064. Delos Santos vs.

COA AUTHOR: Revy Neri

GR. No.198457; August 13, 2013 NOTES:
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
1. Congressman Cuenco of the Second District of Cebu City entered into MOA with VSMMC hospital represented
by Dr. Alquizalas, Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of Php 1,500,000 from his
PDAF to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients undet the Tony N’ Tommy (TNT Health Program).
2. It was agreed that: a.) Cuenco shall identify and recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of
the TNT Program for an amount not exceeding Php 5,000 per patient, except those with major illnesses for whom
a separate limit may be specificied; b.) an indigent patient who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently
disqualified from seeking further medical assistance; and c.) the hospital shall purchase medicine intended for the
indigent patients from outside sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy, subject to reimbursement
when such expenses are supported by official receipts and other documents.
3. Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of the TNT Program, wrote petitioner Antoni, Pharmacist V of VSMMC,
requesting the latter to purchase needed medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from Sacred Heart
Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy which were supposedly accredited suppliers of the DOH.
4. The said request was approved.
5. Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescription and
referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced.
6. Beatriz Booc, State Auditor IV, who was assigned to audit the hospital, came up with her own review of the
account for drugs and medicines charged to the PDAF of Cuenco.
7. She furnished Delos Santos, who created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter, the results of her
review and recommending the investigation of the following irregularities: a.) involving fictitious patients and
falsified prescriptions for anti-rabies and drugs; b.) involving issuance of vitamins mostly to staff of VSMMC and
TNT Office; and c.) covering fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for other drugs and medicines and
unpaid falsified prescriptions and referral letters for drugs and medicine.
8. In the initial investigation conducted by the COA, the results of which were it was found that: (a) 133 prescriptions
for vaccines, drugs and medicines for anti-rabies allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P3,407,108.40,
and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be falsified;(b) 46 prescriptions for other
drugs and medicines allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and already paid by VSMMC
from the PDAF of Cuenco likewise appeared to be falsified; and (c) 25 prescriptions for drugs and medicines
allegedly issued by Dell Pharmacy costing P602,063.50 were also ascertained to be falsified and have not been
paid by VSMMC.
9. A special audit team (SAT), led by Team Leader Atty. Dinapo, Jr., State Auditor V, was formed pursuant to Legal
and Adjudication Office (LAO) Order to conduct a special audit investigation with respect to the findings of Booc
and her team.
10. The SAT reported the following findings and observations: a.) The provision of National Budget Circular No. 476
dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for the PDAF authorized under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8760, as Reenacted (GAA for CY 2001) were not followed; b.) Existing auditing law,
rules and regulations governing procurement of medicines were not followed in the program's implementation; c.)
The program's implementation did not follow the provisions of the MOA by and between Congressman Cuenco
and the Hospital; and acts committed in the implementation of the project were as follows: there were 133 falsified
prescriptions for anti-rabies vaccines, drugs and medicines allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy were paid by
VSMMC from the PDAF of Congressman Cuenco; 46 falsified prescriptions for other drugs and medicines were
likewise reportedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy and paid by VSMMC from the said PDAF; and 25 prescriptions
were also claimed to have been served by Dell Pharmacy but still unpaid.
11. Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the purported
patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed
except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified as evidenced by the
following: Thirteen (13) hospital surgeons disowned the signatures on the prescriptions supporting the claims.
Surgeons do not prescribe anti-rabies vaccines; they operate on patients; Almost all of the patients named in the
prescriptions were not treated or admitted at the Hospital or in its Out-patient Department. Those whose names
appeared on Hospital records were treated at different dates than those appearing on the prescription ; Full dosages
of anti-rabies vaccines were allegedly given to the patients although it is gross error to do so for these medicines
are highly perishable. These should be refrigerated and injected immediately and periodically.
 12. Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued ND No. 2008-09-01,37
disallowing the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified
prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable
therefor.
ISSUE(S): WON the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed
amount of P3,386,697.10.
HELD: NO. In this case, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed
Decisions.
RATIO:
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be
vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The
exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government.

Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also
for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not
only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount
to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is
grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law
or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim,
and despotism.

Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.
For instance, in Reyna case, the Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered
claims of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending
Operations. In similar regard, the Court, in Casal case, sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum
who again, notwithstanding their good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive award granted to its
officials and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and 29 which prohibit the grant of productivity
incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature unless authorized by the Office of the President. In Casal, it was
held that, even if the grant of the incentive award was not for a dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of the issuances of
the President and the directives of the CoA amounts to gross negligence, making the [“approving officers”] liable for the
refund [of the disallowed incentive award]

In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos’ argument that the practices of the TNT Office were already pre-existing
when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to change the same remains highly untenable. Records clearly
reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she was installed as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime “in
the late 2003,” Antoni disclosed to her the irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre -signed and forged
prescriptions. Hence, having known this significant information, she and Antoni should have probed into the matter
further, and, likewise, have taken more stringent measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented herself
with giving oral instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave pre-signed
prescriptions pads, which Antoni allegedly followed during the orientations for new doctors. But, just the same, the
falsification and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or in December 2004, that Delos Santos ordered a forma l
investigation of the attendant irregularities. By then, too much damage had already been done.

All told, petitioners’ acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA issuances and as aforedescribed reasonably
figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence
which resulted to the irregular disbursements from Cuenco’s PDAF. In this light, their liability pursuant to Sections 10473
and 10574 of the Auditing Code, as well as Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts, as
prescribed in CoA Circular No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld. Truly, the degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco’s
PDAF and the resulting detriment to the public cannot pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be
loosely protected and even rendered illusory.
065 G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010 AUTHOR: Bea Mationg
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, NOTES: (if applicable)
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
FACTS: (chronological order)

A petition was filed by Atty. Macalintal, that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal
and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualificat ions of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

MACALINTAL’S CONTENTION: He is bothered at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget
allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioner’s avermen t is
supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules), specificall y:

(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are designated as
"Chairman and Members," respectively;
(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and confidential employees of every member thereof;
(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal" with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk
of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and
(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme Court seal.

OSG: points out that the petition filed by Atty. Macalintal is unspecified and without statutory basis; "the liberal approach in i ts
preparation x x x is a violation of the well known rules of practice and pleading in this jurisdiction."
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates
Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

HELD: Petition is without merit. The PET is constitutional.

RATIO:

(1) The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry:

1. There must be an actual case or controversy;

2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

But even if his submission is valid, petitioner’s standing is still imperiled by the white elephant in the petition, i.e., his
appearance as counsel for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004
presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, because judicial inquiry, as mentioned
above, requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Such appearance as counsel
before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s
constitution.

Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously
appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time,
coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear
absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review. Even on this score
alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.

Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving constitutional and election l aw
issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003), cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v.
Commission on Elections is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential
election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.

The court is guided by well-settled principles of constitutional construction:

Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. This Court, speaking
through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration 20 instructs:

Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all
the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and
to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every
word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be read with other related provisions of the
Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our country’s highest public
officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the
exercise thereof. The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise of judicial power. Plainly,
the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in
the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is sound and tenable.

The background of this is really the case of Roxas v. Lopez. The Gentleman will remember that in that election, Lopez was
declared winner. He filed a protest before the Supreme Court because there was a republic act which created the Supreme
Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The question in this case was whether new powers could be given the Supreme
Court by law. In effect, the conflict was actually whether there was an attempt to create two Supreme Courts and the answer of
the Supreme Court was: "No, this did not involve the creation of two Supreme Courts, but precisely we are giving new
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by the Constitution. Congress may allocate various jurisdictions."

Before the passage of that republic act, in case there was any contest between two presidential candidates or two vice-
presidential candidates, no one had jurisdiction over it. So, it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
What we have done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because
the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.

Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In fact,
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who proposed the insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Cou rt to exercise
exclusive authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and t hen
emphasized that the sole power ought to be without intervention by the legislative department. Evidently, even t he legislature
cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making power
connected thereto.

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was
statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be denied.
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation. The precursors of the present Constitution did not
contain similar provisions and instead vested upon the legislature all phases of presidential and vice-presidential elections –
from the canvassing of election returns, to the proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-president elect, and even the
determination, by ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations may be contested. Unless the legislature enacted a law
creating an institution that would hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential race, a defeated candidate had
no legal right to demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved or to challenge the ineligibility of the proclai med
candidate. Effectively, presidential and vice-presidential contests were non-justiciable in the then prevailing milieu.

Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was permitted to recommend the prosecution
of persons, whether public officers or private individuals, who in its opinion had participated in any irregularity connected with
the canvassing and/or accomplishing of election returns.

The independence of the tribunal was highlighted by a provision allocating a specific budget from the national treasury or
Special Activities Fund for its operational expenses. It was empowered to appoint its own clerk in accordance with its rules.
However, the subordinate officers were strictly employees of the judiciary or other officers of the government who were
merely designated to the tribunal.

After the historic People Power Revolution that ended the martial law era and installed Corazon Aquino as President, civil
liberties were restored and a new constitution was formed. With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission transformed the then statutory PET into a constitutional institution.

Clearly, petitioner’s bete noire of the PET and the exercise of its power are unwarranted. His arguments that: (1) the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices are referred to as "Chairman" and "Members," respectively; (2) the PET uses a differe nt seal; (3)
the Chairman is authorized to appoint personnel; and (4) additional compensation is allocated to the "Members," in order to
bolster his claim of infirmity in the establishment of the PET, are too superficial to merit further attention by the Court.

From the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the Herculean task of
deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in accordance with the process outlined by
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the
additional duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of independence and of the plenary
powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget allocation of the PET.

The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that the
abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is warranted.

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral
tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar onl y to
the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it
faithfully complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change
in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal , respectively,
was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.

As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, we point out that the issue in Buac v. COMELEC 43 involved the characterization of the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections.
However, petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac which declared, in an obiter, that "contests involving the President
and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power."

The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the powe r "shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with our presidential
system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights,
duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the
1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government ." The
power was expanded, but it remained absolute.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power.

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or
metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.

At the higher levels – city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial – exclusive and original jurisdiction
is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests
which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section
2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the
Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to
judicial review – via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party – if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 46

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel
enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by whi ch to direct the course
of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the pow ers
of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in
Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exerci se of
judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority
in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the
PET and the Supreme Court.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
66 LOREN B. LEGARDA, protestant, vs.NOLI L. DE CASTRO, protestee. AUTHOR: Yayie Lanting
P.E.T. Case No. 003 January 18, 2008 NOTES:
PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
1. June 23, 2004: Congress sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) proclaimed protestee Noli L. de Castro the
duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.
 The official count of the votes cast for Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 elections showed that the protestee
obtained the highest number of votes, garnering 15,100,431 votes as against the 14,218,709 votes garnered by the
protestant Loren B. Legarda, who placed second

2. July 23, 2004, the protestant filed this protest with this Tribunal praying for the annulment of the protestee's
proclamation as the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.
a. The First Aspect originally covered "all the erroneous, if not manipulated, and falsified results as reflected in the final
canvass documents" for 9,007 precincts in six provinces, one city and five municipalities.
 avers that the correct results appearing in the election returns were not properly transferred and reflected in the
subsequent election documents and ultimately, in the final canvass of documents used as basis for protestee's
proclamation.
 seeks the recomputation, recanvass and retabulation of the election returns to determine the true result.
b. The Second Aspect required revision of ballots in 124,404 precincts specified in the protest.

3. The Tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest and denied the motion of protestee for its outright dismissal.

4.Protestee filed a motion for reconsideration arguing in the main that the Tribunal erred in ruling that the protest alleged a
cause of action sufficient to contest protestee's victory in the May 2004 elections.

the Tribunal ruled that:

On the matter of sufficiency of the protest, protestee failed to adduce new substantial arguments to reverse our ruling. We hold that while Peña v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal on requisites of sufficiency of election protest is still good law, it is inapplicable in this case. We
dismissed the petition in Peña because it failed to specify the contested precincts. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces,
municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and
substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to protestee's title to his office. In our view, the instant protest consists of alleged
ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time.

Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of
the allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61
of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the
correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunal's rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

On a related matter, the protestant in her reiterating motion prays for ocular inspection and inventory-taking of ballot boxes, and appointment of
watchers. However, the Tribunal has already ordered the protection and safeguarding of the subject ballot boxes; and it has issued also the appropriate
directives to officials concerned. At this point, we find no showing of an imperative need for the relief prayed for, since protective and safeguard
measures are already being undertaken by the custodians of the subject ballot boxes.

WHEREFORE, protestee's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. Protestant's reiterating motion for
ocular inspection and inventory-taking with very urgent prayer for the appointment of watchers is also DENIED for lack of showing as to its actual
necessity.

Further, the protestant LOREN B. LEGARDA is ORDERED to specify, within ten (10) days from notice, the three (3) provinces best exemplifying
the manifest errors alleged in the first part of her protest, and three (3) provinces best exemplifying the frauds and irregularities alleged in the second
part of her protest, for the purpose herein elucidated.
Lastly, the Tribunal hereby ORDERS the Commission on Elections to SUBMIT, within 30 days hereof, the official project of precincts of the May
2004 Elections

5.On August 28, 2006, a preliminary conference was called by Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo to schedule the
presentation of evidence.

6.Several hearings on the First Aspect were held wherein the protestant adduced evidence and the protestee interposed his
continuing objection to such in the form of motions and comments. Months of continuous trial took place until the Hearing
Commissioner made his final report of the proceedings for detailed consideration by the Tribunal.

7.On May 3, 2007, the protestant was required to deposit P3,914,500 for expenses necessary for the continuation of the
revision of ballots. But protestant failed to pay on the due date. Thus, protestee moved to dismiss the protest. The Tribunal
extended the period for protestant to make the necessary deposit. Even with this extension, she still failed to pay. Thus, the
Tribunal partially granted the protestee's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 33 of PET rules, and ordered the dismissal of
the Second Aspect of the protest

8.Protestant filed a memorandum stating that based on the pieces of evidence she presented, both documentary and
testimonial, she has shown that electoral fraud or cheating was committed through the so-calleddagdag-bawas strategy in
the elections for President and Vice-President held last May 14, 2004. Protestant in particular submitted that electoral fraud
was perpetuated as follows:
1. That the correct votes of the parties were properly recorded and tabulated in the election returns (ERs), wherein she garnered a higher number of
votes over protestee De Castro;
2. That when the ERs were canvassed at the municipal level, the ER results were "wrongly and erroneously" transposed and transferred to the
Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOV-P), such that the protestee was given a higher number of votes;
3. That the inaccurate results shown in the SOV-P were totaled and transferred to the Municipal Certificate of Canvass (MCOC), with protestee
prevailing over protestant;
4. That the MCOC, with incorrect totals, was transmitted to the Provincial Board of Canvassers, wherein the inaccurate MCOC t otals were transposed
to the Statement of Votes by Municipalities (SOV-M);
5. That the numbers reflected in the individual SOV-Ms were totaled, and the sum for the whole province was indicated in the Provincial Certificate of
Canvass (PCOC);
6. That the PCOCs, with the erroneously transposed totals stemming from the incorrect SOV-Ps, were the ones canvassed by Congress, acting as the
National Board of Canvassers for the presidential and vice-presidential positions;and
7. That Congress, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, merely "noted" and denied protestant's request to view the precinct-source ERs, and
proceeded to canvass the "already-manipulated/dagdag-bawas" PCOCs, resulting in the flawed and farcical victory of protestee De Castro.
 avers that fraud, by means of the anomalous election practices, was sufficiently proven by using her sample-pilot
precincts in two municipalities in Lanao del Sur, particularly Balindong and Taraka.
 alleges that the "dagdag-bawas" scheme, which was perpetrated through the deliberate and erroneous transposition
of results from the authentic ERs to the SOV-Ps, was further aggravated by an alleged cover-up operation to hide
the same. According to protestant, the Congress-retrieved copies of the ERs which tally with the SOV-Ps, were
fake and spurious; they were intended to cover-up the electoral fraud committed. Protestant submits that the
correct voting results are those reflected in the COMELEC and NAMFREL's copies of the ERs, not those in the
copies retrieved from Congress.
 claims that while she presented pieces of evidence, both testimonial and documentary, in only two municipalities
of Lanao del Sur, i.e., Balindong and Taraka, to prove the electoral fraud perpetrated through the dagdag-
bawas strategy, she could have shown that such fraudulent machination was replicat ed in several other
municipalities of Lanao del Sur and other provinces, such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Lanao del Sur if she had enough time.

9. Protestee, for his part, argues that the Congress-retrieved ERs are public documents as defined under Section 19 (a)Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, and thus, they enjoy the presumption of regularity accorded thereto, and they are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. He avers that there is prima facie presumption that the Congress-retrieved copies
of the ERs are genuine, authentic and duly executed. Protestee submits that protestant has failed to rebut such presumption
with clear and convincing evidence.
 Protestee further contends that, assuming arguendo that the results reflected in the COMELEC, NAMFREL and
MBOC's copies of the ERs are re-tabulated, in lieu of the results in the Congress-retrieved copies, or even if all the
votes in the 497 precincts included in the pilot areas, as well as in the remaining protested precincts in the First
Aspect, are counted in favor of protestant, said votes would be insufficient to overcome the lead of the protestee
totaling 881,722 votes. Hence, in view of the failure of the protestant to make out her case for the First Aspect of
the protest, the same and ultimately the protest in its entirety, must be dismissed without consideration of the other
provinces mentioned.

10. Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo submitted his Final Report of the Proceedings on the First Aspect. After a
thorough analysis of the parties' memoranda and the results of the proceedings on the protest, he recommended the
dismissal of the First Aspect.
 The Hearing Commissioner further recommended, following the precedent set in Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, that
the protest be dismissed for being moot and academic due to abandonment and withdrawal resulting from
protestant's election and assumption of office as senator.
 He also emphasized that assuming that dagdag-bawas had indeed occurred and that the results in the COMELEC's
ER copies indicated in Annex "A" were to be used for re-tabulation, protestant would be entitled to an additional
4,912 votes for the municipality of Taraka and 5,019 votes for Balindong, or a total of 9,931 votes, which is not
 adequate to surpass protestee's lead of 881,722 votes over protestant.
 On protestant's charges of electoral fraud allegedly aggravated by a cover-up operation that switched or exchanged
the Congress' ER copies with spurious ones, the Hearing Commissioner stressed that the Congress-retrieved ERs
are public documents which enjoy the presumption of regularity and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. He concluded that the protestant failed to adequately and convincingly rebut the presumption.
 The Hearing Commissioner also emphasized that protestant failed to substantiate sufficiently her claim that the
Congress-retrieved ERs are spurious and were switched with the authentic copies during an alleged break-in at the
storage area of the House of Representatives as no evidence was presented to prove such break-in. Hence, the
alleged discrepancies found in NAMFREL, MBOC and COMELEC's copies of the ERs are insufficient to exclude
the Congress-retrieved ER copies from the re-tabulation.
 The Hearing Commissioner also observed that in 11 out of the 51 precincts in Balindong, Lanao del Sur, there are
similar entries in the Congress-retrieved ERs and in the COMELEC's copies of the ERs, where protestant garnered
a higher number of votes over protestee, while the entries in the respective SOV-Ms are different in that the
protestee received more votes, belying protestant's assertion that the Congress -retrieved ERs should all be
disregarded since the results therein differ from those in the COMELEC's copies of ERs and that they have been
manipulated to favor protestee. Consequently, according to the Hearing Commissioner's report, protestant failed to
make out her case.

Thus, the Hearing Commissioner recommended that the protestant's Motion to Resolve the First Aspect of the Protest
under consideration should be denied, and consequently, the protest itself, be dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis,
as the pilot-tested revision of ballots or re-tabulation of the certificates of canvass would not affect the winning margin of
the protestee in the final canvass of the returns, in addition to the ground of abandonment or withdrawal by reason of her
candidacy for, election and assumption of office as Senator of the Philippines.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner clearly and convincingly proved the presence of manipulation or falsification of
election results
HELD: NO
RATIO:
After thorough deliberation and consideration of the issues in this case, this Tribunal finds the abovestated
recommendations of its Hearing Commissioner well-taken, and adopts them for its own.

Further, we are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as
such, which fact we can take judicial notice of, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned
her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate. The most relevant precedent on this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, a decision rendered by this Tribunal,
which held that:
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term
of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in
the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned
or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest
involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential
election, thereby enhancing the all-[too] crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the
public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds:
(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules;
(4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible.
Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as
affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an election
protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the
Protestant.

In the case at bar, protestant's tenure in the Senate coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010, that is the
subject of her protest. In Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, the protestant's tenure in the Senate also coincided with the term of
the Presidency she was vying for. Like the protestant in the aforementioned case, the protestant in the case at bar filed her
certificate of candidacy for the Senate, campaigned for the office, assumed office after election, and discharged the duties
and functions of said office. Thus, we agree concerning the applicability of the Defensor-Santiago case as a precedent in
the resolution of the present protest, though they differ in that Defensor-Santiago's case involves the Presidency while
Legarda's protest concerns only the Vice-Presidency.

On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agree with the protestee that the protestant had not adequately and
convincingly rebutted the presumption that as public documents, the Congress-retrieved ER copies, used for the
proclamation of the protestee by the NBC, are authentic and duly executed in the regular course of official business. The
evidence adduced by protestee to show that the supposed security features and markings in the Congress -retrieved ERs and
the COMELEC/NAMFREL's copies are different, did not categorically establish that the Congress -retrieved ERs are fake
and spurious. To overcome the presumption of regularity, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant. Absent such convincing evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In fact, the records show that
even the witnesses presented by the protestant testified that they were able to discern security features and markings in the
Congress-retrieved ERs. The records also show that witnesses were not made to examine all Congress-retrieved ERs in
making observations relative to security features and markings, but only a sample set thereof was utilized, resulting in
grave insufficiency in the evidence presented by protestant.

As to the alleged break-in in Congress, which allegedly facilitated the switching of ERs, no conclusive evidence has been
given. One of the protestant's own witnesses, Atty. Artemio Adasa, Deputy General for Legislative Operations of the
House of Representatives, categorically denied that a break-in and a switching of ERs had occurred in Congress.

At any rate, as pointed out by protestee, even assuming arguendo that all the votes in the 497 precincts included in the pilot
areas for the First Aspect with approximately 99,400 votes are considered in favor of protestant, still the protestant would
not be able to overcome the lead of the protestee. The margin in favor of protestee adds up to a total of 881,722 votes, and
it would take much more than a hundred thousand votes to overcome this lead. This is what th e protestant had set out to do
in her protest before the Tribunal, but unfortunately she failed to make out her case.In fact, Taraka and Balindong, the only
two municipalities on which protestant anchors her arguments for the First Aspect, would only yield an additional 9,931
votes (4,912 votes for Taraka and 5,019 votes for Balindong), a mere fraction of the lead of protestee over protestant. To
say that she could have shown that such fraudulent machination was replicated in several other municipalities of Lanao del
Sur and other provinces, such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Lanao del Sur if she had
enough time, is mere conjecture and can not be considered convincing by this Tribunal. It is the protestant herself who
admits that she was able to adduce evidence only in Taraka and Balindong, for lack of time. But this Tribunal has been
liberal in granting her plea for time extension. To say that the protestant had shown enough evidence to prove that the
whole or even half (440,862) of the lead of the protestee over the protestant is spurious, would go against the grain of the
evidence on hand. One cannot say that half a million votes were illegally obtained based on unclear evidence of cheating in
less than ten thousand. The protestant has been afforded ample opportunity to adduce evidence in her behalf for the First
Aspect of the protest but the evidence presented is simply insufficient to convince the Tribunal to render invalid all or even
half of the 881,722 votes that protestee had over her in the last elections for Vice-President.

WHEREFORE, the First Aspect of the protest is hereby DISMISSED for lack of legal and factual basis, as the pilot-
tested revision of ballots or re-tabulation of the certificates of canvass would not affect the winning margin of the protestee
in the final canvass of the returns, in addition to the ground of abandonment or withdrawal by reason of protestant's
candidacy for, election to and assumption of the office of Senator of the Philippines. The Second Aspect, having been
already DISMISSED on June 5, 2007, pursuant to Rule 33 of this Tribunal, the entire Protest is now
deemed DISMISSED andTERMINATED.
067 Acuzar v. Jarolan and Apresa PLEB
G.R. No. 177878, April 7, 2010
1. On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-014 against
petitioner, SPO1 Leonito Acuzar, before the PEOPLE'S LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB)
charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with
respondent’s minor daughter.
2. Respondent also instituted a criminal case against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of
New Corella, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1712, for Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act.
3. Petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit denying all the accusations leveled against him.
4. The complainant’s daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan, also denied having any relationship with the
petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married person.
5. On August 17, 2000, after due proceedings, the PLEB issued a decision, finding the respondent,
SPO1 Leonito Acuzar, GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT (Child Abuse) which is punishable by
DISMISSAL effective immediately.
6. petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and
TRO alleging that the subject decision was issued without giving him an opportunity to be
heard.
7. He likewise averred that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction in proceeding with
the case without the petitioner having been first convicted in the criminal case before the
regular court.
8. Petitioner pointed out that under the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required
before the Board may act on the administrative case considering that the charge was actually for
violation of law.
9. Petitioner was ordered dismissed from the Philippine National Police effective September 7,
2000.
10. RTC rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB: The petitioner was not given
his day in Court. The hearing at the PLEB, although administrative in nature, has penal sanction
of dismissal and for forfeiture of benefits of the petitioner. It is along this context that the
petitioner should be afforded all the opportunities of hearing which principally includes the
reception of his evidence consistent with our established rules. Due process of law embraces not
only substantive due process, but also procedural due process.
11. CA rendered its Decision reversing and setting aside the trial court’s decision. The CA
found merit in respondent’s argument that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before
the RTC was not the proper remedy because (1) appeal was available and (2) the issues raised
were not pure questions of law but both questions of law and fact.
ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s resort to certiorari was not warranted as
the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was available to him.
HELD: No, We affirm the appellate court’s ruling.
RATIO: A careful perusal of respondent’s affidavit-complaint against petitioner would show that
petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondent’s
minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to
convince this Court.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated,

obstinate or intentional purpose. On the other hand, "violation of law" presupposes final
conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any
special law or ordinance. The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and
distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in
administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required.
Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the
administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has
jurisdiction over the case.

Moreover, Section 43 (e) of Republic Act No. 6975,is explicit, thus: SEC. 43. People’s Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB).

(e) Decisions – The decision of the PLEB shall become final and executory: Provided, That a decision involving demotion or
dismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt
of the copy of the decision.

It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB to
the Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal was available, filing a petition
for certiorari was inapt.
Corollarily, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed
of the means of administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available within the
administrative machinery of the administrative agency, then this alternative should first be
utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to enable such body to review and
correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court.

Moreover, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that
there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.

