling:
The declaration of nullity of marriage is indeed required for purpose of remarriage.
However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good
faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person
is freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that final judgment shall provide
for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children and the delivery of the presumptive legitimes, unless such matters
had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property
will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.
Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The family code has clearly provided the
effects of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them.

87. Santiago v People

Petitioner Leonila Santiago was convicted of bigamy for her marriage with Nicanor Santos who, during
the celebration of their marriage, was still married to Estela Galang. Petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-
accused in the case, because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. Furthermore, she argues that for there
to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven. She contends that her marriage to Santos is
void because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of the
exemptions from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and
wife for at least five years. Without completing the five-year requirement, she theorizes that their marriage without
a license is void.The RTC appreciated the testimony of Galang that 2 months before said marriage, she already
introduced herself to petitioner as Santos’ legal wife, and that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to
be easily duped by a person like Santos. Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution’s evidence.
It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos and also simply stated that the claim of lack of marriage license was
a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Issue:
Should the validity of the second marriage be first proven in order for one to be convicted of bigamy?
Ruling:
Yes. For the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter
of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. In this case, petitioner has
consistently questioned the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the
essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. Record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known
each other for only less than four years. Although they did not submit an affidavit of cohabitation as required by
Article 34 FC, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had
actually cohabited for at least five years.
 Thus, the SC cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath,
adjudge her innocent of the crime. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for the SC to allow petitioner to
use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
Note: The second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice.

88. Atienza v Brilliantes

Lupo A. Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of

Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillanters, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Br. 20, Manila. Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro
with whom respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is
married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he
and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the
same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of
Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again,
neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro
in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal
intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a
license. Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not
apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil
Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the
Family Code.

Issue:

Is Article 40 of the Civil Code inapplicable in the case at bar?

Does Brillantes and Ongkiko have a valid marriage?

Ruling:

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
 Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impair by the application of Article 40
to his case.

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him
five children.
Respondent passed the bar Examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in
1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already
a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a
marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity
to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time.
His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.
89.Beltran v People

Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage
and having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Charmaine, on the other hand, filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest
from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage
arguing that the civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether pendency of the case for nullity of marriage a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case.

Ruling:

No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial
question to a prosecution for concubinage. The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions
is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its requisites are:
a. that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
action and
b. the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will proceed.

In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for
he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a
final judgment.
More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment,
the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore he who cohabits
with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.
90. Bobis v Bobis

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B.
Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-
affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent
initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the
ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

Issue:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

Ruling:

No. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal
case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.
In a recent case for concubinage, it was held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both
crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage
was contracted rests upon the defense, but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the
bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action
may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower
court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.

Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two
marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy
that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent,
therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question
for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution.
91. SSC v Azote
DOCTRINE:
The SSC claims that the right to designate a beneficiary is subject to the SS Law. The designation
of a wife-beneficiary merely creates a disputable presumption that they are legally married and
may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Edna’s designation became invalid with the
determination of the subsistence of a previous marriage. The SSC posits that even though Edgardo
revoked and superseded his earlier designation of Rosemarie as beneficiary, his designation of
Edna was still not valid considering that only a legitimate spouse could qualify as a primary
beneficiary.v

In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife Edna and their children as
beneficiaries. When he died in 2005, Edna tried to claim the death benefits as the wife of a
deceased member but it was denied. It appears from the SSS records that Edgardo had another set
of SSS Form E-4 in 1982 where his former wife Rosemarie and their child were designated as
beneficiaries. Edna did not know that Edgardo was previously married to another woman. She
then filed for a petition before the SSS, and notice was sent to Rosemarie but she made no
answer. The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition because the SSS Form E-4 designating Rosemarie
and her child was not revoked by Edgardo, and that she was still presumed to be the legal wife as
Edna could not proved that Edgardo’s previous marriage was annulled or divorced.

Issue: W/N Edna is entitled to the SSS benefits as the wife of a deceased member

Ruling:

No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k)
thereof, only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the
latter’s SS benefits. Here, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage
with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract.

Since the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated when the Family Code was
already in force. Edna, pursuant to Art 41 of the Family Code, failed to establish that there was no
impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her
marriage to Edgardo. Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of
Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second
wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a
deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits
of Edgardo.

Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it is
required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 828229 to examine available statistical and economic data
to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries.

92. Mercado v Tan

Dr. Vincent G. Mercado and Maria Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 in Bacolod
City. A Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by them. Mercado entered in that
document his status as “single”. Unknown to Tan, Mercado was already married to Thelma Oliva.
The first marriage was solemnized in Cebu City on October 10, 1976. Oliva bore Mercado two
children. Tan therefore filed a complaint for bigamy (Art. 349, RPC) against Mercado in Bacolod
City. Mercado, in his defense, said that his first marriage was already declared null and void and
that Tan had knowledge of his first marriage. The trial court ruled that Mercado’s first marriage
was still subsisting and was liable. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

Issue:
whether the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner
Mercado of bigamy.

Ruling:
Yes. The element of previous legal marriage is present in this case. Under Article 40 of the
Family Code “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgement declaring such previous marriage void”. In this
case, petitioner Mercado contracted a second marriage even though there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity in his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after Tan had filed a complaint charging him of bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, Mercado is liable for bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
93. Morigo v People
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor
at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete
lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia
Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the
Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married.
Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity
of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case
for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Issue:

Whether Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith.

Ruling:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract
on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot
be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, Supreme
Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

94. Carino v Carino

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with her.
In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to
his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he
died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of
SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of
P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She
wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized
during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local
civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s
funeral.
Issue:
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive
legitimes.
Ruling:
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has
been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment
of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party
shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned
by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated
to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of
a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC
which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been
equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each party
notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.
95. Calisterio v Calisterio
Civil Law; Marriages; Judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary in the new Civil Code as long as the prescribed period of absence is met.— A judicial
declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as
the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that themarriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid “until declared
null and void by a competent court.” It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases,
on the party assailing the second marriage.
Same; Same; Conditions in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid.— Under the 1988Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur;
viz.:
(a)The prior spouse of the contracting party must
have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there isdanger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance;
(b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and
(c)there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for
which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration

Facts:
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in
April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The
latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of
Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court
declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be
the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being
allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed
as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her
after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Issue:
Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the
declaration of presumptive death.
Ruling:
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958
where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took
effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only
to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive
death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence
of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and
therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil
Code which provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he
has is generally considered as dead and believed