039 Ang Ladlad v.

COMELEC AUTHOR:
G.R.No. 190582, April 8, 2010 NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC:
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS: (chronological order)
The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual
orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition
on moral grounds, stating that: This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.
1. This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends
religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote: For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for
even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men,
leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that
which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
2. In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye
are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of
brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord!
Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
3. ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards
decency or morality It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that
‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.
4. Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes
‘Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’
5. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for
not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or
failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
6. Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that
does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the
U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the
government, ours too is the State’s avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our
youth from moral and spiritual degradation.

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to
deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the
First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

1. Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has
properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual
 orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole. Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that
the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. If entry into the
party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention
of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s – only that their interests have not
been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when
Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the
nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
2. In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not
recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x
Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right,
and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or
legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief. Thus, even if society’s
understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad
constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same
Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
3. Public Morals. There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices.
Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being
adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-
based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these
are not publicly accepted moral norms.
4. But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim
doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from
its Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of
age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex
with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency
or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing
the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not
later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully
ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment. The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its
Comment on February 2, 2010.

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from
implementing the Assailed Resolutions.

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention. The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion
to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene which motion was granted on February 2,
2010.

The Parties’ Arguments

1. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
2. The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s
application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of immorality. It also opined that
LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression,
and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
3. In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, "the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had
nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its
field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all
provinces in the country."

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a new
one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed
Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non -existence were already
available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at
worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioner’s right to procedural
due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows
that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in
the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT
umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines.

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they
found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitioner
does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business. Against this backdrop,
we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation . Indeed,
aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters." Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor: The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice
Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious
beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some
might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are
second-class citizens.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage,
must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have
a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions an d
moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual
institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and
justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the
elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at
the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion -
based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues: Petitioner’s
accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the
people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong
in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals
we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.We
are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the
brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their
perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.
Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of
law.

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG
agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are
committing immoral acts." The OSG argues: A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a
different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its
hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the
law.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is
robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous,
at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals
themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates
our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate governmen t end. In Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis
of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution."

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes
it, the asserted state interest here – that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state interest
that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this
case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve
to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-
list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under
different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate
class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis
as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not
justified by the circumstances of the case."

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity
of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: In a democracy, this common
agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every
prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order
of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and
these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from
determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally
designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance.
Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs
and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority,
however small – not only for a majority, however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon itself a self-
denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not
only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that
both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights
tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a
change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the
existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or
the majority of the population. A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate
controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a political party
incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the
freedom of association guarantee.

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even
defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood,
believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our
democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the
values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this
Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more
complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear -cut
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of
homosexuality through this Decision.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s p etition has
the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally
participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and –
as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To
the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its
views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in
particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and
groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly
significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather
than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular,
we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in
the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26 All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the
law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied
equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a
status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation." Additionally, a variety of United
Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international
agreements.

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held
by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the
Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as
follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affair s,
the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled
to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be
justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political
affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States
parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective
office.

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now
to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation
to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state
of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It
is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many
social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has
the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then
they are no longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.
Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law
is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which a mount
to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal
attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s role is not to
impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced
by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
PUNO, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
That the assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause of
the Constitution.—The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-
establishment clause of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in
legal—much less constitutional—terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for registration as a sectoral party principally
on the ground that it “tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian and Muslim) beliefs.” To be sure, th e
COMELEC’s ruling is completely antithetical to the fundamental rule that “[t]he public morality expressed in the law is
necessarily secular[,] for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion,
including the morality it sanctions.”

The assailed resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) are violative of the constitutional directive that no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.—The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are
violative of the constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Ang Ladlad’s right of political participation was unduly infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and
personal prejudices of its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a morality
police.

That the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) capitalized on Ang Ladlad’s definition of the term “sexual orientation,”
as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with men, as basis for the declaration that the party
espouses and advocates sexual immorality; This position would deny homosexual and bixesual individuals a fundamental
element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of personal liberty.—The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad’s
definition of the term “sexual orientation,” as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with men, as
basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual immorality. This position, however, would deny
homosexual and bisexual individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of personal
liberty. For, the “ability to [independently] define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty” cannot truly be
exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the “emotional enrichment from close ties with others.”

At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life.—It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. These matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the due process clause. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.

That a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level
of review.—The ponencia of Mr. Justice Del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in
themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause. Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most
liberal basis of judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government need only show that the challenged
classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest. I humbly submit, however, that a classification
based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.
Same; Same; Same; View that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political
progress.—It would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite
some recent political progress. The discrimination that they have suffered has been so pervasive and severe—even though
their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability to contribute to or perform in society—that it is highly unlikely
that legislative enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that discrimination.

That any state action singling les-bians, gays, bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping. —It is therefore
respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment
is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.

That the position that the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community cannot participate in the party-list
system because it is not a “marginalized and underrepresented sector” is belied by the Supreme Court ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, where the Court held that the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive.—It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the
party-list system because it is not a “marginalized and underrepresented sector” enumerated either in the Constitution or
Republic Act No. (RA) 7941. However, this position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.

CORONA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

That the party-list system is essentially a tool for the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of
affording opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the
crafting of national laws.—The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for the
advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the proposition t hat
the advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors contributes to the advancement of the common good and of
our nation’s democratic ideals.

That the Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as “marginalized” to the hands
of Congress.—The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as “marginalized” to
the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995.

The Supreme Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented
in the past.—In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), the Court stressed that the party-list
system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
professionals and even those in the underground movement who wish to come out and participate). They are those sectors
traditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation of national
policy although their sectoral interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the national interest.

The concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by
concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition.—The concept of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors
deemed to be significant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with a constitutional bond, that is, specific
sectors subject of specific provisions in the Constitution, namely, labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, veterans, fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, overseas workers and professionals.

The marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire
to say something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and historically
decisive role in Philippine society.—The long-muffled voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their
respective interests are intimately and indispensably woven into the fabric of the national democratic agenda. The social,
economic and political aspects of discrimination and marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a part icular
sector or group in the advancement of the collective goals of Philippine society as a whole. In other words, marginalized
sectors should be given a say in governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say something
constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and historically decisive role in
Philippine society.

That the majority’s decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a
marginalized and underrepresented sector.—The enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and underrepresented
in the fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA 7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to
disregard the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party’s eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the parties, sectors or organizations “must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941.” For this reason, I submit the majority’s
decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the following manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not mentioned in
Section 5(2), Article VI are “such other sectors as may be provided by law” duly enacted by Congress. —Marginalized
sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are “such other sectors
as may be provided by law” duly enacted by Congress. It is also consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction,
ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word or phrase that follows an enumeration of particular and specific words
of the same class, the general word or phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases ,
akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

That even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals
(LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the party-list system.—Even
assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is
underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as marginalized under the party-list system. First, petitioner is not
included in the sectors mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an
overly strained interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot establish a close connection to any of the said sectors .
Indeed, petitioner does not even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an altogether
distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.
Same; Same; Same; View that only sectors expressly or closely related to those sect ors mentioned in Section 5 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system.—In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its
authority under Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941. Sections 2, 3(d) and (5) of the said law
instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as qualified marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the
party-list system. Respect for that policy and fidelity to the Court’s duty in our scheme of government require us to declare
that only sectors expressly mentioned or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 are qualified to
participate in the party-list system.

Until and unless Congress amends the law to include the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) and other
sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress’ determination on the matter is proper.—The Court is called upon to
exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly adhering to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of
marginalized sectors as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to amend and
expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation. The Constitution expressly and exclusi vely vests
the authority to determine “such other [marginalized] sectors” qualified to participate in the party-list system to Congress.
Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and other sectors in the party-list system, deference
to Congress’ determination on the matter is proper.

The party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially
misunderstood sectors.—While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be given no place in a
truly just, democratic and libertarian society, the party-list system has a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was
not designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors. Rather, it is a
platform for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors whose interests are, by nature and history, also the
nation’s but which interests have not been sufficiently brought to public attention because of these sectors’
underrepresentation.

Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors may qualify as marginalized and
underrepresented, the Court’s task is to respect that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it.—Congress was
given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The
Court’s task is to respect that legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand such
congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of political will and not of judicial judgment.

ABAD, J., Separate Opinion:

The underlying policy of Republic Act No. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. —The underlying
policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an
opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), 359 SCRA 698 (2001), the Court laid down guidelines for accreditation, but these seem to
leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations, clubs, or
associations can pass for sectoral parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court can, in
adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) erred when it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for sectoral party accreditation on
religious and moral grounds—the COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress.—Here, I
fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and
moral grounds. The COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it
to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this point.

That a reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court’s reading, neither the Constitution nor Republic
Act No. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) now suggests.—
The COMELEC’s proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction which is inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the
Constitution and the law. A reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court’s reading, neither the
Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court
said in that case that the list in R.A. 7941 is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of
society, it was envisioned as a social justice tool for the marginalized and underrepresented in general.
That Congress did not provide a definition of the term “marginalized and underrepresented.”—Congress did not provide a
definition of the term “marginalized and underrepresented.” Nor did the Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang
Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in adopting such term. No dou bt,
Congress crafted that term—marginalized and underrepresented—from its reading of the concrete examples that the
Constitution itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the labor, the peasant, the urb an
poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described
by examples of what they are, which was what those who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract
description of them.

That an interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list
sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of
Representatives.—An interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate
party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of
Representatives. It will defeat altogether the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough votes, the
country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There will be an irrational apportionment
of party-list seats in the legislature.

That applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBTs) of a certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. —In this case, Ang
Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons
(LGBTs). Applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, the
Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by and large, subtly if not brutally,
excluded from the mainstream, discriminated against, and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s petition
on religious and moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.

That Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditation—their members are in
the vulnerable class like the women and the youth.—Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for
sectoral party accreditation. Their members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad
represents a narrow definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete and specific definition of a sub -group within the
class (group of gay beauticians, for example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence.
040 PGBI v COMELEC AUTHOR: Krystelle
G.R. No. 190529; April 29, 2010 NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC:
PONENTE: BRION,J:

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari and in the motion for
reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated
October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBIs motion
for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster
of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
BACKGROUND

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act,
provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

xxxx

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

2. The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System which it promulgated on
June 25, 1996.
3. For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679
deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it
failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the
COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions
adversely affected can personally or through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26,
2009.
4. PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad
cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List System Act. Among other
arguments, PGBI asserted that:
 The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which
allows any party, organization and coalition already registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though
is required to file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire t o
participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007
elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next
succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;
 The Supreme Courts ruling in G.R. No. 177548 Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as MINERO v.
Commission on Elections cannot apply in the instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is
removed from PGBIs; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others
similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Courts
ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws;
 The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of
the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941
5. The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit.
 First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941.The provision simply
means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the exemption from registration
does not arise and the party, organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request
for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.
  Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in
the 2004 elections.
 Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of the essence
of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file
their opposition.
6. As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have been
filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion
was obviously filed months after the deadline.
7. PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC when it
moved to reconsider its delisting.
8. We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also
known as MINERO v. Commission on Elections (Minero); we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a
ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court
disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:
9. Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004
elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding elections.
COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.
10. PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI claimed that
the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts
that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inc lusive
of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994.
11. PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to participate in one
(1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to secure the required percentage
in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.
12. Considering PGBIs arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the courts docket.
ISSUE(S): (a) whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether PGBIs right to due process was
violated.
HELD: None. No.

RATIO:
We find the petition partly impressed with merit.

The Minero Ruling

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from
the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if
it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered . The
word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional
deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list
organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds
is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the
party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the laws clear and categorical language and
the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different
and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpret ation
not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941
as follows:
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution
of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in
light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet
qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.

We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to state that a party-list group or organization which qualified
in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in
the last two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the
percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of
Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now
necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or
combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding
elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941
should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the
application of the principle of stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established)
is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a
decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all futur e
cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb
not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be
decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt
to relitigate the same issue.