Here, not only was an appeal available to petitioner as a remedy from the decision of the PLEB,
petitioner also failed to sufficiently show any grave abuse of discretion of the Board which would
justify his immediate resort to certiorari in lieu of an appeal.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim that he has not been afforded all the opportunity to present his side, our
own review of the records of the proceedings before the PLEB reveals otherwise.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the
records or made known to the parties affected.20

In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he had submitted
his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the hearings together with his
counsel and even asked for several postponements. Petitioner therefore cannot claim that he had been
denied of due process.

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to
those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. The requirements are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy

In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of
direct testimony.

Here, we note that petitioner had more than enough opportunity to present his side and adduce
evidence in support of his defense; thus, he cannot claim that his right to due process has been violated.
068 Winston F. Garcia v. Molina and Velasco, G.R. AUTHOR: DJEE
No. 157383, August 10, 2010 NOTES:
PONENTE: Nachura
FACTS:
1) Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two separate Memoranda from petitioner
charging them with grave misconduct.
2) Molina was charged for allegedly committing the following acts:
a) directly and continuously helping some alleged disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest
actions and/or illegal assemblies against the management and the GSIS President and General
Manager;
b) leading the concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22, 2002 during office hours within
the GSIS compound; and
c) continuously performing said activities despite warning from his immediate superiors.
3) In addition to the charge for grave misconduct for performing the same acts as Molina, Velasco was
accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on Office Decorum for leaving his office without
informing his supervisor of his whereabouts; and gross insubordination for persistently disregarding
petitioners instructions that Velasco should report to the petitioners office.
4) These acts, according to petitioner, were committed in open betrayal of the confidential nature of their
positions and in outright defiance of the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism.
5) petitioner required respondents to submit their verified answer within seventy two (72) hours.
6) petitioner ordered the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90) days without pay, effective
immediately
7) following day, a committee was constituted to investigate the charges against respondents.

8) Answer
i) denied the charges against them. Instead, they averred that petitioner was motivated by
vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive
suspension for lack of factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed their opposition to petitioner
acting as complainant, prosecutor and judge.

9) respondents filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive Suspension
Order
i) contended that the acts they allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave
misconduct. Consistent with their stand that petitioner could not act as the complainant, prosecutor
and judge at the same time, respondents filed with the CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to
This Commission.
10)GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to submit to the jurisdiction of the investigating committee and
required them to appear at the scheduled hearing.
11)Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to resolve respondents motions to lift preventive suspension
order and to transfer the case from the GSIS to the CSC.
12)respondents filed with the CA a special civil action for certiotari and prohibition with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order
13)Respondents sought the annulment and setting aside of petitioners order directing the former to submit to
the jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and investigate the administrative case filed against them.
They likewise prayed that petitioner (and the committee) be prohibited from conducting the scheduled
hearing and from taking any action on the aforesaid administrative case against respondents.

14)CA GRANTED.
1) Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
2) In the meantime, the CSC resolved respondents Petition to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension and Petition
to Transfer Investigation to the Commission
3) As to the lifting of the order of preventive suspension, the CSC considered the issue moot and academic
4) This notwithstanding, the CSC opted to discuss the matter by way of obiter dictum. Without making a
definitive conclusion as to the effect thereof in the case against respondents, the CSC declared that a
preliminary investigation is a pre-requisite condition to the issuance of a formal charge
5) On the requested transfer of the investigation from the GSIS to the CSC, the latter denied the same for lack
of merit. The Commission concluded that the fact that the GSIS acted as the complainant and prosecutor
and eventually the judge does not mean that impartiality in the resolution of the case will no longer be
served
6) Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.
7) CA GRANTED
8) CA declared null and void respondents formal charges for lack of the requisite preliminary investigation .
ISSUE(S): WON CA erred in their finding (due process)

HELD: NO

RATIO:

Civil Service Law

The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), or those created by special law.—The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like
the GSIS, or those created by special law. As such, the employees are part of the civil service system and are
subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on discipline, attendance and
general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases
against erring employees.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the
requisite preliminary investigation is null and void; Upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and
substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-
Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.—The CSC Rules does not specifically provide
that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void. However, as clearly outlined
above, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority shall
require the person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from
receipt. The use of the word “shall” quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and
explain his side.

Administrative Law; Due Process;

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from
their jurisdiction; Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.—The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is
unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.

Administrative Proceedings; Due Process;

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the
right to due process in investigations and hearings; What Includes Due Process in Administrative
Proceedings.—Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right
to due process in investigations and hearings. In particular, due process in administrative proceedings has
been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with
the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights ; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known
to the parties affected.

It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at
anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked.—It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab
initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked. Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before the
GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation, records show that in their Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to
Lift Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC, respondents questioned the validity of their preventive
suspension and the formal charges against them for lack of preliminary investigation. There is, thus, no waiver
to speak of.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
069 The Heirs of Jolly Bugarin v. Republic AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 174431, August 6, 2012 NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC: Effect of waiver/estoppel
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: (chronological order)
The late Bugarin was the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) when the late Ferdinand E. Marcos was
still the president of the country from 1965-1986. After the latter’s downfall in 1986, the new administration, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a petition for forfeiture of properties under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1379 against him with the Sandiganbayan. The latter dismissed the petition for insufficiency of evidence in its
August 13, 1991 Decision.

After the Sandiganbayan denied its motion for reconsideration, the PCGG sought a review of the dismissal before the
Court on December 18, 1991. Sitting En Banc, the Court found manifest errors and misapprehension of facts leading it "to
pore over the evidence extant from the records," including Bugarin’s very own summary of his property acquisitions.
Thereafter, the Court found Bugarin to have amassed wealth totaling P2,170,163.00 from 1968 to 1980 against his total
income for the period 1967 to 1980 totaling only ₱766,548.00. With this, the Court held that Bugarin’s properties, which
were visibly out of proportion to his lawful income from 1968 to 1980, should be forfeited in favor of the
government.4The fallo of the January 30, 2002 Decision of this Court in the Republic case, reads: the appealed decision of
the Sandiganbayan is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition is GRANTED, and the properties of respondent
JOLLY BUGARIN acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were disproportionate to his lawful income during the said period
are ordered forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. Let this case be REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for proper determination of properties to be forfeited in petitioner’s favor.

Bugarin moved for a reconsideration and while his motion was pending, he passed away in September 2002. With this
development, his heirs, the petitioners herein, moved to have the case dismissed. The Court denied both Bugarin’s Motion
for Reconsideration and petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners sought reconsideration but the same was likewise
denied. Still, they filed their Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration and its Admission with the
attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied on July 27, 2004 for being a prohibited pleading
while the attached motion was merely noted without action. On June 25, 2004, the January 30, 2002 Decision of the Court
became final and executory and was entered in the Entry of Judgment.

With the case back at the Sandiganbayan, hearing was set for January 12, 2005 to determine which properties of the late
Bugarin would be forfeited in favor of the government. On the said date, only the counsels of the PCGG appeared. Upon
motion, the Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG thirty (30) days within which to submit "a list of properties more or less
equivalent to the amount of P1,403,615.00 and still remaining in the name of defendant Bugarin."

Pursuant to this order, the PCGG filed its Partial Compliance, dated March 3, 2005, and Amended Partial Compliance,
dated April 4, 2005. The latter contained a list of properties and investments found by the Court in the Republic case to
have been acquired by Bugarin from 1968 to 1980 at P1,697,333.00. The PCCG, in a manifestation, informed the
Sandiganbayan of its earnest efforts in verifying the status of Bugarin’s other business investments not included in their
Amended Partial Compliance but only one replied to inform them that Bugarin was "not a stockholder of nor has he any
investment in this company." Thus, in the same manifestation, the PCGG prayed that its latest compliance be considered
sufficient conformity to the Sandiganbayan’s Order of January 12, 2005.10 No comment was filed by petitioners.

In the hearing of May 5, 2005, petitioners moved to cancel the hearings on the ground that they had filed a motion for
leave to file a motion to dismiss. The Sandiganbayan, thus, reset the hearing to August 29 and 30, 2005 and gave the
PCGG time to comment on the motion and petitioners corresponding time to reply.

On May 10, 2005, instead of a copy of their motion for leave to file motion to dismiss, petitioners served upon PCGG their
Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss dated May 5, 2005, to which PCGG filed a comment/opposition. On
August 8, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the
case sought to be dismissed had already been decided by the Court and which decision has, in fact, attained finality on
June 25, 2004. As a result, the Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss subsequently filed by petitioners was
ordered stricken off the record by the Sandiganbayan on September 1, 2005.

Two days prior to the next hearing date on September 29, 2005, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the denial of the
motion for leave of court. With this development, the hearing on the motion was set for September 30, 2005, while the
hearing to determine the properties for forfeiture was reset to a later date. On March 21, 2006, petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was eventually denied and the hearing to determine the properties for forfeiture was held. The
Sandiganbayan ruled, At the hearing this afternoon, only Attys. Crisostomo A Quizon and Joshua Gilbert F. Paraiso,
counsels for the heirs of Jolly Bugarin, appeared. There was no appearance for the plaintiff (respon dent Republic of the
Philippines). let this case be considered submitted for resolution and the Court shall determine which properties shall be
forfeited in favor of the plaintiff, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court dated January 30, 2002.

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of this order arguing that the Sandiganbayan could not determine the properties
to be forfeited on its own, and further prayed that the parties be allowed to present evidence to determine what properties
of Bugarin would be subject to forfeiture.
ISSUE(S): WHETHER OR NOT BUGARIN’S HEIRS SHOULD BE ACCORDED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
HELD: (YES/NO, and a short explanation)

RATIO:
Foremost in petitioners’ arguments is their claim that they have been deprived of their right to due process of law when the
Sandiganbayan, in its April 3, 2006 Resolution, ordered for the forfeiture of Bugarin’s properties pursuant to the January
30, 2002 Decision of this Court in the Republic case. They fault the selection process laid down in the said case which
purportedly denied them the opportunity to show that "not all of the late Bugarin’s properties may be forfeited."21
Petitioners accuse the Sandiganbayan of allegedly reducing their rights to a simple mathematical equation of subtracting
the late Bugarin’s amassed wealth against his lawful income for the same period and using the difference as basis for
choosing the properties to be forfeited for the sole reason that their total acquisition cost was closest to said difference. 22
They, thus, want that another round of trial or hearing be conducted for "further reception of evidence" to determine which
among the properties enumerated in the Republic case are ill-gotten wealth.

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379, or the "Act declaring forfeiture in favor of the state any property found to have been
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee providing for the proceedings therefor,"

Thus, when the government, through the PCGG, filed forfeiture proceedings against Bugarin, it took on the burden of
proving the following:
1. The public official or employee acquired personal or real properties during his/her incumbency;
2. This acquisition is manifestly disproportionate to his/her salary or other legitimate income; and
3. The existence of which gives rise to a presumption that these same properties were acquired prima facie
unlawfully.

After the government had established these, the burden to debunk the presumption was shifted to Bugarin. He had to
explain and adequately show that his acquisitions, even though they might appear disproportionate, were nonetheless
lawfully acquired. Section 6 of RA No. 1379 reads: SEC.6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the
satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property,
forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.

It is evident in the case of Republic that upon filing the petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, the government
through the PCGG offered evidence to establish that the properties acquired by Bugarin during his incumbency as NBI
Director were manifestly disproportionate to the income he derived for the same period establishing that presumption of
prima facie unlawful acquisitions. For his part, Bugarin also offered his evidence. This included no less than 15 witnesses
and documentary evidence consisting of 48 exhibits. As earlier stated, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition for
insufficiency of evidence. On review, this Court assessed that the dismissal was plagued with manifest errors and
misapprehension of facts, thus, impelling this Court to once more "pore over the evidence." In the end, it concluded that
"respondent's (Bugarin’s) properties acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were out of proportion to his lawful income for the
said period should be forfeited in favor of the government for failure of the respondent to show, to the Court 's satisfaction,
that the same were lawfully acquired."

In this case, petitioners point out that "realizing that it did not have the power to receive evidence and to try facts, this
Honorable Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for further recept ion of evidence as to what properties should be
forfeited in favor of the State."
Nothing can be farther from the truth. In the Republic case, the Court already made a determination of what properties
were to be ordered forfeited. There were tables showing summaries of Bugarin’s real property acquisitions, business
investments, as well as shares in exclusive clubs, which were laid out and evaluated. Proceeds of sales, rentals, fees and
pensions were likewise enumerated and studied. The case was ordered remanded to the Sandiganbayan to determine which
properties, among those enumerated as forfeited, were to be actually seized or taken in favor of the government and which
were to remain with petitioners.

The Court pored over the evidence adduced during the hearing at the Sandiganbayan. In the Republic case, Bugarin argued
that some of the properties that were subject of the forfeiture proceedings were acquired by him and his wife before he
became the NBI Director; that the acquisition cost of the properties he acquired during his incumbency was only P2.79
million; that in addition to his salaries as NBI Director, he received allowances from both government and private entities;
and lastly, that his income was also derived from his and his wife’s investments.27

The Court then took account of, and then valuated, all of Bugarin’s claims regarding his income from several sources. The
professional fee Bugarin received from a private law firm, although such act could have earned him an administrative
sanction, was nonetheless included but not the proceeds of his GSIS loan granted sometime in 1983. Some rentals were
similarly excluded from his lawful income because these were earned from 1981 to 1986, which was beyond the period in
question (1968 to 1980). The Court reasoned that the income from these rentals could not have been used to finance the
purchase of real properties and shareholdings prior to 1981. Besides, the legality of said rentals is in itself of serious doubt
since the source (the real property) from where it was derived was not wholly acquired from lawful income.28 From the
incomes that remained or were not excluded, the Court proceeded to deduct the total personal expenses of Bugarin and his
family based on an "extremely" conservative computation by the Sandiganbayan in order to arrive at the difference which
represented Bugarin’s lawful or disposable income that, in turn, could have been used in acquiring his properties. Against
this amount, the Court then compared his acquired properties, and to quote: From the summary of Bugarin’s assets, it can
readily be seen that all of his real properties were purchased or constructed, as the case may be, from 1968 to 1980. The
total acquisition cost thereof was P1,705,583.00. With the exception of those that had been liquidated, those acquired from
1981 onward, and those whose year of acquisition could not be determined, his shareholdings in various corporations and
other investments amounted to P464,580.00 Hence, for the period from 1968 to 1980, he amassed wealth in the amount of
P2,170,163.00. On the other hand, his total income from 1967 to 1980 amounted only to P 766,548.00.

It bears repeating that the proceeds of the loan granted to him by the GSIS in 1983 and the rental income from 1981 to
1986, as well as the proceeds of the sale of his real property in 1984, could not have been utilized by him as his funds for
the real properties and investment he acquired in 1980 and in the preceding years. His lawful income for the said period
being only P 766,548.00, the same was grossly insufficient to finance the acquisition of his assets for the said period whose
aggregate cost was P 2,170,163.00. This gross disparity would all the more be emphasized had there been evidence of his
actual family and personal expenses and tax payments.

Premises considered, respondent’s (Bugarin’s) properties acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were out of proportion to his
lawful income for the said period should be forfeited in favor of the government for failure of the respondent to show, to
the Court’s satisfaction, that the same was lawfully acquired.

Based on the assiduous reassessment of evidence in the Republic case, and after finding that Bugarin’s properties acquired
during the period in question were grossly disproportionate to his lawful income during the same period without any
satisfactory explanation as to how this came to be, the Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the
Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of the forfeiture proceedings, and ordered forfeited in favor of the government Bugarin’s
properties acquired from 1968 to 1980 that were disproportionate to his lawful income earned during the same period. The
case was then remanded to the Sandiganbayan "for proper determination of properties to be forfeited" in favor of the
government.

The preceding summary of the Republic case, readily shows that Bugarin was accorded due process. He was given
his day in court to prove that his acquired properties were lawfully attained. A review of the full text of the said
case will reveal that the summary of properties acquired by Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director was based
on his very own exhibits. From this enumeration, the Court set aside those properties that had been liquidated or
those that had been obtained in 1981 onwards. Even those properties whose acquisition dates could no longer be
determined were also excluded, all to the benefit of Bugarin. What remained was a trimmed down listing of
properties, from which the Sandiganbayan may choose in executing the order of forfeiture of the Court.
Moreover, in arriving at the amount representing his lawful income or disposable income during his incumbency as NBI
Director, the Court subtracted from Bugarin’s income as stated in "Exhibit -’," the personal expenses of his family, which
according to the Court was quite conservative, again redounding to the benefit of Bugarin.

The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Based on the foregoing, Bugarin or his heirs were certainly not
denied that right. Petitioners cannot now claim a different right over the reduced list of properties in order to
prevent forfeiture, or at the least, justify another round of proceedings.

This Court continues to emphasize that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.33 Thus, when the party seeking due process was in fact
given several opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances, then
his cry for due process must fail.

When the case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan for execution, petitioners were likewise accorded due process. Records
of this case reveal that every motion by petitioners for resetting of hearing dates was granted, and every motion filed, either
for reconsideration or leave of court, was heard. Although their counsel claimed that he did not receive the notice for the
first hearing set on January 12, 2005 because it seemed that it was "sent to the wrong address,"35 the fact remains that by
March 3, 2005, he had informed the Sandiganbayan of the mistake and, in fact, provided it with the correct address.36
More importantly though, after the January 12, 2005 setting, five (5) more hearings were set – May 5 and 6, September 29
and 30, and November 10, 2005.37 This time, petitioners were represented. Instead of questioning the order of January 12,
2005, which required the government to submit its list of properties to be forfeited from the delimited list found in the
Republic decision, or seek leave to provide that court with their own alternative list of properties from the same delimited
list, petitioners chose to pursue the course of seeking for the nth time the dismissal of the case altogether, an issue that had
long been resolved and settled by this Court in Republic.

In that hearing set on May 5, 2005, petitioners’ collaborating counsel, in open court, sought leave to file a motion to
dismiss. Necessarily, the hearing for that day and the following day were cancelled. On May 10, petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss, dated May 5, 2005.38 The OSG pointed out that, save for the caption
and the appellation of the parties, the above motion to dismiss was an exact replica of motion to dismiss f iled and
eventually dismissed by the Court in Republic. Eventually petitioners’ motion for leave to file a motion to dismiss was
denied on August 8, 2005.40 The said Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss was subsequently ordered
stricken off the record by the Sandiganbayan on September 1, 2005.41 Unrelenting, petitioners sought reconsideration
which again resulted in the cancellation of the September 29 and 30 settings. Hearing was next reset to November 10, 2005
but this also did not push through because petitioners’ motion for reconsideration had not been resolved at that point.
Hearing was eventually held on March 21, 2006. With petitioners duly represented and despite the absence of the counsels
for the government, the Sandiganbayan issued an order declaring the case submitted for resolution and that it would
determine which properties shall be forfeited.4And as expected, petitioners also sought reconsideration for this.

In the case of Philippine Guardian’s Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, this Court elucidated on this all too important right
to due process,

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI's right to due process was not violated for PGBI was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied
due process.

Petitioners should have realized in the fallo, as well as in the body of the Republic decision, that the properties listed by
this Court were all candidates for forfeiture. At that point, no additional proof or evidence was required. All that was
needed was for the Sandiganbayan, as the court of origin, to make sure that the aggregate sum of the acquisition costs of
the properties chosen remained within the amount which was disproportionate to the income of Bugarin during his tenure
as NBI Director. To reiterate, the case was only remanded to the Sandiganbayan to implement the Court’s ruling in the
Republic case.
To grant the petition and order the Sandiganbayan to receive evidence once again would be tantamount to resurrecting the
long-settled disposition in the Republic case. This cannot be permitted. In settling this once and for all, Section 10 of R. A.
No. 1379 is instructive.

SEC. 10. Effect of Record of Title. The fact that any real property has been recorded in the Registry of Property or office
of the Registry of Deeds in the name of respondent or of any person mentioned in paragraph (1) and (2) of subsection (b)
of section one hereof shall not prevent the rendering of the judgment referred to in section six of this Act.

And paragraphs (1) and (2) referred to provide,

1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concea led by its being recorded in the name of, or
held by, the respondent’s spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.
2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or after the
effectivity of this Act.

It is equally clear in the earlier quoted fallo of the Republic that this Court had already made a determination, nay, a
declaration that the properties of the late Bugarin acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were disproportionate to his lawful
income were ordered forfeited in favor of the State. Following Section 6 of R.A. No. 1379, this means that the late
Bugarin, now being represented by the petitioners, failed to convince the Court that the delimited list of properties were
lawfully acquired. With this failure, the said properties have been ordered forfeited to the extent or up to that which is
disproportionate to his lawful or disposable income which was likewise determined by the Court in that case.

The properties, consisting of real and other investments, acquired within the subject period were identified and listed down
in the case of Republic. Both the acquisition dates which were likewise indicated there were reckoned. Still in Republic,
the lawful income of Bugarin during the same period was also determined by the Court based on his very own "Exhibit
‘38’" minus that tempered amount representing his as well as his family’s personal expenses. Therefore, when the case was
returned to the Sandiganbayan, it was not, as petitioners ardently claim – to conduct another full blown trial or proceeding
to determine or establish the very same things that this Court had long decided in Republic. Rather, it was to choose from
among the Court’s identified and declared reduced list of properties that would approximate the amount which was beyond
or out of proportion to Bugarin’s lawful income also identified and declared by the High Tribunal in the same case.

The immutability of judgment that has long become final and executory is the core, the very essence of an effective and
efficient administration of justice. Thus, in Labao v. Flores,44 this Court reiterated the importance of the doctrine:

Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and ma y no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. All the issues between the parties are deemed
resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of
right as vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case. After all, a denial of a
petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and
this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance
of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

As regards the third issue, petitioners argue that since proceedings in the Republic case are civil in nature, the
Sandiganbayan, in executing the Republic decision, the late Bugarin’s personal properties should have been exhausted
before resorting to the forfeiture of real properties following Section 8, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Once again, petitioners are mistaken. Categorizing forfeiture proceedings as civil rather than criminal is all too simple.
Petitioners, who at one point already took the opposite view, should know better. Forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No.
1379 is a peculiarity.

In the Republic case, this Court held that it is civil in nature because the proceeding does not terminate in the imposition of
a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the government. In addition, the
procedure followed was that provided for in a civil action. Yet, in the case of Cabal v. Kapunan,45 the Court also declared
that forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. Thus, while the procedural aspect of these proceedings remain civil in form,
the very forfeiture of property found to be unlawfully acquired is inescapably in the nature of a penalty.46
Necessarily, petitioners' position must fail. In forfeiting the properties of Bugarin enumerated in the list, the ultimate en d
was to abandon and surrender the properties unlawfully acquired in favor of the government. It is not to simply satisfy
some certain or specific amount which can be done by merely proceeding with the personal properties first and real
properties next. More than the amount, it is the property, whether real 9r personal, that is illegally acquired that is being
sought to be seized or taken in favor of the government.

The properties of Bugarin in the list have been found unlawfully acquired. The same have been ordered forfeited in favor
of the government a decade ago. It is high time that the Republic decision be finally carried out.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
070 CLARITA J. CARBONEL, Petitioner, vs. AUTHOR: Krystelle
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent. NOTES: (if applicable)
G.R. No. 187689; September 7, 2010
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Nachura,J:

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer Assisted Test
(CATS) Career Service Professional Examination given on March 14, 1999, because she lost the original copy of
her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating (hereafter referred to as certificate of rating). Petitioner was
directed to accomplish a verification slip. The Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that
petitioner’s personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the examinee attached to
the application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature affixed on the application
form was different from that appearing on the verification slip. Because of these discrepancies, the Legal Affairs
Division of the CSCRO IV conducted an investigation.
2. In the course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarily made a statement before Atty. Rosalinda S.M. Gepigon,
admitting that, sometime in March 1999, she accepted the proposal of a certain Bettina J. Navarro (Navarro) for
the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application
form and paying the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to take the CATS
Career Service Professional Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as down payment. Upon receipt of the
original copy of the certificate of rating from Navarro, petitioner gave the latter the remaining P5,000.00.
Petitioner, however, misplaced the certificate of rating. This prompted her to secure another copy from the CSCRO
IV.
3. Hence, the formal charge against petitioner.
4. Denying her admissions in her voluntary statement before the CSCRO IV, petitioner, in her Answer, traversed the
charges against her. She explained that after filling up the application form for the civil service examination, she
asked Navarro to submit the same to the CSC. She, however, admitted that she failed to take the examination as
she had to attend to her ailing mother. Thus, when she received a certificate of eligibility despite her failure to take
the test, she was anxious to know the mystery behind it. She claimed that she went to the CSCRO IV not to get a
copy of the certificate of rating but to check the veracity of the certificate. More importantly, she questioned the
use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal charge against her inasmuch as the same was made
without the assistance of counsel.
5. After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and falsification of official documents. The penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its
accessory penalties, was imposed on her. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by CSCRO IV on
November 14, 2003.
6. Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed 9 the same for having been filed almost three years from receipt of the
CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not give credence to petitioner’s explanation that she failed to timely appeal the
case because of the death of her counsel. The CSC opined that notwithstanding the death of one lawyer, the other
members of the law firm, petitioner’s counsel of record, could have timely appealed the decision. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution.
7. Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA which affirmed the decisions and resolutions of the CSCRO
IV and the CSC. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not serious error of fact and law amounting to grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the CA in its assailed decision because petitioner’s finding of guilt was grounded entirely on
her unsworn statement that she admitted the offenses charged and without the assistance of counsel.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
The petition is without merit.

It is undisputed that petitioner appealed the CSCRO IV’s decision almost three years from receipt thereof. Undoubtedly,
the appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period when the decision had long become final and executory. As held
in Bacsasar v. Civil Service Commission, citing Talento v. Escalada, Jr.:
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to conform to the rules
regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and beyond the power of the Court’s review. Jurisprudence mandates
that when a decision becomes final and executory, it becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors -in-interest.
 Such decision or order can no loner be disturbed or re-opened no matter how erroneous it may have been.

This notwithstanding, on petition before the CA, the appellate court reviewed the case and disposed of it on the merits, not
on pure technicality.

To accentuate the abject poverty of petitioner’s arguments, we discuss hereunder the issues she raised.

Petitioner faults the CSC’s finding because it was based solely on her uncounselled admission taken during the
investigation by the CSCRO IV. She claims that her right to due process was violated because she was not afforded the
right to counsel when her statement was taken.

It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to petitioner’s uncounselled statements and, partly on the
basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of officia l
document.

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect
a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains
that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures
against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. We
have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of
the CSC and the CA. The written admission of petitioner is replete with details that could have been known only to her.
Besides, petitioner’s written statement was not the only basis of her dismissal from the service. Records show that the
CSCRO IV’s conclusion was reached after consideration of all the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the
parties during the formal investigation.

Now, on petitioner’s liability and penalty.

It has been established that petitioner accepted Navarro’s proposal for the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service
Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form and in consideration of the amount ofP10,000.00.
Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to take the CATS Career Service Professional Examination and gave
Navarro P5,000.00 as down payment. Upon receipt of the original copy of the certificate of rating from Navarro, petitioner
gave the latter the remaining P5,000.00. Petitioner, however, misplaced the certificate of rating that prompted her to secure
another copy from the CSCRO IV. The CSCRO IV noticed that petitioner’s personal and physical appearance was entirely
different from the picture of the examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered
that the signature affixed on the same application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip. Clearly,
petitioner falsely represented that she took the civil service examination when in fact someone else took the examination
for her.

