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(Professor Barry Buzan, Professor Lene Hansen) Int PDF
(Professor Barry Buzan, Professor Lene Hansen) Int PDF
Y
[ N T E R N A T I ~ N ARELATIONS
L
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
SAGE LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
VOLUME I
The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
@SAGEPublications
Los Angeles London New Delhi Singapore
Introduction and editorial arrangement 0 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen 2007
Every effort has been made to trace and acknowledge all the
copyright owners of the material reprinted herem. However, if
any copyright owners have not been located and contacted at
the time of publication, the publishers will be pleased t o make
the necessary arrangements at the first opportunity.
VOLUME I
The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
I . The Sources of Soviet Conduct X 1
2. "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol
Arnold Wolfers 15
3. Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the
United States Hans J . Morgenthau 30
4. The Delicate Balance of Terror Albert Wohlstetter 55
5. The Stability of a Bipolar World Kenneth N. Waltz 74
6. The Sharing of Nuclear Respons~b~lities:
A Problem In
Need of Solution Andre' Beaufre 97
7. S t r ~ t e g ~Studies
c and Its Cr~tics Hedley Bull 106
8. Arms Control and World Order Hedley Bull 117
9. Cooperation Under the Security D~lemma Robert Jervls 130
10. Rational~tyat the Brmk: The Role of C o g n ~ t ~ vProcesses
e In
Failures of Deterrence lack I,. Snyder 171
11. Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought
Fritz W. Ermarth 19 1
12. Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter Robert Jervis 207
Colin S. Gray
13. Strategic Stability Reconsidered 223
14. Managing Nuclear Multipolarity John J. Weltman 246
15. Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament -
The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament
and Security Issues 258
16. Redefining Security Richard H. Ullman 296
17. Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?
Mohammed Ayoob 317
18. Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy
Implications Carl Sagan 330
vi Contents
VOLUME I1
The Transition to the Post-Cold War Security Agenda
VOLUME I11
Widening Security
43. What is Security? Emma Rothschild
44. A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo Richard Price
45. Securitization and Desecuritization Ole W m e r
46. Security Studies and the End of the Cold War
David A. Baldwin
47. Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School
Bill McStueeney
48. Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and
Methods Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams
49. Collective Identity in a Democratic Community:
The Case of NATO Thomas Risse-Kappe~
SO. Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order:
The Middle Eastern Case Keith Krause
5 1. Constructing National Interests Jutta Weldes
52. Multiple Identities, Interfacing Games: The Social Construction
of Western Action in Bosnia K.M. Fierke
53. Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross
54. Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in
International Relations Emanuel Adler
VOLUME IV
Debating Security and Strategy and the Impact of 9-11
55. Should Strategic Studies Survive? Richard K. Betts 1
56. Identity and the Politics of Security Michael C. Williams 25
viii Contents
46. 'Security Studies and the End of the Cold War', David A. Baldwin
World Politics, 48(1) (1995): 117-41.
O The Johns Hopkins University Press. Reprinted with permission of
The Johns Hopkins University Press.
47. 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School',
Bill McSweeney
Review of International Studies, 22(1) (1996): 8 1-93.
O British International Studies Association, reproduced with permission.
48. 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods',
Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams
Mershon International Studies Review, 40(2) (1996): 229-54.
O Blackwell Publishing. Reprinted with permission.
49. 'Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO',
Thomas Risse-Kappen
Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms
and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996), pp. 357-99.
O Columbia University Press. Reprinted with permission.
50. 'Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: The
Middle Eastern Case', Keith Krause
European Journal of International Relations, 2(3) (1996): 3 19-54.
O Sage Publications Ltd. Reprinted with permission.
51. 'Constructing National Interests', Jutta Weldes
European Journal of lnternational Relations, 2(3) (1996): 275-318.
O Sage Publications Ltd. Reprinted with permission.
52. 'Multiple Identities, Interfacing Games: The Social Construction of
Western Action in Bosnia', K.M. Fierke
European Journal of International Relations, 2 ( 4 ) (1996): 467-97.
0 Sage Publications Ltd. Reprinted with permission.
53. 'Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy', Barry R. Posen and
Andrew L. Ross
lnternational Security, 21(3) (1996-97): 5-53.
O 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Reprinted with permission.
54. 'Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International
Relations', Emanuel Adler
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 26(2) (1997):249-77.
O Millennium: Journal of International Studies. This article first
appeared in Millennium, and is reproduced with the permission of
the publisher.
55. 'Should Strategic Studies Survive?', Richard K. Betts
World Politics, 50(1) (1997): 7-33.
Appendix of Sources xv
0
ne of the concepts in International Relations (IR) is security. Since
the primary unit of IR is the state, the field of International Security
Studies (ISS) was formed around the security of states, somewhat mis-
leadingly labeled 'national security'. That states strive to be secure, and that
security involves not only territorial integrity, but the protection of a particu-
lar set of political and cultural values, is thus one of the axioms of inter-
national politics. Yet, if there is agreement that states seek security, there is
no consensus on what this implies for war and conflict. The Realist school
argues that states are by nature driven by their self-interest and a prudent
suspicion towards others: that they seek their own security first and foremost,
and that they put it above all other goals, including economic prosperity. To
be a strong state requires a healthy economy, technological know-how, and a
united citizenry, but what ultimately counts is a state's ability t o project
military force. To Realists the so-called security dilemma implies that states
strive to enhance their security, particularly by maintaining military capabil-
ity adequate t o meet potential challenges. Yet although conceived as a defen-
sive means, to other states this can easily look like an offensive move. States
become trapped in a spiral where each attempts t o protect its security only
to find others raising the stakes in the attempt t o improve theirs. Alliances
might be forged t o balance the capabilities of threatening states, but they
are, argue Realists, fragile and temporary arrangements that dissolve with
the external threats that brought them together.
The discipline of ISS has Realism and its understanding of the state and
military force at its center. Realism is however far from uncontested, indeed
as many of the articles in this Reader show it is challenged on descriptive,
analytical as well as normative grounds. From the birth of ISS a t the end of
World War 11, Idealist or Liberal approaches held a fundamentally different
view of the state and its security. Idealists agreed with Realism that states
feared for their security, but they disagreed that an inbuilt fear of others drove
states to see security only through the lens of narrow self-interest. Hence, it
is possible t o break the escalating logic of the security dilemma: states do have
the capacity to understand the consequences of their own military strategies
and acquisitions, and international institutions can help solve disputes and
build trust. The state, in short, is not a fixed entity; some might act in a
Realist manner, but others might not. If the state is not necessarily Realist,
neither is the international system: states can form institutional arrangements
xviii Editors' Introduction
whose positive purpose stretches beyond defensive alliances and which make
states realize that their own security is deeply interdependent with that of
others.
The debate between Idealists and Realists centered on the status of the state
and the ensuing dynamics of the international system. This debate was and is
central in that it goes to the core of basic analytical and normative assump-
tions about human nature, political community, sovereignty, authority, legit-
imacy and order. Can security only be provided by the state, as Realists argue,
should international or global security be guaranteed by states cooperating,
or is a radical dismantling of the state a precondition for 'real security'? To
trace the evolution of ISS is to uncover a series of conceptual debates on
whether security should be defined in narrow or in broader terms: whether
the security of the state or the security of other 'referent objects' (crucially, the
individual, humanity, ethnic, religious, racial and gendered groups) should be
privileged, whether the concept should be confined to include only military
threats and organized violence or whether it should include for example envir-
onmental dangers, hunger, poverty and epidemics. These are also debates over
what constitutes good social science and whether normative questions can and
should be raised.
The rest of this Introduction is organized into two main sections. The
first considers the birth of ISS and the main forces that have driven its devel-
opment. The second traces the evolution of ISS, looking first at the main-
stream debates during the Cold War, and at the challenges to them; then at
the widening and deepening of the ISS literature that began later in the Cold
War but blossomed during the 1990s; and finally at the impact, still unfold-
ing, of 9/11 and the 'global War on Terror'. References in bold are to articles
included in the Reader.
ISS emerged as a sub-field of IR after World War 11. It was new in the sense
that while 'security' had long been used by political theorists and military
strategists, 'international security' had never before been the organizing
concept for a field of study. In addition, post-World War I1 writers on inter-
national security began to see themselves as forming a discipline devoted to
a defined set of questions. ISS was nevertheless related to earlier writings in
two important ways.
First, because it drew upon the older discipline of political theory where
writers from classical Greece through to Hobbes, Machiavelli, John Stuart
Mill and Montesquieu had been concerned with the questions of sovereignty
and political authority. It also drew on diplomatic history which traced the
development of relationships between the European states system and the
rest of the world, and military strategists writing on defense, war and power
(on the latter see Baldwin, 1995: 119-120j. The articles included in this
Editors' Introduction xix
reader begin with the birth of the discipline of ISS after World War 11, which
means that these forerunners are not included. But as R.B.J. Walker (1990)
and Michael C. Williams (1998) show, these writings were and are signifi-
cant to ISS precisely because this classical heritage is constantly referred to
and debated.
Second, 'security' was a key political concept prior to 'national security'
gaining center stage after World War 11. Emma Rothschild (1995: 61-4)
traces the many and quite different meanings the word 'security' had before
the French Revolution. She notes that what unites modern uses of 'security'
is a concern with the relationship between the individual on the one side and
the larger collective on the other. Moving from the French Revolution to the
American Depression of the 1930's, Mark Neocleous (2006) and Arnold
Wolfers (1952:481-2) point out that this period linked 'security' to questions
of welfare and economics, not to the national and military security of the state.
What happened after World War I1 was thus that 'security' went from
being a term used within the field of social policy as well as more loosely
within the study of war, defense and diplomacy, to being a term that struc-
tured an entire field. Writing in 1952, Wolfers (1952: 483) observed that,
'The term national security, like national interest, is well enough established
in the political discourse of international relations to designate an objective
of policy distinguishable from others.' The articles included in this four-
volume reader are all part of the development of this field, although they
differ in that some explicitly question the concept of security, while others
take some given version of it for granted. The main example of the latter
practice is most of the works on nuclear deterrence during the Cold War,
which simply analyzed the importance of particular themes within a given
understanding of USIWestern military security (e.g. the distinction between
offensive and defensive weapons, Levy, 1984; or the applicability of a pol-
icy of flexible response or a policy of mutually assured destruction, Jervis,
1979-80; or key events such as the Cuban Missiles Crisis, Snyder, 1978).
Explicit discussions of the concept of security calling for its expansion beyond
nationallstate security and military threats emerged during the 1980's
(Common Security, 1982; Buzan, 1984; Ullman, 1983) and gained ground
as the Cold War and the bipolar international structure dissolved.
When ISS emerged it addressed a classic question - how could states pro-
tect themselves and how did they know what and who were threatening
them? -yet the shift of guiding concepts from 'war' and 'defense' to 'security'
also implied crucial changes in that it opened up the study of a broader set of
political issues, including the importance of societal cohesion and the rela-
tionship between military and non-military threats and vulnerabilities. Indeed
the first three articles in Volume I by George F. Kennan (1947), Arnold
Wolfers (1952) and Hans J. Morgenthau (1952) are clear indications of this
development and together they delineate five themes central to ISS.
First, that the key political question that drove the evolution of LSS was
the concern with the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the ch~llenges
of bipolarity.
xx Editors' Introduction
not necessarily equally important at all times: great power politics, technology,
key events, the internal dynamic of academic debates, and institutionalization.
Technology
Technology drives ISS through its impact on the threats, vulnerabilities and
(in)stability of strategic relationships. The arrival during the mid-1940s of
the atom bomb was pretty much the foundational event for Strategic
Studies and the impact of nuclear - and nuclear- related - technology dur-
ing the Cold War can hardly be exaggerated. Nuclear weapons provided a
xxii Editors' Introduction
huge surplus capacity of destructive power for the first time in military his-
tory. Long-range ballistic missiles speeded up delivery times and were cap-
able of carrying nuclear warheads, a technological development that liberated
nuclear weapons from vulnerable bomber delivery systems, and greatly
increased the capacity to make a first strike against opponents. Whereas
nuclear warheads and intercontinental missiles were real developments feed-
ing huge quantities of ISS literature, the enormous and ongoing literature on
Anti Ballistic Missiles (ABM)/Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) reveals that
even potential technology developments could have major impacts on both
strategic relations and ISS.
Technology need not be exclusively military in kind to make an impact
on ISS. The history of military and civilian technologies is often one of
interplay and 'dual-use'. The Internet for instance was originally developed
as a military technology, as a distributed network transmitting information
under a nuclear attack. Nuclear technology to take another example has a
military as well as a civil side (energy and medicine) that can be difficult to dis-
tinguish, a fact which also complicates the assessment of nuclear proliferation.
The same dilemma is also applicable to biological and chemical weapons or to
the communications technologies applied in both civilian consumer electron-
ics and battlefield management.
If the concept of security is expanded beyond the military sector the list
of technological factors that can drive security debates grows as well. If
AIDSIHIV is seen as a threat to regional security in parts of Africa and Asia,
the retroviral technology for treating those infected is key to the spread and
consequences of the decease (Elbe, 2006). Or, if the environment is threat-
ened by the effects of industrialization, then the technologies implicated in
these threats and their solution become central. The attacks on September 11
and the War on Terror show that technology and the identification of
threats and enemies are intimately linked and that the list of technologies
central t o ISS changes over time. First, the technology of digital networks
(the electronic movement of money, cellphones and Internet communication)
is significant for how physically dispersed terrorist networks communicate
while simultaneously erasing (most of) their traces. Second, the spectacular
character of the attack could be seen as deeply connected to the images
created and the instantaneity with which they were globally broadcast allow-
ing the world to watch in real time as the World Trade Center collapsed
(Der Derian, 2005). Arguably the power of terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda
lies not in their quantitative capabilities (no one considers an invasion likely),
but in their qualitative ability to unsettle Western societies' feeling of security.
Hence the production and distribution of iconic images through new media
technologies that propel this feeling becomes a key security concern.
The question how technology impacts economic, political, military and
cultural developments has been a topic of great debate in the social sciences
and to speak about technology as a driving factor thus raises the specter
of technological determinism (Levy, 1984; Paarlberg, 2004). Yet while tech-
nology is undoubtedly a main driving force in the development of ISS, it is by
no means a determining one, first, because technology is itself influenced by
Editors' Introduction xxiii
the other driving forces; and second, because there are human agents (civilian
and military; commercial and public) who make decisions about which
technology to develop. Decisions on nuclear technology during the Cold War
were hugely impacted by the bipolar confrontation between the US and the
Soviet Union. Once in the world, technology creates pressures of its own,
which again impacts the political process, but this is a complex process
of feedbacks between technology and the other driving forces and hurnan
decisions, not one of determinism.
Key Events
Events come in various forms, and they can change not only relationships
among the powers, but also the academic paradigms used to understand
those relationships. The most dramatic are specific, focused crises that not
only become objects of study in their own right, but which change existing
understandings, relationships and practices in the wider strategic domain.
Two key examples of this type are the Cuba missile crisis in 1962 (Snyder,
1978; Weldes, 1996) and the terrorist attacks on the US on September I I ,
2001 (Barkawi, 2004; Der Derian, 2005). And, the ending of the Cold War
was of course the single most important event in the history of ISS. Other
events take the form of steady processes unfolding over time that change the
knowledge, understanding and consciousness that support existing practices.
A good example of this is the rise of environmental concerns and the move
o f the environment from a background variable to a foreground one (Ullman,
1983; Deudney, 1990). There was no specific crisis that put environmental
issues into the foreground, but rather a steady drip of new information, new
understandings, and a rising public consciousness that grew sufficiently wide
and deep to open a place for environmental security in policy debates and the
ISS literature. The identification of key events might often seem common-
sensical: it is not hard to see the impact of the Soviet Union gaining nuclear
weapons, its dissolution in 1991, or the attacks on September 11. Yet, in ana-
lytical terms one should note that events are in fact politically and inter-
subjectively constituted. It is the acknowledgen~entby politicians, institutions,
the media and the public that something is of such importance that it should
be responded to, possibly even with military means, that makes it an 'event'.
Institutionalization
The themes set out by the very first writers on security worked together with
the driving forces to found a field of Strategic Studies that was simultan-
eously productive, influential and fashionable as well as committed to a nar-
row, state-centric, military-political view of ISS. Broader questions, including
those of economic security and domestic cohesion, put on the research agenda
by Wolfers and Morgenthau were marginalized. Normative questions were
not explicitly pursued either as mainstream ISS (Strategic Studies) saw itself
as being on the right side of a conflict whose existence and legitimacy was
beyond questioning. Cold War ISS was driven largely by the policy problems
facing the US, and to a lesser extent those of its allies (e.g. Beaufre, 1965).
xxvi Editors' Introduction
accept the attack without making any retaliation? Understanding these great
chains of reasoning was seen as crucial to developing the best military options
that would deter the enemy from attacking in the first place.
Much ink was spilled among other technological choices over the costs
and benefits of putting multiple warheads on missiles; of pursuing high
levels of accuracy with so-called precision-guided munitions; of developing
supersonic bombers; of deploying cruise missiles; and of building elaborate
protected hiding places for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.
One o f the fiercest, and still ongoing, arguments of this sort was about ABM,
aka BMD, systems, under argument since the 1970s (Common Security,
1982; Glaser, 1984; Walker, 2000). Part of the argument was about whether
or not it could be done with existing or likely technology. But the more inter-
esting theoretical part was about what impact deployment of an effective, or
even partly effective, BMD would have on nuclear strategic stability. With its
promise of escape from the whole logic of deterrence, and especially from hav-
ing one's population held hostage under the grim, but supposedly stabilizing,
logic of the Cold War's most notorious acronym, MAD (mutually assured
destruction), RMD proved particularly attractive in US domestic politics,
helped there by its appeal to enthusiasm for technological fixes, and its
amenability to being staged as defensive (the protests of strategists about its
costs, technical difficulty and destabilizing consequences notwithstanding).
In addition to the pressures from rapidly evolving technologies, there was
an ongoing fundamental disagreement about the basic nature of nuclear
deterrence itself, and whether that made it easy or difficult to achieve (Jervis,
1979-80; Gray, 1980). Some thought that nuclear weapons made deterrence
easy, because any even half-rational actor would be given serious pause by the
prospect of obliteration. In other words, possession of a nuclear arsenal suf-
ficient for 'assured destruction' would basically suffice, leading to a so-called
'minimum deterrence' strategy. Others calculated that a ruthless rational
actor (as Kennan, 1947 had postulated the Soviet Union to be) would require
not only a threat of high damage, but also a near-certain probability that such
a retaliation would be delivered, before deterrence could be effective.
Minimum deterrence offered a kind of stability in easy parity, and also
economy, but at some risk of vulnerability to utterly ruthless opponents. Its
logic also provided incentives for nuclear proliferation, making it seem fairly
straightforward for lesser powers to acquire a great equalizer. Proliferation
threatened to complicate not only the core elements of the nuclear debate-
deterrence, arms control, and escalation - all of which were much more dif-
ficult with three or more parties than with just two (Weltman, 1981-2;
Walker, 2000), but also bipolarity itself. Consequently, the US and the Soviet
Union led the way in promoting a nuclear nonproliferation regime, and
nuclear proliferation became a large and elaborate subject in its own right
within the ISS literature.
In contrast to minimum deterrence, maximum deterrence thinking offered
higher entrance costs to would-be nuclear weapons states, and an expensive,
open-ended arms race to existing nuclear weapon states. The supposed gain
xxviii Editors' Introduction
was to close loopholes against extreme aggressors who might take risks along
the lines of the ex- ante ex- post dilemma. Dealing with this contingency
generated demands for huge and elaborate forces capable of responding to
aggression at any level, and of maintaining 'escalation dominance' through-
out the spectrum of conventional and nuclear warfighting. Maximum
deterrence thinking rested on the assumption of a highly aggressive, risk-
taking and opportunistic opponent, but it was also driven by the problem
of Extended Deterrence (ED) that arose from the US guarantees to protect
Europe embodied in the NATO alliance.
ED links the technological driver to the great power politics theme.
Extending the US nuclear umbrella was uncomplicated when the US nuclear
monopoly made deterrence easy even in the face of much superior Soviet
conventional military strength in Europe. But it became fiendishly difficult
when the Soviets also acquired the capability to threaten the US with nuclear
weapons. H o w could the European allies believe that the US would retaliate
against the Soviet Union for, say, an attack on West Germany, when the con-
sequence could be Soviet retaliation against American cities? This question
and its many variants haunted Western strategic thinking from Sputnik
onwards (Beaufre, 1965; Jervis, 1979-80; Gray, 1980). It was central to the
literature on NATO and its recurrent discontents over especially nuclear
strategy, which was another major theme in the ISS literature.
Extended deterrence and flexible response fed another concern intrinsic to
the whole logic of maximum deterrence, and also linked to rival superpower
interventions in crises and conflicts in the Third World (Cuba, Southeast
Asia, the Middle East): escalation and how to control it. The practice of ED
inevitably led to scenarios about low- level warfighting in response to local
aggression, and how to respond if the opponent raised the ante by moving
t o higher levels of force, especially to the use of so-called 'tactical' nuclear
weapons. Maximum deterrence logic required that rationality prevail, and
that limited nuclear war be containable, but there were real doubts about
whether such cool-headedness and fine-tuning would be possible once
command and control systems came under the intense and unpredictable
pressures of actual nuclear warfighting. Maximum deterrence logic and ED
thus pushed deterrence theory into fantastic complications. The great
chains of if-then propositions became so long, and rested on so many ques-
tionable assumptions about both technological performance and human
behavior, that the credibility of the theory itself came into question. Even if
the Cold War had not ended, deterrence theory was in trouble, and even at
its peak it was never without challengers.
Strategic Studies definitely provided the foundation for ISS, but it was not
unchallenged, nor was it an entirely uniform block as shown by for instance
Snyder's and Bull's critical discussions of rational actor assumptions (Snyder,
1978; Bull, 1968). Peace Research (PR) had to a large extent constituted
itself in opposition to Strategic Studies with Peace Researchers arguing that
Editors' Introduction xxix
SS's assumptions of (elite) actor rationality and bipolar stability were not only
wrong but dangerous. The devastation brought about by a nuclear exchange
would be so enormous that one should not rely upon small elites to make such
decisions (Sagan, 1 9 8 3 4 ) . Peace Researchers sometimes challenged the frame-
work of bipolarity, mainly arguing that arms control, disarmament, a change
from offensive t o defensive forces, and the acknowledgement of each other's
legitimate existence could lower the levels of tension (Galtung, 1984;
Common Security, 1982). Much of PR thus shared SS's conceptualization of
security in political-military and state-based terms, but argued for a different
analysis of the threats and dangers arising from nuclear deterrence. Perhaps
the most conspicuous area of overlap was in the literature on arms control,
which aimed at trying to stabilize the superpower-nuclear relationship by
managing the types and numbers of weapons deployed (Bull, 1976). Arms
control and much PR, can be seen as trying to give concerns about inter-
national security equal status alongside the mainly national security concerns
of the early Strategic Studies literature. Underlying both was a normative cri-
tique of mainstream Strategic Studies for its failure to question sufficiently (or
in some cases at all) the ethical implications of its state-centric focus on
national security under nuclear conditions.
Epistemologically, many Peace Researchers also adopted a rationalist
and objectivist position: the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the journal
of Peace Research featured studies built on clear assumptions of causality
and quantitative analysis of large data sets. Carl Sagan's (1983-4) 'hard-
science' yet evocative account of the climatic consequences of a nuclear war
shows the objective and positivist nature of ISS challengers as well as the
scope of critics. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was also devoted t o
'hard scientists' engaged in trying t o control and contain the consequences
of the nuclear arms race.
Other Peace Researchers worked more critically with the concept of
security arguing that to privilege state security was t o leave out the security
problems faced by many of the world's individuals. Individual security prob-
lems were numerous, but the most important (particularly in the Third World)
were linked t o economic deprivation (poverty, malnutrition and hunger)
and underdevelopment, t o 'structural violence' in Galtung's (1969) termin-
ology. The report on Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament
chaired by Olof Palme was key in this respect as its concept of Common
Security successfully laid out a wider non-SS security agenda (Common
Security, 1982; Dewitt, 1994). The majority of the report dealt with disarma-
ment and was thus in line with the traditional PR approach to international
security, but the report's first chapter also established a link between domes-
tic and international security and North-South relations arguing that the
Third World was highly negatively affected by global militarization which
exacerbated the risk of 'economic failure and social disruption' (Common
Security, 1982: 5 ) .
Not a11 challengers to ISS self-identified as Peace Researchers and during
the 1980s a series of approaches emerged which t o varying degrees argued
xxx Editors' introduction
The ending of the Cold War was a benchmark event in the evolution of ISS.
Much of the mainstream military-political agenda simply disappeared.
Bipolarity - and the nuclear deterrence which surrounded it - had been the
cornerstone of mainstream ISS for almost 40 years when the Cold War
came to a halt. As a result mainstream ISS faced something of an institu-
tional crisis, and approaches calling for a widening of security to include
other sectors than the military and referent objects besides the state gained
ground. The period from the early 1990s until September 11,2001 did not
have one dominant event or political problem as had the Cold War to tie
the discipline together. The war against Iraq in 1991, the rise of Japan or
China, nuclear proliferation, the wars following the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
Editors' Introduction xxxiii
humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and the war against Serbia in 1999 con-
stituted some of the key events, but none of them structured an overarching
internat~onalsecurlty agenda.
The impact of this on ISS was not simply to end one line of approach and
open the way to another. As the problematique of international security lost
its dominant core and fragmented into multiple concerns, so also ISS evolved
to match. The traditionalist core did not disappear, but it did lose ground to
other approaches. There is thus quite a lot of continuity, but also a substantial
change in the distribution of interest in various approaches. We characterized
Cold War ISS as having one dominant (traditionalist) main stream with a
number of challengers (Peace Research, Arms Control, Poststructuralism,
Feminism, Postcolonialism) arrayed around it. During the 1990s this pattern
changes to something more like a river delta where the main stream branches
off into several streams, with none having a clear claim to be the main one.
Arms Control, like the traditional approach generally, loses relevance because
the strategic military threat has dropped away. Feminism, Postcolonialism and
Poststructuralism continue to evolve as branches of ISS, and new branches
based o n non-military agendas and Constructivist approaches join in. In this
section we will look first at the continuities from the previous two sections,
and then at the newer branches.
The traditionalists remained robust, continuing to claim primacy, and
pursuing a diverse post-Cold War military-political agenda. Their first con-
cern, closely linked to neo-realism, was the debate over which polarity
(multi- or uni-?) had replaced bipolarity, and the consequences thereof for
US grand strategy (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992; Huntington, 1993; Waltz,
1993; Posen and Ross, 1996-7; Kupchan, 1998; Huntington, 1999; Kagan,
2002). At the beginning of the Cold War this type of question had been set-
tled relatively early, and the nature of the rival to the US became quickly
and deeply sedirnented. The ending of the Cold War produced a much
murkier international situation in which the nature and identity of the chal-
) the US, if any, remained unclear: Japan and China were given
l e n g e r ( ~to
particular concern (Waltz, 1993; Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993) as was
the potential rise of an Islamic civilization (Huntington, 1993). The ques-
tion of appropriate US strategy remained open for a longer time.
Traditionalists also remained concerned with the strategic impact of tech-
nology, though now largely delinked from Cold War worries about nuclear
deterrence. Discussions about defenses against BMD, and US policy debates
ahout this, continued. So also did the debate about nuclear proliferation
(Walker, 2000), though increasingly both of these themes were linked to
so-called 'rogue states' (especially Iran, Iraq, North Korea) unwilling to
abide by Western rules of the game. The technology theme was also featured
in debate about the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA, see Paarlberg,
2004), which was mainly concerned with the impact of computing, surveil-
lance and communications technologies on battlefield management.
Conceptually an important shift within traditionalist ISS was to expli-
citly integrate the importance of sub-state conflicts and actors. Cold War
Strategic Studies had only to a limited extent examined the impact of (or on)
xxxiv Editors' Introduction
non-state actors, an analytical decision supported by the fact that while both
the US and the Soviet Union worked to create allies, they did not generally
intervene in defense of populations caught in the throes of civil war or mur-
derous dictators. The end of the Cold War changed this as intra-state and eth-
nic conflicts became more prominent than inter-state wars and cases like the
former Yugoslavia and Somalia extensively covered by the global media.
Humanitarian interventions were undertaken in response with the goal of pro-
tecting civilian populations, although not necessarily to end the war itself
(Posen and Ross, 1996-7; Fierke, 1996). (neo)realists responded by arguing
that their theory was as adequate for analyzing conflicts at the intra-state level
as at the international one (Posen, 1993). It was not tied to state security, but
defined by the question of organized violence (Walt, 1991; Krause, 1996).
Traditionalists did not just pursue their own agenda, but mounted a counter-
attack against the drive towards widening the security agenda that had begun
during the 1980s (see previous section) and gathered strength during the
1990s (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988; Walt, 1991; Kolodziej, 1992; Baldwin,
1995; Betts, 1997). A significant change from the 1980s was that a more
explicit debate on security emerged. The concepts of 'wideners' and 'deepen-
ers' were coined (Krause and Williams, 1996), writers discussed where they
fitted into the disciplinary landscape and more schools and labels were intro-
duced in addition to Poststructuralism and Feminism which continued to
grow.
The least controversial wideners were those who followed the earlier
lead of taking a conception of national (state) security and linking military-
political security to questions of the environment, ethnicity, economy or health
while taking a largely objective and materialist (and often rather empirical)
approach. Another group of challengers was made up of mostly American
Constructivist scholars who worked with the concepts of culture, norms,
ideas and identity to show how these constrained and enabled state behav-
ior in ways that material explanations could not account for (Katzenstein
and Okawara, 1993; Risse-Kappen, 1996; Krause, 1996; Price, 1995; Adler,
1997). This form of Constructivism grew out of the larger epistemological
debate in IR between Rationalists and Reflectivists already under way by the
late 1980s and did not directly challenge state-centrism: it allowed for
ideational factors and non-state actors, particular international institutions,
but this was with the aim of explaining the pursuit of state security (usually
through the critique of Rationalist [Realist] Realist approaches), not to chal-
lenge its definition.
Gradually the Constructivist camp divided into a 'mainstream' and a
'critical' position and the latter shifted the focus from the ideational and
state-centric approach of 'mainstream Constructivism' to the study of lin-
guistic and narrative structures in foreign policy texts and to the way they
legitimized and produced security and identity for example in the American
responses to the Cuban Missiles Crisis or the Western policies towards the
Bosnian War (Weldes, 1996; Fierke, 1996). Critical Constructivists also
showed how competing representations were possible, but marginalized by
Editors' Introduction xxxv
The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 was definitely a key
event but whether or not the subsequent 'global War on Terror' (CWoT)
defines a new era of international security remains an open question.
Whether it does or not hinges on the American ability to securitize 'terror-
ism' as a ,global threat and have this securitization accepted by at least its
major allies and the great powers. If so (and the possibility is plausible if
not certain), then the GWoT would provide a new core framing for ISS of
a kind that has been absent since the end o f the Cold War. Certainly there
is a noticeable new preoccupation with security actors other than the state,
mainly terrorists (Barkawi, 2004; Der Derian, 2005), but also private mili-
tary companies. Concern with terrorism is of course not new, with the lit-
erature stretching back into the Cold War. But the earlier literature dealt
with terrorism as a peripheral problem to the main core of ISS concerns, not
the central one. The situation however is nothing like that at the early stages
of the Cold War when the identity of 'the enemy' crystallized quickly and
attracted a broad consensus in the West. The GWoT itself, and particularly
the characterization of 'terrorism' and the identity of 'terrorists' remain
heavily contested, and the Bush administration's portrait of itfthem has
done as much to divide the West as to unite it (Andreani, 2004-5). At the
time of writing it remains to be seen whether the unfolding disaster of the
US-led intervention in Iraq will do more to discredit or reinforce the GWoT.
Against the idea of a new era in ISS is the fact that the traditional pre-
occupations of great power politics remain strong and that this might make
other states reluctant to comply with the American articulation of the
xxxviii Editors' introduction
ISS will continue to adapt, as it has done since its birth, to changes in the
public policy environment that define what constitutes international security
for any given time and place. It will thus continue to be sensitive to changes
in great power politics and the distribution of power, and to changes in tech-
nology that affect the use of force. It will be shoved and shaped by military-
political events such as 911 1 and the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as
well as by events in other sectors, be it rises in sea level, the spread of a new
plague, or changes in the way identities play into the realm of security. It
seems likely that for some time yet the US will remain central to ISS (as both
subject and main generator of ISS literature), meaning that its domestic pol-
itics will continue to influence the field in a big way. And so long as academic
life goes on, one can be sure that new fashions and new ways of thinking will
make their impact on how ISS evolves.
What seems unlikely to us is that ISS will ever return to its Cold War form
of a single dominant sector and a single dominant mode of analysis. The
widening and deepenings that started during the Cold War and flowered dur-
ing the 1990s are here to stay, even though the balance of influence among
them will vary from place to place and time to time. All the new approaches
have put down roots, made recognized contributions to understanding, estab-
lished audiences for their work, and begun to reproduce themselves through
the training o f next generations. ISS has become, and will remain, the multi-
channeled field that was hinted at when the concept of security first rose to
prominence, but which got temporarily lost during the obsession with nuclear
deterrence that marked the 'golden age' of the Cold War.
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The Sources o f Soviet Conduct
further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the tempor-
ary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New
Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby
served its purpose, it also made it evident that the "capitalistic sector of
society" was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of govern-
mental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always con-
stitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet rCgime and a serious rival
for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with
respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a pri-
vate producer.
Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile
these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, though this
is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the
struggle for succession to Lenin's position of leadership, were not the men to
tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted.
Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism,
unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too
fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the
Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them
a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence
of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they
insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside of
the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to
be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be
dominated by the Party. N o other force in Russian society was to be per-
mitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure.
All else was to be an amorphous mass.
And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party
members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision
and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own
individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the
overbrooding presence of "the word."
Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek
absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed - and found it easy to
believe - that they alone knew what was good for society and that they
would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallenge-
able. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to
recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their
methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they
placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and
happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care.
Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet rkgime is that
down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never
been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predom-
inantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power
which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it
4 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have
also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we
have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was
their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders.
The powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to sustain
them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect
to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon
forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, "to chastise the contumacy"
which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every
man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if
he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his con-
duct he is bound eventually t o be right.
Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well
as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be offi-
cially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such oppos-
ition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying
capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as
existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element,
part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as
these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away; and
when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it dis-
appeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the com-
pulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer
existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be ser-
ious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from
the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the
retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.
This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the
retention of the "organs of suppression," meaning, among others, the army
and the secret ~ o l i c e ,on the ground that "as long as there is a capitalist
encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences
that flow from that danger." In accordance with that theory, and from that
time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been por-
trayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power.
By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original
Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist
worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded
in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence
abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and tactics
and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably
the Nazi rCgime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late
1930's, which did indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union.
But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace
confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not
in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away
the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.
\ T h e S o u r c e s of Soviet Conduct 5
Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit
of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the
semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual
machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of admin-
istration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs
which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet
power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and
ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monop-
olism of the state. The "organs of suppression," in which the Soviet leaders
had sought security from rival forces, became in large measure the masters
of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the
structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship
and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with
the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings
who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this
concept of Russia's position, for without it they are themselves superfluous.
As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with
these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for
nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in
modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own
reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential
opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous
than it could have been before those excesses began.
But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the
maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended. For this fiction has
hcen canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in
its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds
far greater than those of mere ideology.
aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist.
It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist
world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of
the peoples it controls. If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signa-
ture t o documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded
as a tactical maneuvre permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is with-
out honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor. Basically, the
antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phe-
nomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy:
the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspicious-
ness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to
stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of
emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the
other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the
background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who
will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have
changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought
about such "changes." But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvres.
These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they
flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us,
whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of
Soviet power is changed.
This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the
Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be consid-
ered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a
given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has
the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of
progress can take their time in preparing the final coup de grice. Meanwhile,
what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland" - that oasis of power which has
been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union - should be
cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its for-
tunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of pre-
mature, "adventuristic" revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass
Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counter-revolutionary
act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as
defined in Moscow.
This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary
Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept
of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party
itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository
of truth. For if truth were t o be found elsewhere, there would be justifica-
tion for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the
Kremlin cannot and will not permit.
The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and
has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal
X The Sources of Soviet Conduct 7
Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of cen-
turies of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast
unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are
the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the
Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about
retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of
no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its
political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is per-
mitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that
it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world
power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philo-
sophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there
should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired
goal.
- There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must
be reached at any given time.
These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more
difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders
like Napoleon and Hitler. O n the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary
force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front
when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic
and rhetoric of power. O n the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or dis-
couraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient
persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively coun-
tered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of demo-
cratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of
Russia's adversaries - policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less
variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet
Union itself.
In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United
States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient
but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is
important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to d o with out-
ward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of out-
ward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to
political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of pres-
tige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and
threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even
though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders
are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious
that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in polit-
ical affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these
reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the for-
eign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected
and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a
manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to
Russian prestige.
The Sources of Soviet Conduct 9
In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure
against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be
contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force a t a series
of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to
the shifts and manceuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed o r
talked out of existence. The Russians look forward t o a duel of infinite
duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must
be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party repre-
sented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than
Soviet power today represents in the world community.
But if ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side
and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us o n w h o m that ideol-
ogy has n o claim are free to examine objectively the validity o f that prem-
ise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west
over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline
and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision
down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and
resourcef~~lness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years.
What does that spell for Russia itself?
The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern
technique to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience
within the confines o f their power. Few challenge their authority; and even
those w h o d o are unable t o make that challenge valid as against the organs
of suppression of the state.
The Kremlin has also proved able t o accomplish its purpose of building
up in Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, an industrial
foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, t o be sure, not yet complete but
which is nevertheless continuing t o grow and is approaching those of the
other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance
of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been
carried out a t a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and ener-
gies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor o n a scale unprecedented in
modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect o r
abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, con-
sumers' goods production, housing and transportation.
To all that, the war has added its tren~endoustoll of destruction, death
and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in R L I S Stoday ~~ a
population which is physically a n d spiritually tired. The mass of the people
are disillusioned, skeptical and n o longer as accessible as they once were t o
the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers
ahroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight respite
accorded t o the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent
testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little
expression in the purposes of the rigime.
10 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength
of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for
the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The
forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary
means of compelling people to work longer hours than their own volition or
mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they
become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to
the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer
available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.
Here only the younger generation can help. The younger generation,
despite all vicissitudes and sufferings, is numerous and vigorous; and the
Russians are a talented people. But it still remains to be seen what will be
the effects on mature performance of the abnormal emotional strains of
childhood which Soviet dictatorship created and which were enormously
increased by the war. Such things as normal security and placidity of home
environment have practically ceased to exist in the Soviet Union outside of
the most remote farms and villages. And observers are not yet sure whether
that is not going to leave its mark on the over-all capacity of the generation
now coming into maturity.
In addition to this, we have the fact that Soviet economic development,
while it can list certain formidable achievements, has been precariously
spotty and uneven. Russian Communists who speak of the "uneven develop-
ment of capitalism" should blush at the contemplation of their own national
economy. Here certain branches of economic life, such as the metallurgical
and machine industries, have been pushed out of all proportion to other sec-
tors of economy. Here is a nation striving to become in a short period one of
the great industrial nations of the world while it still has no highway network
worthy of the name and only a relatively primitive network of railways.
Much has been done to increase efficiency of labor and to teach primitive
peasants something about the operation of machines. But maintenance is still
a crying deficiency of all Soviet economy. Construction is hasty and poor in
quality. Depreciation must be enormous. And in vast sectors of economic life
it has not yet been possible to instill into labor anything like that general cul-
ture of production and technical self-respect which characterizes the skilled
worker of the west.
It is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date
by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear
and compulsion. And as long as they are not overcome, Russia will remain
economically a vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation, capable
of exporting its enthusiasms and of radiating the strange charm of its primi-
tive political vitality but unable to back up those articles of export by the real
evidences of material power and prosperity.
Meanwhile, a great uncertainty hangs over the political life of the Soviet
Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power from one
individual or group of individuals to others.
': The Sources of Soviet Conduct II
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to
enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime, It must continue to regard
the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must con-
tinue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and
stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of
the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure
toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western
world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly
flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will
eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the
United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm con-
tainment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force
The Sources of Soviet Conduct I3
a t every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a
peaceful and stable world.
But in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by n o means
limited t o holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for
the United States t o influence by its actions the internal developments, both
within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by
which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of
the modest measure of informational activity which this government can
conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important.
It is rather a question of the degree t o which the United States can create
among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which
knows w h a t it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its
internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has
a spiritual vitality capable of holding its o w n among the major ideological
currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created
and maintained, the aims of Kussian Communism must appear sterile and
quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters 111ust wane,
and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the
palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist
philosophy. Even the failure of the United States t o experience the early eco-
nomic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting
with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep
and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.
Ky the same token, exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal dis-
integration within this country have a n exhilarating effect o n the whole
Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope
and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be
noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of Foreign supporters climb on t o
what they can only view as the band wagon of international politics; and
Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs.
It would be an exaggeration t o say that American behavior unassisted
atid alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist
movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the
United States has it in its power t o increase enormously the strains under
which Soviet policy must operate, t o force upon the Kremlin a far greater
degree o f moderation and circumspection than it has had t o observe in
recent years, and in this way t o promote tendencies which must eventually
find their outlet in either the break-up o r the gradual mellowing of Soviet
power. For n o mystical, Messianic movement - and particularly not that of
the Kremlin - can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting
itself in one way o r another t o the logic of that state of affairs.
Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself.
T h e issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the over-all
worth o f the United States a s a nation among nations. To avoid destruction
the United States need only measure up t o its own best traditions and prove
itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.
14 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light
of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations
will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American soci-
ety. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by
providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their
entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and
accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history
plainly intended them to bear.
Notes
1. "Concerning the Slogans of the United States o f Europe," August 1915. Official Sowet
edition of Lenin's works.
2. Here and elsewhere in this paper "Socialism" refers to Marxist or Leninist Communism,
not t o liberal Socialism of the Second International variety.
"National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol
Arnold Wolfers
S
tatesman, publicists and scholars who wish to be considered realists,
as many d o today, are inclined to insist that the foreign policy they
advocate is dictated by the national interest, more specifically by the
national security interest. It is not surprising that this should be so. Today
any reference to the pursuit of security is likely to ring a sympathetic chord.
However, when political formulas such as "national interest" or "national
security" gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care.
They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have
any precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer g ~ ~ i d a n cand
e a
basis for broad consensus they may be permitting everyone to label what-
ever policy he favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.
In a very vague and general way "national interest" does suggest a direc-
tion of policy which can he distinguished from several others which may
present theniselves as alternatives. It indicates that the policy is designed to
promote demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than to individ-
uals, sub-national groups or mankind as a whole. It emphasizes that the
policy subordinates other interests to those of the nation. But beyond this,
it has very little meaning.
When Charles Beard's study of The Idea of National Interest was puh-
lished in the early. years
. of the New Deal and under the impact of the Great
Depression, the lines were drawn differently than they are today. The ques-
tion at that time was whether American foreign policy, then largely eco-
nomic in scope and motivation, was aimed not at promoting the welfare
interests of the nation as a whole but instead at satisfying the material inter-
ests of powerful sub-national interest or pressure groups. While it was
found hard to define what was in the interest of national welfare or to dis-
cover standards by which to measure it, there could be no doubt as to what
people had in mind: they desired to see national policy makers rise above
the narrow and special economic interests of parts of the nation to focus
their attention on the more inclusive interests of the whole.
more security. Some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely
normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others con-
sider it unbearable to live with these same dangers. Although this is not the
place t o set up hypotheses on the factors which account for one or the other
attitude, investigation might confirm the hunch that those nations tend to
be most sensitive to threats which have either experienced attacks in the
recent past or, having passed through a prolonged period of an exception-
ally high degree of security, suddenly find themselves thrust into a situation
of danger." Probably national efforts to achieve greater security would also
prove, in part at least, to be a function of the power and opportunity which
nations possess of reducing danger by their own effort^.^
Another and even stronger reason why nations must be expected not to
act uniformly is that they are not all or constantly faced with the same
degree of danger. For purposes of a working hypothesis, theorists may find
it useful at times to postulate conditions wherein all states are enemies -
provided they are not allied against others - and wherein all, therefore, are
equally in danger of attack.' But, while it may be true in the living world,
too, that no sovereign nation can be absolutely safe from future attack,
nobody can reasonably contend that Canada, for example, is threatened
today to the same extent as countries like Iran or Yugoslavia, or that the
British had as much reason to be concerned about the French air force in
the twenties as about Hitler's Luftwaffe in the thirties.
This point, however, should not be overstressed. There can be no quar-
rel with the generalization that most nations, most of the time - the great
Powers particularly - have shown, and had reason t o show, an active con-
cern about some lack of security and have been prepared to make sacrifices
for its enhancement. Danger and the awareness of it have been, and con-
tinue t o be, sufficiently widespread to guarantee some uniformity in this
respect. But a generalization which leaves room both for the frantic kind of
struggle for more security which characterized French policy a t times and
for the neglect of security apparent in American foreign policy after the
close of both World Wars throws little light on the behavior of nations. The
demand for conformity would have meaning only if it could be said - as it
could under the conditions postulated in the working hypothesis of pure
power politics - that nations normally subordinate all other values to the
maximization of their security, which, however, is obviously not the case.
There have been many instances of struggles for more security taking the
form of an unrestrained race for armaments, alliances, strategic boundaries
and the like; but one need only recall the many heated parliamentary debates
on arms appropriations to realize how uncertain has been the extent to
which people will consent to sacrifice for additional increments of security.
Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more
security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits or the sheer dis-
comfort involved has militated effectively against further effort. It may be
worth noting in this connection that there seems to be no case in history in
which a country started a preventive war on the grounds of security - unless
"National Security"
IIC~* 19
c ~ g n ~ f r c a nd~fferences
t between natrons concerning t h e ~ rover-c~llc h o ~ c eof
the means upon which they place their trust. The controversies concerning
the best road t o future security that are so typical o f coalition partners a t the
close of victorious wars throw light on this question. France in 19 19 and all
the Allies in 1945 believed that protection against another German attack
co~rldhe gained only by means of continued military superiority based o n
German military impotence. President Wilson in 1919 and many observers
in 194.5 were equally convinced, however, that more hope for security lay in
a conciliatory and fair treatment of the defeated enemy, which would rob
him of future incentives t o renew his attack. While this is not the place t o
decide which side was right, one cannot help drawing the conclusion that, in
the matter of means, the roads which are open may lead in diametrically
opposed directions.The choice in every instance will depend o n a multitude
of variables, including ideological and moral convictions, expectations con-
cerning the psychological and political developnients in the camp of the
opponent, and inclinations of individual policy makers."
After all that has been said little is left of the sweeping generalization that
in actual practice nations, guided by their national security interest, tend
to pursue a mif form and therefore imitable policy of security. Instead, there
a r e numerous reasons why they should differ widely in this respect, with
some standing close t o the pole of complete indifference t o security or coni-
plete reliance on nonmilitary means, others close t o the pole of insistence on
absolute security or of complete reliance on coercive power. It should be
added that there exists still another category of nations which cannot be
placed within the continuum connecting these poles because they regard
security of any degree as a n insufficient goal; instead they seek t o acquire
new values even a t the price of greater insecurity. In this category must be
placed not only the "mad Caesars", w h o are o u t for conquest and glory a t
any price, hut also idealistic statesmen w h o would plunge their country into
war for the sake of spreading the benefits of their ideology, for example, of
liberating enslaved peoples.
The actual behavior o f nations, past and present, does not affect the nor-
niativc proposition, t o which we shall n o w turn o u r attention. According t o
this proposition nations are called upon t o give priority t o national security
and thus t o consent t o any sacrifice of value which will provide an addi-
tional increment of security. It m a y be expedient, moral o r both for nations
t o d o so even if they should have failed t o heed such advice in the past and
for the most part are not living up t o it today.
The first question, then, is whether some definable security policy can be
said t o he generally expedient. Because the choice of goals is not a matter of
expediency, it would seem t o make n o sense t o ask whether it is expedient
for nations t o be concerned with the goal of sec~rrityitself; only the means
used t o this end, so it would seem, can he judged as t o their fitness - their
instrumental rationality - t o promote security. Yet, this is not so. Security,
like other aims, may he an intermediate rather than a n ~lltimategoal, in
which case it can be judged as a means t o these more ultimate ends.
22 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
but only relative security may easily become unattractive to those who have
to bear the chief burden. Nothing renders the task of statesmen in a democ-
racy more difficult than the reluctance of the people to follow them very far
along the road to high and costly security levels.