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the
great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous
application of the law an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain.
Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general.
Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon
Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and
immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA
7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We
cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to
do so will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this
concern to the legislatures notice.

The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceed ings, due process is the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand . What is frowned upon is
absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied
due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process
grounds.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009
insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No.
09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the coming May 2010 elections.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
041 Magdalo v. COMELEC AUTHOR:
G.R. No. NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC:
PONENTE:

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its
registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
2. COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO where it held that
Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the
Constitution. It is common knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV,
and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City
on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were
in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful
means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.
3. MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution.
MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified
its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group. COMELEC En
Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO

ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means
HELD:
1. No, COMELECS Resolutions are sustained.
Dispositive:
1. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for
Registration by MAGDALO.
RATIO:
To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation, as
this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on the other
hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a
registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out,
accreditation is the next natural step to follow.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that "seek to achieve their
goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of
B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to
accreditation."

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It
also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common right,
against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not
be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register
political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in charact er. In
exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or
accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of
qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable.

In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders
of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former
President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the
state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to
resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full
battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to
ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government constituted clear acts of violence.
Additional Notes: (they were given amnesty)
This Court, in People v. Patriarca, explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness
which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty
looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
xxx xxx xxx

In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:

"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x"
042 DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, et al., petitioners,
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for
vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality
BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget
Reform Decree of 1977."
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
PONENTE: Fernan, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the
people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for "
listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as follows:

A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE
ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.

B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES
AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.

C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND
PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.

D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.

E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE
BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.

The Solicitor General, in its comment for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were
allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or
determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a
coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.

Petitiners filed a reply stating, among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the
resolution of the present case in abeyance "until developments arise to enable the parties to concretize their respective
stands."

The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered
the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) as basis for the petition's dismissal.

ISSUE: WON Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section
16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency
of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is
for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

RATIO:
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice to national interest that We
take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents' motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact
that the new Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim
section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not officially
reconvened, We see no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.

The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of petitioners' locus standi. Thus:

Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are
many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by
an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer. Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only
persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied. ]

Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as regards taxpayers'
suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere
cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations
Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commisions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a
law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The
purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of
augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, off ice or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is
for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an
even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers
of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as
embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money
from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to
transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among
others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts
all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed
upon the President, "... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations,
results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches
the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development
priorities but on political and personal expediency." The contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section
44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its
face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government against a
coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. Indeed, where the
legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to inter fere
with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes
the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the
essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law" and which power this Court has exercised in many instances.

Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law, which We have earlier mentioned to be
constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord them the protection sought as
they are not acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.

The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about by the plundering of the
Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision [that] allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of
this sad experience cannot remain written in our statute books.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby
declared null and void for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a
statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. PD 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16 (5) Article VIII. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but
likewise goes beyond its tenor. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
043 Senate vs. Ermita AUTHOR:
[G.R. No. 169777; 169659; 169660 ; 169667 ; 169834 ; NOTES: (if applicable)
171246 - April 20, 2006]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring
Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
2. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
3. The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
4. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which req uires
all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.

ISSUE(S):
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

HELD: NO.

RATIO:

The power of inquiry [inquiry in aid of legislation] of Congress is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
An exemption to such Congressional power falls under the rubric of executive privilege which is also a constitutional concept.
Executive privilege, however, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. The validity of a
claim thereof depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Executive officials are NOT exempt from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials.

Section 1 of E.O. 464 specifically applies to department heads. The required prior consent under Section 1 is based on Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either
House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid
on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in
such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress.

Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to
Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged,
and that the President has not reversed such determination. There is an implied claim of privilege, which implied claim is not
accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof.
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to
merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned
that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged.
That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It
threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has
requested.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely
implied. It does not provide for precise and certain reasons for the claim, which deprives the Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case.

Section 2(a) merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive
privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of
opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.

Petitioners are not amiss in claiming that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but
the right of the people to information.

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the
people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising
their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to
unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to
be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they
can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress” opinions which they can then communicate to their
representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just
as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive
privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without
need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid.
Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall
have given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
045 Gutierrez v. House of Representatives AUTHOR: RC Alfafara
[G. R. No. 193459; Feb. 15, 2011] NOTE/S:
PONENTE: Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS:
1. The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the
Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).
2. Before the 15th Congress opened its first session (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI
of the Constitution), private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao
(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
3. A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who, by Memorandum
directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
4. Private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and
James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement
by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio
and Emerenciana de Jesus.
5. On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date, the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker
Belmonte who, by Memorandum also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
6. House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules, instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa,
Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs
Department, to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the
Order of Business for the following day.
7. During its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.
8. After hearing, public respondent (through a Resolution) found both complaints sufficient in form.
9. The Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published.
10. Petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept
the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the
complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.
11. After hearing, public respondent (by Resolution) found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the
complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of
whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was also served a notice directing her to file an
answer to the complaints within 10 days.
12. Six days following her receipt of the notice to file, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application
for injunctive reliefs.
13. Court En Banc: RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order and to require respondents to comment on
the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the OSG to file in 10 days
its Comment on the petition
14. The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public
respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments.
15. Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene which the Court granted by Resolution.
16. Under an Advisory issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted, followed by petitioners filing of a
Consolidated Reply and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review.
(2) Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing its two assailed Resolutions.
HELD:
(1) No, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence
and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
(2) No, in the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral of the
first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there
was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from
which date the 10-day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte
directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day
session period.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court is LIFTED.
RATIO:
1. Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives: The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
2. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the
power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such
power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
3. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action.
4. Santiago v. Guingona: “it is within the power & jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.”
5. Taada v. Angara: In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution,
it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
6. Taada v. Cuenco: Although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
7. Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of this Court
reflects, includes the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
8. In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public
respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and
prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
9. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding
the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
10. Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert
that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner
filed the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and
substance of the two complaints.
11. An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. The question of ripeness is especially
relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. In the present petition, there is no
doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to
publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
12. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel
situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue
from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer
within a period of one year.
13. Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Rep. Tupas, is the subject of an investigation she is conducting,
while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his
father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in
arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.
>> The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication
thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.
>> The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself.
>> In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the
proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.
14. The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of work .
15. Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the
complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.
>> The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express
constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function
to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated
determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the
Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.
>> Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in
determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional
requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement is met
if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.
16. Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as
Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a hearing. In the discharge of its constitutional duty,
the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital to effectively
carry out the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
17. Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls
upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power.
18. Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was
published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She
likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
>> Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication of rules in any medium of
information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation…Public respondent explains that
the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI
of Constitution.
19. While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory difference in their usage.
The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times. A number of those instances involves the promulgation of
various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other
constitutional offices. To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate and publish, the case of
the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their
effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means the delivery of the decision to
the clerk of court for filing and publication.
20. In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise take on different meanings as they are
part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case, the publication of implementing rules occurs
after their promulgation or adoption.
21. Promulgation must be used in the context in which it is generally understood that is, to make known . Generalia verba
sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the
general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.
22. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be understood to
have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
23. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known
its rules. x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept
of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion
that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
>> Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it
did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate, there is no other single
formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.
24. From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute.
25. Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the
effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the
Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated
periods would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the
effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the
impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement.
26. Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at effectively
carry[ing] out the purpose of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House
deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such
situation of early filing and in keeping with the effective implementation of the purpose of the impeachment provisions. In
other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House
to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.
27. Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement
the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to
pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any
impairment of vested rights.
28. It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved,
impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.
29. The one-year bar rule:
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
** Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before
the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment compl aint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent.
** On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the
impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends
somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel
group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its impeachment complaint could
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
>> Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco states that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the
complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice.
>> From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachmen t complaint coupled
with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
>> Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
30. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
31. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone cannot light
up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper
committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one
lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is
kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
32. A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory. For one, it puts premium on
senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the
attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are
devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the
entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to
naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case,
would be barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.
33. Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal
witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be
brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.
34. Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign,
endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the
Constitution since they would have already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually
anybody can initiate a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints.
Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could
not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of committing their endorsement.
The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on
the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial.
35. The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the House Secretary General who would
otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the
proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the
Order of Business of the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to
set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of
a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.
36. Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but
any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a
motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the
propriety of the referral. With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a
subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show
that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said
committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally
prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation
is afforded the House, as the Constitution grants a maximum of 3 session days within which to make the proper referral.
37. As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The
Constitution states that a verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
>> In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral of the
first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010,
there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress
opened from which date the 10-day session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010,
Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well
within the said 10-day session period.
38. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of
reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire
citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity
to remove an impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment
proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice
report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of
at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House. To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justices
recommendation to the House plenary.
>> The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed
provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against
the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the
impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to
accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.
x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence
to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at
issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty
and stability of judicial decisions.
>> As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins,
when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.
39. It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number
of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be
precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment
proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in
Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional
provision.
40. Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly
proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer
is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and
evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers,
the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave
issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of
an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of
protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be
made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once.
There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.
41. Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House.
>> First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner
invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a] complaint or
information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. To
petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its
discretion when it disregarded its own rules. Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will
confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment
process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that of t he
House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the deadline.
>> Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out
the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delvin g into the
practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of whi ch must be made by
the House which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioners invocation of that particular rule of
Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment
offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the Articles of
Impeachment. It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.
42. The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains
that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.
>> Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated
that consolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate; consolidation may come today or may come later on
after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will
decide when is the time to consolidat, and if, indeed, we need to consolidate. Since public respondent, whether motu
proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this
matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.
46 CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA vs. AUTHOR:
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an NOTE: The power of judicial review includes the power of
IMPEACHMENT COURT reviewing justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
[G.R. NO. 200242 - July 17, 2012]
PONENTE: Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
1. A meeting was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint for impeachment against
petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. On that same day, the complaint was voted
in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.
2. On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment court on
the following day.
3. On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption (eg. HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC
HIS STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. For example, it was discovered that petitioner owns a 300-sq. meter apartment
in a posh Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. This was not disclosed in his SALN.)
4. Beginning January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines, acting as an Impeachment Court, conducted
trial proceedings against the petitioner.
5. On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution which allowed the Prosecution to introduce
evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 (petitioner’s alleged failure to disclose to the public his SALN as required
by the Constitution) and 2.3 (on failure to report some properties in SALN) of Article II of the Articles of
Impeachment. Presentation of evidence in support of Paragraph 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and failure to
disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort in
Taguig) was not allowed.
6. In a subsequent Resolution dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s requ est for
subpoena directed to the officers of two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and
dollar currencies.
7. On 8 February 2012, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, arguing that the Impeachment
Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
8. Petitioner’s contentions:
 Petitioner was impeached through the Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that was accomplished with
undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause.
 Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the
alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the
hearings.
 His right to due process was being violated in the impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-
Judges have lost the cold-neutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors.
 Despite the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012 Resolution which disallowed the introduction of
evidence in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, "the allies of President Aquino in the Senate abused
their authority and continued their presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of objection".
9. Respondents’ contentions:
 The issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the
course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or allege any violation of, the three express
and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole power to try and decide impeachment cases.
Unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its
power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the
nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator -Judges are clearly
entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus
failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges.

ISSUE: Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or incidents arising from
impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of the person being
tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
HELD: Yes, it may. However, no relief was granted to Petitioner herein, because the issue has become moot.
RATIO
1. Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy," was foreseen as creating
 divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that "the decision
will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or
guilt." Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter
of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of
checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of
the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial
review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
2. Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens
and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US
Constitution. Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution.
3. In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc, we ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral
of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process
clause and of the one-year bar provision.
4. On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that
could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
5. Mootness
 In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without
any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening
applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice
within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
 An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal
of the petition. WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive
relief/s is DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.
047 REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, vs. AUTHOR: Ernest
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents. NOTE/S: This case has a MR dated October 22 2013. SC
G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013 basically affirms this decision in denying that MR.
TOPIC: COMELEC juris vs. HRET juris; citizenship; residency
PONENTE: PEREZ, J.:
Nature: certiorari
FACTS:
1. On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before
the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it
contained material misrepresentationsg, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of
her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of
Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;2 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her
birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or
an immigrant of the United States of America;5 and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.

