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Med. Sci. Law (1982) Vol. 22, No. 4 Printed in Great Britain
Expert Evidence in the Light of Preece v.
H. M. Advocate
ALISTAIR R. BROWNLIE
S. S.C., Edinburgh
Writers on the history of expert evidence have
attributed the beginnings of the expert to dis-
tant ages according to their predilection: Sir
Sydney Smith cited Grand Vizier Imhotep,
Chief Justice and Physician to King Zoser of
Egypt in 3000 B.C. (Gradwohl, 1954): others
have pointed to the provisions of Roman law
(Codex 12, 36, 6) and the Hebrews also have
candidates for this honour-perhaps Daniel
who interpreted the dream of Belshazzar the
King of the Chaldeans could be regarded as a
Royal expert though not one professing medico-
legal skills (Daniel, Ch. 5). In the middle ages
expert witnesses came to be employed in the
Italian cities and in other parts of Europe
(Simpson, 1961/62) and early records in
England (Buckley v. Rice-Thomas (1554)
1 Plowd. 118) and Scotland (49 Justiciary
Records 1669-78, 2, 285) show that the
expert witness-particularly the physician-
contributed specialist evidence in criminal trials.
In the latter years of last century and the
earlier years of this the names of Spilsbury,
Wilcox and Pepper featured in many criminal
trials creating a great public interest in the
seemingly unanswerable contribution which
science and medicine were then bringing to the
law. Those who clashed with giants of this
period were generally shown to be inferior in
capacity or out of their proper sphere and so
discredited. With Spilsbury's death in 1947 a
new attitude to medico-legal evidence began.
This period coincided with the establishment
and growth of the forensic science laboratories
in which Government scientists carried out
scientific work and, where necessary, testified
in Court to such matters as blood staining,
fingerprints, trace evidence and the examination
of scenes of crime. The expert witness now
237
became not so much a dramatic actor of the
criminal stage as a back-room worker who
emerged from his laboratory to describe some
chemical or physical experiment or observation.
A new generation of forensic pathologists took
over and names such as Littlejohn, the Glaisters,
Sydney Smith and Kerr were matched by Keith
Simpson, Teare, Camps, Poison, Mant and
others. The post-second-world-war period saw
the mechanisation of the forensic science
laboratories and the possibilities for scientific
evidence from microscopy, spectrography,
spectrometry, gas chromatography and many
other instrumental methods. Even the electron
microscope and neutron activation analysis
came occasionally to be used. But the advances
which were made in modern instrumental
methods were not always matched by higher
standards of personal evidence given by forensic
pathologists and other specialists, and much of
the energies of the Forensic Science Society
and the British Academy of Forensic Sciences
in the 1960s and 1970s were directed towards
raising standards of scene of crime investigation
and encouraging higher standards in presentation
of evidence. Bogus experts were not unknown
(Lawton, 1980).
At the present time it can be said that the
status of expert evidence in the Courts of the
United Kingdom is high. Particularly in those
areas where forensic science laboratories are at
work or where University Departments of
Forensic Medicine operate the Courts are
accustomed to receive expert evidence on a
wide range of scientific and medico-legal
matters, and the concern is not so much for
current standards as how these are to be kept
up on the medico-legal side when the present
generation of forensic pathologists retire.
238 Med. Sci. Law (1982) Vol. 22, No. 4

THE LAW skill to be required to answer the question even

The status of expert evidence in law both in though it is the very issue before the Court
Scotland and in England is not in doubt. (Ireland v. Taylor [1949] 1 K.B. 300; R. v.
Initially Courts were slow to accept scientific Holmes [1953] 1 W.L.R. 686; D.P.P. v. A

&
evidence and the law reports abounded with B C Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 Q.B. 1959).
judicial cautions against accepting the evidence Of course the evidence of the expert may be
of the first generations of sometimes rather challenged and like evidence of fact need not
eccentric experts who testified to the facts of be accepted, even though uncontradicted, for
science and medicine as they understood them. 'the parties have invoked the decision of a
But the modern view of the experts (or skilled judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronounce-
witnesses as Scots law termed them) is that ment by an expert' (Davie, loc. cit.). Where
where they are used, his evidence is challenged the grounds of the
expert's opinion or the reasoning followed in
their duty is to furnish the judge or jury with
the necessary scientific criteria for testing the arriving at that opinion may be examined. The
accuracy of their conclusions so as to enable the credit of the expert may be impeached by
judge or jury to form their own independent showing that he was not in a fit state to form
judgment by the application of these criteria to the the opinion, or that he had an interest or bias
facts proved in evidence. or was corrupt, or had expressed a contrary
That dictum of Lord President Cooper of the opinion on another occasion (Alcock v. Royal
Court of Session in a civil case (Davie v. Magis- Exchange Assurance [1849] 13 Q.B. 292).