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 1991, provides:

An act which includes the procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensu re the
commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts to any
violation of the Civil Service examination, has been categorized as a grave offense of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct or Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

It must be stressed that dishonesty is a serious offense, which reflects on the person’s character and exposes the moral
decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue, and integrity. Its immense debilitating effect on the government service
cannot be overemphasized. If a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct,
even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The
government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by
reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow
men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his
office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct,
oppression, and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.

Under the Civil Service Rules, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal which carries the accessory penalties
of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits (except leave credits), and disqualification from
reemployment in the government service.

In Civil Service Commission v. Dasco, Bartolata v. Julaton, and Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, we found the
respondents-employees therein guilty of dishonesty when they misrepresented that they took the Civil Service Examination
when in fact someone else took the examination for them. Because of such dishonesty, the employees were dismissed from
government service.

We find no reason to deviate from these previous rulings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 24, 2008 and
Resolution dated April 29, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101599 are AFFIRMED.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
071 Velasco v. AUTHOR:
Sandiganbayan NOTES: Summary of facts: A complaint for malversation and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was
G.R. No. 169253, February filed by then Mayor Philip Velasco against former Mayor Pacifico Velasco, now petitioner. The Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Then Acting Mayor Dela Cruz moved for
20, 2013 reconsideration. Petitioner filed a motion to strike out the pleading grounded on the lack of legal personality of Acting
TOPIC: Mayor Dela Cruz to file the motion. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon eventually denied the motion for
PONENTE: PEREZ, J. reconsideration. However, upon instructions of the Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO, the Director of the Office of Chief
Legal Counsel, after reviewing the case, recommended the filing of an Information for Technical Malversation. Petitioner,
thus, filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. The Office of the Special Prosecutor denied petitioner’s motion and
filed the Information for technical malversation before the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS:
1. Philip Corpus Velasco, then Mayor of the Municipality of Bacarra in Ilocos Norte, filed an Affidavit-Complaint
against his predecessor, petitioner Pacifico C. Velasco, containing the following pertinent allegations:
1.1 On 21 September 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bacarra passed Resolution No. 98-065 entitled
"RESOLUTION GRANTING AUTHORITY TO THE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE, HON. PACIFICO C.
VELASCO TO PURCHASE 1 UNIT ROAD GRADER-KOMATZU G-D 31 TO BE USED BY THE
MUNICIPALITY OF BACARRA FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF MUNICIPAL AND BARANGAY
ROADS".
1.2 A Disbursement Voucher was issued in favor of PACIFICO C. VELASCO for the amount of P670,000.00 for
the purchase of 1 Road Grader to be used by municipality.
1.3 After the election of May 14, 2001, and after the turn-over, it was found out during the inventory of municipal
properties that the Road Grader was nowhere to be found.
1.4 A Joint Certification was issued by the Office of the Treasurer that there was NO ROAD GRADER-
KOMATZU GD 30 OWNED BY THE MUNICIPALITY OF BACARRA.
1.5 It was discovered PACIFICO C. VELASCO allegedly made a refund of the afore-stated amount to the
Municipal Treasurer.
1.6 Despite the alleged refund made by PACIFICO C. VELASCO, he hired the services of a certain Bernardo J.
Bernardo as Heavy Equipment Operator I.
1.7 Despite the alleged refund made by PACIFICO C. VELASCO, several Requests for Pre-Repair inspections,
Job orders and corresponding Disbursement Vouchers were made for "repairs, spare parts, etc. of a Komatzu
GD 30, Road Grader.
1.8 From the foregoing statement of facts, as supported by documentary evidences, I am accusing former mayor
Pacifico C. Velasco now Provincial Board Member of Ilocos Norte and the Municipal Treasurer of Bacarra,
Ilocos Norte, Lorna S. Dumayag, for violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Revised Penal Code as amended
for using public funds in the amount of P670,000.00 in the purchase of a Road Grader that was subsequently
appropriated by former mayor Pacifico C. Velasco as his personal property.
2. Petitioner admitted requesting for a cash advance from the municipality for the purpose of acquiring the road
grader, which was subsequently utilized by the municipality to repair and maintain roads. When the expected
funds from the national government were not released, he was faced with the problem of liquidating said cash
advance. Thus, he was forced to mortgage the road grader just so he could reimburse the municipality in the sum
of P670,000.00. Petitioner justified the need for replacement of spare parts and/or necessary repairs to be paid out
of municipal funds because the municipal government was using the road grader from October 1998 up to the end
of his term in June 2001. He also defended the appointment of Bernardo Bernardino, who was initially employed
as a casual employee and made permanent six (6) months later. According to petitioner, Bernardino was an all -
around heavy equipment operator and was not solely assigned as operator of the subject road grader.
3. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon: Complaint is dismissed because of lack of probable cause.
4. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), Orlando Casimiro, pursuant
to the authority given by Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, directed the Office of Legal Affairs to review the case.
5. On 8 July 2004, the Office of Legal Affairs recommended that petitioner be indicted for technical malversation.
The Office of Legal Affairs found that while the Sangguniang Bayan authorized the purchase of a road grader, no
sum was appropriated for its purchase. The source of the funding of the P670,000.00 cash advance came from the
municipality’s funds for personal services, which were originally appropriated for salaries of municipal employees.
6. A revised/modified Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner of the crime of Illegal Use
of Public Funds under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code:
6.1 That on or about 20 October 1998 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused PACIFICO C. VELASCO, a high-ranking public official, being then the Mayor of the aforesaid
municipality and as such is accountable for public funds received by or entrusted to him by reason of the duties of his office, while in the performance
and taking advantage of his official and administrative functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously apply or misapply the amount
of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P670,000.00), Philippine Currency, under his administration to a public use other than that for
which such fund was originally appropriated by law or ordinance, when the accused cash advanced the said amount of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY
THOSUAND PESOS (P670,000.00) under Disbursement Voucher No. 101-98-10-037 which amount was appropriated or intended for the payment of
 personal services for the municipal employees of the local government of Bacarra, particularly for their salaries, 13th month pay and other benefits, and
utilized the said amount to purchase one (1) unit road grader but was never recorded as property of the above-named Municipality, and thereafter,
accused mortgaged said road grader to private individuals without authority from the Sangguniang Bayan of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, thereby resulting to
the damage and embarrassment to the public service as the public was made to believe that the road grader purchased by the accused was public
property for use of the municipal government and its constituent barangays.
7. Petitioner alleged that the Office of the Special Prosecutor, without conducting a preliminary investigation,
indicted him not for the offense of which he was charged but for another offense, hence violating his right to due
process.
8. Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the motion for reinvestigation for lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan
found that petitioner had already filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the 8 July 2004 Memorandum. The
Sandiganbayan considered the filing of this motion for reconsideration as compliance with the due process
requirement.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or excess thereof, or gravely abused its discretion, in
denying the motion for reinvestigation.
HELD:
No.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
Indeed, the recital of facts reveals that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which he labelled as "Omnibus Motion
(Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Hold in Abeyance Filing of Information)" on 15 October 2003. A perusal of
the Omnibus Motion shows that petitioner anchored his motion for reconsideration on two (2) grounds – first, the legal
incapacity of the Vice-Mayor to file a motion for reconsideration of an earlier Order by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, dismissing the complaint against petitioner; and second, some elements of the crime of technical
malversation were lacking in the complaint.

Thus, it is incorrect for petitioner to insist that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order of
the Special Prosecutor. Records prove that it was Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio who deputized the Deputy
Ombudsman for MOLEO to act on the case with finality. Pursuant to this authority, the Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO
approved the Memorandum-Resolution dated 8 July 2004 indicting petitioner. Thus, this Memorandum-Resolution
proceeds from the authority of the Special Prosecutor and is virtually his own memorandum. So when petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, he was effectively appealing a Memorandum issued by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. The filing of another motion for reconsideration constitutes a prohibited pleading. Under Section 7 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, "Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved
order or resolution shall be allowed, x x x."

In an apparent attempt to mislead, petitioner brings up the alleged incapacity of Acting Mayor Dela Cruz to file a motion
for reconsideration pertaining to the earlier 13 February 2004 Resolution which dismissed the complaint against him. This
argument cannot prosper. The issue has already been resolved. In fact, the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed
the complaint against petitioner. The purported legal incapacity of Acting Mayor Dela Cruz, therefore, bears no relevance
to the indictment on hand. At any rate, Acting Mayor Dela Cruz, in fact, did possess the legal capacity to file the motion on
behalf of the local government unit he represented. Under Section 46 of the Local Government Code, the vice-mayor
automatically assumes the powers and duties of the mayor in case of the latter’s temporary absence, thus:

SEC. 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) When the governor, city or municipal
Mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not
limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or
the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and
functions of the local chief executive concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which can
only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days.

In fact, Acting Mayor Dela Cruz explained that at that time he filed the motion, Mayor Philip Velasco was "on official
vacation leave and out of the country." It is likewise incontrovertible that Mayor Philip Velasco instituted the complaint in
his capacity as then Mayor of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. Petitioner premises his challenge on legal standing on the mere failure
of the complainant to state in his complaint that he was suing on behalf of the municipality. His argument is specious. As
correctly asserted by Mayor Philip Velasco in his Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Strike, the property sought to be
recovered in the complaint will revert to the municipality and not to him.

We likewise find no merit in petitioner's contention that he was deprived of due process because while the accusation in
the information was for technical malversation, the crime charged in the complaint was for malversation and violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Court had the occasion to rule on this issue in Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan. Petitioner therein was accused of
malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code before the Ombudsman for failing to deliver the ambulance that
he had received on behalf of the municipality. The complaint for malversation was initially dismissed for lack of probable
cause, but petitioner was later on charged for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioner decried lack of due process because there was no preliminary investigation conducted on the offense of which he
was being charged in the Information. The Court held otherwise, thus:

Petitioner loses sight of the fact that preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or
information. The preliminary designation of the offense in the directive to file a counter-affidavit and affidavits of one's
witnesses is not conclusive. Such designation is only a conclusion of law of Deputy Ombudsman Domingo. The
Ombudsman is not bound by the said qualification of the crime. Rather, he is guided by the eviden ce presented in the
course of a preliminary investigation and on the basis of which, he may formulate and designate the offense and direct the
filing of the corresponding information. In fact, even the designation of the offense by the prosecutor in the in formation
itself has been held inconclusive, to wit:

[t]he real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital
of facts in the complaint or information . . . it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the
information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the Information.

What matters is compliance with due process during the preliminary investigation. That was accorded to petitioner. Due
process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or
an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As aptly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, "Mr. Velasco was properly informed of the acts for which he was being investigated and later charged. He
participated actively in the preliminary investigation and in fact, was given ample opportunity to buttress the allegations
against him when he filed his counter-affidavit and submitted evidence on his behalf." Upon issuance of the Memorandum
indicting petitioner, petitioner even filed the corresponding motion for reconsideration.1âwphi1 Thus, petitioner was given
all avenues to present his side and refute all allegations against him. He was accorded, and he availed of, due process.

After the preliminary investigation compliant with due process, the Ombudsman, guided by the evidence presented during
the preliminary investigation formulates and designates the offense. The Ombudsman did so in this case. The formulation
of the offense depends on the evidence presented, not on the conclusionary designation in the complaint.
072 RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. Note: Petition for habeas data denied. SC discussed Facebook’s privacy settings in
relation to the facts and circumstance of this case! Long discussion though since
MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, v. the procedural aspect of the case was relevant to the main issue presented. 
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES, Respondents. The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society
is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014 personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
PONENTE: Velasco Jr., J. desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

~ Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

FACTS:
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were graduating high school students
at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach
party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad
only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook
profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned
from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified
Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of th eir
black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook
user.

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photos to
Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation,
STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook,
to wit:
Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;
Apparel that exposes the underwear;
Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and
Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the
office of Sr. Purisima, STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were
castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S.
Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as
part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for
Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al. In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be
enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises. On March 25,
2012, petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor.

The RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to
which STC filed a motion for reconsideration. Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the
sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance of the TRO remained unresolved. Thereafter, petitioners filed before
the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data on the basis of the following considerations:

The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday
beach party;
The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew
 or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the
minors were called “immoral” and were punished outright;
The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving
digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC

To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a ) a
writ of habeas data be issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies
of the subject data before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information ,
data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained in violation
of the children’s right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ of habeas data. Respondents complied with
the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition ,
viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the
instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue; and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.

RTC then rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the
existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quo held that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the
photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on
discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.
ISSUES: 1. WON a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu.
2. WON there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the
minors involved in this case.
HELD: Both No. Petition for habeas data denied. Respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors’ privacy
rights. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
RATIO: We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age.” The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a
person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the
writ may be extended.

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will
not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar, this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online
social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users,
sans the spatial barriers, bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leaves
an indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.

The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Contrary to
respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of
Amparo in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have
been made. Habeas data, to stress, was designed “to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.”
As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the
annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of
Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that [the] writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as
an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The
remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents.

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous. To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the
habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering,
storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection
against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collectin g,
or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or
entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in
something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her
family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of
a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ
from getting to said person or entity. To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of
the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and st orage, and in the
process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in vie w
of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of
technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

The right to informational privacy [on Facebook]

The evolution of the concept of privacy was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The
Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or
situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.Of the three, what is relevant to the case at
bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.

Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN
users, “[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in
some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need
to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and
to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy. [Hence,] the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the
Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that
occur in OSNs. The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind
that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––
sharing a myriad of information, some of which would have otherwise remained personal.

Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat:
“Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy s ettings
are not fool-proof.” For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images (photos),
posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her des ired
privacy setting (public, friends of friends, friends, custom, and only me). These are privacy tools, available to Facebook
users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose facts about
[themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences.” Ideally, the selected setting will be based
on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to
regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting,
fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook
would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that
many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile
will view the information they post or upload thereto.

This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy in all of his or
her Facebook activities. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that
said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile
detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using
these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at “Only Me” or a custom list so that only the user or a
chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would
also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private
space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and whether the
disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images
were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors
carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against
unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon
their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was
a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under “very private” or “Only Friends”
setting safeguarded with a password. Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their
profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends,
including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. As petitioner’s children
testified, it was Angela who uploaded the subject photos which were only viewable by the five of them, although who
these five are do not appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that “my students showed me some pictures of girls clad in brassieres.
This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in
[F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At
the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various
photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their
friends in Facebook.”

In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the
students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five
of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of t hem,
and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’
Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable
to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public a t
large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or
the photograph itself.

Also, United States v. Maxwell held that “[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can
reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.”

That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this
regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of
the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook “allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;”
(2) A good number of Facebook users “befriend” other users who are total strangers;
(3) The sheer number of “Friends” one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can “share” 49 the former’s post, or “tag” others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible
only to his or her own Facebook friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it
can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged
by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of
which was set at “Friends.”

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook
friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at “Friends,” the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically
increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the
audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends,
respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook
friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not
resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Cur iously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In
fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that
respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case
No. CEB-38594. These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to
petitioners’ assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily
clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a
conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they
placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now
insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only”
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom”
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead
of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that “the best filter is the one between your children’s ears.” This means that self-regulation on the part
of OSN users and internet consumers in general is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations. As a cyberspace
community member, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that many OSN users,
especially minors, fail. Responsible social networking or observance of the “netiquettes” on the part of teenagers has been
the concern of many due to the widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate
its students on proper online conduct may be most timely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and
organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenship in their respective
programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to be responsible in their
dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the
Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage in cyberspace activities .
Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much
information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or
uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available
online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information,
otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be
allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must
not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here,
requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These
are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within
the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if
they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site’s layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors’ privacy rights, We find no cogent reason
to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo. In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the
other assigned errors.

Petition Denied. RTC decision Affirmed.

073 JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner, 
 vs.
 THE AUTHOR:
HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, NOTES: (if applicable)
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and Sorry, long case! :’(
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of
minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails, among others, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for
Prohibition with Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Petition for Prohibition) which questioned the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004," and sought a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to prevent the implementation of the Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) and criminal prosecution of herein petitioner Jesus A. Garcia under the law.
2. At the outset, it should be stressed that the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9262 and instead dismissed the Petition for Prohibition on technical grounds.
3. Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband,
Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also
a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
4. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-
respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended t he
same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
5. Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified
TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
6. The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
7. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
8. Petitioners arguments, on the main, is that Republic Act No. 9262 is unconstitutional for making a gender-based
classification, thus, providing remedies only to wives/women and not to husbands/men. He claims that even the title of the
law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children" is already pejorative and sex-discriminatory because
it means violence by men against women.20 The law also does not include violence committed by women against children
and other women. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under it
because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the
husband/male gender. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, the equal
protection guarantee is violated.

ISSUE(S):
1. WHETHER OR NOT R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT R.A. NO. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A
BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
4. WHETHER OR NOT R.A. NO. 9262 IS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.

HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO.
4. NO.

All things considered, there is no ground to declare Republic Act No. 9262 constitutionally infirm.
RATIO:
1. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical
treatment of women and men under Republic Act No. 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy
and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally e ndowed
differences between men and women.

Republic Act No. 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic
violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and
empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children
are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or
middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied
in the 1987 Constitution.

The enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases involving violence committed against
women in the Philippines. In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported 54 that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969 cases involving
violence against women were filed under Republic Act No. 9262. From 2004 to 2012, violations of Republic Act No. 9262 ranked first
among the different categories of violence committed against women. The number of reported cases showed an increasing trend from
2004 to 2012, although the numbers might not exactly represent the real incidence of violence against women in the country, as the
data is based only on what was reported to the PNP. Moreover, the increasing trend may have been caused by the continuous
information campaign on the law and its strict implementation. 55 Nonetheless, statistics show that cases involving violence against
women are prevalent, while there is a dearth of reported cases involving violence committed by women against men, that will require
legislature intervention or solicitous treatment of men.

Preventing violence against women and children through their availment of special legal remedies, serves the governmental objectives
of protecting the dignity and human rights of every person, preserving the sanctity of family life, and promoting gender equality and
empowering women. Although there exists other laws on violence against women56 in the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 deals
with the problem of violence within the family and intimate relationships, which deserves special attention because it occurs in
situations or places where women and children should feel most safe and secure but are actually not. The law provides the widest range
of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but
by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside from filing a cri minal case
in court, the law provides potent legal remedies to the victims that theretofore were not available. The law recognizes, with valid
factual support based on statistics that women and children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal
intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men need legal protection from violence
perpetuated by women.

The law takes into account the pervasive vulnerability of women and children, and the seriousness and urgency of the situatio n, which,
in the language of the law result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 57 Hence, the law permits the
issuance of protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a hearing. The law has granted
authority for barangay officials to issue a protection order against the offender, based on the victim’s application. The RTC may
likewise grant an application for a temporary protection order (TPO) and provide other reliefs, also on the mere basis of the
application. Despite the ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of
by the victim without violating the offender’s right to due process as it is only when a full-blown hearing has been done that a
permanent protection order may be issued. Thus, these remedies are suitable, reasonable, and justified. More importantly, they serve
the objectives of the law by providing the victims necessary immediate protection from the violence they perceive as threats to their
personal safety and security. This translates to the fulfillment of other governmental objectives as well. By assuring the victims instant
relief from their situation, they are consequently empowered and restored to a place of dignity and equality.

Verily, the classification made in Republic Act No. 9262 is substantially related to the important governmental objectives of valuing
every person’s dignity, respecting human rights, safeguarding family life, protecting children, promoting gender equality, and
empowering women.

The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women and men prescribe that they be treated
differently under particular conditions in order to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the disadvantaged position of a
woman as compared to a man requires the special protection of the law

2. The Issuance of the TPO did not Violate Petitioner’s Right to Due Process. A protection order is issued under Republic Act No.
9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child. 60 The circumstances surrounding the
availment thereof are often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims must have immediate and uncomplicated access to the
same. Hence, Republic Act No. 9262 provides for the issuance of a TPO under Sec. 15.

The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it unconstitutional. Procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which
the law is enforced. It consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and
competent tribunal.61 However, it is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those involved herein. Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing regul ations were
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commo nly
designated as the police power.62

Notice and/or hearing may be dispensed in the case of the ex parte issuance of the TPO, although it is a judicial proceeding. The urgent
need for a TPO is inherent in its nature and purpose, which is to immediately provide protection to the woman and/or child victim/s
against further violent acts. Any delay in the issuance of a protective order may possibly result in loss of life and limb of the victim.
The issuing judge does not arbitrarily issue the TPO as he can only do so if there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against women and their children exists or is about to recur based on the verified allegations in the petition of the
victim/s.64 Since the TPO is effective for only thirty (30) days,65 any inconvenience, deprivation, or prejudice the person enjoined –
such as the petitioner herein – may suffer, is generally limited and temporary.

Petitioner is also not completely precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time. Following the issuance of the
TPO, the law and rules require that petitioner be personally served with notice of the preliminary conference and hearing on private
respondent’s petition for a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) 66 and that petitioner submit his opposition to private respondent’s
petition for protections orders.67 In fact, it was petitioner’s choice not to file an opposition, averring that it would only be an "exercise
in futility." Thus, the twin rights of notice and hearing were subsequently afforded to petitioner but he chose not to take advantage of
them. Petitioner cannot now claim that the ex parte issuance of the TPO was in violation of his right to due process.

3. The SC do not really see any indication that Congress actually intended to classify women and children as a group against men,
under the terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather than a clear intent at classification, the overriding intent of the law is indisputably to
harmonize family relations and protect the family as a basic social institution. 9 After sifting through the comprehensive information
gathered, Congress found that domestic and other forms of violence against women and children impedes the harmony of the family
and the personal growth and development of family members. In the process, Congress found that these types of violence must
pointedly be addressed as they are more commonly experienced by women and children due to the unequal power relations of men and
women in our society; Congress had removed these types of violence as they are impediments that block the harmonious development
that it envisions for the family, of which men are important component members.Thus, with the objective of promoting solidarity and
the development of the family, R.A. No. 9262 provides the legal redress for domestic violence that particularly affects women and their
children.

4. There is No Undue Delegation of Judicial Power to Barangay Officials. A Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
of violence against the family or household members particularly women and their children. 68 The authority of barangay officials to
issue a BPO is conferred under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9262.

There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive
power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not
a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
074 NAPOCOR v. Pinatubo Commercial, AUTHOR JANNA | Items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular 99-75 does not
represented by Alfredo A. Dy infringe on the equal protection clause. as these were based on a
[G.R. No. 176006; March 26, 2010] reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any
TOPIC: Equal Protection Clause business or trade but the integrity of government property, as well as
PONENTE: CORONA, J. promote the objectives of RA 7832.
NATURE: The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision dated June 30, 2006 rendered by the RTC of
Mandaluyong, Branch 213 declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional. The dispositive portion
of the decision provides: WHEREFORE then, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring item[s] 3 and 3.1 of NAPOCOR
Circular No. 99-75, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products
either purely or partly out of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for being violative of
substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as for restraining competitive free trade and commerce. The claim
for attorney’s fees is denied for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED. NPC also assails the RTC resolution dated November 20, 2006
denying its motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
FACTS:
1. NPC Circular No. 99-755 dated October 8, 1999 set the guidelines in the "disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-
reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC installations and to generate
additional income for NPC." Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular provide:
3. QUALIFIED BIDDERS
3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this circular are partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing
finished products either purely or partly out of aluminum, or their duly appointed representatives. These bidders may be based locally or
overseas.6

2. April 2003: NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap ACSR cables.
3. PINATUBO Commercial, a trader of scrap materials such as copper, aluminum, steel and other ferrous and non -ferrous
materials, submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC.
4. April 29, 2003: PINATUBO was informed in a letterthat its application for pre-qualification had been denied.
5. PINATUBO asked for reconsideration but NPC denied it.
6. PINATUBO filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75, with a prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, arguing that the circular was unconstitutional as it violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution, and ran counter to the government policy of competitive public bidding.
7. RTC Decision: (1) Upheld PINATUBO’s position and declared items 3 and 3.1 of the circular unconstitutional, ruling
that it was violative of substantive due process because, while it created rights in favor of third parties, the circula r had not
been published; (2) Pronounced that the circular violated the equal protection clause since it favored manufacturers and
processors of aluminum scrap vis-à-vis dealers/traders in the purchase of aluminum ACSR cables from NPC; (3) Found
that the circular denied traders the right to exercise their business and restrained free competition inasmuch as it allowed
only a certain sector to participate in the bidding.

8. Hence this petition where NPC: (1) Insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not of general
application. It was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal committees, heads of
offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs; (2) Contends that there was a substantial
distinction between manufacturers and traders of aluminum scrap materials specially viewed in the light of RA
7832.13 According to NPC, by limiting the prospective bidders to manufacturers, it could easily monitor the market of its
scrap ACSRs. There was rampant fencing of stolen NPC wires; (3)Maintains that traders were not prohibited from
participating in the pre-qualification as long as they had a tie-up with a manufacturer.
ISSUE(S): (1) (1) Whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published; (2) Whether items 3 and 3.1 of the NPC Circular
No. 99-75 violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution; (3) and restrained free trade and competition.
HELD: NO; NO; NO. RTC decision reversed and set aside.

RATIO:
ISSUE #1: NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published
1. In Tañada v. Tuvera 15 stressed the need for publication in order for statutes and administrative rules and regulations to
have binding force and effect, viz.: x x x all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivi ty is
fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative power or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules and
Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.16
2. Tañada, however, qualified that: Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. 17 (emphasis ours)

3. In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or
implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of
scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-
qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS.18 It also provided for the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the
award, mode of payment and release of awarded scrap ACSRs. 19 All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding
and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not invol ved in the bidding process.
Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally.

Pinatubo’s argument that items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 deprived it of its "right to bid" or that these conferred such right in favor of a
third person is erroneous. Bidding, in its comprehensive sense, means making an offer or an invitation to prospective contractors whereby the
government manifests its intention to invite proposals for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment for official business or public use, or for
public works or repair. 20 Bidding rules may specify other conditions or require that the bidding process be subjected to certain reservations or
qualifications. 21 Since a bid partakes of the nature of an offer to contract with the government, 22 the government agency involved may or may not
accept it. Moreover, being the owner of the property subject of the bid, the government has the power to determine who shall be its recipient, as well
as under what terms it may be awarded. In this sense, participation in the bidding process is a privilege inasmuch as it can only be exercised under
existing criteria imposed by the government itself. As such, prospective bidders, including Pinatubo, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in
it if they fail to meet these criteria. Thus, it has been stated that under the traditional form of property ownership, recipients of privileges or largesse
from the government cannot be said to have property rights because they possess no traditionally recognized proprietary interest therein.23

Also, as the discretion to accept or reject bids and award contracts is of such wide latitude, courts will not interfere, unless it is apparent that such
discretion is exercised arbitrarily, or used as a shield to a fraudulent award. The exercise of that discretion is a policy decision that necessitates prior
inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation. This task can best be discharged by the concerned government agencies, not by the
courts. Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, they stray into the realm of
policy decision-making. Limiting qualified bidders in this case to partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in
producing finished products made purely or partly of aluminum was an exercise of discretion by the NPC. Unless the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily or used as a subterfuge for fraud, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion.