2. In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman
Mandanas), there is no valid and binding marriage between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas
was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio.7
Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to
her.8 As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964.9 Lastly,
petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by
evidence.10

3. During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed a "Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence
and Amended List of Exhibits"11 consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled
"Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document executed by its author
Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a
holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and
Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.

4. On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling petitioner’s COC. The COMELEC First Division found that,
contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the oneyear residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.13 Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone
district of Marinduque.

5. petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such
status by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact
of her marriage to an American citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage
only resulted into dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the one-year
residency requirement prescribed by the Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile
of origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.

6. On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

7. Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.

8. On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality16 declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this
Court restraining its execution.

9. On same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives.

10. Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.
ISSUE: In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order,
petitioner raises the following issues:

31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her
 oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.

32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it too k
cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of law.

33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that
Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House
of Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

HELD: NO. Petition must fail.

RATIO:

JURISDICTION

It is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be
a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is asserting that it is the HRET
which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the House of Representatives is best
discussed in another tribunal of competent jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the issues raised by
petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it was emphasized that the
term of office of the Members of the House of Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Re solutions,
unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives , as
stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge o f all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives,
to wit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)

When is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives?

Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, / Limkaichong v. COMELEC/ Gonzalez v. COMELEC:

“…once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. “

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To
repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election."28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June
2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of Representatives.

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker
in open session.

Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and
(2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open
session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated
14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the
COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser
which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a decision of the
COMELEC First Division.

Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was promulgated on 27 March 2013, and the assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory
after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and executory, petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 3729
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she failed to do
so. She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say
that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same
having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and
the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process
of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence.
Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence"
was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before the
COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan’s petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner
had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her .

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in
the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:31

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
 heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)

CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCY

As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have
accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on
petitioner’s lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied
that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.

Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent
is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now
shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the
privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she
remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has reacquired such
status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted
no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that
she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her.33 Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit
of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.34 Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and
zeal to serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity."35 We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If petitioner
executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she
executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the A ffidavit was executed
in September 2012.

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that
Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of natural-born
Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what
is already part of the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously
passed upon by Respondent COMELEC."36 This statement raises a lot of questions – Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of
natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has
indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in
connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For
another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular
No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner’s oath of office
as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner’s citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.

As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born status, we quote with approval the ruling of
the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque:

"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re -acquisition of Filipino
 citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the
period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that petitioner had already re-acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that
she has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that petitioner had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she has met the one-year residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of
origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact
alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, petitioner has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American
citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA."37 (Emphasis
supplied.)

All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the COMELEC is given much discretion in the
evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in
Mastura v. COMELEC:

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or
no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself — on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.1âwphi1

Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which warrants this Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined
meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission on Elections39 where the Court held:

x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule
65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross. (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of discretion exists.

ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS

Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives other than those enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the
same meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of Representatives who have acquired foreign
citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err
when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen. It simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.
DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission
on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld.SO ORDERED.
048 ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, AUTHOR: Darth twinkle
vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, NOTES:
Respondent.
G.R. No. 191618 June 7, 2011
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Nachura, J.:
FACTS:

1. Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.”
2. Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
3. The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Macalintal of the SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition
and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
4. Atty Macalintal argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for
the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
5. The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the
Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of
the Constitution.

ISSUE(S): 1) WON PET is constitutional. 2) WON PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

HELD: 1) YES. 2) NO.
SC:. WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 191618 STANDS.

RATIO:

1. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin
Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
“constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary.
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to
carry it into effect.

Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. Thus:

Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the Herculean
task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in accordance with the process
outlined by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez
that the additional duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of independence and of the
plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget allocation of the PET.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes
the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that the
abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not
unwarranted.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en
banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's
method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.6

2. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power
“shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up embodied in the
Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When
the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially
a judicial power.

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or
metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.

At the higher levels - city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial - exclusive and original jurisdiction
is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests
which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section
2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the
Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject
to judicial review - via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party - if there is a showing that the decision was rendered
with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they
are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of
the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI
(for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution..
049. Ople vs. Torres AUTHOR: Revy Neri
GR. No. 159402; February 23, 2011 NOTES:
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
1. President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308 or Adoption of a National Computerized on
December 12, 1996.
2. The said AO provides that it will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons
seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations.
3. AO No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulations on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997.
4. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee,
are charged with the implementation of AO No. 308.
5. Petitioner Ople prays to invalidate AO No. 308 or Adoption of National Computerized Identification Reference
System on two important constitutional grounds: 1.) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and 2.)
it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
6. The court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

ISSUE(S): WON Administrative Order No 308 is null and unconstitutional.

HELD: YES. The petition is granted and AO 308 declared null and void for being unconstitutional. Assuming, arguendo,
that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."

RATIO:
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that
is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.

Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable.
The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to
execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of
government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power
to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,
legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in
the Presidents. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for
the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No.
308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make
rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty,
affords no proctection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get
this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a
citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No.
308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs."

It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our
people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O.
No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement;
it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology
are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less
verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it
over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. The computer is capable of
producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes. It
can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When
information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the
subject. Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the right to
privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true
to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their
rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.

The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the
policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes and
bounds of the ID System.

The Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational
relationship test. He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of
basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for
development planning. He cocludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are
rationally related to the end. We are not impressed by the argument.
In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny
for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give
the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is
not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They
must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to
preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human
rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in
danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
 050[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998] AUTHOR: Bea Mationg
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF NOTES: (if applicable)
BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR *The case is about remedial law. It discussed forum shopping,
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT the propriety of filing petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. mandamus. I did not include those topics anymore since this is
CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. a POLI case.
ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Martinez, J.

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located in Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and
Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners.
2. The land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly
annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
3. During the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property
under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which
ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives to
desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the subject land until further orders.
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May 21, 1992,
directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary
proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed
nullification for the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the
subject property.
6. The DARAB acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank to
seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Directors memorandum,
dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank to return the
claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until further orders.
7. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed
Resolution, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the
subject property is situated.

However, on November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from
agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the
distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:

1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;

2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;
5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project has no reference to Memo Circular
No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.
8. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and
distribution of the property.
9. Governor Fortich of Bukidnon appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the
conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting
an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a memorandum to the President favorably endorsing the project with a
recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the province for the conversion
of the land. The Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the (DILG), recommended the conversion of the subject land to
industrial/institutional use with a request that the President hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in
question.
Office of the President: converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great
opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none)
does not guarantee such benefits.
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the
subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August
11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers (farmers who protested against the conversion)
protest by issuing the so-called Win/Win Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the approximately forty-four (44)
hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be
suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the highway provided in
the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned government agencies are
directed to immediately conduct the segregation survey of the area, valuation of the property and
generation of titles in the name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously determine who among
the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment of just compensation to
NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including other lands previously
surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the Department of Agrarian
Reform in the implementation of this Order.
Petitioners sought to nullify the said resolution. In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners
claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by
fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to
come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March
1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.

ISSUE(S): What is the legal effect of the Win-Win Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision
involving the same subject matter, which had already become final and executory?

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.

RATIO:
(1) The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in
Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:

SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after
the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of Ma rch 29, 1996 final and
executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-
open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of
the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a
second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of
the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executory,
the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening
of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach
a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence
to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such
principle must immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has
attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street in a 1918 case, is a lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
(2) The motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their
motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in
interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the
alleged master list was made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution
which directs the DAR to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-
beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those purportedly Found Qualified
and Recommended for Approval. In other words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment
or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interestmeans a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.[59] Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in
question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null and void.
Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
51 HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor of the AUTHOR: Yayie Lanting
Province of Nueva Ecija, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. NOTES:
TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
represented by SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY
MANUEL R. SANCHEZ, MR. OSCAR C. TINIO, in his capacity as Provincial Vice-
Governor of Nueva Ecija, and MR. LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR. CRISPULO S.
ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C. SANTOS, MR.VICENTE C. PALILIO, and MR.
NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in their capacity as Provincial Board Members of Nueva
Ecija, respondents.
G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998
PONENTE: PUNO, J.
FACTS:
1. On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging petitioner
with grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
 alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and
uttered threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who encircled the area. Private
respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the
province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts were intended to harass
them into approving this loan; that fortunately, no session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that day for lack of quorum and the
proposed legislative measure was not considered; that private respondents opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecij a had an
unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that the
provincial budget officer and treasurer had earlier disclosed that the province could not afford to contract another obligati on; that
petitioner's act of barging in and intimidating private respondents was a serious insult to the integrity and independence of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his private army posed grave danger to private respondents' lives and safety.

2. Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury
of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province

3. President Ramos noted that the situation of "12 Sep at the Session Hall," i.e., the refusal of the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to approve the proposed loan, did not appear to justify "the use of force, intimidation or armed
followers." He thus instructed the then Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to "[t]ake
appropriate preemptive and investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not the peace."

4. Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against him and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its
annexes. In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit [his] verified/sworn answer thereto, not a
motion to dismiss, together with such documentary evidence that [he] has in support thereof, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt."

6. Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle
the controversy. The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and order in the
province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-
existence.

7.Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt.
 petitioner requested for an extension of 30 days to submit his for 3 times and was granted for 3 times but the last
extension was for only 10days.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order
 Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in
default and to have waived his right to present evidence
 Undersecretary Sanchez reconsidered the order of default in the interest of justice. He noted the appearance of
petitioner's counsel and gave petitioner "for the last time" fifteen (15) days from receipt to file his answer.

8. Since petitioner still failed to file his answer, he was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence in his
behalf. Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order of default and directed private respondents to present their
evidence ex-parte.

9.Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss."

  alleged that the letter-complaint was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office of the President;
 the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him to answer the complaint.

10. on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the
President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against
him.

11. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA challenging the order of preventive suspension and the
order of default.

12.Meanwhile, the proceedings before the DILG continued.

 Undersecretary Sanchez denied the "Motion to Dismiss" and "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration."

13.petitioner filed with the DILG a "Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension, "Motion to Lift Default Order and
Admit Answer Ad Cautelam."
 petitioner alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, while he was at his district office in the town of Munoz, he re ceived a phone
call from Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Jose del Mundo. Del Mundo, who belonged to petitioner's political party, informed him that
Vice-Governor Tinio was enraged at the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who were in petitioner's party because they refused to
place on the agenda the ratification of the proposed P150 million loan of the province.Petitioner repaired to the provincial capitol to advise
his party-mates on their problem and at the same time attend to his official functions. Upon arrival, he went to the Session Hall and asked
the members present where Vice-Governor Tinio was. However, without waiting for their reply, he left the Hall and proceeded to his
office.

14. Undersecretary Sanchez granted the "Motion to Lift Default Order and to Admit Answer Ad Cautelam" and admitted
the "Answer Ad Cautelam" as petitioner's position paper

15. petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation."

 prayed that a formal investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23; and that this be held at the province of Nueva Ecija

16.In the meantime, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition. Petitioner filed the present petition to the SC

17. After filing the petition before this Court, petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction."
 alleged that subsequent to the institution of this petition, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments
rendered a resolution on the case finding him guilty of the offenses charged. His finding was based on the position
papers and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties. The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of
complainants' witnesses to be "more natural, reasonable and probable" than those of herein petitioner Joson's.

18.Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He
imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay

19.The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the order of the Executive Secretary.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the CA erred in applying the alter-ego principle?
HELD: NO
RATIO:
Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the Local Government Code enumerates the grounds for which an elective local
official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office. Section 60 reads:
"Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. -- An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the
following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan , sangguniang
panlunsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court."

When an elective local official commits an act that falls under the grounds for disciplinary action, the administrative
complaint against him must be verified and filed with any of the following:
"Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.-- A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be filed
before the Office of the President.
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to
the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose
decision shall be final and executory."
An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and filed with the proper government office. A complaint against an
elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the President. A complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed with
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.

The petitioner questions the jurisdiction and authority of the DILG Secretary over the case. He contends that under the law,
it is the Office of the President that has jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that the Court of Appeals erred in
applying the alter-ego principle because the power to discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not with the
DILG Secretary.

Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the
Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23, to wit:
"Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified, against elective local officials mentioned in the preceding Section shall
be acted upon by the President. The President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining
Authority."
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority. He may
constitute an Investigating Committee in the Department of the Interior and Local Government for the purpose.
The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service, constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government."

Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself
or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating
Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is
not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a
Special Investigating Committee.

The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his
power of general supervision over local governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions."

The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers
perform their duties." If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The President's power of general supervision means no
more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law.
Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local
officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. Thus:
"Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an investigation of the nature involved in thi s
proceeding, and in view of the nature and character of the executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is invested,
the constitutional grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner
herein.Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority
to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational,
and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful stud y and
investigation.”

The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the
power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23,
however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The
President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency. Thus:
"Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief E xecutive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed b y and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President. The power of control is provided in the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."

Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President,
however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in
behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and
supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in
the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.

The procedure how the Disciplining and Investigating Authorities should exercise their powers is distinctly set forth in the
Local Government Code and A.O. No. 23. Section 62 of the Code provides:
"Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.-- (a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the President or the sanggunian
concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and commence
investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of such answer of the respondent.

Sections 1 and 3, Rule 5 of A.O. No. 23 provide:

"Sec. 1. Commencement. Within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the complaint and answer,
together with their attachments and other relevant papers, to the Investigating Authority who shall commence the investigation of the case within ten
(10) days from receipt of the same.

"Sec. 3. Evaluation. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the complaint and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determine whether there is
a prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal administrative proceedings."
When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining Authority shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his verified
answer within fifteen (15) days from notice. Upon filing of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating Authority
for investigation.

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the power of the President when he required petitioner
to answer the complaint. Undisputably, the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President but it was the DILG
Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer.

Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office
should have first required petitioner to file his answer.Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been referred
to the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the
answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case. The President found the
complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter
is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.

In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in recommending to the Disciplining
Authority his preventive suspension during the investigation.Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the
Local Government Code, viz:
"Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.-- (a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;

(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the
offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence;Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty
(60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively
suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.
In sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are
joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability
that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.

Executive Secretary Torres, on behalf of the President, imposed preventive suspension on petitioner Joson
Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied
with. Petitioner's failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his right to
file answer and present evidence; and as a result of this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined. The Executive
Secretary also found that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during the
pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against him.

We now come to the validity of the January 8, 1998 Resolution of the Executive Secretary finding petitioner guilty as
charged and imposing on him the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months from office without pay.
Petitioner claims that the suspension was made without formal investigation pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7 of A.O.
No. 23.

The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous. Petitioner's right to a formal
investigation is spelled out in the following provisions of A.O. No. 23, viz:
"SEC. 3 Evaluation. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the complaint and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determine whether there is
a prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal administrative proceedings.
SEC. 4. Dismissal motu proprio. If the Investigating Authority determines that there is no prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal
administrative proceedings, it shall, within the same period prescribed under the preceding Section, submit its recommendation to the Disciplining
Authority for the motu proprio dismissal of the case, together with the recommended decision, resolution, and order.
SEC. 5. Preliminary conference. If the Investigating Authority determines that there is prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal
administrative proceedings, it shall, within the same period prescribed under the preceding Section, summon the parties to a preliminary conference to
consider the following:
a) whether the parties desire a formal investigation or are willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record; and
b) If the parties desire a formal investigation, to consider the simplification of issues, the possibility of obtaining stipulation or admission of facts and
of documents, specifically affidavits and depositions, to avoid unnecessary proof, the limitation of number of witnesses, and such other matters as may
be aid the prompt disposition of the case.
The Investigating Authority shall encourage the parties and their counsels to enter, at any stage of the proceedings, into am icable settlement,
compromise and arbitration, the terms and conditions of which shall be subject to the approval of the Disciplining Authority.
After the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall issue an order reciting the matters taken up thereon, including the facts stipulated
and the evidences marked, if any. Such order shall limit the issues for hearing to those not disposed of by agreement or admission of the parties, and
shall schedule the formal investigation within ten (10) days from its issuance, unless a later date is mutually agreed in writing by the parties
concerned."

The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23
provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they
desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether
a formal investigation would be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As
respondent, he is accorded several rights under the law, to wit:
"Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. -- The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor
through compulsory process of subpoena orsubpoena duces tecum."

An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. These rights are essentially
part of procedural due process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in person or
by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory
attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Rules
Implementing the Local Government Code and in A.O. No. 23. Well to note, petitioner formally claimed his right to a
formal investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam has been admitted by Undersecretary Sanchez.

Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of
position papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O.
No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
but this is only after formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to
dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory to
each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Position
papers are often-times prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discovery of truth
difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to
appointive officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective government officials are
not exactly similar to those against appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to elective local officials are
separate and distinct from appointive government officers and employees. This can be gleaned from the Local Government
Code itself.

In the Local Government Code, the entire Title II of Book I of the Code is devoted to elective officials. It provides for their
qualifications and election, vacancies and succession, local legislation, disciplinary actions, and recall. Appointive officers
and employees are covered in Title III of Book I of the Code entitled "Human Resources and Development." All matters
pertinent to human resources and development in local government units are regulated by "the civil service law and such
rules and regulations and other issuances promulgated thereto, unless otherwise provided in the Code." The "investigation
and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees as well as their suspension
and removal" are "in accordance with the civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws," the results of which "shall
be reported to the Civil Service Commission."

It is the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on the Civil Service, that primarily governs appointive officials
and employees. Their qualifications are set forth in the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Code. The
grounds for administrative disciplinary action in Book V are much more in number and are specific than those enumerated
in the Local Government Code against elective local officials. The disciplining authority in such actions is the Civil
Service Commission although the Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities are also given the power to investigate and decide disciplinary actions against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. When a complaint is filed and the respondent answers, he must "indicate whether or not he elects a
formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory." If the officer or employee elects a formal investigation,
the direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent "consist[s] of the sworn statement and documents submitted in
support of the complaint and answer, as the case may be, without prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence
deemed necessary x x x, upon which the cross-examination by respondent and the complainant, respectively, is based.”The
investigation is conducted without adhering to the technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings." Moreover, the
appointive official or employee may be removed or dismissed summarily if (1) the charge is serious and the evidence of
guilt is strong; (2) when the respondent is a recidivist; and (3) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable.

The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials are markedly different from
appointive officials. The rules on the removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The procedure
of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive
officials but not to those elected. An elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community that
elected him. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short duration. Suspension and
removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office. When an elective official is suspended or removed,
the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are
entitled to the services of the elective official of their choice. Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the
elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the public respondent Executive Secretary is declared null
and void and is set aside. No Cost.
052 DE CASTRO V JBC The conclusion is ineluctable that only the President
can appoint the Chief Justice.
1. The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
2. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election.
3. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy.”
4. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
5. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
6. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the
five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;
and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through
letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
7. Others either applied or were nominated.
8. Candidates who accepted their nominations without conditions were Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion; and Associate Justice
Edilberto G. Sandoval (Sandiganbayan). Candidates who accepted their nominations with conditions were
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales.
9. The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failure to meet the standards set
by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio of the Office of the Ombudsman (due to cases
pending in the Office of the Ombudsman).
10. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of
the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any,
not later than February 22, 2010.The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The
Philippine Star issues of February 13, 2010
11. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance
with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the
position due to the controversy now before us being yet unresolved
12. The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate not only among legal luminaries, but also among non-
legal quarters, and brought out highly disparate opinions on whether the incumbent President can appoint
the next Chief Justice or not.
13. Petitioner Mendoza notes that in Valenzuela, which involved the appointments of two judges of the Regional
Trial Court, the Court addressed this issue now before us as an administrative matter to avoid any possible
polemics concerning the matter, but he opines that the polemics leading to Valenzuela would be miniscule
[sic] compared to the polemics that have now erupted in regard to the current controversy, and that unless
put to a halt, and this may only be achieved by a ruling from the Court, the integrity of the process and the
credibility of whoever is appointed to the position of Chief Justice, may irreparably be impaired.
ISSUE:
1. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety? (MAIN ISSUE)
2. What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the
matter of the appointment of his successor?
3. May the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or being
considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President even
during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII?
4. Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
Locus Standi of Petitioners
The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the
controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are of transcendental
importance to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone
(including the petitioners), regardless of ones personal interest in life, because they concern that great doubt
about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent
Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great
number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.

In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any
petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the
requirement.Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to
remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein.

Justiciability

We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is
that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be
submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice.

Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or
to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public
interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts,
as may be needed.

The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. We need not await the
occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the
Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed
by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is
sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to
intelligently adjudicate the issues. Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.

Substantive Merits
I
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply
to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
or to other appointments to the Judiciary

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

1. Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

2. Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that the
incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the
ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary.
The Court agrees with the submission.

FIRST: Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the
Article.

Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the
Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for
the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by
the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively (Valenzuela), by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the
President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1),
Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored
that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in
the negative. As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats
the intent of the framers.

Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that
Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like
Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed.
We reverse Valenzuela.

Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the
Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will
be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.

The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing
power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15,
Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language.

SECOND: Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no question
that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight
appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive.

Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment
of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the
unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose
of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The creation of the JBC
was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission
on Appointments.

THIRD: As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was
confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional)
Commissions records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals.

FOURTH: Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing
powers of the President. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department.

It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

FIFTH. Sec. 9, Article VIII says:

xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. xxx

The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-
member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who
are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.

The Judiciary Act of 1948

The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno,
considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the
successor. We cannot agree with the posture.

Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states:

Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or of
his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall
apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice.

A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice and 14
Associate Justices, who all shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. With
reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is
never in an acting capacity.

Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not
yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers of the
office. It ought to be remembered, however, that it was enacted because the Chief Justice appointed under the
1935 Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, and the confirmation
process might take longer than expected.
The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to having the Associate Justice
who is first in precedence take over. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from
its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no
justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.

III
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC

May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President?

Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts.
The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of
selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.

Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day
period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after
the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to
make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby
effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the
qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.

The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the Presidents mandatory 90-day period to
appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the
President lies within the discretion of the JBC.

The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the
list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty,
there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore,
there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in
submitting the list to the President.

Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC

The conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint the Chief Justice. Hence, Sorianos petition for
prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the JBC from intervening in the process of nominating the
successor of Chief Justice Puno, lacks merit.

On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge mounted
against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex
officio members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, thereby prejudicing the chances of some
candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC,
is not based on the petitioners actual interest, because they have not alleged in their petition that they were
nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that issue.
053 Vera v. People AUTHOR: DJEE
PONENTE: Laurel NOTES:
FACTS:
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation
Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose
Vera concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in
the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the
Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused
like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only
meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that
Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated probation officer – hence, a Manila court cannot
grant probation.

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it
violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it
the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law – if a province chooses to apply the
probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed
– hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave the option to
the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law – however, the legislature did not provide
guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executive’s power to grant
pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect encroached upon the
executive’s power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC – ironic
because their main stance was the non-applicability of the probation law only in Manila while recognizing its
application in provinces).

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, represent ing the State as well as
the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created.
Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past
without question but is now questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).

ISSUE(S):

1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from questioning the
validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Quickie Ratio

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the equal
protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply providing for a
probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the accused within said
province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the
respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what
standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the
probation law in their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its
whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to provide for
probation. Probation does not encroach upon the President’s power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon.
Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president to commute
penalties.

RATIO:

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO POWER; PRESIDENT'S VETO NOT BINDING ON THE SUPREME
COURT.—In vetoing a bill, the President may express the reasons which he may deem proper, but his
reasons are not binding upon the Supreme Court in the determination of actual controversies submitted to it
for determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a
matter encompassed within his constitutional power of veto but which happens- to be at the same time
pending determination before the Supreme Court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or
determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway the
judgment of the court one way or another and prevent it from taking what in its opinion is the proper course
of action to take in a given case.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.—If it is ever necessary to make any vehement affirmance during
this formative period of our political history, it is that the judiciary is independent of the Executive no less
than of the Legislative department of our government—independent in the performance of its functions,
undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the
accomplishment of its sworn duty as it sees it and understands it.