trates of Edinburgh 1953 SC 34) has been The plight of the expert has been described in
noted with approval by text writers and judges one textbook:
south of the border (Cross, 1980) and in other
He has to answer when asked and stop when told;
countries and is the classic statement of the he cannot give his evidence as he chooses, but
duties of the expert witness. It implies an effort must confine himself to the questions asked. He
on the part of the Court to understand and can be interrupted at any moment and ridiculed,
follow the specialist evidence. But it also reprimanded or contradicted. High qualifications
where may not prevent him cutting a hopeless figure in
implies that there will be some cases the witness box; poise and sense of what is called
the issues are so complex or the material so for in a witness may make him impressive though
esoteric that the Court may be unable to his qualifications be mediocre. If he is ill-informed
follow the reasoning, and in these cases the upon facts and hasty in opinions he will seldom
Court's dependence upon the expert will be at escape discomfort.
(Wily and Stallworthy, 1962).
a maximum (Hammelmann, 1947).
Expert evidence is competent only where If the theory advanced by the expert is out-
there is a question of medicine, science or other landish it is said that he may even be cross-
specialist skill at issue which the Court cannot examined upon it by his own side (R. v. Cook
resolve at its own hand, and then only from an 147 C.C.C. Sess. Pap. 466). Most commonly
expert who is shown to have the necessary the evidence of the medical or scientific witness
qualifications and experience to enable him to is challenged by obtaining an opinion from
give a valid opinion on the issue (Blair, 1973). another doctor or scientist to the opposite
It used to be thought that the expert was effect. When this happens it is open to the
prohibited from giving evidence on the actual Court to believe one or other of the witnesses
question at issue in the case itself because to but more often the evidence simply cancels out
do so would usurp the function of the judge and the Court decides the issue on other
or jury. The foremost American writer on grounds. It is important to keep in view that
evidence regarded that argument as unsound where experts disagree the matter remains one
and misleading (Wigmore, 1940). With the for the Court. Some commentators have been
growth of scientific knowledge that supposed struck by the anomaly of the jury who are by
rule was breached and it is now probably definition ordinary men in the street having to
acceptable for an expert who has himself decide between competing specialists, and
observed the facts on a question of science or Professor Glanville Williams has suggested that
 Brownlie: Expert Evidence in the Light of Preece v. H. M. Advocate 239
'obviously it calls for an expert to choose
between experts' (Williams, 1955). The scope
of an expert's expertise is necessarily limited
and the expert who strays beyond his own field
is often caught out if he answers a question
giving his opinion on a matter which falls
outwith its bounds. The special privilege of the
expert is that unlike other witnesses he is
allowed to speak not only to the facts *hich he
knows but also to the opinions which he holds
or has formed on these facts. 'The expert's
opinion is admissible in evidence solely to fill
the gap due to the tribunal's inability to draw a
proper technical conclusion from the facts'
(Simon, 1953). So the expert is well advised to
keep fact and opinion clearly separated in
his evidence.
GIVING EVIDENCE
The qualities which ideally the expert ought to
possess have been tabulated as perception,
judgment, a good memory and power of ex-
pression (Powell, 1910) and his functions
rather graphically described as: generalising
from experience, acting as librarian, statistician
and within limits as advocate (Eggleston, 1978).