In the second place, national security policies when based on the accu-
mulation of power have a way of defeating themselves if the target level is
set too high. This is due to the fact that "power of resistance" cannot be
unmistakably distinguished from "power of aggression". What a country
does to bolster its own security through power can be interpreted hy oth-
ers, therefore, as a threat to their security. If this occurs, the vicious circle
of what John Herz has described as the "security dilemma" sets in: the
efforts of one side provoke countermeasures by the other which in turn tend
to wipe out the gains of the first. Theoretically there seems to be no escape
from this frustrating consequence; in practice, however, there are ways to
convince those who might feel threatened that the accumulation of power
is not intended and will never be used for attack." The chief way is that of
keeping the target level within moderate bounds and of avoiding placing
oneself in a position where it has to be raised suddenly and drastically. The
desire to escape from this vicious circle presupposes a security policy of
much self-restraint and moderation, especially in the choice of the target
levef." It can never be expedient to pursue a security policy which by the
fact of provocation or incentive to others fails to increase the nation's rela-
tive power position and capability of resistance.
The question of what means are expedient for the purpose of enhancing
security raises even more thorny problems. Policy makers must decide how
to distribute their reliance on whatever means are available to them and,
particularly, how far to push the accumulation of coercive power. N o
attempt can he made here to decide what the choice should be in order to
be expedient. Obviously, there can be no general answer which would meet
the requirements of every case. The answer depends on the circumstances.
A weak country may have no better means at its disposal than to prove to
stronger neighbors that its strict neutrality can be trusted. Potentially strong
countries may have a chance to deter an aggressor by creating "positions of
strengthv. In some instances they may have no other way of saving them-
selves; while in others even they may find it more expedient to supplement
such a policy, if not to replace it, by a policy intended to negotiate their
opponent out of his aggressive designs.
The reason why "power of resistance" is not the general panacea which
some believe it to be lies in the nature of security itself. If security, in the
objective sense of the term at least, rises and falls with the presence or
absence of aggressive intentions on the part of others, the attitude and
behavior of those from whom the threat emanates are of prime importance.
Such attitude and behavior need not be beyond the realm of influence by
the country seeking to bolster its security. Whenever they do not lie beyond
this realm the most effective and least costly security policy consists in
inducing the opponent to give up his aggressive intentions.
24 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
While there is no easy way to determine when means can and should be
used which are directed not at resistance but at the prevention of the desire
of others to attack, it will clarify the issue to sketch the type of hypotheses
which would link specific security policies, as expedient, to some of the
most typical political constellations.
One can think of nations lined up between the two poles of maximum
and minimum "attack propensity", with those unalterably committed to
attack, provided it promises success, at one pole and those whom no
amount of opportunity for successful attack could induce to undertake it at
the other. While security in respect to the first group can come exclusively
as a result of "positions of strength" sufficient to deter or defeat attack,
nothing could d o more to undermine security in respect to the second group
than to start accumulating power of a kind which would provoke fear and
countermoves.
Unfortunately it can never be known with certainty, in practice, what
position within the continuum one's opponent actually occupies. Statesmen
cannot be blamed, moreover, if caution and suspicion lead them to assume
a closer proximity to the first pole than hindsight proves to have been justi-
fied. We believe we have ample p o o f that the Soviet Union today is at or
very close to the first pole, while Canadian policy makers probably place
the United States in its intentions toward Canada a t the second pole.
It is fair to assume that, wherever the issue of security becomes a matter
of serious concern, statesmen will usually be dealing with potential oppon-
ents who occupy a position somewhere between but much closer to the first
of the two poles. This means, then, that an attack must be feared as a pos-
sibility, even though the intention to launch it cannot be considered to have
crystallized to the point where nothing could change it. If this be true, a
security policy in order to be expedient cannot avoid accumulating power
of resistance and yet cannot let it go at that. Efforts have to be made simul-
taneously toward the goal of removing the incentives to attack. This is only
another way of saying that security policy must seek to bring opponents to
occupy a position as close to the second pole as conditions and capabilities
permit.
Such a twofold policy presents the greatest dilemmas because efforts to
change the intentions of an opponent may run counter to the efforts to
build up strength against him. The dangers of any policy of concessions,
symbolized by "Munich", cannot be underestimated. The paradox of this
situation must be faced, however, if security policy is to be expedient. It
implies that national security policy, except when directed against a country
unalterably committed to attack, is the more rational the more it succeeds
in taking the interests, including the security interests, of the other side into
consideration. Only in doing so can it hope to minimize the willingness of
the other to resort to violence. Rather than to insist, then, that under all
conditions security be sought by reliance on nothing but defensive power
and be pushed in a spirit of national selfishness toward the highest targets,
111 "NationalSecurity" 25
It follows that policies of national security, far from being all good or
all evil, may be morally praiseworthy or condemnable depending on their
specific character and the particular circumstances of the case. They may be
praised for their self-restraint and the consideration which this implies for
values other than security; they may instead be condemned for being inade-
quate to protect national values. Again, they may be praised in one instance
for the consideration given to the interests of others, particularly of weaker
nations, or condemned in another because of the recklessness with which
national values are risked on the altar of some chimera. The target level falls
under moral judgment for being too ambitious, egotistical and provocative
or for being inadequate; the means employed for being unnecessarily costly
in other values or for being ineffective. This wide range of variety which
arises out of the multitude of variables affecting the value computation
would make it impossible, and in fact meaningless, to pass moral judgment,
positive or negative, on "national security policy in general".
It is this lack of moral homogeneity which in matters of security policy
justifies attacks on so-called moralism, though not on moral evaluation.
The "moralistic approach" is taken to mean a wholesale condemnation either
of any concern with national security - as being an expression of national
egotism - or of a security policy relying on coercive and therefore evil power.
The exponent of such "moralism" is assumed to believe that security for all
peoples can be had today by the exclusive use of such "good" and altruistic
means as model behavior and persuasion, a spirit of conciliation, international
organization or world government. If there are any utopians who cling to this
notion, and have influence on policy, it makes sense to continue to disabuse
them of what can surely be proved to be dangerous illusions.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the opposite line of argument,
which without regard for the special circumstances would praise everything
done for national security or more particularly everything done for the
enhancement of national power of resistance, is no less guilty of applying
simple and abstract moral principles and of failing to judge each case real-
istically on its merits.
In conclusion, it can be said, then, that normative admonitions to con-
duct a foreign policy guided by the national security interest are no less
ambiguous and misleading than the statement of fact concerning past behav-
ior which was discussed earlier. In order to be meaningful such admonitions
would have to specify the degree of security which a nation shall aspire to
attain and the means by which it is to be attained in a given situation. It may
be good advice in one instance to appeal for greater effort and more arma-
ments; it may be no less expedient and morally advisable in another instance
to call for moderation and for greater reliance on means other than coercive
power. Because the pendulum of public opinion swings so easily from extreme
complacency to extreme apprehension, from utopian reliance on "good will"
to disillusioned faith in naked force only, it is particularly important to be
wary of any simple panacea, even of one that parades in the realist garb of
a policy guided solely by the national security interest.
28 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e
Notes
1. Hans Morgenthau's In Defense of the National Interest (New York, 1951) IS the most
explicit and impassioned recent plea for an American foreign policy which shall follow "but
one guiding star - the National Interest". While Morgenthau is not equally explicit in regard
t o the meaning he attaches t o the symbol "national interest", it becomes clear in the few pages
devoted to an exposition of this "perennial" interest that the author is thinking in terms of the
national security interest, and specifically of security based on power. The United Stares, he
says, is interested in three things: a unique position as a predominant Power without rival in
the Western Hemisphere and the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe as well as in
Asia, demands which make sense only in the context of a quest for security through power.
2. Walter Lippmann, U. S. Foreign Policy (Boston, 1943), p. 51.
3. This explains why some nations which would seem to fall into the category of status
quo Powers par excellence may nevertheless be dissatisfied and act very much like "imperial-
ist" Powers, as Morgenthau calls nations with acquisitive goals. They are dissatisfied with the
degree of security which they enjoy under the status quo and are out to enhance it. France's
occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 illustrates this type of behav~or.Because the demand for more
security may induce a status quo Power even to resort to the use of violence as a means of
attaining more security, there is reason to beware of the easy and often self-righteous assump-
tion that nations which desire to preserve the status quo are necessarily "peace-loving".
4. Security and power would be synonymous terms if security could be attained only through
the accumulation of power, which will be shown nor to be the case. The fear of attack -security
in the subjective sense - is also not proportionate to the relative power position of a nation. Why,
otherwise, would some weak and exposed nations conslder themselves more secure today than
does the United States?
Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, 1950), d e f ~ n -
ing security as "high value expectancy" stress the subjective and speculative character of
security by using the term "expectancy"; the use of the term "h~gh",while mdicating no defin-
ite level, would seem to imply that the security-seeker aims at a position in which the events
he expects - here the continued unmolested enjoyment of his possessions - have considerably
more than an even chance of materializing.
5. The United States offers a good illustration and may be typical in this respect. For a long
time this country was beyond the reach of any enemy attack that could be considered prob-
able. During that period, then, it could afford to dismiss any serious preoccupation w t h
security. Events proved that it was n o worse off for having done so. However, after this happy
condition had ceased to exist, government and people alike showed a lag in their awareness of
the change. When Nicholas J. Spykman raised his voice in the years before World War I1 to
advocate a broader security outlook than was indicated by the symbol "Western Hemisphere
Defense" and a greater appreciation of the r6le of defenswe mtlitary power, he was dealing
with this lag and with the dangers implied in it. If Hans Morgenthau and others raise t h e ~ r
warning voices today, seemmgly treading in Spykman's footsteps, they are addressing a narlon
which after a new relapse into wishful thinking in 1945 has been rad~callydisillusioned and
may now be swinging toward excessive security apprehensions.
6. Terms such as "degree" or "level" of security are not intended to indicate merely
quantitative differences. Nations may also differ in respect to the breadth of their security per-
spective as when American leaders at Yalta were so preoccupied with security agalnst the then
enemy countries of the United States that they failed or refused to consider future American
security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The differences may apply, instead, to the time range for
which security is sought as when the British at Versailles were ready to offer France short-run
security guarantees while the French with more foresight ins~sredthat the "German danger"
would not become acute for some ten years.
7. For a discussion of this working hypothesis - as part of the "pure power" hypothesis -
see my article on "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference" in World Pol~tics,vol. IV,
No. 1. October 1951.
"National Security" 29
popes were doing if they did not apply the principles of the balance of power;
and how the nations which either neglected these principles or applied them
wrongly suffered political and military defeat and even extinction, while the
nation which applied these principles most consistently and consciously, that
is, Great Britain, enjoyed unrivalled power for an unparalleled length of time.
The historian who wishes to replace the balance of power as the guiding
principle of American foreign policy with the "humanitarian and pacific
traditions" of the "coordinate state"' must first of all explain how it has
come about that the thirteen original states expanded into the full breadth
and a good deal of the length of a continent, until today the strategic fron-
tiers of the United States run parallel to the coastline of Asia and along the
River Elbe. If such are the results of policies based upon "humanitarian and
pacific traditions," never in the history of the world has virtue been more
bountifully rewarded! Yet our historian must explain not only the great
sweep of American expansion, but also the specific foreign policies which
in their historic succession make up that sweep. Is it easier to explain the
successive shifts of American support from Great Britain to France and
back again from the beginning of King George's War in 1744 to the War of
1812 in terms of the "coordinate state" than in terms of the balance of
power? The same question might be asked about the postponement of the
recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies until 1822, when
the Floridas had been acquired from Spain and Spain had thereby been
deprived of the ability to challenge the United States from within the hemi-
sphere. The same question might be asked about the Monroe Doctrine
itself, about Lincoln's policies toward Great Britain and France, and about
our successive policies with regard to Mexico and the Caribbean. One
could go on and pick out a t random any foreign policy pursued by the
United States from the beginning to 1919 and one would hardly find a pol-
icy, with the exception perhaps of the War of 1812, which could not be
made intelligible by reference to the national interest defined in terms of
power - political, military, and economic - rather than by reference to the
principle of the "coordinate state." This inevitable outcome of such an
inquiry is well summarized in these words:
Ease and prosperity have made us wish the whole world to be as happy
and well to do as ourselves; and we have supposed that institutions and
principles like our own were the simple prescription for making them so.
And yet, when issues of our own interest arose, we have not been
unselfish. We have shown ourselves kin to all the world, when it came to
pushing an advantage. Our action against Spain in the Floridas, and
against Mexico on the coasts of the Pacific; our attitude toward first
the Spaniards, and then the French, with regard to the control of the
Mississippi; the unpitying force with which we thrust the Indians to the
wall wherever they stood in our way, have suited our professions of
peacefulness and justice and liberality no better than the aggressions of
I I ii,itr T h e National Interest of T h e U S . 33
other nations that were strong and not to be gainsaid. Even Mr. Jefferson,
philanthropist and champion of peaceable and modest government though
he was, exemplified this double temper of the people he ruled. "Peace is
our passion," he had declared; but the passion abated when he saw the
mouth of the Mississippi about to pass into the hands of France. Though
he had loved France and hated England, he did not hesitate then what
language to hold. "There is on the globe," he wrote to Mr. Livingston at
Paris, "one single spot the possessor of which is our natural and habitual
enemy. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans seals the
union of two nations, who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive pos-
session of the sea. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the
British fleet and nation." Our interests must march forward, altruists
though we are; other nations must see to it that they stand off, and d o
not seek to stay us.
This realist appraisal of the American tradition in foreign policy was published
in 1901 in the Atlantic Monthly. Its author was a professor of jurisprudence
and political economy at Princeton by the name of Woodrow Wilson."
Nothing more needs to be said to demonstrate that facts d o not support
a revision of American diplomatic history which tries to substitute "humani-
tarian and pacifist traditions" and the "coiirdinate state" for power politics
and the balance of power as the guiding principle of American foreign
policy. What, then, does support it? Three things: the way American states-
men have spoken about American foreign policy; the legal fiction of the
"coiirdinate state"; finally, and foremost, an emotional urge to justify
American foreign policy in humanitarian, pacifist terms.
It is elementary that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained
only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the
foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what states-
men have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts
we can surmise what their objectives might have been. Yet examination of
the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of his-
tory, we must approach historical reality with a kind of rational outline,
a map which suggests to us the possible meanings of history. In other words,
we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain
problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances and ask ourselves,
what are the rational alternatives from which a statesman may choose who
must meet this problem under these circumstances, presuming always that
he acts in a rational manner, and which of these rational alternatives was
this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, likely to
choose? It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts
and their consequences which gives meaning to the facts of history and
makes the scientific writing of political history possible.
In the process of writing the history of foreign policy the interpretations
by statesmen of their own acts, especially if they are made for public
34 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
consumption, must needs have a strictly subsidiary place. The public self-
interpretation by actors on the political scene is itself, of course, a political
act which seeks to present a certain policy to its presumed supporters in
terms of their moral and political folklore and to those against which it is
directed in terms which intend to embarrass and deceive. Such declarations
may indeed shed light upon the character and objectives of the policy pur-
sued if they are considered in conjunction with, and in subordination to,
rational hypotheses, actions, and likely consequences. Yet it is quite a dif-
ferent matter to interpret the American tradition of foreign policy in the
light of a collection of official statements which, like most such statements,
present humanitarian and pacifist justifications for the policies pursued. If
anybody should be bold enough to write a history of world politics with so
uncritical a method he would easily and well-nigh inevitably be driven to
the conclusion that from Timur to Hitler and Stalin the foreign policies of
all nations were inspired by the ideals of humanitarianism and pacifism.
The absurdity of the result is commensurate with the defects of the method.
It is only from a method which accepts the declarations of statesmen
as evidence of the character of the policies pursued, that the principle of
the "coordinate state" receives a semblance of plausibility. Statesmen and
international lawyers have been wont to speak of the "equal dignity" of all
states, regardless of "wealth, power, size, population or c u l t ~ r e , "which
~ I
take the principle of the "coordinate state" to mean. It is also referred to as
the principle of "federalism in international r e l a t i ~ n s . " ' As
~ its prime ex-
amples are cited the relations amongst the states of the Union, the states of
the American system, the members of the Commonwealth of Nations, and
the members of the Swiss Confederation. If the whole world were organized
in accordance with this principle, as are already these four political entities,
it is assumed that the freedom, dignity, and peace of all nations would then
be assured.
There is no need to examine the theoretical and practical merits of the
principle of the "coordinate state," because for none of the four political
entities mentioned does the idea of the "coordinate state" provide the prin-
ciple of political organization. The equality of the states as the political
foundation of the United States became obsolescent when Chief Justice
Marshall's Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity of the Constitution in
favor of the federal government, and it became obsolete when the Civil War
proved Chief Justice Marshall's point. The equality of the states survives
today only in the shadow and by virtue of the federal government's polit-
ical supremacy, and without the cohesive force of that supremacy there
would be no union of equal states to begin with. That these powers of the
federal government are limited and qualified by the principle of federalism,
that is, by the constitutionally granted powers of the states, is quite a dif-
ferent matter; it concerns the distribution of powers between federal gov-
ernment and states within a general system of checks and balances, but has
nothing to do with the equality of the states as the alleged political foun-
dation of the American system of government. With the exception of the
hloip,t.nth~u The National Interest of The U S . 35
located in some part of it. It is by virtue of its superior power that the pre-
dominant part can afford to grant the other members of the federal system
a measure of equality in the non-political sphere. These observations bring
us back to power politics and the balance of power to which the principle
of the "coordinate state" was supposed t o be the alternative.
In truth, it is not the disinterested consideration of facts which has given
birth to the theory of the "coordinate state." That theory is rather the response
to an emotional urge, and since this emotion is not peculiar to a particular
author but typical of a popular reaction to the new role which the United
States must play in world affairs, it deserves a brief analysis.
One of the great experiences of our time which have impressed them-
selves upon the American mind is the emergence of the United States as a
nation among other nations, exposed to the same opportunities, tempta-
tions, risks, and liabilities to which other nations have been traditionally
exposed. This experience becomes the more shocking if it is compared with
the expectation with which we fought the Second World War. We expected
from that war a reaffirmation of the secure, detached, and independent
position in world affairs which we had inherited from the Founding Fathers
and which we had been successful in preserving at least to the First World
War. By avoiding what we thought had been Wilson's mistakes, we expected
t o emerge from that war if not more independent, certainly more secure
than we were when we entered it. In fact, ~ r o b a b not l ~ even in the early
days of the Republic were we more exposed to danger from abroad than we
are today, and never had we less freedom of action in taking care of our
interests than we have today.
It is naturally shocking to recognize that a happy chapter in the history
of the nation and in one's own way of life has come to an end. There are
those who reconcile themselves to the inevitable, albeit with sorrow rather
than with glee, and try to apply the lessons of the past to the tasks at hand.
There are others who try to escape from a disappointing and threatening
reality into the realm of fantasy. Three such escapist fantasies have arisen in
our midst in response to the challenge of American world leadership and
power: the fantasy of needless American participation in war, the fantasy of
American treason, and the fantasy of American innocence.
The first of these fantasies presumes that the present predicament is a
result not of necessity but of folly, the folly of American statesmen who
needlessly intervened in two world wars. The second of these fantasies
attributes the present predicament to treason in high places whereby the
fruits of victory were handed to the enemy. The third of these fantasies
denies that the predicament is real and prefers to think of it as an intellec-
tual fraud perpetrated upon the American people. To support this fictional
denial of the actualities of the present, it draws upon a fictional account of
the past. The United States does not need to bear at present the intellectual,
moral, and political burdens which go with involvement in power politics
and the maintenance of the balance of power; for it has never borne them in
the past, never having been thus involved. The golden age of past political
I hi 1 T h e National interest of T h e U.S. 37
innocence sheds its glow upon a but seemingly less innocent present and
promises a future in which all the world will follow the example of America,
forswear power politics and the balance of power, and accept the principle
of the "coiirdinate state." Our rearmament program, as exemplified in the
Atlantic Security Pact, we are told, has nothing to do with the balance of
power but aims at the "organization of as much of the world as we can upon
the basis of the coiirdinate state. . . . It may prove impossible under present
conditions to build such a system without having to fight a war with Russia,
but then at least we will be fighting, as we did before, for the thing we con-
sider worth defending with our lives and treasure."" Thus a fictional
account of the American past, begun as an act of uncalled-for patriotic piety,
issues in an ideology for a third world war. Escape we must from the unfamil-
iar, unpleasant, and dangerous present, first into the political innocence of
the past and from there into the immediate future of a third world war,
beyond which the revived and universalized innocence of the more distant
future will surely lie.
We have said that to present the American tradition in foreign policy as
having been free from concern with power politics and the balance of
power is not warranted by the facts of American history. Yet it might still
be argued, and it is actually being argued, that, regardless of the evidence
of history, the American people will not be reconciled to power politics and
the balance of power and will support only policies based upon abstract
moral principles. While in the past the United States might have pursued
balance of power policies and while it might be a good thing if it did do so
again, the American people will not stand for it. Here the emotional appeal
to patriotic piety is joined by calculations of political expediency. Yet the
case for misrepresenting American history has nothing to gain from either.
There is a strong tendency in all historiography to glorify the national
past, and in popular presentations that tendency takes on the aspects of the
jingoist whitewash. Even so penetrating a mind as John Stuart Mill's could
deliver himself of an essay in which he proved, no doubt to the satisfaction
of many of his English readers but certainly of few others, that Great Britain
had never interfered in the affairs of European nations and had interfered
in those of the Indian states only for their own good.'' Yet it is the measure
of a nation's maturity to be able to recognize its past for what it actually is.
Why should we not admit that American foreign policy has been generally
hardheaded and practical and at times ruthless? Why should we deny
Jefferson's cunning, say, in the Puget Sound affair, the cruelty with which
the Indians were treated, and the faithlessness with which the treaties with
the Indians were cast aside? We know that this is the way all nations are
when their interests are at stake - so cruel, so faithless, so cunning. We know
that the United States has refrained from seeking dominions beyond the
seas not because it is more virtuous than other nations, but because it had
the better part of a continent to colonize.
As has been pointed out elsewhere at greater length, the man in the
street, unsophisticated as he is and uninformed as he may be, has a surer
38 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
grasp of the essentials of foreign policy and a more mature judgment of its
basic issues than many of the intellectuals and politicians who pretend to
speak for him and cater to what they imagine his prejudices to be. During
the recent war the ideologues of the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms,
and the United Nations were constantly complaining that the American sol-
dier did not know what he was fighting for. Indeed, if he was fighting for
some Utopian ideal, divorced from the concrete experiences and interests of
the country, then the complaint was well grounded. However, if he was
fighting for the territorial integrity of the nation and for its survival as a free
country where he could live, think, and act as he pleased, then he had never
any doubt about what he was fighting for. Ideological rationalizations and
justifications are indeed the indispensable concomitants of all political
action. Yet there is something unhealthy in a craving for ideological intoxi-
cation and in the inability to act and t o see merit in action except under the
stimulant of grandiose ideas and far-fetched schemes. Have our intellectuals
become, like Hamlet, too much beset by doubt to act and, unlike Hamlet,
compelled to still their doubts by renouncing their sense of what is real? The
man in the street has n o such doubts. It is true that ideologues and dema-
gogues can sway him by appealing to his emotions. But it is also true, as
American history shows in abundance and as the popular success of
Ambassador Kennan's book demonstrates, that responsible statesmen can
guide him by awakening his latent understanding of the national interest.
Yet what is the national interest? How can we define it and give it the content
which will make it a guide for action? This is one of the relevant questions to
which the current debate has given rise.
It has been frequently argued against the realist conception of foreign
policy that its key concept, the national interest, does not provide an accept-
able standard for political action. This argument is in the main based upon
two grounds: the elusiveness of the concept and its susceptibility to inter-
pretations, such as limitless imperialism and narrow nationalism, which are
not in keeping with the American tradition in foreign policy. The argument
has substance as far as it goes, but it does not invalidate the usefulness of
the concept.
The concept of the national interest is similar in two respects to the "great
generalities" of the Constitution, such as the general welfare and due process.
It contains a residual meaning which is inherent in the concept itself, but
beyond these minimum requirements its content can run the whole gamut of
meanings which are logically compatible with it. That content is determined
by the political traditions and the total cultural context within which a nation
formulates its foreign policy. The concept of the national interest, then, con-
tains two elements, one that is logically required and in that sense necessary,
and one that is variable and determined by circumstances.
\lo~ci.~itl-iau T h e National Interest of T h e U.S. 39
Any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national
interest must obviously have some reference to the physical, political, and cul-
tural entity which we call a nation. In a world where a number of sovereign
nations compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies
of all nations must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum
requirements. Thus all nations d o what they cannot help but do: protect their
physical, political, a n d cultural identity against encroachments by other
nations.
It has been suggested that this reasoning erects the national state into the
last word in politics and the national interest into an absolute standard for
political action. This, however, is not quite the case. The idea of interest is
indeed of the essence of politics and, as such, unaffected by the circum-
stances of time and place. Thucydides' statement, born of the experiences
of ancient Greece, that "identity of interest is the surest of bonds whether
between states or individuals" was taken up in the nineteenth century by
Lord Salisbury's remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among
nations is "the absence of all clashing interests." The perennial issue between
the realist and utopian schools of thought over the nature of politics, to which
we have referred before, might well be formulated in terms of concrete inter-
ests vs. abstract principles. Yet while the concern of politics with interest is
perennial, the connection between interest and the national state is a product
of history.
The national state itself is obviously a product of history and as such
destined t o yield in time to different modes of political organization. As
long as the world is politically organized into nations, the national interest
is indeed the last word in world politics. When the national state will have
been replaced by another mode of organization, foreign policy must then
protect the interest in survival of that new organization. For the benefit of
those who insist upon discarding the national state and constructing supra-
national organizations by constitutional fiat, it must be pointed out that
these new organizational forms will either come into being through con-
quest or else through consent based upon the mutual recognition of the
national interests of the nations concerned; for no nation will forego its
freedom of action if it has n o reason to expect proportionate benefits in
compensation for that loss. This is true of treaties concerning commerce or
fisheries as it is true of the great compacts, such as the European Coal and
Steel Community, through which nations try to create supranational forms
of organization. Thus, by a n apparent paradox, what is historically relative
in the idea of the national interest can be overcome only through the pro-
motion in concert of the national interest of a number of nations.
The survival of a political unit, such as a nation, in its identity is the irre-
ducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-a-vis other units.
Taken in isolation, the determination of its content in a concrete situation is
relatively simple; for it encompasses the integrity of the nation's territory, of
its political institutions, and of its culture. Thus bipartisanship in foreign pol-
icy, especially in times of war, has been most easily achieved in the promotion
40 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
the United Nations, that, in other words, the foreign policy of the United
States is actually identical with the policy of the United Nations. This asser-
tion cannot refer to anything real in actual politics to support it. For the con-
stitutional structure of international organizations, such as the United
Nations, and their procedural practices make it impossible for them to pursue
interests apart from those of the member-states which dominate their policy-
forming bodies. The identity between the interests of the United Nations and
the United States can only refer to the successful policies of the United States
within the United Nations through which the support of the United Nations
is being secured for the policies of the United States.16The assertion, then, is
mere polemic, different from the one discussed previously in that the identi-
fication of a certain policy with a supranational interest does not seek to
reflect discredit upon the former, but to bestow upon it a dignity which the
national interest pure and simple is supposed to lack.
The real issue in view of the problem that concerns us here is not
whether the so-called interests of the United Nations, which d o not exist
apart from the interests of its most influential members, have superseded
the national interest of the United States, but for what kind of interests the
United States has secured United Nations support. While these interests
cannot be United Nations interests, they do not need to be national inter-
ests either. Here we are in the presence of that modern phenomenon which
has been variously described as "utopianism," "sentimentalism," "moral-
ism," the "legalistic-moralistic approach." The common denominator of all
these tendencies in modern political thought is the substitution for the
national interest of a supranational standard of action which is generally
identified with an international organization, such as the United Nations.
The national interest is here not being usurped by sub- or supranational
interests which, however inferior in worth to the national interest, are never-
theless real and worthy of consideration within their proper sphere. What
challenges the national interest here is a mere figment of the imagination, a
product of wishful thinking, which is postulated as a valid norm for inter-
national conduct, without being valid either there or anywhere else. At this
point we touch the core of the present controversy between utopianism and
realism in international affairs; we shall return to it later in this paper.
The national interest as such must be defended against usurpation by
non-national interests. Yet once that task is accomplished, a rational order
must be established among the values which make up the national interest
and among the resources to be committed to them. While the interests which
a nation may pursue in its relation with other nations are of infinite variety
and magnitude, the resources which are available for the pursuit of such
interests are necessarily limited in quantity and kind. N o nation has the
resources to promote all desirable objectives with equal vigor; all nations
must therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as possible. The
indispensable precondition of such rational allocation is a clear understand-
ing of the distinction between the necessary and variable elements of the
national interest. Given the contentious manner in which in democracies
h l o r e c . i i ~ h ~ r r The National Interest of The U.S. 43
the variable elements of the national interest are generally determined, the
advocates of an extensive conception of the national interest will inevitably
present certain variable elements of the national interest as though their
attainment were necessary for the nation's survival. In other words, the neces-
sary elements of the national interest have a tendency to swallow up the
variable elements so that in the end all kinds of objectives, actual or poten-
tial, are justified in terms of national survival. Such arguments have been
advanced, for instance, in support of the rearmament of Western Germany
and of the defense of Formosa. They must be subjected to rational scrutiny
which will determine, however tentatively, their approximate place in the
scale of national values.
The same problem presents itself in its extreme form when a nation pur-
sues, or is asked to pursue, objectives which are not only unnecessary for
its survival but tend to jeopardize it. Second-rate nations which dream of
playing the role of great powers, such as Italy and Poland in the interwar
period, illustrate this point. So d o great powers which dream of remaking
the world in their own image and embark upon world-wide crusades, thus
straining their resources to exhaustion. Here scientific analysis has the
urgent task of pruning down national objectives to the measure of available
resources in order to make their pursuit compatible with national survival.
Finally, the national interest of a nation which is conscious not only of
its own interests but also of that of other nations must be defined in terms
compatible with the latter. In a multinational world this is a requirement of
political morality; in an age of total war it is also one of the conditions for
survival.
In connection with this problem two mutually exclusive arguments have
been advanced. O n the one hand, it has been argued against the theory of
international politics here presented that the concept of the national inter-
est revives the eighteenth-century concept of enlightened self-interest, pre-
suming that the uniformly enlightened pursuit of their self-interest by all
individuals, as by all nations, will of itself be conducive to a peaceful and
harmonious society. O n the other hand, the point has been made that the
pursuit of their national interest by all nations makes war the permanent
arbiter of conflicts among them. Neither argument is well taken.
The concept of the national interest presupposes neither a naturally har-
monious, peaceful world nor the inevitability of war as a consequence of
the pursuit by all nations of their national interest. Quite to the contrary, it
assumes continuous conflict and threat of war, to be minimized through the
continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic action. N o
such assumption would be warranted if all nations at all times conceived of
their national interest only in terms of their survival and, in turn, defined
their interest in survival in restrictive and rational terms. As it is, their
conception of the national interest is subject to all the hazards of misinter-
pretation, usurpation, and misjudgment to which reference has been made
above. To minimize these hazards is the first task of a foreign policy which
seeks the defense of the national interest by peaceful means. Its second task
44 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
We have said before that the utopian and realist positions in international
affairs d o not necessarily differ in the policies they advocate, but that they
part company over their general philosophies of politics and their way of
thinking about matters political. It does not follow that the present debate
is only of academic interest and without practical significance. Both camps,
it is true, may support the same policy for different reasons. Yet if the rea-
sons are unsound, the soundness of the policies supported by them is a mere
coincidence, and these very same reasons may be, and inevitably are,
invoked on other occasions in support of unsound policies. The nefarious
consequences of false philosophies and wrong ways of thinking may for the
time being be concealed by the apparent success of policies derived from
them. You may go to war, justified by your nation's interests, for a moral
purpose and in disregard of considerations of power; and military victory
seems t o satisfy both your moral aspirations and your nation's interests. Yet
the manner in which you waged the war, achieved victory, and settled the
peace cannot help reflecting your philosophy of politics and your way of
thinking about political problems. If these are in error, you may win victory
on the field of battle and still assist in the defeat of both your moral prin-
ciples and the national interest of your country.
Any number of examples could illustrate the real yet subtle practical
consequences which follow from the different positions taken. We have
chosen two: collective security in Korea and the liberation of the nations
that are captives of Communism. A case for both policies can be made from
both the utopian and realist positions, but with significant differences in the
emphasis and substance of the policies pursued.
Collective security as an abstract principle of utopian politics requires
that all nations come to the aid of a victim of aggression by resisting the
aggressor with all means necessary to frustrate his aims. Once the case of
aggression is established, the duty to act is unequivocal. Its extent may be
affected by concern for the nation's survival; obviously no nation will com-
mit outright suicide in the service of collective security. But beyond that ele-
mental limitation no consideration of interest or power, either with regard
to the aggressor or his victim or the nation acting in the latter's defense, can
qualify the obligation to act under the principle of collective security. Thus
high officials of our government have declared that we intervened in Korea
\ ( I ii: T h e National Interest of T h e U S . 45
not for any narrow interest of ours but in support of the moral principle of
collective security.
Collective security as a concrete principle of realist policy is the age-old
maxim, "Hang together or hang separately," in modern dress. It recognizes
the need for nation A under certain circumstances to defend nation B against
attack by nation C. That need is determined, first, by the interest which A
has in the territorial integrity of B and by the relation of that interest to all
the other interests of A as well as to the resources available for the support
of a11 those interests. Furthermore, A must take into account the power
which is at the disposal of aggressor C for fighting A and B as over against
the power available to A and B for fighting C. The same calculation must
he carried on concerning the power of the likely allies of C as over against
those of A and B. Before going to war for the defense of South Korea in the
name of collective security, an American adherent of political realism would
have demanded an answer to the following four questions: First, what is our
interest in the preservation of the independence of South Korea; second,
what is our power to defend that independence against North Korea; third,
what is our power to defend that independence against China and the Soviet
Union; and fourth, what are the chances for preventing China and the Soviet
Union from entering the Korean War?
In view of the principle of collective security, interpreted in utopian
terms, our intervention in Korea was a foregone conclusion. The interpret-
ation of this principle in realist terms might or might not, depending upon
the concrete circumstances of interest and power, have led us to the same
conclusion. In the execution of the policy of collective security the utopian
had to be indifferent to the possibility of Chinese and Russian intervention,
except for his resolution to apply the principle of collective security to any-
body who would intervene on the side of the aggressor. The realist could
not help weighing the possibility of the intervention of a great power on the
side of the aggressor in terms of the interests engaged and the power avail-
able on the other side."
The Truman administration could not bring itself to taking resolutely the
utopian or the realist position. It resolved to intervene in good measure on
utopian grounds and in spite of military advice to the contrary; it allowed
the military commander to advance to the Yalu River in disregard of the risk
of the intervention of a great power against which collective security could
be carried out only by means of a general war, and then refused to pursue
the war with full effectiveness on the realist grounds of the risk of a third
world war. Thus Mr. Truman in 1952 is caught in the same dilemma from
which Mr. Baldwin could extricate himself in 1936 on the occasion of the
League of Nations sanctions against Italy's attack upon Ethiopia only at an
enormous loss to British prestige. Collective security as a defense of the status
quo short of a general war can be effective only against second-rate powers.
Applied against a major power, it is a contradiction in terms, for it means ne-
cessarily a major war. Of this self-defeating contradiction Mr. Baldwin was as
unaware in the 'thirties as Mr. Truman seems to be in 1952. Mr. Churchill
46 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
put Mr. Baldwin's dilemma in these cogent terms: "First, the Prime Minister
had declared that sanctions meant war; secondly, he was resolved that there
must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions. It was evidently
impossible to comply with these three conditions." Similarly Mr. Truman
had declared that the effective prosecution of the Korean War meant the
possibility of a third world war; he resolved that there must be no third
world war; and he decided upon intervention in the Korean War. Here, too,
it is impossible to comply with these three conditions.
Similar contradictions are inherent in the proposals which would sub-
stitute for the current policy of containment one of the liberation of the
nations presently the captives of Russian Communism. This objective can
be compatible with the utopian or realist position, but the policies designed
to secure it will be fundamentally different according to whether they are
based upon one or the other position. The clearest case to date for the
utopian justification of such policies has been made by Representative
Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin who pointed to these four "basic defects"
of the "negative policy of containment and negotiated coexistence":
heart of Europe and their cooperation with the Chinese armies constitute
the t w o main sources of the imbalance of power which threatens our secur-
ity. Yet before he formulates a program of liberation, he will seek answers
to a number of questions such as these: While the United States has a gen-
eral interest in the liberation of all captive nations, what is the hierarchy of
interests it has in the liberation, say, of China, Esthonia, and Hungary? And
while the Soviet Union has a general interest in keeping all captive nations
in that state, what is the hierarchy of its interests in keeping, say, Poland,
Eastern Germany, and Bulgaria captive? If we assume, as we must on the
historic evidence of two centuries, that Russia would never give up control
over Poland without being compelled by force of arms, would the objective
of the liberation of Poland justify the ruin of western civilization, that of
Poland included, which would be the certain result of a third world war?
What resources does the United States have at its disposal for the liberation
of all captive nations or some of them? What resources does the Soviet
Union have at its disposal to keep in captivity all captive nations or some
of them? Are we more likely to avoid national bankruptcy by embarking
upon a policy of indiscriminate liberation with the concomitant certainty of
war or by continuing the present policy of containment?
It might be that in a particular instance the policies suggested by the
answers to these questions will coincide with Representative Kersten's pro-
posals, but there can be no doubt that in its overall character, substance,
emphasis, and likely consequences a utopian policy of liberation differs fun-
damentally from a realist one.
The issue between liberation as a utopian principle of abstract morality
vs. the realist evaluation of the consequences which a policy of liberation
would have for the survival of the nation has arisen before in American his-
tory. Abraham Lincoln was faced with a dilemma similar to that which con-
fronts us today. Should he make the liberation of the slaves the ultimate
standard of his policy even at the risk of destroying the Union, as many
urged him to do, or should he subordinate the moral principle of universal
freedom to considerations of the national interest? The answer Lincoln gave
to Horace Greeley, a spokesman for the utopian moralists, is timeless in its
eloquent wisdom. "If there be those," he wrote on August 22, 1862,
who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save
slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save
the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I d o not
agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the
Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If 1 could save the
Union without freeing any slave I would d o it, and if I could save it
by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing
some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slav-
ery, and the colored race, I do because 1 believe it helps to save the Union;
and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save
the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts
48 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will
help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and
I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear t o be true views.
I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty;
and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all
men everywhere could be free.
It must be obvious from this passage and from all my other writings on
the subject2' that my position is the exact opposite from what this critic
makes it out t o be. I have always maintained that the actions of states are
subject to universal moral principles and I have been careful to differentiate
my position in this respect from that of Hobbes. Five points basic to my
position may need to be emphasized again.
The first point is what one might call the requirement of cosmic humility
with regard to the moral evaluation of the actions of states. To know that
states are subject to the moral law is one thing; to pretend to know what is
morally required of states in a particular situation is quite another. The
human mind tends naturally to identify the particular interests of states, as
of individuals, with the moral purposes of the universe. The statesman in the
defense of the nation's interests may, and at times even must, yield to that
tendency; the scholar must resist it at every turn. For the light-hearted
assumption that what one's own nation aims at and does is morally good and
that those who oppose that nation's policies are evil is morally indefensible
+ilcl 1 The National Interest of The U S . 49
and his "personal wish" which is t o see universal moral values realized
throughout the world.
The issue has been admirably put by Father Wilfred Parsons of Catholic
University in defending Ambassador Kennan's position:
Mr. Kennan did not say state behavior is not a fit subject for moral judg-
ment, but only that it should not sway our realization of the realities with
which we have to deal. Msgr. Koenig continues: "Should we accept power
realities and aspirations without feeling the obligation of moral judg-
ment?" And he appeals to the present writer and other political scientists
to say whether this doctrine agrees with Pope Pius XII's messages on peace.
I am sure that most political scientists, and also Mr. Kennan, would
agree with the Monsignor that we should not accept those realities "with-
out feeling the obligation of moral judgment." But there is a difference
between feeling this obligation (and even expressing it) and allowing this
feeling to sway our actions in concrete negotiations that deal with the
national or world common good. We can still feel and yet deal.
To make my meaning clearer, I understood Mr. Kennan to hold that
we went off the beam with Woodrow Wilson, when we began to make
our moral disapprobation an essential part of our foreign relations, even
sometimes at the expense of our own and the world's common good.
Logically, such an attitude would inhibit our dealing with Britain,
France and a host of countries. Pius XI, speaking of Mussolini after the
Lateran Treaty, said he would deal with the devil himself if he must.
Here was moral disapprobation, but it was not "carried over into the
affairs of states."
This relative position, and not the absolute one of Msgr. Koenig
(with which in itself I agree), is, I think, the issue raised by Mr. Kennan,
and it is worth debating on that basis.14
Notes
Albert Wohlstetter
Arctic through our D ~ s t a n tEarly Warning line, with bombers refueled over
Canada - all resulting in plenty of warning. Most hopefully, it is sometimes
assumed that such attacks will be preceded by days of visible preparations
for moving ground troops. Such assumptions suggest that the Soviet leaders
will be rather bumbling or, better, cooperative. However attractive it may
be for us to narrow Soviet alternatives to these, they would be low in the
order of reference of any reasonable Russians ~ l a n n i n gwar.
available when he was writing in 1956 on weapons for all-out war. But
much of his analysis was based on the assumption that H-bombs could not
be made small enough to be carried in an intercontinental missile. It is now
widely known that intercontinental ballistic missiles will have hydrogen
warheads, and this fact, a secret at the time, invalidates Mr. Blackett's
calculations and, I might say, much of his optimism on the stability of the
balance of terror. In sum, one of the serious obstacles to any widespread
rational judgment on these matters of high policy is that critical elements of
the problem have to be protected by secrecy. However, some of the principal
conclusions about deterrence in the early 1960s can be fairly firmly based,
and based on public information.
The most important conclusion is that we must expect a vast increase in the
weight of attack which the Soviets can deliver with little warning, and the
growth of a significant Russian capability for an essentially warningless
attack. As a result, strategic deterrence, while feasible, will be extremely dif-
ficult to achieve, and at critical junctures in the 1960s, we may not have the
power to deter attack. Whether we have it or not will depend on some dif-
ficult strategic choices as to the future composition of the deterrent forces
as well as hard choices on its basing, operations and defense.
Manned bombers will continue to make up the predominant part of our
striking force in the early 1960s. None of the popular remedies for their
defense will suffice - not, for example, mere increase of alertness (which
will be offset by the Soviet's increasing capability for attack without signifi-
cant warning), nor simple dispersal or sheltering alone or mobility taken
by itself, nor a mere piling up of interceptors and defense missiles around
SAC bases. Especially extravagant expectations have been placed on the
airborne alert - an extreme form of defense by mobility. The impression is
rather widespread that one-third of the SAC bombers are in the air and
ready for combat at all times.8 This belief is belied by the public record.
According t o the Symington Committee Hearings in 1956, our bombers
averaged 31 hours of flying per month, which is about 4 percent of the
average 732-hour month. An Air Force representative expressed the hope
that within a couple of years, with an increase in the ratio of crews to
aircraft, the bombers would reach 45 hours of flight per month - which is
6 percent. This 4 to 6 percent of the force includes bombers partially fueled
and without bombs. It is, moreover, only an average, admitting variance
down as well as up. Some increase in the number of armed bombers aloft
is to be expected. However, for the current generation of bombers, which
have been designed for speed and range rather than endurance, a continu-
ous air patrol for one-third of the force would be extremely expensive.
O n the other hand, it would be unwise t o look for miracles in the new
weapons systems, which by the mid-1960s may constitute a considerable
'\ $1 iii iIL The Delicate Balance of Terror 61
portion of the United States force. After the Thor, Atlas and Titan there are
a number of promising developments. The solid-fueled rockets, Minuteman
and Polaris, promise in particular to be extremely significant components
of the deterrent force. Today they are being touted as making the problem of
deterrence easy to solve and, in fact, guaranteeing its solution. But none of
the new developments in vehicles is likely to d o that. For the complex job
of deterrence, they all have limitations. The unvaryingly immoderate claims
for each new weapons system should make us wary of the latest "techno-
logical breakthroughs." Only a very short time ago the ballistic missile itself
was supposed to be intrinsically invulnerable on the ground. It is now more
generally understood that its survival is likely to depend on a variety of
choices in its defense.
It is hard to talk with confidence about the mid and late-1960s. A sys-
tematic study of an optimal or a good deterrent force which considered all
the major factors affecting choice and dealt adequately with the uncertain-
ties would be a formidable task. In lieu of this, I shall mention briefly why
none of the many systems available or projected dominates the others in any
obvious way. My comments will take the form of a swift run-through of the
characteristic advantages and disadvantages of various strategic systems at
each of the six successive hurdles mentioned earlier.
The first hurdle to be surmounted is the attainment of a stable, steady-
state peacetime operation. Systems which depend for their survival on
extreme decentralization of controls, as may be the case with large-scale dis-
persal and some of the mobile weapons, raise problems of accidents and over
a long period of peacetime operation this leads in turn to serious political
problems. Systems relying on extensive movement by land, perhaps by truck
caravan, are an obvious example; the introduction of these on European
roads, as is sometimes suggested, would raise grave questions for the govern-
ments of some of our allies. Any extensive increase in the armed air alert will
increase the hazard of accident and intensify the concern already expressed
among our allies. Some of the proposals for bombardment satellites may
involve such hazards of unintended bomb release as to make them out of the
question.
The cost to buy and operate various weapons systems must be seriously
considered. Some systems buy their ability to negotiate a given hurdle - say,
surviving the enemy attack - only at prohibitive cost. Then the number that
can be bought out of a given budget will be small and this will affect the
relative performance of competing systems at various other hurdles, for
example penetrating enemy defenses. Some of the relevant cost comparisons,
then, are between competing systems; others concern the extra costs to the
enemy of canceling an additional expenditure of our own. For example, some
dispersal is essential, though usually it is expensive; if the dispersed bases
are within a warning net, dispersal can help to provide warning against some
sorts of attack, since it forces the attacker to increase the size of his raid and
so makes it more liable to detection as well as somewhat harder to coijrd-
inate. But as the sole or principal defense of our offensive force, dispersal has
64 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
The purpose is to reduce vulnerability and has little to do with any increas-
ing radius of SAC aircraft. The early B-52 radius is roughly that of the
B-36; the B-47, roughly that of the B-50 or B-29. In fact the radius limitation
and therefore the basing requirements we have discussed will not change
substantially for some time to come. We can talk with comparative confi-
dence here, because the U.S. strategic force is itself largely determined for
this period. Such a force changes more slowly than is generally realized. The
vast majority of the force will consist of manned bombers, and most of
these will be of medium range. Some U.S. bombers will be able to reach
some targets from some U.S. bases within the 48 states without landing on
the way back. O n the other hand, some bomber-target combinations are
not feasible without pre-target landing (and are therefore doubtful). The
Atlas, Titan and Polaris rockets, when available, can of course do without
overseas bases (though the proportion of Polaris submarines kept at sea can
be made larger by the use of submarine tenders based overseas). But even
with the projected force of aerial tankers, the greater part of our force,
which will be manned bombers, cannot be used at all in attacks on the
Soviet Union without at least some use of overseas areas.
What of the bases for Thor and Jupiter, our first intermediate-range ballis-
tic missiles? These have to be close to the enemy, and they must of course be
operating bases, not merely refueling stations. The Thors and Jupiters will be
continuously in range of an enormous Soviet potential for surprise attack.
These installations therefore re-open, in a most acute form, some of the ser-
ious questions of ground vulnerability that were raised about six years ago in
connection with our overseas bomber bases. The decision to station the Thor
and Jupiter missiles overseas has been our principal public response to the
Russian advances in rocketry, and perhaps our most plausible response.
Because it involves our ballistic missiles it appears directly to answer the
Russian rockets. Because it involves using European bases, it appears to make
up for the range superiority of the Russian intercontinental missile. And most
important, it directly involves the NATO powers and gives them an element
of control.
There is no question that it was genuinely urgent not only to meet the
Russian threat but to d o so visibly, in order to save the loosening NATO
alliance. Our allies were fearful that the Soviet ballistic missiles might mean
that we were no longer able or willing to retaliate against the Soviet Union in
case of an attack on them. We hastened to make public a reaction which
would restore their confidence. This move surely appears to increase our own
power to strike back, and also to give our allies a deterrent of their own, inde-
pendent of our decision. It has also been argued that in this respect it merely
advances the inevitable date at which our allies will acquire "modern"
weapons of their own, and that it widens the range of Soviet challenges which
Europe can meet. But we must face seriously the question whether this move
will in fact assure either the ability to retaliate or the decision to attempt it,
on the part of our allies or ourselves. And we should ask at the very least
whether further expansion of this policy will buy as much retaliatory power
68 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
precisely who their legal owner is will not affect the retaliatory power of the
Thors and Jupiters one way or the other. They would not be able to deter an
attack which they could not survive. It is curious that many who question
the utility of American overseas bases (for example, our bomber bases in the
United Kingdom) simply assume that, for our allies, possession of strategic
nuclear weapons is one with deterrence.