This brings to the fore the next question: whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99 -75 violated the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. (ISSUE # 2)

1. The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances." 25 The guaranty
of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.26The equal
protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.

2. Items 3 and 3.1 met the standards of a valid classification. Indeed, as juxtaposed by the RTC, the purpose of NPC
Circular No. 99-75 was to dispose of the ACSR wires. 28 As stated by Pinatubo, it was also meant to earn income for the
government.29 Nevertheless, the disposal and revenue-generating objective of the circular was not an end in itself and
could not bar NPC from imposing conditions for the proper disposition and ultimately, the legitimate use of the scrap
ACSR wires. In giving preference to direct manufacturers and producers, it was the intent of NPC to support RA 7832,
which penalizes the theft of ACSR in excess of 100 MCM. 30 The difference in treatment between direct manufacturers and
producers, on one hand, and traders, on the other, was rationalized by NPC as follows: x x x NAPOCOR can now easily monitor
the market of its scrap ACSR wires and verify whether or not a person’s possession of such materials is legal or not; and consequently, prosecute
under R.A. 7832, those whose possession, control or custody of such material is unexplained. This is based upon the reasonable presumption that if
the buyer were a manufacturer or processor, the scrap ACSRs end with him as the latter uses it to make finished products; but if the buyer were a
trader, there is greater probability that the purchased materials may pass from one trader to another. Should traders without tie-up to manufacturers or
processors of aluminum be allowed to participate in the bidding, the ACSRs bidded out to them will likely co-mingle with those already proliferating
in the illegal market. Thus, great difficulty shall be encountered by NAPOCOR and/or those authorities tasked to implement R.A. 7832 in determining
whether or not the ACSRs found in the possession, control and custody of a person suspected of theft [of] electric power transmission lines and
materials are the fruit of the offense defined in Section 3 of R.A. 7832. 31

3. Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable
classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government property, as
well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct
manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction.
ISSUE # 3: Finally, items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not restrain free trade or competition.

1. Pinatubo contends that the condition imposed by NPC under items 3 and 3.1 violated the principle of competitiveness
advanced by RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) which states:

SEC. 3. Governing Principles on Government Procurement. – All procurement of the national government, its departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and/or controlled corporations, government financial institutions and local
government units, shall, in all cases, be governed by these principles: x x x (b) Competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private
contracting parties who are eligible andqualified to participate in public bidding. (emphasis ours)

2. The foregoing provision imposed the precondition that the contracting parties should be eligible and qualified. It should
be emphasized that the bidding process was not a "free-for-all" where any and all interested parties, qualified or not, could
take part. Section 5(e) of RA 9184 defines competitive bidding as a "method of procurement which is open to participation
by any interested party and which consists of the following processes: advertisement, pre-bid conference, eligibility
screening of prospective bidders, receipt and opening of bids, evaluation of bids, post-qualification, and award of
contract x x x." The law categorically mandates that prospective bidders are subject to eligibility screening, and as earlier
stated, bidding rules may specify other conditions or order that the bidding process be subjected to certain reservations or
qualifications.32 Thus, in its pre-qualification guidelines issued for the sale of scrap ACSRs, the NPC reserved the right to
pre-disqualify any applicant who did not meet the requirements for pre-qualification.33 Clearly, the competitiveness policy
of a bidding process presupposes the eligibility and qualification of a contestant; otherwise, it defeats the principle that
only "responsible" and "qualified" bidders can bid and be awarded government contracts. 34 Our free enterprise system is
not based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows
the let-the-devil-devour-the-hindmost rule.35

3. Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of others does
not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition. 36 While the Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to
promote the general welfare. 37 In the present case, the unregulated disposal and sale of scrap ACSR wires will hamper
the government’s effort of curtailing the pernicious practice of trafficking stolen government property. This is an evil
sought to be prevented by RA 7832 and certainly, it was well within the authority of the NPC to prescribe conditions in
order to prevent it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213 dated June 30, 2006 and resolution dated November 20, 2006 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case
No. MC-03-2179 for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75 is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

 The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."
 The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable
classification.
 The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
075 Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of AUTHOR: RC Alfafara
2010 et al. NOTE/S:
[G.R.Nos.192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010]
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
1. Two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of EO No. 1, entitled Creating
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
2. The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo)
in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails EO No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public
office and to appropriate funds therefor.
3. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
4. The genesis of the cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno
Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap.” The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective,
catapulted the good senator to the presidency. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a
need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous
administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed EO No. 1 establishing the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
5. Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public
trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the
COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale
and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and emplo yees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under the Administrative Code
of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1,
involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration and submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
xxx xxx xxx.
6. The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an independ ent
collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.
7. The PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect, and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact -
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
8. Barely a month after the issuance of EO No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are
essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds
for its operation.
(b) The provision of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create
an entirely new public office was inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of
the previous administration and it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the consistent and general international practice of four decades
wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights violations.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad for
trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will altogether
vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel
can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even a statute.
9. In their Consolidated Comment, the respondents, through the OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), P.D. No. 1416 (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No.
9970, and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question EO No. 1.
(2) Whether or not EO No. 1 violated the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.
(3) Whether or not EO No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
(4) Whether or not EO No. 1 violated the equal protection clause.
(5) Whether or not the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorgan ize as expressed in Section 31 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
HELD:
(1) Yes, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. HOWEVER, with regard to Biraogo, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to
question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. The Court, however, found reason in Biraogo’s assertion
that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.
(2) No, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is
no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor
General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for
the commission. Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules
and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
(3) No, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much
less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them is certainly not a function given to the commission. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the
DOJ and the Ombudsman.
(4) Yes, EO No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of
it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck
down for being unconstitutional.
(5) No, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing structure. The PTC was
not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of EO No. 1.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
RATIO:
1. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; ( 3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
>> Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their
personal stake in the outcome of the case.
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail EO No. 1.
Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints
on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. An act of the Executive which
injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
WITH REGARD TO BIRAOGO:
It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from funds already
appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional
action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of EO No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that
may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense
of the Constitution.
2. David v. Arroyo: Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, the real-party-in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailin g an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either
case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
3. NY Supreme Court in People v. Collins: In matter of mere public right, however, the people are the real parties. It is at
least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished,
and that a public grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers’ suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and
a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.
The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or
legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient t hat he
has a general interest common to all members of the public.
>> This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.
>> The Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
>> The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco are non -
existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
4. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission:
>> Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is
already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned,
much less envisioned in said provision.
5. Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary: Under Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For
this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President.
6. Canonizado v. Aguirre: Reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.
7. The creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create
public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
8. According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis
under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize
the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and
materials. >> The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public
office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos
of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices
and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim became functus oficio
upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents
powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
9. Marcos v. Manglapus: The 1987 Constitution brought back the presidential system of government and restored the
separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of
government with provision for checks and balances. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
10. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized.
>> Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In simpler terms, judicial discretion is
involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly
authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
11. The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights. Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into:
x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry."
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation.
To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing.
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits
of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon
as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
12. Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi -
judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law.
13. At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public
employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Loca l
Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local
Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.
>> EO No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A.
No. 6770.
>> The act of investigation by the Ombudsman contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the
determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of
the Ombudsman’s primordial duties.
14. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
>> Nowhere in EO No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness…its findings
would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latit ude
to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties
but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.
15. Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court
finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
16. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
17. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
18. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions co ver all
the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
19. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
20. For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated ,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed..
21. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
22. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. All that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
>> Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. Specifically, these are:
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these
distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only. The
reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said
administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety.
23. The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation
to the previous administration only… The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the
earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point.
24. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. While the thrust of
the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1 must be read together
with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions would
only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure in partisan hostility.
25. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it
was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not
even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past.
The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.
28. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to
include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they w ould be
covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the
President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of
the petitioners that the EO No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo
administration.
29. The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial
Power that includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
30. The Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void
and unconstitutional.
31. It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment
of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify the
means. No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in
accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.
32. The Constitution must ever remain supreme.
33. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the
test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution.
76 HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK vs. AUTHOR:
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in NOTES: Involves a
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL “broad” warrant
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR.
and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City
[G.R. No. L-19550; June 19, 1967]
PONENTE: Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges —issued 42 search warrants against petitioners and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to
be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioners contend that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court — because, among others, (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; and (3) the warrants were issued to
fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrants for the search of the residences of petitioners are valid
HELD: No, they are null and void.
RATIO:

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations, and (b) those
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

A. Whether or not petitioners may question the legality of the warrants and seizures for the documents,
papers, and things in the offices of the corporations
>> No, they may not.

1. [P]etitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of these contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
2. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

B. Whether or not the warrants and seizures for the documents, papers, and things in the petitioners’
residences are valid(MAIN ISSUE)
> > No, they are not.
 1. Two points must be stressed in connection with [the constitutional mandate on search and seizure],
namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
2. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws[.]
3. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers.
4. [T]he warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.

As to Respondent’s contentation that, based on the Moncado vs. People's Court case, “even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible
in evidence against petitioners herein”, the SC held that:
 We are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned...
[M]ost common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by
the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition
is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
079. HPS Software and Communication and AUTHOR: Revy Neri
Corporation vs. PLDT NOTES:
GR. No.170217; December 10, 2012
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
1. The complainant PAOCTF filed with this Honorable Court two applications for the issuance of search warrant for
Violation of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code for Theft of Telephone Services and for Violation of P.D. 401
for unauthorized installation of telephone communication equipments following the complaint of the PLDT that
they were able to monitor the use of the respondents in their premises of Mabuhay card and equipments capable of
receiving and transmitting calls from the USA to the Philippines without these calls passing through the facilities
of PLDT.
2. Complainant’s witnesses Richard Dira and Reuben Hinagdanan testified under oath that Respondents are engaged
in the business of International [S]imple Resale or unauthorized sale of international long distance calls .
3. They explained that International Simple Resale (ISR) is an alternative call pattern employed by communication
provider outside of the country.
4. This is a method of routing and completing international long distance call using pre-paid card which respondents
are selling in the States.
5. These calls are made through access number and by passes the PLDT International Gate Way Facilities and by
passes the monitoring system, thus making the international long distance calls appear as local calls, to the damage
and prejudice of PLDT which is deprived of revenues as a result thereof.
6. The trial court issued two search warrants for violation of Article 308 of the RPC (Theft of Telephone Services)
and for violation of PD 401 (Unauthorized Installation of Telephone Connections) which both contained identical
orders directing that several items are to be seized from the premises of HPS Corporation and from the persons of
Hyman Yap, et al.
7. The search warrants were immediately implemented on the same day by a PAOCTF-Visayas.
8. The police team searched the premises of HPS Corporation located at HPS Building, Plaridel St., Brgy. Alang-
Alang, Mandaue City, Cebu and seized the articles specified in the search warrants.
9. Hyman Yap et al filed a Motion to Quash and/or Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence.
10. HPS Corporation filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return of the Things Seized.
11. Both pleadings sought to quash the search warrants at issue on the ground that the same did not refer to a specific
offense; that there was no probable cause; and that the search warrants were general warrants and were wrongly
implemented.
12. In response, PLDT formally opposed the aforementioned pleadings through the filing of a Consolidated
Opposition.
13. The trial court then conducted hearings on whether or not to quash the subject search warrants and the parties
produced their respective evidence.
14. PLDT filed a Motion for Time to File Memorandum asking the trial court that it be allowed to submit a
Memorandum within a period of 20 days from receipt of the trial court’s ruling.
15. However, the trial court issued the assailed Joint Order granting the motion to quash the search warrants and return
the things seized before the period for the filing of PLDT’s Memorandum had lapsed.
ISSUE(S):
A.) WON PLDT has legal personality to file the petition for special civil action of Certiorari without the consent or
approval of the Solicitor General
B.) WON PLDT committed forum-shopping
C.) WON the two search warrants were improperly quashed and the release of the items seized was improper
D.) WON the subject search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
HELD:
A.) YES
B.) NO
C.) YES
D.) NO
RATIO:

Before resolving the aforementioned issues, we will first discuss the state of jurisprudence on the issue of whether or not
the activity referred to as “international simple resale” (ISR) is considered a criminal act of Theft in this jurisdiction.

Plainly, this Court had categorically stated and still maintains that an ISR activity is an act of subtraction covered by the
provisions on Theft, and that the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is personal property, which
can be the object of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

The acts of “subtraction” include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating,
containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully
deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits o f
any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service.

Anent the issue of whether PLDT possesses the legal personality to file the petition in G.R. No. 170694 in light of
respondents’ claim that, in criminal appeals, it is the Solicitor General which has the exclusive an d sole power to file such
appeals in behalf of the People of the Philippines, this Court rules in the affirmative.

The petition filed by PLDT before this Court does not involve an ordinary criminal action which requires the participation
and conformity of the City Prosecutor or the Solicitor General when raised before appellate courts.

On the contrary, what is involved here is a search warrant proceeding which is not a criminal action, much less a civil
action, but a special criminal process.

With regard to the issue of whether or not PLDT’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure should have been dismissed outright by the Court of Appeals since no motion for reconsideration was filed by
PLDT from the assailed May 23, 2001 Joint Order of the trial court, this Court declares that, due to the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case, the petition for certiorari was properly given due course by the Court of Appeals
despite the non-fulfillment of the requirement of the filing of a motion for reconsideration. In the case at bar, it is apparent
that PLDT was deprived of due process when the trial court expeditiously released the items seized by virtue of the subject
search warrants without waiting for PLDT to file its memorandum and despite the fact that no motion for execution was
filed by respondents which is required in this case.

Moving on to the issue of whether PLDT was engaged in forum shopping when it filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with the Court of Appeals despite the fact that it had previously filed an appeal from the assailed May 23, 2001 Joint
Order, this Court rules in the negative.

In the case at bar, forum shopping cannot be considered to be present because the appeal that PLDT elevated to the Court
of Appeals is an examination of the validity of the trial court’s action of quashing the search warrants that it initially issued
while, on the other hand, the petition for certiorari is an inquiry on whether or not the trial court judge committed grave
abuse of discretion when he ordered the release of the seized items subject of the search warrants despite the fact that its
May 23, 2001 Joint Order had not yet become final and executory, nor had any motion for execution pending appeal been
filed by the HPS Corporation, et al. Therefore, it is readily apparent that both cases posed different causes of action.

As to the fourth issue of whether or not the two search warrants at issue were improperly quashed, PLDT argues that the
Court of Appeals erroneously appreciated the facts of the case and the significance of the evidence on record when it
sustained the quashal of the subject search warrants by the trial court mainly on the basis of test calls using a Mabuhay
card

This Court has consistently held that the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it
must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons and things to be seized
As summarized in its memorandum, PLDT submitted the following to the trial court, during the application for the subject
search warrants and during the hearing on HPS Corporation, et al.’s motion to suppress the evidence:

A. PLDT conducted surveillance on the ISR activities of HPS Corporation and that the said surveillance operation
yeilded positive results that PLDT telephone lines were being utilized for illegal ISR operation;
B. The call details records also indicated that even if the calls originated from the USA, the clling party reflected
therein are local numbers of telephone lines which PLDT had verified as the same as those subscribed by Philip
Yap and/ or HPS Corporation;
C. An ocular inspection revealed that all PLDT lines were illegally connected to various telecommunications and
switching equipment which were used in illegal ISR Activities;

Taken together, the aforementioned pieces of evidence are more than sufficient to support a finding that test calls were
indeed made by PLDT’s witnesses using Mabuhay card with PIN code number 332 1479224 and, more importantly, that
probable cause necessary to engender a belief that HPS Corporation, et al. had probably committed the crime of Theft
through illegal ISR activities exists. To reiterate, evidence to show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be
distinguished from proof beyond reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required

With regard to the issue of whether or not the subject search warrants are in the nature of general warrants, PLDT argues
that, contrary to the ruling of the former Eighteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision dated April 8 ,
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75838, the subject search warrants cannot be considered as such because the contents of both
stated, with sufficient particularity, the place to be searched and the objects to be seized, in conformity with the
constitutional and jurisprudential requirements in the issuance of search warrants. On the other hand, HPS Corporation, et
al. echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that the language used in the subject search warrants are so all -
embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of HPS Corporation regardless of whether they are legal or
illegal.

A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it
to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987
Constitution.

Utilizing the benchmark that was previously discussed, this Court finds that the subject search warrants are not general
warrants because the items to be seized were sufficiently identified physically and were also specifically identified by
stating their relation to the offenses charged which are Theft and Violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 through the
conduct of illegal ISR activities.

Lastly, on the issue of whether or not the release of the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants was proper,
this Court rules in the negative.

In all, we agree with the former Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals that there was indeed grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in the premature haste attending the release of the items seized.
080 G.R. No. 191023 February 06, 2013 AUTHOR: Bea Mationg
DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN, Petitioner, NOTES: (if applicable)
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
TOPIC: Search AND Seizure
PONENTE: Villarama, J.
FACTS: (chronological order) Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) under an Information which states:

That on or about the 24th day of May 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused DON DJOWEL A. SALES, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control 0.23 gram of dried Marijuana fruiting tops, a dangerous drug.

Upon arraignment, petitioner duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

PROSECUTION: Petitioner was scheduled to board a Cebu Pacific plane bound for Aklan at its 9:45 a.m. flight. He arrived in
Terminal 1 Domestic Road, Pasay City at around 8:30 in the morning. As part of the routine security check at the predeparture
area, petitioner passed through the Walk-Thru Metal Detector Machine and immediately thereafter was subjected to a body
search by a male frisker on duty, Daniel M. Soriano, a non-uniformed personnel (NUP) of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Aviation Security Group (ASG).

While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly bulging inside the right pocket of his short pants. When Soriano asked
petitioner to bring the item out, petitioner obliged but refused to open his hands. Soriano struggled with petitioner as the latter
was nervous and reluctant to show what he brought out from his pocket. Soriano then called the attention of his supervisor,
PO1 Cherry Trota-Bartolome who was nearby.

Petitioner finally opened his right hand revealing two rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. After
informing petitioner of his constitutional rights, PO1 Trota-Bartolome brought petitioner and the seized evidence to the 2nd
Police Center for Aviation Security (2nd PCAS), PNP-ASG Intelligence and Investigation Branch and immediately turned over
petitioner to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Airport Team at the Ramp Area, Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Complex, Pasay City. The investigating officer, POII Samuel B. Hojilla, placed the markings on the two marijuana
sticks: "SBH-A" and "SBH-B."

The specimens marked "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" when subjected to chemical analysis at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame,
Quezon City yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug.

DEFENSE: He, together with his girl friend and her family were headed to Boracay Island for a vacation. While he was queuing
to enter the airport, he was frisked by two persons, a male and a female. The two asked him to empty his pockets since it was
bulging. Inside his pocket were a pack of cigarettes and cash in the amount of P8,000.00 in 500 peso -bills. His girl friend told
him to get a boarding pass but he asked her to wait for him as he will still use the comfort room. On the way to the comfort
room, he was blocked by a male person who frisked him for a second time, asking for his boarding pass. This male person
wearing a white shirt without an ID card, asked petitioner to empty his pockets which he did. The male person then said it was
"okay" but as petitioner proceeded to go inside the comfort room, the male person called him again saying that "this fell from
you" and showing him two "small white wrappings which seemed to be marijuana." Petitioner told the male person that those
items were not his but the latter said they will talk about it in the comfort room.

At that point, petitioner claimed that his girl friend was already shouting ("Ano ‘yan, ano ‘yan?") as she saw PO1 Trota-
Bartolome approaching them. PO1 Trota-Bartolome then told petitioner to explain at the ground floor while the male person
(Soriano) was showing to her the marijuana sticks saying "Ma’am, I saw this from him." Petitioner went back to the comfort
room and there he saw his girl friend’s father (the Mayor of their hometown, Camiling, Tarlac) talking with a police officer.
However, his girl friend and her family left him and he was investigated by the police officers.

RTC: Found the accused guilty.

CA: ruled that the body search conducted on petitioner is a valid warrantless search made pursuant to a routine airport
security procedure allowed by law.
ISSUE(S): W/N the CA failed to address the following assigned errors:

(1) IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE ITEMS SUPPOSEDLY TAKEN FROM THE
APPELLANT WERE THE VERY SAME ITEMS THAT REACHED THE CHEMIST FOR ANALYSIS;
(2) THIS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE PROSECUTION’S IMPROBABLE SCENARIO AT THE AIRPORT WHERE, FOR NO
SPECIAL REASON GIVEN, THE APPELLANT HAD TO BE METICULOUSLY BODILY SEARCHED EVEN AFTER HE HAD
TWICE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED THROUGH THE DETECTOR.

HELD: The petition is without merit. The prosecution established with competent evidence that the petitioner is
guilty.
RATIO: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1)
that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport security officers found in the person of petitioner the
marijuana fruiting tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final security check at the airport’s pre-departure area.
Petitioner at first refused to show the contents of his short pants pocket to Soriano who became suspicious when his hand felt
the "slightly bulging" item while frisking petitioner.

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and
the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

Petitioner concedes that frisking passengers at the airport is a standard procedure but assails the conduct of Soriano and PO1
Trota-Bartolome in singling him out by making him stretch out his arms and empty his pockets. Petitioner believes such
meticulous search was unnecessary because, as Soriano himself testified, there was no beep sound when petitioner walked past
through the metal detector and hence nothing suspicious was indicated by that initial security check. He likewise mentioned
the fact that he was carrying a bundle of money at that time, which he said was not accounted for.

There was no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his pockets upon the
frisker’s reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioner’s short pants was a prohibited or illegal
substance.

Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. Said
provision reads:

SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following
condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of
the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. (Italics in the original)

x x x. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of
the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by appellant ),
and thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of
such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus,
the strip search in the ladies’ room was justified under the circumstances.

The search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants pockets being a valid search pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, the illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in evidence. Petitioner’s reluctance to
show the contents of his short pants pocket after the frisker’s hand felt the rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous
demeanor aroused the suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an item or material subject to confiscation
by the said authorities.

The trial and appellate courts correctly gave credence to the straightforward and candid testimonies of PO1 Trota -Bartolome
and NUP Soriano on the frisking of petitioner at the pre-departure area, during which the two rolled papers containing dried
marijuana fruiting tops were found in his possession, and on petitioner’s immediate arrest and investigation by police office rs
from the 2nd PCAS and PDEA teams stationed at the airport. As a matter of settled jurisprudence on illegal possession of drug
cases, credence is usually accorded the narration of the incident by the apprehending police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner.

Petitioner questions the integrity of the drug specimen supposedly confiscated from him at the airport by PO1 Trota-
Bartolome. He maintains that there was no evidence adduced to assure that those items that reached the Chemist were the
same items which were taken from him. This is crucial since the Chemist had said that the items were brought to her, not by the
PNP officer, but another person (SPO2 Rosendo Olandesca of PDEA) who was not presented as witness.

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the presentation and admission of the seized
prohibited drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. This requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution as well as to ensure that doubts regarding
the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements and custody of the seized
prohibited item, from the accused, to the police, to the forensic laboratory for examination, and to its presentation in evidence
in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony about every link in the chain or movements of the illegal drug,
from the moment of seizure until it is finally adduced in evidence. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that a testimony
about a perfect chain is almost always impossible to obtain.

The identity of the seized substance in dangerous drug cases is thus established by showing its chain of custody. Section 1(b) of
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defined the concept of "chain of custody" as follows:

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized
item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition [.]

The rule on chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of
the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in
court. We have held, however, that the failure of the prosecution to show compliance with the procedural requirements
provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR is not fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellant’s
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. As long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.

There was no merit in petitioner’s argument that the non-presentation of SPO2 Olandesca and PO2 Hojilla as witnesses is fatal
to the prosecution’s case. As this Court held in People v. Amansec:

x x x there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which requires each and everyone who came into
contact with the seized drugs to testify in court. "As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established to
have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and
every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand."
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
81. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,- versus - NG YIK BUN, AUTHOR: Yayie Lanting
KWOK WAI CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI, CHUA SHILOU HWAN, KAN SHUN NOTES:
MIN, and RAYMOND S. TAN,Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 180452 January 10, 2011
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
1. On August 24, 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information from an
operative that there was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon
instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team in coordination with a Philippine
National Police detachment, and, along with the operative, the team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort
in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya.

2. The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters. They
spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, Capt.
Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan
replied that it was shabu and pointed, when probed further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172
bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated. Bundles of noodles (bihon) were also found on the premises.

3. A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on samples of the 172 confiscated bags
showed the white substance to be shabu.

4. Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered
a plea of not guilty upon re-arraignment.

RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged.

CA: affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.
 contrary to accused-appellants assertion, they were first arrested before the seizure of the contraband was made.
 accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto loading transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance into an L-300 van which, thus, justified their arrests and the seizure of the contraband.
 agreed with the prosecution that the urgency of the situation meant that the buy-bust team had no time to secure a
search warrant.
 found that the warrantless seizure of the transparent plastic bags can likewise be sustained under the plain view
doctrine.
 ruled that People v. Cuizon was not applicable to the instant case, as, unlike in Cuizon, the apprehending officers
immediately acted on the information they had received about an ongoing shipment of drugs.
 noted that accused-appellant Hwan effectively waived his right to be present during the inspection of exhibits and
hearing, for the manifestation made by the prosecution that accused-appellant Hwan waived his right to be present
was never raised in issue before the trial court.
 held that the trial court correctly admitted Exhibits K and M even if the photographer was not presented as a
witness. The CA based its ruling on Sison v. People, which held that photographs can be identified either by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. It agreed with the
Solicitor General that accused-appellants were correctly tried and convicted by the trial court under RA 6425 and
not RA 9165, as can be gleaned from the fallo of the RTC Decision.
ISSUE(S): whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
On the issue of warrantless arrest, it is apropos to mention what the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides
in part:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid
under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants contention,
there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and
surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an
ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort
in BarangayBignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters;
and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300
van.

Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting
contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan
as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellantswho were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of
loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amendedis valid.

In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the
basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his
view. In the instant case, it can plausibly be argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense of
possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted
by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside
transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers. And to write finis to the issue of
any irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court notes, as it has consistently held, that accused -appellants are deemed
to have waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea.

Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of
an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the
individuals caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to be in possession of prohibited drugs without
proof that they were duly authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a
prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of accused-appellants. There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the
defense that a warrant was needed to arrest accused-appellants.

Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their allegation of a frame-up in rebutting the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. They relied on mere denials, in contrast with the testimony of Capt. Ibon, who
testified that he and his team saw accused-appellants loading plastic bags with a white crystalline substance into an L-300
van at the Villa Vicenta Resort. Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed that they were ordered by the police officers
to act like they were loading bags onto the van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was arrested
inside a restaurant. But as the trial court found, the persons who could have corroborated their version of events were not
presented in court. The only witness presented by Tan, a tricycle driver whose testimony corroborated Tans alone, was not
found by the trial court to be credible.

As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecutions witnesses, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties and affirm the trial courts finding that the police officers testimonies are deserving of full faith and
credit. Appellate courts generally will not disturb the trial courts assessment of a witness credibility unless certain material
facts and circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded. We find no reason to deviate from this rule in the
instant case.

On the alleged lack of notice of hearing, it is now too late for accused-appellant Hwan to claim a violation of his right to
examine the witnesses against him.

As the records confirm, accused-appellant Hwan and his counsel were not present when the forensic chemist testified. The
prosecution made a manifestation to the effect that accused-appellant Hwan waived his right to be present at that
hearing. Yet Hwan did not question this before the trial court. No evidence of deliberate exclusion was shown. If no notice
of hearing were made upon him and his counsel, they should have brought this in issue at the trial, not at the late stage on
appeal.
 All told, we hold that the findings of both the RTC and the CA must be affirmed. The trial courts determination as to the
credibility of witnesses and its findings of fact should be accorded great weight and respect more so when affirmed by the
appellate court. To reiterate, a look at the records shows no facts of substance and value that have been overlooked, which,
if considered, might affect the outcome of the instant appeal. Deference to the trial courts findings must be made as it was
in the position to easily detect whether a witness is telling the truth or not.
Penalty Imposed

Accused-appellants were each sentenced by the lower court to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of PhP 5,000,000. This
is within the range provided by RA 6425, as amended. We, therefore, affirm the penalty imposed on accused-appellants.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00485, finding accused-appellants Ng
Yik Bun, Kwok Wai Cheng, Chang Chaun Shi, Chua Shilou Hwan, Kan Shun Min, and Raymond S. Tan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 16, Art. III of RA 6425, as amended, isAFFIRMED IN TOTO.
082 People v. Buenaventura
G.R. No. 184807, November 23, 2011
1. Accused-appellant Gregg C. Buenaventura guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
2. On August 5, 2003 in Pasig City, the accused, sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Michael Espares, a police
poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) centigrams (0.03 gram) of
white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
3. The RTC summarized the evidence of the parties as follows:
On August 5, 2003, at about 5:30 in the afternoon, a confidential informant arrived in their office at the Pasig
Police Station to report the rampant selling of illegal drugs by Gregg. They relayed the information to their
Chief who immediately caused the formation of a team composed including (PO1 Espares and PO3 Sanchez) as
team members, to conduct a buy-bust operation against the said suspect, with PO1 Espares as the poseur-
buyer. PO1 Espares, the poseur-buyer, together with the confidential informant, then approached the suspect
while the other team members positioned themselves nearby to observe. Upon getting near the suspect, the
informant introduced PO1 Espares to the former as the one who wanted to buy shabu. The suspect then asked
how much and in reply, PO1 Espares said that he wanted to buy PHP200.00 worth of shabu simultaneously
handing, the PHP200.00 marked money to the suspect. In turn, the latter took out from his right pocket a
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Espares. Sensing
that something was amiss, the suspect immediately ran towards his house and locked the door. Momentarily,
they heard voices coming from the roof-top and saw the suspect, together with another person, jump towards
the kangkungan, a watery part at the back of suspects house. Eventually, PO1 Espares and his companions
were able to corner and arrest the suspect, who later turned out to be the herein accused, Gregg C.
Buenaventura. Recovered from the accused was the marked buy-bust money where PO1 Espares placed the
markings MPE/GCB representing his initials and that of the accused, respectively, and the date 8.05.03 of
the buy[-]bust operation.
4. GREGG BUENAVENTURA denied selling dangerous drugs. Accused further testified on cross-examination
that it was only from his neighbors that he learned that policemen came to his house while he was at his
friend Pilos house.
5. Accused-appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
6. It is [accused-appellants] posture that his arrest and the seizure of the marked money, being without warrant,
were illegal as it violates Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution providing:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
7. CA: affirmed in toto the RTC judgment against the accused-appellant.
ISSUE: WON the CA’s judgment of conviction has been proven beyond reasonale doubt
HELD: We sustain the judgment of conviction against accused-appellant, for the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was selling dangerous drugs without lawful authority, in violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
RATIO:
Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch, in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved or shall act as a broker in any of such transaction.

For the successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under the aforequoted statutory
provision, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.

The presence of all of these elements in the instant case has been duly established.

(P0) 1 (Espares) and P03 (Sanchez), provided clear and detailed testimonies, and corroborated each others account of
the entrapment or buy-bust operation their team conducted on August 5, 2003, during which, they caught accused-
appellant in flagrante delicto or while in the commission of the offense of illegally selling dangerous drugs.

The entrapment operation was planned in response to a tip given by a confidential informant.

Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police
officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption.

In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in
arresting accused-appellant. We accord great respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of
the witnesses in the absence of any palpable error or arbitrariness in its findings.

In contrast, accused-appellants defense consisted only of denial and claim of frame-up. Aside from accused-
appellants bare allegations, there is no other evidence on record to corroborate his version of events on August 5,
2003.

Accused-appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. As has been
held, denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.

The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

Accused-appellant asserts the violation of his constitutional right as the police officers did not have a warrant to
search accused-appellants person and to seize the marked money in his possession.

We are not persuaded.

A buy-bust operation is far variant from an ordinary arrest; it is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been
accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust operation, the
violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized, but
duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the
commission of the crime.
083 Fajardo v. People AUTHOR: DJEE
PONENTE: Nachura NOTES:
FACTS:
1. Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866
2. on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality of Kalibo,
Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, without authority of law,
permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, custody and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1 US with
SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short magazine
of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces
live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and recovered from their possession during a
search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan Police
Provincial Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive Judg e
Dean Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.”
3. When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.4 During pre-trial, they
agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
a. The search warrant subject of this case exists;
b. Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject of the search warrant in this case who is a
resident of Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;
c. Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita Fajardo in the evening of August 27, 2002 but
does not live therein;
d. Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;
e. The search warrant was served in the house of accused Elenita Fajardo in the morning of
August 28, 2002; and
4.
The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not arrested immediately upon the arrival of the military
personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw them in possession of a firearm in the evening of
August 27, 2002.5
5. Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess the
confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No. 1866,
as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against them.
6. For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant was defective
because the allegation contained in the application filed and signed by SPO1 Tan was not based on his
personal knowledge. They quoted this pertinent portion of the application:
7. “That this application was founded on confidential information received by the Provincial Director, Police
Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.” 7
8. They further asserted that the execution of the search warrant was infirm since petitioner, who was inside
the house at the time of the search, was not asked to accompany the policemen as they explored the place,
but was instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).
9. Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding
team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine
Army.
10. Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the raiding team arrived.
She averred that such situation was implausible because she was wearing garterized shorts and a
spaghetti-strapped hanging blouse. 8

ISSUE(S): WON seizure of property was valid therefore the evidence gathered or confiscated is admissible

HELD: NO
 RATIO:
Illegal Possession of Firearms; Criminal Procedure; Duplicity of Offenses; Pleadings, Practice and
Procedure; Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of
live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under
paragraph 2 of the said section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, while illegal possession of
the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol is penalized under paragraph 1.—A reading of the information clearly
shows that possession of the enumerated articles confiscated from Valerio and petitioner are punishable under
separate provisions of Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. Illegal possession of two (2)
pieces of short magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber, and
fourteen (14) pieces of live caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under paragraph 2 of the said section, viz.:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered
firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms
with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested. On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber
pistol, model no. M1911A1 US, with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number, is
penalized under paragraph 1, which states: Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or
possession of firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms or ammunition.—The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal
in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other
firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
By virtue of the changes brought about by Republic Act No. 8294, an information for illegal possession of
firearm should now particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is classified,
and should there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped according to the
categories stated in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, amending Presidential Decree No. 1866.—This is the
necessary consequence of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which categorized the kinds of
firearms proscribed from being possessed without a license, according to their firing power and caliber. R.A.
No. 8294 likewise mandated different penalties for illegal possession of firearm according to the above
classification, unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind
of firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads: Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms of Ammunition.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire dispose, or possess any
firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. (Emphasis ours.) By virtue of such changes, an information for
illegal possession of firearm should now particularly refer to the paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized
firearm is classified, and should there be numerous guns confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped
according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer
suffice to lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated
provision, as in the instant case, because different penalties are imposed by the law, depending on the caliber
of the weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges.

Searches and Seizures; Plain View Doctrine; Requisites;

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.—Under the plain view
doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view,
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be
in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand,
and its discovery inadvertent.

Elements; Conspiracy;

Absent any evidence pointing to an accused’s participation, knowledge or consent in the actions of another
accused, she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers.—Illegal possession of firearms, or, in
this case, part of a firearm, is committed when the holder thereof: (1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof (2)
lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm. We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor
constructive possession of the subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw
Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the
receivers, before or during their disposal. At the very least, petitioner’s possession of the receivers was merely
incidental because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioner’s house.
Absent any evidence pointing to petitioner’s participation, knowledge or consent in Valerio’s actions, she cannot
be held liable for illegal possession of the receivers.

Presumption of Innocence;

Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt, and the rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised
Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law.—
Petitioner’s apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the assumption
that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence. Mere speculations and
probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The rule is the same whether the offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which aremala in se,
or in crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law. The quantum of proof required by law was
not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is concerned.

Illegal Possession of Part of a Firearm; Elements.

—In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not have the corresponding license for
it. By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must yield these requisites:
(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and (b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the
license for the firearm to which the seized part/component corresponds.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
084 United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005 NOTES: Plain view doctrine cannot be applied where there
TOPIC: The Plain View Doctrine was no evidence in plain view of law enforcers serving the
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J. search warrant.
FACTS: (chronological order)
The application was docketed as People v. Ernesto Isip, et al., Respondents, Search Warrant Case No. 04-4916 and raffled
to Branch 24 of the court. Appended thereto were the following: (1) a sketch showing the location of the building to be
searched; (2) the affidavit of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo Protection and Security Agency hired by United Laboratories,
Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly saw the manufacture, production and/or distribution of fake drug products such as Revicon
by Shalimar Philippines; (3) the letter-request of UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive manufacturer and/or distributor
of Revicon and Disudrin, for the monitoring of the unauthorized production/manufacture of the said drugs and, if
warranted, for their seizure; (4) the letter-complaint of UNILAB issued through its Director of the Security and Safety
Group; and (5) the joint affidavit of NBI Agents Roberto Divinagracia and Rolando Besarra containing the following
allegations:
a. When learned that an Asset was already placed by ARMADILLO PROTECTIVE AND SECURITY AGENCY
named CHARLIE RABE, who was renting a room since November 2003, at the said premises located at No. 1571
Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. MR. RABE averred that the owner of the premises is a certain MR. ERNESTO ISIP
and that the said premises which is known as SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES, Shalimar Building, are being used to
manufacture counterfeit UNILAB products, particularly REVICON multivitamins, which was already patented by
UNILAB since 1985;
b. Upon verification of the report, we found out that the said premises is a six-story structure, with an additional floor
as a penthouse, and colored red-brown. It has a tight security arrangement wherein non-residents are not allowed to
enter or reconnoiter in the premises;
c. We also learned that its old address is No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and has a new address as 1571
Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; and that the area of counterfeiting operations are the first and second floors of
Shalimar Building;
d. Since we cannot enter the premises, we instructed the Asset to take pictures of the area especially the places
wherein the clandestine manufacturing operations were being held. At a peril to his well-being and security, the
Asset was able to take photographs herein incorporated into this Search Warrant Application.

A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the application for the search warrant.
After conducting the requisite searching questions, the court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 04-
4916 dated January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search of the first and second floors of the
Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The court also directed the police to seize the
following items:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraph ernalia used
in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts and
documents used in recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON
multivitamins.

NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in which he declared that the search of
the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described
in the warrant, was done in an orderly and peaceful manner. He also filed a Return of Search Warrant, alleging that no
other articles/items other than those mentioned in the warrant and inventory sheet were seized. The agent prayed that of the
items seized, ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at least one box of Inoflox be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of
Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination.10 The court issued an order granting the motion, on the condition that the turn
over be made before the court, in the presence of a representative from the respondents and the court.

The respondents filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence." They contended that the
implementing officers of the NBI conducted their search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the building at No.
1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in "open display" were allegedly found. They pointed out,
however, that such premises was different from the address described in the search warrant, the first and second floors of
the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The respondents, likewise, asserted that the
NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized in the
search warrant.
UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the search was limited to the first and second
floors of the Shalimar building located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They averred
that, based on the sketch appended to the search warrant application, Rabe’s affidavit, as well as the joint affidavit of
Besarra and Divinagracia, the building where the search was conducted was located at No. 1571, Aragon Street corner
Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old address,
and the new address was No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that the warrant was not
implemented in any other place.

In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those listed in the search warrant. They also
claimed that the seizure took place in the building located at No. 1524-A which was not depicted in the sketch of the
premises which the applicant submitted to the trial court.1In accordance with the ruling of this Court in People v. Court of
Appeals, the respondents served a copy of their pleading on UNILAB.

On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the respondents, on the ground that the things
seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those described in the search warrant. On March 16, 2004, the trial court
issued an advisory that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence against the respondents in any
proceedings, as the search warrant had already been quashed.

UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the reconsideration of
the order, contending that the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents ,
and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The respondents objected to the appearance of the
counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter could not appear for the People of the Philippines. The respondents moved
that the motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be stricken off the record. Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they insisted
that the items seized were contained in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue corner Aragon
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating on plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those
described and itemized in the search warrant application, as well as the warrant issued by the court itself. The respondents
emphasized that the Shalimar Laboratories is authorized to manufacture galenical preparations of the following pr oducts:

In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had the personality to file the motion for reconsideration because it
was the one which sought the filing of the application for a search warrant; besides, it was not proscribed by Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure from participating in the proceedings and filing pleadings. The only parties to the
case were the NBI and UNILAB and not the State or public prosecutor. UNILAB also argued that the offended party, or
the holder of a license to operate, may intervene through counsel under Section 16 of Rule 110, in relation to Section 7(e),
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the place searched by the
NBI officers.2In their rejoinder, the respondents manifested that an ocular inspection was the option to look forward to.
However, no such ocular inspection of the said premises was conducted.

In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the result of its examination of the Disudrin and Inoflox samples which
the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar Building. On its examination of the actual component of Inoflox, the BFAD
declared that the substance failed the test.22 The BFAD, likewise, declared that the examined Disudrin syrup failed the
test.

On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion for reconsideration filed by UNILAB. The court
declared that: The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take possession of "finished
or unfinished products of United Laboratories (UNILAB), particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents
evidencing the counterfeit nature of said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the warrant does
not, however, include REVICON but other products. And whether or not these seized products are imitations of UNILAB
items is beside the point. No evidence was shown nor any was given during the proceedings on the application for search
warrant relative to the seized products. On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence, cannot be
sustained.

Contentions:
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the trial court quashed the search warrant for a
ground which was not raised by the respondents herein in their motion to quash the warrant. As such, it argues that the trial
court ignored the issue raised by the respondents. The petitioner insists that by so doing, the RTC deprived it of its right to
due process. The petitioner asserts that the description in the search warrant of the products to be seized – "finished or
unfinished products of UNILAB" – is sufficient to include counterfeit drugs within the premises of the respondents not
covered by any license to operate from the BFAD, and/or not authorized or licensed to manufacture, or repackage drugs
produced or manufactured by UNILAB. Citing the ruling of this Court in Padilla v. Court of Appeals,28 the petitioner
asserts that the products seized were in plain view of the officers; hence, may be seized by them. The petitioner posits that
the respondents themselves admitted that the seized articles were in open display; hence, the said articles were in plain
view of the implementing officers.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petition should have been filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) because factual questions are raised. They also assert that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition
involving the validity and the implementation of the search warrant. They argue that the petitioner merely assisted the NBI,
the BFAD and the Department of Justice; hence, it should have impleaded the said government agencies as parties -
petitioners. The petition should have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of the NBI and/or
the BFAD, because under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code, the OSG is mandated to represent the government and
its officers charged in their official capacity in cases before the Supreme Court. The respondents further assert that the trial
court may consider issues not raised by the parties if such consideration would aid the court in the just determination of th e
case.

The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the sealed boxes so fast even before respondent Isip
could object. They argue that the seizure took place at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 220778, and not at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by TCT No. 174412
as stated in the search warrant. They assert that the ruling of the Court in People v. Court of Appeals29 is applicable in th is
case. They conclude that the petitioner failed to prove the factual basis for the application of the plain view doctrine.

In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is, in fact, the real party -in-interest to defend the validity of the
search warrant issued by the RTC; after all, it was upon its instance that the application for a search warrant was filed by
the NBI, which the RTC granted. It asserts that it is not proscribed under R.A. No. 8203 from filing a criminal complaint
against the respondents and requesting the NBI to file an application for a search warrant. The petitioner p oints out that the
Rules of Criminal Procedure does not specifically prohibit a private complainant from defending the validity of a search
warrant. Neither is the participation of a state prosecutor provided in Rule 126 of the said Rules. After all, the p etitioner
insists, the proceedings for the application and issuance of a search warrant is not a criminal action. The petitioner asserts
that the place sought to be searched was sufficiently described in the warrant for, after all, there is only one building on the
two parcels of land described in two titles where Shalimar Philippines is located, the place searched by the NBI officers. It
also asserts that the building is located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.

The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because the boxes were found outside the door of
the respondents’ laboratory on the garage floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the members of the raiding team –
precisely because these were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The boxes in which the items were contained
were themselves so designated to replicate true and original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on the left hand
corner of one side of some of the boxes33 the letters "ABR" under the words "60 ml," appeared to describe the
condition/quality of the bottles inside (as it is with genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the same brand). The
petitioner pointed out that "ABR" is the acronym for "amber bottle round" describing the bottles in which the true and
original Disudrin (for children) is contained.

The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their own "license plates" which were instituted as among its
internal control/countermeasures. The license plates indicate that the items within are, supposedly, "Disudrin." The NBI
officers had reasonable ground to believe that all the boxes have one and the same data appearing on their supposedly
distinctive license plates. The petitioner insists that although some of the boxes marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo
were, indeed, sealed, the tape or seal was also a copy of the original because these, too, were marked with the distinctive
UNILAB logo. The petitioner appended to its pleading pictures of the Shalimar building and the rooms searched showing
respondent Isip; the boxes seized by the police officers containing Disudrin syrup;35 and the boxes containing Inoflox and
its contents.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 boxes of Inoflox 200 mg. are INADMISSIBLE
as evidence against the respondents because they constitute the "fruit of the poisonous tree" or, CONVERSELY, whether
or not the seizure of the same counterfeit drugs is justified and lawful under the "plain view" doctrine and, hence, the same
are legally admissible as evidence against the respondents in any and all actions?
HELD: INADMISSIBLE
RATIO:
We agree with the petitioner’s contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the
commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get
possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of
public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings.39 While an
application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.

A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant
evidence of crime.40 It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions.41 A search warrant
is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the
People of the Philippines.

A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere
private rights.43 It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of
private persons.44 It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.

However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agency charged with the
enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search wa rrant
proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the
properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI
or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court,
or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash.

In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents’ motion to quash the search warrant. The
respondents served copies of their reply and opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto Alejandro, Jr.47 The court
a quo allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed by it and its counsel.

The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the
RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a
petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the
petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG: From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners
were involved in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court
declared that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals ,
if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the
private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition
due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.49

The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before
it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by the
parties.

The Court does not agree with the petitioner’s contention that the issue of whether the Disudrin and Inoflox products were
lawfully seized was never raised in the pleadings of the respondents in the court a quo. Truly, the respondents failed to
raise the issue in their motion to quash the search warrant; in their reply, however, they averred that the seized items were
not included in the subject warrant and, therefore, were not lawfully seized by the raiding team. They also averred that the
said articles were not illegal per se, like explosives and shabu, as to justify their seizure in the course of unlawful search.51
In their Opposition/Comment filed on March 15, 2004, the respondents even alleged the following:

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether there is a legal basis to quash the search
warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in evidence. Since the articles allegedly seized during the implementation of
the search warrant – Disudrin and Inoflux products – were not included in the search warrant, they were, therefore, not
lawfully seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per se, as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or shabu
as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful search, or being in plain view or some such. No need whatever for some
public assay.

The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper examination or assay that the Disudrin and
Inoflox samples allegedly seized from respondent’s place were counterfeit. All the relevant presumptions are in favor of
legality.52

The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner that the respondents never raised in the court
a quo the issue of whether the seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox products was valid.

On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and Inoflox, the Court, likewise, rejects the
contention of the petitioner.

A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The officers
of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left
to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.

Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him.
However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain
view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements
for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion
or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating
evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being
present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the fact
that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they
should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or
evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to obtain another warrant.56 Under the doctrine,
there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.

The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the facts therein
available to him, determine probable cause of the object’s incriminating evidence.57 In other words, to be immediate,
probable cause must be the direct result of the officer’s instantaneous sensory perception of the object.58 The object is
apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of
the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the benefit of any un lawful search or seizure. It must be
apparent at the moment of seizure.

The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not have known in advance of the location
of the evidence and intend to seize it. Discovery is not anticipated.

The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of
evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate
the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal activity.

Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a person.

Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would
warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as
evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical, non-
traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. The evidence thus collected must be
seen and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law enforcement.

In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a quo as among the properties
to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize "counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or importation, distribution
and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins." The implementing officers failed to find
any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they were
found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.

It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were seized based on the
plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence
should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the doctrine during
the hearing of the respondents’ motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view
exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the petitioner even attempted to
adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant ,
or any of the petitioner’s representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the
enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and
immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal
knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately
apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened.

In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential requirements for the
application of the plain view doctrine.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
085 RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF AUTHOR: Krystelle
LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S NOTES: (if applicable)
RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL
CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
TOPIC:
PONENTE: PADILLA,J:

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
2. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches
and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their
alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the
Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC
manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit
himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his
car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
3. Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches
and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
4. Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints
are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court
to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners'
right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
5.
ISSUE(S): WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs.
Integrated National Police, it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated
are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights
have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in
any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by
the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there
was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and
order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal
times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to
the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we
pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and
refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National
Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught
with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national
security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on
the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be
reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they
are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every
individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice,
hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he
resists.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a routine measure of security
and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to
actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the
social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can sustain such a
measure. And we are not even under martial law.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with
the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the existence alone
of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is
also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is
not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.)
To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.

Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the light of day by virtue of
General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS,
UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING
PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance.
(See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures, the same measures
against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that
terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved
party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that
event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in
particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and
gruesomeness.

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by
itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto themselves
a roving one at that.

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not
to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question,
exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No
search warrant has been issued by a judge.

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ...
or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother
watching every step we take and every move we make.

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to involve routine checks
compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men,
CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without
batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be anymore correct here.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a warrantless search,
which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the
hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the
checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the "showcase of democracy"
in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make
liberty in the land, a living reality.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught
with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of nationa l
security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on
the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be
reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they
are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every
individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice,
hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he
resists.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as a routine measure of security
and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to
actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the
social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can sustain such a
measure. And we are not even under martial law.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with
the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am agreed that the existence alon e
of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is
also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is
not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.)
To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.

Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw the light of day by virtue of
General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS,
UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES), a martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING
PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance.
(See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive measures, the same measures
against which we had fought so painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that
terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved
party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that
event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in
particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and
gruesomeness.

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by
itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto themselves
a roving one at that.

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not
to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question,
exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No
search warrant has been issued by a judge.

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ...
or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother
watching every step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority refers to involve routine checks
compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men,
CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without
batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed actual incidents.

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be anymore correct here.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right against a warrantless search,
which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the
hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the
checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the "showcase of democracy"
in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make
liberty in the land, a living reality.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

086 People v. Dequina AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011 NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC:
PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
1. Accused-appellants Nelida D. Dequina (Dequina), Joselito J. Jundoc (Jundoc), and Nora C. Jingabo (Jingabo) were
charged before the RTC of Manila with Violations of Section 4, in relation to Section 21, paragraphs (e-l), (f), (m),
and (o) of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659.
2. INFORMATION: That on or about September 29, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confed erating together and helping one another, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver,
transport or give away to another any prohibited drug, did and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, or
offer for sale, deliver or transport marijuana dried flowering tops with total weight of thirty two thousand nine
hundred ninety five (32,995) grams which is a prohibited drug.
3. Summarized testimonies of prosecution witnesses: Police Officer III Wilfredo Masanggue testified that at about
6:00 a.m., of September 29, 1999, he and SPO1 Anthony Blanco were instructed by their superior, Chief Inspector
Romulo Sapitula to proceed at the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila, where, according to the
report given by the informant, three persons a male and two female[s] would be coming from Baguio City to
deliver unknown quantity of marijuana. In no time, they arrived at the designated place and parked their mobile
patrol car along Juan Luna Street, facing the northern direction just near the corner of Raxabago Street.

At around 9:00 a.m., they noticed a taxi cab coming from Yuseco St. heading towards the direction of the pier. At
a certain point along Raxabago Street, about a hundred meters away from the position of their patrol car the taxi
stopped. From it emerged three passengers a man and two women each one of them carrying a black travelling
bag. As the trio fitted the descriptions given to them by Inspector Sapitula, they intently watch ed and monitored
their movements.

About one or two minutes later, as the trio started walking towards the western portion of Raxabago St., they drove
and trailed them. As the patrol car got closer behind them, [Dequina] noticed its presence. She started walking in a
more hurried pace as if she wanted to run away. SPO1 Blanco alighted from the car and chased [Dequina] while
PO3 Masanggue, who was behind the wheels also alighted and restrained [Jundoc] and [Jingabo]. While thus
trying to get away, [Dequina] dropped the bag she was carrying. As a result, the zipper of the bag gave
way. Bundles of dried leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags case into view. Suspecting the stuffs to be
marijuana, they further inspected the other two bags in the possession of [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] and found out that
they had the same contents. They boarded the three accused, along with their bags in their patrol car and proceeded
to the hospital for physical examination before bringing them to their headquarters. While in transit, [Dequina]
pleaded to them to allow her to make a call but they did not heed the request as the car was still in motion.

At the western Police District Headquarters at United Nations Avenue, they turned over the three accused together
with the bags to PO3 Eduardo Pama, a police investigator of the district Anti-Narcotics Unit for
investigation. During the investigation, it was discovered that each of the three black travelling bags confiscated
from the three accused contained eleven bricks of marijuana. In connection with the incident, he and SPO1 Blanco
executed the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension dated September 30, 1999.