WHEN CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED.—The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not
be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and
is necessary to a determination of the case; i. e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota presented.

RESORT TO EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The question of the

constitutionality of an Act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may
be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law,
even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil.,
818), the Supreme Court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the
petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see also 12 C. }., p. 783); and in Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259, affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
[1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an"
action of., quo warranto brought in the name of- the Government of the Philippines. It has also been. held
"that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings, although there are
authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute;
and even on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question
is necessary to a decision of the case. The same may be said as regardsprohibition and certiorari.

CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY; EXCEPTIONS.—As a

general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised
by the pleadings, ordinarily it may be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal. But the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion,
may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented.
Thus, in. criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may
be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Even in civil
cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for
the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the
case. And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any
time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below.

PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF PARTY; RIGHT AND INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY.—The person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the
Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
Hence, the well-settled rule that 'the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

RELIANCE ON PROBATION ACT; BY FISCAL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE
PEOPLE.—The mere fact that. the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon in the past and all that
time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been
impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines
estopped from now assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when
presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised
before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in
relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.

WHEN DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY NECESSARY ; WAIVER IF CASE CAN BE

DECIDED ON OTHER POINTS.—While the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is
indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and a just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if
the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points. (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No
11,558; 2 Brock., 447, Vide, also Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the
determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case,
as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C. J., p.
782.)

REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY.—The Supreme Court will

take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has
never before been passed upon by the courts; that many persons accused and convicted of crime in the
City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will
likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent M. C. U, has been at large
for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All await the decision of this court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to
prevent muItiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221
be now resolved.

THE JUDICIARY; ITS DUTY TO ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION.—Under a doctrine peculiarly American,
it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. The Supreme .Court, by clear implication
from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare
an act of the National Legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from
its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to- the
supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ;PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY; RATIONALE OF

PRESUMPTION.—All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An
act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The
responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The
question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government
itself." (U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250,
276; U. S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the
sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to
support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting
and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. Then, there is that peculiar
political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an
elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows that the courts will not set aside a law as
violative of the Constitution except in clear cases.

THE PARDONING POWER UNDER THE JONES LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES.—Section 21 of the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, vests in
the Governor-Gerieral of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit
fines and forfeitures." This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines. The provisions of the
Jones Law and the Constitution of the Philippines differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in
the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon
could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction. The
Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon
a person before the facts of his case were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution thought this
undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be
exercised "after conviction". So too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to
"cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United States.

COMMUTATION AND AMNESTY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.—Our Constitution makes

specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may
grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the
President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly.
EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING POWER.—The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in
the Executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given
by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing
to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one, of the departments can exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution.
(20 R. C. L., pp. 540, 541.) Where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or
implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor
delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof (12 C. J., pp. 838, 839).

PROBATION; POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A PROBATION LAW.—The

Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its
broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. The legislative power to set punishment for
crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the legislature may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit,
the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment, and
whether it should be certain, or indeterminate, or conditional. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined
all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrat ed the desire
to vest in the courts—particularly the trial courts—large discretion in imposing- the penalties which the law
prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the
courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly
circumstanced, should suffer.

PROBATION NOT IN CONFLICT WITH PARDONING POW-ER.—The Probation Act does not conflict with
the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary
sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President
may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest
andimprisonment.

DIVISION OF POWERS.—Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed
among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is
the highest expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.—The power to make

laws—the legislative power—is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law and in a unicameral
National Assembly by the Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape
its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to
abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare
potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through
a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the
English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as
an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of
separation of powers.

RULE FORBIDDING DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY NOT INFLEXIBLE; EXCEPTIONS.—

The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to
delegate legislative powers to local authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is empowered to
delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. Courts
have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large, though some authorities
maintain that this may not be done. Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution
itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The
National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, -to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues."
And section 16 of the Same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national
emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy."

TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION ;DETAILS OF EXECUTION.—In testing whether a statute constitutes an

undue delegation of legislative power or not , it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its
terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so -that nothing was left to the judgment of any
other appointee or delegate of the legislature. In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho {[1922], 43 Phil., 1), the
Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule. The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a
certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.

PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PROVINCIAL

BOARDS.—The Probation Act does not, by the 'force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a
"roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of
the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If a provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate
the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the
provincial boards.

TRUE DlSTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO MAKE LAW AND DlSCRETION AS. TO ITS
EXECUTION; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852], 1
Ohio St., 77, 88. See also,Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.) To the same effect are decisions
of the Supreme Court in the Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547);
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39 Phil., 660) ; and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234).

CONDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW; RELAXATION OF THE DOCTRINE.—Laws may be made

effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a
particular community (6 R. C. L., 118, 170172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, p. 227). In
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat, 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that the legisture may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to
ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a
mental process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency to relax
the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and
economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his
work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Professor Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of
the United States and is accepted.

LOCAL OPTION LAWS ; EIGHT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT; SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF A

GENERAL LAW NOT COUNTENANCED.—The legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different
from those applicable to other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove
expressed, courts in many jurisdictions have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws
to the vote of the people. (6 R. C. L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in
character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different
circumstances. Without denying the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of
purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon in
matters of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general
subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in
Act No. 4221.

LEGISLATIVE POLICY; EXECUTION THEREOF; CONSTITUTION BOTH A GRANT AND LlMITATION OF

POWER.—A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what
may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power,
legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been
said that popular government lives because of the unexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is
unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and
that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. But
it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation. of power and one of these
time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; CLASS LEGISLATION; CLASSIFICATION ON REASONABLE

BASIS.—" * * * nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." This basic individual right
sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of our government and on the
subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police
power, taxation and eminent domain. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws
is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable
basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable
must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the
class.

RESULTANT INEQUALITY FROM UNWARRANTED DELEGATION; PROBATION ACT PERMITS DENIAL

OF EQUAL PROTECTION.—In the case of Act No. 4221, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards. While inequality may result in the
application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the
necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a
situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant
authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before courts should assume the task of
setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the
opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that
account bad. We see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of
such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust
and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes may be adjudged
unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of
the law it is unconstitutional.

SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT;GOVERNMENT OF LAWS; EQUALITY CLAUSE NOT "A ROPE OF

SAND".—Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several
provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of a
probation officer of a given year—and have probation during that year—and thereafter decline to make
further appropriation, and have no probation in subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the
abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a
situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make
the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand."

SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT INSEPARABLE FROM REST OF ACT; PROBATION AND

PROBATION OFFICERS.—Section 11 of the Probation Act (No. 4221) is inseparably linked with the other
portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the
system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended
beneficial results of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination
of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action
of the different provincial boards. If not one of the provinces—and this is the actual situation now—
appropriates the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be
illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer
without a probation system.

PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ;PRESUMPTION AGAINST MUTILATION OF STATUTE.—In seeking

the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to
elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so
independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act
substantially unaffected by the process.

WlSDOM AND PROPRIETY OF LEGISLATION; PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL

LEGISLATION.—That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as
there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course, possible. But this would be arguing on what the
law may be or should be and not on what the law is.Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom
and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But
much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the
law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any
purpose—not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
054 Tesoro v. Director of Prisons AUTHOR:
G.R. No. L-46437, May 23, 1939 NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC:
PONENTE: MORAN, J.
FACTS: (chronological order)
On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days, to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (100), or undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. This penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, the then Governor-General Frank
Murphy granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to the following conditions:
1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence without first obtaining the consent of the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence;
2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner;
3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence, during the first year, once a month, and thereafter, once every three months.

Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect.

On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of
adultery alleged to have been committed with one Concordia Dairo, wife of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To the
complaint were attached the affidavits of the complainant Jose Nagar, of Luz Nagar and of Epimaco Nagar. The case was
thereafter forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information
which, however, was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant.

Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with Board of Indeterminate Sentence,
and upon the same facts supporting the criminal action aforementioned, charged the petitioner with violation of the
conditions of his parole. On February 3, 1938, petitioner was summoned to appear before the board for a hearing on the
aforecited complaint, but petitioner asked for postponement until the day following. On February 4, 1938, petitioner
addressed a letter to the board denying the charge of illicit relations with the complainant's wife the included therewith the
supposed retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the latter had stated in his former affidavit. On the same date Simeon
Figalang, a parole officer assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board, and, on the strength thereof
and papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board addressed a communication to the President of the Philippines,
recommending the arrest and reincarceration of the petitioner. And on February 19, 1938, the President issued the
following order:

To any lawful officer: Whereas, Eufemio P. Tesoro, convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
falsification of an official document, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of from 2 years to 3 years, 6 months and 21
days' imprisonment, plus P100 fine, was granted pardon on parole by His Excellency, the Governor -General, on November
14, 1935, under certain conditions, one of which provides that he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself
in an orderly manner, and Whereas, said Eufemio P. Tesoro has violated this condition in that, in the latter part of
September, 1937, and continuously thereafter, he betrayed the confidence of his brother-in-law, Jose Nagar, by
maintaining adulterous relations with the latter's wife, under the following circumstances: Upon the death on September
18, 1937, of parolee Tesoro's wife (sister of Jose Nagar) and in order to mitigate the grief of the bereaved family and to
help in the keeping of the house and caring of the children of said parolee, Jose Nagar and his wife came to live with the
parolee in San Juan, Rizal; but taking advantage of the frequent absences of Jose Nagar from the house, parolee Tesoro
made advances to Jose Nagar's wife, Concordia Dairo, succeeded in having illicit relations with her and even went to the
extent of taking away the woman from her legitimate husband, after the couple had moved from h is home, and he is now
living with her in adultery.

Therefore, by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, you are hereby
ordered to arrest parolee Eufemio P. Tesoro and to commit him to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Manila, who is
hereby authorized to confine said person for the service of the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he
was originally committed to prison.

By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director of Prisons. Thereupon,
petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, and upon denial thereof by the trial court, took
the present appeal.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the denial for writ of habeas corpus by the trial court is proper?
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
Section 63 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted parole, gives the Governor-
General the following powers and duties: To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial,
conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted
person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any
such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or
suspension of sentence.

Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as follows: The President shall have
the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses,
except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to
impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.

Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, above quoted, in so far as it confers upon the Chief
Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has been impliedly repealed by the aforecited constitutional provision, as
the latter omitted to specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the President of the Philippines.
This contention is untenable. The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with
such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. If the
omission of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to the President, the effect would
be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by
the Chief Executive. That such effect was never intended by the Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond question.

Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal authority to investigate the conduct of the
petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive
secretary of the board once a month during the first year of his parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his
consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part o f
the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori to make
recommendations to the President by whose authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily
carries with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocation is to be
rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of inquiry and investigation, the President of the
Philippines is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the government, or even of
any individual, to secure the necessary assistance. When, therefore, the President chose to intrust his power of inquiry upon
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, a government agency created precisely for the concern of persons released on parole,
he acted both upon legal authority and good judgment.

Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime is necessary before he
can be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed
that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was,
therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the
petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, the Chief
Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." (Emphasis ours.)

Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the conditional parole. He claims that, according
to the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the latter part of September, 1937," as found by the
President, but after October 28, 1937, the date when the parole was supposed to expire. But that as it may, where, as in the
instant case, the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the
Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The petitioner herein having
consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the
courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.

Besides, even conceding that the petitioner's violation of the parole took place after October 28, 1937, when his maximum
penalty was to have expired, we still find no error in the order of the arrest and recommitment. It is the petitioner's
contention that, upon the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires, and,
therefore, his liberty becomes absolute subject to no conditions contained in his parole. In other words, he holds the view
that the period during which he was out on parole should be counted as service of his original sentence. We do not
subscribe to this contention.

In People vs. Tapel (35 Off. Gaz., 1603), we said: When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same
state in which he was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs.
Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well -settled that, in requiring
the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of
his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time
served on the original sentence. (20 R.C.L., p. 570; State vs. Horne [1906], 52 Fla., 125; 42 So., 388; 7 L.R.A. [N.S.}, 719,
725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell [1879], Miss., 282.)