Since the Civil Evidence Act 1972 it has
been common for expert witnesses in England
to give their evidence in civil cases upon
deposition, although such a witness may always
be called to Court to explain personally what
he has written (Samuels, 1974). Efforts have
been made at least in civil cases to compel
pre-trial disclosure of medical reports and to a
degree this is helpful (Brown, 1980). In Scotland,
however, particularly in the case of forensic
pathology, it has hitherto been usual for two
Crown witnesses to concur in a joint report
which is laid before the Court and is available
to the parties from the time when the Indict-
ment is served. These written reports form the
foundation of the examination and cross-
examination of the experts when they give
personal evidence as they always do. Following
the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, s. 26
however, certain routine reports will prove
themselves and autopsy or forensic science
reports may be proved by the oral evidence of a
single witness unless of course the witness is
called to be in attendance. The fact that the
pathologists' reports are written ensures that
the opponents will have advance notice of the
terms of the expert evidence, so that there is
no question of parties being taken by surprise
by that evidence (Camps, 1968). It seems from
provisions like the Road Traffic Act 1972, s. 10
and the foregoing section of the Criminal Justice
(Scotland) Act 1980 that the trend towards
certificate evidence, which if not challenged in
advance becomes sufficient in law and so un-
challengeable, will continue. Within limits this
is not unsatisfactory but it must not be allowed
to prevent up-and-coming experts from learning
by experience how to give evidence (Gee,
1980). Indeed the most complex scientific and
technical evidence will certainly have to be
given orally if it is to stand a chance of being
understood and assessed (Coleman and Walls,
1974). The Court, it has been argued, have no
right to accept uncritically evidence which
cannot be formulated in propositions which an
educated person, having taken sufficient
trouble, cannot understand (Brownlie, 1978).
Although it was for a time doubtful, it is now
clear that in Scotland the essential facts in a
case must be corroborated even where they
may consist of opinion evidence (McKillen v.
Barclay Curie & Co. 1967 S.L.T. 41-46).
It is the view of many solicitors that there is
no reason at all why prosecution experts should
not be invited to discuss their evidence in
advance with the defence in criminal cases and
every reason why they should do so. In Scotland
they are already obliged to submit to pre-
cognition (H. M. Advocate v.Monson & Another
(1893) 21 R. (J) 5) and regularly do so. There
may even be a place for joint examinations by
experts (Langston, 1967). The practice of pre-
trial consultations with one's own expert is
nearly universal and it would make sense that
where experts know that they have been
retained on opposite sides in a case they should,
with the consent of their clients, discuss with
one another the extent of their agreement and
disagreement. If the area of dispute is identified
in this way it can only assist the Court in
getting more quickly to the root of the differ-
ence, and the witnesses in giving them time to
ruminate upon the reasons for the difference.
The practice of some solicitors in requiring
their expert witness to undertake not to discuss
his evidence in advance with anyone is question-
240 Med. Sci. Law (1982) Vol. 22, No. 4
able and need not be accepted by the expert.
Unlike the witness to fact the expert is not
personally involved in the case (Robb, 1968).
Much heart searching is occasioned to some
experts by reason of the fact that for a fee
they are called to give evidence on behalf of
one party or another in a case. While it is true
that the witness is in one sense partisan there
should be no question of an expert witness
bending his evidence or tailoring it to satisfy
the requirements of him who calls him. The
expert has a duty to his own specialty and to
the Court which far transcends his duty to the
person who will be paying his fee. On the other
hand in the United Kingdom an expert witness
giving evidence will be doing so within the
adversary system and there is no obligation on a
witness to volunteer unfavourable circumstances
(Dix and Todd, 1961) or to make out his
opponent's case for him; it has always been
thought sufficient if the witness gives his evi-
dence fairly and moderately and leaves it to the
opponent to draw attention to those aspects of
the matter which may be favourable to the
opponent. The expert was counselled by Lord
MacMillan many years ago never to allow
himself to become the partisan of one side
(MacMillan, 1937), and that advice holds
good today.
PREECE v. H. M. ADVOCATE [1981] Crim.
LR. 783
On 20th December 1972 the body of a woman
was found in a wood on the English side of the
Border near Carlisle. She had been strangled.
At first this was thought to be a murder falling
within English jurisdiction and work began on
that basis. About three months later it appeared
that the body was associated with a long-
distance lorry driver based in Stoke-on-Trent
who travelled regularly through central Scotland
to Aberdeen and back and that the murder had
taken place in Scotland. The enquiry then
reverted to Scotland.
At his eight-day trial in June 1973 (H. M.