There remains the view that the provision of these weapons will broaden
the range of response open to our allies. In so far as this view rests on the
belief that the intermediate-range ballistic missile is adapted to limited war,
it is wide of the mark. The inaccuracy of an I.R.B.M. requires high-yield
warheads, and such a combination of inaccuracy and high yield, while quite
appropriate and adequate against unprotected targets in a general war,
would scarcely come within even the most lax, in fact reckless, definition of
limited war. Such a weapon is inappropriate for even the nuclear variety of
limited war, and it is totally useless for meeting the wide variety of provo-
cation that is well below the threshold of nuclear response. In so far as these
missiles will be costly for our allies to install, operate and support, they are
likely t o displace a conventional capability that might be genuinely useful
in limited engagements. More important, they are likely to be used as an
excuse for budget cutting. In this way they will accelerate the general trend
toward dependence on all-out response and so will have the opposite effect
to the one claimed.
Nevertheless, if the Thor and Jupiter have these defects, might not some
future weapon be free of them? Some of these defects, of course, will be over-
come in time. Solid fuels or storable liquids will eventually replace liquid oxy-
gen, reliabilities will increase, various forms of mobility or portability will
become feasible, accuracies may even be so improved that such weapons can
be used in limited wars. But these developments are all years away. In con-
sequence, the discussion will be advanced if a little more precision is given
such terms as "missiles" or "modern" or "advanced weapons." We are not
distributing a generic "modern" weapon with all the virtues of flexibility in
varying circumstances and of invulnerability in all-out war. But even with
advances in the state of the art on our side, it will remain difficult to maintain
a deterrent, especially close in under the enemy's guns.
It follows that, though a wider distribution of nuclear weapons may be
inevitable, or a t any rate likely, and though some countries in addition to
the Soviet Union and the United States may even develop an independent
deterrent, it is by n o means inevitable or even very likely that the power to
deter all-out thermonuclear attack will be widespread. This is true even
though a minor power would not need t o guarantee as large a retaliation as
we in order to deter attack on itself. Unfortunately, the minor powers have
smaller resources as well as poorer strategic location^.^ Mere membership
in the nuclear club might carry with it prestige, as the applicants and nom-
inees expect, but it will be rather expensive, and in time it will be clear that
it does not necessarily confer any of the expected privileges enjoyed by the
two charter members. The burden of deterring a general war as distinct
I r1 The Delicate Balance of Terror 69
from limited wars is still likely to be on the United States and therefore, so
far as our allies are concerned, on the military alliance.
There is one final consideration. Missiles placed near the enemy, even if
they could not retaliate, would have a potent capability for striking first by
surprise. And it might not be easy for the enemy to discern their purpose.
The existence of such a force might be a considerable provocation and in
fact a dangerous one in the sense that it would place a great burden on our
deterrent force which more than ever would have to guarantee extreme risks
to the attacker - worse than the risks of waiting in the face of this danger.
When not coupled with the ability to strike in retaliation, such a capability
might suggest - erroneously, to be sure, in the case of the democracies - an
intention to strike first. If so, it would tend to provoke rather than to deter
general war.
I have dealt here with only one of the functions of overseas bases: their use
as a support for the strategic deterrent force. They have a variety of impor-
tant military, political and economic rhles which are beyond the scope of this
paper. Expenditures in connection with the construction or operation of our
bases, for example, are a form of economic aid and, moreover, a form that is
rather palatable to the Congress. There are other functions in a central war
where their importance may be very considerable and their usefulness in a
limited war might be substantial.
Indeed nothing said here should suggest that deterrence is in itself an ade-
quate strategy. The complementary requirements of a sufficient military policy
cannot be discussed in detail here. Certainly they include a more serious devel-
opment of power to meet limited aggression, especially with more advanced
conventional weapons than those now available. They also include more ener-
getic provision for active and passive defenses to limit the dimensions of the
catastrophe in case deterrence should fail. For example, an economically fea-
sible shelter program might make the difference between 50,000,000 survivors
and 120,000,000 survivors.
But it would be a fatal mistake to suppose that because strategic deter-
rence is inadequate by itself it can be dispensed with. Deterrence is not dis-
pensable. If the picture of the world I have drawn is rather bleak, it could
none the less be cataclysmically worse. Suppose both the United States and
the Soviet Union had the power to destroy each others' retaliatory forces
and society, given the opportunity to administer the opening blow. The sit-
uation would then be something like the old-fashioned Western gun duel. It
would be extraordinarily risky for one side not to attempt to destroy the
other, or to delay doing so, since it not only can emerge unscathed by strik-
ing first but this is the sole way it can reasonably hope to emerge at all.
Evidently such a situation is extremely unstable. O n the other hand, if it is
clear that the aggressor too will suffer catastrophic damage in the event of
his aggression, he then has strong reason not to attack, even though he can
administer great damage. A protected retaliatory capability has a stabiliz-
ing influence not only in deterring rational attack, but also in offering every
inducement to both powers to reduce the chance of accidental war.
72 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
they are serious problems and some sorts of limitation and inspection agree-
ment might diminish them. But if there is to be any prospect of realistic and
useful agreement, we must reject the theory of automatic deterrence. And we
must bear in mind that the more extensive a disarmament agreement is, the
smaller the force that a violator would have to hide in order to achieve com-
plete domination. Most obviously, "the abolition of the weapons necessary in
a general or 'unlimited' war" would offer the most insuperable obstacles to an
inspection plan, since the violator could gain an overwhelming advantage
from the concealment of even a few weapons. The need for a deterrent, in this
connection too, is ineradicable.
VII. Summary
Almost everyone seems concerned with the need to relax tension. However,
relaxation of tension, which everyone thinks is good, is not easily distin-
guished from relaxing one's guard, which almost everyone thinks is bad.
Relaxation, like Miltown, is not an end in itself. Not all danger comes from
tension. To be tense where there is danger is only rational.
What can we say then, in sum, on the balance of terror theory of auto-
matic deterrence? It is a contribution to the rhetoric rather than the logic of
war in the thermonuclear age. The notion that a carefully planned surprise
attack can be checkmated almost effortlessly, that, in short, we may resume
our deep pre-sputnik sleep, is wrong and its nearly universal acceptance is
terribly dangerous. Though deterrence is not enough in itself, it is vital.
There are two principal points.
First, deterring general war in both the early and late 1960s will be hard
at best, and hardest both for ourselves and our allies wherever we use forces
based near the enemy.
Second, even if we can deter general war by a strenuous and continuing
effort, this will by no means be the whole of a military, much less a foreign
policy. Such a policy would not of itself remove the danger of accidental
outbreak or limit the damage in case deterrence failed; nor would it be at
all adequate for crises on the .periphery.
-
A g~nerallyuseful way of concluding a grim argument of this kind
would be to affirm that we have the resources, intelligence and courage to
make the correct decisions. That is, of course, the case. And there is a good
chance that we will d o so. But perhaps, as a small aid toward making such
decisions more likely, we should contemplate the possibility that they may
not be made. They are hard, do involve sacrifice, are affected by great
uncertainties and concern matters in which much is altogether unknown
and much else must be hedged by secrecy; and, above all, they entail a new
image of ourselves in a world of persistent danger. It is by no means certain
that we shall meet the test.
I "r : c The Delicate Balance of Terror 73
Notes
1. 1 w'tnt t o thank C.J. Hitch, M.W. Hoag, W.W. Kautnian. A.W. Marshall, H.S. Rowen
and W.W. Taylor for suggestions in preparatton of t h ~ sarticle.
2. (icorge t Kennan, "A Chance t o Withdraw O u r Troops in Europe," H i l r p r ' s
Mirg~rzrnc,,February 1958, p. 4 1.
3. P.M.S. Blackett, "Atomic Weapons a n d East-West RelLttions" ( N e w York: C:,lrnhridgc
l i n ~ v e r y ~ tPress,
y 19561, p. 32.
4. Joseph Alsop, "The New Balance of Power," Encotinter, M'iy 1958, p. 4. It s h o ~ ~ he ld
added that, since these lines were written, Mr. Alsop's vlews have altered.
5. The Nrtv York Timcs, Septernher 6, 1958, p. 2.
6 . (;enera1 Pierre M . Gallois, "A French General Analyzes Nuclear-Age Strategy," Rinlrtk,
Nov. 1 9 58. p. 19; "Nuclear Aggresston a n d National Suicide," Tlw Reportrr., Sept. 18, 19.58,
p. 2 3 .
7. See footnote 9.
8 . See, for example, "NATO, A Critical Appraisal," hy Gardner Patterson ~ n Edg,~r d
S. F u r n ~ s s ,Jr., Princeton University Conference on NATO, Princeton, June 1957, p. 32:
"Although n o one pretended t o know, the hypothesis that one-third of the striking force of the
United States S t r a t e g ~ cAir C o m m m d w a s in the air a t all times was regarded hy most ,IS re:]-
son.lhle."
9 . Gcneral Gallois argues that, while alllances will offer no guarantee, "a small number of
honlbs and a small number of carrlers suffice tor a threatened power t o protect ~tselfagainst
atomic destruction." (Rhrlitis, op. cit., p. 7 1.) H I Snurner~calillustr~tionsgive the defender some
4 0 0 underground launching sites (ihid., p. 22, and The Reporter, o p crt., p. 2 5 ) and suggest t h ~ t
their elimmatton would require between 5,000 a n d 25,000 missiles - w h ~ c his "more o r less
irnpos\ihle" - and that in any case the aggressor would not survive the fallout from his o w n
w c a p o n s WWhier these ,ire 1,irge numhers of targets from the standpoint of the .lggressor will
depend o n the accurac): yield and reliability of offense weapons as well '1s the r e ~ i s t ~ i n cofe the
defender's shelter.; and a number of other matters not spec~fiedin the argument. Gener,il G,lllois
15 ,iw,ire that the expectatton of surviv.il depends o n distance even in the hallist~cmts\ile age and
that o u r .illies are not so fortunate in this respect. Close-in missiles h ~ v ehetrer bomb y~eldsand
accuracies. Moreover, manned a ~ r c r a f - t with still better y~eldsa n d ,~ccuracies- c,in be ~ ~ s by cd
a n aggressor here since warning of their approach is very short. Suffice it t o sciy that the numer-
ic.11 adv'lntage General C;,lllois cites is greatly exaggerated. Furthermore, lie exaggerates the
destructiveness of the retaliatory blow against the aggressor's c ~ t i e sby the renin,ltirs ot tlie
defender's missile forcr -even assuming the aggressor would rake n o special m e a s ~ ~ r teos protcct
hi, cities. Rut pxticulrlrly tor the aggressor - w h o does not lack warntng - ,I civil defense pro-
gram c,in moderate the darnage d o n r by a poorly organized attack. Finally, the sugge\tion that
the a g g r e w u would not surbive the tall-out from his own weapons 1s simply In rrror. The r a p ~ d -
decay fission products w h ~ c hare the ni,ljor lethal problem in the local~tyof ,I surface burst ,Ire
not a serious difficulty for the aggressor. The a m o u n t of the slowdecay products, s t r o n t i ~ ~ m - 9 0
a n d cesium-1.37, In tlie atmosphere would rise considerably. If nothing were done t o counter it,
thts ~ntglir,for ertaniple, increase by many tlmes the incidence of such rel,lti\ely r'ire diseases '1s
hone cancer and leukemia. However, such a cahmity, implying ,111increase of. s ~ y20,000 , deaths
per ).ear for a nation of 200,000,000, 1s of a n entirely d~fferenrorder from the c.lt,istrophe
~ n b o l w n gtens of ~ n ~ l l ~ oofn deaths,
s w h ~ c hGeneral Gallois c o n t e n ~ p l ~ ~elsewhere.
tes And there
'ire measures t h ~ might t reduce even this effect drast~cally.(See the R A N D C o r p o r a t m i Report
R-322-KC:, Report o n iz Stlrri)~of N o ? ~ - M ~ l ~ tDL,~L'MSC,
l ~ r y J L I I 1.
~ 1958.)
10. Aerial reconnaissance, of course, could have a n rndirrrt util~tyhere for surveying large
drect\ t o determine the n ~ ~ m h and e r location of observation posts needed t o p r o v ~ d emore
timely warning.
1 I. J-lmes F. K ~ n g Jr.,
, "Arms and M a n rn the Nuclear-Rocket Era," The Nclc' Keplihl~r,
Seprernhe~-1, 19.58.
5
The Stability of a Bipolar World
Kenneth N.Waltz
postwar period has shown a remarkable stability. Measuring time from the
termination of war, 1964 corresponds to 1937. Despite all of the changes
in the nineteen years since 1945 that might have shaken the world into
another great war, 1964 somehow looks and feels safer than 1937. Is this
true only because we now know that 1937 preceded the holocaust by just
two years? O r is it the terror of nuclear weapons that has kept the world
from major war? O r is the stability of the postwar world intimately related
to its bipolar pattern?
clear that the Soviet economy was growing at a rate that far exceeded our
own, many began to worry that falling behind in the economic race would
lead t o our losing the cold war without a shot being fired. Disarmament
negotiations have most often been taken as an opportunity for propaganda.
As contrasted with the 1930's, there is now constant and effective concern
lest military preparation fall below the level necessitated by the military
efforts of the major antagonist. Changes between the wars affected differ-
ent states differently, with adjustment to the varying ambitions and abilities
of states dependent on cumbrous mechanisms of compensation and realign-
ment. In a multipower balance, who is a danger to whom is often a most
obscure matter: the incentive t o regard all disequilibrating changes with
concern and respond to them with whatever effort may be required is con-
sequently weakened. In our present world changes may affect each of the
two powers differently, and this means all the more that few changes in the
national realm or in the world at large are likely to be thought irrelevant.
Policy proceeds by imitation, with occasional attempts to outflank.
The third distinguishing factor in the bipolar balance, as we have thus
far known it, is the nearly constant presence of pressure and the recurrence
of crises. It would be folly to assert that repeated threats and recurring
crises necessarily decrease danger and promote stability. It may be equally
wrong to assert the opposite, as Khrushchev seems to appreciate. "They
frighten us with war," he told the Bulgarians in May of 1962, "and we
frighten them back bit by bit. They threaten us with nuclear arms and we
tell them: 'Listen, now only fools can d o this, because we have them too,
and they are not smaller than yours but, we think, even better than yours.
So why do you d o foolish things and frighten us?' This is the situation, and
this is why we consider the situation to be good."2 Crises, born of a condi-
tion in which interests and ambitions conflict, are produced by the deter-
mination of one state t o effect a change that another state chooses to resist.
With the Berlin blockade, for example, as with Russia's emplacement of
missiles in Cuba, the United States decided that to resist the change the
Soviet Union sought to bring about was worth the cost of turning its action
into a crisis. If the condition of conflict remains, the absence of crises
becomes more disturbing than their recurrence. Rather a large crisis now
than a small war later is an axiom that should precede the statement, often
made, that to fight small wars in the present may be the means of avoiding
large wars later.
Admittedly, crises also occur in a multipower world, but the dangers are
diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definition of vital interests easily
obscured. The skillful foreign policy, where many states are in balance, is
designed to gain an advantage over one state without antagonizing others
and frightening them into united action. Often in modern Europe, possible
gains have seemed greater than likely losses. Statesmen could thus hope in
crises to push an issue to the limit without causing all the potential opponents
to unite. When possible enemies are several in number, unity of action among
states is difficult to secure. One could therefore think - or hope desperately,
The Stability of a Bipolar World 77
T h e End of t h e B i p o l a r Era?
to move contrary to the desires of the United States and the Soviet Union,
as marking the end of the postwar world in which the two superpowers
closely controlled the actions of even their major associates [3].Hedley Bull,
in a paper prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations in the fall of 1963,
tentatively reaches the conclusion that between now and 197.5 "the system
of polarization of power will cease to be recognizable: that other states will
count for so much in world politics that the two present great powers will
find it difficult, even when cooperating, to dominate them."'
If power is identical with the ability to control, then those who are free
are also strong; and the freedom of the weak would have to be taken as an
indication of the weakness of those who have great material strength. But
the weak and disorganized are often less amenable to control than those
who are wealthy and well disciplined 141. The powerful, out of their strength,
influence and limit each other; the wealthy are hobbled by what they have
to lose. The weak, on the other hand, bedevil the strong; the poor can more
easily ignore their own interests. Such patterns endure and pervade the rela-
tions of men and of groups. Lnited States Steel enjoys less freedom to vary
the price of its products than d o smaller producers. The United States gov-
ernment finds it easier to persuade large corporations and the great labor
unions to cooperate in an anti-inflationary policy than to secure the com-
pliance of small firms and independent unions. The political party in oppos-
ition is freer to speak irresponsibly than is the government. Power corrupts
and renders its possessors responsible; the possession of wealth liberates
and enslaves. That similar patterns are displayed in international relations
is hardly surprising. It is not unusual to find that minor states have a con-
siderable nuisance value in relation to states greatly their superiors in power.
A Chiang Kai-shek, a Syngman Rhee, or a Mossadegh is often more diffi-
cult to deal with than rulers of states more nearly one's equal in power.
The influence and control of the two great powers has stopped short of
domination in most places throughout the postwar period. The power of
the United States and of the Soviet Union has been predominant but not
absolute. To describe the world as bipolar does not mean that either power
can exert a positive control everywhere in the world, but that each has
global interests which it can care for unaided, though help may often be
desirable. To say that bipolarity has, until recently, meant more than this is
to misinterpret the history of the postwar world. Secretary Dulles, in the
middle 1950's, inveighed against neutralism and described it as immoral. His
judgment corresponded to a conviction frequently expressed in Communist
statements. P. E. Vyshinsky, in a 1948 issue of Problems of Philosophy,
declared that "the only determining criterion of revolutionary proletarian
internationalism is: are you for or against the U.S.S.R., the motherland of
the world proletariat? . . . The defense of the U.S.S.R., as of the socialist
motherland of the world proletariat, is the holy duty of every honest man
everywhere and not only of the citizens of the U.S.S.R."' The rejection of
neutralism as an honorable position for other countries to take is another
example of intensity of competition leading to an extension of its range.
80 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
By coming to terms with neutralism, as both the United States and the
Soviet Union have done, the superpowers have shown even their inability
to extend their wills without limit.
Bearing in mind the above considerations, can we say whether the recent
independent action of France and Communist China does in fact indicate
the waning of bipolarity, or does it mean merely the loosening of bipolar
blocs, with a bipolar relation between the United States and the Soviet
Union continuing to dominate? By the assessment of those who themselves
value increased independence, the latter would seem to be the case. The Earl
of Home, when he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, thought he
saw developing from the increased power of the Soviet Union and the
United States a nuclear stalemate that would provide for the middle states
a greater opportunity to maneuver.' De Gaulle, in a press conference
famous for other reasons, included the statement that uncertainty about
their use "does not in the least prevent the American nuclear weapons,
which are the most powerful of all, from remaining the essential guarantee
of world p e a ~ e . "Communist
~ China's calculation of international political
and military forces may be highly similar. "Whatever happens," Chou En-lai
has said recently, "the fraternal Chinese and Soviet peoples will stand
together in any storm that breaks out in the world arena."' Ideological dis-
putes between China and Russia are bitter; their policies conflict. But inter-
ests are more durable than the alliances in which they sometimes find
expression. Even though the bonds of alliance are broken, the interest of the
Soviet Union could not easily accommodate the destruction of China if that
were to mean that Western power would be poised on the Siberian border.
That strategic stability produces or at least permits tactical instability is
now a cliche of military analysis. The axiom, transferred to the political
realm, remains true. Lesser states have often found their opportunity to
exist in the interstices of the balance of power. The French and Chinese, in
acting contrary to the wishes of their principal partners, have certainly
caused them some pain. Diplomatic flurries have resulted and some changes
have been produced, yet in a more important respect, France and China
have demonstrated not their power but their impotence: their inability to
affect the dominant relation in the world. The solidity of the bipolar bal-
ance permits middle states to act with impunity precisely because they
know that their divergent actions will not measurably affect the strength of
the Soviet Union or the United States, upon which their own security con-
tinues to rest. The decisions of Britain, France, and China to build nuclear
establishments are further advertisements of weakness. Because American
or Soviet military might provides adequate protection, the middle powers
need not participate in a military division of labor in a way that would con-
tribute maximally to the military strength of their major associates.
The United States is inclined to exaggerate the amount of strength it can
gain from maintaining a system of united alliances as opposed to bilateral
arrangements. The exaggeration arises apparently from vague notions about
the transferability of strength. Actually, as one should expect, the contribution
1 ,ili The Stability of a Bipolar World 81
o f each ally is notable only where it believes that its interests require it to
make an effort. In resisting the invasion of North Korean and, later, Chinese
troops, roughly 90 percent of the non-Korean forces were provided by the
United States."' In South Vietnam at the present time the United States is the
only foreign country engaged. British and French military units in West
Germany, under strength and ill equipped, are of little use. Western Europe
remains, to use the terminology of the 19303, a direct consumer of security.
The only really significant interest of the United States, as is nicely conveyed
by Arnold Wolfers' dubbing us "the hub power,"" is that each country that
may be threatened by Soviet encroachment be politically stable and thus able
to resist subversion, be self-dependent and thus less of an expense to us, and
be able at the outset of a possible military action to put up some kind of a
defense.
On these points, the American interest in Western Europe is precisely the
same as its interest in the economically underdeveloped countries. In the
case of the European countries, however, losses are harder to sustain and
there are advantages clearly to be gained by the United States where our
interests and theirs overlap. It would be difficult to argue that the foreign-aid
programs undertaken by Britain, France, and West Germany transcend a
national purpose or have been enlarged in response to our insisting upon
their duty to share the military and economic responsibilities that the
United States has assumed. The protection of persons, property, and the
pound sterling required Britain to resist Communist guerrillas in Malaya,
which was after all still her dependency. In such a case, the bearing of a
heavy burden by another country serves its interests and ours simultan-
eously. If anything, the possibility of a transfer of strength has decreased in
the past fifteen years, along with a decline in usable military power in
Britain. Britain had in her army 633,242 men in 1948; by 1962 she had
209,500, with further reductions anticipated. The comparable figures for
France are 465,000 and 706,000." France, with a system of conscription for
a comparatively long term and at relatively low pay, has maintained mili-
tary forces impressively large when measured as a percentage of her POPLI-
lation 151. As France takes the first steps along the route followed by England,
her military planning runs parallel to the earlier English calculations; she
will seek to cope with the pressures of large money requirements by mak-
ing similar adjustments. According to present French plans, the total of men
under arms is to be reduced by 4 0 per cent [6].
To compensate for the loss of influence that once came from making a
military contribution outside their own borders, the one country has tried
and the other is now attempting to build nuclear establishments that sup-
posedly promise them some measure of independence. The British effort
remains dependent on American assistance, and the French effort to build
an effective nuclear weapons system is in its infancy. The independence of
recent French policy cannot have been grounded on a nuclear force that
barely exists. It is, rather, a product of intelligence and political will exer-
cised by President de Gaulle in a world in which bipolar stalemate provides
82 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
the following picture emerges: the Soviet Union, at an assumed growth rate
o f 5 per cent, will have in the year 2004 a gross national product of $2,080
billion; the United States, at a growth rate of 3 per cent, will have by 2000
a gross national product of $2,220 billion; West Germany, if it grows at a
sustained rate of 6 per cent yearly, will have by 1998 a gross national prod-
uct of $672 billion, and Communist China, projected at 7 per cent, will
have a gross national product in 2002 of $800 billion 171. The growth rates
assume2 are unlikely to be those that actually prevail. The rat& chosen are
those that will narrow the gap between the greatest and the middle powers
to the largest extent presently imaginable. Even on these bases, it becomes
clear that the Soviet Union and the United States to the end of the millennium
will remain the preponderant powers in the world unless two or more of the
middle powers combine in a way that gives them the ability to concert their
political and military actions on a sustained and reliable basis.
The gap that exists can be described in other ways which are more frag-
mentary but perhaps give a still sharper picture. The United States has been
spending on its military establishment yearly an amount that is two-thirds
or more of the entire West German or British or French gross national prod-
uct. In 1962, the Europe of the Six plus Great Britain spent on defense less
than a quarter of the military expenditure of the United S t a t e s . ' T h e United
States spends more on military research and development than any of the
three largest of the West European countries spends on its entire military
establishment.
The country that would develop its own resources, military and other, in
order to play an independent role in the world, faces a dreadful problem. It
is understandably tempting for such countries to believe that by developing
nuclear weapons systems, they can noticeably close the gap between them-
selves and the superpowers. The assumption that nuclear weapons will
serve as the great equalizers appeared early and shows an impressive per-
sistence. "The small country," Jacob Viner wrote in 1946, "will again be
more than a cipher or a mere pawn in power-politics, provided it is big
enough to produce atomic bombs."" Stanley Hoffmann, writing in the
present year, reflects a similar thought in the following words: "True, the
French nuclear program is expensive; but it is also true that conventional
rearmament is not cheaper, and that a division of labor that would leave all
nuclear weapons in United States hands and specialize Europe in conven-
tional forces would earmark Europe for permanent dependence (both mili-
tary and political) in the cold war and permanent decline in the
international competition."'"
It is difficult to know just what is meant by saying that "conventional
rearmament is not cheaper" than a nuclear program, but it is clear that
nuclear programs are very expensive indeed [8 1. France and Britain now spend
about 7 per cent of their gross national products on defense. If this were
increased to the American level of approximately 1 0 per cent, or even if it
were doubled, the defense spending of each country would remain com-
paratively small. The inability to spend large sums, taken together with the
84 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
S o m e Dissenting Opinions
The fact remains that many students of international relations have con-
tinued to judge bipolarity unstable as compared to the probable stability o f
a multipower world. Why have they been so confident that the existence of
a number of powers, moving in response to constantly recurring variations
in national power and purpose, would promote the desired stability?
According to Professors Morgenthau and Kaplan, the uncertainty that
results from flexibility of alignment generates a healthy caution in the foreign
policy of every country." Concomitantly, Professor Morgenthau believes
that in the present bipolar world, "the flexibility of the balance of power
and, with it, its restraining influence upon the power aspirations of the main
protagonists on the international scene have disappeared."13 One may agree
with his conclusion and yet draw from his analysis another one unstated by
him: The inflexibility of a bipolar world, with the appetite for power of
each major competitor at once whetted and checked by the other, may pro-
mote a greater stability than flexible balances of power among a larger
number of states.
What are the grounds for coming to a diametrically different conclusion?
The presumed double instability of a bipolar world, that it easily erodes or
explodes, is to a great extent based upon its assumed bloc character. A bloc
improperly managed may indeed fall apart. The leader of each bloc must be
concerned at once with alliance management, for the defection of an allied
state might be fatal to its partners, and with the aims and capabilities of the
88 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
If the preceding explanations are correct, they are also of practical import-
ance. Fixation upon the advantages of flexibility in a multipower balance has
often gone hand in hand with an intense anxiety associated with bipolarity:
the fear that a downward slide or a sudden technological breakthrough by
one great state or the other would decisively alter the balance between them.
Either occurrence could bring catastrophic war, which for the disadvantaged
would be a war of desperation, or world domination from one center with
or without preceding war. The fear is pervasive, and in American writings
most frequently rests on the assumption that, internally dissolute and tired
o f the struggle, we will award the palm to the Soviet Union. Sometimes this
anxiety finds a more sophisticated expression, which turns less upon internal
derangements. In this view, the United States, as the defensive power in the
world, is inherently disadvantaged, for the aggressive power will necessarily
gain if the competition continues long enough. But a conclusion derived from
an incomplete proposition is misleading. One must add that the aggressive
state may lose even though the state seeking to uphold the status quo never
take the offensive. The Soviet Union controls no nation now, except possibly
Cuba, that was not part of its immediate postwar gains. It has lost control in
90 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
Yugoslavia and the control it once seemed to have in China. The United
States, since the time it began to behave as a defensive power, has seen some
states slip from commitment to neutralism, but only North Vietnam and
Cuba have come under Communist control. One would prefer no losses at
all, but losses of this magnitude can easily be absorbed. On balance, one
might argue that the United States has gained, though such a judgment
depends on the base line from which measurement is made as well as upon
how gains and losses are defined.
That the United States and the Soviet Union weigh losses and gains
according to their effect upon the bipolar balance is crucial, but there are
many changes in Africa, or Asia, or Latin America that are not likely to be
to the advantage of either the Soviet Union or the United States. This judg-
ment can be spelled out in a number of ways. The doctrine of containment,
for example, should be amended to read: defend, or insulate so that one loss
need not lead to another. The habits of the cold war are so ingrained and
the dangers of a bipolar world so invigorating that the defensive country is
easily led to overreact. In Southeast Asia, since no gain for Communist
China is likely to benefit the Soviet Union, American concern should be
confined to maintaining its reputation and avoiding distant repercussions.
If one goes further and asks how great a gain will accrue to the People's
Republic of China if it extends its territorial control marginally, the answer,
in any of the areas open to it, must be "very little." Neutralization moves
by President de Gaulle, if they can obscure the responsibility for unwanted
events, may in fact be helpful. It is important to realize that the bipolar
world is continuing lest we worry unnecessarily and define the irrelevant
gesture or even the helpful suggestion of lesser powers as troublesome.
A 5 per cent growth rate sustained for three years would add to the
American gross national product an amount greater than the entire gross
national product of Britain or France or West Germany. Even so, the accre-
tion of power the Soviet Union would enjoy by adding, say, West Germany's
capabilities to her own would be immensely important; and one such gain
might easily lead to others. Most gains from outside, however, can add rela-
tively little to the strengths of the Soviet Union or the United States. There
are, then, few single losses that would be crucial, which is a statement that
points to a tension within our argument. Bipolarity encourages each giant
to focus upon crises, while rendering most of them of relative inconse-
quence. We might instead put it this way: Crisis is of concern only where
giving way would lead to an accumulation of losses for one and gains for
the other. In an age characterized by rapidity of change, in many respects
time is slowed down - as is illustrated by the process of "losing" Indo-China
that has gone on for nineteen years without a conclusive result. Since only
a succession of gains could be decisive, there is time for the losing state to
contrive a countering action should it be necessary to do so.
simplicity of relations within a bipolar world, the great pressures that are
generated, and the constant possibility of catastrophe produce a conservatism
on the part of the two greatest powers. The Soviet Union and the United
States may feel more comfortable dealing a deux than in contemplating a
future world in which they vie for existence and possible advantage with
other superpowers. While there is naturally worry about an increase of ten-
sions to intolerable levels, there is also a fear that the tensions themselves will
lead America and Russia to seek agreements designed to bring a relaxation
that will be achieved at the expense of lesser powers. The French general, Paul
Stehlin, commenting on American opposition to Nth-country nuclear forces,
which he interprets as part of an American-Russian effort to maintain a bi-
polar world, asks wistfully: "Does Europe have less political maturity than
the Big Two credit each other with?" With some bitterness he criticizes
America for placing "more faith in the ability of the Russians to control their
tremendous stockpiles of offensive weapons than they do in my country's
capacity to use with wisdom and moderation the modest armaments it is
working so hard to develop for purely deterrent purposes.""
Worries and fears on any such grounds are exaggerated. The Soviet
Union and the United States influence each other more than any of the states
living in their penumbra can possibly hope to do. In the world of the pres-
ent, as of the recent past, a condition of mutual opposition may require
rather than preclude the adjustment of differences. Yet first steps toward
agreement have not led to second and third steps. Instead they have been
mingled with other acts and events that have kept the level of tension quite
high. The test ban was described in the United States as possibly a first great
step toward wider agreement that would increase the chances of maintain-
ing peace. In almost the same breath it was said that we cannot lower our
guard, for Soviet aims have not changed.18 Larger acts than agreement to
halt testing under the sea and above the ground are required to alter a situ-
ation that congealed long ago. The Soviet Union and the United States
remain for the foreseeable future the two countries that can irreparably dam-
age each other. So long as both possess the capability, each must worry that
the other might use it. The worry describes the boundaries that have so far
limited both the building up of tensions and the abatement of competition.
Where weapons of horrible destructive power exist, stability necessarily
appears as an important end. It will not, however, be everyone's highest
value. One who accepts the analysis of bipolarity and the conclusions we
have drawn may nevertheless prefer a world of many powers. The unity and
self-dependence of Europe may, for example, rank higher as goals than
international stability. Or, one may think of European unity as a means of
melding American power with the strength of a united Europe in order to
achieve Western hegemony. Unipolarity may be preferable, for those peoples
who then become dominant, to a competition between two polar states. It
may even promise a greater stability. The question is too complicated to
take up at the moment, but some words of caution are in order.
The United States has consistently favored the unification of Europe, for
adding the strength of a united Europe to the existing power of America
92 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
Notes
1. T h e point has been m ~ d bye Raymond Aron, a m o n g others. "Even ~f it had not had the
bomb, would the U n ~ t e dStates have tolerated the expansion of the Soviet empire a5 tar as the
94 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Atlantic? And would Stalin have been ready to face the risk of general war?" Raymond Aron,
The Century of Total War (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 151.
2. Hanson W. Baldwin, from information supplied by Strategic Air Command headquar-
ters, estimates that Russian intercontinental missiles are one-fourth to one-fifth as numerous
as ours, though Russian warheads are larger. The Russians have one-sixth to one-twelfth the
number of our long-range heavy bombs, with ours having a greater capability (New York
Times, November 21, 1963). In medium range ballistic missiles Russia has been superior.
A report of the Institute of Strategic Studies estimated that as of October, 1962, Russia had
700 such missiles, the West a total of 250 (New York Times, November 9, 1962). British
sources tend to place Russian capabilities in the medium range higher than do American
estimates. Cf. P.M.S. Blackett, "The Real Road to Disarmament: The Military Background to
the Geneva Talks," New Statesman (March 2, 19621, pp. 295-300, with Hanson
W. Baldwin, New York Times, November 26, 1961.
3. See, for example, Walter Lippmann, "NATO Crisis - and Solution: Don't Blame De
Gaulle," Boston Globe, December 5, 1963, p. 26: "The paramount theme of this decade, as
we know it thus far, is that we are emerging from a two-power world and entering one where
there are many powers."
4. Cf. Georg Simmel, "The Sociology of Conflict, 11," The American Journal of Sociology,
IX (March, 1904), 675: "when one opposes a diffused crowd of enemies, one may oftener gain
isolated victories, but it is very hard to arrive at decisive results which definitely fix the rela-
tionships of the contestants."
5. In 1960, 1.5% of total population for France; 1.01% for the United Kingdom; 1.39%
for the United States. M.R.D. Foot, Men in Uniform (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, for
the Institute for Strategic Studies, 19611, pp. 162, 163.
6. The reduction is figured from the level of military manpower in 1960. Ministre des
Armkes, Pierre Messmer, "Notre Politique Militaire," Revue de Difense Natronale (May, 1963),
p. 754.
7. To complete the picture, Britain in 1962 had a gross national product of $79 billion and
France of $72 billion. Gross national product figures for all of the countries mentioned, except
China, are from the New York Times, January 26, 1964, E8. The figure of $50 billion for
China in 1962, though it is a figure that is widely given, is necessarily a crude estimate. As a
close and convenient approximation, I have taken 3, 5, 6, and 7% as doubling in 24, 14, 12,
and 1 0 years, respectively.
8. Albert Wohlstetter has estimated that the first one hundred Polaris missiles manufac-
tured and operated for five peacetime years will cost three to five times as much as the cost of
the first one hundred B-47s ("Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + l Country," Foreign Affairs,
XXXIX [ A ~ r i l 19611.
& & ,
. >,
364).
,
9. France plans to have three nuclear submarines of sixteen missiles each, the first to be
operating in 1969, the others following at two-year intervals (Messmer, "Notre Politique
Militaire," p. 747).
10. It is not wholly absurd for British and French governments to proclaim, as they fre-
quently do, that an embryonic capability brings an immediate increase of strength; for further
expenditures are not likely to bring much of an additional payoff. Cf. President de Gaulle's
message to his minister-delegate at Reggane upon the explosion of France's first atomic device:
"'Hurrah for France! From this morning she is stronger and prouder!"' Leonard Beaton and
John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), p. 91.
11. The experiences of Chinese Communists prior to 1949 and of the People's Republic of
China since that date suggest that attempts to outflank may bring a greater success than efforts
to imitate! Or, applying an economist's term to military matters, would-be Nth-countries
would d o well t o ask, where d o we have a comparative advantage?
12. Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process rn International Politics (New York: Wiley,
1957), p. 37; and "Bipolarity in a Revolutionary Age," in Kaplan, ed., The Revolution rn
World Politics (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 254. The difficulties and dangers found in a bi-
polar world by Kaplan are those detected by Hans J. Morgenthau in a system of opposing
alliances. It is of direct importance in assessing the stability of international systems t o note
Waltz The Stability of a Bipolar World 95
that Morgenthau finds "the opposition of two alliances ... the most frequent configuration
within the system of the balance of power" (Politrcs Among Nations [3d ed.; New York:
Knopf, 1961, part 41, p. 189). Kaplan, in turn, writes that "the most likely transformation o f
the 'balance of power' system is to a h~polarsystem" (System and Process, p. 36).
13. Kaplan, though hc treats the case almost as being trivial, adds a statement that IS at least
suggestive: "The tight b~polarsystem 1s stahle only when both bloc actors are h~erarchically
organized" (System and Process, p. 43).
14. Kaplan, e.g., by the fourth and sixth of his rules of a balance-of-power system, requires
a state to oppose any threatening state and to be wllling to ally with any other (System and
Prowss, p 23).
References
I. Henry Kissinger, "Strains on the Alliance," Forergn Affairs, XLI (January, 1963), 284. Cf.
Max Kohnstamm, "The European Tide," D~edalus,XCIII (Winter, 19641, 100-1 02;
McCeorge Bundy's speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, New York Trmes, December
7, 1961; John F. Kennedy, "Address at Independence Hall," Philadelphia, July 4, 1962,
Puhlzc Papers of the I'rcsrdents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 19631, pp. 537-539.
2. Quoted in V.D. Sokolovskii, ed., Sovzet Military Strategy, Herbert S. Dinerstein, I.eon
( h u r t , and Thomas W. Wolfe, translators and English editors (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 19631, p. 43.
3. Herman Kahn, On Thermonucleur War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19601,
p. 315.
4. Richard N. Rosecrance, Action iwrd Reaction m World Politics (Boston: L~ttle,Brown, 1963),
pp. 210-211.
5. Hedley Bull, "Arlant~cMilitary Problems: A Preliminary Essay." Prepared for the Council
on Foreign Relations meeting of November 20, 1963, p. 21. Quoted with permission of
the author.
6. P. E. Vyshinsky, "Con~munismand the Motherland," 3s quoted in The Kremlin Speirks
(Department of State Publ~cation,4264, October, 1951), pp. 6, 7.
7. Nat~onalUnion of Conservative and Unionist Associations, Officral Report, 8 1st Annual
Conference, 1.landudno (October 10-13, 1962). p. 93.
8. Arnhassadc de FI-ance, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 185 (January 14, 1963), p. 9.
9. In a statement taped in i'eklng before his African trip In January of 1964, Neu, York fines,
February 4, 1964, p. 2. Cf. the message sent by Communist China's leaders to Premier
Khru~hchevupon the occasmn of his seventieth birthday. After referring to differences
between them, it is stated that: "In the event of a maior world cris~s,the two parties, our two
peoples will undoubtedly stand together agamst our common enemy," New York Times,
April 17, 1964, p. 3.
10. L.eland M. Goodr~ch,"Korea: Collective Measures Against Aggression," Internationd
Conciliat~m,No. 494 (October, 1953), 164.
I I . "Stresses and Strains in 'Going It With Others,"' in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Allrance l'olicy
itr the Chld War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 7.
12. The Statesmank Year-Bouk, S.H. Steinberg, ed. ( I a n d o n : Macm~llan,1948), p. 50. Ibid.
(IYSl), p. 99 1. [lid. (196.31, pp. 103, 104, 1003. The figures for Great Britain exclude
the women'^ services, Territorial Army, and colonial troops. Those for France exclude the
gendarmes.
13. Bull, "Atlantic Military Problems," p. 24.
14. Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, Arms and Stizbilrty in Europe (New York: Praeger,
lY6?1), p. 205.
15. Jacob Viner, "The implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations."
t'roc-eedi?l#s of the American P / ? ~ ~ J s ( J ~Society,
~ ~ c u XC:
/ ( 1946), .55.
96 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e
16. Stanley Hoffmann, "Cursing de Gaulle Is Not a Policy," The Reporter, XXX (January 30,
1964), 40.
17. Cf. Malcolm W. Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," In Morton A. Kaplan, ed., T i ~ e
Revolution in World Politics (New York: Wiley, 19621, pp. 408, 409.
18. Cf. a forthcoming book by Victor Basiuk, Institute of War and Peace Studies. Columb~a
University.
19. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (March I , 1960),cols. 1 136-1 138. Compare
Hugh Gaitskell, The Challenge of Co-Existence (London: Methuen, 19571, pp. 45-46.
20. Quoted by Eldon Griffiths, "The Revolt of Europe," The Saturday Etlening Post, CCLXIII
(March 9, 1963), 19.
21. Bull, "Atlantic Military Problems," p. 29.
22. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Natrons (3d ed.; New York: Knopf, 1961 ), part 4.
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process rn International Politrcs (New York: Wiley, 1957),
pp. 22-36. I shall refer only to Morgenthau and Kaplan, for their writings are widely
known and represent the majority o p i n ~ o nof students in the field.
23. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 350. Cf. Kaplan, System and Process, pp. 3 6 4 3 ;
and Kaplan, "Bipolarity in a Revolutionary Age," In Kaplan, ed., The Revolution in
World Polrtics (New York: Wiley, 1962), pp. 2 5 1-266.
24. The point is nicely made in an unpublished paper by Wolfram E Hanrieder, "Actor
Objectives and International Systems" (Center of International Studies, Princeton
University, February, 1964), pp. 4 3 4 4 .
25. For a sharp questioning of "the myth of flexibility," see George Liska's revlew article
"Continuity and Change in International Systems," World Politics, XVI (October, 19631,
122-123.
26. Raymond Aron, Paix et Guerre entre les Natrons (Paris: Calmann-Lev); 1962), p. 156.
27. Gen. Paul Stehlin, "The Evolution of Western Defense," Foreign Affairs, XLII (October,
1963), 81, 77.
28. See, for example, Secretary Rusk's statement before the Senate Foreign Relat~ons
Committee, New York Times, August 13, 1963.
29. Ambassade de France, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 175 (May 15, 1962), p. 6.
The Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities: A Problem in
Need of Solution
Andre Beaufre
The various solutions to the basic problem of the sharing of nuclear respon-
sibilities which have been proposed naturally reflect these different national
aims and attitudes.
The Americans thought they had found a solution to the problem in the
plan for a multilateral force. This concept, however, was originally no more
than a secondary product of the Nassau Conference, of which the principal
outcome was the project for a multi-national force embracing the United
States, Britain and France. As a result of France's refusal to take part that
idea was stillborn, and the whole force of American diplomacy was then
concentrated behind the proposal for a multilateral force originally devised
primarily to meet German anxieties. This proposal had the advantage of
completely safeguarding the Americans' freedom of nuclear decision while
at the same time including the European forces in a system which gave them
a semblance of consultation. In addition, it implied the creation of a tightly
t+<rrilre The Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities 99
integrated inter-allied force very closely linked both to the NATO command
and to American technology. At the same time, a few minor alterations were
made in NATO's nuclear organisation in Europe to provide for a wider
share by European officers in local nuclear planning.
The disadvantages of this scheme were that it would be costly and that
it would, in practice, merely result in reinforcing what was already a super-
abundant American nuclear capability without providing the European
partners with anything more than a nominal right of control. In general, it
had only a lukewarm reception, except by the Germans; they saw it as a
step towards the removal of the discrimination from which they felt them-
selves to be suffering, and as an opportunity to express their support of the
United States whose nuclear protection seemed essential to them. But in
order to guard against what they considered to be the dangerous hypothesis
that the land defence of Europe should depend on purely conventional
weapons, they also insisted on the absolute need for that defence to be
based on tactical nuclear weapons.
France clearly expressed her opposition in principle to the MLF, both
because it offered only illusory possibilities of any real sharing of nuclear
responsibilities and because it irrevocably integrated Europe in the
American nuclear system, thereby excluding any hope that a real European
nuclear force might eventually be established. Instead, France continued to
build up her small nuclear force and to reiterate her wish that the allies
should co-ordinate their strategies in an effective way.
In this situation, the new British Labour Government thought it a clever
move, in the hope of gaining support from the European opponents of the
MLF, to propose an alternative to it. The essential characteristics of this
new ANF proposal were the creation of a multi-national force, composed
of an equal number of British and American Polaris submarines, and of a
mixed-manned Polaris surface fleet on the MLF pattern, but now without
British participation. It was proposed that this force should be placed at the
disposal of NATO to carry out 'interdiction' missions of a more or less
long-range nature in support of the defence of Europe. In addition, certain
arrangements would allow the European Powers to exercise a minimum of
control over the planning and use of this force.
The most obvious result of the British proposal was to deprive the MLF
of what little impetus remained to it. The collision of so many opposing
views on the problem of the sharing of nuclear responsibilities resulted in a
general hesitation to deal with it, and by the beginning of this year it had
reached a dead-end.
During this period, however, it has become clear that the strategic situation
has so far been transformed that the need for an important revision of the
concepts on which the strategy of NATO had been based has become
clearly indicated. For instance, it has become obvious that the hypothesis of
100 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
the threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe has now, to all intents and
purposes, lost any validity. This development has, of course, been brought
about in large part by the value of NATO as a deterrent, but it has also been
due t o the political and psychological evolution within the U.S.S.R. In any
case, the fact is that not only does such an invasion now seem improbable,
but that the hypothesis of a nuclear war has become unthinkable - because
a nuclear war would certainly entail reciprocal destruction of such propor-
tions that no political objective could justify it. In modern strategic jargon,
the 'bilateral deterrence' of both sides is 'bistable absolue'.
This new situation, which I have analysed in detail in my book,
Dissuasion et Stratkgie,' must have some highly important consequences -
in that it must lead t o a complete change in the ideas to which we have
become accustomed.
These ideas were based on the proposition that, in order to deter an
attack, it was necessary to develop a defensive and retaliatory capacity
which could win the war, or, at least, deprive the enemy of any hope of win-
ning it. This conception implied the need to foresee the course of a nuclear
war and the means by which victory could be gained in it; hence the
detailed study devoted to the problem of launching nuclear weapons and to
the use of tactical and strategic weapons. But such exercises in foresight lost
any purpose from the moment that the enemy possessed sufficient means
of nuclear retaliation. In present circumstances, both at the tactical and
strategic levels, a nuclear exchange would rapidly lead to irrational situations
in which none of the belligerents would be able to maintain its control over
operations. The extent of the destruction that would be caused on both
sides would make this kind of war what might be termed suicide 'by return'.
Given that probability, it cannot but be concluded that the unleashing of a
nuclear war would be the signal for a major catastrophe which should be
avoided at all costs. The course of events immediately after such a war had
begun would render the war itself futile. Thus, contrary to what has been
assumed hitherto, the kernel of the problem does not lie in devising a defen-
sive strategy t o be used in time of war, but in the strategy employed in time
of peace, before any use of nuclear weapons, to deter any open conflict. The
main concern has thus shifted from defence to deterrence and from wartime
to peacetime.
But the application of this new strategy of deterrence is a particularly
delicate matter. When nuclear war seemed plausible, in the Foster Dulles
era, the mere threat of it was an easy and effective gesture. Today, when
each of the two major opponents is convinced that anything is preferable to
a resort t o nuclear weapons, any threat to use them tends to lose all cred-
ibility. O n the other hand, if one of those opponents were to think that such
weapons would not be used in any circumstances, the resulting situation
would be even more dangerous, for there would then be a risk of the loss of
the advantage of the stability which the mere fear of a nuclear conflict has
imposed upon Europe. The political instability resulting from the violent
division of Europe and Germany, and from the subjection of the satellite
The Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities 10 1
states, cannot avoid leading to conflicts over which, even though they might
he of secondary importance, any governmental control might be lost, so
bringing about a new great war. Even if this serious possibility could he
avoided we would still have to face dangerous complications. That is why
special efforts need to be made to preserve for nuclear weapons that capac-
ity for engendering fear from which we have hitherto so greatly benefited.
Several methods have been proposrd to attain this end. The first - that
of Mr. McNamara, Phase One - was to declare that, if she launched the first
strike, the United States possessed the means to reduce the enemy's capacity
for retaliation very considerably. This thesis is perfectly logical and would
be completely convincing if this 'counter-force capability', which in any
case entails considerable resources, did not appear increasingly less easy to
maintain in face of the development of missile-firing submarines and rockets
protected in concrete silos.
O n the other hand, the Soviet approach to the problem has hitherto been
to declare that war could not be limited, and that any important conflict
would escalate to the nuclear threshold. This is an irrational position and
one which tends to give the nuclear threat a minimum of credibility. In the
same spirit, France has refused to accept the principle of flexible response
as a demonstration of her willingness to face the prospect of escalation to
the strategic nuclear threshold in the event of aggression.