SPO1 Anthony Blanco testified that in the early morning of September 29, 1999, together with PO3 Wilfredo
Masanggue, he was dispatched by their superior to the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila,
where it was reported that shipment of marijuana would take place. They were further informed that the drug
couriers were composed of a man and two women and that each of them were carrying a travelling bag.

After they arrived at the designated area, they parked their vehicle along Juan Luna near Raxabago Street. Then
they waited. Suddenly, they noticed the arrival of a taxicab from where three persons a man and two women
alighted. Each of them was carrying a bag. The trio fitted the descriptions given to them. As the suspects walked
away, they drove and trailed them. As they got close behind them, accused Nelida Dequina noticed the presence of
the mobile car. She dropped the black bag she was carrying and the same was unzipped. The contents thereof
consisting of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags came into view. They arrested the three
suspects later identified as the accused herein and boarded them into their car. While on board the vehicle,
[Dequina] and [Jundoc] confessed that the contents of the other two bags confiscated from them were also
 marijuana.

At the WPD Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, the three accused were turned over to the Office of the
District Anti-Narcotics Unit where they were investigated by PO3 Wilfredo Pama. It was there where the other
two bags confiscated from [Jingabo] and [Jundoc] were re-opened and confirmed to contain marijuana.
4. RTC: Guilty.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and the warrantless seizure of the marijuana were illegal.
HELD:
No.
Dispositive:
1. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
RATIO:
Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent
judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. [13] It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [14]

Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal and
judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving
vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.

On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may
be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to carry or convey from one place to
another. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in
flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not
even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content because when the latter noticed the police officers presence, she
walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the
dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their
warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as
incidental to their lawful arrest.

Besides, accused-appellants did not raise any protest when they, together with their bags containing marijuana,
were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution. In People v. Fernandez, we ruled that:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he
is precluded from later complaining thereof. x x x. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may,
like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

In order to exonerate herself from criminal liability, Dequina contends that she transported the marijuana under the
compulsion of an irresistible fear.Jundoc and Jingabo, on the other hand, claim that they went along to accommodate
Dequina, a trusted childhood friend.
 We are unconvinced.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus
me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act.The force contemplated must be so
formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. Here,
Dequinas version of events that culminated with her and Jundoc and Jingabos arrests on September 29, 1999 is
implausible.Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and Jingabos assertion of blind trust in Dequina and total ignorance of the
transportation of marijuana. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it observed that:

While [Dequina] wants us to believe that she acted under compulsion and that a certain Sally called all the
shots, she nevertheless admitted that their accommodations when they reached Manila was with her aunt
in Guadalupe. On cross examination, she said that it was she who told Sally that they were going to stay
with her aunt. More importantly, the alleged threat on her daughter was unclear. At one point in her
testimony, she claimed that her daughter was to be under the custody of Sally while she was
away. However, during the trial her lawyer manifested that her daughter was in fact in Manila and in the
court room attending the hearing. Moreover, accused-appellants themselves picture a very precise and
elaborate scheme in the transport of the huge shipment of marijuana. With this, it is simply contrary to
human experience that the people behind the shipment would entrust the same to an unknowing and
uncertain person such as [Dequina] and her two stooges, unless they themselves were in on
it. Furthermore, the scheme or transport of the marijuana shipment was so exact that [Jundoc] and
[Jingabo] only had enough time to rest in the house of [Dequinas] aunt in Guadalupe from the time they
arrived in Manila in the morning to the time they had to go to provincial bus station in the afternoon,
negating their purported desire to see Manila. Clearly, the defense story is riddled with holes.

Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Although the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct
evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. Thus, as found by
the RTC, conspiracy by and among accused-appellants was present in this case, as it may be inferred from the following
acts of accused-appellants:

This was shown when by their account, the three accused left Iloilo together, stayed in Manila for a while,
left for Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga and returned to Manila thereafter. They were together when the
apprehending police officers pounced on them near the pier premises on their way back to Iloilo, each of
them carrying a travelling bag which contained marijuana. x x x.

With the enactment and effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty imposable upon violators of Section 4 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) if the marijuana involved weighs 750 grams or
more. The quantity of marijuana involved in this case weighs 32,995 grams, hence, the applicable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since the imposable penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the rules for the application of
indivisible penalties under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. As there is neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the RTC correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Finally, considering that the penalty imposed is the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law could not be applied.
087 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, accused-
appellant.
G.R. No. 138881. December 18, 2000
PONENTE:, J.
FACTS:
The information against accused-appellant Leila Johnson alleged that on June 26, 1998 inside NAIA accused Johnson
possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug weighing a total of 580.2 grams . The said
accused does not have the corresponding license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug. She pleaded not
guilty. he prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI Forensic Chemist George de Lara, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile,
duty frisker Olivia Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The defense presented accused-appellant who testified in her own
behalf.

Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean
Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American and had since been working
as a registered nurse in the US.

On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to
the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, June 26, 1998.

At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her
duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband
goods, and explosives.

When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States, she felt something
hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had
just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.

Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile. She was directed
to take accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for inspection. Inside the womens room, accused-appellant was
asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and accused-appellant gave the same answer she had
previously given. Ramirez then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant brought out three
plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the women’s room.

In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she was approached
by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the women’s room. There, she was asked
to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was found on her person. She was later taken
to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some change were
taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a
certain Col. Castillo. After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white
packages on the table. They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the
packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a fiscal for
inquest. She claimed that throughout the period of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never
allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines.

RTC decision: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as
amended and hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted her: (1) despite failure of the prosecution in proving the negative
allegation in the information; (2) despite failure of the prosecution in proving the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride; (3) despite violation of her constitutional rights; and (4) when guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
ISSUE: WON Johnson is guilty of illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Consti related: WON there was violation of Johnson’s constitutional rights?

HELD: Yes. The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in order that a person may be validly charged with
and convicted of illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, have been complied
with by the prosecution in this case. The decision of the trial court must accordingly be upheld.

No. The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
RATIO:
1. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights. She argues
that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic
bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed
of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, should have been excluded
from the evidence.

The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention and used
in evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). On
the other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person .

The trial court held:

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and x x x x
(Underscoring supplied)

A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson as the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. This presupposes
that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or [a] confessi on
from him."

The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited,
hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The
methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures.

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should
these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place
passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply
to routine airport procedures.

The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.

2. Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs had been obtained while she was in the custody of the airport
authorities without the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in the records is it
indicated that accused-appellant was required to affix her signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile and
Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony to that effect, were presented by the prosecution in proving its case.

There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-appellants passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other
personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and her
signature thereon. Rule 126, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the search and seizure only of the
following:
Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her.

** Note: other issues and discussion are crim related

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.

There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers
on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to rout ine
airport procedures.
088 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, AUTHOR:

 vs.
 BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant. NOTES: (if applicable)
[G G.R. No. 188611; June 16, 2010]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: NACHURA, J.

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. On October 26, 2005, the San Gabriel Police Station conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a
suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B.
Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana,
the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).
2. On October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who
informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The
agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded
the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the
other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one know.
3. When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice
who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were
already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them
that they were under arrest, but the women got away.
4. PO2 Pallayoc brought the other woman he caught, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the
bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the
bags. Three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana
fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.
5. Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination.
The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
6. When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present evidence, she testified that:
7. On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger
jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-
ang"), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant
refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the
poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away.
A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station.
When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered
the true contents of the bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she did
not know what were contained in the bags.
8. RTC found Belen Mariacos guilty. The CA affirmed RTC decision. Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective
decisions on the fact that the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not Mariacos’ constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending
officer.

HELD: NO.
RATIO:

The SC is asked to determine the limits of the powers of the State’s agents to conduct searches and seizures. Thus, the Court must
determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of petitioner.

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.14

Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no
search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of
probable cause.

The purpose for allowing warrantless search in moving vehicle is justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of
probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only
as long as officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged.

The rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the
basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must
be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle
is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. 21

This exception is easy to understand. It is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on
an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
must be sought.22

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or
prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him
to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer
had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.

Moreover, in her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked
her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence.

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial.
Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.26

Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting
circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case.27 Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug,
without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.28
089 People of the Philippines v. Andre Marti AUTHOR: JANNA | Right against unreasonable searches
[G.R. No. 81561; January 18, 1991] and seizure does not apply in this case, because the
TOPIC: Searches by Private Entities contraband (marijuana) found in the package mailed by
PONENTE: BIDIN, J. Marti was brought to the attention of the NBI (Government)
by private individuals.
NATURE: Appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)
convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i),
Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
FACTS:
1. August 14, 1987: between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., MARTI and his common-law wife, SHIRLEY Reyes, went to the
booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them four (4) gift wrapped packages.
2. ANITA Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them.
3. MARTI informed ANITA that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
4. MARTI filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland" ANITA then asked him if she could examine and inspect the packages, but MARTI refused, assuring her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich.
5. Because of MARTI’s representation, ANITA no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The 4packages were then
placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top
of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment.
6. Before delivery of MARTI’s box, the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. JOB Reyes (proprietor) and
husband of ANITA, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection.
7. When he opened MARTI’s box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom, and out of curiosity, he squeezed one of the
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane
wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.
8. JOB REYES then prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the
Narcotics Section of the NBI at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987.
9. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at
Ermita, Manila.
10. JOB REYES brought out the box where MARTI’s packages were placed and in the presence of the NBI agents,
opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried
marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers .
11. The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes, and there he discovered bricks or
cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened, and dried
marijuana leaves were found neatly stocked underneath the cigars
12. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects.
13. NBI agents tried to locate MARTI, but to no avail because the stated address in his passport (copy given to Sps.
Reyeses) is the Manila Central Post Office. The agents then requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security.
14. MARTI was caught on August 27, 1987 while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office. He was invited by the NBI
to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI
submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried
leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. Thereafter, an Information was filed against
appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
15. After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE(S): Whether the evidence against MARTI is in violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizure and
privacy of communication, and therefore inadmissible as evidence.
HELD: NO, because the contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals (JOB REYES) so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
RATIO:

1. Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or whe n public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as
follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec.
1 [3], Article III) was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may
turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081
[1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized
the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon.
Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

2. It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the
State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
3. On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities.
4. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
5. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]: 1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers
to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and
other possessions. . . .. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstan ces above noted, for in
the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . .

6. In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures declared that: (t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its
protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the a ctivities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the
right of seizure by process duly served.

The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner
thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics. And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals

7. Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said: The search of which appellant complains, however,
was made by a private citizen — the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing
the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called t he local
police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not
require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
8. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prose cution of the
offense charged. Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on
used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction. The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In
both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the
prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary
measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box
containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened
the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no
search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed
by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified
without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution

9. In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the
police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable
search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
10. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals
finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection.
11. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
12. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
13. Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology
found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or
private individuals The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must
be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either
a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar,
167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications
introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed
against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else. Corolarilly, alleged violations against
unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of
sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also
be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.
14. Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies,
in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
90 Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo v. Chairperson AUTHOR: RC Alfafara
Constantino-David, et al. NOTE/S:
[G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011] Involves a search of office computer assigned to a gov’t employee
PONENTE: Villarama, Jr., J. who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from
service. The employees personal files stored in the computer were
used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-
Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program
of the CSC.
2. An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David marked Confidential
and sent through LBC from a certain Alan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated
Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice which documents marked
Confidential are left unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
3. The letter-complaint reads:
xxx. As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an employee of
your agency to be a lawyer of an accused govt employee having a pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law
and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of the Mamamayan
muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt system
will not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly because our perception of your clean and good office is
being tainted.
- Concerned Govt employee
4. Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in IT, and issued a memo directing them to conduct
investigation and to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.
5. After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their
arrival, the team informed the officials, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III
Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson Davids directive.
6. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed
by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity.
7. Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time,
informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.
8. Petitioner replied thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer.
Another text message received by pet. from PALD staff also reported the presence of the team from CSC main office.
9. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving all the files stored.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to
Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was
found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the
petitioner (40-42 files) were draft pleadings in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
10. Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit
his explanation or counter-affidavit within 5 days from notice.
11. Chairperson David made the following observations:
Most of the files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are connected with administrative cases that may be lumped as
pending. It is also of note that most of the draft pleadings are for and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as respondents
in administrative cases. This gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully
aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government
tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. The number of pleadings so prepared further
demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be
the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly against common human experience, to believe that the person concerned had
engaged in this customary practice without any consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files appears to insinuate the
collection of fees. That the draft pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo raises the presumption that he was
the one responsible or had a hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer was within his direct control and disposition.
12. Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred in the anonymous letter-complaint which had no
attachments because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC
officials of conducting a fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and
subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had
protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave in which he informed Director Castillo that the
files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not
authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and
protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property,
the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee
who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter,
petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents
copied from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree.
13. CSC: Finding prima facie case against the petitioner and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees).
14. Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath within 5 days from notice and indicate whether he elects a
formal investigation. Since the charges fall under Sec.19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days
preventive suspension effective immediately upon receipt of the resolution.
15. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as
without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman , such power
pertaining solely to the court. He also prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him.
16. CSC: Denied the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioners answer.
17. Petitioner filed an Urgent Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing both the Show -Cause Order and
Resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction.
18. Prior to this, petitioner lodged an administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel D.G.
Buensalida (Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the
Ombudsman, and a separate complaint for disbarment against Director Buensalida.
19. Petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal investigation of the case.
20. He filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction.
21. Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled, the CSC reset the same with warning that the failure of
petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the
formal investigation ex-parte.
22. Pet. moved to defer or to reset the pre-hearing conference, claiming that the investigation proceedings should be held in
abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the pre-
hearing conference with similar warning on the consequences of pet. and/or his counsels non -appearance. This prompted
pet. to file another motion in the CA, to cite the respondents, including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt.
23. CSC: Denied pet. motion to set aside the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated
hearing officer, Atty. Jimenez. The hearing officer was directed to proceed with the invest igation proper with dispatch.
24. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to
have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
25. CSC: Guilty and Pollo was meted with the penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties (ie. disqualification to hold
public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service examinations.)
26. CA: Dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by CSC officials.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred.
(2) Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files without his
knowledge and consent transgressed his constitutional right to privacy.
HELD:
(1 & 2) No, the CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation
of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of
the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to
ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated February 29,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
2. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable searches and
seizures.
3. People v. Marti: Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter worded as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
4. Katz v. United States: The US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation
made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure.
Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone
call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was
further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person
has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable (objective).
5. Mancusi v. DeForte: It addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in the workplace…The Court
recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police. Xxx xxx xxx
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace, OConnor teaches:
x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of
employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate
regulation. x x x The employees expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation. An
office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees.
Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others such
as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public may have frequent access to an individuals
office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that constitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government
does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer,
x x x but some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is
reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
6. On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that...requiring an employer to
obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employees office, desk, or file cabinets for a work -related
purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy
warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such
procedures, is simply unreasonable. x x x The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers
is the efficient and proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the
work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered an employees
desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of
probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to
retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory
conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and proper
operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work -
related, noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related employee
misconduct. x x x Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient
manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other
work-related misfeasance of its employees. x x x x In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement make the probable-cause requirement impracticable. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly
burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize
arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on t he
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well
as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider whether theaction was
justified at its inception, x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place, x x x
8. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-
issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which
he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did
he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On
the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his
office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed
a trivial request. He described his office as full of people, his friends, unknown people and that in the pa st 22 years he had
been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting
cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of
name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying
customer. Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would
recognize as reasonable.
9. Moreover… Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 Computer Use Policy (CUP) explicitly provides:
POLICY
1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and may be used only for legitimate business
purposes.
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the performance of their respective jobs.
3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given time.
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not have an expectation of privacy in anything
they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and assign Users to handle the confidential
examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the
computer through the Internet or any other computer network. Users understand that the CSC may use human or automated means
to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal property or for the exclusive use of a User to
whom a memorandum of receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or operated by other users. However, he is accountable
therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.
10. The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work -related misconduct
prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC.
>> A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
11. Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception and scope. We
quote with approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines
established by OConnor:..It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government
employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement…If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in
the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then
such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity
of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and
objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actu ally
impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
12. Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were
subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store
documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly,
the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat
the purpose of the work-related investigation.
13. Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent
manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe
the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the
search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
14. All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any
way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an
employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its
employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.
15. We likewise find no merit in his contention that OConnor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does
not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioners computer was
justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence
relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the
anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in OConnor.
16. (In comparison to Atty. Morales’ case) The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the
former which involved a personal computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein
petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has
absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other
relevant factors and circumstances under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO
10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office
computer assigned to him.
17. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only respect
but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally rea sonable
minds might conceivably opine otherwise. The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of
drafts of legal pleadings and documents stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the
witnesses it presented during the formal investigation…We hold that the CSCs factual finding regarding the authorship of
the subject pleadings and misuse of the office computer is well-supported by the evidence on record…This indicates that
the author thereof knowingly and willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the interests of parties
contrary or antagonistic to the Commission.
18. The administrative complaint is deemed to have been initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot
inspection and search of the files stored in the hard drive of computers in the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous
letter -- as part of the disciplining authority’s own fact-finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima
facie case against the petitioner who was then directed to file his comment.
19 Civil Service Commission v. CA: Under E.O. No. 292 and the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the appropriate disciplining authority,
even without being subscribed and sworn to.
>> The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by the CSC Chair and not the
Commission as a collegial body was already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the Addendum. According to
Chairperson David, said memorandum order was in fact exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the Commission
Meeting, attended by her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the
time saw no need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use of the
Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum order. Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely
internal in nature, or which regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be published
prior to its effectivity.
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSCs ruling that petitioner is
guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No.
6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate penalt y of dismissal with all its
accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules and regulations.
91 IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF AUTHOR:
MR. AMADO P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, NOTES:
19, 20 AND 21, 2007 Contumacious Speech
[A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC; 8 Aug 2008]
PONENTE: Reyes, R.T., J.
FACTS:
1. The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the Business Circuit column of Amado P.
Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation of which he is the publisher. The articles,
containing statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court, came out
in four (4) issues of the newspaper on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007.
 Basically, it’s gossip about how a secretary of a lady justice received, in behalf of the lady
justice, a gift-wrapped box about the size of two dozen milk cans. Believing that the gift
might be something perishable, the secretary opened the box. What was inside was a gift
estimated at P10 million. The secretary informed the magistrate about the gift. The lady
justice was said to have fired the secretary, because “she would not have anybody catch
her accepting a bribe.” All the other articles related to this and was him giving clues as to
the identity of the secretary, bribe giver, etc.
 Overall, through the series of articles, respondent Macasaet has “painted a clear picture”:
a Chinese-Filipino businessman who was acquitted of a crime supposedly left P10 million
in five different boxes with the security guard at the Supreme Court guardhouse, which
was picked up by Cecilia Muoz Delis (the secretary) who was forthwith fired for opening
one of the boxes.
2. Because of this, an Investigating Committee was formed which, after due trial, found that the statements of
Macasaet maligning and degrading the Supreme Court and tending directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, to be utterly unjustified. Thus, it recommended that
Macasaet be cited for indirect contempt.
ISSUE:Whether or not Macasaet is guilty of indirect contempt of court
HELD: Yes, he is.
RATIO:
1. Freedom of expression, which includes freedom of speech and of the press, is one of the hallmarks of a
democratic society. It has been recognized as such for centuries.
2. Closely linked with the right to freedom of speech and of the press is the public right to scrutinize and
criticize government. The freedom to question the government has been a protected right of long-standing
tradition throughout American history… It is justified on the ground that if the determination of justice
cannot be hidden from the public, this will provide: (1) a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or
idiosyncrasy, and (2) the maintenance of the public’s confidence in the administration of justice.
3. While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary.
4. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed that judicial
independence encompasses two distinct but related concepts of independence.
 One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks
to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge
has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without
having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial
office. The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of
the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.
 A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved
- wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the
public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority.
 For sure, judicial criticism can be constructive, uncovering and addressing a problem that merits
public attention… But there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate
attack upon the courts or their judges. Attacks upon the court or a judge not only risk the
inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional
 responsibilities; they also undermine the people’s confidence in the courts.
 Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent and distort the
nature and context of judicial decisions, those that are misleading or without factual or legal basis,
and those that blame the judges for the ills of society, damage the integrity of the judiciary
and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. These attacks do a grave disservice to the
principle of an independent judiciary and mislead the public as to the role of judges in a
constitutional democracy, shaking the very foundation of our democratic government.
5. Of course, the power to punish for contempt is exercised on the preservative principle. There must be
caution and hesitancy on the part of the judge whenever the possible exercise of his awesome prerogative
presents itself. The power to punish for contempt, as was pointed out in Villavicencio v. Lukban, should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke
its inherent power to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. But
when called for, most especially when needed to preserve the very existence and integrity of no less than
the Highest Court, this principle bears importance.
6. In determining the liability of the respondent in this contempt proceeding, we weigh the conflicting
constitutional considerations respondent claim of his right to press freedom, on one hand; and, on the
other hand, ensuring judicial independence by upholding public interest in maintaining the dignity of the
judiciary and the orderly administration of justice both indispensable to the preservation of democracy
and the maintenance of a just society.
7. We have no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in our decisions, judicial reasoning, or
even how we run our public offices or public affairs. They should even be constructive and should pave
the way for a more responsive, effective and efficient judiciary. Unfortunately, the published articles of
respondent Macasaet are not of this genre. On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are
baseless scurrilous attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press freedom. They leave
no redeeming value in furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing but damage the
integrity of the High Court, undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and
threaten the doctrine of judicial independence.
8. Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a “court of thieves” and a “basket of rotten
apples”. These publications directly undermine the integrity of the justices and render suspect the
Supreme Court as an institution. Without bases for his publications, purely resorting to speculation and
fishing expeditions in the hope of striking or creating a story, with utter disregard for the institutional
integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that degrade and impede the orderly
administration of justice.
9. [As shown before the Investigation Committee,] Respondent Macasaet’s wanton disregard for the truth
was exhibited by his apathetic manner of verifying the veracity of the information he had gathered for
his articles concerning the alleged bribery of a Lady Justice. His bases for the amount of money, the
number of boxes, the date of delivery of the boxes, among other important details, were, by his own
admission founded on personal assumptions.
10. Respondent thus admits to having written his articles as means to fish out the Lady Justice involved in an
alleged bribery fed to him by his source, with reckless disregard of whether or not such bribery indeed
took place. It defies reason why any responsible journalist would go on to publish any material in a
newspaper of general circulation without having ascertained even the five Ws and one H of the story.
11. It is precisely because of his failure to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism that we accept the
findings of the Investigating Committee in holding respondent Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of
court. He must be made accountable for his complete failure to exercise even a single vestige of
responsible journalism in publishing his unfounded and ill-thought diatribes against the Judiciary and the
honorable people who serve it.
092 SALVADOR D. FLOR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AUTHOR: Ernest
respondent. NOTE/S:
[G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005]
TOPIC: Libel
PONENTE: Chico Nazario, J.:
Nature: pet 4 rev on certiorari
FACTS:

1. An information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor
and correspondent, respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. The information reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of Albay,
Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused who are the news
correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor,
integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization
and concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit,
publish and circulate an issue of the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region, with banner headline and
front page news item read by the public throughout the Bicol Region, pertinent portions of which are quoted verbatim as follows:
VILLAFUERTES DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE

CITY-Gov. Luis Villafuertes denial that he did not spend government money for his trips to Japan and Israel two weeks ago has failed
to convince people in Camarines Sur, reliable sources said.

What the people know, the sources said, is that the two trips of the governor who is also the minister of the Government
Reorganization Commission was purely junket.

This was confirmed when capitol sources disclosed that about P700,000.00 collected by way of cash advances by ranking provinc ial
officials were allegedly used for the two trips.

The cash advances, the sources said, were made at the instance of Villafuerte.

It was learned that the amount was withdrawn without resolution approving its release.

Villarfuerte however said that he spent his own money for the two trips.

The governor was accompanied abroad by political supporters mostly municipal mayors in Camarines Sur, the report said.

This was contested by several individuals who told Bicol Forum that the members of Villafuertes entourage did not have offici al
functions in the province.

Villafuerte and his companions reportedly attended the 1986 baseball games in Japan.

When in truth and in fact said allegations are false and utterly untrue as the complainant has not done such acts, thus embarrassing,
discrediting and ridiculing him before his friends, followers and other people.

2. The information was later amended to include Jose Burgos, Jr., who was at that time the publisher-editor of the Bicol Forum. The trial court,
however, never acquired jurisdiction over his person as he did not surrender nor was he ever arrested by the authorities.

3. It appears from the records that prior to the filing of the criminal complaint, the private complainant had already instituted a separate civil action
for damages arising out of the questioned news article before the RTC, Branch 23, Naga City. Due to this, the criminal suit for libel was ordered
consolidated with the civil case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[5] Subsequently, the consolidated actions
were transferred to RTC, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur, in accordance with Republic Act No. 4363 which outlines the venue of libel cases in
the event that the offended party is a public official such as in this case.[6] Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued with accused Burgos,
Jr., being declared as in default in the civil case due to his failure to attend its pre-trial conference.

4. Upon being arraigned, the petitioner and Ramos both pleaded not guilty.

5. During the trial, the private complainant himself took the witness stand to refute the statements contained in the subject news article. According
to him, there were previous news reports and broadcasts regarding the cash advances allegedly made by some provincial government officials
of Camarines Sur and that it was also reported that he made a trip to Japan which was branded as a mere junket.The private complainant,
however, explained that after he clarified over the radio that he never went to Japan, the issue was never discussed again until the matter was
included in the questioned news item.[9] As for the cash advances, the private complainant stated that the Provincial Auditor and the Budget
Officer had already made a statement to the effect that he had no pending cash advances.[10] Further, the private complainant clarified that he
made his trip to Israel in his capacity as a cabinet member of former President Corazon C. Aquino and that he spent his own money for the
said official trip thereby debunking Bicol Forums report that his travel to Israel was purely a junket.[11] The private complainant also
 complained that no one from the Bicol Forum made any attempt to get his side of the story nor was he aware of any effort exerted by the
representatives of said publication to confirm the veracity of the contents of the subject news article from any source at th e provincial
capitol.[12] Finally, the private complainant took exception to the banner headline which states Villafuertes Denial Convinces No One.
According to him, the Bicol Forum seemed to be making a mockery of his previous explanations regarding the cash advances and his trips
abroad and such a sweeping statement subjected him to public ridicule and humiliation.[13]

6. On the other hand, Ramos testified that he wrote the questioned news item on the basis of a note given to him by a source whom he refused to
identify.[14] Said source was allegedly connected with the Provincial Treasurers Office. The note reads:

Media consultants of Villafuerte specially DWLV announcers had been announcing the travels of Villafuerte to Israel and Japan without spending a single centavo.
This is unbelievable as lately the Gov. said he [spent] his own money for the trips.