Advocate v. Preece: High Court of Justiciary,
Edinburgh) scientific evidence was given of
blood and seminal stains, hairs, fibres, grass
seeds and other material said to link Preece, the
lorry driver, to the victim. The scientific
evidence was mostly given by Dr Clift, an
experienced biologist from one of the forensic
science laboratories, who made the tests on the
body substances and on the trace evidence
found in the cabin of Preece's long-distance
lorry. There was little other conclusive evidence
at the trial and after evidence by Dr Clift and
corroborating evidence from a junior colleague
who himself had not undertaken any of the
scientific work, Preece was found guilty by a
jury majority and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. At the trial Preece had been represented
by experienced Counsel advised by a forensic
pathologist but there had been little, if any,
challenge in Court of the scientific evidence. In
charging the jury the trial judge, Lord Avonside,
summed up the case 'impeccably' (according to
the judges who later reviewed the scientific
evidence) but with only a brief reference to the
scientific evidence of hairs, fibres and paint
and no mention at all of the evidence of the
examination of stains of body fluids on the
deceased's clothing, 'for everyone' to quote
from his charge to the jury 'experienced in
these Courts, it is known that if you get one
expert to say yea you get another sure as fate
to say nay: and that is why it is entirely, I am
afraid, for you (ladies and gentlemen of the
jury) to judge which forensic evidence you
accept and which you do not'.
APPEAL
An appeal was taken against the conviction on
the general ground of insufficiency of evidence
in February 1974 but this was dismissed and
the conviction affirmed. After Preece had been
in prison for more than seven years questions
were raised in Parliament and elsewhere as to
the quality of the scientific evidence and the
scientific detachment of Dr Clift and the case
was referred by the Secretary of State back to
the High Court of Justiciary under s. 263(1)(a)
of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975.
That procedure was one which had rarely been
used. The first and most famous occasion was
when, after a belated attack on the judge's
charge to the jury in Slater v. H. M. Advocate
(1928 J.C. 94), Oscar Slater's conviction was
reviewed and quashed and Slater was released
from prison twenty years after his alleged crime.
In Gallagber v. H. M. Advocate (1951 J.C. 38)
 Brownlie: Expert Evidence in the Light of Preece v. H. M. Advocate 241
the Court refused to entertain new evidence
because they were not satisfied that it would
necessarily produce a different verdict and in
Higgins v. H. M. Advocate (1956 J.C. 69) it
was established that the test for allowing new
evidence was that it must have produced a
different verdict had it been given at the trial.
THE REFERENCE
The general allegations made to the High Court
on behalf of Preece at the referred hearing
[19811 Crim. L.R. 783-5 were that Dr Clift
had deliberately suppressed evidence which
should have been disclosed and that the evi-
dence he gave was lacking in quality and
objectivity. In the event the High Court agreed
to hear fresh evidence limited to certain sero-
logical matters. Accordingly Dr Clift was
ordered under s. 252 of the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1975 to give evidence afresh and
the evidence of six leaders of the profession
was also called for on the serological aspects of
the case, some of these experts being cited on
behalf of Preece and the others on behalf of the
Crown. The Court itself described the assem-
blage of expert witnesses as 'perhaps the most
impressive body of outstanding forensic sero-
logists and forensic scientists which has ever
been assembled in one Court'. Equally it has to
be said that the ordeal which Dr Clift had to
undergo was unmatched in legal history. The
recall under citation of an expert witness after
eight years to be confronted by a galaxy of
leaders of his own profession and subjected to
hours of cross-examination in a glare of publicity
in a situation where he was both unrepresented
and attacked as to his honesty, his scientific
detachment and his capabilities was an occur-
rence without parallel in Scottish legal history
which must fill every past and prospective
expert witness with alarm.
The challenge to Dr Clift's evidence resolved
itself into three branches. It was alleged that
Dr Clift had withheld evidence which he should
have given as to the blood grouping status of
the victim; that he had failed to disclose that
stains he had tested were not isolated seminal
stains but mixed seminal and vaginal stains,
and that he had reached unwarrantable and
scientifically impossible conclusions thereon.