A variation of these attitudes has been provided by the Germans: they
have proposed that tactical nuclear weapons should be placed along the
whole length of the Iron Curtain, so that the aggressor would be thus
assured that any invasion would result in escalation to the nuclear threshold.
The French and German attitudes appear dangerous to American experts,
who retnain haunted by the fear of a nuclear conflict and who, because of the
risks to American territory that such a conflict would now imply, wish to
guard against any 'catalytic' escalation. They have therefore been prompted
to put forward an original and adroit proposal by which the risk of nuclear
conflict would be preserved but maintained at a limited level. This is Mr.
McNamara's Phase Two solution, in which he asserts the possibility that the
United States might respond to an act of aggression by nuclear warning shots,
intended to show her willingness to resort to nuclear weapons, hut only
demonstratively and without actually beginning an all-out nuclear conflict.
The enemy would thus be deterred from resorting to nuclear war by the
threat of massive retaliation against his population, a threat substantiated by
an important fleet of missile-firing submarines and a large number of concrete-
encased Minutemen. As Mr. ~ c ~ a m a himself
r a has put it, damage is to be
limited by the threat of 'insured destruction'.
Incontestably, each of these attitudes reflects the logic of the different
capabilities of the nuclear powers - a clear indication that deterrence cannot
be applied in the same way by all the nuclear powers and that American
policies cannot be followed by lesser nuclear partners. But given the fact that
all these attitudes reflect attempts to grapple with the difficult problem o f
restoring the credibility of a threat which everyone knows to have hecome
102 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
(a) Since it is desirable to increase the uncertainty felt by the enemy by more
than one method and by basing a strategy of deterrence on more than
one centre, it is quite useless to create a new force, such as the MLF or
the ANF, if this is to be dependent directly and openly upon American
nuclear strategy, which already possesses a super-abundant capacity. To
be effective as a deterrent, any new force must, in peacetime, be subject to
an autonomous centre of decision. On the other hand, a nuclear centre of
I3edutrc The Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities 103
The ideas which I have put forward above, and which I believe to be soundly
based, are none the less too novel to gain immediate and universal accept-
ance. Some time will no doubt elapse before the need will be recognised for
such an adaptation of our concepts to accord with that evolution of the
strategic situation at present unevenly understood within the alliance. It may
be thought, therefore, that this is too early a stage for positive proposals for
the reorganisation of the alliance to be put forward.
Nevertheless, even if the overall thesis which I have outlined is received
with reservations, two facts are unquestionable:
I . There are no arrangements within the alliance (except for Berlin) to pro-
vide for possible peacetime crises - which can arise at any time in
Central Europe as a consequence of its political evolution; nor does
there exist any means to co-ordinate action by the allied powers in the
event of such a crisis. It is absolutely essential that this gap in forward
planning should be filled.
104 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
2. Whether or not one approves of the nuclear situation within the alliance,
there are at present three national nuclear forces whose organisation
must be co-ordinated to provide for the event of war.
These two axioms imply the need to set up two kinds of organisation.
The first would have the task of carrying out, in Europe, what the Americans
call 'crisis management' - no doubt in the form of a 'contingency planning
committee' intended to examine possible crises and their solutions. Such a
committee would certainly need to work for some considerable time before
it was able t o produce practical results. This is a further reason for not
postponing the formation of such a group, for it would have the advantage
of bringing about close co-operation among the major allies - including
Germany - on problems of immediate concern.
The second body would be charged with developing, within the Atlantic
framework, the necessary basis for the co-ordination of national nuclear
forces in time of war. Such studies would allow for the discussion of the
principles of nuclear strategy - something which has hitherto, to all intents
and purposes, been confined to a purely American framework. It seems that
the proposals lately put forward by Mr. McNamara in Paris amount to a
first step in this direction.
The main purpose of these two committees would be to produce a better
mutual understanding of the viewpoints of the different allies and thereby to
pave the way for the development of positive policies acceptable to all. At a
later stage, it would be possible to envisage the creation of a body designed
to improve the co-ordination of peacetime deterrent strategies and wartime
nuclear strategies. I do not propose to mention now any of the schemes
which could be put forward in present circumstances, because the strategic
position is constantly changing and no one can precisely foresee its shape by
the time such studies might have been completed.
It is on this note that I would like to conclude. The nuclear history of the
last 15 years has shown that the situation has constantly changed and that,
on each occasion, the changes have been far-reaching. As I have tried to
point out in this article, it is some time since we entered upon a new phase,
marked by an excess of stability at the nuclear threshold. We have not yet
taken sufficient account of the consequences of this changed situation in
our strategic nuclear ideas, for these are still based on the concept of deter-
rence although the use of nuclear weapons has become unthinkable. It is
therefore urgent that we should adapt ourselves to this new situation.
But, equally, this situation can itself change rapidly. Already, the Vietnam
crisis is leading to an important change of perspective towards Europe on
the part of the United States. Failing a relatively rapid compromise, these
developments can lead to an end of the essentially bipolar system which has
controlled world strategy since 1945. The consequences in Europe of such
The Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities 105
Note
I . I'.ir~s: Armand Colin. 1964. An English edition will he published in the ~ u t u m nby F,lher &
Faller.
Strategic Studies and Its Critics
Hedley Bull
conduct of strategic nuclear war the object of victory over the opponent has
in fact taken second place to that of our own survival. It has sometimes been
argued that the chief mission of United States strategic nuclear forces in the
event of general war is that of the limitation of damage suffered by the United
States and its allies - an object that is not relative to the amount of damage
suffered by the enemy, but absolute.
Second, strategic thinking is no longer the preserve of the military. The great
strategic writers of the past, like Liddell Hart, Fuller, and Mao Tse-tunb' in our
'
own time, were soldiers (or sailors or airmen) or ex-soldiers. They were often
quite bad soldiers; and they had qualities of mind that soldiers, good and bad,
do not often have. But underlying all their theorizing was the assunlption that
strategy was in some sense a practical business, that experience of the man-
agement of forces and weapons in war, even if it was not a sufficient condition
of strategic understanding, was at least a necessary one.
The military profession today is very far from having vacated the field of
strategy; in wide areas of strategic policy the chiefs of staff responsible to
governments remain the preponderant influence. But in the United States
and to a lesser extent elsewhere in the Western world, the civilian experts
have made great inroads. They have overwhelmed the military in the qual-
ity and quantity of their contributions to the literature of the subiect; no one
would now think of turning to the writings of retired officers rather than to
the standard academic treatments of deterrence, limited war, or arms control
for illumination of the problems of the nuclear age. They increasingly dom-
inate the field of education and instruction in the subject - the academic and
quasi-academic centers of strategic studies have displaced the staff colleges
and war colleges, except in narrow fields of professional knowledge. And,
most prominently in the United States, the civilian strategists have entered
the citadels of power and have prevailed over military advisers o n major
issues of policy.
A third peculiarity of strategic thinking at the present time is its abstract
and speculative character. There has not yet been a nuclear war, and the pos-
sibility that there will be one has not yet existed long enough for it to have
become clear how the structure of international life will be affected. Anyone
who has embarked upon a discussion of what the conditions are under which
one country can deter another from doing something, of whether or not
limitations are possible in nuclear war, of whether the nuclear stalemate
makes conflict at lower levels more likely or less, or of whether one country
can credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons on behalf of another must have
experienced the sense of being at sea in an argument i11 which, it seems,
almost any position can be plausibly defended and almost none is safe from
attack.
Strategic thinking, of course, has always been speculative. It has always
had to deal with the future, and it has always involved the making of plans,
the fulfilment of which depends on decisions taken by the opponent as well
as o n those we take ourselves. And the conditions of war and crisis under
which these decisions have to be made make them peculiarly difficult to
108 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
simple solutions of one kind or another. Most basically, perhaps, the position
of the professional strategist is and will remain controversial because the
legitimacy of the question he sets himself - What shall the state do with its
military force? - is itself controversial. While there continues to be disagree-
ment in modern society as to whether or not the state should ever use mili-
tary force or possess it at all, there will not be general agreement ahout the
worth and utility of students of strategy, in the way in which there is now
(although there has not always been) about that of students of medicine,
architecture, or economics.
To show that the motives that underlie criticism of the strategist are some-
times discreditable is not, of course, to say that it is only from these sources
that criticism arises, still less to provide a rebuttal of the criticisms themselves.
Many of the criticisms are worth sympathetic consideration. In my view they
do not constitute, either singly or collectively, a valid indictment of the work
of the civilian strategists. But we should be grateful that they have been made,
for they do draw attention to some false paths along which strategists might
stray and sometimes have strayed. Here 1 shall consider five of the charges.
The first and most common complaint is that the strategists leave morality
out of account. Strategists are often said to be technicians and calculators who
are indifferent as to the moral standing of the causes for which war is under-
taken or of the means by which it is carried on.
There is a sense in which strategic thinking does and should leave morai-
it): out of account. Strategy is about the relationship between means and
ends, and an exercise in "pure" strategy will exclude consideration of the
moral nature of the means and the ends, just as it will exclude anything else
that is extraneous. If what is being said is that strategic judgments should
be colored by moral considerations or that strategic inquiry should be
restricted by moral taboos, this is something that the strategist is bound to
reject. If what the critics of Herman Kahn have in mind is that he should
not have thought about the unthinkable or that he should have thought
about it with his heart instead of his head, then they are obstructing him in
his essential task.
What can be said, however, is that while strategy is one thing and morals
are another, the decisions that governments take in the field of military policy
should not be based on considerations of strategy alone. If the charge against
the strategists is that their advice to governments is drawn up in purely strate-
gic terms, as if strategic imperatives were categorical imperatives, or that they
themselves have no other dimension in their thinking than the calculation of
means and ends, then this is a serious and legitimate complaint.
But so far as one can judge, such a charge is not true of any of the strate-
gists. It is easy to see that their works, dealing as they d o with strategy and
not with other subjects, might give the impression that decisions should be
determined by the logic of this subject alone, but there is no reason to
believe that this impression is correct. Strategists as a class, it seems to me,
are neither any less nor any more sensitive to moral considerations than are
other intelligent and educated persons in the West.
1 10 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Why, then, is the charge so frequently made? Can all the critics be
wrong? Surely as between Herman Kahn and his critic James Newman, as
between Irving Horowitz and those he calls "the new civilian militarists,"
or as between Anatol Rapoport and the various unnamed strategists who
are his targets there is some sort of moral disagreement. I believe that there
is, but that what is at issue is not whether or not moral questions should
be asked before decisions are taken but what the answers to the moral
questions are.
In almost any disagreement as to whether or not to resort to war or to
threaten it, or as to how a war should be conducted or what risks in it should
be run, there are moral arguments to be advanced on both sides. What the
critics take t o be the strategists' insensitivity to moral considerations is in
most cases the strategists' greater sense of the moral stature of American
and Western political objectives for which war and the risk of war must be
undertaken. The notion that virtue in international conduct lies simply in
avoiding risk of war and never in assuming it, always in self-abnegation and
never in self-assertion, only in obeying the rules a world community might
legislate if it existed and never in pursuing the different moral guides that
are appropriate in a situation in which it does not - such a notion is of
course untenable. But it forms part of the perspective of many of the critics.
What chiefly characterizes the so-called idealist school to which they belong
is not (as is often said) that it exaggerates the force of moral considerations,
still less that it alone is endowed with moral vision, but that it fails to
appreciate the full range of the moral argument, that it embraces what
Treitschke called "the monkish type of virtue" without being able to see
that there is any other.
There is, I think, a related moral disagreement between the strategists and
their critics, which concerns the role of the strategist as an adviser to govern-
ments. It is said that there is something unbecoming to an intellectual - or at
all events to a university man, with his allegiance to the universal republic of
science - in bestowing the fruits of his strategic advice upon any particular
government. Since governments use this advice to further their conflicts with
one another, the strategic adviser is in a different position from the scholar or
scientist who gives advice about the economy or health or education, since in
these fields the interests of one nation may be advanced without injuring
those of others. The scholar may legitimately ~ r o f f e radvice, if he has any,
about the conditions of peace, so the argument goes, but he is disloyal to his
calling if he provides advice about war.3
Some of this criticism may be met readily enough. One may point out
that the strategic interests of nations are not wholly exclusive of one
another and that contemporary strategists have been inclined to draw atten-
tion to the common interests that nations have in avoiding nuclear war and
in limiting it if it occurs. One may say that one of their contributions has
been the systematic study of arms control, which may be defined as co-
operation among antagonistic states in advancing their perceived common
interests in military policy. Arms-control policy is, I should say, subsumed
t:tiIi Strategic Studies and Its Critics III
under strategy as a special case. It may also be pointed out that it is facile
to regard war and peace as alternative objects of policy, as if peace did not
need to be enforced or war were not an outgrowth of diplomacy.
Yet it remains true that the strategic adviser does assist the government
he serves to advance its objectives at the expense of those of other govern-
ments. But whether or not there is anything in the position of such an
adviser unbecoming to a scholar or a scientist will depend on what we take
the moral nature of that government
- and its objectives to be. Few of the
critics would, 1 think, argue that the scientists who assisted the British and
American governments during the Second World War, and whose position
the contemporary strategists have inherited, were acting in an improper
way. Not everyone will agree that the position is the same now; but at least
it is not possible to maintain that there is any general incompatibility
between assisting a state to augment its relative military position and
remaining faithful to scholarly or scientific values.
The second criticism that I wish to discuss is that strategists take for
granted the existence of military force and confine themselves to considering
how to exploit it, thereby excluding a whole range of policies such as
disarmament or nonviolent resistance that are intended to abolish military
force or to provide substitutes for it.
It is true that strategists take the fact of military force as their starting
point. The question is whether any other starting point is possible at all,
whether the doctrine of disarmament that is implicit in this complaint is not
inherently untenable. The capacity for organized violence between states is
inherent in the nature of man and his environment. The most that can be
expected from a total disarmament agreement is that it might make arma-
ments and armed forces fewer and more primitive.
If what is meant by "total disarmament" is a state of affairs in which war
is physically impossible, in which states cannot wage war even when they
want to (this is what Litvinov meant when he first put forward the proposal
in 1927), then we must say that such a state of affairs cannot be. If, on the
other hand, what is meant is a situation in which military force has been
reduced to very low qualitative and quantitative levels, then this is some-
thing that can in principle occur and may well seem worth trying to bring
about. But the view that security against war is best provided by a low level
of armaments rather than a high one is a particular strategic theory; the
arguments for it and against it belong to the same mode of discourse as that
we apply in evaluating any other proposition about the relationship between
military force and possible ends of policy.
Either, then, the second criticism is a nonsense or it represents an attempt
to contribute to strategic reasoning, not a statement about it from outside.
In fact, it would seem to me, proposals for radical disarmament and
for nonviolent resistance have received a fair hearing within the Western
community of strategists. No doubt strategists are inclined to think too
readily in terms of military solutions to the problems of foreign policy
and to lose sight of the other instruments that are available. But this is the
1 12 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
occupational disease of any specialist, and the remedy for it lies in entering
into debate with the strategist and correcting his perspective.
The third criticism is that strategists are inclined to make unreal assump-
tions about international politics and that in comparing alternative strategies
and computing their costs and benefits they make assumptions that simplify
and distort political reality, that d o not allow for change, and that in the
course of the subsequent analysis become lost to sight.
This is a complaint that has a great deal of force. The technical rigor and
precision of much strategic analysis has been achieved at the cost of losing
touch with political variety and change. If the political terms in the strategists'
equations were more complex and were changed more frequently, the beauty
of much of the ratiocination would be destroyed.
Some of the now-classic analyses of America's problem in choosing her
weapons and military posture were founded upon the assumption that there
was only one significant relationship in nuclear international politics, that
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that this consisted only
of hostility. Not only, as it were, was the game two-person and zero-sum,
but the two persons were assumed to be identical twins, Country A and
Country B. Even when these analyses were first made they were a simplifi-
cation of reality, but with their survival into the age of the Soviet-American
dktente and of the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance and the Communist
bloc, they became dangerously unreal. The greatest absurdities of this sort
in recent times formed part of the debate that took place in the United
States during the Kennedy administration about the control of nuclear
weapons in NATO. The various solutions were set out in programmatic
form - a United States nuclear monopoly, national nuclear forces, a NATO
nuclear force, a European nuclear force - and their advantages and
disadvantages were spelled out on the basis that NATO was a single person
and that the sole requirement of that person was to deter attack by the
Soviet Union. Not all those who contributed to the debate, of course,
formulated the problem in this way, but many a weighty treatise appeared
that did so. General de Gaulle has now demonstrated what was perhaps all
along clear, that Paris and London are not Washington and that nuclear
forces have diplomatic functions as well as military ones; but it is extraor-
dinary for how long, under its own momentum, this strange logic persisted.
All that one can say in defense of the strategists against this charge is
that follies of this sort are not inherent in what they do, that technical pre-
cision must often be sacrificed so as to allow for political variety and
change, and that enough of the strategists are aware of this to ensure that
the corrections can come from inside the strategic community.
The fourth criticism is that the civilian strategists are pseudoscientific in
their methods, that specialist techniques they employ - such as game theory,
systems analysis, simulation, and the writing of scenarios - are bogus when
used to arrive a t strategic decisions and serve to give an air of expertise to
positions arbitrarily and subjectively arrived at. This is the theme of the
book Deadly Logic, by Philip Green, and it is also part of the meaning of
I Strategic Studies and Its Critics 1 13
the wrong-headed but subtle and powerful book Strategy and Conscience,
by Anatol Rapoport.
The crux of the matter is the attack on game theory, which more clearly
than any of the other techniques mentioned does represent an impressive
expertise. Rapoport presents some strong arguments against the application
of game theory to strategic decision-making. Exercises in game theory, he
says, deal in numerical probabilities, but these cannot be assigned to unique
events. Such exercises assume the unlimited ability of each party to think
and compute with no limit of time - which actual decision-makers cannot
do. The exercises assume that the goals of each party are single, simple, and
unchanging, whereas historical individuals and groups have objectives that
are plural, complex, and subject to constant revision. And so on.
This attack on the use of game theory is bewildering. As Donald Brennan
has pointed out in a review of Rapoport, the great majority of civilian strate-
gists do not use game theory and indeed would be at a loss to give any
account of i t . T h e r e are, certainly, a number of strategists, like Thomas
Schelling, who have mastered this technique, but in their work exercises in
game theory serve only to illustrate points that are independently arrived at;
they have not employed game theory in order to determine solutions
to strategic problems. As far as I know, the only person who has claimed
that game theory presents a method of solving strategic problems is Oskar
Morgenstern of Princeton University. Morgenstern collaborated with J o h n
von Neumann in producing Theory of Games and Economic Behavior and
has also written a book on strategy, The Question o f National Defense.' But
even in Morgenstern's book, which contains much rhetoric about the value
of game theory, it is not possible to find an instance in which he makes use
of it. I do not despair of finding an example of what Green and Rapoport
are talking about, but I must say 1 have not so far come across one. It may
be that although game theory is not an essential or even a significantly used
technique of the civilian strategists, some of the logic of game theory is
implicit in the way some strategists do their thinking, and a critique of the
former is a way of providing a critique of the latter.h The basic point of Philip
Green's book, that the technique and rigor that the civilian strategists have
brought to the subject do not provide a means of circumventing political
choices and that they can be and sometimes are employed as a political
weapon in support of one arbitrarily chosen policy or another, is undoubt-
edly correct. This, however, is an argument for recognizing the limits of rigor
and precision and for being on guard against their misuse, not for abandon-
ing rigor and precision in favor of something else.
Both in the domestic defense debates in Western countries today and in
international rivalries over arms control or the sharing of military burdens
within alliances, the strategist is constantly finding that his works are
pressed into the service of political objectives that are pursued on different
grounds. The army, the navy, the air force, each has its strategic ideology; the
United States, France, and Great Britain, in contending with one another as
to how nuclear weapons shall be controlled in NATO, as to where and in
114 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
that now exists have not been thought out. They have all been put forward in
relation to classical international conflict between states that are internally
stable and armed with the most advanced weapons, and they have not been
adapted to the different but now more prominent circumstances of civil con-
flicts within unstable states with primitive military equipment. Moreover, even
in the narrow field in which, quite rightly, the civilian strategists have concen-
trated their efforts, their most fundamental assumptions are open to challenge,
as the debate about ballistic missile defense is now showing.
Yet the work of the civilian strategists has at least charted some reasoned
course where otherwise there might well have been only drift. It has pro-
vided some solid intellectual fare that subsequent generations, even though
they reject it, are at least likely to recognize as a serious attempt to come to
grips with the problem. When one asks oneself what the history of strate-
gic policy in the West might have been in the last ten years had this influ-
ence not been brought to bear, or when one contemplates the moral and
intellectual poverty of the debate about nuclear affairs (or of that part of it
we are able to see) in the Soviet Union where in fact no such influence
exists, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that even though the civilian
strategists have sometimes committed the errors I have been exploring, they
have served us well.
Notes
By "our present theory and practice" I mean the body of theoretical writings
about arms control that arose in the West in the late 1950s and early 1960s
and the body of unilateral policies, tacit understandings and formal agree-
ments, chiefly involving the United States and the Soviet Union, that have
grown LIPabout arms control since that time. What we should notice about
this theory and practice is the extent to which it assumes or implies that
world order can and should be founded upon the present political structure
of the world and the existing distribution of power within it.
First, there is the definition of arms control itself: "Arms control in its
broadest sense comprises all those acts of military policy in which antag-
onistic states cooperate in the pursuit of common purposes even while they
are struggling in the pursuit of conflicting ones."' When two antagonistic
states pursue common purposes in their military policy - as the United States
and the Soviet Union have sometimes done - these purposes may be univer-
sal ones, accepted as valid by international society as a whole, but they may
also be purely bilateral ones, the special purposes of the cooperating powers
themselves. "If two states," I wrote in 1964, "were to achieve their common
goals in this field by bringing about the ruin of other nations there would
seem no reason to deny that what they were engaged in was arms control,
except for the common but quite unnecessary assumption that arms control
has about it an aura of spiritual rectitude, instead of being a temporal
process like any otheran2
Our present definition of arms control does not in itself entail any bias
either for or against the present political structure of the world. But there is
a tendency in present-day thinking to regard cooperation between the
United States and the Soviet Union as the chief embodiment of arms control,
to see in the field of relations between these two powers both the principal
dangers with which arms control has to contend and the principal means of
coping with them. While (as I shall argue) Soviet-American cooperation in
arms control serves universal purposes it inevitably serves special or bilateral
purposes also. These special or bilateral purposes reflect the preference of
the two great powers for a world order in which they continue to enjoy a
privileged position.
Secondly, there are the objectives proclaimed for arms control. These are
taken to be ~ r i m a r i concerned
l~ with security: to make war, and especially
nuclear war, less likely, and to make it less catastrophic in terms of death
and destruction, if it should occur. A secondary objective is taken to be to
reduce the economic costs of military programs. A tertiary objective has
sometimes been added: the moral and social one of combating "the milita-
rization of society.""
N o doubt these objectives command a wide degree of support in inter-
national society, but the concrete meaning they have acquired serves to
rationalize the existing distribution of power. The list of objectives does not
include goals such as the promotion of just international and internal change,
which in the view of a large section of international society requires an assault
on the prevailing distribution of power, and should be pursued even at the
price of reduced security, an increased economic burden of armaments and a
greater "militarization of society." There is a tendency to confuse the national
security of the United States and the Soviet Union with international security,
the security of international society as a whole; it is the latter objective, not
the former, that should be the cardinal one in assessing arms control p o l i ~ i e s . ~
In some respects Soviet-American cooperation in arms control promotes the
national security of the United States and the Soviet Union at the expense of
the security of other states: it results, for example, in understandings about
Birll Arms Control a n d World Order 1 19
spheres of influence within which local states are left vulnerable to coercion
by one or the other of the great powers, in the redirection of conflict between
the great powers to "gray areas" in which wars are fought "by proxy," and
in attempts to deny third parties arms which they regard as necessary for their
security. Where Soviet-American cooperation evidently promotes inter-
national security and not merely the national security of the great powers -
for example, contributing to the avoidance of global nuclear war - it does so
in ways that leave the existing political structure of the world intact.
Thirdly, there is the notion that the chief proximate goal of arms control
is to stabilize the relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence between the
United States and the Soviet Union. This is a notion that is basic to most con-
temporary thinking about arms control, whether we envisage the stabilization
of mutual nuclear deterrence as achieved through "high" Soviet and United
States arms levels or "low," as implying acceptance of "mutual assured
destruction" or not implying it, as accompanied by "parity" or by some form
of "superiority" for one side, as bound up with some political program for
the promotion of "detente" or as independent of it, as a "first step" towards
nuclear disarmament or as a goal sufficient in itself. Whatever the merits or
demerits of this goal might be, we should recognize that the attempt to stabil-
ize the relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States
and the Soviet Union, while it is logically consistent with a variety of patterns
of power international politics, confines our attention to measures which
allow the two superpowers to retain arms levels sufficient for mutual nuclear
deterrence, and excludes measures (such as nuclear disarmament, or general
and complete disarmament) which carry the risk of radical change in the dis-
tribution of power as between the superpowers and the rest. Moreover, in
practice Soviet-American cooperation in this field has been accompanied by
the attempt to legitimize very high ceilings of strategic arms, by political
cooperation directed against third parties and by enunciation of a principle of
parity whose effect is to formalize the claims of these two states to a special
position in the hierarchy of military power.
Fourthly, there is the idea that it should he a proximate goal of arms con-
trol to stop or to contain the ,geographical or horizontal diffusion of military
power. This is an idea whose most notable expression is the attempt to com-
bat nuclear proliferation, but it may be seen also in the concern that has been
expressed about the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and of
conventional arms, especially through the arms trade. Whatever validity
there may be in the argument that international security is endangered by the
spread of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons and conven-
tional arms among a wider circle of states, it is an argument which serves to
rationalize the existing distribution of power. When we decide that it is the
horizontal spread of nuclear weapons rather than their vertical spread that
calls for urgent preventative action, that biological weapons should he fore-
gone by the rich powers because they are "the poor man's atom bomb," or
that there should be measures to stop poor countries from buying conven-
tional arms from rich countries, but not measures to stop rich countries from
120 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
producing these arms for themselves, we are choosing arms control arrange-
ments which leave those countries which now possess preponderant military
power secure in the enjoyment of their position.
Fifthly, there is the idea that the United States and the Soviet Union, so
as to minimize the risk of general nuclear war, should observe a series of
tacit rules for the avoidance and control of crises arising out of their con-
flicting objectives in many parts of the world. This is the idea that lies
behind the attempts of the two great powers to restrain allies and clients
that might embroil them on opposite sides in local conflicts, to disengage
from such allies and clients in cases where they cannot be adequately
restrained, to demarcate spheres of influence in which each can intervene
without fear of counter-intervention by the other. Whatever merits we may
find in this idea, we should recognize that what it implies in practice is
the maintenance of a political structure in which the two great powers
cooperate to frustrate the objectives of others: of allied states which seek
to divest themselves of great power restraints, of client states which seek to
engage great power support for their private goals, of fettered states which
seek t o break free of the spheres of influence to which they have been
assigned, and of aspirant great powers which seek to stake out new spheres
of influence of their own.
In the Western countries at present there is some disposition to question
established theories and policies about arms control. Thus there has been
much discussion of the relationship between SALT and political detente, of
the feasibility of establishing Soviet-American strategic parity by agreement,
of the implications of studies of "bureaucratic politics" for the theory of
arms races, of the bearing on arms control of the cruise missile, and of the
relative merits of negotiation and unilateral action as means of advancing
the objectives of arms control."ut there has been little discussion of the
question whether the assumptions about world order that are so central to
our present approach to arms control, and are so decisively rejected by
China and the aspirant powers of the third world, are valid."
If our present theory and practice of arms control proceed on the assumption
that world order can and should be founded on the present political structure
of the world and distribution of power within it we should not leap to the
conclusion that it is an undefendable assumption. Our present theory and
practice have arisen in response to the perception of overwhelming dangers
of nuclear war between the two great powers, and of a need to curb these
dangers as a matter of urgent priority. Those who tell us that some different
order of priorities should have been followed must ask themselves whether
an approach to world order which did not begin with the attempt to find
common ground between the two powers with the capacity to destroy the
world as we know it was ever a possible or an honorable one.
titiil Arms Control and World Order 12 1
If the search for common ground between the United States and the Soviet
Union has resulted in arrangements which confirm their privileged position
in the hierarchy of power we may also point out that the dangers of nuclear
war between them threaten not only the two great powers but international
society as a whole; that these arrangements have in fact served to reduce the
dangers, however inadequately and imperfectly; and that it is not immedi-
ately obvious how the United States and the Soviet Union could have drawn
together in arms control arrangements without also involving themselves in
political cooperation against third parties. If the international order con-
firmed by our present arms control arrangements is one in which certain
powers claim special privileges and responsibilities the question may be asked
whether any international order has ever existed in which this was not so;
and whether, if the United States and the Soviet Union were to forego their
claims to a special position so as to make room for others, there is any rea-
son to suppose that these others would be more willing or able to take on the
responsibilities of such a privileged position than they have been in the past.
But the vision of world order that is projected by our present arms con-
trol arrangements is one against which the majority of states are in revolt.
It is true that among countries such as China, India, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt,
Libya, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, one finds different degrees
of opposition to these arrangements, deep mutual divisions without any
agreement about an alternative conception of world order. However, they
all see the emphasis on Soviet-American bilateral goals - in arms control, in
the treatment of security as the commanding value, in the preoccupation
with stabilization of the great power balance, in the efforts to control pro-
liferation, and in the network of tacit understandings between the great
powers - as part of a system of hegemony which they wish to break down
in spite of the fact they have nothing in mind with which to replace it.
It is sometimes argued that the dissent of China and the third world
states from the existing international order need not be fatal to it; that these
states are too weak and divided among themselves to provide any serious
challenge; that particular recalcitrant powers among them c a n be bought
off with favors conferred by one or another of the great powers or their
allies - as even India's opposition to the existing order has been moderated
by its dependence on the Soviet Union, and China's by its sense of strategic
interests shared with the United States. But the shift in the distribution of
power toward the countries of the third world has already begun, and its
impact has already been dramatic. China is a nuclear power, India has con-
ducted a nuclear explosion and half a dozen more third world states have
the potential to develop a nuclear capability. The oil-producing countries
have not only brought about a shift of wealth in their favor and a global
realignment on the Arab-Israeli dispute; more importantly, perhaps, they
have demonstrated by their example what dividends are to be reaped by
overcoming internecine disputes in the interests of a united front, and by
abandoning a position of conciliation for one of confrontation. At the present
time the levers of power available even to the strongest of third world countries
122 T h e Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
are only such as are conferred by rudimentary military power, the prestige
of numbers, the possession of raw materials which others need, and the
appeal of ideology. In the long run we must expect that some of them will
also have a t their disposal the levers conferred by advanced technology and
high industrial capacity, which will not remain permanently the monopoly
of the so-called northern countries.
The idea of the disunity of the third world, that "there is no such thing
as the third world," overlooks the fact that on certain basic issues this ram-
shackle coalition of states has held together to a remarkable degree, and
that in the last 30 years (as relating to the legitimacy of colonialist and
white supremacist governments, the legality of "wars of national libera-
tion," the duty to transfer wealth from rich countries to poor, the right to
expropriate foreign assets, the law of the sea) it has drastically changed the
prevailing norms in international society. In much of this endeavor the third
world countries have been powerfully supported by the Soviet Union. This
should remind us that the Soviet Union's own commitment to the existing-
international order is a half-hearted and perhaps merely tactical one; that
the Soviet Union, while on some issues (nuclear proliferation, the law of the
sea) it stands arrayed with the "North" against the "South", on others ("wars
of national liberation" against colonialist and white supremacist govern-
ments) it is the ally of the third world against the Western powers.
The conception of world order implicit in our present approach to arms
control is based too narrowly upon the elements of consensus between the
United States and the Soviet Union and their allies. At the same time this con-
ception of world order embodies too narrow a range of goals: it treats the
security of the two great powers as prior to that of international society as a
whole, and it fails to recognize goals of just international and internal change.
What conception of world order, then, should we put in its place? Not,
I think, one which proclaims that a viable world order can be constructed
only if we move "beyond the states system." There is no convincing evi-
dence that the system of states is in decline and about to give place to some
different form of universal political organization; nor, I believe, should we
be impressed by the argument that the states system has become "obsolete"
in the sense of being dysfunctional in relation to basic goals such as peace
and security, eocnomic and social justice and the control of the human envir-
onment. It is only in the Western world that the cry is heard that we should
transcend the states system; the socialist and third world countries clearly
seek to work within its framework. The problem of world order is not that
of how to move beyond the states system, but that of how to make it work.'
Making the states system work must involve the attempt to preserve and
ultimately t o extend the element of consensus among states about common
interests, common rules and common institutions - the consensus whose
existence in the past has entitled us to say that states form not only an inter-
national system but also an international society. It is sometimes argued that
as a consequence of the technological unification of the world, or the growth
of economic "interdependence" or the multiplication of transnational social
KIIII Arms Control and World Order 123
ties consensus in our times has been growing. Thus international lawyers tell
us with satisfaction that it is now widely agreed that rights and duties in
international law are enjoyed not only by states but by individual human
beings, that the scope of international law has widened beyond a rudimen-
tary "international law of coexistence" to become an "international law of
cooperation," and that the source of international law is no longer the con-
sent of states but the consensus or general will of the international commu-
nity as a whole. But there are strong grounds for thinking that at the global
or universal level consensus about the basic framework of orderly inter-
national coexistence has not been growing but shrinking - as the consequence
of ideological divisions, the revolt of subject peoples and the geographical
expansion of the states system beyond its originally European confines.
Making the states system work is a matter of preserving and nurturing what
remains of a rudimentary consensus about "minimum order," not of advan-
cing towards some "optimum order" about which, at the global level, no
consensus exists o r is in prospect.
The consensus which has to be nurtured is not one simply between the
United States and the Soviet Union, or these two plus China, or a wider
consort that would include Japan and Western Europe if and when they
demonstrate that they are great powers. N o consensus is likely to be ade-
quate for a viable states system that does not embrace the countries which
now form the third world. These countries represent a majority of states
and of the world's population and are too large and potentially powerful a
segment of international society to be assigned the status merely of an
object or series of objects of its governing rules.
It follows from this that our conception of world order should not be
shaped by prescriptions for a more centralized system, expressed in an
expanding United Nations or upon "non-territorial centralized direction.""
The third world countries are opposed to centralizing tendencies in world
politics, perceiving correctly that if more powerful centralized institutions
were to be established now, they would rob ably be controlled by the pre-
sent great powers and would reflect their special interests. It is more likely
that world order will continue to rest upon a decentralized system, and that
if a greater role is to be played by international institutions these will be
regional rather than global ones. The question of the establishment of more
powerful institutions at the global level remains, as it were, on the agenda
of world politics: but it is not likely to be discussed seriously by the third
world or indeed by the socialist states until there has first been a shift of
power in their favor.
Whatever notions we entertain about a desirable and feasible world
order, they have to take account the third world's alienation from the
arrangements for world order that exist now. This alienation is rooted not
merely in grievances about colonialism or racism or the distribution of wealth,
consumer goods or technology: it is rooted also in the third world's lack of
power, including military power - its sense of impotence and vulnerability in
relation to the Western countries and the Soviet Union. It may be one of the
124 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
conditions of a more viable world order that the shift of power towards the
third world, whose beginnings we noted above, should first be expanded.
It is true that the third world countries at present are preoccupied not with
order but with change; that as they become more powerful they are likely to
create disorder in the course of bringing this change about; and the present
frame work of world order, reflecting as it does the preferred values of the
West and of the Soviet Union, will not be strengthened but is bound to be
weakened by a shift in the distribution of military power towards the third
world countries. But the objection of the third world countries is not to the
quality of order in the present international arrangements; it is rather to the
way in which these arrangements discriminate against them. Once the changes
they are seeking have been effected, and new arrangements have replaced the
old ones, it is possible that they will come to sense a stake in them.
The task of carrying out this redistribution of power must fall to the
third world countries themselves: it is too much to expect that the great
powers and their allies will be willing to carry out this task for them, or
even that they could if they wished to d o so. It is for the third world coun-
tries t o mobilize their resources, to combine with one another and to chal-
lenge the elements of discrimination in the present system. But the Western
powers and the Soviet Union should recognize that such a challenge is nat-
ural and inevitable. They should also recognize that while some of the pre-
sent perceived interests will be injured in the process, they themselves have
a stake in the emergence of a world order of which the majority of states
and of the world's population feel themselves to be a part.
There are difficulties and risks in this approach. It is true that as the major
countries of the third world acquire more military power they are likely to
seek to exploit it in relation to one another and not merely in relation to the
present great powers. It is true that there is no agreement among the third
world states as to which of them are to be the beneficiaries of the process of
redistribution. It is true that world order requires that we attempt to limit and
contain military power; the creation of new centers of military power is bound
to make that attempt more difficult.
C o n s e q u e n c e s f o r A r m s Control
I should not argue that our approach to arms control should be determined
in detail by some precise vision of a desirable or feasible world order. To do
this would be to treat visions of world order more seriously than they deserve;
we cannot be sure enough about the desirability or feasibility of any one of
them to regard it as the legislator of policy here and now. It does appear to
me, however, that we should try to sever the close connection which now
exists between the theory and practice of arms control and attempts to pre-
serve the existing distribution of power. Not only does this connection make
arms control an obstacle to changes' which may be necessary if a more viable
world order is to be evolved, but it also serves to discredit arms control, and
I Arms Control and World Order 125
to obscure the role which it has to play in promoting the purposes of those
seeking to challenge the present distribution of power.
First, we should maintain that the cooperation involved in arms control
should promote universal purposes and not merely bilateral ones. Cooper-
zation that promotes special or bilateral purposes may count as arms con-
trol, but we should be clear that the proper purpose of arms control is to
advance objectives endorsed by international society as a whole. In the case
of United States-Soviet cooperation we should distinguish between the pur-
pose of avoiding nuclear war, which is generally endorsed, and the purpose
of preserving United States and Soviet ascendancy, which is not. The meas-
ures that lead to the one are not always easily distinguishable from those
that lead to the other, and it would be naive to suppose that the two great
powers could pursue the former while wholly abstaining from the latter. But
at least we can distinguish these purposes in our minds, and consider how
far in practice the political structure of American and Soviet ascendancy is
essential to the political structure of peace.
Secondly, while recognizing that security against war, and especially
nuclear war, is the prime goal of arms control, we should distinguish
between the national security of the United States and the Soviet Union, and
the security of international society as a whole; and we should insist that it
is the latter that is the overriding test. It is clear that the national security of
the two great powers is served by arrangements, like the tacit understanding
about spheres of influence, that has left Eastern Europe and Central America
vulnerable to great power intervention; by the export of conflicts to
Southeast Asia or the Persian Gulf or Africa; or by their opposition to
nuclear proliferation in China and India and elsewhere. But it is also clear
that these arrangements do not promote the national security of the other
countries concerned. Whether the security of international society as a whole
is more helped than hindered by these arrangements is a moot point. But
even if we were to conclude that it is more helped than hindered by them we
should still need to distinguish between the security of international society
as a whole and that of its two most powerful members, and we should still
need to insist that there may be other avenues to the former besides those
that have been ordained by the United States and the Soviet Union.
At the same time we should take account of the fact that the goal
of security comes into conflict with that of the promotion of international
and internal change very widely regarded as just. I d o not mean that arms
control arrangements should be designed so as to promote black liberation
in southern Africa, or revolution in Chile or the establishment of a state of
Palestine. It is better to recognize that arms control is concerned chiefly
with only one dimension of world order, viz. peace and security, and more
particularly with its military aspects, than to saddle it with responsibility
for every dimension. But we need to be aware, in pursuing arms control, of
the existence of other dimensions of world order, and particularly of the
role of military force in effecting changes that express emerging principles
of international legitimacy.
126 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Notes
1. Hedley Bull, "Introduction t o the Second Edition," The Control of the Arms Race
( N e w York: Praeger, 1965), p. xiv.
2. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, p. xxxv.
ic I Arms Control and World Order 1 29
could permit cooperation. But the main point remains: although actors may
know that they seek a common goal, they may not be able to reach it.
Even when there is a solution that is everyone's first choice, the inter-
national case is characterized by three difficulties not present in the Stag
Hunt. First, to the incentives to defect given above must be added the potent
fear that even if the other state now supports the staus quo, it may become
dissatisfied later. N o matter how much decision makers are committed to
the status quo, they cannot bind themselves and their successors to the same
path. Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can
shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise.
The second problem arises from a possible solution. In order to protect
their possessions, states often seek to control resources or land outside their
own territory. Countries that are not self-sufficient must try to assure that
the necessary supplies will continue to flow in wartime. This was part of the
explanation for Japan's drive into China and Southeast Asia before World
War 11. If there were an international authority that could guarantee access,
this motive for control would disappear. But since there is not, even a state that
would prefer the status quo to increasing its area of control may pursue the
latter policy.
When there are believed to be tight linkages between domestic and for-
eign policy or between the domestic politics of two states, the quest for
security may drive states to interfere pre-emptively in the domestic politics
of others in order to provide an ideological buffer zone. Thus, Metternich's
justification for supervising the politics of the Italian states has been sum-
marized as follows:
Every state is absolutely sovereign in its internal affairs. But this implies
that every state must d o nothing to interfere in the internal affairs of any
other. However, any false or pernicious step taken by any state in its
internal affairs may disturb the repose of another state, and this conse-
quent disturbance of another state's repose constitutes an interference in
that state's internal affairs. Therefore, every state - or rather, every sov-
ereign of 3 great power - has the duty, in the name of the sacred right of
independence of every state, to supervise the governments of smaller
states and to prevent them from taking false and pernicious steps in their
internal affairs."
have got to guard, which is supposed to protect the gateways of India. Those
gateways are getting further and further away from India, and I do not know
how far west they are going to be brought by the General Staff.""
Though this process is most clearly visible when it involves territorial
expansion, it often operates with the increase of less tangible power and influ-
ence. The expansion of power usually brings with it an expansion of respon-
sibilities and commitments; to meet them, still greater power is required. The
state will take many positions that are subject to challenge. It will be involved
with a wide range of controversial issues unrelated to its core values. And
retreats that would be seen as normal if made by a small power would be
taken as an index of weakness inviting predation if made by a large one.
The third problem present in international politics but not in the Stag
Hunt is the security dilemma: many of the means by which a state tries to
increase its security decrease the security of others. In domestic society, there
are several ways to increase the safety of one's person and property without
endangering others. One can move to a safer neighborhood, put bars on the
windows, avoid dark streets, and keep a distance from suspicious-looking
characters. Of course these measures are not convenient, cheap, or certain of
success. But no one save criminals need be alarmed if a person takes them.
In international politics, however, one state's gain in security often inadvert-
ently threatens others. In explaining British policy on naval disarmament in
the interwar period to the Japanese, Ramsey MacDonald said that "Nobody
wanted Japan to be i n ~ e c u r e . "But
~ the problem was not with British desires,
but with the consequences of her policy. In earlier periods, too, Britain had
needed a navy large enough to keep the shipping lanes open. But such a navy
could not avoid being a menace to any other state with a coast that could be
raided, trade that could be interdicted, or colonies that could be isolated.
When Germany started building a powerful navy before World War I,
Britain objected that it could only be an offensive weapon aimed at her. As
Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, put it to King Edward VII: "If the
German Fleet ever becomes superior to ours, the German Army can conquer
this country. There is no corresponding risk of this kind to Germany;
for however superior our Fleet was, no naval victory could bring us any
nearer to Berlin." The English position was half correct: Germany's
navy was an anti-British instrument. But the British often overlooked what
the Germans knew full well: "in every quarrel with England, German
colonies and trade were ... hostages for England to take." Thus, whether she
intended it or not, the British Navy constituted an important instrument of
coer~ion.~
Given this gloomy picture, the obvious question is, why are we not all
dead? Or, to put it less starkly, what kinds of variables ameliorate the
impact of anarchy and the security dilemma? The workings of several can
It 1 c Security Dilemma 133
1 COOPERATE
3
4
DEFECT
R
The fear of being exploited (that is, the cost of CD) most strongly drives the
security dilemma; one of the main reasons why international life is not more
nasty, brutish, and short is that states are not as vulnerable as men are in a
state of nature. People are easy to kill, but as Adam Smith replied to a friend
who feared that the Napoleonic Wars would ruin England, "Sir, there is a
great deal of ruin in a nation.""he easier it is to destroy a state, the greater
the reason for it either to join a larger and more secure unit, or else to be
especially suspicious of others, to require a large army, and, if conditions
arc favorable, to attack at the slightest provocation rather than wait to be
134 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
attacked. If the failure t o eat that day - be it venison or rabbit - means that
he will starve, a person is likely to defect in the Stag Hunt even if he really
likes venison and has a high level of trust in his colleagues. (Defection is
especially likely if the others are also starving or if they know that he is.) By
contrast, if the costs of CD are lower, if people are well-fed or states are
resilient, they can afford to take a more relaxed view of threats.
A relatively low cost of CD has the effect of transforming the game from
one in which both players make their choices simultaneously to one in which
an actor can make his choice after the other has moved. He will not have to
defect out of fear that the other will, but can wait to see what the other will
do. States that can afford to be cheated in a bargain or that cannot be
destroyed by a surprise attack can more easily trust others and need not act at
the first, and ambiguous, sign of menace. Because they have a margin of time
and error, they need not match, or more than match, any others' arms in
peacetime. They can mobilize in the prewar period or even at the start of the
war itself, and still survive. For example, those who opposed a crash program
to develop the H-bomb felt that the U.S. margin of safety was large enough so
that even if Russia managed to gain a lead in the race, America would not be
endangered. The program's advocates disagreed: "If we let the Russians get
the super first, catastrophe becomes all but certain."'
When the costs of CD are tolerable, not only is security easier to attain
but, what is even more imporant here, the relatively low level of arms and
relatively passive foreign policy that a status-quo power will be able to
adopt are less likely to threaten others. Thus it is easier for status-quo states
to act on their common interests if they are hard to conquer. All other
things being equal, a world of small states will feel the effects of anarchy
much more than a world of large ones. Defensible borders, large size, and
protection against sudden attack not only aid the state, but facilitate coop-
eration that can benefit all states.
Of course, if one state gains invulnerability by being more powerful than
most others, the ~ r o b l e mwill remain because its security provides a base
from which it can exploit others. When the price a state will pay for DD is
low, it leaves others with few hostages for its good behavior. Others who are
more vulnerable will grow apprehensive, which will lead them to acquire
more arms and will reduce the chances of cooperation. The best situation is
one in which a state will not suffer greatly if others exploit it, for example,
by cheating on an arms control agreement (that is, the costs of CD are low);
but it will pay a high long-run price if cooperation with the others breaks
down - for example, if agreements cease functioning or if there is a long war
(that is, the costs of DD are high). The state's invulnerability is then mostly
passive; it provides some protection, but it cannot be used to menace others.
As we will discuss below, this situation is approximated when it is easier for
states to defend themselves than to attack others, or when mutual deterrence
obtains because neither side can protect itself.
The differences between highly vulnerable and less vulnerable states
are illustrated by the contrasting policies of Britain and Austria after the
l e r ~ ~Security
s Dilemma 135
prohibitively high cost in CD), the more they are likely to be sensitive to
even minimal threats, and to demand high levels of arms. And if arms are
positively valued because of pressures from a military-industrial complex, it
will be especially hard for status-quo powers to cooperate. By contrast, the
security dilemma will not operate as strongly when pressing domestic con-
cerns increase the opportunity costs of armaments. In this case, the net
advantage of exploiting the other (DC) will be less, and the costs of arms
races (that is, one aspect of DD) will be greater; therefore the state will
behave as though it were relatively invulnerable.
The second aspect of subjective security is the perception of threat (that
is, the estimate of whether the other will cooperate)." A state that is predis-
posed to see either a specific other state as an adversary, or others in general
as a menace, will react more strongly and more quickly than a state that sees
its environment as benign. Indeed, when a state believes that another not
only is not likely to be an adversary, but has sufficient interests in common
with it to be an ally, then it will actually welcome an increase in the other's
power.
British and French foreign policies in the interwar years illustrate these
points. After the rise of Hitler, Britain and France felt that increases in each
other's arms increased rather than decreased their own security. The differing
policies that these states followed toward Germany can be explained by their
differences on both dimensions of the variable of subjective security."
Throughout the period, France perceived Germany as more of a threat than
England did. The British were more optimistic and argued that conciliation
could turn Germany into a supporter of the status quo. Furthermore, in the
years immediately following World War I, France had been more willing to
forego other values in order to increase her security and had therefore fol-
lowed a more belligerent policy than England, maintaining a larger army and
moving quickly to counter German assertiveness. As this example shows, one
cannot easily say how much subjective security a state should seek. High
security requirements make it very difficult to capitalize on a common inter-
est and run the danger of setting off spirals of arms races and hostility. The
French may have paid this price in the 1920's. Low security requirements
avoid this trap, but run the risk of having too few arms and of trying to con-
ciliate an aggressor.
One aspect of subjective security related to the predisposition to perceive
threat is the state's view of how many enemies it must be prepared to fight.