No one will believe this. The governor and party went to Israel and Japan as there were some P700,000.00 cash advances collec ted in form of advances by top
provincial officials for the trips. No [doubt] Villafuerte had a hand on this because he is the governor approving cash advances. Among them were Panes and Maceda.

There were no resolution, please publish this that people concern will react and they be forced to account for the money. Authenticated papers will follow. Bulls eye
ito.

7. Ramos likewise alleged that prior to writing the subject news article, he went to his source to ask some clarificatory questions and was told that
he would be given authenticated records of the cash advances. Later, he was given a copy of the Schedule of Cash Advances of Disbursing
Officers and Other Officers (as of June 30 1987).[17] Among the provincial government officials listed therein were the priva te respondent who
had a 1986 balance of P25,000.00 incurred for cultural activities; Atty. Jose Maceda who also had a 1986 balance of P130,084.00 for sports
development, Operation Smile, NAMCYA Festival, and prisoners subsistence; and Eulogio Panes, Jr., who had beside his name a 1986
balance of P250,000 for the purpose of sports development. Ramos also claimed that when he went to the Provincial Treasurers Office to
conduct his investigation, he was shown some vouchers and was told that many of the members of the baseball delegation to Japan were not
elected provincial officials and, in fact, some mayors and private individuals were sent as part of the Philippine group.[18]

8. During his turn at the witness stand, the petitioner admitted that the headline was written by him in his capacity as the man aging editor[19] in
accordance with the policy of their paper to print as headlines matters dealing with public concerns and public officials.[20 ] According to him,
the banner headline and the sub-headline truthfully reflect the substance of the story prepared by Ramos.[21]

9. After the trial, the court rendered them guilty and liable for damages etc.

10. Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. MR denied. Court of Appeals ruled:

The informant of Nick Ramos made a sweeping conclusion that it was Gov. Villafuerte who made the trips abroad using government
money as there were cash advances of P700,000.00 made by top provincial officials, without first having verified the truth about
the matters contained in his report. The imputation became malicious when they are based on mere conjectures. The
alleged libelous article must be construed as a whole. The effect of the news item upon the minds of the readers must be
considered in the prosecution of libel cases. The words used in the news report tends to impute a criminal act on the governor
which may cause the readers to hold him up to public ridicule and induce them to believe that the governor was indeed guilty. The
accused editor admitted that he did not make any personal investigation as to the truth of the statements made in the report. When
such communication was sent for publication, the so-called privilege was destroyed when malice in fact was present.

ISSUE: Whether the questioned news item is libelous.

HELD: NO. Petition Granted.

RATIO:

Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.[ Any of these imputations is defamatory and under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious.[28] The presumption of malice, however, does not exist in the following
instances:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.[29]

The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are those which are classified as absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits
regardless of the existence of malice in fact. Included herein are statements made in official proceedings of the legislature by the members thereof.[30]
Likewise, statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged but only if pertinent or relevant to the case involved.[31]

The other kind of privileged matters are the qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications which, unlike the first classification, may be susceptible
to a finding of libel provided the prosecution establishes the presence of malice in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code fall into this category.

In the case, however, of Borjal v. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court recognized that the enumeration stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code is not
exclusive but is rendered more expansive by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, thus:

. . . To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nations penal code but in the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Cae te [38 Phil. 253],
this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing
libels.[33]

Clearly, when confronted with libel cases involving publications which deal with public officials and the discharge of their official functions, this Court is
not confined within the wordings of the libel statute; rather, the case should likewise be examined under the constitutional precept of freedom of the
press. As enunciated in the seminal case of United States v. Bustos[34] -

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of offi cialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual
be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected
criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the
Judiciary to any or all the agencies of Government public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.[35]

Of course, this does not mean that a public official is barred from recovering damages in cases involving defamations. His entitlement, however, is
limited to instances when the defamatory statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.[36] This is the test laid down in the leading case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.[37]

In the case at bar, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the purported libelous news item was designed to malign the integrity and
reputation of the [private complainant] for it ascribed to the latter corruption and dishonesty in government service.[38] Moreover, the OSG maintains that
the questioned news article does not enjoy the mantle of protection afforded a privileged matter as the petitioner and Ramos published the news item
based on mere speculation and conjecture.[39] Their decision to publish the unverified information furnished them by the unnamed source, who was
never presented before the trial court, and their failure to verify the truth of statements which appeared under the banner headline of the 18-24 August
1986 issue of the Bicol Forum indicates that the news item was published intemperately and maliciously.[40] The OSG is therefore of the opinion that the
subject news item satisfied the test pronounced in the New York Times case. We do not agree.

As the US Supreme Court itself declared, reckless disregard cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be
marked out through case-by-case adjudication.[41] The case of Garrison v. State of Louisiana[42] stressed that only those false statements made with
the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or crimi nal sanctions[43] and
concluded by restating the reckless disregard standard in the following manner:

. . . The test which we laid down in New York Times is not keyed to ordinary care; defeasance of the privilege is conditioned , not on mere
negligence, but on reckless disregard for the truth.[44]

Subsequently, in St. Amant v. Thompson[45] it was stated that

. . . These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, o r would have
investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. [46]

Applied to the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution failed to meet the criterion of reckless disregard. As the records reveal, the issue of
cash advances against the coffers of the provincial government of Camarines Sur was a major political topic in said locality at that time. Even
the private respondent himself admitted during his direct testimony that he went on radio in order to address the matter. It was clearly a
legitimate topic to be discussed not only by the members of the media but by the public as what was involved was the dispensation of
taxpayers money.

Further, it bears emphasis that in this case, the petitioner and Ramos had in their possession information relating to the ca sh advances and the private
respondents travels abroad. The information was provided by one who worked in the provincial treasurers office and had access to the pertinent financial
records of the provincial government. Their informant was familiar with the procedure with regard to the approval of cash advances. The inference they
drew from the note given by their source that the private respondent prodded some of the provincial government officials to take out cash advances may
have been false but the same does not warrant a conviction for libel nor support a claim for damages. As discussed by Newell

Slight unintentional errors, however, will be excused. If a writer in the course of temperate and legitimate criticism falls into error as to some detail, or
draws an incorrect inference from the facts before him, and thus goes beyond the limits of strict truth, such inaccuracies will not cause judgment to go
against him, if the jury are satisfied, after reading the whole publication, that it was written honestly, fairly and with regard to what truth and justice
require. It is not to be expected that a public journalist will always be infallible.[47]

During the hearing of these cases, the private complainant also refuted the material points contained in the subject news article in an effort to prove the
falsity of the allegations contained therein. This Court finds such effort inadequate to adjudge the petitioner guilty of the crime of libel or to entitle the
private respondent to damages. Under the New York Times test, false statements alone are not actionable; maliciousness may be shown only through
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity.[48]

Further, both the prosecution and the OSG make capital of Ramos and the petitioners failure to confirm the information supplied by the unidentified
source which ultimately became the basis for the news article under consideration in an obvious attempt to establish the element of reckless disregard
for truth. The prosecution also painstakingly tried to establish malice in fact on the part of the petitioner by harping on the fact that neither he nor Ramos
took the time to give the private respondent the chance to air his side before putting the alleged libelous news story to print.

The contention fails to persuade.

While substantiation of the facts supplied is an important reporting standard, still, a reporter may rely on information given by a lone source
although it reflects only one side of the story provided the reporter does not entertain a high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity.[49]
The prosecution, in this case, utterly failed to prove that the petitioner and Ramos entertained such awareness.

We also hold that the petitioners and Ramoss failure to present their informant before the court as well as other evidence that would prove Ramos claim
that he had conducted an investigation to verify the information passed on to him should not be taken against them. On this point, we turn to our
pronouncement in the case of Rodolfo R. Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[50] to wit:

A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making
such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech
and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, public discussion is a political duty
and the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.[51]

Indeed, the difficulty of producing evidence, both documentary and testimonial, on behalf of the petitioner was readily apparent when, during his cross-
examination, Ramos testified that he was not allowed by the custodians of the material provincial financial records to photocopy th e latter particularly
because said documents dealt with the matter of cash advances.[52]

Further, as their informant was employed in the provincial treasurers office, it is understandable why he opted not to expose himself and openly charge
his superior, the private complainant herein, lest he incur the latters wrath.

Finally, the private respondent claims that the banner headline ridiculed him before the public does not merit consideration as the rule in this jurisdiction
is that [t]he headline of a newspaper story or publication claimed to be libelous must be read and construed in connection wi th the language that
follows.[53] A perusal of the entire news story accompanying the headline in this case readily establishes the fact that the questioned article dealt with
refutations by the private respondents critics of his explanation over the radio with regard to the issues mentioned therein. The wording of the headline
may have contained an exaggeration but the same nevertheless represents a fair index of the contents of the news story accompanying it.[54]
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 10 December 1996 which affirmed the Joint Decision
dated 18 March 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur, and its Resolution of 19 August 1999 denying reconsideration are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.
093 RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ, petitioner, AUTHOR:
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL NOTES:
COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 40, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 118971 September 15, 1999
TOPIC:
PONENTE:
FACTS:

1. Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37
families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza
regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo. After their meeting with Atienza and
other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA
compound concerning their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, the following news article 2 appeared in the
newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa:
Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang 38 mahihirap na pamilya sa Tondo Foreshore Area na umano'y
inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang barangay chairman sa pakikipagsabwatan sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing Authority
sapul 1980.
Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo ng barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo Foreshore Area, sa mga
project manager ng NHA upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa sa naturang lugar.
Xxxx
Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating pinuno ng city hall ng Maynila, MHS Minister Conrado Benitez, at ilang
pinuno ng pulisya ang barangay chairman kaya "nakalusot" ang mga ginawa nitong katiwalian. Bukod sa pagkamkam ng
mga lupaing gobyerno, kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga
nakawan ng manok.
"Sapin-sapin na ang mga kaso na idinulog namin noong nakalipas na mga taon, pero pinawalang saysay ang lahat ng iyon,
kabilang na ang tangkang pagpatay sa akin kaugnay ng pagrereklamo sa pangangamkam ng lupa noong 1984," sabi pa ni
Vasquez.

2. Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latter's
statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation
3. The question for determination in this case is the liability for libel of a citizen who denounces a barangay official
for misconduct in office. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, found petitioner guilty and fined him
P1,000.00 on the ground that petitioner failed to prove the truth of the charges and that he was "motivated by
vengeance in uttering the defamatory statement." On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 dated February
1, 1995, affirmed
ISSUE(S):1. whether or not he is criminally liable for libel
HELD: NO.
SC: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
RATIO:
1. To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be proved:
(a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge (c) identity of
the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
2. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a
vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstances which tends to dishonor
or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
3. Finally, malice or ill will must be present. Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or security duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.
4. The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be presumed so that it was
incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the
defamatory statements is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and
functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does
not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
 5. In this case, contrary to the findings of the trial court, on which the Court of Appeals relied, petitioner was able to
prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. His allegation that, through connivance with NHA
officials, complainant was able to obtain title to several lots at the Tondo Foreshore Area was based on the letter of
NHA Inspector General Hermogenes Fernandez to petitioner's counsel which reads: In connection with your
request, that you be furnished with a copy of the results of the investigation regarding the complaints of some
Tondo residents against Chairman Jaime Olmedo, we are providing you a summary of the findings based on the
investigation conducted by our Office which are as follows:
6. Based on the subdivision plan of Block 260, SB 8, Area III, Jaime Olmedo's present structure is constructed on six
lots which were awarded before by the defunct Land Tenure Administration to different persons as follows: Xxx
The above-mentioned lots were not yet titled, except for Lot 1. Fortunato de Jesus sold the said lot to a certain Jovita Bercasi,
a sister-in-law of Jaime Olmedo. The other remaining lots were either sold to Mr. Olmedo and/or to his immediate relatives.
7. In addition, petitioner acted on the basis of two memoranda, both dated November 29, 1983, of then NHA General
Manager Gaudencio Tobias recommending the filing of administrative charges against the NHA officials
"responsible for the alleged irregular consolidation of lots [in Tondo to Jaime and Victoria Olmedo.]"
8. With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it must be noted that what petitioner
stated was that various charges (for attempted murder against petitioner, gambling, theft of fighting cocks) had
been filed by the residents against their barangay chairman but these had all been dismissed. Petitioner was able to
show that Olmedo's involvement in the theft of fighting cocks was the subject of an affidavit-complaint, dated
October 19, 1983, signed by Fernando Rodriguez and Ben Lareza, former barangay tanods of Barangay 66, Zone
6, Tondo. Likewise, petitioner presented a resolution, dated March 10, 1988, of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor in TBP-87-03694, stating that charges of malversation and corrupt practices had been filed against
Olmedo and nine (9) other barangay officials but the same were dismissed. Indeed, the prosecution's own evidence
bears out petitioner's statements. The prosecution presented the resolution in TBP Case No. 84-01854 dismissing
the charge of attempted murder filed by petitioner against Jaime Olmedo and his son-in-law, Jaime Reyes. The
allegation concerning this matter is thus true.1âwphi1.nêt
9. It was error for the trial court to hold that petitioner "only tried to prove that the complainant [barangay chairman]
is guilty of the crimes alluded to; accused, however, has not proven that the complainant committed the crimes."
For that is not what petitioner said as reported in the Ang Tinig ng Masa. The fact that charges had been filed
against the barangay official, not the truth of such charges, was the issue.
10. In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area
were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public
duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and
duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden of proving
that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends.
11. For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official
conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statements was made with actual malice — that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist
of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sulliva.
12. A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good
motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised
Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule
would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech
and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said,
"public discussion is a political duty" and the "greatest menace to freedom is an inert people."
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
094. SWS vs. COMELEC AUTHOR: Revy Neri
GR. No.147571; May 5, 2001 NOTES:
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
1. Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and
thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof.
2. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features newsworthy items of information including election surveys.
3. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of R.A.
No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen
(15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an
election.
4. The term election surveys is defined in 5.1 of the law as follows: Election surveys refer to the measurement of
opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of
public discussion in relation to the election, including voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues
during the campaign period (hereafter referred to as Survey).
5. To implement 5.4, Resolution 3636, 24(h), dated March 1, 2001, of the COMELEC enjoins Surveys affecting
national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.
6. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the
national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly.
7. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey
results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.
8. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
9. Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the
manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the
election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period
proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of
the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is
narrowly tailored to meet the evils sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is
minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last
7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require
timeliness. Respondent claims that in National Press Club v. COMELEC, a total ban on political advertisements,
with candidates being merely allocated broadcast time during the so-called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour,
was upheld by this Court. In contrast, according to respondent, it states that the prohibition in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
is much more limited.

ISSUE(S): WON 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech,
expression and the press.
HELD: YES. We hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a
direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3)
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression.

RATIO:
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of 5.4? The United States Supreme Court,
through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. OBrien:

A government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and
press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content-neutral regulations and is said to have
become canonical in the review of such laws. It is noteworthy that the OBrien test has been applied by this Court in at least
two cases.

Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to
the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is
greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.

Our inquiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as applied to 5.4.

First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted
governmental interest makes such interest not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the
publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same
subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In
effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical res ults.
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that the government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.

Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground t hat it
is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the
right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not
made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days
immediately before a local election.

Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting
restriction of free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test, namely, that
the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the
prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, junking of weak or losing candidates, and
resort to the form of election cheating called dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
Thus, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the COMELEC is given the power:

To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election
propaganda, after due notice and hearing.
095 Eliseo Soriano vs. Consoliza P. Laguardia, in her AUTHOR: Bea Mationg
capacity as the MTRCB Chairman NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC: Freedom of speech
PONENTE: Velasco, J. Sorry for the 6-page digest but this case is too long! 

FACTS: (chronological order)

Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola
ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito..

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon
and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing in relation to
the alleged use of some cuss words in the episode of Ang Dating Daan.

MTRCB: preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section
3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.

Petitioner filed with this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the admin case, the MTRCB issued a
decision which states:
“finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three
(3) months suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan.”

The Court consolidated the two petitions filed by the respondent.

ISSUE(S): W/N the Order of Preventive Suspension against Ang Dating Daan is null and void for being issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:
-IRR is invalid for the issuance of preventive suspension;
-lack of due hearing;
-being violative of the EPC; freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and expression.
-It partakes of the nature of a subsequent punishment curtailing the same;
-PD 1986 is not complete-in-itself and does not provide for a sufficient standard for its implementation
thereby resulting in an undue delegation of legislative power by reason that it does not provide for the
penalties for violations of its provisions.

HELD: Petition is dismissed. MTRCB Order is upheld.

(1) RATIO: As to the order of preventive suspension

Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:

Section 3. Powers and Functions.The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
xxxx

c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the x x x production, x x x
exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials
subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board applying contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime such as but not limited to:

vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living
or dead;
xxxx
 (d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x production, copying, distribution,
sale, lease, exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be
objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x produced, copied, reproduced,
distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television;

k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes
and objectives of this Act x x x.

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly
set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to supervise, regulate,
and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to
be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television.

Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory
statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate.

Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. Preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986.

But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to deprive
the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute
to regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral
materials and to impose sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to
petitioners assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither
did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive
suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCBs duty of regulating or
supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final
analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

(2) As to the lack of hearing

The MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared before that Board
for a hearing on private respondents complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was issued after the
adjournment of the hearing, proving that he had already appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of
PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue [a]ny time during the pendency of the case. In this particular case, it was done after
MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 and of administrative complaints that had been filed
against him for such violation. At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing.

(3) As to the equal protection clause

The equal protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. It guards against undue favor and
individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same
shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no
proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the
MTRCBs disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily
gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. The Court
need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC ministers,
as hosts ofAng Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too different to even consider whether
or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.

(4) As to religious freedom

Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious speech, adding
that words like putang babae were said in exercise of his religious freedom.

The argument has no merit.

The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads as follows:

No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.

There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing
furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition
program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another
person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that
he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that
some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daanowed to a TV station does not convert the
foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his
reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse.
Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.

(5) As to violation of religious freedom

Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on
the main ground that the decision violates, apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution, which reads:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievance.

He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in particular, unconstitutional for reasons articulated in
this petition. The Court is not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But first, we restate certain general concepts and
principles underlying the freedom of speech and expression.

It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures come within the broad
protection of the free speech and expression clause. Each method though, because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of
people and accessibility to children, tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast
media, of all forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection. Just as settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in
the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or
subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to t he
freedom of expression.

Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however,
not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being protected.
As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern. In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee obviously was not intended to give
immunity for every possible use of language. From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: [T]he freedom to express ones sentiments and
belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed
within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others.

It is also not a protected speech. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value
expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting
words, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression
endangering national security.

The Court finds that petitioners statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence,
it is, in that context, unprotected speech.

A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average adult, the
utterances Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
[dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! may not constitute obscene but merely indecent utterances. They can be
viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient
interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated G or
for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children.

While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be
expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a
television broadcast could corrupt impressionable young minds. The term putang babae means a female prostitute, a term
wholly inappropriate for children, who could look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal meaning, missing the context
within which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms, ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, making reference to the
female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then stating that Sandoval was worse than that by using
his mouth in a similar manner. Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also
without placing the phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the
reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings of the words used, young minds, without the guidance of an
adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent speech as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in the ir
own speech or form their own ideas on the matter. In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear
petitioners words, when speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not the
average adult. The average child may not have the adults grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the understanding that
language may be colorful, and words may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very
suggestive of a female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we find petitioners utterances obscene and not
entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.

The Court in Chavez elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that is content-based
and that which is content-neutral. A content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a
content-neutral restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under well-defined standards
tailored to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of the expression. Courts subject content-based
restraint to strict scrutiny.

The suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one perspective, permissible restriction. We make this disposition
against the backdrop of the following interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive
medium that, to borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, easily reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren
will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day
when there was a reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a G or for
general patronage rated program.Under Sec. 2(A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
[s]uitable for all ages, meaning that the material for television x x x in the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain anything
unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision. The words petitioner used were,
by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in petitioners utterances
on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.

A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornograph, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of
imminent lawless action, and expression endangering national security. But this list is not, as some members of the Court
would submit, exclusive or carved in stone. Without going into specifics, it may be stated without fear of contradiction
that US decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general exceptions. As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to
the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unprotected
speech, created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. As unprotected speech, petitioners utterances can be
subjected to restraint or regulation.

Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978, petitioner asserts that his utterances must
present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and such
danger must be grave and imminent.

Petitioners invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive of speech tests, would not avail
him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated by Justice
Holmes, accords protection for utterances so that the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint or
subsequent punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil which the
government has the power to prohibit. Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of press is susceptible of restriction when
and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the government may lawfully protect. As it
were, said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of
government. It was originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-
government action, or to have serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the
community. The clear and present danger rule has been applied to this jurisdiction. As a standard of limitation on free speech
and press, however, the clear and present danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all problems and does away
with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to release a
defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic disaster. As we observed
in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the clear and present danger test does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to free spee ch,
the Court rules that the governments interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately
buttresses the reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on petitioners prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating
Daan during the suspension period.

The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State to provide protection to the
youth against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice their general well-being. The Article on youth, approved on
second reading by the Constitutional Commission, explained that the State shall extend social protection to minors against all
forms of neglect, cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and practices which may foster racial, religious or other forms of
discrimination.

Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of neglect,
exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents, through
regulatory mechanisms, protect their childrens minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. The
Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of nation-building. In the same
way, the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character. Petitioners offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to
the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the
welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae. constitute a substantial and
compelling government interest in regulating petitioners utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.

The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action MTRCB took in the narrow confines of the
case. To reiterate, FCC justified the restraint on the TV broadcast grounded on the following considerations: (1) the use of
television with its unique accessibility to children, as a medium of broadcast of a patently offensive speech; (2) the time of
broadcast; and (3) the G rating of the Ang Dating Daan program.

There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly indecent if not
outright obscene. It is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary
powers. It is the kind of speech that the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent should such action
served and further compelling state interests. One who utters indecent, insulting, or offensive words on television when
unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language of FCC, a pig in the parlor. Public interest would be served
if the pig is reasonably restrained or even removed from the parlor.

Ergo, petitioners offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint.

Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or subsequent punishment that, however,
includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.

After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an administrative sanction or subsequent
punishment for his offensive and obscene language in Ang Dating Daan.

To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional breaches of the
freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access
to numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. PD 1986
was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or
license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program. The Board can classify movies and television programs
and can cancel permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast.

The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and television shows, even religious programs,
was upheld in Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals.

The three (3) months suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the
offensive and obscene remarks he uttered on the evening of August 10, 2004 in his television program, Ang Dating Daan. It is a
sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. And the
imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of PD 1986 and the
remedies that may be availed of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel or tort, if
applicable. As FCC teaches, the imposition of sanctions on broadcasters who indulge in profane or indecent broadcasting does
not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be overlooked, the sanction imposed is not per se for petitioners exercise of his
freedom of speech via television, but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program.

More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to regulation
under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners, program producers, and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of
MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry.

Neither can petitioners virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly treated as pri or
restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for
uttering an unprotected form of speech.

As to undue delegation of power

Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power, as PD 1986 does not provide for the range
of imposable penalties that may be applied with respect to violations of the provisions of the law. The argument is without
merit.

Petitioners protestation about undue delegation of legislative power for the sole reason that PD 1986 does not provide
for a range of penalties for violation of the law is untenable. His thesis is that MTRCB, in promulgating the IRR of PD 1986,
prescribing a schedule of penalties for violation of the provisions of the decree, went beyond the terms of the law. As the C ourt
said in Chavez v. National Housing Authority:

x x x [W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. x x x [W]hen the statute does not
specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power
vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its function.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
96 JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO BROCKA, AUTHOR: Yayie Lanting
JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners, vs. CHAIRMAN MARIA NOTES:
KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE
BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION
(BRMPT), respondents.
G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
PONENTE: Fernando., CJ.
FACTS:
1. The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit duly
registered as a single proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic Trade.

2. The respondent is the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, with Maria Kalaw Katigbak as its Chairman
and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada as its Vice-Chairman, also named respondents.

3. In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Boar, a permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the
classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted.

4. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was
without basis.

5. respondent Board released its decision: affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee.
 further resolved to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these
deficiencies are supplied.

6. This Court required respondent to answer.

Respondent: it was alleged that the petition is moot as "respondent Board has revoked its questioned resolution, replacing
it with one immediately granting petitioner company a permit to exhibit the film Kapit without any deletion or cut [thus an]
adjudication of the questions presented above would be academic on the case."
Further: "The modified resolution of the Board, of course, classifies Kapit as for -adults-only, but the petition does not raise
any issue as to the validity of this classification. All that petitioners assail as arbitrary on the part of the Board's action are
the deletions ordered in the film. The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner: The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated
objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations
advanced by the Board as basis for its classification.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the classification of the film as "For Adults Only." is without legal and factual basis and is
exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression?
HELD: NO
RATIO:
It would be unduly restrictive under the circumstances to limit the issue to one of the sufficiency of standards to guide
respondent Board in the exercise of its power. Even if such were the case, there is justification for an inquiry into the
controlling standard to warrant the classification of "For Adults Only." This is especially so, when obscenity is the basis
for any alleged invasion of the right to the freedom of artistic and literary expression embraced in the free speech and free
press guarantees of the Constitution.

1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic
impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the
prevailing cultural traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson is the "importance of motion pictures as
an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear
dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a
diminution of the basic right to free expression. Our recent decision in Reyes v. Bagatsing cautions against such a move.
Press freedom, as stated in the opinion of the Court, "may be Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such freedom, as
is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that [the State] has a right to prevent.
2. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press. If it were so, then such basic
rights are emasculated. It is however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of
such right. This is not to deny that equally basic is the other important aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for
the purposes of this litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on freedom from censorship. It is, beyond question, a well-
settled principle in our jurisdiction. As early as 1909, in the case of United States v. Sedano, a prosecution for libel, the
Supreme Court of the Philippines already made clear that freedom of the press consists in the right to print what one
chooses without any previous license. There is reaffirmation of such a view in Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, where
an order of respondent Commission on Elections giving due course to the certificate of candidacy of petitioner but
prohibiting him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers was considered an
abridgment of the right of the freedom of expression amounting as it does to censorship. It is the opinion of this Court,
therefore, that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the
classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for
general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to abide by
the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity.

3. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of excession may be limited is the clear and present danger of
an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also
present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal
connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be
ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the require of its being well-nigh inevitable. The
basic postulate, wherefore, as noted earlier, is that where the movies, theatrical productions radio scripts, television
programs, and other such media of expression are concerned — included as they are in freedom of expression —
censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to public public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest. There is merit to the observation of Justice Douglas that "every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what
medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.