This rule applies, by analogy, to conditional parole. (46 C.J., 1209.)

The foregoing discussion brings us to the last contention of the appellant as to the duration of the penalty he has yet to
serve after his recommitment. Act No. 1561 provided that a convict released on parole and who, thereafter, violates its
conditions, shall serve the full sentence of the court as though no parole has ever been granted him, the time between the
parole and the subsequent arrest not being considered as part of the term of his sentence in computing the period of his
subsequent confinement. But this Act has been repealed by the Administrative Code, and section 64 (i) thereof omitted
such provision. Act No. 4103, section 8, provides that any prisoner released on parole who violates any condition thereof,
shall, upon re-arrest and confinement, serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was
originally committed to prison. This Act is not, however, applicable to the present case, as the petitioner was paroled not
under the provision thereof, but by virtue of section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code. There is, thus, no statutory
provision squarely governing the case with respect to the duration of the petitioner's confinement after his recommitment.
In the absence of such statutory provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From the express terms of the parole that
"should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect," it is evident
that the petitioner herein should serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court .
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

LAUREL, J., concurring in the result.

I concur in the result, but withhold my assent to the statement, unnecessarily made in my opinion that Act No. 4103 — as
amended by Act No. 4225 — is inapplicable to the present case.

CONCEPCION, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result, but I dissent with respect to the interpretation given by the majority to the second condition of the
appellant's parole. Said the decision: "Under condition No. 2 of his parole, pet itioner agreed that he 'will not commit any
other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner.' (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission, not
his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated
his parole." I am of the opinion that the "commission" of a crime may only be determined upon the "conviction" of the
accused. It is not sufficient that a person be charged with having committed a crime in order to consider that he is
convicted thereof. His innocence is a legal presumption which is overcome only by his conviction after he is duly and
legally prosecuted. And the courts of justice are the only branch of the government which has exclusive jurisdiction under
the law to make a pronouncement on the conviction of an accused.

In the present case, however, a judicial pronouncement can not be required regarding the commission of the crime imputed
to the appellant because the information for adultery lodged against him was dismissed for failure of the complaining
witness to appear. In these circumstances and as an exception to the general rule, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence was
justified in conducting the investigation of the crime complained of and in recommending to the President of the
Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the appellant for violation of his conditional pardon, for it is not just that by the
omission or negligence of a witness who fails to appear in court, the violation of the pardon granted conditionally to the
appellant should be left unpunished.
055 CRESENCIO RUBEN TOLENTINO, petitioner- AUTHOR: Krystelle
appellant, vs. CESARIO CATOY, Provincial Warden, NOTES: (if applicable)
Batangas, Batangas, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-2503; December 10, 1948
TOPIC:
PONENTE: TUASON, J.:

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Petitioner was a Hukbalahap and was found by the Court of First Instance of Batangas guilty of the crime of illegal
assembly held in furtherance of the Hukbalahap designs. The judgment was promulgated on May 11, 1948.
2. On June 21, the President issued Proclamation No. 76 granting amnesty under certain conditions to leaders and
members of the Hukbalahap and the PKM organizations. On July 16, within the 20-day period for surrender
imposed as a condition by the amnesty, the petitioner, already serving sentence, sent the President a petition for his
release under the provisions of the proclamation. No action was taken on this petition and the petitioner came to
court with the present application.
3. Judge Juan Enriquez, who heard and decided the petition in the court below, was of the opinion that "the petitioner
is clearly covered by the amnesty proclamation" but refused to grant the writ because "he (petitioner) has failed to
follow the procedure outlined by the implementing circulars (of the Secretary of Justice) so that he may avail of
the benefits thereof." He called attention to the fact that circular No. 27-A "vests the release of such prisoners on
the Committee on the Implementation of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 in Manila, instead of the President."
He gives to understand that only this committee is authorized to order the discharge of convicted Hukbalahaps
under the proclamation.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the grant of writ and entitled for his release.
HELD: YES
RATIO:
If the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of this proclamation and he is unable to obtain his release through executive
channels, it devolves on the courts to protect his rights. This is a fundamental right which cannot be left to the decision of
executive officers. This should be especially true where, as an in this case, the implementation committee was not the
creation of the proclamation nor was it even mentioned in this document. The committee was appointed by the Secretary of
Justice as an instrumentality to facilitate, not to hinder or obstruct, the carrying out of the provisions of the amnesty.

Let it be said that the Solicitor General does not seem to agree with the lower court's theory, having passed it up. The law
officer of the Government bases his opposition to the petition under consideration on a different ground — that the
petitioner did not present any arm. He thus raises only a question of fact, and fact was the only question which the
respondent argued at the hearings before this Court.

There is attached to the record of the Court of First Instance a certificate drawn in the form prescribed in the Secretary of
Justice's circulars and signed by the Commanding Officer of the Constabulary in Batangas, stating that on July 10,
petitioner presented himself with a Remington .45 caliber pistol and ammunition. The Provincial Fiscal who appeared with
Solicitor Bautista of the Solicitor General's office admitted the authenticity of the Constabulary Commanding Officer's and
the petitioner's signatures affixed to the certificate. In impugning this paper, he said it was not seen by him when the case
was tried and submitted in the lower court. He also said that the firearms mentioned in the certificate belonged to another
man and had been surrendered by the latter.

That the fiscal did not see the certificate is no authority for the allegation that it was not there. It is to be kept in min d that
no oral evidence was introduced, the case having been submitted for decision on the pleadings and their annexes . Judge
Enriquez's opinion that the petitioner comes within the terms of the proclamation tends to suggest that the petitioner had
fulfilled all its conditions, including the presentation of firearms and ammunition. His Honor's emphasis on the need of
strict compliance with the Secretary of Justice's circular, taken in connection with his opinion, gives added ground for
supposing that an arm and ammunition were turned in.

The provincial fiscal's insinuation that the gun was surrendered by another Hukbalahap has nothing to support it than his
belief. Belief, suspicion and conjectures can not overcome the presumption of regularity and legality which attaches to the
certificate in question. But granting the truth of the fiscal's statement, it nevertheless may be that the petitioner, who was an
officer in the Hukbalahap organization, was the true and real owner of the weapon and not the man who previously
surrendered it.

This is not saying that surrender of firearms was a necessary requirement to stay the effects of the proclamation. It is not
necessary to decide this question, and we do not attempt to do so.

Some members of the Court question the applicability of Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 to Hukbalahap already undergoing
sentence upon the date of its promulgation. The Secretary of Justice's implementing circulars are predicated on the
assumption that the proclamation is all-inclusive. As a contemporary construction, this opinion of the Secretary of Justice
ought to carry much weight, considering that, as the department head who advised the Chief Executive and in whose
department the proclamation was drawn, he is in a position to be informed of its scope and meaning.

Quite apart from this consideration, the majority of the Court believe that by its context and pervading spirit the
proclamation extends to all members of the Hukbalahap and PKM organizations. It makes no exception when it announces
that the amnesty is proclaimed "in favor of the leaders and members of the association known as Hukbalahap and
Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid." No compelling reason is apparent for excluding Hukbalahaps of any class or
condition from its object, which is "to forgive, and forego the prosecution of the crimes of rebellion, sedition, etc.," as a
"just and wise measure of the Government." We are to suppose that the President and the Congress, knowing that a good
number of Hukbalahap and PKM affiliates had been or were being prosecuted, would have, in clear terms, left them out if
that had been the intention, instead of leaving their exclusion to inference.

As a matter of fact, we can discover neither advantage nor desirableness that could have induced the President and the
Congress to adopt a policy of condoning the offense of Hukbalahaps who persisted in their defiance of the Government
and not the crime of those who had already tasted the bitter pill of retribution for their transgression. That runs counter t o
the spirit of generosity and magnanimity which inspired Proclamation No. 76. It is not in keeping with the procla mation's
concept that forgiveness is more expedient for the Government and the public welfare than punishment. If total punishment
is foregone in favor of Hukbalahaps who succeeded in evading arrest, it stands to reason that those who fell into the
clutches of the law have better claim to clemency for the remaining portion of a punishment fixed for the same offense.

The avowed practical objective of the amnesty is to secure pledge of loyalty and obedience to the constituted authorities
and encourage resumption of lawful pursuits and occupation. This objective can not be expected to meet with full success
without the goodwill and cooperation of the Hukbalahaps who have become more embittered by their capture, prosecution
and incarceration. It was known that those dissidents who had been arrested and prosecuted were not going to remain in
jail forever, and that discrimination against them might in itself be a driving force for them and their sympathizers to take
up arm again.

We pursue the above line of reasoning as a means of determining the grantor's intention, not as a means of enlarging the
proclamation's meaning. We test an interpretation by its results.

Fundamentally and in their utmost effect, pardon and amnesty are synonymous. Mr. Justice Field in Knote vs. United
States, 24 Law. ed., 442, 443, said that "the distinction between them is one rather of philological interest than of legal
importance." It seems to be generally conceded in the United States that the word "'pardon' includes amnesty." (Sta te vs.
Eby, 71 S. W., 61.) This being so, the rules for interpreting pardon and amnesty ought not to vary. Now then, according to
a well-recognized doctrine, pardon is construed "most strictly against the state." "Where general words are used, their
natural meaning is not to be restricted by other words unless the intention to do so is clear and manifest." (46 C. J., 1192.)

At best, the contention that the grace and beneficence of the amnesty are denied the Hukbalahaps who were in prison rests
on the idea that being restrained of liberty they can not surrender. Our answer is that surrender is required merely as a
token of willingness to abide by the conditions of the grant. It is not intended as, and can not accomplish the purpose of, a
security. As evidence of good faith, surrender by Hukbalahaps from the field is not more effective than a prisoner's written
and more solemn manifestation of his acceptance. If physical presence be deemed essential, prisoners not only present
themselves but are under the custody of the authorities subject to their absolute control until released.
The writ will be granted and the petitioner discharged from confinement immediately without costs. It is so ordered.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
056 Barrioquinto v. Fernandez AUTHOR:
G.R. No. NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC:
PONENTE:
FACTS:
1. Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war. The case was
proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life
imprisonment.
2. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No.
8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
3. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However,
Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two
accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a
certain Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to them.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.

HELD:
No, Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty
Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the
offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he
is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the
nation,” or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.

Dispositive:
2. Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the application for
amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless
the courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and finally, the question whether or not they are
entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered.
RATIO:
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence
of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does “nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffra ge,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” and it “in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence” (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition
precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the
amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of the
benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.” Although the accused does not confess the
imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the
amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for
the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy,
or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and
to be “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,” or not, in accordance with the
terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to
cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or
not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
057 MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, Petitioner, v. ALEJO
Note: Short case. This is the full text. Separate opinion is mostly in Spanish
LABRADOR, ET AL., Respondents. language. This case is about the pardoning power of the chief executive.
G.R. No. 47941 December 7, 1940
PONENTE: Laurel, J.
FACTS:
On March 15, 1930, the CFI of Rizal found respondent Teofilo C. Santos guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced
him to six months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law, to return to the offended parties, Toribio
Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo, the amounts P375 and P125, respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. On appeal, this court confirmed the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, he was
confined in the provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, from March 14, 1932 to August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding
costs of trial. As to his civil liability consisting in the return of the two amounts aforestated, the complainants condoned the
same.
Notwithstanding his conviction, Teofilo C. Santos continued to be a registered elector in the municipalit y of
Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal president of that
municipality.

On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known as the Election Code, was approved by the
National Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been
"declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property." In view of this provision, the respondent forthwith
applied to His Excellency, the President, for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing date of August 15, 1939. Upon the
favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive, on December 24, 1939, granted the said
petition, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold
public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature
and involving no money or property responsibility."

Petitioner Miguel Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of voters
in precinct No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357. After hearing, the court below rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

"Without going further into a discussion of all the other minor points and questions raised by the petitioner, the court
declares that the pardon extended in favor of the respondent on December 24, 1939, has had the effect of excluding the
respondent from the disqualification created by section 94, subsection (b) of the New Election Code. The petition for
exclusion of the respondent Teofilo C. Santos should be, as it hereby is, denied. Let there be no costs."