A state can be relaxed about increases in another's arms if it believes that
there is a functioning collective security system. The chances of peace are
increased in a world in which the prevailing international system is valued
in its own right, not only because most states restrain their ambitions and
those who d o not are deterred (these are the usual claims for a Concert sys-
tem), but also because of the decreased chances that the status-quo states
will engage in unnecessary conflict out of the quest for security. Indeed, if
there were complete faith in collective security, n o state would want an
army. By contrast, the security dilemma is insoluble when each state fears
It I \ I Security Dilemma 137
that many others, far from coming to its aid, are likely to join in any attack.
Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, was setting a high secur-
ity requirement when he noted:
Besides the Great Powers, there are many small states who are buying or
building great ships of war and whose vessels may by purchase, by some
diplomatic combination, or by duress, be brought into the line against
us. None of these powers need, like us, navies to defend their actual
safety of independence. They build them so as to play a part in world
affairs. It is sport to them. It is death to us."
It takes great effort for any one state to be able to protect itself alone
against an attack by several neighbors. More importantly, it is next to
impossible for all states in the system to have this capability. Thus, a state's
expectation that allies will be available and that only a few others will be
able to join against it is almost a necessary condition for security require-
ments to be compatible.
The main costs of a policy of reacting quickly and severely to increases in the
other's arms are not the price of one's own arms, but rather the sacrifice of the
potential gains from cooperation (CC)and the increase in the dangers of need-
less arms races and wars (DD). The greater these costs, the greater the incen-
tives to try cooperation and wait for fairly unambiguous evidence before
assuming that the other must be checked by force. Wars would be much more
frequent - even if the first choice of all states was the status quo - if they were
less risky and costly, and if peaceful intercourse did not provide rich benefits.
Ethiopia recently asked for guarantees that the Territory of Afars and Issas
would not join a hostile alliance against it when it gained independence.
A spokesman for the Territory replied that this was not necessary: Ethiopia
"already had the best possible guarantee in the railroad" that links the two
countries and provides indispensable revenue for the Territory." l 4
The basic points are well known and so we can move to elaboration.
First, most statesmen know that to enter a war is to set off a chain of unpre-
dictable and uncontrollable events. Even if everything they see points to a
quick victory, they are likely to hesitate before all the uncertainties. And i f
the battlefield often produces startling results, so do the council chambers.
The state may be deserted by allies or attacked by neutrals. O r the postwar
alignment may rob it of the fruits of victory, as happened to Japan in 1895.
Second, the domestic costs of wars must be weighed. Even strong states can
be undermined by dissatisfaction with the way the war is run and by the
necessary mobilization of men and ideas. Memories of such disruptions
were one of the main reasons for the era of relative peace that followed the
Napoleonic Wars. Liberal statesmen feared that large armies would lead to
despotism; conservative leaders feared that wars would lead to revolution.
138 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e
(The other side of this coin is that when there are domestic consequences of
foreign conflict that are positively valued, the net cost of conflict is lowered
and cooperation becomes more difficult.)Third - turning to the advantages
of cooperation - for states with large and diverse economies the gains from
economic exchange are rarely if ever sufficient to prevent war. Norman
Angel1 was wrong about World War I being impossible because of economic
ties among the powers; and before World War 11, the U.S. was Japan's most
important trading partner. Fourth, the gains from cooperation can be
increased, not only if each side gets more of the traditional values such as
wealth, but also if each comes to value the other's well-being positively.
Mutual cooperation will then have a double payoff: in addition to the direct
gains, there will be the satisfaction of seeing the other prosper.'"
While high costs of war and gains from cooperation will ameliorate the
impact of the security dilemma, they can create a different problem. If the
costs are high enough so that DD is the last choice for both sides, the game
will shift to "Chicken." This game differs from the Stag Hunt in that each
actor seeks to exploit the other; it differs from Prisoner's Dilemma in that
both actors share an interest in avoiding mutual non-cooperation. In
Chicken, if you think the other side is going to defect, you have to cooper-
ate because, although being exploited (CD) is bad, it is not as bad as a total
breakdown (DD). As the familiar logic of deterrence shows, the actor must
then try to convince his adversary that he is going to stand firm (defect)and
that the only way the other can avoid disaster is to back down (cooperate).
Commitment, the rationality of irrationality, manipulating the communica-
tions system, and pretending not to understand the situation, are among the
tactics used to reach this goal. The same logic applies when both sides are
enjoying great benefits from cooperation. The side that can credibly
threaten to disrupt the relationship unless its demands are met can exploit
the other. This situation may not be stable, since the frequent use of threats
may be incompatible with the maintenance of a cooperative relationship.
Still, de Gaulle's successful threats to break up the Common Market unless
his partners acceded to his wishes remind us that the shared benefits of
cooperation as well as the shared costs of defection can provide the basis
for exploitation. Similarly, one reason for the collapse of the Franco-British
entente more than a hundred years earlier was that decision makers on both
sides felt confident that their own country could safely pursue a policy that
was against the other's interest because the other could not afford to
destroy the highly valued relationship.I6 Because statesmen realize that the
growth of positive interdependence can provide others with new levers of
influence over them, they may resist such developments more than would
be expected from the theories that stress the advantages of cooperation.
Defecting not only avoids the danger that a state will be exploited (CD),but
brings positive advantages by exploiting the other (DC). The lower these
lcri i i Security Dilemma 139
possible gains, the greater the chances of cooperation. Even a relatively sat-
isfied state can be tempted to expand by the hope of gaining major values.
The temptation will be less when the state sees other ways of reaching its
goals, and/or places a low value on what exploitation could bring. The
gains may be low either because the immediate advantage provided by DC
(for example, having more arms than the other side) cannot be translated
into a political advantage (for example, gains in territory), or because the
political advantage itself is not highly valued. For instance, a state may not
seek to annex additional territory because the latter lacks raw materials, is
inhabited by people of a different ethnic group, would be costly to garrison,
or would be hard to assimilate without disturbing domestic politics and
values. A state can reduce the incentives that another state has to attack it,
by not being a threat to the latter and by providing goods and services that
would be lost were the other to attempt exploitation.
Even where the direct advantages of D C are great, other considerations
can reduce the net gain. Victory as well as defeat can set off undesired
domestic changes- within the state. Exploitation has at times been frowned
upon by the international community, thus reducing the prestige of a state
that engages in it. O r others might in the future be quicker to see the state
as a menace to them, making them more likely to arm, and to oppose it
later. Thus, Bismarck's attempts to get other powers to cooperate with him
in maintaining the status quo after 1871 were made more difficult by the
widely-held mistrust of him that grew out of his earlier aggressions.'-
The variables discussed so far influence the payoffs for each of the four pos-
sible outcomes. To decide what to do, the state has to go further and calcu-
late the expected value of cooperating or defecting. Because such
calculations involve estimating the probability that the other will cooperate,
the state will have to judge how the variables discussed so far act on the
other. To encourage the other to cooperate, a state may try to manipulate
these variables. It can lower the other's incentives to defect by decreasing
what it could gain by exploiting the state (DC) - the details would be simi-
lar to those discussed in the previous paragraph - and it can raise the costs
of deadlock (DD). But if the state cannot make DD the worst outcome for
the other, coercion is likely to be ineffective in the short run because the
other can respond by refusing to cooperate, and dangerous in the long run
because the other is likely to become convinced that the state is aggressive.
So the state will have to concentrate on making cooperation more attractive.
One way to do this is to decrease the costs the other will pay if it cooperates
and the state defects (0). Thus, the state could try to make the other less
vulnerable. It was for this reason that in the late 1950's and early 1960's
some American defense analysts argued that it would be good for both sides
if the Russians developed hardened missiles. Of course, decreasing the
other's vulnerability also decreases the state's ability to coerce it, and opens
140 T h e Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
the possibility that the other will use this protection as a shield behind which
to engage in actions inimical to the state. But by sacrificing some ability to
harm the other, the state can increase the chances of mutually beneficial
cooperation.
The state can also try to increase the gains that will accrue to the other
from mutual cooperation (CC). Although the state will of course gain if it
receives a share of any new benefits, even an increment that accrues entirely
t o the other will aid the state by increasing the likelihood that the other will
cooperate. l 8
This line of argument can be continued through the infinite regressions
that game theory has made familiar. If the other is ready to cooperate when
it thinks the state will, the state can increase the chances of CC by showing
that it is planning t o cooperate. Thus the state should understate the gains
it would make if it exploited the other (DC) and the costs it would pay if
the other exploited it (CD), and stress or exaggerate the gains it would
make under mutual cooperation (CC) and the costs it would pay if there is
deadlock (DD). The state will also want to convince the other that it thinks
that the other is likely t o cooperate. If the other believes these things, it will
see that the state has strong incentives to cooperate, and so it will cooper-
ate in turn. One point should be emphasized. Because the other, like the
state, may be driven t o defect by the fear that it will be exploited if it does
not, the state should try to reassure it that this will not happen. Thus, when
Khrushchev indicated his willingness to withdraw his missiles from Cuba,
he simultaneously stressed to Kennedy that "we are of sound mind and
understand perfectly well" that Russia could not launch a successful attack
against the U.S., and therefore that there was no reason for the U.S. to con-
template a defensive, pre-emptive strike of its own.''
There is, however, a danger. If the other thinks that the state has little
choice but to cooperate, it can credibly threaten to defect unless the state
provides it with additional benefits. Great advantages of mutual coopera-
tion, like high costs of war, provide a lever for competitive bargaining.
Furthermore, for a state t o stress how much it gains from cooperation may
be to imply that it is gaining much more than the other and t o suggest that
the benefits should be distributed more equitably.
When each side is ready to cooperate if it expects the other to, inspec-
tion devices can ameliorate the security dilemma. Of course, even a perfect
inspection system cannot guarantee that the other will not later develop
aggressive intentions and the military means to act on them. But by reliev-
ing immediate worries and providing warning of coming dangers, inspec-
tion can meet a significant part of the felt need to protect oneself against
future threats, and so make current cooperation more feasible. Similar func-
tions are served by breaking up one large transaction into a series of smaller
ones.20 At each transaction each can see whether the other has cooperated;
and its losses, if the other defects, will be small. And since what either side
would gain by one defection is slight compared to the benefits of continued
cooperation, the prospects of cooperation are high. Conflicts and wars
I I Security Dilemma 14 1
among status-quo powers would be much more common were it not for the
fact that international politics is usually a series of small transactions.
How a statesman interprets the other's past behavior and how he projects
it into the future is influenced by his understanding of the security dilemma
and his ability to place himself in the other's shoes. The dilemma will operate
much more strongly if statesmen do not understand it, and do not see that
their arms - sought only to secure the status quo - may alarm others and that
others may arm, not because they are contemplating aggression, but because
they fear attack from the first state. These two failures of empathy are linked.
A state which thinks that the other knows that it wants only to preserve the
status q ~ and~ othat its arms are meant only for self-preservation will conclude
that the other side will react to its arms by increasing its own capability only
if it is aggressive itself. Since the other side is not menaced, there is no legitim-
ate reason for it to object to the first state's arms; therefore, objection proves
that the other is aggressive. Thus, the following exchange between Senator
Tom Connally and Secretary of State Acheson concerning the ratification of
the NATO treaty:
The other side of this coin is that part of the explanation for detente is that
most American decision makers now realize that it is at least possible that
Russia may fear American aggression; many think that this fear accounts for
a range of Soviet actions previously seen as indicating Russian aggressiveness.
Indeed, even 36 percent of military officers consider the Soviet Union's motiv-
ations to be primarily defensive. Less than twenty years earlier, officers had
been divided over whether Russia sought world conquest or only expansion."
Statesmen who do not understand the security dilemma will think that the
money spent is the only cost of building up their arms. This belief removes
one important restraint on arms spending. Furthermore, it is also likely to
lead states to set their security requirements too high. Since they do not
142 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
understand that trying to increase one's security can actually decrease it, they
will overestimate the amount of security that is attainable; they will think that
when in doubt they can "play it safe" by increasing their arms. Thus it is very
likely that two states which support the status quo but do not understand the
security dilemma will end up, if not in a war, then at least in a relationship of
higher conflict than is required by the objective situation.
The belief that an increase in military strength always leads to an increase
in security is often linked to the belief that the only route to security is through
military strength. As a consequence, a whole range of meliorative policies will
be downgraded. Decision makers who do not believe that adopting a more
conciliatory posture, meeting the other's legitimate grievances, or developing
mutual gains from cooperation can increase their state's security, will not
devote much attention or effort to these possibilities.
On the other hand, a heightened sensitivity to the security dilemma makes
it more likely that the state will treat an aggressor as though it were an inse-
cure defender of the status quo. Partly because of their views about the causes
of World War I, the British were predisposed to believe that Hitler sought only
the rectification of legitimate and limited grievances and that security could
best be gained by constructing an equitable international system. As a result
they pursued a policy which, although well designed to avoid the danger of
creating unnecessary conflict with a status-quo Germany, helped destroy
Europe.
A final consideration does not easily fit in the matrix we have been using,
although it can be seen as an aspect of vulnerability and of the costs of CD.
Situations vary in the ease or difficulty with which all states can simultan-
eously achieve a high degree of security, The influence of military technology
on this variable is the subject of the next section. Here we want to treat the
impact of beliefs, geography, and commitments (many of which can be con-
sidered to be modifications of geography, since they bind states to defend
areas outside their homelands). In the crowded continent of Europe, secur-
ity requirements were hard to mesh. Being surrounded by powerful states,
Germany's problem - or the problem created by Germany - was always
great and was even worse when her relations with both France and Russia
were bad, such as before World War I. In that case, even a status-quo
Germany, if she could not change the political situation, would almost have
been forced to adopt something like the Schlieffen Plan. Because she could
not hold off both of her enemies, she had to be prepared to defeat one
quickly and then deal with the other in a more leisurely fashion. If France
or Russia stayed out of a war between the other state and Germany, they
would allow Germany to dominate the Continent (even if that was not
Germany's aim). They therefore had to deny Germany this ability, thus
making Germany less secure. Although Germany's arrogant and erratic
behavior, coupled with the desire for an unreasonably high level of security
IPILI Security Dilemma 143
(which amounted t o the desire to escape from her geographic plight), com-
pounded the problem, even wise German statesmen would have been hard
put t o gain a high degree of security without alarming their neighbors.
A similar situation arose for France after World War I. She was committed
to protecting her allies in Eastern Europe, a commitment she could meet only
by taking the offensive against Germany. But since there was no way to guar-
antee that France might not later seek expansion, a France that could success-
fully launch an attack in response to a German move into Eastern Europe
would constitute a potential danger to German core values. Similarly, a United
States credibly able to threaten retaliation with strategic nuclear weapons if
the Soviet Union attacks Western Europe also constitutes a menace, albeit a
reduced one, to the Soviet ability to maintain the status quo. The incompati-
bility of these security requirements is not complete. Herman Kahn is correct
in arguing that the United States could have Type I1 deterrence (the ability to
deter a major Soviet provocation) without gaining first-strike capability
because the expected Soviet retaliation following an American strike could be
great
- enough to deter the U.S. from attacking unless the U.S. believed it would
suffer enormous deprivation (for instance, the loss of Europe) if it did not
strike." Similarly, the Franco-German military balance could have been such
that France could successfully attack Germany if the latter's armies were
embroiled in Eastern Europe, but could not defeat a Germany that was free to
devote all her resources to defending herself. But this delicate balance is very
hard to achieve, especially because states usually calculate conservatively.
Therefore, such a solution is not likely to be available.
For the United States, the problem posed by the need to protect Europe is
an exception. Throughout most of its history, this country has been in a much
more favorable position: relatively self-sufficient and secure from invasion, it
has not only been able to get security relatively cheaply, but by doing so, did
not menace others.14 But ambitions and commitments have changed this situ-
ation. After the American conquest of the Philippines, "neither the United
States nor Japan could assure protection for their territories by military and
naval means without compromising the defenses of the other. This problem
would plague American and Japanese statesmen down to 1941 ."" Further-
more, to the extent that Japan could protect herself, she could resist American
threats to go t o war if Japan did not respect China's independence. These
complications were minor compared t o those that followed World War 11.
A world power cannot help but have the ability t o harm many others that is
out of proportion to the others' ability to harm it.
Britain had been able t o gain security without menacing others to a
greater degree than the Continental powers, though t o a lesser one than the
United States. But the acquisition of colonies and a dependence on foreign
trade sacrificed her relative invulnerability of being an island. Once she
took India, she had to consider Russia as a neighbor; the latter was expand-
ing in Central Asia, thus making it much more difficult for both countries
t o feel secure. The need t o maintain reliable sea lanes t o India meant that
no state could be allowed t o menace South Africa and, later, Egypt. But the
144 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
need t o protect these two areas brought new fears, new obligations, and
new security requirements that conflicted with those of other European
nations. Furthermore, once Britain needed a flow of imports during both
peace and wartime, she required a navy that could prevent a blockade. A
navy sufficient for that task could not help but be a threat to any other state
that had valuable trade.
A related problem is raised by the fact that defending the status quo often
means protecting more than territory. Nonterritorial interests, norms, and the
structure of the international system must be maintained. If all status-quo
powers agree on these values and interpret them in compatible ways, prob-
lems will be minimized. But the potential for conflict is great, and the policies
followed are likely to exacerbate the security dilemma. The greater the range
of interests that have to be protected, the more likely it is that national efforts
to maintain the status quo will clash. As a French spokesman put it in 1930:
"Security! The term signifies more indeed than the maintenance of a people's
homeland, or even of their territories beyond the seas. It also means the main-
tenance of the world's respect for them, the maintenance of their economic
interests, everything in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life
itself, of the nation."26 When security is thought of in this sense, it almost
automatically has a competitive connotation. It involves asserting one state's
will over others, showing a high degree of leadership if not dominance, and
displaying a prickly demeanor. The resulting behavior will almost surely clash
with that of others who define their security in the same way.
The problem will be almost insoluble if statesmen believe that their secur-
ity requires the threatening or attacking of others. "That which stops growing
begins to rot," declared a minister to Catherine the Great."" More common
is the belief that if the other is secure, it will be emboldened to act against
one's own state's interests, and the belief that in a war it will not be enough
for the state to protect itself: it must be able to take the war to the other's
homeland. These convictions make it very difficult for status-quo states to
develop compatible security policies, for they lead the state to conclude that
its security requires that others be rendered insecure.
In other cases, "A country engaged in a war of defense might be obliged
for strategic reasons to assume the offensive," as a French delegate to an inter-
war disarmament conference put it.28 That was the case for France in 1799:
It did not matter to the surrounding states that France was not attacking
because she was greedy, but hecause she wanted to be left In peace. Unless
there was some way her neighbors could provide France with an alternate
route to her goal, France had to go to war.
Another approach starts with the central point of the security dilemma - that
an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others - and exam-
ines the conditions under which this proposition holds. Two crucial variables
are involved: whether defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished
from offensive ones, and whether the defense or the offense has the advan-
tage. The definitions are not always clear, and many cases are difficult to
judge, but these two variables shed a great deal of light on the question of
whether status-quo powers will adopt compatible security policies. All the
variables discussed so far leave the heart of the problem untouched. Rut when
defensive weapons differ from offensive ones, it is possible for a state to make
itself more secure without making others less secure. And when the defense
has the advantage over the offense, a large increase in one state's security only
slightly decreases the security of the others, and status-quo powers can all
enjoy a high level of security and largely escape from the state of nature.
When we say that the offense has the advantage, we simply mean that it is
easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend
one's own. When the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and
to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take. If effective defenses
can be erected quickly, an attacker may be able to keep territory he has taken
in an initial victory. Thus, the dominance of the defense made it very hard
for Britain and France to push Germany out of France in World War I. But
when superior defenses are difficult for an aggressor to improvise on the
battlefield and must be constructed during peacetime, they provide no
direct assistance to him.
The security dilemma is at its most vicious when commitments, strategy, or
technology dictate that the only route to security lies through expansion.
Status-quo powers must then act like aggressors; the fact that they would
gladly agree to forego the opportunity for expansion in return for guarantees
for their security has no implications for their behavior. Even if expansion is
not sought as a goal in itself, there will be quick and drastic changes in the dis-
tribution of territory and influence. Conversely, when the defense has the
advantage, status-quo states can make themselves more secure without gravely
endangering others."' Indeed, if the defense has enough of an advantage and
if the states are of roughly equal size, not only will the security dilemma cease
to inhibit status-quo states from cooperating, but aggression will be next to
I46 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Beliefs about the course of a war in which the offense has the advantage
further deepen the security dilemma. When there are incentives to strike
first, a successful attack will usually so weaken the other side that victory
will be relatively quick, bloodless, and decisive. It is in these periods when
conquest is possible and attractive that states consolidate power internally -
for instance, by destroying the feudal barons - and expand externally. There
are several consequences that decrease the chance of cooperation among
status-quo states. First, war will be profitable for the winner. The costs will
be low and the benefits high. Of course, losers will suffer; the fear of losing
could induce states to try to form stable cooperative arrangements, but the
temptation of victory will make this particularly difficult. Second, because
wars are expected to be both frequent and short, there will be incentives for
high levels of arms, and quick and strong reaction to the other's increases
in arms. The state cannot afford to wait until there is unambiguous
evidence that the other is building new weapons. Even large states that have
faith in their economic strength cannot wait, because the war will be over
before their products can reach the army. Third, when wars are quick,
,,
states will have to recruit allies in advance." Without the opportunity for
bargaining and re-alignments during the opening stages of hostilities, peace-
time diplomacy loses a degree of the fluidity that facilitates halance-of-
power policies. Because alliances must be secured during peacetime, the
international system is more likely to become bipolar. It is hard to say
whether war therefore becomes more or less likely, but this hipolarity
increases tension between the two camps and makes it harder for status-quo
states to gain the benefits of cooperation. Fourth, if wars are frequent,
statesmen's perceptual thresholds will be adj~istedaccordingly and they will
be quick to perceive ambiguous evidence as indicating that others are
aggressive. Thus, there will be more cases of status-quo powers arming
against each other in the incorrect belief that the other is hostile.
When the defense has the advantage, all the foregoing is reversed. The
state that fears attack does not p r e e m p t - since that would be a wasteful
use of its military resources - but rather prepares to receive an attack.
Doing so does not decrease the security of others, and several states can do
it simultaneously; the situation will therefore be stable, and status-quo
powers will be able to cooperate. When Herman Kahn argues that ulti-
matums "are vastly too dangerous to give because ... they are quite likely
to touch off a pre-emptive strike,"'%e incorrectly assumes that it is always
advantageous to strike first.
More is involved than short-run dynamics. When the defense is dominant,
wars are likely to become stalemates and can be won only at enormous cost.
Relatively small and weak states can hold off larger and stronger ones, or can
deter attack by raising the costs of conquest to an unacceptable level. States
then approach equality in what they can do to each other. Like the .45-caliber
pistol in the American West, fortifications were the "great equalizer" in some
periods. Changes in the status quo are less frequent and cooperation is more
common wherever the security dilemma is thereby reduced.
I48 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
states did not seek a negotiated settlement as soon as the shape of the war
became clear. Schlieffen had said that if his plan failed, peace should be
sought."' The answer is complex, uncertain, and largely outside of the scope of
our concerns. But part of the reason was the hope and sometimes the expect-
ation that breakthroughs could be made and the dominance of the offensive
restored. Without that hope, the political and psychological pressures to fight
to a decisive victory might have been overcome.
The politics of the interwar period were shaped by the memories of the
previous conflict and the belief that any future war would resemble it.
Political and military lessons reinforced each other in ameliorating the secur-
ity dilemma. Because it was believed that the First World War had been a mis-
take that could have been avoided by skillful conciliation, both Britain and,
to a lesser extent, France were highly sensitive to the possibility that interwar
Germany was not a real threat to peace, and alert to the danger that reacting
quickly and strongly to her arms could create unnecessary conflict. And
because Britain and France expected the defense to continue to dominate,
they concluded that it was safe to adopt a more relaxed and nonthreatening
military posture."" Britain also felt less need to maintain tight alliance
bonds. The Allies' military posture then constituted only a slight danger to
Germany; had the latter been content with the status quo, it would have been
easy for both sides to have felt secure behind their lines of fortifications. Of
course the Germans were not content, so it is not surprising that they devoted
their money and attention to finding ways out of a defense-dominated stale-
mate. Blitzkrieg tactics were necessary if they were to use force to change the
status quo.
The initial stages of the war on the Western Front also contrasted with
the First World War. Only with the new air arm were there any incentives
to strike first, and these forces were too weak to carry out the grandiose
plans that had been both dreamed and feared. The armies, still the main
instrument, rushed to defensive positions. Perhaps the allies could have suc-
cessfully attacked while the Germans were occupied in Poland.4L But belief
in the defense was so great that this was never seriously contemplated.
Three months after the start of the war, the French Prime Minister summed
up the view held by almost everyone but Hitler: on the Western Front there
is "deadlock. Two Forces of equal strength and the one that attacks seeing
such enormous casualties that it cannot move without endangering the con-
tinuation of the war or of the aftermath."43 The Allies were caught in a
dilemma they never fully recognized, let alone solved. O n the one hand,
they had very high war aims; although unconditional surrender had not yet
been adopted, the British had decided from the start that the removal of
Hitler was a necessary condition for p e a ~ e . ~ Wthe n other hand, there were
no realistic plans or instruments for allowing the Allies to impose their will
on the other side. The British Chief of the Imperial General Staff noted,
"The French have no intention of carrying out an offensive for years, if at
all"; the British were only slightly b ~ l d e r . ~So
' the Allies looked to a long
war that would wear the Germans down, cause civilian suffering through
I50 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e
shortages, and eventually undermine Hitler. There was little analysis to sup-
port this view - and indeed it probably was not supportable - but as long
as the defense was dominant and the numbers on each side relatively equal,
what else could the Allies do?
To summarize, the security dilemma was much less powerful after World
War I than it had been before. In the later period, the expected power of the
defense allowed status-quo states to pursue compatible security policies and
avoid arms races. Furthermore, high tension and fear of war did not set off
short-run dynamics by which each state, trying to increase its security, inad-
vertently acted to make war more likely. The expected high costs of war,
however, led the Allies t o believe that no sane German leader would run the
risks entailed in an attempt to dominate the Continent, and discouraged
them from risking war themselves.
Technology and Geography. Technology and geography are the two main
factors that determine whether the offense or the defense has the advantage.
As Brodie notes, "On the tactical level, as a rule, few physical factors favor
the attacker but many favor the defender. The defender usually has the advan-
tage of cover. He characteristically fires from behind some form of shelter
while his opponent crosses open ground."46 Anything that increases the
amount of ground the attacker has to cross, or impedes his progress across it,
or makes him more vulnerable while crossing, increases the advantage accru-
ing to the defense. When states are separated by barriers that produce these
effects, the security dilemma is eased, since both can have forces adequate for
defense without being able to attack. Impenetrable barriers would actually
prevent war; in reality, decision makers have to settle for a good deal less.
Buffer zones slow the attacker's progress; they thereby give the defender time
to prepare, increase problems of logistics, and reduce the number of soldiers
available for the final assault. At the end of the 19th century, Arthur Balfour
noted Afghanistan's "non-conducting" qualities. "So long as it possesses few
roads, and no railroads, it will be impossible for Russia to make effective use
of her great numerical superiority at any point immediately vital to the
Empire." The Russians valued buffers for the same reasons; it is not surpris-
ing that when Persia was being divided into Russian and British spheres of
influence some years later, the Russians sought assurances that the British
would refrain from building potentially menacing railroads in their sphere.
Indeed, since railroad construction radically altered the abilities of countries to
defend themselves and to attack others, many diplomatic notes and much
intelligence activity in the late 19th century centered on this ~ubject.~'
Oceans, large rivers, and mountain ranges serve the same function as
buffer zones. Being hard to cross, they allow defense against superior num-
bers. The defender has merely to stay on his side of the barrier and so can
utilize all the men he can bring up to it. The attacker's men, however, can
cross only a few at a time, and they are very vulnerable when doing so. If all
states were self-sufficient islands, anarchy would be much less of a problem.
A small investment in shore defenses and a small army would be sufficient
to repel invasion. Only very weak states would be vulnerable, and only very
Jt.rc~h Security Dilemma 151
large ones could menace others. As noted above, the United States, and to a
lesser extent Great Britain, have partly been able to escape from the state of
nature because their geographical positions approximated this ideal.
Although geography cannot be changed to conform to borders, borders
can and d o change to conform to geography. Borders across which an
attack is easy tend to be unstable. States living within them are likely to
expand or be absorbed. Frequent wars are almost inevitable since attacking
will often seem the best way to protect what one has. This process will stop,
or a t least slow down, when the state's borders reach - by expansion or con-
traction - a line of natural obstacles. Security without attack will then be
possible. Furthermore, these lines constitute salient solutions to bargaining
problems and, to the extent that they are barriers to migration, are likely to
divide ethnic groups, thereby raising the costs and lowering the incentives
for conquest.
Attachment to one's state and its land reinforce one quasi-geographical
aid to the defense. Conquest usually becomes more difficult the deeper the
attacker pushes into the other's territory. Nationalism spurs the defenders
to fight harder; advancing not only lengthens the attacker's supply lines, but
takes him through unfamiliar and often devastated lands that require
troops for garrison duty. These stabilizing dynamics will not operate, how-
ever, if the defender's war materiel is situated near its borders, or if the
people d o not care about their state, but only about being on the winning
side. In such cases, positive feedback will be at work and initial defeats will
be i n ~ u r m o u n t a b l e . ~ "
Imitating geography, men have tried to create barriers. Treaties may pro-
vide for demilitarized zones on both sides of the border, although such zones
will rarely be deep enough to provide more than warning. Even this was not
possible in Europe, but the Russians adopted a gauge for their railroads that
was broader than that of the neighboring states, thereby complicating the
logistics problems of any attacker - including Russia.
Perhaps the most ambitious and at least temporarily successful attempts
to construct a system that would aid the defenses of both sides were the
interwar naval treaties, as they affected Japanese-American relations. As
mentioned earlier, the problem was that the United States could not defend
the Philippines without denying Japan the ability to protect her home
island^.^' (In 1941 this dilemma became insoluble when Japan sought to
extend her control to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. If the Philippines
had been invulnerable, they could have provided a secure base from which
the U.S. could interdict Japanese shipping between the homeland and the
areas she was trying to conquer.) In the 1920's and early 1930's each side
would have been willing to grant the other security for its possessions in
return for a reciprocal grant, and the Washington Naval Conference agree-
ments were designed to approach this goal. As a Japanese diplomat later
put it, their country's "fundamental principle" was to have "a strength
insufficient for attack and adequate for defense.""' Thus, Japan agreed in
1922 to accept a navy only three-fifths as large as that of the United States,
152 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
and the U.S. agreed not to fortify its Pacific islands." (Japan had earlier
been forced to agree not to fortify the islands she had taken from Germany
in World War I.) Japan's navy would not be large enough to defeat
America's anywhere other than close to the home islands. Although the
Japanese could still take the Philippines, not only would they be unable to
move farther, but they might be weakened enough by their efforts to be vul-
nerable to counterattack. Japan, however, gained security. An American
attack was rendered more difficult because the American bases were unpro-
tected and because, until 1930, Japan was allowed unlimited numbers of
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines that could weaken the American fleet
as it made its way across the ocean.""
The other major determinant of the offense-defense balance is technol-
ogy. When weapons are highly vulnerable, they must be employed before
they are attacked. Others can remain quite invulnerable in their bases. The
former characteristics are embodied in unprotected missiles and many kinds
of bombers. (It should be noted that it is not vulnerability per se that is cru-
cial, but the location of the vulnerability. Bombers and missiles that are easy
to destroy only after having been launched toward their targets d o not cre-
ate destabilizing dynamics.) Incentives to strike first are usually absent for
naval forces that are threatened by a naval attack. Like missiles in hardened
silos, they are usually well protected when in their bases. Both sides can
then simultaneously be prepared to defend themselves successfully.
In ground warfare under some conditions, forts, trenches, and small
groups of men in prepared positions can hold off large numbers of attack-
ers. Less frequently, a few attackers can storm the defenses. By and large, it
is a contest between fortifications and supporting light weapons on the one
hand, and mobility and heavier weapons that clear the way for the attack on
the other. As the erroneous views held before the two world wars show, there
is no simple way to determine which is dominant. "[Tlhese oscillations are
not smooth and predictable like those of a swinging pendulum. They are
uneven in both extent and time. Some occur in the course of a single battle
or campaign, others in the course of a war, still others during a series of
wars." Longer-term oscillations can also be detected:
The early Gothic age, from the twelfth to the late thirteenth century, with
its wonderful cathedrals and fortified places, was a period during which
the attackers in Europe generally met serious and increasing difficulties,
because the improvement in the strength of fortresses outran the advance in
the power of destruction. Later, with the spread of firearms at the end of
the fifteenth century, old fortresses lost their power to resist. An age ensued
during which the offense possessed, apart from short-term setbacks, new
advantages. Then, during the seventeenth century, especially after about
1660, and until at least the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession
in 1740, the defense regained much of the ground it had lost since the
great medieval fortresses had proved unable to meet the bombardment of
the new and more numerous artillery.53
icZ;\ I* Security Dilemma 1 53
Another scholar has continued the argument: "The offensive gained an advan-
tage with new forms of heavy mobile artillery in the nineteenth century, but
the stalemate of World War I created the impression that the defense again had
an advantage; the German invasion in World War 11, however, indicated the
offensive superiority of highly mechanized armies in the field."'J
The situation today with respect to conventional weapons is unclear. Until
recently it was believed that tanks and tactical air power gave the attacker an
advantage. The initial analyses of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war indicated that
new anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons have restored the primacy of the
defense. These weapons are cheap, easy to use, and can destroy a high pro-
portion of the attacking vehicles and planes that are sighted. It then would
make sense for a status-quo power to buy lots of $20,000 missiles rather than
buy a few half-million dollar tanks and multi-million dollar fighter-bombers.
Defense would be possible even against a large and well-equipped force;
states that care primarily about self-protection would not need to engage in
arms races. But further examinations of the new technologies and the history
of the October War cast doubt on these optimistic conclusions and leave us
unable to render any firm judgment."'
Concerning nuclear weapons, it is generally agreed that defense is impos-
sible - a triumph not of the offense, but of deterrence. Attack makes no sense,
not because it can be beaten off, but because the attacker will be destroyed in
turn. In terms of the questions under consideration here, the result is the equiva-
lent of the primacy of the defense. First, security is relatively cheap. Less than
one percent of the G.N.P. is devoted to deterring a direct attack on the United
States; most of it is spent on acquiring redundant systems to provide a lot of
insurance against the worst conceivable contingencies. Second, both sides can
simultaneously gain security in the form of second-strike capability. Third, and
related to the foregoing, second-strike capability can be maintained in the face
of wide variations in the other side's military posture. There is no purely mili-
tary reason why each side has to react quickly and strongly to the other's
increases in arms. Any spending that the other devotes to trying to achieve
first-strike capability can be neutralized by the state's spending much smaller
sums on protecting its second-strike capability. Fourth, there are no incentives
to strike first in a crisis.
Important problems remain, of course. Both sides have interests that go
well beyond defense of the homeland. The protection of these interests cre-
ates conflicts even if neither side desires expansion. Furthermore, the shift
from defense to deterrence has greatly increased the importance and per-
ceptions of resolve. Security now rests on each side's belief that the other
would prefer to run high risks of total destruction rather than sacrifice its
vital interests. Aspects of the security dilemma thus appear in a new form.
Are weapons procurements used as an index of resolve? Must they be so
used ? If one side fails to respond to the other's buildup, will it appear weak
and thereby invite predation? Can both sides simultaneously have images of
high resolve or is there a zero-sum element involved? Although these prob-
lems are real, they are not as severe as those in the prenuclear era: there are
154 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
many indices of resolve, and states d o not so much judge images of resolve
in the abstract as ask how likely it is that the other will stand firm in a par-
ticular dispute. Since states are most likely to stand firm on matters which
concern them most, it is quite possible for both to demonstrate their resolve
to protect their own security simultaneously.
Offense-Defense Differentiation
The other major variable that affects how strongly the security dilemma
operates is whether weapons and policies that protect the state also provide
the capability for attack. If they d o not, the basic postulate of the security
dilemma no longer applies. A state can increase its own security without
decreasing that of others. The advantage of the defense can only ameliorate
the security dilemma. A differentiation between offensive and defensive
stances comes close to abolishing it. Such differentiation does not mean,
however, that all security problems will be abolished. If the offense has the
advantage, conquest and aggression will still be possible. And if the offense's
advantage is great enough, status-quo powers may find it too expensive to
protect themselves by defensive forces and decide to procure offensive
weapons even though this will menace others. Furthermore, states will
still have to worry that even if the other's military posture shows that it is
peaceful now, it may develop aggressive intentions in the future.
Assuming that the defense is at least as potent as the offense, the differen-
tiation between them allows status-quo states to behave in ways that are
clearly different from those of aggressors. Three beneficial consequences fol-
low. First, status-quo powers can identify each other, thus laying the founda-
tions for cooperation. Conflicts growing out of the mistaken belief that the
other side is expansionist will be less frequent. Second, status-quo states will
obtain advance warning when others plan aggression. Before a state can
attack, it has to develop and deploy offensive weapons. If procurement of
these weapons cannot be disguised and takes a fair amount of time, as it
almost always does, a status-quo state will have the time to take counter-
measures. It need not maintain a high level of defensive arms as long as its
potential adversaries are adopting a peaceful posture. (Although being so
armed should not, with the one important exception noted below, alarm
other status-quo powers.) States do, in fact, pay special attention to actions
that they believe would not be taken by a status-quo state because they feel
that states exhibiting such behavior are aggressive. Thus the seizure or devel-
opment of transportation facilities will alarm others more if these facilities
have no commercial value, and therefore can only be wanted for military rea-
sons. In 1906, the British rejected a Russian protest about their activities in a
district of Persia by claiming that this area was "only of [strategic] import-
ance [to the Russians] if they wished to attack the Indian frontier, or to put
pressure upon us by making us think that they intend to attack it."j6
The same inferences are drawn when a state acquires more weapons
than observers feel are needed for defense. Thus, the Japanese spokesman
l ~ r ~ iSecurity
i Dilemma 155
at the 1930 London naval conference said that his country was alarmed by
the American refusal to give Japan a 70 percent ratio (in place of a 60 per-
cent ratio) in heavy cruisers: "As long as America held that ten percent
advantage, it was possible for her to attack. So when America insisted on
sixty percent instead of seventy percent, the idea would exist that they were
trying to keep that possibility, and the Japanese people could not accept
that."" Similarly, when Mussolini told Chamberlain in January 1939 that
Hitler's arms program was motivated by defensive considerations, the
Prime Minister replied that "German military forces were now so strong as
to make it impossible for any Power or combination of Powers to attack her
successfully. She could not want any further armaments for defensive pur-
poses; what then did she want them for?"'8
Of course these inferences can be wrong - as they are especially likely to
be because states underestimate the degree to which they menace others."
And when they are wrong, the security dilemma is deepened. Because the
state thinks it has received notice that the other is aggressive, its own arms
building will be less restrained and the chances of cooperation will he
decreased. But the dangers of incorrect inferences should not obscure the
main point: when offensive and defensive postures are different, much of
the ~~ncertainty about the other's intentions that contributes to the security
dilemma is removed.
The third beneficial consequence of a difference between offensive and
defensive weapons is that if all states support the status quo, an obvious
arms control agreement is a ban on weapons that are useful for attacking.
As President Roosevelt put it in his message to the Geneva Disarmament
Conference in 1933: "If all nations will agree wholly to eliminate from pos-
session and use the weapons which make possihle a successful attack,
defenses auton~atically will become impregnable, and the frontiers and
independence of every nation will become s e ~ u r e . " ~The " fact that such
treaties have been rare - the Washington naval agreements discussed above
and the anti-ABM treaty can be cited as examples - shows either that states
are not always willing to guarantee the security of others, or that it is hard
to distinguish offensive from defensive weapons.
Is such a distinction possible? Salvador de Madariaga, the Spanish states-
man active in the disarmament negotiations of the interwar years, thought
not: "A weapon is either offensive or defensive according to which end of it
YOLI art. looking at." The French Foreign Minister agreed (although French
~ o l i c ydid not always follow this view): "Every arm can be employed offen-
sively or defensively in turn. . . . The only way to discover whether arms are
intended for purely defensive purposes or are held in a spirit of aggression is
in all cases to enquire into the intentions of the country concerned." Some
evidence for the validity of this argument is provided by the fact that much
time in these unsuccessful negotiations was devoted to separating offensive
from defensive weapons. Indeed, no simple and unambiguous definition is
possible and in many cases no judgment can be reached. Before the American
entry into World War I, Woodrow Wilson wanted to arm merchantmen only
I56 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
with guns in the back of the ship so they could not initiate a fight, but this
expedient cannot be applied to more common forms of armament^.^'
There are several problems. Even when a differentiation is possible, a
status-quo power will want offensive arms under any of three conditions,
(1)If the offense has a great advantage over the defense, protection through
defensive forces will be too expensive. (2) Status-quo states may need offen-
sive weapons to regain territory lost in the opening stages of a war. It might
be possible, however, for a state to wait to procure these weapons until war
seems likely, and they might be needed only in relatively small numbers,
unless the aggressor was able to construct strong defenses quickly in the
occupied areas. (3) The state may feel that it must be prepared to take the
offensive either because the other side will make peace only if it loses terri-
tory or because the state has commitments to attack if the other makes war
on a third party. As noted above, status-quo states with extensive commit-
ments are often forced to behave like aggressors. Even when they lack such
commitments, status-quo states must worry about the possibility that if
they are able to hold off an attack, they will still not be able to end the war
unless they move into the other's territory to damage its military forces and
inflict pain. Many American naval officers after the Civil War, for example,
believed that "only by destroying the commerce of the opponent could the
United States bring him to terms."62
A further complication is introduced by the fact that aggressors as well
as status-quo powers require defensive forces as a prelude to acquiring offen-
sive ones, to protect one frontier while attacking another, or for insurance in
case the war goes badly. Criminals as well as policemen can use bulletproof
vests. Hitler as well as Maginot built a line of forts. Indeed, Churchill reports
that in 1936 the German Foreign Minister said: "As soon as our fortifica-
tions are constructed [on our western borders] and the countries in Central
Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory, all these countries
will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies, and a new con-
stellation will develop."63 So a state may not necessarily be reassured if its
neighbor constructs strong defenses.
More central difficulties are created by the fact that whether a weapon
is offensive or defensive often depends on the particular situation - for
instance, the geographical setting and the way in which the weapon is used.
"Tanks ... spearheaded the fateful German thrust through the Ardennes in
1940, but if the French had disposed of a properly concentrated armored
reserve, it would have provided the best means for their cutting off the pene-
tration and turning into a disaster for the Germans what became instead
an overwhelming victory."64 Anti-aircraft weapons seem obviously defen-
sive - to be used, they must wait for the other side t o come t o them. But the
Egyptian attack on Israel in 1973 would have been impossible without
effective air defenses that covered the battlefield. Nevertheless, some dis-
tinctions are possible. Sir John Simon, then the British Foreign Secretary, in
response to the views cited earlier, stated that just because a fine line could
not be drawn, "that was no reason for saying that there were not stretches
/{'IL I< Security Dilemma 157
of territory on either side which all practical men and women knew to be
well o n this or that side of the line." Although there are almost n o weapons
and strategies that are useful only for attacking, there are some that are
almost exclusively defensive. Aggressors could want them for protection,
hut a state that relied mostly on them could not menace others. More fre-
quently, we cannot "determine the absolute character of a weapon, but [we
can] make a comparison ... [and] discover whether or not the offensive
potentialities predominate, whether a weapon is more useful in attack or in
defense.""
The essence of defense is keeping the other side out of your territory.
A purely defensive weapon is one that can do this without being able to pene-
trate the enemy's land. Thus a committee of military experts in an interwar
disarmament conference declared that armaments "incapable of mobility by
means of self-contained power," or movable only after long delay, were
"only capable of being used for the defense of a State's territory.""" The most
obvious examples are fortifications. They can shelter attacking forces, espe-
cially when they are built right along the f r ~ n t i e r , ~but
; they cannot occupy
enemy territory. A state with only a strong line of forts, fixed guns, and a
small army to man them would not be much of a menace. Anything else that
can serve only as a barrier against attacking troops is similarly defensive. In
this category are systems that provide warning of an attack, the Russian's
adoption of a different railroad gauge, and nuclear land mines that can seal
off invasion routes.
If total immobility clearly defines a system that is defensive only, limited
mobility is unfortunately ambiguous. As noted above, shortrange fighter
aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles can be used to cover an attack. And,
unlike forts, they can advance with the troops. Still, their inability to reach
deep into enemy territory does make them more useful for the defense than
for the offense. Thus, the United States and Israel would have been more
alarmed in the early 1970's had the Russians provided the Egyptians with
long-range instead of short-range aircraft. Naval forces are particularly dif-
ficult to classify in these terms, but those that are very short-legged can be
used only for coastal defense.
Any forces that for various reasons fight well only when on their own
soil in effect lack mobility and therefore are defensive. The most extreme
example would be passive resistance. Noncooperation can thwart an
aggressor, but it is very hard for large numbers of people to cross the bor-
der and stage a sit-in o n another's territory. Morocco's recent march on the
Spanish Sahara approached this tactic, but its success depended on special
circumstances. Similarly, guerrilla warfare is defensive to the extent to
which it requires civilian support that is likely to be forthcoming only in
opposition to a foreign invasion. Indeed, if guerrilla warfare were easily
exportable and if it took ten defenders to destroy each guerrilla, then this
weapon would not only be one which could be used as easily to attack the
other's territory as to defend one's own, but one in which the offense had
the advantage: s o the security dilemma would operate especially strongly.
158 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
If guerrillas are unable to fight on foreign soil, other kinds of armies may
be unwilling to do so. An army imbued with the idea that only defensive wars
were just would fight less effectively, if at all, if the goal were conquest.
Citizen militias may lack both the ability and the will for aggression. The
weapons employed, the short term of service, the time required for mobiliza-
tion, and the spirit of repelling attacks on the homeland, all lend themselves
much more to defense than to attacks on foreign territory.hx
Less idealistic motives can produce the same result. A leading student of
medieval warfare has described the armies of that period as follows:
"Assembled with difficulty, insubordinate, unable to maneuver, ready to melt
away from its standard the moment that its short period of service was over,
a feudal force presented an assemblage of unsoldierlike qualities such as have
seldom been known to coexist. Primarily intended to defend its own borders
from the Magyar, the Northman, or the Saracen ..., the institution was utterly
unadapted to take the o f f e n ~ i v e . "Some
~ ~ political groupings can be similarly
described. International coalitions are more readily held together by fear than
by hope of gain. Thus Castlereagh was not being entirely self-serving when in
1816 he argued that the Quadruple Alliance "could only have owed its origin
to a sense of common danger; in its very nature it must be conservative; it can-
not threaten either the security or the liberties of other States."'O It is no acci-
dent that most of the major campaigns of expansion have been waged by
one dominant nation (for example, Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany),
and that coalitions among relative equals are usually found defending the
status quo. Most gains from conquest are too uncertain and raise too many
questions of future squabbles among the victors to hold an alliance together
for long. Although defensive coalitions are by no means easy to maintain -
conflicting national objectives and the free-rider problem partly explain why
three of them dissolved before Napoleon was defeated - the common interest
of seeing that no state dominates provides a strong incentive for solidarity.
Weapons that are particularly effective in reducing fortifications and
barriers are of great value to the offense. This is not to deny that a defen-
sive power will want some of those weapons if the other side has them:
Brodie is certainly correct to argue that while their tanks allowed the
Germans to conquer France, properly used French tanks could have halted
the attack. But France would not have needed these weapons if Germany
had not acquired them, whereas even if France had no tanks, Germany
could not have foregone them since they provided the only chance of break-
ing through the French lines. Mobile heavy artillery is, similarly, especially
useful in destroying fortifications. The defender, while needing artillery to
fight off attacking troops or t o counterattack, can usually use lighter guns
since they d o not need to penetrate such massive obstacles. So it is not sur-
prising that one of the few things that most nations at the interwar disarma-
ment conferences were able to agree on was that heavy tanks and mobile
heavy guns were particularly valuable t o a state planning an attack."
Weapons and strategies that depend for their effectiveness on surprise are
almost always offensive. That fact was recognized by some of the delegates to
I C I L I ~ Security Dilemma 159
the interwar disarmament conferences and is the principle behind the common
national ban on concealed weapons. An earlier representative of this wide-
spread view was the mid-19th-century Philadelphia newspaper that argued:
"As a measure of defense, knives, dirks, and sword canes are entirely useless.
They are fit only for attack, and all such attacks are of murderous character.
Whoever carries such a weapon has prepared himself for homicide.""
I t is, of course, not always possible to distinguish between forces that are
most effective for holding territory and forces optimally designed for taking
it. Such a distinction could not have been made for the strategies and
weapons in Europe during most of the period between the Franco-Prussian
War and World War I. Neither naval forces nor tactical air forces can be read-
ily classified in these terms. But the point here is that when such a distinction
is possible, the central characteristic of the security dilemma no longer holds,
and one of the most troublesome consequences of anarchy is removed.