Having spent several days hearing the evidence
of Dr Clift and of the six other forensic scien-
tists the Court gave a lengthy judgment in
which they found it established that Dr Clift
had at the trial omitted from his written report
and failed to mention in evidence the blood
group and secretor status of the victim although
he knew her to be Group A and probably a
secretor; that he had unwarrantably professed
to be able to distinguish from mixed seminal
and vaginal staining that the grouping of the
male contributor was Group A secretor;
that there was no scientific support for Dr
Clift's claim that he could distinguish in the
mixed staining the blood group substances
derived from the male because, as he had
asserted, these gave a stronger reaction than
would have been characteristic of such sub-
stances emanating from the female; and that
Dr Clift's evidence fell short of the standards of
accuracy and objectivity required of an expert
witness. The Court went on to hold that had
the jury heard the new evidence which the High
Court had heard the jury would have found Dr
Clift to be discredited as a scientific witness and
accordingly the whole of the evidence which he
gave would have been regarded as unreliable
and the appeal must be allowed and the con-
viction quashed.
IMPLICATIONS
The implications of this judgment for medical
and scientific witnesses seem at first sight to be
considerable. In the first place the Court casti-
gated the expert witness for an omission from
his written report. It is of course absolutely
clear that an expert witness must try to present
a balanced and full report. The peculiarity of
this case however is that in his original draft
English-style report Dr Clift bad disclosed the
blood group of the victim. In translating the
English-style report into the Scottish form
when it became clear that the case was one to
be dealt with according to Scottish procedures
the victim's blood group status, which was a
fact of importance, was omitted. This of course
was reprehensible and could have come about,
as the Court accepted, either deliberately or
through inadvertence. What is so strange,
however, is that at the Preece trial no one-
not the Crown counsel who must have known
from the original report the victim's blood
242 Med. Sci. Law (1982) Vol. 22, No. 4

group, not the defence Counsel advised by his between certain things even though others
expert forensic pathologist, not the judge- cannot replicate his results? It is not unknown
asked a single question as to the victim's in some fields of science for one set of workers
group. Had they done so the matter would to be able to achieve certain results in experi-
have been instantly clarified. One is led to mental situations which others consistently
wonder whether they followed the import of fail to match.
the evidence which was of course to suggest The conclusion of the Court was that without
that because the accused was Blood Group A expressing an opinion upon Dr Clift's credibility
secretor the stains might have come from him. his evidence fell far below the standards of
It would surely be an elementary question to accuracy, fairness and objectivity to be expected
enquire whether they might also have come from such a witness and that had the jury heard
from the other person alleged to have been the evidence which they had heard the jury
present. In the light of this it is difficult to see would have rejected entirely the evidence of
why the Court should have been so extremely Dr Clift and his junior, not only on the sero-
critical of Dr Clift's evidence and why they logical aspects of the case but also on the other
should have said as they did that he 'deprived scientific matters said to link the accused with
the defence and the Court of the means whereby the scene of the crime. Having thus demolished
his confident opinion could have been called in the scientific evidence there was no other
question'. The evidence in question was not reliable evidence and the conviction of Preece
evidence which could have been positively in- had to be quashed.
criminating to the accused but was merely
evidence which put him into a class where COMMENT
(along with many others) he might have contri- The comments which spring to mind upon this
buted the stains. The main criticism of this part case from the point of view of experts are as
of his evidence must be that he allowed the follows:
Court to take an inference from his evidence- (a) Nothing in the Preece case changes the
exclusionary rather than directly probative- law. It merely elucidates the Scottish Court's
which was more definite than was justified. interpretation of the existing law. The problem
is still to know precisely what has to be done to
DISCRIMINATION comply with the expert's oath to tell the truth
The other main issue which occupied the Court and the whole truth, a requirement which has
for a very considerable time was in regard to been recognised as difficult to fulfil in terms
Dr Clift's claim to be able to distinguish between (East, 1947). Professor Gordon has recently
the constituents in the mixed staining on the written of the expert witness: 'He fulfils his
victim's clothing. The Court ruled that there oath by giving his opinion frankly and honestly
was no support for Dr Clift in this claim and without minimising any difficulties it may
mentioned that his theory 'stood (as it still cause, or suppressing any doubts he has.'
stands) without support from any reputable (Gordon, 1981). Whether English Courts will
scientific authority and it had not in 1973 seen follow the Preece case in this respect remains to
the light of day in any scientific publication or be seen. A similar question has been raised as to
journal (except possibly in domestic literature United States practice (Belli, 1968).
circulating in a police training establishment (b) Beware of written reports. It is clear
with which Dr Clift was associated in England).' that everything relevant must be exhaustively
This is of course a perfectly fair point. A wit- disclosed in written reports if experts are to
ness who claims to be able to do what others avoid the charge of having deprived the Court
cannot do may not find it easy to gain credence. of the opportunity to assess all the evidence.