Petitioner Cristobal has filed the present petition for certiorari in which he impugns the decision of the court below on the
several grounds stated in the petition.

Petitioner’s contention: the pardon granted by the President of the Philippines, to respondent Teofilo C. Santos did not
restore the said respondent to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief
Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise
by the Chief Executive of a legislative function; and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory
penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these propositions involve an inquiry into the primary question
of the nature and extent of the pardoning power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation by the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the pardon granted to respondent Teofilo C. Santos restored him to the full enjoyment of his political rights
HELD: Yes. Although the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is
absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but also removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction .
RATIO:
Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides:

"(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the
 concurrence of the National Assembly."

It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief
Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of
impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction.

In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification fr om
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment, which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are
accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the
term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.

In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is
absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."

While there are cases in the United States which hold that the pardoning power does not restore the privilege of voting, this
is because, as stated by the learned judge below, in the United States the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the
hands of the State and not in the hands of the Federal Government. Even then, there are cases to the contrary (Jones v.
Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766; Hildreth v. Heath, 1 Ill. App. 82). Upon other hand, the suggestion that the
disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of
the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive,
not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the
political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

There are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the
power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It
must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is
entrusted.

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.
058 FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, petitioner-appellant, AUTHOR:

 vs.
 GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent-appellee. NOTES: (if applicable)
[G.R. No. L-48100; June 20, 1941]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: LAUREL, J.

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque.

2. Pelobello Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention.
3. Florencio Pelobelo filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was
already convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello averred that Palatino
is already barred from voting and being voted upon. Pelobel averred that Palatino having been convicted of final judgment in 1912
of atendado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not
having been removed by plenary pardon.
4. Gregorio Palatino was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon dated 1915, and was also granted of absolute pardon
by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines dated December 25, 1940.
5. By these facts he restored all his civil and political rights.
6. The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee for
the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional
pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted
the respondent-appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction?
HELD: YES.

RATIO:

Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by
President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming
office. The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the prior
conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in question.

The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal
conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date
fixed by law for assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code).
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that
an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction, and that when
granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction, While
there may be force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be
extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this j urisdiction is not
to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty
to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant
disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25
years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right
of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of t hat
municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in
December, 1940.

Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the
position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the
date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office.

The SC sees no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional gra nt to the
Chief Executive. The SC, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
059 In Re: Wilfredo S. Torres (In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas AUTHOR: JANNA | Wilfredo was
Corpus of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres; Ludia Dela Rosa Torres, Wife of released on conditional pardon by the
Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters Ramona Elisa R. Torres and President, but upon recommendation of the
Maria Cecila R. Torres vs. The Director, Bureau of Corrections, New Bureau of Corrections, he was again put to
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, M.M.) jail because he had broke the law again
[G.R. No. 122338; December 29, 1995] (numerous times). SC ruled that they have
TOPIC: Habeas Corpus; Conditional Pardon; Powers of the President no authority to interfere with the power of
PONENTE: HERMOSISIMA, JR. J. the president to give or revoke pardon.
FACTS:
1.In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray for
his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of
pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. WILFREDO was convicted by CFI of Manila for two counts of estafa in 1979. The CA affirmed these convictions. The
maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000.
3. April 18, 1979: A conditional pardon was granted to WILFREDO by then President Marcos on condition that he would
"not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. 5" WILFREDO accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement.
4. May 21, 1986: The Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to WILFREDO because he had been charged with 20 counts of estafa before, and convicted of
sedition by, the RTC of QC
5. September 8, 1986: The President cancelled the conditional pardon of WILFREDO.
7. October 10, 1986: Then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of
Arrest and Recommitment against WILFREDO, who was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
8. WILFREDO impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment in the case of Torres v. Gonzales, where
the SC ruled as follows: Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned and who is alleged to have breached
the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of th e Revised Administrative
Code, or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code . . . Here, the President has chosen to proc eed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
9. Now, WILFREDO, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from the SC.
ISSUE(S): Whether the relief of Habeas Corpus should be granted in favor of WILFREDO

HELD: NO, Unfortunately, there is no adequate basis for the SC to oblige such relief.
RATIO:
1. We ruled consistently,viz., in Tesoro v. Director of Prisons, Sales v. Director of Prisons, Espuelas v. Provincial Warden
of Bohol and Torres v. Gonzales, that, where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the
President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor by final judgment, in order to
effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions
of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach ther eof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are
purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny. We have so ruled in the past, and we so rule now.

2. A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the
convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not
comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or
an additional one. 10 By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed
himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee
complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief
Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched
rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of
the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee,
having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot
invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 11
3. It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against
him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent
violation of his right to a speedy trial.

4. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or
unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of
conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial
scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional
pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the
acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority
to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final
judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not
there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the
reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and
absolutely lodged in his office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Courts have no authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our
fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon.
060 Ampatuan et al. v. Hon. Puno, et al. AUTHOR: RC Alfafara
[G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011] NOTE/S:
PONENTE: Abad, J.
FACTS:
1. On Nov. 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters, then
President Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and
the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She directed the AFP and the PNP "to undertake such measures as may
be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence" in the named places.
2. Three days later, Pres. Arroyo also issued AO 273 "transferring" supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the DILG. But, due to issues raised over the terminology used in
AO 273, the President issued AO 273-A amending the former, by "delegating" instead of "transferring" supervision of the
ARMM to the DILG.
3. Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan,
Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65.
They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and
seize the regional government’s powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also
known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise,
not merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and
replace them. Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency
powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that
respondents DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.
4. In its comment, the OSG insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its
autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. She issued the proclamation pursuant to her "calling out" power
as Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Sec 18, Art VII of the Constitution. The determination of the need to
exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom. She must use her judgment based on intelligence reports and such best
information as are available to her to call out the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and
whenever these reared their ugly heads. On the other hand, the President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her
supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. These orders did not authorize
a take over of the ARMM. They did not give him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials. The delegation
was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings. Further, the assailed proclamation and administrative
orders did not provide for the exercise of emergency powers.
5. Although normalcy has in the meantime returned to the places subject of this petition, it might be relevant to rule on the
issues raised in this petition since some acts done pursuant to Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273 -A could impact on
the administrative and criminal cases that the government subsequently filed against those believed affected by such
proclamation and orders.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act.
(2) Whether or not Pres Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
(3) Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions.
HELD:
(1) No, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
(2) No, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed
forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
(3) Yes, the OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the President’s decision to call out the armed forces, as stated:
“The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It is also
a known fact that both have an arsenal of armed followers who hold elective positions in various parts of ARMM and the
rest of Mindanao.” …In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation
1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
1. The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy
is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of
the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the region.
>> But, in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12 of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named
the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short,
the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
2. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP
and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is not by itself an exercise of
emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
>> The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she
did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out
of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in
the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion . x x x
4. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it would
generally defer to her judgment on the matter.
5. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora: …If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that
the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always
accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might
decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
The President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and
decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
6. Petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat
and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the "calling out" power had no factual basis. They simply alleged
that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire
ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
7. Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and the
main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military and police
had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive measures
from the Ampatuan clan. x x x x
The Ampatuan forces are estimated to be approximately two thousand four hundred (2,400) persons, equipp ed with about
two thousand (2,000) firearms, about four hundred (400) of which have been accounted for. x x x
As for the Mangudadatus, they have an estimated one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel, with about two hundred
(200) firearms. x x x
Apart from their own personal forces, both clans have Special Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel who support
them: about five hundred (500) for the Ampatuans and three hundred (300) for the Mangudadatus.
What could be worse than the armed clash of two warring clans and their armed supporters, especially in light of
intelligence reports on the potential involvement of rebel armed groups (RAGs).
>> One RAG was reported to have planned an attack on the forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show support and
sympathy for the victims. The said attack shall worsen the age-old territorial dispute between the said RAG and the
Ampatuan family.
x x x x On the other hand, RAG faction which is based in Sultan Kudarat was reported to have received three million pesos
(P3,000,000.00) from Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. for the procurement of ammunition. The said faction is a force to reckon
with because the group is well capable of launching a series of violent activities to divert the attention of the people and the
authorities away from the multiple murder case. x x x
>> In addition, two other factions of a RAG are likely to support the Mangudadatu family. The Cotabato-based faction has
the strength of about five hundred (500) persons and three hundred seventy-two (372) firearms while the Sultan Kudarat-
based faction has the strength of about four hundred (400) persons and three hundred (300) firearms and was reported to be
moving towards Maguindanao to support the Mangudadatu clan in its armed fight against the Ampatuans.
>> Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high -powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans.23 Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take
preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed
groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
8. Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn the declaration of a state of
emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has been reported that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still
a need to disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the presence of troops in those places is still
necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite
the passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.
61 ARTHUR D. LIM and PAULINO R. ERSANDO vs. AUTHOR:
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY as alter ego of HER EXCELLENCEY GLORIA NOTE: A party who does
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, and HONORABLE ANGELO REYES in his capacity as Secretary of not have any legal
National Defense standing cannot question
---------------------------------------- the constitutionality of
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA vs. the Visiting Forces
GLORIA MACAPAGA-ARROYO, ALBERTO ROMULO, ANGELO REYES Agreement.
[G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002]
PONENTE: De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS:
1. Beginning January 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the US started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in
conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest
combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951. The entry of American troops into the country is proximately due to
the September 11, 2001 attacks.
2. Prior to the year 2002, the last "Balikatan" was held in 1995. This was due to the paucity of any formal agreement
relative to the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Philippines. In the meantime, the respective
governments of the two countries agreed to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale. The lack of consensus was
eventually cured when the two nations concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999.
3. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They filed suit in their capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers.
4. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, filed a petition-in-intervention on
February 11, 2002. They aver that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu,
and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
Respondents in the holding of "Balikatan 02-1" joint military exercise
HELD: No, there was none.
RATIO:
1. The holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in the framework of the treaty antecedents to which the
Philippines bound itself. The first of these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, for brevity). The MDT has been
described as the "core" of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the United
States. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training
with its American counterparts; the "Balikatan" is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT's
objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.
2. The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and the decision not to renew it created a vacuum in US-
Philippine defense relations, that is, until it was replaced by the Visiting Forces Agreement.
3. It should be recalled that on October 10, 2000, by a vote of eleven to three, this Court upheld the validity of the
VFA.
4. The VFA provides the "regulatory mechanism" by which "United States military and civilian personnel [may visit]
temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government." It contains
provisions relative to entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal
jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the
agreement and its termination. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of
years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine
military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe.

Whether "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement

1. To resolve this [sub-issue], it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself[.] Unfortunately, not much help can be had
therefrom since the terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The VFA permits United States
personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined.
The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the
 Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United
States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular,
from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
2. However, we are not left completely unaided... [Upon examination of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, it is apparent that] the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to
deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be
taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.
3. After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word
“activities" arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain
leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other
than military.
4. [T]he VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that “Balikatan 02-1” falls
under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and
intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities - as
opposed to combat itself - such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
Granted that "Balikatan 02-1" is permitted under the terms of the VFA, what may US forces legitimately do in
furtherance of their aim to provide advice, assistance and training in the global effort against terrorism? May
American troops actually engage in combat in Philippine territory?
1. The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise participants
may not engage in combat "except in self-defense."
2. [N]either the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. [The
Charter of the United Nations states that]: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
3. In the same manner, both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties
and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987
Constitution. In particular, the Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded way before the present Charter, though it
nevertheless remains in effect as a valid source of international obligation.
4. The Constitution regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate." Even more pointedly, the Transitory Provisions state: “Sec. 25. After the expiration in
1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning
Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.”
5. The [Declaration of Principles and State Policies in the 1987 Constitution shows the country’s] antipathy towards
foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed
entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception. Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and
our obligations arising from international agreements.
6. In Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was held that “the fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are
given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.” This is not exactly helpful in solving the problem at
hand since in trying to find a middle ground, it favors neither one law nor the other, which only leaves the
hapless seeker with an unsolved dilemma.
7. From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle
of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
8. Our Constitution espouses the opposing view. [Section 5 of Article VIII states that:] “The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
 Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in: (a) all cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
9. In Ichong v. Hernandez, we ruled that the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or
amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.
10. In Gonzales v. Hechanova ,we ruled that “As regards the question whether an international agreement may be
invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question." In
other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
11. The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on
Philippine territory.
Are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and
assistance exercise?
1. As a rule, we do not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to
their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance
with the rules of evidence.
2. As a result, we cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo
government is engaged in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort
by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite us to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao,
to make factual findings on matters well beyond our immediate perception, and this we are understandably
loath to do.
062 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW AUTHOR: Ernest
HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners, vs. NOTE/S:
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION
ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988
TOPIC: arrest; searches and seizures
PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Nature: habeas corpus
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna, while
Adriaan Van Elshout, 58 years old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna.