Offinse-Defense Differentiation and Strategic Nuclear Weapons. In the
interwar period, most statesmen held the reasonable position that weapons
that threatened civilians were o f f e n s i ~ e . 'But
~ when neither side can protect
its civilians, a counter-city posture is defensive because the state can cred-
ibly threaten to retaliate only in response to an attack on itself or its closest
allies. The costs of this strike are so high that the state could not threaten
to use it for the less-than-vital interest of compelling the other to abandon
an established position.
In the context of deterrence, offensive weapons are those that provide
defense. In the now familiar reversal of common sense, the state that could
take its population out of hostage, either by active or passive defense or by
destroying the other's strategic weapons on the ground, would be able to alter
the status quo. The desire to prevent such a situation was one of the ration-
ales for the anti-ABM agreements; it explains why some arms controllers
opposed building ABM's to protect cities, but favored sites that covered
ICBM fields. Similarly, many analysts want to limit warhead accuracy and
favor n~ultiplere-entry vehicles (MRV's), but oppose multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). The former are more useful than single
warheads for penetrating city defenses, and ensure that the state has a second-
strike capability. MIRV's enhance counterforce capabilities. Some arms con-
trollers argue that this is also true of cruise missiles, and therefore do not want
them to be deployed either. There is some evidence that the Russians are not
satisfied with deterrence and are seeking to regain the capability for defense.
Such an effort, even if not inspired by aggressive designs, would create a severe
security dilemma.
What is most important for the argument here is that land-based ICBM's
are both offensive and defensive, but when both sides rely on Polaris-type
systems (SLBM's), offense and defense use different weapons. ICBM's can be
used either to destroy the other's cities in retaliation or to initiate hostilities
by attacking the other's strategic missiles. Some measures - for instance,
hardening of missile sites and warning systems - are purely defensive, since
they do not make a first strike easier. Others are predominantly offensive - for
160 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
IV. Four W o r l d s
The two variables we have been discussing - whether the offense or the
defense has the advantage, and whether offensive postures can be distin-
guished from defensive ones - can be combined to yield four possible worlds.
Ierwi Security Dilemma 163
3 4
N o securlty d~lernrna,hut
OFFENSIVE POSTURE aggression poss~hle.
DISTINGUISHABLE Status-quo states can follow Doubly st<~ble
FROM LIEFENSIVF. O N E different policy than
aggressors.
W'lrning given.
The first world is the worst for status-quo states. There is no way to get
security without menacing others, and security through defense is terribly
difficult to obtain. Because offensive and defensive postures are the same,
status-quo states acquire the same kind of arms that are sought by aggres-
sors. And because the offense has the advantage over the defense, attacking
is the best route to protecting what you have; status-quo states will there-
fore hehave like aggressors. The situation will be unstable. Arms races are
likely. Incentives to strike first will turn crises into wars. Decisive victories
and conquests will be common. States will grow and shrink rapidly, and it
will be hard for any state to maintain its size and influence without trying
to increase them. Cooperation among status-quo powers will be extremely
hard to achieve.
There are no cases that totally fit this picture, but it bears more than a
passing resemblance to Europe before World War I. Britain and Germany,
although in many respects natural allies, ended up as enemies. Of course
much of the explanation lies in Germany's ill-chosen policy. And from the
perspective of our theory, the powers' ability to avoid war in a series of earl-
ier crises cannot be easily explained. Nevertheless, much of the behavior in
this period was the product of technology and beliefs that magnified the
security dilemma. Decision makers thought that the offense had a big
advantage and saw little difference between offensive and defensive military
postures. The era was characterized by arms races. And once war seemed
likely, mobilization races created powerful incentives to strike first.
In the nuclear era, the first world would be one in which each side relied
on vulnerable weapons that were aimed at similar forces and each side
understood the situation. In this case, the incentives to strike first would
be very high - so high that status-quo powers as well as aggressors would
be sorely tempted to pre-empt. And since the forces could be used to change
the status quo as well as to preserve it, there would be no way for both sides
to increase their security simultaneously. Now the familiar logic of deter-
rence leads both sides to see the dangers in this world. Indeed, the new
understanding of this situation was one reason why vulnerable bombers
164 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
and missiles were replaced. Ironically, the 1950's would have been more
hazardous if the decision makers had been aware of the dangers of their
posture and had therefore felt greater pressure to strike first. This situation
could be recreated if both sides were to rely on MIRVed ICBM's.
In the second world, the security dilemma operates because offensive and
defensive postures cannot be distinguished; but it does not operate as strongly
as in the first world because the defense has the advantage, and so an
increment in one side's strength increases its security more than it decreases
the other's. So, if both sides have reasonable subjective security requirements,
are of roughly equal power, and the variables discussed earlier are favorable,
it is quite likely that status-quo states can adopt compatible security
policies. Although a state will not be able to judge the other's intentions
from the kinds of weapons it procures, the level of arms spending will give
important evidence. Of course a state that seeks a high level of arms might
be not an aggressor but merely an insecure state, which if conciliated will
reduce its arms, and if confronted will reply in kind. To assume that the
apparently excessive level of arms indicates aggressiveness could therefore
lead to a response that would deepen the dilemma and create needless
conflict. But empathy and skillful statesmanship can reduce this danger.
Furthermore, the advantageous position of the defense means that a status-
quo state can often maintain a high degree of security with a level of arms
lower than that of its expected adversary. Such a state demonstrates that it
lacks the ability or desire to alter the status quo, at least at the present time.
The strength of the defense also allows states to react slowly and with
restraint when they fear that others are menacing them. So, although status-
quo powers will to some extent be threatening to others, that extent will be
limited.
This world is the one that comes closest to matching most periods in his-
tory. Attacking is usually harder than defending because of the strength of
fortifications and obstacles. But purely defensive postures are rarely pos-
sible because fortifications are usually supplemented by armies and mobile
guns which can support an attack. In the nuclear era, this world would be
one in which both sides relied on relatively invulnerable ICBM's and
believed that limited nuclear war was impossible. Assuming no MIRV's, it
would take more than one attacking missile to destroy one of the adver-
sary's. Pre-emption is therefore unattractive. If both sides have large inven-
tories, they can ignore all but drastic increases on the other side. A world
of either ICBM's or SLBM's in which both sides adopted the "Schlesinger
Doctrine" would probably fit in this category too. The means of preserving
the status quo would also be the means of changing it, as we discussed ear-
lier. And the defense usually would have the advantage, because compellence
is more difficult than deterrence. Although a state might succeed in changing
the status quo on issues that matter much more to it than to others, status-quo
powers could deter major provocations under most circumstances.
i c L ti 5 Security Dilemma I65
In the third world there may be no security dilemma, but there are security
problems. Because states can procure defensive systems that do not threaten
others, the dilemma need not operate. But because the offense has the advan-
tage, aggression is possible, and perhaps easy. If the offense has enough of an
advantage, even a status-quo state may take the initiative rather than risk
being attacked and defeated. If the offense has less of an advantage, stability
and cooperation are likely because the status-quo states will procure defen-
sive forces. They need not react to others who are similarly armed, but can
wait for the warning they would receive if others started to deploy offensive
weapons. But each state will have to watch the others carefully, and there is
room for false suspicions. The costliness of the defense and the allure of the
offense can lead to unnecessary mistrust, hostility, and war, unless some of the
variables discussed earlier are operating to restrain defection.
A hypothetical nuclear world that would fit this description would be
one in which both sides relied on SLBM's, but in which ASW techniques
were very effective. Offense and defense would be different, but the former
would have the advantage. This situation is not likely to occur; but if it did,
a status-quo state could show its lack of desire to exploit the other by
refraining from threatening its submarines. The desire to have more pro-
tecting you than merely the other side's fear of retaliation is a strong one,
however, and a state that knows that it would not expand even if its cities
were safe is likely to believe that the other would not feel threatened by its
ASW program. It is easy to see how such a world could become unstable,
and how spirals of tensions and conflict could develop.
The fourth world is doubly safe. The differentiation between offensive and
defensive systems permits a way out of the security dilemma; the advantage
of the defense disposes of the problems discussed in the previous paragraphs.
There is no reason for a status-quo power to be tempted to procure offensive
forces, and aggressors give notice of their intentions by the posture they
adopt. Indeed, if the advantage of the defense is great enough, there are n o
security problems. The loss of the ultimate form of the power to alter the sta-
tus quo would allow greater scope for the exercise of nonmilitary means and
probably would tend to freeze the distribution of values.
This world would have existed in the first decade of the 20th century if
the decision makers had understood the available technology. In that case,
the European powers would have followed different policies both in the
long run and in the summer of 1914. Even Germany, facing powerful en-
emies on both sides, could have made herself secure by developing strong
defenses. France could also have made her frontier almost impregnable.
Furthermore, when crises arose, no one would have had incentives to strike
first. There would have been no competitive mobilization races reducing the
time available for negotiations.
In the nuclear era, this world would be one in which the superpowers
relied on SL.BM's, ASW technology was not up to its task, and limited
166 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
nuclear options were not taken seriously. We have discussed this situation
earlier; here we need only add that, even if our analysis is correct and even
if the policies and postures of both sides were to move in this direction, the
problem of violence below the nuclear threshold would remain. On issues
other than defense of the homeland, there would still be security dilemmas
and security problems. But the world would nevertheless be safer than it has
usually been.
Author's N o t e
I am grateful to Robert Art, Bernard Brodie, and Glenn Snyder for comments, and to the
Committee on Research of the UCLA Academic Senate for financial support. An earlier ver-
sion of this essay appeared as Working Paper No. 5, UCLA Program in Arms Control and
International Security.
Notes
1. This kind of rank-ordering is not entirely an analyst's invention, as is shown by the fol-
lowing section of a British army memo of 1903 deal~ngwith British and Russian railroad con-
struction near the Persia-Afghanistan border:
The conditions of the problem may ... be briefly summarized as follows:
a ) IF we make a railway t o Seistan while Russia remains inactive, we gain a considerable
defensive advantage at considerable financial cost;
b) If Russia makes a railway to Seistan, while we remain inact~ve,she gains a considerable
offensive advantage at considerable financial cost;
c) If both we and Russia make railways to Seistan, the defens~veand offensive advantages
may be held t o neutralize each other; in other words, we shall have spent a good deal of money
and be n o better off than we are at present. O n the other hand, we shall be no worse off,
whereas under alternative ( b ) we shall be much worse off. Consequently, the theoretical bal-
ance of advantage lies with the proposed radway extension from Quetta to Selstan.
W.G. Nicholson, "Memorandum on Seistan and Other Points Raised in the Discussion on the
Defence of India," (Committee of Imperial Defence, March 20, 1903). It should be noted that
the possibility of neither side building railways was nor mentioned, thus strongly biasing the
analysis.
2. Paul Schroeder, Metternlch's D~plomacya t Its Zenith, 1820-182.3 (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press 1969), 126.
3. Quoted in Michael Howard, The Continental Commrtment (Harmondsworth, England:
Penguin 19741, 67.
4. Quoted in Gerald Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor (Columbia: University of M m o u r i
Press 1963), 167.
5. Quoted in Leonard Wainstein, "The Dreadnought Gap," in Robert Art and Kenneth
Waltz, eds., The Use of Force (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), 155; Raymond Sontag, European
Diplomatic History, 1871-1932 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1933), 147. The
French had made a similar argument 50 years earlier; see James Phinney Baxter 111, The
Introduction of the Ironclad Warship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1933), 149. For
a more detailed discussion of the security ddemma, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception
in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 19761, 62-76.
6. Experimental evidence for this proposition is summarized in James Tedeschi, Barry
Schlenker, and Thomas Bonoma, Conflict, Power, and Games (Chicago: Aldine 1973), 135-41.
l c i v ~ s Security Dilemma I67
7. T h e results of Prisoner's Dilemma games played in the laboratory support this argu-
ment. See Anarol Kapoport a n d Albert C h a m m a h , Prisoner's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan I'ress I 9 6 5 ) , 33-50. Also see Kohert Axelrod, Conflict of lnterest (Chicago:
M a r k h a m l 9 7 0 ) , 60-70.
8. Q u o t e d in Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University
I'ress 195Y), 6 .
9. Herbert York, The Aduisors: Oppenhernrer, Teller, and the Superbonrb (San Franc~sco:
Freeman 19 7 6 ) , 56-60.
10. For the development of the concept of suhject~vesecurity, see Arnold Wolfers, Drscorti
illid Collirboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1962), chap. 10. In the present section we
assume that the state believes that ~ t security s can he hest served by increasing its arms; later
we will d ~ s c u s ssome o f the conditions under which this s s u m p t l o n does not hold.
11. T h e question of when a n actor will see another as a threat is important m d under-
studied. For a valuahle treatment (although o n e marred by serious methodologic,~l fl,~ws),
see Raymond Cohen, "Threat Perception in International Kelations," Ph.1). d ~ s s .( H e l m \ \
University 1974). Among the important factors, touched o n below, are the lessons from the
previous war.
12. Still the hest treatment is Arnold Wolfers, Hrztairr and France Bettiwn TILVJ Wlrs (New
York: Harcourt, Br,~ce1 9 4 0 ) .
13. Quoted in I'eter Gretton, Former N a l d Person (London: Cassell 1968), 15 1.
14. Michael Kaufman, "Tension Increases in French Colon!;" New York Tntrrs. July I I, 1976.
15. Experimental support f o r thls argument is summarized in M o r t o n L)eut\cii, T h ,
Kcsr~lrrtroriof Conf1ic.t ( N e w Haven: Yale University Press 1973). 18 1-95,
16. R o g u Bullen, Pn/nierstotr Guizot, and tlw Collapsr of the E r r t ~ n t(:ordral~ ~ (1.01idon:
Athlonc 1'1-e\s 19741, 81, 88, 9.3, 2 12. For 3 different vlew of this case, w e Stanley Mellon,
"Fnrenre, Il~plomacy,and tanrasy," Rez~irwsin European Hzstory, 1 1 (September 19761, 7 6 - 8 0 .
17. S~tnll.lrly, a Ft-ench diplomat h,ts argued that "the worst result o f Loui\ XIV's ,lh,~n-
donrnenr of o u r t r a d ~ t i o n a lpolicy w a s rhe distrust it aroused towards us ahro,ld." Jules
L l m b o n , "The Perni,~nenr B ~ s c sof French Foreign Pol~cp," F i ~ r e i pAffinrs. Vlll ( J a n u a r y
I Y 30), 1-9.
18. Thi\ a\\umec, however, that these benefits t o the other w ~ l nor l s o Improve the othet-'\
power posltlon that ~t will be more able t o menace the state in the future.
19. W',ilter I.aFeher, ed., T l ~ c1)ynanrics of World Power; A llocarnrrrrtn~Hrstory o/
Clrirtcd StLrtesFor~lgllPolrry 194 5-1 97.3, 11: Eastern Ertrope and t l ~ cSorwt IJn~on( N C U York:
Chelsea House in association w ~ t hhlcGraw-Hill 197.3), 700.
2 0 . T h o m a s Schelling, T h e Strategy of C:onflrct ( N e w York: O x t o r d U r i ~ v c r \ ~ t Press
y
IL)h3), 134-35.
2 I. (1.5. (:ongres\, Senate, Committee o n Foreign Relations, Hearin,qs, k'r)rt/~Atl~7trtli
lkwt): 8 l st Cong., I at sess. ( 19491, 17.
22. B r ~ ~ cKussett
e a n d Elizabeth Hanson, Interest m d Idrolog)! (San Fra~iclsco:F r e e m m
I 9 7 i ) , 260; Morris l a n o w i t r , The Professional Soldrrr ( N e w York: Free Press 1 9 6 0 ) , chap. 13.
2.1. tiahti, O n T/~erwronrt~lear Wilr (Princeton: P r ~ n c e t o nUniversity Press I9hO), 138-60.
It should he noted t h ~ the t French example is largely hypothetical because Fr'lnce had n o intell-
tlon of tulhlling her obligations once Germany became strong.
24. Wolfers (fn. 9 ) , chap. 1.5; C. Vann Woodward, "The Age o f Keinterpret,ir~ot~,"
A111~rict771 Historical Rer&ri? Vol. 6 7 (October 1960), 1-1 9.
2.5. W ~ l l i a ~ Braisted,
n The United States N a l y rtr the P'~cific. 1897-1909 (Austin:
Ilnivers~tyof Teuas Press 19581, 240.
26. Carnhon (fn. 171, 18.5.
27. Quoted in Adam IJlatn, Exparrsrorr and Co-/-krstence ( N e w h r k : I'r,ieger I %8), 5. In
1920 the US. Navy's General Board similarly declared "A nation must advance o r retrocede
I I I world position." Quoted in W ~ l l i m iBraisted, T ~ J Unrtrd C States N ' Z ~InI ~thr I'~7crfic-.
1909-1922 (Austin: University o f Texas I'ress 1971), 488.
28. Quoted in M a r ~ o nBoggs, Attempts to Define and Lnnlt "Aggressi~v"Arnrnnrrrit 171
Diplowrilcy mzd Strntcgy (Columbia: [Jniversity of Missouri Studies, XVI, No. 1, 194 1 ) 4 1 .
168 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
29. Steven Ross, European Diplomatic History, 1789-181.5 (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday 1969), 194.
30. Thus, when Wolfers (fn. l o ) , 126, argues that a status-quo state that settles for rough
equality of power with its adversary, rather than seeking preponderance, may be able to con-
vince the other t o reciprocate by showing rhat it wants only to protect itself, not menace the
other, he assumes that the defense has an advantage.
31. Schelling (fn. 20), chap. 9.
32. Quoted in First Fischer, War of illusions (New York: Norton 19751, 377, 461.
33. George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John
Wiley 1977), 105-06; Sontag (fn. 5), 4-5.
34. Kahn (fn. 23), 21 1 (also see 144).
35. For a general discussion of such mistaken learning from the past, see Jervis (fn. 5 ) ,
chap. 6. The important and still not completely understood question of why this belief formed
and was maintained throughout the war is examined in Bernard Brodie, War and Polrtrcs
(New York: Macmillan 1973), 262-70; Brodie, "Technological Change, Strategic Doctrme,
and Political Outcomes," in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security
Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1976), 290-92; and Douglas Porch, "The
French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive, 1900-14," in Brian Bond and Ian Roy, eds., War
and Society (New York: Holmes & Meier 197.5), 117-43.
36. Some were not so optimistic. Gray's remark is well-known: "The lamps are going out
all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our life-time." The German Prime Minister,
Bethmann Hollweg, also feared the consequences of the war. But the controlling view was rhat
it would certainly pay for the winner.
37. Quoted in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, 111, The Challenge of War, 1916-1 9 16
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1971), 84.
38. Quester (fn. 33), 98-99. Robert Art, The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapouw, I1
(Beverly Hills: Sage Professional Papers in International Studies Series, 1973), 14-1 8, 26-28.
39. Konard Jarausch, "The ILlusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's
Calculated Risk, July 1914," Central European History, 11 (March 1969), 50.
40. Brodie (fn. 8), 58.
41. President Roosevelt and the American delegates to the League of Nat~onsDisarmament
Conference maintained that the tank and mobile heavy artillery had re-established the domi-
nance of the offensive, thus making disarmament more urgent (Boggs, fn. 28, pp. 3 1, 108), but
this was a minority position and may not even have been believed by the Americans. The reduced
prestige and influence of the military, and the high pressures to cut government spending
throughout this period also contributed to the lowering of defense budgets.
42. Jon Kimche, The Unfought Battle (New York: Stein 1968); Nicholas William Bethell, The
War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 1939 (New York: Holt 1972); Alan Alexandroff
and Richard Rosecrance, "Deterrence in 1939," World Politics, XXIX (April 1977), 4 0 4 2 4 .
43. Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly, eds., Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries,
1937-1940 (New York: McKay 1962), 173.
44. For a short time, as France was falling, the British Cabinet d ~ discuss
d reaching a nego-
tiated peace with Hitler. The officlal history ignores this, but it 1s covered in P.M.H. Bell, A
Certain Eventuality (Farnborough, England: Saxon House 1974), 4 0 4 8 .
45. Macleod and Kelly (fn. 43), 174. In flat contrad~ctionto common sense and almost
everything they believed about modern warfare, the Allies planned an expedition to
Scandinavia to cut the supply of iron ore to Germany and to aid F~nlandagainst the Russians.
But the dominant mood was the one described above.
46. Brodie (fn. 8), 179.
47. Arthur Balfour, "Memorandum," Committee on Imperial Defence, April 30, 1903,
pp. 2-3; see the telegrams by Sir Arthur Nicolson, in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds.,
British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. 4 (London: H.M.S.O. 1929), 429, 524.
These barriers d o not prevent the passage of long-range aircraft; but even in the air, distance
usually aids the defender.
Icn I . Security Dilemma I69
48. See for example, the discussion of warfare among Ch~nesewarlords in Hsi-Sheng Chi,
"The Chinese Warlord System as a n International System," in Morton Kaplan, ed., N e w
Apprr~dchest o Internatrond Relat~ons(New York: St. Martin's 1968), 405-25.
49. Some American decision makers, including military officers, thought that the best way
out of the dilemma was t o abandon the Philippines.
SO. Quoted in Eking Morrison, Turmod and Tradition: A Study of the Lrfe awd Tinzes of
Henry 1.. Stirnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1960), 326.
5 1. The U S . "refused to consider limitations on Hawaiian defenses, rmce these works
posed n o threat to Japan." Braisted (fn. 27), 612.
52. That is part of the reason why the Japanese admirals strongly objected when the civ~l-
Ian leaders decided to accept J seven-to-ten ratio in lighter craft in 1930. Stephen I'elz, Rnc-e
ro Pearl Harbor (Cambridge: Harvard Univers~tyPress 1974), 3.
53. John Nef, War a i ~ dHuman Progress (New York: Norton 1963), 185. Also see ihid.,
2.17, 242-43, and 323; C. W. Oman, T / JArt ~ of War in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
LJnivers~tyPress 19.531, 70-72; J o h n Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730-1200 (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell IJniversity Press 1971), 212-14; Michael Howard, War in ~k~cropcwn History
(1.ondon: Oxford University Press 1976), 33-37.
54. Q ~ ~ i cWright,
y A Study of War (abridged ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1964), 142. Also see 63-70, 74-75. There are important exceptions to these general~zations-
the American Civil War, for instance, falls in the middle of the period Wright says is dominated
by the offense.
55. Geoffrey Kemp, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and Uri Ka'anan, eds., T h e Othcr Arms Race
(i.exington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1975); James Foster, "The Future of Conventional Arnis
Control," Policy Scrcnces, No. 8 (Spring 1977), 1-19.
56. Richard Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Polrcy, 1898-2 914
(Princeton: Pr~ncetonUniversity Press 1973), 273; Grey to Nicolson, in Gooch and Ternperley
( t n . 47), 4 14.
57. Quoted in James Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autononzy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1966), 49. American naval officers agreed with the Japanese that a ten-to-six
r,ltlo would endmger Japan's supremxy in her home waters.
58. E.1.. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., Doc~tmentson Brrtish Foreign Polrry, I9IC)-l9?9,
T h ~ r dseries, 111 (London: H.M.S.O. 1950), 526.
59. Jervis (fn. 5 ) , 69-72, 3.52-55.
60. Quoted in Merze Tatc, T h e United States m d A r n ~ a n ~ e n t(Cambridge:
s Harvard
Univcrs~tyPress 1948), 108.
6 1 . Koggs (fn. 28), 1.5, 40.
62. Kenneth Hagan, American Gunhoat lliplonzacy rrnd the Old Navy 1877-1889
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1973), 20.
6.3. Winston Churchill, T h e G a t l ~ e r ~ nStorm
g (Boston: Houghron 19481, 206.
64. Brodie, War and Politics (fn. 35), 325.
65. Boggs (fn. 28), 42, 83. For a good argument about the possible different~~lt~on hetween
offens~veand defensive weapons in the 1930's. see Basil Liddell Hart, "Aggression and the
Prohle~nof Weapons," English Review, Vol. 5.5 (July 1932). 71-78.
66. Quoted in Boggs (fn. 28), 39.
67. On these grounds, the Germans claimed in 1932 that the French forts were offensive
(ibid.. 49). Si~nilarly,fortified forward naval bases can he necess'lry for 1,lunching a n attack;
see Rrai\ted (fn. 27), 643.
68. The French made this argument 111 the interwar period; see Rlchard Challener, Thc
k r m c h Theory of the Nation rn Arms (New York: C;olumbia IJniversity Press 1955), 181-82.
The Germ.lns disagreed; see Boggs (fn. 281, 44-45.
69. Oman (fn. 531, 57-58.
70. Quoted in Charles Wehster, Foreign Policy of Castlerc~zgh.1 I, 18 1.F-1822 [L.ondon:
G. Bell and Sons 196.31, .5 50.
71. Koggs (in. 28), 14-15, 4 7 4 8 , 60.
170 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
72. Quoted In Philip Jordan, Frontter Law and Order (Lmcoln: Un~versityof Nebraska
Press 1970), 7; also see 16-17.
73. Boggs (fn. 28), 20, 28.
74. See, however, Desmond Ball, "The Counterforce Potential of American SLBM
Systems," Journal of Peace Research, XIV (No. 1, 1977), 23-40.
75. Richard Garwin, "Anti-Submarine Warfare and National Security," Scientific
American, Vol. 2 2 7 (July 1972), 14-25.
76. The latter scenario, however, does not require that the state closely match the number
of missiles the other deploys.
77. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966),
69-78. Schelling's arguments are not entirely convincing, however. For further d~scussion,see
Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Re-Visited," Working Paper No. 14, UCLA Program in Arms
Control and International Security.
Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive
Processes in Failures o f Deterrence
Jack L. Snyder
A
ccording to the scenarios imagined by most strategists, nuclear
confrontation is a game involving a trade-off between two values.
First, there is the value associated with the immediate issue of con-
tention: for instance, in the Cuban missile crisis, maintaining U.S. prestige
in the world arena; in the Berlin crisis, maintaining the credibility of U.S.
commitments. Second, there is the value of minimizing the possibility that
an unwanted general war could result from this superpower confrontation.
Assuming a strong commitment on the part of both adversaries, any policy
that tries to attain the value associated with the immediate point of con-
tention will tend to increase the likelihood of general war. Conversely, any
policy that seeks to maximize the avoidance of war will jeopardize the pro-
tection of the first value.'
Trying to understand the dynamics of this two-value game has been a
chief preoccupation of strategists since the advent of nuclear weaponry. I t
is important, first of all, to understand how this game should be played, so
that the decision maker will be able to recognize the strategies that give him
the best chance of optimizing his interests and preparing an appropriate
force posture, military doctrine, and diplomatic strategy. At the same time,
it is also important to understand how the game will be played by flesh-and-
blood decision makers. This understanding is crucial for two reasons:
(1)Since each player's optimal strategy depends on the strategy adopted by
his opponent, such an understanding may help the player to estimate his
opponent's probable responses and to adjust his own strategy accordingly;
(2) If the non-optimizing strategies adopted by human decision makers tend
to occur in regular patterns, then a knowledge of these patterns may help
each player to monitor his own strategies.
Source: World l'ol~trcs,3 0 ( 3 )(1 978): 34\5-65.
172 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e
T h e Cybernetic M o d e l
"Value Disaggregation"
conflicts inherent in crisis diplomacy are of this kind. Any decision maker
knows he must consider the closely related problems of war avoidance and
diplomatic success simultaneously, not sequentially. He cannot tell one bureau-
cracy to worry about avoiding war and another to concern itself only with
winning the confrontation. If the value conflict is to be eliminated, it must be
done by psychological means, not bureaucratic ones.
The human mind, of course, can and will deal with such trade-offs
analytically i f compelled to d o so by a highly structured decision environ-
ment. However, trade-offs violate the experimentally established principle
of cognitive consistency. Therefore, if the decision environment is suffi-
ciently unstructured and entails sufficient uncertainty so that there is leeway
for interpretation, the decision maker will tend to conceptualize the prob-
lem in such a way that the trade-off can be denied. In other words, if the
point of view that there is no trade-off relationship can be taken (that is, if
it is not precluded by the "reality principle"), then it will be taken. Thus,
the problem is cast in a form with which the cybernetic decision maker can
deal."
Once such a conceptualization of a problem is established, cognitive
principles work to impute certainty to the correctness of that view by selective
processing of incoming information which depreciates the value of discon-
firming evidence and by "categorical inferences" of certainty or impossibil-
ity." With regard to the latter point, Steinbruner discusses John Kennedy's
inference that he would be impeached if the missiles were not removed from
Cuba:
That Kennedy might have taken his impeachment quite seriously as the
outcome of his following a conciliatory course in the crisis is [harder] to
imagine within the analytic paradigm. It would appear as a rare limiting
case (all other outcomes each assigned a probability of zero).
By contrast, cognitive theory readily accounts for the existence of
firm, categorical, nonprobabilistic beliefs in the presence of intense
uncertainty. The cognitive processing mechanisms of the mind provide a
number of ways in which beliefs become established, independent of the
weight of objective evidence. ... To the cognitive theorist it becomes
quite readily conceivable that Kennedy meant exactly what he said
about his impeachment - as he said it. As a general matter, cognitive the-
ory makes the assumption that structure will be imposed on certain situ-
ations, and uncertainty thereby resolved, not by probabilistic judgments
but by categorical inferences.14
The following case study of U.S. decision making during the Cuban missile cri-
sis will stress the role of the cognitive principle of management of inconsistency
178 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
Graham Allison has pointed out that the nature of the decision environment
in the Cuban missile crisis makes it particularly well suited for "Model I"
(rational actor) analysis: "In the context of ultimate danger to the nation, a
small group of men, unhitched from the bureaucracy, weighed the options
and decided."2s The decision makers were highly conscious of the need to
approach their dilemma in a rational-analytic manner. Furthermore, their
chosen course of action was highly successful in achieving their goals. Hence,
in such a case, Allison argues, alternative models "are forced to compete on
Model 1's home ground. The dimensions and factors uncovered by Model I1
[bureaucratic processes] and Model 111 [bureaucratic politics] in this case will
therefore be particularly s ~ g g e s t i v e . "This
~ ~ is also true for an explanation
based on nonrational cognitive processes of decision.
The present analysis will focus on the overall shaping of the decision mak-
ers' attitudes toward their options and the process by which those options
were weighed, rather than on nonrational constraints on the decision.
Avoiding the T r a d e - o f f
Kennedy and most of his advisors conceptualized the decision in a way that
avoided placing their two relevant values (war avoidance and the mainten-
ance of prestige in the international arena) in conflict. They achieved this by
conceiving the problem in terms of "risking war now" versus "running an
even greater risk of war later." If Kennedy did not act to save U.S. inter-
national prestige nozu, the loss of that prestige would contribute to an
increased chance of war later. Kennedy attributed virtual certainty to the
view that the Russians would be encouraged to push for greater and greater
concessions in Berlin and elsewhere unless the missiles were unconditionally
removed. Viewed in this light, Kennedy's choice of avoiding a diplomatic
solution (such as trading Cuban missiles for Jupiters in Turkey) in favor of
an essentially unconditional ultimatum must have seemed reasonable to
Snvdei Rationality at the Brink 179
him despite his estimate that his course of action entailed a probability
"between one out of three and even" of nuclear war." It would be worth
taking such horrendous risks if the diplomatic or do-nothing options
entailed even greater long-run risks of war. In sum, Kennedy's "war now
versus war later" formulation of the problem permitted him to deny the
trade-off relationship which seemingly existed between the values of avoiding
war and maintaining prestige. In fact, it permitted him to view the values as
mutually reinforcing: standing firm in Cuba would demonstrate America's
resolve and, hence, reduce the long-run likelihood of war.
Clearly, Kennedy's formulation of the problem is not prohibited by the
rational model simply because it corresponds closely to the formulation
predicted by the cognitive model. It is Kennedy's imputation of certainty
to a highly uncertain situation which most strongly suggests the operation
of the cognitive model, rather than the "no trade-off" character of his for-
mulation per se. Kennedy's decision environment was highly "underdeter-
mined." Many and diverse interpretations could be and have been given
to the Soviets' motivations - and to their future intentions, had the missile
gambit been successful. Some of these interpretations would hardly have
justified a one-in-three risk of nuclear war as the price of removing the
missiles, especially when their removal could have been secured with less
risk (albeit at a somewhat higher price) diplomatically. The rational paradigm
offers no guidance as to how such vast uncertainties can be resolved. The cog-
nitive paradigm, however, explains unambiguously, in terms of cognitive
principles and pressures, why Kennedy and the ExCom decided as they did.
In such situations, the decision maker may be forced to deal with the
values analytically; but, since uncertainty is great in this case, one might
expect subconscious, nonrational, cognitive processes to structure the deci-
sion in such a way that the values d o not conflict.
Intuitively, it is not hard to imagine the cognitive stress which the sacrifice
of either value would have entailed for President Kennedy, especially when his
own prestige as well as that of the United States was on the line. The Bay of
Pigs, his disastrous confrontation with Khrushchev in Vienna, and the domes-
tic allegation that he was long on profile but short on courage, all combined
to make the unconditional withdrawal of the missiles an important value
indeed, perhaps tantamount to the avoidance of nuclear war itself.
With two such vital values at stake, it is not hard to imagine that Kennedy
was under strong cognitive pressure to view his situation in a way that would
permit him to adopt a strategy which held out the possibility of winning big
with respect to both values - even if it meant running the risk of losing big as
well. An analytic, trade-off-oriented formulation of the problem could not
achieve this for Kennedy; a cognitive, "no trade-off" formulation could.
"A M i s s i l e is a M i s s i l e "
Conceptually, there were two possible ways to avoid the trade-off. The first,
and simplest, would have been to disclaim the significance of the introduc-
tion of the missiles into Cuba. By telling themselves that the missiles did
not, in any appreciable way, affect the military balance or undermine the
prestige of the United States, the members of the ExCom could have acqui-
esced in the installation of the missiles and incurred no cognitive costs. Both
values - prestige maintenance and war avoidance - could have been viewed
as essentially irrelevant t o the missile issue.
In fact, a t the beginning of the ExCom's deliberations, Secretary of
Defense McNamara argued for exactly this view: "A missile is a missile. It
makes no great difference whether you are killed by a missile fired from the
Soviet Union or from Cuba."28 Ted Sorensen reports: "As some (but not all)
Pentagon advisers pointed out to the President, we had long lived within
range of Soviet missiles, we expected Khruschev to live with our missiles
nearby, and by taking this addition calmly we would prevent him from
inflating its i m p ~ r t a n c e . " ~ ~
Objective arguments on this point were mixed. McNamara's view was
bolstered by the fact that the vulnerable, soft-site missiles could be useful
only in a first strike, and that the Soviets were far from a credible first-strike
capability even with the additional deliverable warheads provided by the
Cuban emplacements." Meanwhile, the armed services pointed to the
reduced warning time for getting American bombers off the ground, and "
the diplomats and politicians stressed the importance of "appearances,"
independent of strictly military considerations." In any case, uncertainty
regarding the significance of the Russians' gambit was great enough to permit
McNamara to rationalize his dissonance-avoiding formulation.
5nt tiel Rationality a t the Brink 18 1
The other possible means for avoiding the trade-off between the avoidance of
war and the maintenance of prestige was the formulation, "risk war now to
avoid certain war later." This, in fact, was the conceptualization adopted by
Kennedy. In his speech of October 22 announcing the blockade, Kennedy
said: "Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged,
ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our
word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of
these missiles against this or any other country and to secure their withdrawal
or elimination from the Western HemisPhere."j5
Robert Kennedy recalled that "we all agreed in the end that if the Russians
were ready to go to nuclear war over Cuba, they were ready to go to nuclear
war and that was that. So we might as well have the showdown then as six
months later." j h
In the ExCom, Secretary of State Rusk had concluded his case for an air
strike with a similar sentiment: "If we don't d o this, we go down with a
whimper. Maybe it's better to go down with a bang.""'
Presidential biographers Schlesinger and Sorensen summed up Kennedy's
and, generally speaking, the ExCom's attitude, as follows:
The Soviets would move [in Berlin], [Kennedy] expected, but they
probably would whatever we did; and perhaps this show of strength
would make them think twice about it.39
This view per se was neither necessarily wrong nor necessarily incom-
patible with the analytic model. However, the unswerving nature of the
President's commitment t o this view under conditions of great uncertainty
is more reminiscent of the cognitive than of the analytic paradigm.
C o m p e l l e n c e a n d Certainty
Kennedy's steadfast commitment t o the "war now versus war later" view is
directly reflected in the strategy he adopted to force the Russians to remove
their missiles. That strategy was essentially one of compellence: a strategy
based on the renunciation of choice.
The President and his brother assured each other that they had no choice
but to compel the Russians to dismantle the missiles unconditionally. "It
looks really mean, doesn't it? But then, really there was no other choice. If
they get this mean on this one in our part of the world, what will they d o
on the next?"40
The President then tried t o convince the Russians that he was locked
into a no-choice situation. If a blockade did not get the missiles out, an air
strike would, Kennedy told Ambassador Dobrynin via his brother.41 In
effect, he told the Russians that he was not interested in compromise solu-
tions; he had no choice but to insist on the unconditional removal of the
missiles. Therefore, the Soviets would have only two options: submit t o his
demands or provoke an escalation of the conflict. However, since Kennedy
had read The Guns of August and was attuned to the Soviets' need to avoid
h ~ m i l i a t i o n he
, ~ ~would permit them the option of capitulating gracefully
before he unilaterally imposed a military solution. But if the Soviets were
really intent on pushing him, Kennedy told them in effect, there was noth-
ing he could d o to avert escalation.
Despite Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter's protestations about controlling
the risks in Cuba, the fact remains that "all [the Kennedys'] skill would have
been to n o avail if in the end [Khrushchev] had preferred his prestige, as they
preferred theirs, to the danger of a world war."43 And despite Sorensen's and
Schlesinger's description of the ExCom's decision process as painstakingly
open and rational, the fact remains that the President and most of his ad-
visors perceived only one real option: an uncompromising policy based on
compellence, rejecting any trade-off of values. Such policies are the hallmark
of the cognitive decision maker.
T h e Failure t o N e g o t i a t e
Most scenarios suggest that World War 111 is likely to ensue from a two-
value game between the superpowers. The case study discussed in this
analysis illustrates the tendency of human decision makers to deal with such
situations by avoiding the recognition of the trade-off relationship that exists
between a player's own values. According to experimentally supported cogni-
tive theories, this avoidance reduces "cognitive dissonance" and re-establishes
cognitive consistency.
In the case study, the simplest method of ignoring the trade-off relation-
ship consists of the view that there is no contradiction between values because
one of them is not really threatened. Secretary of Defense McNamara
employed this method of trade-off avoidance when he argued that a missile
is a missile, whether launched from Cuba or the Soviet Union.
However, sometimes reality constraints (for instance, obvious diplomatic
costs of a do-nothing solution) or political constraints (for instance,
Republican and Congressional attitudes during the Cuban crisis) can pre-
clude this direct means of avoiding a trade-off. In that case, the decision
maker will tend to sidestep the trade-off between war avoidance and, say,
prestige maintenance by conceptualizing his dilemma according to a "risk
war now or incur destruction later" formula. The decision maker thereby
i ~ ~ \ : i s > r Rationality at the Brink 185
allows himself to argue that only by running some risk of war over the
immediate issue of contention can he demonstrate resolve to his adversaries
and, thus, avoid an inevitable war in the future. This formulation makes the
two values consonant and extricates the d e c ~ s ~ omaker
n from the d~ssonance-
produc~ngtrade-off. However, ~t 1s l~kelyto produce war ~f the adversary
also ddopts it.
5trateg1sts have recogn~zedthat the "better war now than war later"
concept presents real problems for the theory of deterrence, even aslde from
the lessons of cognitive theory. To quote Warner Schillmg:
The level of destruction that would attend a nuclear war becomes less
relevant if the critical choices should be made through reference to
relative, rather than absolute, costs (better World War I11 now than
later).
... there will be many opportunities for statesmen to conclude -
accurately or inaccurately - that ... the intentions of their opponent
make the costs of war unavoidable."
In sum, the analysis of the Cuban case study in light of cognitive theory
has re-emphasized the dangers of a compellence strategy. It should also
make us more circumspect about the tendency to regard deterrence as a
deus ex machina for avoiding nuclear war.
The present analysis suggests that, in situations structured along the lines
of a probable nuclear confrontation, there are "regularities of human
thought" that tend to lead decision makers away from seeing the trade-offs
which must be seen if deterrence is to work. At the same time, it is clear that
confrontations for high stakes between superpowers d o not inevitably result
in nuclear destruction. O n the contrary, there appear to be several mitigating
factors:
Author's N o t e
An earlier draft of this paper was prepared for Professor Warner Schilling's Colloquium on
Military Technology and International Relations at Columb~aUniversity, and appeared in the
Rand Corporation paper series (P-5740, October 1976). The earlier vers~on~ncludesa more
extensive discussion of the 1914 case.
Notes
Kennedy. Only detailed information on the Soviets' decision process, which is currently
unavailable, could resolve this question.
53. Schilling, "Technology and International Relations," The International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and Free Press 1968), 593.
54. Holsti, "Crisis, Stress, and Decision-making," International Social Science Journal,
XXIII, No. I (1971), 61-62, citing Sheldon J. Korchin and Seymour Levine, "Anxiety and
Verbal Learning," ]ournal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 5 4 (March 1957), 238.
55. Steinbruner (fn. 9), 147.
Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought
Fritz W. Ermarth
W
e are having trouble with Soviet strategic doctrine. Soviet thinking
about strategy and nuclear war differs in significant ways from our
own. To the extent one should care about this - and that extent
is a matter of debate - we d o not like the way the Soviets seem to think.
Before 1972, appreciation of differences between Soviet and American
strategic thinking was limited to a small number of specialists. Those who
held it a matter of high concern for policy were fewer still. Since that time,
concern about the nature, origins, and consequences of these differences is
considerably more widespread, in large measure as a result of worry about
the Soviet strategic arms buildup and the continued frustrations of achiev-
ing a real breakthrough in SALT.
Heightened attention to the way the other side thinks about strategic
nuclear power is timely and proper. The nature of the Soviet buildup and
some of our own previous choices have locked us out of pure "hardware
solutions" to our emerging strategic security problems that are independent
of the other side's values and perceptions. Whatever one thinks about the
wisdom or folly of the manner in which we have pursued SALT so far, it is
desirable that management of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship have a
place for an explicit dialogue. That dialogue should include more attention
to strategic concepts than we have seen in past SALT negotiations.
Moreover, whatever the role of SALT in the future, the existence of "rough
parity" or worse almost by definition means that we cannot limit strategic
policy to contending merely with the opponent's forces. In the cause of
deterrence, crisis management, and, if need be, war, we must thwart his
strategy. That requires understanding that opponent better.
Although many have and express views on how both the United States
and the Soviet Union deal with strategic problems, there is in fact little sys-
tematic comparison of the conceptual and behavioral foundations of our
respective strategic activity. In this area, more than other comparative
inquiries into communist and non-communist politics, there are the obs-
tacles of secrecy in the path of research. Perhaps as vital, neither government
nor academic institutions appear to have cultivated many people with the
necessary interdisciplinary skills and experience.
The most influential factor that has inhibited lucid comparisons of U.S.
and Soviet strategic thinking has been the uncritically held assumption that
they had to be very similar, or a t least converging with time. Many of 11s have
been quite insensitive to the possibility that two very different political
systems could deal very differently with what is, in some respects, a common
problem. We understood the problem of keeping the strategic peace on equit-
able and economical terms - or so we thought. As reasonable men the Soviets,
too, would come to understand it our way.
Explaining this particular expression of our cultural self-centeredness is
itself a fascinating field for speculation. I think it goes beyond the American
habit of value projection. It may result from the fact that post-war devel-
opments in U S . strategy were an institutional and intellectual offspring of
the natural sciences that spawned modern weapons. Scientific truth is trans-
national, not culturally determined. But, unfortunately, strategy is more like
politics than like science.
The next five to ten years of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship could
well be characterized by mounting U.S. anxieties about the adequacy of our
deterrent forces and our strategic doctrine. There seems to be little real
prospect that the SALT process, as we have been conducting it, will sub-
stantially alleviate these anxieties. Even if a more promising state of affairs
emerges, however, it is hard t o see us managing it with calm and confidence
unless we develop a more thorough appreciation of the differences between
U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking. Things have progressed beyond the point
where it is useful t o have the three familiar schools of thought on Soviet
doctrine arguing past each other: one saying "Whatever they say, they think
as we do;" the second insisting, "Whatever they say, it does not matter;"
and the third contending, "They think what they say, and are therefore out
for superiority over us."
Comparative strategic doctrine studies should address systematically a
series of questions:
What are the central decisions about strategy, force posture, and force
employment or operations that doctrine is supposed t o resolve for the sides
examined?
What are the prevailing categories, concepts, beliefs, and assertions that
appear to constitute the body of strategic thought and doctrine in question?
What are the hedges and qualifications introduced t o modify the main
theses of official thinking?
194 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
Answering these questions for both the United States and the Soviet
Union is admittedly n o easy matter, especially in a highly politicized envir-
onment in which many participants have already made up their minds how
they want the answers to come out with respect to assumed impact on U.S.
strategic policy. But we have the data to d o a good deal better than we have
to date.
What is U.S. strategic doctrine and policy? What is Soviet strategic doctrine
and policy? The Soviets provide definitions of doctrine (doktrina) and policy
(politika)that state they are official principles, guidance, and instructions from
the highest governing authorities to provide for the building of the armed
forces and for their employment in war.
The most useful thing about these definitions is that they remind us - or
should -that we d o not have direct and literal access to Soviet strategic doc-
trine and policy through the most commonly available sources, i.e., Soviet
military literature and various pronouncements of authoritative political
and military figures. Our insight into Soviet strategic policy is derived by
inference from such sources along with inferences from observed R&D and
force procurement behavior, what we manage to learn about peacetime
force operations and exercises, and occasional direct statements in more
privileged settings, such as SALT, by varyingly persuasive spokesmen.
The value of all these sources is constrained by the limitations of our
perceptive apparatus, technical and intellectual, and the fact that Soviet
communications on strategic subjects serve many purposes other than con-
veying official policy, such as foreign and domestic propaganda. For all
that, we have gained over the years a substantial degree of understanding
of the content of Soviet strategic thinking, of the values, standards, object-
ives, and calculations that underlie Soviet decisions. It is this total body of
thinking and its bearing on action that are of concern here.
Where lack of access complicates understanding of Soviet strategic doc-
trine, a n overabundance of data confuses understanding of the American
side, a point that Soviets make with some justice when berated with the evils
i I rndrt h American and Soviet Strategic Thought 195
of Soviet secrecy. If, in the case of the United States, one is concerned about
the body of thinking that underlies strategic action it is clearly insufficient to
rely on official statements or documents a t any level of classification or
authority. Such sources may, for one reason o r another, not tell the whole
story or paper over serious differences of purpose behind some action.
One of the difficulties in determining the concepts or beliefs that underlie
U.S. strategic action is that strategic policy is a composite of behavior taking
place in at least three distinguishable, but overlapping arenas. The smallest,
most secretive, and least significant over the long-term, assuming deterrence
does not fail, is the arena of operational or war planning. The second arena
is that of system and force acquisition; it is much larger and more complex
than the first. The most disorganized and largest, but most important for the
longer-term course of U.S. strategic behavior is the arena of largely public
debate over basic strategic principles and objectives. Its participants range
from the most highly placed executive authorities to influential private elites,
and occasionally the public a t large. Strategy-making is a relatively demo-
cratic process in the United States.
To be sure, may areas of public policymaking can be assessed in terms
of these overlapping circles of players and constituents. But the realm of
U.S. strategic policy may be unusual in the degree to which different rules,
data, concerns, and participants dominate the different arenas. These dif-
ferences make it difficult t o state with authority what U.S. strategic policy
is on an issue that cuts across the arenas. For example, public U.S. policy
may state a clear desire t o avoid counter-silo capabilities on stability
grounds. The weapons acquisition community may, for a variety of reasons,
simultaneously be seeking a weapons characteristic vital t o counter-silo
capability, improved ballistic missile accuracy. As best they can with
weapons available, meanwhile, force operators may be required by the logic
of their task t o target enemy missile silos as a high priority.
Despite these complexities, however, it is ~ o s s i b l eto generalize a body of
policy concepts and values that govern U.S. strategic behavior. There are
strong tendencies that dominate U.S. strategic behavior in the areas of declara-
tory policy, force acquisition, and arms control policy. Again, the case of US.
counter-silo capabilities may be cited. Today, the United States lacks high con-
fidence capabilities against Soviet missile silos; it may continue to lack them
for some time or indefinitely. This is in part the result of technological choice,
the early selection of small ICBMs and the deployment of low-yield MIRV
weapons. It is also the result of Soviet efforts to improve silo hardness. But the
main reason for this lack is that we have abided by a conscious judgment - that
a serious counter-silo capability, because it threatens strategic stability, is a bad
thing for the United States to possess.
The situation seems more straightforward, if secretive, on the Soviet side.