It does suggest too that a witness should only This seems to involve disclosure of the weak-
testify to what has been well established and ness as well as the strength of the evidence
described in the literature. Is a .witness not whether asked or not. In oral evidence a witness
also entitled to say-if it is the case-that he simply has to answer the questions he is asked:
has confidence in his own ability to discriminate in written reports there is apparently a duty to
 Brownlie: Expert Evidence in the Light of Preece v. H. M. Advocate 243
be sufficiently comprehensive as to convey a
fair understanding of his evidence.
(c) Some witnesses have in the past disliked
cross-examination. Judging by the Preece case,
it is to be welcomed; for if the issues are opened
up and debated it cannot at a later date easily
be said that something was withheld.
(d) Theory and experience which cannot be
supported by published work are particularly
open to challenge. Do judges think that un-
published methods are not valid, or only assume
validity after publication?
(e) Never throw away case notes or working
papers. They may be called for up to eight
years later. Although scientific witnesses cannot
normally be compelled to become involved in
giving evidence, once they have done so they
may be required to re-establish their evidence
long after having left the witness box if those
dissatisfied with a Court's judgment are suffi-
ciently assiduous in their criticism as to have
the case remitted back under this exceptional
procedure.
(f) Perhaps the most important lesson to be
learned from the Preece case is that solicitors
must diligently carry out their functions and
grapple with scientific evidence. It is not
enough to concentrate on the lay evidence
and hope that the scientific evidence will go
away. It is vital that solicitors are alert both to
what is said in evidence and what is not said
(Lincoln, 1980). If solicitors fail to follow the
import of the expert evidence and fail to have it
thoroughly tested all sorts of injustices may
follow for their clients, for the Court and even
for the expert. As the Ormrod Committee
noted (Report of the Committee on Legal
Education Cmnd. 4595-HMSO 1971, para.
96) there is much to be done in the area of
improving the education of solicitors in the
techniques of understanding and dealing with
such technical evidence.
EVIDENCE METHODS
Obviously these difficulties and problems
raise the more fundamental question whether
our method of dealing with expert evidence in
the adversary system is acceptable. Although it
would be possible to adopt the Continental
system of Court experts this would ill accord
with the adversary system and would limit
cross-examination and challenge (Coutts, 1966)
(Brownlie, 1974). There has in several juris-
dictions in recent years been much attention
paid to minimising the element of surprise in
relation to expert evidence. The Evershed
Committee Report on Supreme Court Practice
& Procedure (Cmnd. 8878-HMSO 1953)
dealing with medical evidence in English civil
cases concluded that it was eminently desirable
that each party should know in advance what is
the expert evidence to be called for the other
side, and certain rules were introduced to secure
this. To some extent in England this happens,
but problems of confidentiality have reduced
the effectiveness of the procedure. The matter
is still alive and further attempts will no doubt
be made to solve it.
That distinguished judge Sir Roger Ormrod
has more than once advocated that in civil and
criminal cases the reports of all scientific wit-
nesses should be disclosed in advance of the
trial and it should be made clear that experts
are free-irrespective of the wishes of the
parties-to consult together, and advocated
that the best solution:
... which would satisfy both scientists and lawyers
would be the express adoption by all scientific
witnesses of some of the conventions which rule
the (English) Bar. It is customary to disclose in
advance to the opponent a list of cases to be
referred to in argument and it is the duty of the
advocate to call the attention of the court to any
reported decision which in any way is against the
submission which he is making. It should be the
right and duty of experts to exchange their reports
before trial and, if they wish, consult together
and it should be a rigorous obligation on all experts
to give the court, as clearly as they can, the limits
of accuracy of their evidence, whether it is experi-
mental or theoretical, and to disclose, if it be the
fact, that other views exist in their profession. It
should also be their duty to the court, to indicate
what inferences cannot properly be drawn from
their evidence.
(Ormrod, 1968; 1972)
If this radical suggestion were implemented
fully (and perhaps the Scottish Courts are going
some way towards implementing it in the
Preece judgment) it may be that a new degree
of communication and mutual trust would
begin to be engendered amongst medical and
scientific witnesses involved in the legal process.
Meanwhile it is only too clear that the giving of
244 Med. Sci. Law (1982) Vol. 22, No. 4

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