4. The law, however, frowns on obscenity and rightly so. As categorically stated by Justice Brennan in Roth v. United
States speaking of the free speech and press guarantee of the United States Constitution: "All Ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance — unorthodox Ideas, controversial Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the prevailing
climate of opinion — have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
area of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. Such a view
commends itself for approval.

5. There is, however, some difficulty in determining what is obscene. There is persuasiveness to the approach followed in
Roth: "The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt
upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina v. Hicklin. Some American courts adopted this standard but later decisions
have rejected it and substituted this test: whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the
effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with
sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, the
substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.

6. The above excerpt which imposes on the judiciary the duty to be ever on guard against any impermissible infringement
on the freedom of artistic expression calls to mind the landmark ponencia of Justice Malcolm in United States v.
Bustos, decided in 1918. While recognizing the principle that libel is beyond the pale of constitutional protection, it left no
doubt that in determining what constitutes such an offense, a court should ever be mindful that no violation of the right to
freedom of expression is allowable. It is a matter of pride for the Philippines that it was not until 1984 in New York Timer
v. Sullivan, thirty-years later, that the United States Supreme Court enunciated a similar doctrine.

7. It is quite understandable then why in the Roth opinion, Justice Brennan took pains to emphasize that "sex and obscenity
are not synonymous. Further: "Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has
indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human
interest and public concern.
8. In the applicable law, Executive Order No. 876, reference was made to respondent Board "applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard, words which can be construed in an analogous manner. Moreover, as far as the
question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the
patronage of the State. That is a constitutional mandate. It will be less than true to its function if any government office or
agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for
reality. It is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belles-
lettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is
entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. As so wen
put by Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion, "the widest scope of freedom is to be given to the adventurous and
imaginative exercise of the human spirit" in this sensitive area of a man's personality. On the question of obscenity,
therefore, and in the light of the facts of this case, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in
such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent decision citing the language
of Justice Malcolm in Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, it is "an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of construction,
applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will
maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. As thus construed, there can be no valid
objection to the sufficiency of the controlling standard and its conformity to what the Constitution ordains.

9. This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion.
That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficu lty and travail undergone by
petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Moreover its
perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. This Court concludes then that there was an
abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave.

Accordingly, certiorari does not lie. This conclusion finds support in this explanation of respondents in its Answer to the
amended petition: "The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to theater operators and viewers that some
contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club and a good
portion of the film shots concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the theater
stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of the
picture, there exists scenes of excessive violence attending the battle between a group of robbers and the police. The
vulnerable and imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes. " Further: "Respondents further stated in
its answer that petitioner company has an option to have the film reclassified to For-General-Patronage if it would agree to
remove the obscene scenes and pare down the violence in the film." Petitioners, however, refused the "For Adults Only"
classification and instead, as noted at the outset, filed this suit for certiorari.

10. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures . It
is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so
because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set.
Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court
of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult
population. 34 it cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for
the welfare of the young.

WHEREFORE, this Court, in the light of the principles of law enunciated in the opinion, dismisses this petition for
certiorari solely on the ground that there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the
classification of Kapit sa Patalim as "For-Adults-Only."
097 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo The case is just tooo long with so many issues, even net digests are long
(disclaimer!LOL). Tried to incorporate everything, with concise ratio for every
489 SCRA 160 (2006) issue.
1. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued
PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution which states
that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion”
2. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 implementing PP 1017 and AFP and PNP to immediately carry out
appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did
so citing the following bases:
 elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the
NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the
democratic Philippine State;
 these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;
 Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and
present danger to the safety and integrity of the State
3. A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the
following course of events ensued:
 February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I” detailing the plans for bombing
more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to
attend.
 February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information
that “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I.”
 February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to
defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP
chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration. The two were later taken into custody by
Gen. Senga. However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of
anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military.
 The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.
4. The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:
 Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th celebration of
Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless
arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.
 Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell
media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government."
 Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos
regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.
5. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind
the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army
(NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present
danger. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners’ counsels.
6. The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that
PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the
questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
7. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
8. The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at
hand.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court
against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
ISSUES: On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may
be summarized as follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic. NO
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and
171424 (Legarda) have legal standing. YES
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017. YES
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
A. Facial Challenge
B. Constitutional Basis
C. As Applied Challenge
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that
"acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU -KMU
members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as
well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO:

I- Moot and Academic Principle

The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the
eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it.

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review. All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the
instant petitions.

In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s Separate
Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary. However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s very statement that an
otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule
pointed out by the Chief Justice.

II- Legal Standing

The requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion where the "transcendental
importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is
but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the " liberality
doctrine" on legal standing.

It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to
the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this
Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a
relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases." This Court holds that all the petitioners
herein have locus standi. Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any
other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and
that is by impeachment.

SUBSTANTIVE: 1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, it must be proven that the
President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something
that the petitioners failed to prove.

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual
basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.

2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional; The SC ruled in the following way;

A. Facial Challenge: (MAIN ANSWER)

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement encroached on
both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens. A
facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech
cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that
it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence.

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that
‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

OTHER DISCUSSION OF OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE: JUST IN CASE SIR ASKS:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the
litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case
to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own
interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties;

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws
and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.

Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech c ases. And
like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again,
petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of
common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.

B. Constitutional Basis: Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017. The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided
into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: "by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any
act of insurrection or rebellion"
Second provision: "and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;"
Third provision: "as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency."

First Provision: Calling-out Power (MAIN ANSWER)

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as
a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion.

The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.’ Are these conditions present in the instant cases? YES. As stated earlier, considering the
circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence
network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.

OTHER DISCUSSION OF CALLING-OUT POWER AND MARTIAL LAW: JUST IN CASE SIR ASKS:

There is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a "state of rebellion" and the authority to proclaim a state of
national emergency. President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, a declaration allowed for being a chief executive. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written.

PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also
relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and
business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.

PP107 IS NOT A MARTIAL LAW: Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial
Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. The declaration of Martial Law is a
"warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and
order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in
any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."

Second Provision: "Take Care" Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. David et al averred
that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such powe r is
vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted
former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081) The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’

Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws. It follows that
these decrees and laws are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural
calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national
emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from
Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize
her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he
has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.

C. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"

Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of
expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow. Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3)
indicate "direct injury." A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from
the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.

Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may
afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its
general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Now, may this Court
adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The
criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and
not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.

Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and
appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts
are considered illegal. The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively
presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and
the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts
unconstitutional and illegal.
099 GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006 NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC: Libelous Statement
PONENTE: GARCIA, J.
FACTS: (chronological order)
In August 1987, the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the physicians’
licensure examinations. Out of the total two thousand eight hundred thirty-five (2,835) examinees who took the
examinations, nine hundred forty-one (941) failed.

On February 10, 1988, a certain Abello and over two hundred other unsuccessful examinees filed a Petition for Mandamus
before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test
papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test questions vitiated
the results of the examinations.

As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, among other beats, its
co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed
and narrated the news coverage for the ten o’clock evening news edition of GMA’s Channel 7 Headline News.

The text of the news report, as drafted and narrated by Vidal and which GMA Network, Inc. aired and televised on
February 10, 1988, runs: Some 227 examinees in the last August Physician Licensure Examinations today asked the
Manila [RTC] to compel the [PRC] and the Medical Board of Examiners to recheck the August 1987 test papers. The
petitioners [examinees] today went to the Presiding Judge to also ask for a special raffling of the case considering that the
next physicians examinations have been scheduled for February [1988]. They said that the gross, massive, haphazar d,
whimsical and capricious checking that must have been going on for years should now be stopped once and for all.

The last examination was conducted last August at the PRC central offices, the Far Eastern University and the Araullo
High School, the exams on multiple choice or matching type involve 12 subjects including general medicine, biochemistry,
surgery and obstetrics and gynecology. 21 schools participated in the examination represented by some 2,835 medical
student graduates, 1,894 passed and 141 failed. The results of the exams were released December 9 and were published the
following day in metropolitan papers last years.

A group of failing examinees enlisted the help of the Offices of the President and the Vice President and as a result were
allowed by PRC to obtain the official set of test questions. The students then researched and produced the key answers to
the key questions.

The petitioners were also allowed to see their own test papers, most of them copying the papers.

With these copies, they were able to match the scores and the correct answers in the examinations. They found that the
errors in checking were so material that they actually lowered the scores that formed the individual ratings of the
examinees in the various subjects.

Examples of the discrepancies are to be found in identical answers being rated as incorrect in one examinee’s paper but
correct in another. There is also the case of two different answers being rated as correct. There are indications of wrong
counting of total scores per subject so that the totals are either short by two up to four points.

Finally, there are raw scores that have been transmuted incorrectly so that a passing score was rendered a failure. The
petitioners said that the haphazard and whimsical and capricious checking should now be stopped once and for all. They
said that the nine years formal studies and the one year internship not to mention the expenses and the blood, sweat, and
tears of the students and their families will have been rendered nugatory. The petitioners also noted that Com. Francia had
promised last January 12 to rectify the errors in the checking and yet they have not received the appropriate action
promised whereas the next exams have been set for Feb. 20, 21, 27 and 28. (Words in bracket added.)

Stung by what they claim to be a false, malicious and one-sided report filed and narrated by a remorseless reporter, the
herein respondents instituted on September 21, 1988 with the RTC of Makati City a damage suit against Vidal and GM A
Network, Inc., then known as the Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. In their complaint,5 docketed as Civil Case No. 88-
1952 and raffled to Branch 64 of the court, the respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, alleged, among other things, that then
defendants Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and
simultaneous visual presentation on GMA Network, Inc.’s Channel 7. They added that, as a measure to make a forceful
impact on their audience, the defendants made use of an unrelated and old footage (showing physicians wearing black
armbands) to make it appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful
examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the video footage in question actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by
doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital
management.

In their answer with counterclaim, the defendants denied any wrongdoing, maintaining that their February 10, 1988 late
evening telecast on the filing of the mandamus petition was contextually a concise and objective narration of a matter of
public concern. They also alleged that the press freedom guarantee covered the telecast in question, undertaken as it was to
inform, without malice, the viewing public on the conduct of public officials. And vis-à-vis the particular allegation on the
film footages of the PGH demonstration, defendants tagged such footages as "neutral." Pressing the point, defendants
hastened to add that the footages were accompanied, when shown, by an appropriate voiceover, thus negating the idea
conjured by the plaintiffs to create an effect beyond an obligation to report.

In the course of trial, the plaintiffs presented testimonial evidence to prove their allegations about the Vidal report having
exposed them, as professionals, to hatred, contempt and ridicule. And in a bid to establish malice and bad faith on the part
of the defendants, the plaintiffs adduced evidence tending to show that the former exerted no effort toward presenting their
(plaintiffs’) side in subsequent telecasts.

In a decision dated October 17, 1995, the trial court found for the herein petitioners, as defendants a quo, on the postulate
that the Vidal telecast report in question is privileged. This Court finds the telecast of February 10, 1988 aired over
Channel 7 by [petitioner] Rey Vidal as a straight news report of the acts and conduct of the members of the Medical Board
of Examiners who are public officers, devoid of comment or remarks, and thus privileged, and recognized under the 1987
Constitution.

A comparative examination of the telecast of the disputed news report with the Petition for Mandamus entitled Abello, et
al., vs. Professional Regulation Commission … filed before the [RTC] by the medical examinees reveals that the disputed
news report is but a narration of the allegations contained in and circumstances attending the filing of the said Petition for
Mandamus. In the case of Cuenco vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-29560, March 31, 1976 …, [it was] … held that the correct rule
is that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in Court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a
decision promulgated should be covered by the privilege. xxx. This Court adopts the ruling [in Cuenco] to support its
finding of fact that the disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in the said Petition for
Mandamus, filed by the medical examinees, thus the same falls within the protected ambit of privileged communication.

Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, herein respondents went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
52240. As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision of January 25, 2001, reversed and set aside that
of the trial court. The CA, too, regarded the text of the news telecast as not libelous and as a qualifiedly privileged
communication, "[it having been] merely lifted or quoted from the contents and allegations in the said petition [for
mandamus]."10 But unlike the trial court, the CA saw fit to award damages to the respondents, it being its posture that the
insertion to the news telecast of the unrelated 1982 PGH picket film footage is evidence of malice. Without quite saying
so, the CA viewed the footage insertion as giving a televised news report otherwise privileged a libelous dimension. In the
precise words of the appellate court:

While it is the duty of the media to report to the public matters of public concern and interest, the report should be a fair,
accurate and true report of the proceedings. The subject telecast failed in this aspect. The insertion of the film footage
showing the doctors’ demonstration at the PGH several times during the news report on the petition filed by the board
flunkers undoubtedly created an impression that the said demonstration was related to the filing of the case by the board
flunkers. The insertion of the film footage without the words ‘file video’, and which had no connection whatsoever to the
petition, was done with the knowledge of the [petitioners], thus, in wanton and reckless disregard of their duty to the public
to render a fair, accurate and true report of the same.

The findings of malice on the part of the [petitioners] should not be construed as a censure to the freedom of the press
since their right to render a news on matters of public concern was not the issue but rather the misrepresentation made
when they inserted a film footage of the doctors’ demonstration which created a wrong impression of the real situation.
Unquestionably, the news reporting, interview and the showing of [the flunkers] filing the case were fair reporting. At this
point, that would have been sufficient to inform the public of what really happened. However, for reasons only known to
[petitioners], they inserted the questioned film footage which had no relation to the news being reported. There is no other
conclusion that there was motive to create an impression that the issue also affected the doctors which forced them to
demonstrate. xxx. (Words in brackets supplied).

With the view we take of this case, given the parallel unchallenged determination of the two courts below that what
petitioner Vidal reported was privileged, the award of damages is untenable as it is paradoxical.

An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or
libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or
condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person.11 Liability for libel attaches
present the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
ISSUE(S): whether or not the televised news report in question on the filing of the petition for mandamus against the
respondents is libelous
HELD: No

RATIO:
Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact) or may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the
imputation (malice in law). Malice, as we wrote in Brillante v. Court of Appeals,13 is a term used to indicate the fact that
the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation
of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that
the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
as to the truth or falsity thereof.

In the instant case, there can be no quibbling that what petitioner corporation aired in its Channel 7 in the February 10,
1988 late evening newscast was basically a narration of the contents of the aforementioned petition for mandamus. This is
borne by the records of the case and was likewise the finding of the trial court. And the narration had for its subject nothing
more than the purported mistakes in paper checking and the errors in the counting and tallying of the scores in the August
1987 physicians’ licensure examinations attributable to the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine.

Conceding hypothetically that some failing specifically against the respondents had been ascribed in that news telecast, it
bears to stress that not all imputations of some discreditable act or omission, if there be any, are considered malicious thus
supplying the ground for actionable libel. For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the
presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the presumption.

Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the
existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment
as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of these are speeches or debates made by Congressmen or
Senators in the Congress or in any of its committees. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express
malice or malice in fact. The second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of
libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.

To be sure, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege
communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to
include fair commentaries on matters of public interest.

In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second kind of privileged matter, the same being
the product of a simple narration of the allegations set forth in the mandamus petition of examinees Abello, et al., devoid
of any comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found the narration to be without accompanying
distortive or defamatory comments or remarks. What at bottom petitioners Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then did was
simply to inform the public of the mandamus petition filed against the respondent doctors who were admittedly the then
chairman and members of the Board of Medicine. It was clearly within petitioner Vidal’s job as news writer and reporter
assigned to cover government institutions to keep the public abreast of recent developments therein. It must be reiterated
that the courts a quo had determined the news report in question to be qualifiedly privileged communication protected
under the 1987 Constitution.

This brings us to the more important question of whether or not the complaining respondents, in their effort to remove the
protection accorded by the privilege, succeeded in establishing ill-will and malice on the part of the petitioners in their
televised presentation of the news report in dispute, thus committing libel.

The CA, adopting the respondents’ line on the matter of malice, resolved the question in the affirmative. As the CA noted,
the insertion of an old film footage showing doctors wearing black armbands and demonstrating at the PGH, withou t the
accompanying character-generated words "file video," created the impression that other doctors were supporting and
sympathizing with the unsuccessful examinees.

The Court disagrees. Contrary to the CA’s findings, the identifying character-generated words "file video" appeared to
have been superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of televiewers of the idea that a particular footage is
current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely to prevent
misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public."17 The trial court added the observation that "the use of file
footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice."18 At any rate, the absence of the accompanying character -generated
words "file video" would not change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the audio-video publication
complained of is concerned. For, with the view we take of the state of things, the video footage was not libel in disguise;
standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.

And lest it be overlooked, personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to
defamation. The law against defamation protects one’s interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation "as good
as one’s character and conduct warrant" in the community.19 Clearly then, it is the community, not personal standards,
which shall be taken into account in evaluating any allegations of libel and any claims for damages on account thereof.

So it is that in Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel, we held: The term "community" may of course be drawn as narrowly or
as broadly as the user of the term and his purposes may require. The reason why for purposes of the law on libel the more
general meaning of community must be adopted in the ascertainment of relevant standards, is rooted deep in our
constitutional law. That reason relates to the fundamental public interest in the protection and promotion of free speech and
expression, an interest shared by all members of the body politic and territorial community. A newspaper … should be free
to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest, wherever they may take place within the
nation and as well in the outside world, with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another (however
defined in scope) on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keep within the general
community. Any other rule on defamation, in a national community like ours with many, diverse cultural, social, religious
an other groupings, is likely to produce an unwholesome "chilling effect" upon the constitutionally protected operations of
the press and other instruments of information and education.

It cannot be over-emphasized furthermore that the showing of the 1982 film footage, assuming for argument that it
contained demeaning features, was actually accompanied or simultaneously voiced over by the narration of the news report
lifted from the filing of the mandamus petition. As aptly put by the petitioners without controversion from the respondents,
there was nothing in the news report to indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create another news story beyond
what was reported.

To be sure, actual malice, as a concept in libel, cannot plausibly be deduced from the fact of petitioners having dubbed in
their February 10, 1988 telecast an old unrelated video footage. As it were, nothing in the said footage, be it taken in
isolation or in relation to the narrated Vidal report, can be viewed as reputation impeaching; it did not contain an attack, let
alone a false one, on the honesty, character or integrity or like personal qualities of any of the respondents, who were not
even named or specifically identified in the telecast. It has been said that if the matter is not per se libelous, malice cannot
be inferred from the mere fact of publication.22 And as records tend to indicate, the petitioners, particularly Vidal, do not
personally know or had dealings with any of the respondents. The Court thus perceives no reason or motive on the part of
either petitioner for malice. The respondents too had failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioners were
animated by a desire to inflict them unjustifiable harm or at least to place them in a discomforting light.

Surely, the petitioners’ failure, perhaps even their indisposition, to obtain and telecast the respondents’ side is not an
indicia of malice. Even the CA, by remaining mum on this point, agrees with this proposition and with the petitioners’
proffered defense on the matter. As petitioner Vidal said while on the witness box, his business as a reporter is to report
what the public has the right to know, not to comment on news and events, obviously taking a cue from the pronouncement
of the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New York Times Co. v. Connor23 that "a reporter … may rely on statements
made by a single source even though they reflect only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution by a public
official."

What is more, none of the herein respondents ever made a claim or pretence that he or all of them collectively was or were
among the demonstrating PGH doctors in the 1982 video footage. It thus puzzles the mind how they could claim to have
been besmirched by the use of the same video in the subject news telecast.

Given the foregoing considerations, the propriety of the award by the CA of moral and exemplary damages need not detain
us long. Suffice it to state that moral damages may be recovered only if the existence of the factual and legal bases for the
claim and their causal connection to the acts complained of are satisfactorily proven.24 Sadly, the required quantum of
proof is miserably wanting in this case. This is as it should be. For, moral damages, albeit incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate one for injury sustained and actual damages suffered.25
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if the claimants, respondents in this case, were able to
establish their right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.26 Not being entitled to moral damages,
neither may the respondents lay claim for exemplary damages.

In all, the Court holds and so rules that the subject news report was clearly a fair and true report, a simple narration of the
allegations contained in and circumstances surrounding the filing by the unsuccessful examinees of the petition for
mandamus before the court, and made without malice. Thus, we find the petitioners entitled to the protection and immunity
of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. It follows that they too cannot be held
liable for damages sought by the respondents, who, during the period material, were holding public office.

We close this ponencia with the following oft-quoted excerpts from an old but still very much applicable holding of the
Court on how public men should deport themselves in the face of criticism:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe
relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can
be assuaged by the balm of clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment
upon his officials acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
100 JEJOMAR C. BINAY, for and in behalf of his AUTHOR: Krystelle
minor daughter, JOANNA MARIE BIANCA S. NOTES: (if applicable)
BINAY, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, GENIVI V. FACTAO and VICENTE G.
TIROL, respondents.
G.R. No. 170643; September 8, 2006
TOPIC: J
PONENTE:

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. In the April 15-21, 2001 issue of Pinoy Times Special Edition, an article entitled "ALYAS ERAP JR." was
published regarding the alleged extravagant lifestyle of the Binays and the assets that they acquired while in public
office. Paragraph 25 of the article reads:
Si Joanne Marie Bianca, 13 ang sinasabing ampong anak ng mga Binay, ay bumibili ng panty na nagkakahalaga ng P1,000
ang isa, ayon sa isang writer ni Binay. Magarbo ang pamumuhay ng batang ito dahil naspoiled umano ng kanyang ama.
2. Based on this article, Elenita S. Binay, mother of the minor Joanna Marie Bianca, filed a complaint for libel against
private respondents Vicente G. Tirol as publisher, and Genivi V. Factao as writer of the article, with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati. The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
xxxx
5. GENIVI V. FACTAO, as writer of the said article, voluntarily, illegally, and with the object to insinuate and made it
understood, and was in effect understood and interpreted by the public who read it, that the young lady referred to therein can
be no other than my daughter Joanne, in this manner transmitting maliciously and intentionally to the public the impression
that Joanne is a spoiled, spendthrift brat who would not mind or care to spend P1,000 for her underwear, all as already stated,
with the object of destroying her reputation and discrediting and ridiculing her before the bar of public opinion.
6. The said article, for whatever its avowed purpose may be, is clearly aimed at scurrilously attacking my husband Jejomar C.
Binay. In which case, the insinuations directed at Joanne are clearly pointless and was done only for purposes of exposing
Joanne to public contempt.
6.1. That the said article should specifically focus in on Joanne’s panty is a clear and malicious invasion of
her privacy and calculated to heap scorn and ridicule upon her. On top of this, there is no connection
whatsoever to her being an adopted child despite which this was needlessly and maliciously highlighted.
3. Joanna also submitted an affidavit 8 where she claimed that:
4. The article was completely unmindful of the hurt and anguish I felt after it needlessly and maliciously highlighted my
being an adopted daughter. Furthermore, the article is a blatant lie. I have never in my life bought an underwear costing
P1,000.00 or more. On the contrary, I have always maintained to keep a simple and modest life as it is how my parents had
brought me up. The questioned article has no valid object except to destroy my reputation and to discredit and to bring
ridicule upon me before my peers and that of the public.
4. Private respondents did not file their counter-affidavits.
5. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case for libel and recommended the filing of information against private
respondents. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
6. Alleging that they did not receive the subpoena and copy of the complaint, private respondents filed an omnibus
motion to re-open the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor, however, denied private respondents’ motion
for reconsideration, thus they filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.
7. On July 2, 2002, then Acting Justice Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez reversed the City Prosecutor’s findings and
directed the withdrawal of the information filed in court. Elenita’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the
Resolution dated January 8, 2003, hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed with the Court of
Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision dated November 22, 2004, denying the petition and sustaining the
Justice Secretary’s ruling that there was nothing libelous in the subject article.
8. CA: denied Elena’s Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE(S): Whether or not there is prima facie evidence showing that the subject article was libelous.
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
We grant the petition.

Under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." Its elements are as
follows: (a) an imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and (d) the existence of malice. Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, it must be defamatory,
malicious, published, and the victim is identifiable.
The elements of publication and identity of the person defamed are present in this case. Thus, in resolving the issue at
hand, we limit our discussion on whether paragraph 25 of the subject article contains the two other elements of libel, to
wit: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another, i.e., whether the paragraph is defamatory; and (b)
existence of malice.

In MVRS Pub. Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Phils., Inc., we defined defamatory language in this wise:

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the
plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good
name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the
opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of
general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the
plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. (Emphasis added)

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are construed in their entirety and taken in their
plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense.

Tested against the foregoing, we find that there is prima facie showing that paragraph 25 of the subject article is
defamatory. It is opprobrious, ill-natured, and vexatious as it has absolutely nothing to do with petitioner's
qualification as a mayoralty candidate or as a public figure. It appears that private respondents’ only purpose in
focusing on Joanna’s status as an adopted child and her alleged extravagant purchases was to malign her before the
public and to bring her into disrepute. This is a clear and simple invasion of her priva cy.

In Buatis, Jr. v. People, the Court found libelous a letter addressed to a lawyer for using words such as "lousy," "inutile,"
"carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan." It cast aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a
lawyer and exposed him to public ridicule. Evidence aliunde was found unnecessary to prove libel.

In the same manner, we need not require any evidence aliunde to prove that paragraph 25 is defamatory. It has exposed
Joanna to the public at large as a spoiled and spendthrift adopted daughter and a compulsive buyer who has no qualms
buying expensive lingerie.

Private respondents argue that paragraph 25 constitutes privileged communication because it was a fair comment on the
fitness of petitioner to run for public office, particularly on his lifestyle and that of his family. As such, malice cannot be
presumed. It is now petitioner’s burden to prove malice in fact.

We are not convinced.

In the first place, paragraph 25 does not qualify as a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication, which Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code limits to the following instances: (1) A private communication made by a person to another
in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and (2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.

To qualify under the first category of a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication, paragraph 25 must fulfill
the following elements: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is
made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter,
and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good
faith and without malice.
Whichever way we view it, we cannot discern a legal, moral, or social duty in publishing Joanna's status as an adopted
daughter. Neither is there any public interest respecting her purchases of panties worth P1,000.00. Whether she indeed
bought those panties is not something that the public can afford any protection against. With this backdrop, it is obvious
that private respondents' only motive in inserting paragraph 25 in the subject article is to embarrass Joanna before the
reading public.

In addition, the claim that paragraph 25 constitutes privileged communication is a matter of defense, which is can only be
proved in a full-blown trial. It is elementary that "a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof."

Moreover, under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if
it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. It is thus incumbent upon private respondents
to prove that "good intention and justifiable motive" attended the publication of the subject article.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 75989 dated November 22, 2004, upholding the
Justice Secretary’s Resolutions dated July 2, 2002 and January 8, 2003, ordering the withdrawal of the information filed against private respondents
Genivi V. Factao and Vicente G. Tirol and the Resolution dated November 25, 2005, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is ORDERED to continue and proceed with the case for libel against
private respondents Vicente G. Tirol and Genivi V. Factao.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):