Soviet strategic policymaking takes place in a far more vertical and closed
system. Expertise is monopolized by the military and a subset of the top
political leadership. Although elites external t o this group can bid for its
scarce resources to some extent, they cannot seriously challenge its values
196 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
and judgments. Matters of doctrine, force acquisition, and war planning are
much more intimately connected within this decision group than in the
United States. Policy arguments are indeed possible. Public evidence suggests
a series of major Soviet debates on nuclear strategy from the mid-1950s to
the late 1960s, although identification of issues, alternatives, and parameters
in these debates must be somewhat speculative.
These considerations make difficult, but not impossible, the comparative
treatment of U.S. and Soviet strategic belief systems and concepts. One may
describe with some confidence how the two very different decision systems
deal with certain concerns central t o the strategic nuclear predicament of
both sides. Much about U.S. and Soviet strategic belief systems can be cap-
tured by exploring how they treat five central issues: (1) the consequences of an
all-out strategic nuclear war, (2) the phenomenon of deterrence, (3) stability,
(4) distinctions and relationships between intercontinental and regional
strategic security concerns, and ( 5 )strategic conflict limitation.
C o n s e q u e n c e s of N u c l e a r W a r
For a generation, the relevant elites of both the United States and the Soviet
Union have agreed that an unlimited strategic nuclear war would be a
sociopolitical disaster of immense proportions. Knowing the experiences of
the peoples of the Soviet Union with warfare in this century and with
nuclear inferiority since 1945, one sometimes suspects that the human
dimensions of such a catastrophe are more real to Russians, high and low,
than to Americans, for whom the prospect is vague and unreal, if certainly
- -
forbidding.
For many years the prevailing U.S. concept of nuclear war's consequences
has been such as to preclude belief in any military or politically meaningful
form of victory. Serious effort on the part of the state to enhance the
prospect for national survival seemed quixotic, even dangerous. Hence
stems our relative disinterest in air defenses and civil defenses over the last
fifteen years, and our genuine fear that ballistic missile defenses would be
severely destabilizing. Growth of Soviet nuclear power has certainly clinched
this view of nuclear conflict among critical elements of the U.S. elite. But
even when the United States enjoyed massive superiority, when the Soviet
Union could inflict much less societal damage on the United States, and then
only in a first strike (through the early 1960s), the awesome destructiveness
of nuclear weapons had deprived actual war with these weapons of much
of its strategic meaning for the United States.
The Soviet system has, however, in the worst of times, clung tenaciously
to the belief that nuclear war cannot - indeed, must not - be deprived of
strategic meaning, i.e., some rational relationship to the interests of the state.
It has insisted that, however awful, nuclear war must be survivable and some
kind of meaningful victory attainable. As most are aware, this issue was
debated in various ways at the beginning and end of the Khrushchev era,
with Khrushchev on both sides of the issue. But the system decided it had to
I I 111,ii t i I American and Soviet Strategic Thought 197
believe in survival and victory of some form. Not so to believe would mean
that the most basic processes of history, on which Soviet ideology and polit-
ical legitimacy are founded, could be derailed by the technological works of
man and the caprice of an historically doomed opponent. Moreover, as the
defenders of doctrinal rectitude continued to point out, failure to believe in
the "manageability" of nuclear disaster would lead to pacificism, defeatism,
and lassitude in the Soviet military effort. This should not be read as the tri-
umph of ideological will over objective science and practical reason. From
the Soviet point of view, nuclear war with a powerful and hostile America
was a real danger. Could the state merely give up on its traditional respon-
sibilities to defend itself and survive in that event? Their negative answer
hardly strikes one as unreasonable. Their puzzlement, alternating between
contemptuous and suspicious, over U.S. insistence on a positive answer is
not surprising.
In recent years the changing strategic balance has had the effect of
strengthening rather than weakening the asymmetry of the two sides' con-
victions on this matter. Dubious when the United States enjoyed relative
advantage, strategic victory and survival in nuclear conflict have become
the more incredible to the United States as the strategic power o f the
Russians has grown. For the Soviets, however, the progress of arms and
war-survival programs has transformed what was in large measure an ide-
ological imperative into a more plausible strategic potential. For reasons to
be examined below, Soviet leaders possibly believe that, under favorable
operational conditions, the Soviet Union could win a central strategic war
today. Notwithstanding strategic parity or essential equivalence of force,
they may also believe they could lose such a conflict under some conditions.
Deterrence
The concept of deterrence early became a central element of both U.S. and
Soviet strategic belief systems. For both sides the concept had extended or
regional dimensions, and a good deal of political content. There has, in
short, been some functional symmetry between the deterrence thinking of
the two sides: restraint of hostile action across a spectrum of violence by the
threat of punishing consequences in war. Over time and with shifts in the
overall military balance, latent asymmetries of thinking have become more
pronounced. For the United States, strategic deterrence has tended to
become the only meaningful objective of strategic policy, and it has become
progressively decoupled from regional security. For the Soviets, deterrence -
or war prevention - was the first, but not the only and not the last objec-
tive of strategy. Deterrence also meant the protection of a foreign policy
that had both offensive and defensive goals. And it was never counterposed
against the ultimate objective of being able to manage a nuclear war suc-
cessfully should deterrence fail. The Soviet concept of deterrence has
evolved as the strategic balance has improved for the Soviet Union from
primary emphasis on defensive themes of war prevention and protection of
198 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
prior political gains to more emphasis on themes that include the protection
of dynamic processes favoring Soviet international interests. Repetition of
the refrain that detente is a product of Soviet strategic power, among other
things, displays this evolution.
Stability
Intercontinental a n d Regional
Defining the boundary line between strategic and non-strategic forces has
been a troubling feature of SALT from the beginning. It is one of diplo-
macy's minor ironies that forward capabilities the United States has long
regarded as part of the general purpose forces we have been hard pressed
t o keep out of the negotiations. But peripheral strike forces the Soviets have
systematically defined and managed as strategic seem very difficult t o bring
into the picture.
Geography imparted an intercontinental meaning t o the term strategic
for the United States. The same geography dictated that, for the Soviet
Union, strategic concern began a t the doorstep. Soviet concern about the
military capabilities in the hands of and on the territory of its neighbors is
genuine, although Soviet arguments for getting the United States t o legit-
irnatize and pay for those concerns a t SALT in terms of its own central force
allowances have been a bit contrived. They are tantamount t o penalizing
the United States for having friends, while rewarding the Soviet Union for
conducting itself in a manner that has left it mostly vassals and opponents
on its borders.
Underlying these definitional problems are more fundamental differ-
ences between U.S. and Soviet doctrines on what is generally called "coup-
ling." It has long been U.S. policy t o assure that U.S. strategic nuclear
forces are seen by the Soviets and our NATO allies as tightly coupled to
European security. Along with conventional and theater nuclear forces, U.S.
strategic nuclear forces constitute an element of the NATO "triad." The
good health of the alliance politically and the viability of deterrence in
Europe have been seen t o require a very credible threat to engage U.S.
strategic nuclear forces once nuclear weapons come into play above the level
of quite limited use. For more than twenty years NATO's official policy has
had t o struggle against doubts that this coupling could be credible in the
absence of clear U.S. strategic superiority. Yet the vocabularly we commonly
employ itself tends t o strain this linkage in that theater nuclear forces
are distinguished from strategic. Ironically, the struggle to keep so-called
Forward Based Systems out of SALT, because we could not find a good way
to bring in comparable Soviet systems, tended t o underline the distinction.
In o u r thinking about the actual prosecution of a strategic conflict, once
conflict a t that level begins we tend t o forget about what might be the local
outcome of the regional conflict that probably precipitated the strategic
exchange.
The Soviets, on the other hand, appear to take a more comprehensive
view of strategy and the strategic balance. Both in peacetime political com-
petition and in the ultimate test of a central conflict, they tend to see all force
elements as contributing to a unified strategic purpose, national survival and
200 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e
Conflict Limitation
the quest for counterforce advantages. They have replayed the criticism that
such concepts weaken deterrence and cannot prevent nuclear war from
becoming unlimited.
To some degree, Soviet propaganda on this theme is suspect for being
aimed at undermining U.S. strategy innovations that detract from the political
benefits of Soviet strategic force improvement. Given differences of view in the
United States o n this subject, moreover, the Soviets could hardly resist the
temptation to fuel the U.S. argument. There are several reasons why Soviet
public pronouncements should not be taken as entirely reflecting the content
of operative Soviet strategic thinking and planning regarding limited nuclear
use. For one thing, qualified acceptance in doctrine and posture of a non-
nuclear scenario, or at least a non-nuclear phase, in theater conflict displays
some Soviet willingness to embrace conflict limitation notions previously
rejected. Soviet strategic nuclear force growth and modernization, in addition,
have given Soviet operational planners a broader array of employment options
than they had in the 1960s and may have imparted some confidence in Soviet
ability to enforce conflict limitations. It would not be surprising, therefore, to
find some Soviet contingency planning for various kinds of limited nuclear
options at the theater and, perhaps, at the strategic level.
One may seriously doubt, however, whether Soviet planners would
approach the problem of contingency planning for limited nuclear options
with the conceptual baggage the U.S. system carries. It would seem contrary
t o the style of Soviet doctrinal thinking to emphasize bargaining and risk
management. Rather the presence of limited options planning in the Soviet
system would seem likely t o rest on more traditional military concepts of
economizing on force use, controlling actions and their consequences,
reserving options, and leaving time t o learn what is possible in the course
of a campaign. The Soviet limited options planner would seem likely t o
approach his task with a more strictly unilateral set of concerns than his
American counterpart.
Comparative study of U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine should give atten-
tion t o a closely related matter: how we perceive and measure force bal-
ances. Allusion has already been made to asymmetries between U.S. and
Soviet definitions of strategic forces, what should be counted in SALT, etc.
This is by no means the heart of the matter. U.S. and Soviet methodologies
for measuring military strength appear to differ significantly.
Many rather amateurish and misleading beliefs about the way the
Soviets measure and value military strength prevail; for example, that the
Soviets have some atavistic devotion t o mass and size. Mass they d o believe
in because both experience and analysis show that mass counts. They can
be quite choosey about size, however, as a look a t their tank and fighter
designs reveals. Within the limits of their technological potential, they have
202 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
been quite sensitive and in no way primitive in their thinking about quality/
quantity tradeoffs.
Another widespread notion is that the Soviets have an unusual propensity
for worst-case planning or military overinsurance. This is hard to demonstrate
convincingly in Soviet behavior. The Soviet theory of war in central Europe,
for example, is daring, not conservative. Despite much rhetoric on the danger
of surprise and the need for high combat readiness, Soviet strategic planning
has not accorded nearly the importance to "bolt-from-the-blue" surprise
attack that the United States has. This does not look like overinsurance.
The problem of measuring strength goes more deeply to differing appre-
ciations of the processes of conflict and how they bear on force measure-
ment. U.S. measures of the overall strategic balance tend to be of two general
types. First come the so-called static measures of delivery vehicles, weapons,
megatonage and equivalent megatonage, throwweight, and, perhaps, some
measure of hard-target kill (such as weapon numbers times a
scaled yield factor divided by the square of Circular Error Probability).
Comparisons of this type can display some interesting things about differing
forces. But they say very little about how those forces, much less the nations
that employ them, will fare in war. By themselves, static measures can be
dangerously misleading.
We then move on to the second, or quasi-dynamic, class of measures. Here
the analyst is out to capture the essential features of a "real war" in terms
general enough to allow parametric application, frequent reiteration of the
analysis with varying assumptions, and easy swamping of operational and
technical details which he may not be able to quantify or of which he may be
ignorant. Typically, certain gross attributes of the war "scenario" will be
determined, e.g., levels of alert, who goes first, and very general targeting pri-
orities. Then specified "planning factor" performance characteristics are
attributed to weapons. Because it is relatively easy (and fun), a more or less
elaborate version of the ICBM duel is frequently conducted. The much more
subtle and complicated, but crucial, engagement of air and sea-based forces
is usually handled by gross assumption, e.g., n percent of bomber weapons
get to target, all SSBNs at sea survive. Regional conflicts and forces are typ-
ically ignored. Of course, all command/control/communications systems are
assumed to work as planned - otherwise the forces, and even worse, the ana-
lyst would be out of business. Finally, "residuals" of surviving forces, fatality
levels, and industrial damage are totaled up. A popular variant is to run a
countermilitary war in these terms and then see whether residual forces are
sufficient to inflict "unacceptable damage" on cities. If so, then deterrence is
intact according to some. Others point to grossly asymmetric levels of sur-
viving forces to document an emerging strategic imbalance.
Most specialists agree and explicitly admit that this kind of analysis does
not capture the known, much less the unknown complexities, uncertainties,
and fortuities of a real strategic nuclear conflict of any dimension. Such litur-
gical admissions are usually offered to gain absolution from their obvious con-
sequences, namely that the analysis in question could be, not illuminating, but
I :rri,ir~h American and Soviet Strategic Thought 203
quite wrong. However, more heroic analytic attempts at capturing the real
conlplexity and operational detail of a major nuclear exchange are usually not
made because they are: a ) usually beyond the expertise of single analysts or
small groups, b) not readily susceptible t o varied and parametric application,
and c) still laden by manifold uncertainties and unknowns that are very hard
to quantify. Hence they are very hard t o apply to the tasks of assessing stra-
tegic force balances or the value of this or that force improvement. The more
simplistic analysis is more convenient. The analyst can conduct it many times,
and talk over his results with other analysts who d o the same thing. The whole
methodology thereby acquires a reality and persuasiveness of its own.
The influence of this kind of analysis in our strategic decision system has
many explanations. It has sociological origins in the dominance of econo-
mists and engineers over soldiers in the conduct of our strategic affairs. It
conforms with the needs of a flat and argumentative policy process in which
there are many and varied participants, from generals to graduate students.
They need a common idiom that does not soak up too much computer time
and can be unclassified. And finally, in part because of the first explanation
cited, when it comes to nuclear strategy, we d o not believe much in "real"
nuclear war anyway. We are after a standard of sufficiency that is adequate
and persuasive in a peacetime setting.
Two things about this style of strategic analysis merit staring in the context
of this paper. First, on the face of it, the value of simplistic, operationally-
insensitive methodologies is assuredly less in the present strategic environment
than it was when the United States enjoyed massive superiority. Not only are
weapons, force mixes, and scenarios more complicated than these methodo-
logies can properly illuminate, but the relative equality of the two sides going
into the conflict makes the subleties, complexities, and uncertainties all the
more important for how they come out. Second, the Soviets d o not appear to
do their balance measuring in this manner.
One can gain a fair insight into the manner of Soviet force balance analy-
sis from public sources, particularly Soviet military literature. Additional
inferences can be drawn from the organization and professional composition
of the Soviet defense decision system, and from some of the results of Soviet
decisions. O n the whole it appears that Soviet planners and force balance
assessors are much more sensitive than we are to the subtleties and uncer-
tainties - what we sometimes call "scenario dependencies" - of strategic
conflict seen from a very operational perspective. The timing and scale of
attack initiation, tactical deception and surprise, uncertainties about weapons
effects, the actual character of operational plans and targeting, timely
adjustment of plans to new information, and, most important, the continued
viability of command and control - these factors appear to loom large in
Soviet calculations of conflict outcomes.
The important point, however, is a conceptual one: Unlike the typical
U.S. planner, the Soviet planner does not appear t o see the force balance
prior t o conflict as a kind of physical reification of the war outcome and
therefore as a measure of strategic strength by itself. Rather he seems to see
204 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
in launching a strategic attack and achieving the specific objectives that the-
oretical analysis might suggest to be possible, such as destruction of
Minuteman. Particularly because they are highly sensitive to operational
uncertainties they would not, in one of the more noteworthy phrases of the
latest Defense Department posture statement, gamble national survival on a
"single cosmic throw of the dice." This construction of the problem obscures
the high likelihood that decisions to go to strategic war will be made under
great pressure and in the face of severe perceived penalty if the decision is not
made and the war comes anyway. They are not likely to come about in a situ-
ation in which the choice is an uncertain war or a comfortable peace. It also
obscures the fact that the heavy weight o f uncertainty will also rest o n the
shoulders of U.S. decisionmakers in a crisis.
Dangers of Misunderstanding
In sum, there are fundamental differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic
thinking, both at the level of value and at the level of method. The existence
of these differences and, even more, our failure to recognize them have had
dangerous consequences for the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship.
One such might be called the "hawk's lament." Failing to appreciate the
character of Soviet strategic thinking in relation to our own views, we have
underestimated the competitiveness of Soviet strategic policy and the need
for con~petitiveresponsiveness on our part. This is evident in both our SAI,T
and our strategic force modernization behavior.
A second negative effect might be termed the "dove's lament." By pro-
jecting our views onto the Soviets, and failing to appreciate their real
motives and perceptions, we have underestimated the difficulties of achiev-
ing genuine strategic stability through SALT and over-sold the value of what
we have achieved. This has, in turn, set us up for profound, perhaps even
hysterical, disillusionment in the years ahead, in which the very idea of
negotiated arms control could be politically discredited. If present strategic
trends continue, it is not hard to imagine a future political environment in
which it would be difficult to argue for arms control negotations even of a
very hard-nosed sort.
The third and most dangerous consequence of our misunderstanding of
Soviet strategy involves excessive confidence in strategic stability. U.S. stra-
tegic behavior, in its broadest sense, has helped to ease the Soviet Union onto
a course of more assertive international action. This has, in turn, increased
the probability of a major East-West confrontation, arising not necessarily
by Soviet design, in which the United States must forcefully resist a Soviet
advance or face collapse of its global position, while the Soviet Union can-
not easily retreat or compromise because it has newly acquired global power
status to defend and the matter at issue could be vital. In such conditions, it
is all too easy to imagine a "war is coming" situation in which the abstract
technical factors on which we rest our confidence in stability, such as expected
206 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
force survival levels and "unacceptable damage," could crumble away. The
strategic case for "waiting to see what happens," for conceding the opera-
tional initiative to the other side - which is what crisis stability is all about -
could look very weak. Each side could see the great operational virtues of
preemption, be convinced that the other side sees them too, and be hourly
more determined that the other side not have them. This, in any case, could
be the Soviet way of perceiving things. Given the relative translucence of U.S.
versus Soviet strategic decision processes, however, our actual ability to pre-
empt is likely to be less than the Soviets', quite apart from the character of
the force balance. Add to that the problem of a vulnerable Minuteman
ICBM force and you have a potentially very nasty situation.
What we know about the nature of our own strategic thinking and that
of the Soviet Union is not at all comforting at this juncture. The Soviets
approach the problem of managing strategic nuclear power with highly
competitive and combative instincts. Some have argued that these instincts
are largely fearful and defensive, others that they are avaricious and confi-
dent. My own reading of Russian and Soviet history is that they are both,
and, for that, the more difficult to handle.
The United States and the Soviet Union share two awesome problems in
common, the creation of viable industrial societies and the management of
nuclear weapons. Despite much that is superficially common t o our heri-
tages, however, these two societies have fundamentally different political
cultures that determine how they handle these problems. The stamp of a
legal, commercial, and democratic society is clearly seen in the way the
United States has approached the task of managing nuclear security. Soviet
styles of managing this problem bear the stamp of an imperial, bureau-
cratic, and autocratic political tradition. While the United States is willing
t o see safety in a compact of "live and let live" under admittedly unpleas-
ant conditions, the Soviet Union operates from a political tradition that sus-
pects the viability of such deals, and expects them, at best, to mark the
progress of historically ordained forces to ascendancy.
It is not going t o be easy to stabilize the strategic competition on this
foundation of political traditions. But if we understand the situation clearly,
there should be no grounds for fatalism. Along with a very uncomfortable
degree of competitiveness, Soviet strategic policy contains a strong element
of professionalism and military rationalism with which we can do business
in the interest of a common safety if we enhance those qualities in ourselves.
The Soviets respect military power and they take warfare very seriously.
When the propaganda and polemics are pared away, they sometimes won-
der if we do. We can make a healthy contribution t o our own future, and
theirs, by rectifying this uncertainty.
Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter
Robert Jervis
P
roponents of AD argue that the vulnerability of population centers in
both the United States and the Soviet Union that conies with mutual
second-strike capability has transformed strategy. Because a military
advantage n o longer assures a decisive victory, old ways of thinking are no
longer appropriate. The healthy fear of devastation, which cannot be exor-
cised short of the attainment of a first-strike capability, makes deterrence
relatively easy. Furthermore, because cities cannot he taken out o f hostage,
the perceived danger of total destruction is crucial at all points in the threat,
display, or use of force.
Four implications follow. First, because gaining the upper hand in purely
military terms cannot protect one's country, various moves in a limited war -
such as using large armies, employing tactical nuclear weapons, or even
engaging in limited strategic strikes - are less important for influencing the
course of the battle than for showing the other side that a continuation of
the conflict raises an ~lnacceptabledanger that things will get o ~ i of t hand.
New weapons are introduced not to gain a few miles of territory, but to
engage in what Schelling has called competition in risk taking.' Escalation
dominance - the ability to prevail at every level of military conflict below
that of all-out war - is thus neither necessary nor sufficient to reach one's
goals, be they to preserve the status quo or to change it. Being able to win
on the battlefield does not guarantee winning one's objectives, since the risk
of escalation may be too great to justify the expected benefits.
Second, it does not matter which side has more nuclear weapons. In the
past, having a larger army than one's neighbor allowed one to conquer it
and protect one's own population. Having a larger nuclear stockpile yields
no such gains. Deterrence comes from having enough weapons to destroy
the other's cities; this capability is an absolute, not a relative, one.'
Source: /'olitic~z/S&WCC Q ~ ~ a r t t ' r94(4)
~ y , ( 1979-80): 6 17-33,
208 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
less self-defeating strikes, the importance of the details of the strategic balance
becomes clear.'
Proponents of FR thus disagree with the AD position that the inherent
riskiness of any major provocation in the nuclear era means that a second-
strike capability protects against much more than an unrestrained assault
o n the country's homeland. Secretary of Defense Brown a r g ~ ~ ethat s "we
now recognize that the strategic nuclear forces can deter only a relatively
narrow range of contingencies, much smaller in range than was foreseen
only 20 or 30 years ago.""imilarly, Brown, like Schlesinger before him,
claims that "only if we have the capability to respond realistically and effect-
ively to an attack at a variety of levels can we ... have the confidence neces-
sary to a credible deterrent."' But, the proponents of AD would reply, this
argument advocating something approximating escalation dominance
misses the point. No state can respond "effectively" in the sense of being
able to take its population centers out of hostage; thus, it is the willingness
to run risks and the perceptions of this willingness that will determine
whether a response is "realistic" and a threat is credible.
Much of the difference between the two schools of thought turns on differ-
ing ideas about stability. Both groups agree on the overwhelming importance
of preserving one's cities. But for the proponents of FR, the common interest
in avoiding a mutually disastrous outcome can be used as a lever to extract
competitive concessions. Either side can take provocative actions because the
other cannot credibly threaten to respond by all-out war. Proponents of AD,
on the other hand, see stability as broader, and deterrence as covering
a wider set of interests, since it follows from the reasonable fear that any
challenge to an opponent's vital interest could escalate. Paradoxically, stability
is in part the product of the belief that the world is not entirely stable, that
things could somehow get out of control.
There are two elements that influence beliefs about the extent to which
the risks of escalation could be kept limited and controlled, and it is not
surprising that advocates of AD and FR disagree about both. The first eleni-
ent is the American reaction and the Soviet anticipation of it. Advocates of
FR fear that the Russians might be certain enough that the United States
would not use nuclear weapons in response to a major provocation to make
such a provocation worth taking. Those who support a policy of AD deny
this, noting that the United States has behaved too unpredictably for any state
to be sure what it will do. Part of the reason for the disagreement on this
point is that proponents of both AD and FR project their views onto the gov-
ernments of the United States and the Soviet Union. The latter believe, and
the former deny, that a large Russian arms build-up would intimidate the
United States.
The other element in the belief about whether the risks would seem
controllable is a judgment about the inherent limits of manipulation and
2 10 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
prediction in human affairs. While these factors are rarely discussed expli-
citly, the tone of much of the FR writings implies that men can make fine,
complex, and accurate calculations. Friction, uncertainty, failures of imple-
mentation, and the fog of battle d o not play a major role. Men see clearly,
their subordinates are able to carry out intricate instructions, and the other
side gets the desired message. Thus, Secretary Brown recently argued that "if
we try bluffing [the Russians with a threat of massive retaliation], ways can
be found by others to test our bluffs without undue risk to them."I0 Such
attempts would involve reasonable risks only if the situation were under
complete control and seen by the Soviets as relatively safe, and then only if
they believed this to be the case. (But many proponents of FR also believe
that the United States cannot rely on tactical nuclear weapons to defend
Europe because their use could too easily lead to all-out war. This fits oddly
with the belief that the superpowers could fight a limited strategic war.)
For the advocates of AD, this is a dream world. War plans can be drawn
up on this basis, but reality will not conform. Furthermore, decision makers,
having experienced the multiple ways in which predictions prove incorrect
and situations get out of control, d o not commit the fallacy of believing that
escalation could be carefully manipulated and thus would not place any
faith in the precise options of limited nuclear warfare. FR advocates see the
need for a policy they consider to be prudential in the sense of being able
to cope with unlikely but dangerous contingencies because they d o not
think decision makers can be counted on to avoid terrible risks; proponents
of AD d o not think American policy has to cover such remote possibilities
because they are confident that statesmen are at least minimally prudent.
This difference in beliefs - or perhaps I should say in intuitions - goes
far to explain why some of the proponents of FR see a much greater dan-
ger of a Russian first strike than d o advocates of AD. One would not expect
any difference of opinion here since the question seems entirely technical.
But it is not. To launch a first strike in the belief that one could destroy most
of an opponent's strategic forces is to accept a set of complex and uncertain
calculations: the weapons have never been tested under fully operational
conditions; accuracies are estimated from performances over test ranges,
which may be different when the missiles are fired over different parts of
the earth; the vulnerability of the other side's silos (and one's own) can
never be known with certainty before the war; and the effects on the envir-
onment of huge nuclear explosions can only be guessed at. The same orien-
tation that leads one to believe that statesmen could be sufficiently
confident of their ability to prevent escalation to allow them to engage in
major provocations also fits with the conclusion that statesmen might place
sufficient confidence in their estimates to launch a disarming strike.
If differences in beliefs about the risks inherent in major provocations
are one source of the dispute between AD and FR, another is a difference
in perceptions of the risks that the Russians are willing to run. Most pro-
ponents of AD argue that while the desire to expand is not completely
absent, the Russians are not so strongly motivated in this regard as to be
It...\ it. Nuclear Superiority 211
The basic concern of the proponents of FR is that the threat to attack Soviet
population centers is not credible when the Russians can respond in kind.
In a crisis the United States must "have a wider choice than humiliation or
all-out nuclear action," to use President Kennedy's terms." The danger that
the proponents of FR see was expressed well by Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger in 1975: "If one side should remove the other's capability for
flexible and controlled responses, he might find ways of exercising coercion
and extracting concessions without triggering the final holocaust .... No
opponent should think that he could fire at some of our Minuteman or SAC
[Strategic Air Command] bases without being subjected to, at the very least,
a response in kind. N o opponent
.. should believe that he could attack other
U.S. targets of military or economic value without finding similar or other
appropriate targets in his own homeland under attack .... Above all, no
opponent should entertain the thought that we will permit him to remove
our capability for flexible strategic responses.""
We can examine the problem more clearly by seeing that Schlesinger and
other proponents of FR blur the distinction between two kinds of wars. The
first involves demonstration attacks. Since they d o not require large numbers
of missiles, neither the size of each side's force nor its vulnerability is import-
ant. The second is a counterforce war of attrition in which the Russians
would launch the first nuclear strike, trying to destroy as much of the
American strategic force as possible, either in one blow or by moving more
slowly and taking out the opposing forces in a series of strikes. Although the
United States would still be able to attack the Soviet Union's cities, the only
2 12 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
result of such a strike would be to have U.S. cities blown up thirty minutes
later. If the U.S. strategic force is vulnerable, the Russians can destroy much
of it without using a similar proportion of their force; if the U.S. force
cannot hit protected targets, it will not be able to reduce the Russian force.
But, and this is crucial, it is only in counterforce wars of attrition that the
comparison of each side's counterforce capabilities matters.
Examining a number of contexts in which defense problems arise, one
can see that the distinction between attacks that have an effect by demon-
strating resolve and those that aim at reducing an opponent's capability
recurs and is closely tied to the basic difference between the AD and FR
positions. If the AD position is correct and counterforce wars of attrition
are not a real possibility in the nuclear era, then the United States does not
have to worry that its Minuteman force is vulnerable or that the Russians
have a greater ability to destroy hard targets than the United States does.
To evaluate the arguments, it is useful to examine the potentially critical
situations.
Protecting Europe
One major fear is that the Soviets could launch a large-scale conventional
attack that would conquer Europe unless the United States escalated. If
the United States tried to stave off defeat by employing tactical nuclear
weapons, the Soviets could reply in kind, nullifying any advantage the West
may have gained. One FR remedy would be to develop the means to defend
against an attack at any level of violence. Thus the West would deploy con-
ventional forces to contain a conventional attack and tactical nuclear
weapons to cope with a like attack. This alluring argument is not correct.
An aggressor could attack in the face of escalation dominance if he believed
that the defender would not pay the price of resisting, a price that includes
a probability that the fighting will spread to each side's population centers.
The other side of this coin is that a state that could be confident of winning
a military victory in Europe could be deterred from attacking or deterred
from defending against an attack by the fear that the war might spread to
its homeland. Only if the risk of such escalation could be reduced to zero
would this element disappear and purely military considerations be deter-
minative. The advocates of FR thus overstate the efficacy of their policy.
Of course if the United States lacks escalation dominance it would have
to take the initiative of increasing the level of violence and risk in the event
of a Soviet attack on Europe. But the onus of undertaking the original move
would still remain with the aggressor. And since the level of risk is shared
equally by both sides, what is likely to be more important than the inhib-
ition against having to take the initiative is the willingness or unwillingness
to approach the brink rather than concede defeat, a factor not linked to escal-
ation dominance. Furthermore, some practical considerations reinforce this
conclusion. As Bernard Brodie argued, it is hard to imagine that the Soviets
would launch a conventional attack in the face of NATO's tactical nuclear
, Nuclear Superiority 2 13
whether the danger that such a conflict would escalate to attacks on popu-
lation centers would dominate decision makers' calculations.
Preemption
of striking first can only be translated into political gains if the war remains
counterforce and the state with the most missiles left after a series of
exchanges prevails without losing its population centers."' The FR fallacy
here is parallel to that involved in the claim that escalation dominance is
necessary or sufficient for deterring or prevailing in a conflict in Europe.
Competition in risk taking, rather than con~petitionin military capability,
dominates.
which would be present even if the United States said it would not react
in this way - would have to weigh very heavily on the Soviet decision makers.
But the existence of tight control would not ensure the s ~ ~ c c eof
s s a strat-
egy of attrition. If the Russians launched a counterforce strike and the
United States did not retaliate against Soviet cities, it might nullify a Russian
war-fighting strategy by not responding at all. This may seem as bizarre as
a counterattack on population centers, but on closer examination it makes
some sense. Why should the United States retaliate? What would the
Russians have gained by destroying a significant portion of the U.S. strategic
force? Why would they be in a better position to work their will after a
strike than before it? If the United States acts as though it is weakened, it
will be in a worse bargaining position, but this is within American control.
To withhold a response, while maintaining the ability to destroy Russian
cities later, could as easily be taken as a sign of high resolve as of low. The
United States would forego hitting many Russian military targets, but this
2 16 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
would not sacrifice much of value since attacking them would not limit the
Soviet ability to destroy the United States. Only if a war in Europe were
being fought at the same time, and thus a failure to respond created or mag-
nified an imbalance of land forces, would withholding a return counterforce
strike give up something of value. But for the Soviets to attack American
strategic forces (and NATO tactical nuclear forces) in conjunction with
fighting a war in Europe would be to run a very high risk of an American
counterattack on Soviet population centers.
The possibility of not responding to a Soviet counterforce strike points to
the odd nature of a nuclear war of attrition. The benefit of the efforts to
reduce an opponent's strategic forces comes only near the end, when the
state is able to take its society out of hostage. Unless and until that point is
reached, the side that is "losing" the counterforce war of attrition can d o
nearly as much damage to the side that is "winning" as it could before the
war started. Military efforts can succeed only if the "loser" allows them to
by sparing the "winner's" cities. Of course it will be costly for the "loser" to
initiate counterstrikes against population centers, since the "winner" will
presumably retaliate. But this is true regardless of the details of the strategic
balance.
If the ultimate threat, even during a war of attrition, is that of destroy-
ing cities, it is clear that such wars are more competition in risk taking than
they are attempts to gain an advantage on the battlefield. To concentrate on
the military advantages that accrue to one side or the other by counterforce
attacks is to ignore the fact that in any nuclear war the element of threat of
escalation will loom very large.21This general point is missed by Secretary
of Defense Brown when he says that the ability to hit a wide range of mili-
tary targets "permits us t o respond credibly to threats or actions by a
nuclear opponent."22 But what is crucial is less the capability than the will-
ingness to use it. Even if the United States had the ability to match the Soviets
round for round, target for target, it might not d o so - and the Russians
might move in the belief that the United States would not respond - because
the costs and risks were felt to be too great. And even if the United States
lacked such a capability, the Soviet fear of an all-out response could lead it
to expect that any provocation would be prohibitively costly. Since what
matters in limited strategic wars, even if they involve targets that are
predominantly military, is each side's willingness to run high risks, it is the
"balance of resolve" rather than the "balance of military power" that will
most strongly influence their o u t ~ o m e s . ~ ~ xammunition
tra cannot com-
pensate for weakness in will or a refusal - perhaps a sensible refusal - to
run the risk of destruction.
The importance of competition in risk taking implies that demonstration
attacks would be more useful than attempts t o reduce an opponent's mili-
tary capabilities. Such attacks could be aimed at a military installation, an
isolated element of an opponent's strategic forces, a command and control
facility, or a city. The purpose of such an action would be to inflict pain,
show resolve, and raise the risks of all-out war to a level that an opponent
i~ I \ Nuclear Superiority 2 17
would find intolerable. Such risks, of course, weigh on both sides, but only by
willingly accepting high risks can a state prevail. In addition to high resolve,
in order to engage in nuclear demonstrations a state needs to be able to carry
out a certain number of limited options. But the ammunition requirements are
nowhere near as high as they are for a counterforce war of attrition (and both
sides can simultaneously have the capability for demonstrations).
Demonstration strikes would exert pressure in three ways. First, they
would exact some degree of punishment on the other side. But the immedi-
ate pain inflicted would probably be less important than the underlying
motivation of these strikes - the implied threat to d o more harm unless the
opponent complies with the attacking state's demands. This threat gains its
credibility because the attacking state has shown that it is willing to engage
in very risky actions that have increased the chance that targets in its own
country would be struck. When both sides have second-strike capability,
one side prevails in a crisis, not by showing that it can inflict pain on the
other (for this is obvious and true for the both sides), but by demonstrating
that it feels so strongly about the issue at stake that it is willing to be hurt
in return rather than suffer a defeat. Third, any nuclear attack increases
the chance that uncontrolled escalation will occur. It is this specter that
exerts so much pressure on statesmen not to use nuclear weapons in the first
place or to make concessions in any conflict in which they are used. Even if
one side launched a counterforce strike, the war would almost surely end
before either had run out of ammunition. Resolve, not capability, would be
the limiting factor. When Secretary Brown claims that "fully effective deter-
rence requires forces of sufficient size and flexibility to attack selectively
a range of military and other targets"14 and argues that to do this the
United States needs an invulnerable ICBM, he is either thinking in terms of
a war of attrition or overstating the number of warheads the United States
needs.
Possible Objections
Before drawing the conclusions that are implicit in the previous analysis, I
should note three obvious objections. First, it can be argued that if I am
right, and the strategic balance is quite stable, an increase in American arms
will not have dire consequen~es.~' Since all the United States can lose hy
additional deployment is money, argue the critics, it is better to play it safe
and buy the extra systems. Moreover, how can anyone be sure that a war
of attrition will not occur? But surely there must be some judgments about
plausibility, some concern for costs, and some consideration of the chance
that the United States might teach others lessons that are both incorrect and
dangerous. The new weapons cost a lot of money and avoiding waste is not
a goal to be scorned lightly.lh Furthermore, although there are no strong
and direct links between the adversaries' defense budgets or between the
budgets and the degree of superpower conflict, it is hard to keep the military
2 18 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
and political tracks entirely separate. A final line of rebuttal is the most
important: t o develop a posture based on the assumption that limited
nuclear wars are possible is to increase the chance that they will occur. If
the Russians already believe in the possibility that such wars could be kept
limited, U.S. acceptance of this position would increase the likelihood of
their occurrence. O n the other hand, if the Russians now find these kinds
of war incomprehensible, they might learn t o accept them if the United
States talked about them long and persuasively enough. This could decrease
the chance that a nuclear war would immediately involve the mass destruc-
tion of population centers, but at the cost of increasing the chance of more
limited nuclear wars - which then could escalate. Such a trade-off is highly
likely, and even Schlesinger acknowledged that adoption of his doctrine
might increase the chance of limited nuclear strike^.^'
The second objection is that my analysis ignores the fact that the Russians
d o not accept the notion that mutual assured destruction creates stability.
Soviet military doctrine is an arcane field that cannot be treated in detail
here, although the bulk of the evidence indicates that the Soviet view of
strategy is very different from the A m e r i ~ a n .They
~ ~ appear to take war
more seriously. Indeed, much of Soviet military doctrine is pure military
doctrine - that is, the ideas are not particularly Russian or particularly
Marxist but simply those one would expect from people charged with pro-
tecting society and winning wars. Many statements by Soviet generals are
similar t o statements by American generals when the latter are not influ-
enced by the ideas or constrained by the power of the civilian leadership;
many American military officials seek the same program that the Russians
are following. Thus one cannot draw from the fact that Russians probably
buy more than is needed for deterrence the inference that they are willing to
run high risks to try to expand. The American generals who call for higher
spending are not necessarily more bellicose than those who disagree with
them.29 Both the Russian and the U.S. generals may want to prepare for the
worst and get ready to fight if a war is forced on them. The Russians may be
buying what they think is insurance, and we do not ordinarily think that
someone who buys a lot of insurance for his car is planning to drive recklessly.
While there is considerable evidence that the Russians want military
forces that would provide as good an outcome as possible should war be
forced on them, there is very little evidence that they think that such forces
could be used to coerce the West. It has yet to be shown that they think that
a superior ability to destroy military targets provides a shield behind which
they can make political advances or that Soviet military doctrine measures
American deterrence in terms of the United States' ability to match their
posture. The Russians may not accept the idea that mutual vulnerability is a
desirable state of affairs, but they seem to understand very well the potency
of the American threat to destroy their society. Indeed their outlook is
uncongenial to a counterforce war of attrition. While the Russians probably
would attack U.S. strategic forces in the event of war, they have not talked
about sparing the opponent's cities. Instead, they seem to be planning to hit
as many targets as they can if war breaks out.
l e ~ v i s Nuclear Superiority 2 19
Even if the Russians were to say that they believed a war of attrition was
possible, the United States would not have to adopt such a view. While it
takes the agreement of both sides to fight a counterforce war, this is not true
for AD. If one side denies that counterforce wars could be kept limited and
convinces the other side that it believes this, the other cannot safely act on
its doctrine. The Russians understood this in the periods when McNamara
and Schlesinger were enunciating their doctrines, and American statesmen
took their professions of disbelief seriously. Even if the Russians were to
reverse their position, they would have to take American denials seriously
also.
A third objection is that although the Soviet superior ability to destroy
strategic forces and the related existence of Minuteman vulnerability is not
a strategic problem, it is a political problem. Accordingly, because other
nations are influenced by indicators of nuclear superiority, the United States
must engage in this competition. (This argument loses some credibility since
most people who make it also claim that superiority is meaningful apart
from these perceptions.) There are several lines of rebuttal. First, there is lit-
tle evidence that European or Third World leaders pay much attention to
the details of the strategic balance. Second, the United States provides most
of the information and conceptual framework that underpins third-party dis-
cussions of the balance. The United States might be able to persuade others
that it would behave differently because the Russians could wipe out much
of the American capability to destroy Soviet missiles. But it would proba-
bly be easier to convince them that this was not true. Few world leaders
expect the United States and the Soviet Union to fight a war of attrition.
Moreover, if the Russians believe that superiority matters and thus may be
somewhat emboldened, the bargaining advantages they will gain will be
slight if the United States holds to the position that this is nonsense. If the
United States convinces the Soviet Union that it does not see a meaningful
difference in strength, the USSR cannot safely stand firm in crisis bargain-
ing because it will not have any reason to think that the United States is
more likely to retreat.
Conclusions
We can draw several conclusions. The question of which side has greater
ability to destroy the other's strategic forces matters only in a war of attri-
tion. Such a war seems unlikely enough so that it is not worth spending large
sums and running considerable dangers to prepare for it. Because either side
can use its nuclear weapons to destroy its opponent's population centers, the
danger of escalation would play a very large role in any war and could not
be controlled by having more missiles, more accurate missiles, and more
invulnerable missiles than the other side. The nuclear revolution cannot he
undone. As we have seen, many of the arguments about the supposed dan-
gers following from Soviet superiority in fact are consequences of parity. The
American deterrent is deterred by the fact that its cities are vulnerable, not
220 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
by the fact that the Russians have some supposed military advantage. Since
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can take its cities out of
hostage, the state that is willing to run the greatest risks will prevail. Many
of those who call for the United States to match or surpass the Soviet's
nuclear arsenal are trying t o have the United States compensate for what
they feel is a weakness of resolve by an excess in weaponry. But such a defi-
ciency, if it exists, cannot be compensated. A wider range of options will
merely give the Russians more ways, and safer ways, of coercing the West.
If the balance of resolve is so important, is the United States at a disad-
vantage compared to the Soviet Union? Some would argue that the United
States has shown in Vietnam that it will not fight to defend its interests and
those of its allies. But few dominoes fell after April 1975; other states may
have been less impressed by the final American withdrawal than they were
by its willingness to spend so much blood and treasure on an unimportant
country. Furthermore, resolve is not so much an overall characteristic of an
actor as it is a factor that varies with the situation because it reflects the
strength of the state's motivation to prevail on a given issue. The state
defending the status quo has the advantage in most conflicts in which the
balance of resolve is crucial because it usually values the issue or territory
at stake more than its opponent does." It is easier for a state to convince
the other side that it will fight to hold what it has than it is to make a cred-
ible threat to fight rather than forego expansion. A world in which resolve
matters so much may not be so bad for the United States.
Even if both sides recognize the greater determination of the side defend-
ing the status quo, accidents and miscalculations are still possible, especially
in situations growing out of a crisis in a third area. To rely solely on AD
may be too dangerous. Some degree of insurance can be purchased by a
continuation of the present American posture, which includes the availabil-
ity of limited nuclear options. But these should be demonstrations, keyed to
competition in risk taking, not attempts to wage a war of attrition; thus, the
United States would not have t o match the Soviets on any of the standard
measures of nuclear power. It does not take a superior or even an equal mili-
tary force to show by limited use that one is willing to take extreme
measures rather than suffer a defeat. Such costs and risks are the trading
chips of bargaining in the nuclear era; even if the United States had the
weapons and doctrine for an FR policy, it could not avoid relying on them.
Although the United States should be able to conduct limited nuclear
demonstrations, it should not stress this part of its policy. At this point there
is n o reason t o think that such fantastic measures will ever be necessary, and
they should be looked on as something to be done only in the most dire
emergency, not as a tool of statecraft. Too much discussion of the possibil-
ity of such strikes might lead either or both sides to believe that the risks of
a limited exchange were manageable, that escalation would remain under
tight control. At best, the United States would therefore create a world in
which limited nuclear wars were more likely to occur. At worst, these beliefs
would be tested and proven to be incorrect.
]imI - Nuclear Superiority 22 1
Acknowledgement
I would like t o thank 1)esniond Ball, Richard Berts, Thomas Brown, James Dighy, James King,
George Quester, Michael Mandelbaum, Stanley Sierkiewicz, Dennls Ross, and Glenn Snyder
for comments, and the Solomon Guggenheim Fund for financial support.
Notes
7. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Fiscal Year 1975
Authorization, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 51.
8. Department of Defense, Annual Report, E Y 1980 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1979), p. 76. Brown's posture statement is a combination of FR and AD and
so is more honest, but less coherent, than many of the previous statements.
9. Department of Defense, Annual Report, El! 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1978), p. 54.
10. Department of Defense, Annual Report, El! 1980, p. 75.
11. This also partially explains why many of the proponents of FR think that the threat to
destroy Russian cities would be an insufficient deterrent and that the United States should
develop a targeting policy aimed at convincing the Soviet leaders that their regime would not
be able to maintain control of the country after a war.
12. "Radio and Television Report to the American People o n the Berlin Crisis, July 25,
1961," in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: ]ohn E Kennedy, 1961
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 535.
13. Department of Defense, Annual Report, El! 1976 a n d El! 1 9 7 T (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 11-4-11-5.
14. Bernard Brodie, Escalation a n d the Nuclear Option (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1966).
15. Colin Gray, "The Scope and Limits of SALT," Foreign Affarrs 56 (July 1978): 788.
16. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture
and H.R. 12564, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1975, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, part 1, pp. 47,49.
17. Ibid., p. 29.
18. The United States might get around this dilemma by building missiles that were invul-
nerable, but that lacked accurate MIRVs. It is interesting to note that the U.S. Air Force has
done a much better job of developing a and accurate missile than it has in making
that missile able to survive a Russian attack.
19. Department of Defense, Annual Report, E l! 1979, p. 56.
20. This point is overlooked by Paul Nitze in "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of
Detente," Foreign Affairs 5 4 (January 1976): 226-30, and in "Deterring our Deterrent," p. 210.
21. Indeed the incentives for the state that is behind in a counterforce war to escalate
increase as its military situation worsens. If it fears it may soon lose its second-strike capabil-
ity, the losing state may will feel greater pressure t o up the ante while it still can.
22. Department of Defense, Annual Report, E Y 1980, p. 78.
23. For further discussion of this point see Robert Jerv~s,"Deterrence Theory Revisited,"
World Politics 3 1 (January 1979): 314-22, The Soviet stress on the importance of the "correl-
ation of forces" is not inconsistent with this notion.
24. Speech before the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Pol~cyAssociation, New
York, 5 April 1979, p. 3. Also see Department of Defense, Annual Report, E Y 1980, pp. 77-78.
25. There is a similar contradiction in McCeorge Bundy's claim that although nuclear
superiority is meaningless, we need arms control agreements "To Cap the Volcano" (Foreign
Affairs 4 8 [October 19691: 1-20).
26. Bernard Brodie argues that the strategic balance is so stable that saving money should
be the main goal of arms control ("On the Objectives of Nuclear Arms Control," International
Security 1 [Summer 19761: 17-36). His position is further developed in "The Development of
Nuclear Strategy," ibid. 2 (Spring 1978): 65-83. I am greatly indebted to these articles.
27. House Armed Serv~cesCommittee, Hearings on Military Posture, p. 50.
28. For a dissenting view, see Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms
Limitation in Soviet Policy," International Security 3 (Summer 1978): 112-47.
29. A study of postwar situations reveals that the U.S. milltary often advised against foreign
military adventures. See Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1977).
30. Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," p. 318.
31. Robert Butow, Tojo a n d the Coming of the War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1961), p. 203.
Strategic Stability Reconsidered
Colin S. Gray
I
n an important article published in 1978, John Steinbruner claimed: "As
the United States force posture has evolved over the past 1 5 years, the
idea of stability has emerged as the central strategic objective, and the
asserted conceptual consensus seems to be organized around that object-
ive."' This essay will focus on whether the theories of stability most widely
held in the West may not be gravely deficient and whether the integrity of
the concept of strategic stability may not itself be questionable.
Discussion of stability and its possible requirements is in fact a discus-
sion of deterrence theory, which in reality is a debate about the operational
merits of different postures and doctrines. No useful, objective, doctrine-
neutral exploration of the idea of stability is possible. The discussion that
follows makes no pretense of neutrality; instead, it endeavors, first, to
explain the roots, meaning, and deficiencies of the still dominant theories of
stability and, second, to suggest a theory that has much greater internal and
external integrity.
It is important to recognize that, for all its popularity, there is no useful con-
sensus about the meaning of stability. Most commentators, and certainly the
government of the United States (and NATO), acknowledge the value in the
twin concepts of arms race stability and crisis stability. As arms race stability
is commonly understood, it is the condition wherein neither party to an arms
competition will press military developments or deployments in quest of
major advantage, because such advantage is judged to be unattainable, how-
ever desirable. Crisis stability is a quality of strategic relations: during periods
of acute crisis, instruments of war (mechanical, electronic, organizational)
should not be the immediate cause of war. At this level of generality, these
concepts have been widely understood and approved (in the West) since at
least 19h0.2 Consensus breaks down, however, over the particular policy
Source: Dadalz~s:Iouynal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 109(4) (1980):
135-54.