2. The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID.
Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center.

3. Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID
agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens
opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for
working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original twenty two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.

4. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well
as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.

5. On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

6. On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act
and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners.

7. On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their
continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to
examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners were healthy.

8. On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied considering the certification by the CID physician that
petitioners were healthy. To avoid congestion, respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer
was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID where trial was on-going.

9. On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he
be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the co untry." On 7 April
1988, the Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the
same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition.

10. On 4 April 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor
General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was
filed by the Solicitor General.

ISSUE: Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:

1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes
the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an
administrative investigation.

2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were
not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision.

3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with
their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further
allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.

HELD: NO. Petition must fail.

RATIO:
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is
available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the constitutional
requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring
to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them
and act in pursuance thereof." (People vs. Syjuco 64 Phil. 667 [1937]; Alverez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]).

The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when
such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5).

In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which
period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968,22 SCRA 857; People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86, cited in CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 143). Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule 126,1985 Rules on criminal Procedure).

But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed
against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and
46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint
against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-
39823, February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases
subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89
SCRA 717). "It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, althou gh such
confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]).

That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms,
the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had
committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis p. 555; Paraphilia (or
unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor
General's Return of the Writ, on p. 101. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public m orals and violative of the
declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987
Constitution).

At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their
arrest and estops them from questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza,
L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525).

The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in
relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:

(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a de termination
by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the very
purpose of deportation proceeding would be defeated.

Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and
1987 2 Constitutions, which are substantially Identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other
hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a pe nal process. It need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.

It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a punishment,
(Maliler vs. Eby, 264 U.S., 32), it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could
continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings are administrative in character, (Kessler vs.
Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53
F. [2d], 155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him, relating the facts
relied upon. (U.S. vs. Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before
unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all the strict rules of evidence
governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of cro ss-examination. (U.S. vs.
Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to
explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp., 437). (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).

The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of
Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the
Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not
order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as
undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.

Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is
constitutional. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition of their stay in this country. (Morano vs.
Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562).

To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment of the State.

The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, which gives authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an
alien temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds required for the stay, is not unconstitutional.

xxx xxx xxx

... Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under Section 37[al of Comm onwealth Act
613. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State. (Ng Hua To vs. Galang, G. R. No. 10145,
February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411).

"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing
Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation
proceedings.

The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G. R. No. 10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963])
reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution), it is there fore even doubtful whether the
arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause,
leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were
issued.

What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported , that a fair hearing be conducted
(Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. Thus, Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code explicitly provides:

Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or
excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by
said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such a case the person concerned shall be
informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense . He shall also
have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.

The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the
right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other
conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-9700, February 28,1962, 4 SCRA 442). "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right
of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun Hai et al vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation proceedings do
not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said pro ceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, supra).

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or
public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is
found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). Particularly so in
this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Co mmissioner of Immigration
and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied. SO ORDERED.
063 The Board of Commissioners v. Jung Keun Park AUTHOR:
G.R. No. 159835 NOTES: (if applicable)
TOPIC: Immigration
PONENTE: Brion

FACTS: (chronological order)

1. Respondent Jung Keun Park (Park) is a national of the Republic of Korea who came to the Philippines with his family in
the early 1990s to invest in various businesses in the country.
2. Sometime in 2000, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received a letter from Gyung Taek Cha,
requesting the BIDs assistance and cooperation in deporting Park as he was purportedly facing charges of fraud in Korea
for which a warrant for his arrest had been issued by the Korean Police. The letter also stated that Parks Korean Passport
No. NW0057145 had been cancelled on March 8, 2000 and no other passport had been issued to him since. Acting on this
July 6, 2000 letter, the BID officials arrested Park and deported him to Korea on July 24, 2000.
3. Park returned to the Philippines, entering via Zamboanga City from Malaysia, aboard the Sampaguita Ferry 2. Believing
that Park re-entered the country without a valid passport, the BID again arrested Park and indicted him for violating
Section 37(a)(7)[6] of Commonwealth Act No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended (Immigration
Act).

On the very same date that Park was indicted, the BID issued a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) against Park
after finding that he had indeed violated the Immigration Act. Accordingly, the BID ordered Park to be deported,
imposed upon him administrative fines and fees, and included him in its Blacklist.

4. To secure his provisional release pending deportation, Park filed a Petition for Bail with the BID, stating that he had
already paid the administrative fines and fees imposed on him in the SDO. Park also claimed that he should no longer be
considered an undocumented alien because (a) he had been issued a Travel Certificate by the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea in Manila that was valid from January 16, 2001 up to June 19, 2001, and (b) he was a holder of a Special Investors
Resident Visa (SIRV). The BID, however, did not act on his petition.
5. About six months after the BID issued the SDO, Park filed a motion to have it set aside. He insisted that he should not
be considered as an undocumented alien since his Passport No. NW0057145 had not really been cancelled as falsely stated
in the July 6, 2000 letter, a letter which he claimed was later disavowed by the Korean Embassy. Even assuming that this
passport was actually cancelled, Park argues that the Korean Embassy had already issued him a new passport (Passport No.
PH0003486) on April 5, 2001, with validity up to April 5, 2006. Moreover, he was a holder of a SIRV and a travel
certificate.
5. Without, however, going into the merits of Parks claims, the BID denied his motion to set aside the SDO; it ruled that
the motion was belatedly filed, since the SDO had already become final and executory for Parks failure to appeal it within
the reglementary period provided in the Rules of Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings (Deportation Rules).
6. Park assailed the BIDs SDO and October 15, 2001 Resolution, through a certiorari petition filed before the CA. He
reiterated his arguments why he should no longer be considered as an undocumented alien. Park also claimed that he had
been denied of his right to due process, since no hearing of his case was conducted befor e the BIDs Board of Special
Inquiry or the Board of Commissioners; the SDO was in fact issued on the same day that the Charge Sheet was filed.

CA ruled in favor of Park. The CA declared that the BIDs issuance of the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution was
characterized by grave abuse of discretion and, accordingly, nullified them. The BID contests this ruling as legally
erroneous and invokes the Courts appellate jurisdiction via a Rule 45 petition.
ISSUE(S): Whether SDO and Resolution denying Parks motion to set aside the SDO are valid, thus CA erred in ruling in
favor of Park.
HELD: YES. A review of the records compels us to rule that the BID had sufficient factual and legal basis for the SDO
and the October 15, 2001 Resolution. The CA committed legal error in finding that the BID acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution.
RATIO:
Non-immigrants are required by law to present valid passports and visas upon entry into the Philippines

All non-immigrants are required to present unexpired passports and valid visas prior to their admission into the Philippines
under Section 10 of the Immigration Act:

Section 10. Non-immigrants must present for admission into the Philippines unexpired passports or official documents in
the nature of passports issued by the governments of the countries to which they owe allegiance or other travel documents
showing their origins and identity as prescribed by regulations, and valid passport visas granted by diplomatic or consular
officers, except that such document shall not be required of the following aliens: (a) a child qualifying as a non-immigrant,
born subsequent to the issuance of the passport visa of the accompanying parent, the visa not having expired ; and (b) a
seaman qualifying as such under section (9) of this Act. [Emphasis supplied.]

Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another
officer designated by him or the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien : x
xxx

(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a
non-immigrant;

We conclude this case by recognizing and pointing out certain aspects that the BID may, in its discretion, still want to look
into. Section 29 (a) of the Immigration Act states:

Section 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines: x x x x

(15) Persons who have been excluded or deported from the Philippines, but this provision may be waived in the discretion
of the Commissioner of Immigration: Provided, however, That the Commissioner of Immigration shall not exercise his
discretion in favor of aliens excluded or deported on the ground of conviction for any crime involving moral turpitude or
for any crime penalized under sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act or on the ground of having engaged in hoarding,
black-marketing of profiteering unless such aliens have previously resided in the Philippine immediately before his
exclusion or deportation for a period of ten years or more or are married to a native Filipino woman;

As a rule, an alien is barred from re-entering the territory of the deporting State. However, States may, upon proper
application, waive previous deportation orders and allow an alien to re-enter, provided, the re-entry and readmission of the
alien do not pose a risk to the general welfare. As stated in the quoted provision above, the Commissioner of Immigration
may exercise sound discretion in the readmission of previously excluded aliens (subject to certain limitations). After Park
was first deported back to Korea on July 24, 2000 on the strength of the July 6, 2000 letter, he returned to the Philippines
apparently without the requisite consent of the Commissioner of Immigration prior to his re-entry. Whether the July 6,
2000 letter was actually repudiated by the Korean Embassy does not figure into this equation, as Park’s earlier deportation
was already a fait accompli. His failure to secure the Commissioner of Immigration’s consent/waiver prior to readmission
into the deporting State leaves the Commissioner sufficient ground to charge him with violation of Section 37(a)(2) of the
Immigration Act, which declares that:

Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another
officer designated by him or the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
xxxx

(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of
entry;

Park was indicted for violating this requirement because when he returned to the Philippines on October 28, 2000, he used
his Passport No. NW0057145 a passport that had already been cancelled according to the Korean Embassys July 6, 2000
letter. At the time Park was indicted, there was no official document repudiating the July 6, 2000 letter. Par k did not
present other competent proofs that his Passport No. NW0057145 had not been cancelled. In deportation proceedings, the
alien bears the burden of proving that he entered the Philippines lawfully. We do not believe that Park was able to
discharge this burden by belatedly presenting a photocopy of his Passport No. NW0057145 that bore stamp marks of the
date of his arrival in and departure from Malaysia, just days before his return to the country. In all his pleadings before t he
BID and the CA, he never mentioned this prior Malaysian trip, and he conveniently excused the presentation of his
Passport No. NW0057145 by claiming he had misplaced/lost it. Since the authenticity of the arrival and departure stamp
marks in Parks Passport No. NW0057145 had not been passed upon by either the BID or the CA, we cannot accord it
weight and credence.
No due process violation when the summary deportation proceedings were held and when the SDO was issued

Were the documents that Park subsequently presented sufficient to set aside the SDO? The BID posits that these
documents should not even be considered because the SDO had already lapsed into finality (for which reason, the BID
denied Parks motion in its October 15, 2001 Resolution). Park disagrees and claims that the SDO cannot be final because
its issuance was tainted with due process violations by the BID. We, however, fail to see the SDO the way Park does.

The actual designation of the offense is not material so long as the act constituting the offense was clearl y alleged in the
Charge Sheet and sufficient enough to inform Park of the specific ground for his deportation. In this case, we think it was.
Notably, in the pleadings Park filed with the BID, he insisted that his Passport No. NW0057145 had not been cancel led;
that he possessed the requisite travel documents; and that he is not an undocumented alien. Under these circumstances, we
highly doubt Parks claim that he had been denied of his right to be informed; otherwise, he would not have found the need
to raise such defenses against the charge. Our opinion is fortified by the fact that Park never raised this particular objection
to the charge when the case was still before the BID and the CA. Thus, the allegations in the Charge Sheet were sufficient,
and there was full compliance by the BID with the requirement under Section 37(c) that no alien shall be deported without
being informed of the specific grounds for his deportation.

Contrary to Parks claims, the February 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001 letters did not categorically repudiate the cancellation
of Parks Passport No. NW0057145 that was stated in the July 6, 2000 letter. The subsequent issuance of a new passport to
Park, as we said, did not erase the fact that he was not lawfully admitted into the country in the first place, as he returned
without a valid passport. When an alien has already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found
unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at
the time of his entry.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):