224 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
the military requirements that will enable it to defend its vital interests. The
stability theory dominant in the 1960s and 1970s was addressed at root to
a relationship between two supposedly like-minded and ultimately (after
detente had done its work) like-intending adversary-partners. Although a
sea-change is evident in this new decade in official U.S. (and NATO) appre-
ciation of Soviet habits and motives, the burden of obsolescent strategic the-
ories o f stability remains.
T h e United Stares
The U.S. defense community, with very few exceptions, decided that a
stable military balance would mean a safer world with fewer resources
expended on defense than would be the case with an unstable military bal-
ance; should be compatible with the support of U.S. foreign policy interests
(though it is unclear whether very careful analysis was performed on this
subject); and should eventually find favor with the Soviet Union, because of
its technological inevitability and near-evident desirability. In a book that
perhaps merits description as the fullest and most mature statement of
1960s-style stability (through mutual vulnerability) theory, Jerome Kahan
wrote: "A mutual stability approach, in the broadest sense, rests on the
premise that the United States is benefited if the Soviet Union maintains a
strategic deterrent capability comparable in overall strength to our own; it
is an acceptance of both the mutual assured destruction relationship and
numerical parity." A little earlier he had written, "If, then, the USSR's stra-
tegic doctrine is largely understandable and somewhat comparable to ours, it
is possible to establish a relatively effective U.S. policy of mutual stability.""
The United States seemed to know what it wanted and to believe that
what was good for the United States would come to be seen by the Soviet
Union as good for it also. A stable military balance, in American perspec-
tive, was one in which each side's military forces looked roughly compar-
able and neither side believed it could gain a significant military advantage
by striking first, because neither side would be able to protect its domestic
assets against retaliation. These elements of stability derived initially, in
good part, from discouraging analyses of the future promise of damage-
limiting strategies. Military-technological prediction - that future societal
vulnerability will be a fact, not a matter for choice - was transformed into
normative terms. Far from being a problem, mutual vulnerability was seen
as an opportunity to establish more stable Soviet-American strategic rela-
tions. The Soviet Union might prefer to compete for "useful advantage" so
long as that was believed to be attainable, but technology surely has a logic
that the Soviets must, and will, respect. In 1970 Roman Kolkowicz
expressed the then popular, and perhaps even plausible, view that
The convergence of strategic ideas hoped for in the late 1960s and early
1970s - that is, a Soviet convergence with the American concept of a stable
Cra) Strategic Stability Reconsidered 227
and the rest - appear to play no identifiable role in guiding Soviet military
planning.ls In the half-light of the growing appreciation of the alien charac-
ter of Soviet strategic culture, U.S. policymakers have to reassess the relevance,
and prudence, of the strategic ideas that have held intellectual and declara-
tory (policy, if not always war-planning) sway for the past fifteen years.
Despite the evidence accumulating on RussianISoviet strategic culture
and the military-program momentum implications of that culture, Western
commentators continue to deny, implicitly, that stability is a condition
describing a military-political relationship. "Stability," as it pervades much
of American theorizing about deterrence questions, is essentially static and
absolute. It tends to lack a sense of competition. Using this logic, the United
States has a deterrence problem of finite physical dimensions. The complex
military balance is stable if the Soviet urban-industrial target set is ad-
equately covered and if the United States looks, and preferably is, resolute
in its willingness to retaliate.
What kind of damage would most likely be judged acceptable by a Soviet
leadership? This question has been posed, and even answered of lateI9 - with
conclusions that cast grave doubts on the merits of the society destruction
bedrock of the theory that identifies stability with mutual vulnerability - but
the covering of the urban-industrial target set still is accorded pride of place
in official U.S. stable deterrence prose.20
It may be that this society punishment oriented theory can provide a
robust basis for a stable military balance, even in an adversary relationship
with an alien Soviet strategic culture. It is possible that the Soviet military
(and political) establishment is seeking the unattainable in its evident pur-
suit of a war-waginglwar-winning capability, and that the United States
would be ill-advised to compete very vigorously with military programs
designed to improve war-waging performance. However, now that it is gen-
erally recognized that the Soviet military effort marches to the beat of a dis-
tinctly non-American d r ~ m m e r , ~and ' as the Soviet military competitive
position continues to improve across the board, there should be no serious
resistance to consideration of the possibility that the consequences of main-
stream Western stability theory may lead to under-recognized dangers.
The ideas that comprise the concept of a stable military balance reflect
fairly faithfully the world view, values, and pertinent education of those
commentators, policymakers, and theorists who have articulated American
strategic culture.22 The United States is a satisfied world power with a fun-
damentally defensive strategic mission as its international responsibility.
From 1946, when The Absolute Weapon was p ~ b l i s h e d , ~ " the ~ present
day, American strategic theorists have tended to argue, explicitly or impli-
citly, that the development of nuclear weapons has imposed a "techno-
logical peace." The mainstream concept of stability speaks eloquently to the
long-recognized U.S. tendency to define conditions as problems to be solved.
The existence of very large and diverse strategic nuclear arsenals solves
the problem of possible premeditated war between nuclear-armed states,
because the war initiator will know that he cannot deny the enemy the
:,r, I\ Strategic Stability Reconsidered 229
But such credibility [of nuclear response] depends not simply on a per-
ceived balance, or imbalance, of weapons systems, but on perceptions of
the nature of the society whose leaders are threatening such retaliation.
Peoples who are not prepared to make the effort necessary for opera-
tional defense are even less likely to support a decision to initiate a
nuclear exchange from which they will themselves suffer almost incon-
ceivable destruction, even if that decision is taken at the lowest possible
level of nuclear escalation."
that neither superpower would dare intrude into regions well understood to
be of vital interest to the other. The relationship between intense arms compe-
tition, its associated first-strike alarms, and political tension remains ill under-
stood, but a plateau of stable deterrence resting on total societal vulnerability
and sufficient weapon invulnerability, should - so the argument goes - calm
many of the anxieties that the arms competition can foster.
The more reasonable supporters of SALT I tended t o avoid asserting that
the Soviet political leadership and General Staff had been educated to
accept American-style stable deterrence thinking. They assumed instead
that American strategic vigilance would deny the Soviet Union any militar-
ily meaningful future advantage and that Soviet leaders would rein in their
programs appropriately. In addition, it was widely assumed that the five-
year "Interim Agreement" on strategic offensive arms would be superceded
by a permanent treaty regime that would greatly assist stability, owing to
the survivability for offensive forces and the predictability for defense plan-
ning it would provide.27 Stability could be enforced through expensive com-
petitive effort, but the case for attempting t o encourage stability through
negotiated joint management of the strategic balance had to be attractive.
In short, stable balance theory was believed t o reflect inescapable tech-
nological those truths were t o be codified, at least in part, via the
SALT process; and the SALT process was t o be both the centerpiece and the
beneficiary of a multichannel and increasingly entangling dttente venture.
Third, stable deterrence theory indicated "how much is enough."29 U.S.
strategic culture is oriented toward problem-solving. The U.S. defense and
arms control community has extreme difficulty accommodating the idea
that it is condemned to an endless competition with the Soviet Union. Stable
deterrence plus the parity principle appeared to reduce the stress and strain
of unwelcome and unfamiliar strategic thought to a fairly simple problem
of efficient management.
Fourth, stable deterrence, with its logical implication of a finite need for
weapons, appeals to the Western belief that peacetime defense preparation
has an almost wholly negative social impact. An insular strategic culture,
such as that of the United States, tends generally to view as inherently
wasteful the allocation of scarce resources for defense functions. It supports
substantial armed forces in peacetime only because such forces are, at best,
regrettable necessities. Major defense program initiatives often are taken
belatedly and reluctantly, and have to be justified very specifically in terms
of identifiable or very plausible threats.
Even on its own terms it is legitimate t o question the validity of main-
stream U.S. stable deterrence theory. For example: as Henry Kissinger has
argued forcefully, in policy practice it constitutes "a revolution in NATO doc-
trine"" (which was not noticed, or was simply disregarded, by its propon-
ents); it has nothing to say on the problem of self-deterrence (which is not
a trivial deficiency, because it is likely that the United States would be under
the most pressure to lead an escalation process); and it is not responsive to
the fact that deterrent calculations are not always relevant in the sequence
Cray Strategic Stability Reconsidered 23 1
of events that lead to war. Leaving such reservations aside,31the most trouble-
some aspect of main-stream stable mutual deterrence theory is that it does
not speak to Soviet reality.
T h e Soviet Union
(mu1ti)national existence.36 Russian and Soviet history teach the lesson that
"those who fall behind, get beaten."37 The Soviet Union is improving its
security condition by increasing its control over its external environment.
Even discarding cultural and geopolitical explanations, the detail of
Soviet military activity drives one to recognition of the deeper imperatives
that have molded Soviet strategic c u l t ~ r e . 'There
~ is an enormous inertia
behind the Soviet military establishment, some of which can be explained
in Western military-rational ways. But much of it reflects a mindless move-
ment that flows from habitual "safe-siding" through minimal decision-
making, eschewing of potentially dangerous initiatives, and generally
focusing on doing what one knows one can d o - in a society that is near-
obsessed with the fear of disruptive change and that seeks to avoid risks.
Of course, innovation is possible in the Soviet Union, though it gener-
ally is ordered and even organized from above. The Soviet military buildup
and modernization programs of the past fifteen years (in particular) speak
to forces very deep within the character of the Soviet system. Alarmed
Western observers see clear evidence that the Soviet Union is building more
military power than it needs for defense (a totally alien formulation in
Soviet perspective) and rejecting the Western concept of a stable military
balance. What we see, rather, is the cumulative product of a bureaucratic-
industrial system that rarely changes a course once set (there is no evidence
to suggest any official Soviet desire to change military direction) and that is
steadily providing the military means needed for preponderance - the Soviet
vision of a desirable military relationship with potential enemies.
The strategic cultural attitudes that flow from its history make it unlikely
that the Soviet Union will join the United States in managing a stable military
balance. The Soviet commitment to compete for relative advantage (real or
illusory) is so fundamental, and so rational in Soviet terms, that stability
can only be enforced.
The implications of this strategic cultural theme could be very grim for
Western security. By dint of fairly steady effort, and moved by a prudence
that has expansive military requirement implications, the Soviet Union
could come to believe that in East-West crises it will be the United States
that will back down. The ideas and military program details associated with
the dominant Western concept of stability amount to a posture, military
and civilian, that is not serious about the actual conduct of war. To itemize:
the United States has a very limited hard-target counterforce and counter-
control capability; it lacks survivable command, control, communications,
and intelligence (C31)assets; it has no homeland defense; it has no real plans
for timely industrial mobilization or for postwar recovery; it has no vision
of how all parts of the military posture should cooperate in a global war; it
has made only the most feeble preparation for strategic-force reconstitu-
tion; and it has no convincing story to tell vis-a-vis war aims and the polit-
ical character of a postwar international order.j9
These criticisms are leveled in the context of attempts to provide
adequately in those areas by a Soviet adversary.40That some weapons and
s , I~ r i Strategic Stability Reconsidered 233
Stability Dissected
The concept of stability is used in a wide variety of senses, among which two
merit individual analytic attention: arms race stability and crisis stability.
The idea of arms race stability holds that the basic engine of competition is
the first-strike fear encouraged by defense programs designed to threaten at
least part of the opponent's ability to wreak massive societal damage in a
second strike." Thus a stable arms competition is one wherein neither side
invests in programs that the other would view as a challenge to its assured
destruction capability, and hence would be motivated to offset. This kind of
logic was elaborated in some detail in the late 1960s. It was argued that the
arms race was driven not so much by the reality of first-strike danger as by
the fears that flowed from anticipation of such danger.44
"Sympathetic parallelism" in armament programs was the logical corollary
of the arms race "spiral" theory. Just as the superpowers could stimulate each
other to build increasingly capable weapons, so should they be able, through
234 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
The concept of crisis stability refers to a strategic condition wherein the very
character, readiness, and mobilization procedures of armed forces in co11-
frontation should not themselves comprise the proximate cause of war. Very
often crisis stability/instability is deemed to inhere in particular kinds of
weapons. However, as Thomas Schelling has argued persuasively, to focus
on weapon technology is to miss a good part of the potential problem.
The static dimension reflects the expected outcome, at any given moment,
if either side launches war. The dynamic dimension reflects what happens
to that calculation if either side or both sides should move in the direction
of war, by alert, mobilization, demonstration, and other actions that
unfold over time.48
written that "the most severe problems with the concept of stability result
from the fact that its technical definition has not included a critical dimension
of strategic capability: namely, the physical and organizational arrangements
for exercising deliberate command of strategic forces."s4 Steinbruner argues
that when the concept of stability is expanded to accommodate C31 desider-
ata, the preferred force structure (given classic stability themes) might alter
markedly. For example: "The submarine-based strategic force which is clearly
the most stable under the conventional definition is just as clearly the worst
in terms of command stability."""
Those theorists who believe that deterrence is a function of mutual soci-
etal vulnerability should be concerned lest command instability results in
unintended armed conflict or in essentially uncontrolled escalation in the
course of a war. Those theorists who believe that deterrence flows from the
promise of proficient military conduct should be concerned lest command
instability denies the U.S. armed forces the ability to wage war in a militarily
intelligent fashion.
A good fraction of the strategic debate of recent years rested on quite
unrealistic assumptions concerning the quality and survivability of U.S.
(and NATO) C31 assets. There was much weaving of interesting strategic
targeting tapestries in the 1970s, but I suspect that most of the targeting
schemes that envisaged the protracted and progressive unfolding of a delib-
erate design of destruction (for carefully calculated military and political
effect) failed to take adequate note of likely or ~ossiblecommand instabil-
ity phenomena (U.S. and Soviet).
There is ample evidence suggesting that classic stability theory, which
encourages the belief that nuclear war would be the end of history, pro-
moted a relaxed climate concerning the many details of actually managing
a central war campaign. A dominant belief that nuclear forces have failed
if they are ever used is hardly likely to stimulate officials to think very real-
istically about command stability problems in a nuclear war environment.
Steinbruner's persuasive advocacy of the need to place command stability at
the center of nuclear (and other) planning concerns fails to recognize that
the relative neglect of command stability issues flows in good part from the
widespread acceptance of a classic stability theory (based on the assump-
tion of the desirability of mutual societal vulnerability) that he approves.
of U.S. strategic theorizing erred was in tying the multifold concept of stability
to a particular theory of deterrence that did not match the burgeoning evidence.
That theory held that each superpower had an assured destruction (counter-
value) requirement vis-a-vis the other and that an enduring stable deterrence
relationship could be constructed only on such a basis.
This theory of arms race stability was wrong - it could not explain the
course of the strategic arms competition in the 1970s (under the aegis of
SALT I or in the shadow of SALT 11). Whatever mix of motives and institu-
tional forces drove Soviet weapon procurement, the principle of sufficiency
supported by the idea of assured destruction (let alone mutual assured
destruction) clearly was not prominent among them. It is a matter of histor-
ical record that the Soviet Union since 1972 has worked hard to undermine
whatever degree of strategic stability (based on mutual societal vulnerability)
there may have been at that time. In their ICBM, air defense, BMD (in
research and development), ASW, and civil defense programs the Soviets have
provided persuasive evidence that their systemic view of the arms competition
is dramatically different from the view adhered to by succeeding U.S. admin-
istrations. They have sought, and are continuing to seek, "useful advantage"
through whatever degree of preponderance the United States permits.'?
The "classical" theory of crisis stability may o r may not be correct; for-
tunately, the 1970s have not provided a field test. However, the Soviet per-
spective on strategic matters suggests that the explanatory power of the
theory may be poor. Richard Burt expressed this skepticism when he wrote:
"Central strategic war, according to Soviet literature, is not likely to stem
from mechanistic instabilities within the superpower military relationship,
but rather from real and enduring differences between competing political
systems and national interests." j8
In principle, certainly, it is sensible to argue that it would be undesirable
for the superpowers to deploy forces that lend themselves to first-strike
destruction. However, it is no less sensible to argue that "the reciprocal fear
of surprise attack"" as the principal proximate cause of war merits prob-
able identification as a U.S. "mechanistic" fantasy. This is not to endorse a
total indifference to Burt's "mechanistic instabilities," but to suggest that
the traditional theory of crisis stability - on the basis of which particular
weapons and doctrines are praised or vilified - needs considerable amend-
ment. It overemphasizes the roba able role of mechanistic instabilities in an
acute East-West crisis while taking a wholly apolitical approach to an inher-
ently political phenomenon; and it is inimical to the extended deterrence
requirement that the United States be capable and willing to take the stra-
tegic initiative.
Many of the elements of a new theory of strategic stability already have
been expressed in official prose and action over the past five years. However,
the theoretical revolution remains incomplete. What is missing, above ail
else, is a recognition of the pervasiveness and longevity of competition and
a positive approach to the functions of strategic nuclear forces. On this last
point, for example, Harold Brown treats both arms race and crisis stability
240 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
in negative terms. For arms race stability, the United States must ensure
"that the balance is not capable of being overturned by a sudden Soviet
technological break-through"; for crisis stability, it must ensure that neither
the United States nor the Soviet Union would feel itself under pressure to
initiate an exchange in a crisis.60
Brown's concerns are appropriate, but they do not approach the heart of
what stable deterrent ideas should indicate vis-a-vis U.S. force planning. An
adequate concept of stability has to be anchored in a prospectively effective
theory of deterrence a t the highest levels of violence. Crisis stability should
be approached in terms of the calculations of probable war-waging prowess
made by the parties involved. Concern about mechanistic, or technical, cri-
sis (in)stability would be policy-appropriate only in a condition of such
intense antipathy that overall central war campaign analyses would dom-
inate decision processes. The Soviet Union would not "go to war" because
a large fraction of its ICBM force was theoretically vulnerable to a U.S. first
trike,^' any more than would the United States should the situation be
reversed. Crisis stability, if possible, would flow from a Soviet belief that
any escalation of the military conflict would produce negative military and
ultimately political returns. The U.S. Department of Defense acknowledges
this but it does not recognize that the United States is most unlikely to
be able to enforce stability if damage to the U.S. homeland cannot be limited
severely.63
Strategic stability should not be equated with strategic stalemate. The
United States cannot afford a master strategic concept that implies thorough-
going mutual U.S.-Soviet strategic d e t e r r e n ~ eIf. ~strategic
~ stability is to retain
its preeminence as a U.S. policy goal, it should be redefined for compatibility
with the extended deterrent duties that the geopolitics of the Western Alliance
place on the U.S. strategic force posture. A stable strategic balance, in
U.S./NATO perspective, is one that would permit the United States to:
(SIOP) can have integrity only in the context of active and passive defense.
Fortunately, there is good reason to believe that the technology of air and
missile defense for the late 1980s and b e y ~ n d , ' ~with substantial civil
defense assistance, could restore a much more even relationship between
offense and defense, and a useful meaning to the concept of stability.
Author's Note
This paper represents my views alone. It has had only limited circulation among the Hudson
Institute staff and n o formal review procedure. N o opinions, statements of fact, o r conclusions
can properly be attributed to the Institute, its staff, its Members, o r its contracting agencies.
I am very grateful to Keith Payne of the Hudson Institute professional staff for his valuable
assistance with this article.
References
1. John Steinbruner, "National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability," The]ournal
o f Conflict Resolution, 22(3) (September 1978): 413.
2. For example, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1960). "It is not the 'balance' - t h e sheer equality or symmetry
in the situation - that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the stability of the balance. The
balance is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy the other's ability to strike
back" p. 232.
3. Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom, Helm, 1979), p. 14.
4. "Hostages must remain unambiguously vulnerable and retaliatory forces must remain
unambiguously invulnerable." Ian Smart, Advanced Strategic Missiles: A Short Guide,
Adelpbi Papers no. 63 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, December
1969), p. 28.
5. See Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 29, 19801, pp. 65, 67.
6. See Colin S. Gray and Keith B. Payne, "Victory Is Possible," Foreign Policy, no. 39 (Summer
1980): 14-27.
7. See Stanley Sienkiewicz, "Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic
Analysis," World Politics, 30, II(1) (October 1979): 90-1 10.
8. Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operatrons,
R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, September 1977), p. 8.
9. John Erickson, "The Soviet Military System: Doctrine, Technology and 'Style,'" in S o ~ i e t
Military Power and Performance, Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger (eds.) (Hamden,
Conn.: Archon, 19791, pp. 1 8 4 3 .
10. Y. Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace (Jerusalem: Israeli Program for Scientific
Translations, 19661, p. 48.
11. Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U S . Strategic Arms Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 272.
12. Roman Kolkowicz et al., The Soviet Union and Arms Control - A Superpower Dilemma
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 35-57.
13. See Fritz Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International
Security, 3 ( 2 ) (Fall 1978): 138-55.
14. See William E. Odom, "Who Controls Whom In Moscow," Foreign Policy, no. 19 (Summer
1975): 109-23.
15. Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," Political Science Quarterly, 94(4)
(Winter 1979-80): 630.
Lid) Strategic Stability Reconsidered 243
favored measure of strategic sufficiency is the notion that 'too much I S not enough.'" H o u ~
To Think Ahout Souret Milrtary Doctrine, P-5939 (Santa M o n ~ c aCalif.:
, RAND, February
19781, p. 7.
36. See Richard Pipes, Russra under the Old Regrme (New York: Scribner's, 1974), chapter I ;
and Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heirrtland, Rrnzlands, and the
Technological Reuolzrtion (New York: Crane, Russak lfor the N a t ~ o n a l Strategy
Information Center], 19771, chapter 3.
37. Joseph Stalin (speech in 1931), quoted in Arthur J. Alexander, Decrsron-Making in Sotiet
Weapons Procurement, Adelphi Papers nos. 147-148 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Winter 1978/9), p. 2.
38. Ibid., passim. See also Karl F. Spielmann, Analyzing Souret Strategic Arms Decisrons
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978).
39. These allegations are presented and defended in detail in Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: The
Case for a Theory of Victory"; and Gray and Payne, "Victory Is Possible."
40. See Douglass and Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War.
41. See Johan J. Hoist, "Strategic Arms Control and Stabil~ty:A Retrospective Look," in Why
ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy, Hoist and Wllliam Schneider, Jr.
(eds.) (New York: Pergamon, 1969), chapter 12.
42. Such capabilities discourage adventure on the part of the imperialists.
43. See Jerome Wiesner, "The Cold War is Dead, but the Arms Race Rumbles On," Brrll~trn
of the Atomic Scientists, 2 3 ( 6 ) (June 1967): 6-9; and George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics
of the Arms Race," Scientific American, 220(4) (Aprd 1969): 15-25.
44. See Lawrence Freedman, U S . Intelligence and the Soviet Strategrc Threat (London:
Macmillan 1977), passim.
45. Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton Universiry Press,
1941), pp. 252-46. This is a modest expansion of Brodieis point but is faithful to his plaln
meaning.
46. I have challenged that theory at some length in The Sovret-American Arms R x e
(Farmborough, Hampshire, England: Saxon House, 1976).
47. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inpuence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19661, p. 234.
48. Ibid., p. 236.
49. Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't ,Matter," p. 622.
50. Nicholar Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the
Balance of Power (Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1970, first pub. 1942), p. 21.
51. Kahan, Securrty in the Nuclear Age, p. 272.
52. Ibid., p. 273.
53. Note the judgment on this point in Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,"
pp. 982-3, 985-6.
54. John Steinbruner, "National Security and the Concept of Strareg~cStability," p. 417.
55. Ibid., p. 422.
56. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SA1.T (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1973), p. 9.
57. See Erickson, "The Soviet Military System," pp. 28-29.
58. "Arms Control and Soviet Strategic Forces: The Risks of Ask~ngSA1.T to Do Too Much,"
The Washington Revrew of Strategic and International Studies, l ( 1 ) (January 1978): p. 22.
59. The title of chapter 9 in Schelling, The Strategy of Confiict.
60. Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981, p. 69.
61. Notwithstanding the enormous significance that the Soviets attach to the surprise disrupt~\.e/
disarming blow, their operational practices v l s - h i s t h e ~ rstrategic forces have never
approached the day-in, day-out instant readiness ethos of SAC and the U.S. SSBN force.
62. Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1981, pp. 65-68, 85-88.
63. Damage limitation on a major scale is very far indeed from the desiderata of Harold Brown's
Department of Defense. See Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year
1979 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2, 1978), p. 65. By
way of contrast, a very useful discussion of the Sower approach to damage limitation IS
Strategic Stability Reconsidered 245
I
t appears probable that the next few decades will see the emergence of
many new nuclear weapons powers, especially in the third world. The
recent Israeli attack against Iraq's nuclear reactor demonstrated dramat-
ically the importance of attempting to manage an increasingly proliferated
world. Systematic analysis of the implications of this regime for the stabil-
ity of the central balance, and for stability in regional conflict situations,
has begun. What is required now is an assessment of the scope for arms
control measures designed to minimize the likelihood that such a process
will result in the weapon's being used. Without ceasing to think in terms of
measures t o discourage and retard decisions to acquire nuclear weapons
and to minimize the spread of capabilities to do so, we must think about
managing the effects of that measure of nuclear spread which it would be
imprudent t o assume we can prevent.
facilities designed expressly for a weapons program. New techniques for the
fabrication of weapons-grade material have made even this considerably
cheaper than in the decades immediately following the Second World War.
Recent reports concerning a weapons program in Pakistan which has reached
an advanced stage suggest that the "direct" route to the acquisition of nuclear
weapons no longer is beyond the economic capabilities of many states in the
third world.
Political trends in the contemporary world have implications parallel to
these technological and economic ones. One cannot but observe a relative
decline in the last few decades of the influence of superpower alliances as
determinants of the foreign policies of small states, as well as the emergence
of many new international actors in the wake of the post-war demise of
European colonial systems. It follows that, to an extent considerably greater
than in the immediate post-war years, foreign and defense policy in smaller
states is largely influenced by the idiosyncracies of their local or regional
situation. Decisions about the acquisition of weapons of any type are no dif-
ferent from other defense policy decisions. There is little reason to assume that
a "nuclear allergy" will be any more prevalent in the third world than it has
been among the governments of industrialized states.
To be sure, it is simplistic to merely divide states into those which are
nuclear weapons powers, and those which are not. To be useful in a military
sense, a nuclear device must be produced in some quantity; it must be so con-
structed as to be deliverable; and a state must possess the means to deliver it.
Furthermore, the military significance of a given nuclear capability depends
upon the military capabilities o f putative opponents. Finally, detonation of a
nuclear device may have little other than symbolic significance as an indicator
of military capability. A state may explode a device which cannot be delivered
against an opponent. Conversely a state may possess a usable military nuclear
capability without the necessity of first physically testing a device. Knowledge
of weapons technology is now sufficiently advanced to allow governments to
rely confidently upon computerized simulation techniques to indicate the like-
lihood that the products of a nuclear weapons construction program would in
fact explode when desired.
These considerations, however, do not affect the general point that the
economic, technological, and personnel requirements for the creation of a
nuclear weapons program with military significance in various regional con-
texts are widespread. Having a capability does not of course mean that a
state will or must employ it; but it does suggest that it would be imprudent
to assume that a government would normally deny itself that military where-
withal which it concludes might be useful to it in achieving its local foreign
policy objectives.
If capability and interest in a state coalesce to produce a favorable deci-
sion regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the elaborate physical
safeguards structures that exist under both the NPT regime and bilateral
agreements should not be regarded as more than retardants. Superpower
sanctions - unilateral or collective - would no doubt be considerably more
248 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
There is a recent illustration of the difficulties which lie in the way of continu-
ing and effective superpower sanctions against the emergence of new nuclear
weapons powers. The superpowers apparently combined in August 1977
to dissuade the government of South Africa from proceeding with a test of
a nuclear device, after facilities for such a test were discovered by satellite
reconnaissance. Is this the harbinger of a superpower anti-nuclear condo-
minium? I think not. The exceptional nature of the South African experience
must be borne in mind. The superpowers were able t o act jointly in this case
because neither had cross-cutting political interests. South Africa is politically
isolated. The African policy of each superpower, independently arrived at, is
based on the attempt to maintain good relations with South Africa's black
neighbors. Neither saw any interest in jeopardizing those relations by sup-
porting South Africa. If, in fact, South Africa was preparing a test, and if
indeed she was dissuaded by a collective superpower demarche, the success
of the dissuasion was based upon a random coalescence of policy between the
superpowers, a coalescence that both antedated the proliferation question
and was far broader in scope.
In South Asia on the other hand, no such coalescence exists. Indeed, since
the Second World War, each of the superpowers has sought influence and
alliances in the region by supporting one side or another in regional conflicts.
Thus the superpowers have conflicting policies in the region and each is disin-
clined to pursue policies which might jeopardize its regional alignments. When
the question of nuclear proliferation arose in the region at the time of the
Indian "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974, these pre-existing patterns of
superpower conflict prevailed over any latent inclination the two might
have had to meet the problem of nuclear proliferation by common action.
Furthermore the individual efforts of each superpower were subverted by
the competitive condition which prevails between them. Each superpower
is constrained against imposing sanctions against a n ally, or allowing the
other superpower to so act, for fear of precipitating a realignment, or at
least of giving relative advantage to its superpower opponent.
Neither India nor Pakistan is diplomatically isolated; each possesses a meas-
ure of diplomatic flexibility which affords it leverage against its superpower
I I Managing Multipolarity 249
patron. For the superpowers to make anti-proliferation policy their first pri-
ority would require them to ignore the imperatives of their relationship with
each other. To complicate matters still further, what is required for the con-
trol of the spread of conventional arms often conflicts with what is required
to control nuclear spread.
Thus the initial American reaction to the Indian explosion was straight-
forward: a threat to cut off all nuclear supplies unless India accepted full-
scope safeguards. But it was soon apparent that such pressure would only
drive India further in the direction of an autarchic nuclear industry in which
she would pay even less deference to the NPT regime than she had paid hith-
erto, and that it would have the effect of making India's general relationship
with the Soviet Union even closer. While the strategic symbolism of the
Indian explosion may have been directed at China, the explosion must have
appeared a threat more concrete than symbolic from the Pakistani perspective.
Certainly that sense of threat, and the determination to develop a nuclear
capability in response, has been steady and uninterrupted in Islamabad, sur-
viving unchanged despite dramatic and violent domestic political upheaval.
The American response to intelligence reports that Pakistan was surrepti-
tiously accumulating the components of a uranium enrichment facility was
in the form of the carrot and the stick. Major conventional arms transfers,
if Islamabad would desist from her nuclear enterprise, was the carrot; a cut-off
of existing military assistance was the stick. But a carrot for Pakistan must
he perceived in New Delhi as a stick - albeit a small stick - with which to beat
India.
In any event, carrot and stick both have become submerged in the re-
energized "great game" between the superpowers, catalyzed by the events in
Afghanistan. The image now is of Washington arduously pressing conven-
tional arms upon a reluctant Islamabad. Far from imposing conditions, the
American concern now is to sweeten the deal sufficiently for it to be accepted.
Details will differ in other regions and in other years. But on balance we
should expect outcomes not dissimilar from these. Prevention of the spread
of nuclear arms will tend to conflict with prevention of conventional arms
proliferation. Both will give way to what Washington and Moscow each per-
ceive to be indicated in order to maintain relatively stable standing with what
Raymond Aron calls its "enemy-partner" in the central balance. Perhaps the
superpowers are mistaken in believing that their relative influence in the
third world significantly affects that balance. Nevertheless they continue to
believe it and to act on that belief. There is certainly no sign that this belief
grows weaker.
As for the last of these questions, much depends upon the attributes of
the new nuclear weapons states. For at least until the end of this century, the
stability of the central strategic balance will remain substantially unaffected
by any force which could be deployed by most of those states commonly
included in lists of potential "Nth countries." There are a few (East or West
Germany, Japan, a United Europe, and possibly Brazil) whose acquisition of
nuclear weapons could affect the stability of the central balance. But if any
of these states should in fact deploy what it is capable of producing, the
effect upon the central balance will still be a function of the political context
within which that deployment occurred, as much as it will be a function of
the nuclear "hardware" taken by itself.
With these exceptions, nuclear acquisition by others can represent no
more than strategic "pinpricks" to the superpowers. No force which any of
the remaining states would be capable of building during the foreseeable
future could threaten the survivability of more than a small fraction of super-
power strategic forces. Against any of these "Nth" powers, a superpower
could threaten an overwhelming and certain countervalue response, which
could be mounted by a fragment of its forces small enough not to affect
materially its strategic posture against the other superpower. There is no
reason, furthermore, not to expect that the superpowers will continue
to retain a wide qualitative lead over these states in all matters related to
strategic technology.
This is not to suggest that the proliferation of small and relatively primi-
tive nuclear forces will create no dangers for superpower governments and
for their populaces. These dangers do not, however, include the gravest:
instability which might make central war more probable. Catalytic war is
not a major danger, but government-sponsored terrorism or blackmail might
be. Insofar as the latter might become a problem, its resolution is a matter
of enhanced physical security and improved intelligence procedures, activ-
ities which are beyond the scope of this essay. Moreover, acts of terrorism or
blackmail involving complicity (of omission or commission) by governments
or territorially based quasi-governmental organizations, can be effectively
countered or deterred by threat of retaliation if the responsible agent can
be identified. Thus the dangers represented by these acts in a nuclearized
international system should not be overestimated.
This guarded optimism must be severely qualified if we turn to the impli-
cations of nuclear weapons acquisition by the "exceptions" mentioned above.
These "middle nuclear powers" are chosen because of their substantial eco-
nomic capabilities, and their potential to engage in "state of the art" research,
development, and production. If one or more of these powers should deploy
a force which approaches its capabilities, such a force could no longer be con-
sidered merely a "pinprick," from the superpower perspective. In such a con-
text the problem of superpower vulnerability might grow somewhat more
difficult with resultant complications for the management of the strategic
relationship between the superpowers. Third states by themselves would
not be able to threaten the survival of superpower forces; but they might
LVeIt r-ii,iii Managing Multipolarity 25 1
Proliferation anio
weapons were and are pointed. Nuclear weapons were introduced into a pre-
existing pattern of alignments and conflicts, a pattern which the weapons'
introduction did not change. In order to predict the effects of middle-power
nuclear weapons acquisition in the future, we must similarly examine political
context, and not merely technological capability.
What developments are likely to induce further middle powers to go
nuclear? Brief examination is sufficient to suggest that further proliferation
at this level is likely only as a response t o prior, and major, change in the
pattern of alignments that has characterized the international system since
the Second World War. Thus any German resort to nuclear weapons must first
assume the breakdown in some fashion or other of the division of Europe laid
down at Yalta and Potsdam. Similarly, a nuclear Japan implies the prior col-
lapse of a security system in the Pacific based upon American hegemony.
If such dramatic changes were to occur, the incalculability which would
result would render formal or informal attempts at arms control futile, until
such time as new and firm political patterns might emerge. It does not fol-
low, however, that the likelihood of major war must increase, unless we
assume a technology which must produce a world of universal vulnerability.
Far more likely is a situation in which volatility in arms races is accom-
panied by political caution. To the extent that policy is capable of advancing
or retarding the emergence of such an environment it must be directed
toward preserving the utility of existing alignment patterns in the eyes of
potential nuclear powers.
But we must understand that their madness consists in the extremity of their
intentions and rhetoric, not in any lack of capacity for prudence in the choice
of means. At the very end, Hitler may have been determined to involve his
nation in his personal suicide. But prior to the war there is every evidence to
suggest he was prepared to moderate his actions in the event other powers
should threaten him with dire consequences.
It is the somber virtue of nuclear weapons that they reduce consequences
to a starkly simple level. We should not expect nuclear weapons to moderate
the intentions of fanatical individuals with their hands upon the instruments
of mass destruction; but equally we should not expect them to use those means
to achieve their ends unless they conclude that they can use them witho l t dire
consequence to themselves.
It would be ingenuous, however, to suggest that an "invisible hanc" will
infallibly operate to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in local wars. If we
are optimistic enough to assume that political analysis is capable of making
predictions at all, such predictions must take the form of broad statements
of tendencies, rather than precise forecasts of particular events. All we can
say with certainty here is that over time, the pacific trends described he -e will
tend to operate. But even one event which runs counter to the trend will be
a disaster beyond measure for those involved. Hostilities involving nuclear
weapons may occur prior to the lapse of enough time for a mutually stable
weapons posture to develop. The problem for policy thus becomes one of
minimizing the probability that such adverse events might occur.
Conclusion
Author's N o t e
Note
I. I have examined these questions at length elsewhere a n d here shall only deal with them
In summary form. See the author's "Nuclear D e v o l u t ~ o na n d World Order," World l'olztics,
Vol. XXXII, N o . 2 (janu,lry 19801, pp. 169-1 93.
Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament -
The Report of the Independent Commission
on Disarmament and Security Issues
L
ess than two generations after the carnage of the Second World War,
the world seems to be marching towards the brink of a new abyss,
towards conflicts whose consequences would exceed experience and
defy imagination. Having survived the tragedies of two global wars in this
century, wars that touched virtually all nations, leaving tens of millions
dead, hundreds of millions wounded or homeless, and a whole continent in
shambles, mankind might have embraced new means of organizing the
international community, means that could prevent such catastrophes in the
future. Indeed, important efforts have been made towards this end, but in
1982, nearly four decades after the Second World War, the inescapable con-
clusion is that these efforts have not yet succeeded.
Humanity has made only limited progress towards the limitation of
nuclear and conventional weapons and has not taken even halting steps
towards disarmament. Arms races between the great nuclear powers and
between rivals in particular regions have continued for decades and now
seem to be accelerating. Every year has brought advances in the technology
of warfare; developments which mean that future wars would be more
destructive and inhumane. Every year has witnessed the spread of advanced
military technologies to more nations. Every year has seen new examples of
the suffering such weapons can cause; new demonstrations of man's appar-
ently limitless capability to inflict pain and destruction on his neighbours,
even his countrymen. And, most chilling, every year has uncovered new evi-
dence that humanity may eventually confront the greatest danger of all -
worldwide nuclear war.
It is long past the time for men and women to halt these trends. The dan-
gers are far too great to be ignored. Decisive action must be taken now to
Source: Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament - The Report of the Independent
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (London: Pan Books, 1982), Chapter 1,
'Common Survival' pp. 1-13, Chapter 6 , 'Recommendations and Proposals' pp. 138-76.
Disarmament and Security Issues 259
halt and reverse the spiral of the arms race and the deterioration of political
relations. and to reduce the risks of conventional and nuclear wars.
Arms a n d Insecurity
security - dangers from within and without. But the realities are such that
military strength alone cannot provide real security. By every index of mili-
tary strength it is evident that most nations have become more powerful over
the years. Yet, judged by the increasingly strident tone of international and
domestic debates about these issues, it is also clear that greater national
military might has not led to a greater sense of national security.
The growth of the peace and anti-nuclear movements in Europe and
North America is instructive. These movements gathered strength at pre-
cisely the time when many governments were stressing the need for security
through expanded nuclear weapon programmes.
society must isolate the conflict and resolve it by peaceful means. Only in
such a world will people be able to feel a true sense of national security.
Consequently, if the world is to approach even the possibility of achieving
true security - ending the danger of nuclear war, reducing the frequency and
destructiveness of conventional conflicts, easing the social and economic bur-
dens of armaments - important changes are necessary in the way that nations
look at questions of armaments and security. Most important, countries must
recognize that in the nuclear age, nations cannot achieve security at each
other's expense. Only through cooperative efforts and policies of interlocking
national restraint will all the world's citizens be able to live without fear of
war and devastation, and with the hope of a secure and prosperous future for
their children and later generations.
egitimate R i g h t
A secure existence, free from physical and psychological threats to life and
limb, is one of the most elementary desires of humanity. It is the funda-
mental reason why human beings choose to organize nation states, sacrific-
ing certain individual freedoms for the common good - security. It is a right
shared by all - regardless of where they live, regardless of their ideological
or political convictions.
264 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
The adage that violence begets violence is as true for relations between
countries as it is for relations between individuals. Historically, the use of
force as an instrument of national policy has only rarely been effective over
the long run. In the nuclear age, it raises risks which are disproportionate
to any conceivable gain. Too often, the use of force is claimed to be in self-
defence. Prevailing definitions of self-defence must be tightened and nar-
rowed. Renewed renunciation of force as an instrument of national policy
is an important element in a policy of common security. Nevertheless, all
states must retain the right t o use force in their own defence and, in accord
with the conditions and procedures specified in the Charter of the United
Nations, in collective defence of victims of aggression.
The urge of nations to win advantage over others, to gain security at each
other's expense, is the engine that drives the competitive acquisition of
armament and pushes the world towards nuclear war. It reflects the false
premise that security can somehow be gained unilaterally. Consequently,
policies which seek advantage - either through the accumulation of arma-
ments, or by bargaining in negotiations for unilateral gain, or, most dan-
gerously, by the exercise of military power - should be renounced. Restraint
should be the watchword of all states: restraint, out of respect for the right
of others t o security, but also in selfish recognition that security can be
attained only by common action.
With parity and the absence of threats established as guiding principles for
military relationships, it is equally important that the nations of the world
act in concert to reduce armaments substantially. In making such reduc-
tions, particular attention should be paid to those types of weapons which
raise the greatest concern on either side, as these carry the greatest danger
of leading to war. The larger military powers must ass~lmethe major
responsibility for initiating and sustaining efforts to reduce armaments, but
all nations should share in, and would benefit from, significant progress
towards this end. The benefits of reducing armaments in terms of allevi-
ating the economic and social burdens of the arms race are obvious. Of even
greater importance would be the creation of a political atmosphere in which
peaceful relations among nations could flourish, and in which there would
be a lesser risk of war.
Third World T e n s i o n s
The Third World has been the scene of most of the world's violence since
1945. The cost of this upheaval and destruction has been tremendous.
There are many causes of Third World conflict. For most of the postwar
266 T h e Cold War a n d N u c l e a r D e t e r r e n c e
period, turmoil in developing regions was the result of the struggle for
independence. But even now, when there are virtually no colonies left, many
sources of tension and potential conflict remain.
In the absence of a natural basis for the borders for many Third World
nations, territorial claims and pressures for the fragmentation of national
societies have been frequent and sometimes intense. In many developing
nations, historic animosities, religious and racial hatreds and battles for
political influence and privilege among disparate elements of society all lead
to violent conflict.
Last, but far from least, pressures stemming from economic underdevel-
opment and the maldistribution of resources and wealth produce stresses
and strains both within and between nations. Hunger, malnutrition,
poverty and ill-health on a massive scale all work to spur political change,
sometimes through violent means.
The developing regions are fragmented and torn by a variety of indigen-
ous conflicts, but many of them have been complicated by the superimpos-
ition of East-West tensions. As these tensions rise there is increased risk of
their being transferred to Third World regions where indigenous conflicts
provide opportunities for them to flourish. Conversely, regional conflicts
can themselves lead to wider escalation of tension involving the danger of
great power confrontation. The Third World has a deep and continuing
interest in de'tente, in curbing the arms race, and in improved relations
between the great powers.
Finally, we should note the broader tension between the industrialized
nations and the developing world. Politically, ideologically and econom-
ically, the North-South dialogue is frozen. The growing economic and social
disparities between North and South have been catalogued frequently, most
recently in the report of the Brandt Commission: North-South: A pro-
gramme for survival. A failure to rectify these trends could lead in time to
worldwide chaos and international conflict. For the present, North-South
tensions are mainly of an economic nature, damaging the development
prospects of the Third World and also making it impossible to implement
long-term economic arrangements that could provide greater prosperity for
all. But potentially much more is at stake.
Over the long term, a decline in North-South relations can have the
most serious impact on the psychological atmosphere in which we all must
live, on the basic fabric of international politics, and on the risk of war.
between different nations and different parts of the world strongly reinforce
the point. Peace cannot be obtained through military confrontation. It must
be sought through a tireless process of negotiation, rapprochement, and nor-
malization, with the goal of removing mutual suspicion and fear. We face
common dangers and thus must also promote our security in common.
The destructive power of modern nuclear and conventional weapons,
both in quantity and quality, has totally outrun traditional concepts of war
and defence. In the event of a major world war, which would escalate inex-
orably to the use of nuclear weapons, all nations would suffer devastation
to a degree that would make 'victory' a meaningless word. The only realis-
tic way to avoid such a catastrophe is to quickly develop a process by which
progress towards disarmament is made rapidly, and to establish a system of
political and economic cooperation among nations such that all gain an
Important and equitable stake in its contmuance.
In sense, the truth of these statements seems already to have been rec-
o g n l ~ e dby people throughout the world. We are greatly encouraged that ,is
the C o m m ~ s s ~ ohas
n met and worked there has been a vlrtual explosion of
popular sentiment In favour of peace and d~sdrmament.It 1s long past tlme
for all governments to respond to the popular urge for true security. If they
fail to meet these expectations, we will all be the victlms of t h e ~ rfolly.
A New Departure
All states have a right to security. In the absence of a world authority with
the right and power to police international relations, states have to protect
268 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
In its final document, the first special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament charged the Committee on Disarmament with
elaborating a comprehensive programme leading to general and complete
disarmament. The Committee completed its task in April 1982. The
Commission strongly supports the goal of general and complete disarma-
ment. We recognize that this objective will not be realized in the near future.
But the ideal of a world in which international relations are based on the
rule of law, cooperation, and the peaceful pursuit of political ends must be
held high. This is the goal as well as the measure of efforts to reach inter-
national agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. To make progress
in that direction it is necessary to develop a concrete and comprehensive
programme of action reflecting the complex interrelationships of the many
critical elements in the present situation. It is necessary to break the impasse
and start a downward spiral.
The economic and social costs of military competition constitute strong rea-
sons for countries to seek disarmament. The costs of military spending are
especially onerous in the difficult economic circumstances of the 1980s. These
costs, of course, are different for different countries. But some are common to
almost everyone: use of government revenues; diversion of scarce scientific
and technical skills from social pursuits; denial of investments which could
otherwise increase economic growth. The journey towards reversing the arms
race will follow a different path for each country. But for all countries the
economic prize will be great.
Disarmament and Security Issues 269
Were they ever to cross the nuclear threshold, nations would be set on a
course which does not lend itself to prediction. The very process of destruc-
tion would render prior calculations and attempts to exercise control fruit-
less. We reject any notion of 'windows of opportunity' for nuclear war. Any
doctrine based on the belief that it may be possible to wage a victorious
nuclear war is a dangerous challenge to the prudence and responsibility
which must inspire all approaches to international peace and security in the
nuclear age. We conclude that it is impossible to win a nuclear war and dan-
gerous for states to pursue policies or strategies based on the fallacious
assumption that a nuclear war might be won.
attendant increased risk of nuclear war. The greatest danger would be for
people anywhere to become so used to an open-ended nuclear arms race that
they become complacent about the danger involved, or lose faith in their
capacity to turn the tide. But nations are not condemned to live by the ugly
dictates of nuclear weapons. They have the choice and indeed the responsibil-
ity to c ~ i r band eliminate the horrendous forces of destruction which nuclear
weapons represent.
We believe that there is an urgent need for agreements specifying major
reductions of nuclear weapons and restraints on their qualitative improve-
ments, with a view to maintaining parity at the lowest possible level of
forces. Stabilizing the nuclear arms race in this way could create a basis for
further steps in the direction of stopping the production of nuclear weapons
a n d reaching agreen~enton their eventual elimination. There is a need to
create a downward momentum. Nations cannot confine their efforts to
managing the existing high levels of armaments. Major reductions and con-
straints on qualitative 'improvements' must be a dominant theme in future
negotiations and agreements.
1.3 The anti-ballistic missile treaty must be upheld: The 1972 Treaty Limiting
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems is an important agreement designed to lessen the
chance of nuclear war and to constrain the strategic arms race from escalating
into broader dimensions. It does not suggest that international peace and secur-
ity should be based on the ability of the great powers to inflict unacceptable
destruction on each other. It does reflect the fact that for the foreseeable future
there are no effective means of defending against ballistic missiles. States must
coexist, therefore, in a condition of mutual vulnerability, making the pursuit
of common security a matter of survival for humanity.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is a substantial and necessary building
block in a viable system of common security. Abrogation of the Treaty would
undermine the whole strategic arms limitation and reduction process. The fail-
ure t o uphold the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty could lead to a destabilization
of the international situation and a greater risk of nuclear war. W e urge that
the treaty be upheld.
confidence. The parties have still to agree on what is the number of troops in
the reduction area at the present time, the details of the linkage between the
two phases of reductions, and the scope of the associated measures. The
Commission considers that the outstanding differences could be resolved sat-
isfactorily provided there were the political will to do so. Continued stalemate
will seriously diminish public confidence in negotiations for arms reductions.
We urge that the participating states conuene a meeting of Fowign Ministers
to resolve the differences and conclude an agreement before the end of 1982.
An agreement specifying parity and reduction of conventional forces in
Central Europe should be accompanied by commitments to abstain from
moving arms and troops to areas where they would diminish the security of
other countries in Europe. Agreement in Vienna on conventional forces in
Central Europe would provide a basis for, and facilitate the negotiation of,
agreements on withdrawal and reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe.
A subsequent agreement on parity of conventional forces in Europe a t sub-
stantially reduced levels could facilitate more far-reaching agreements on
the withdrawal and reduction of nuclear weapons. Such agreements would
be more likely if in the negotiations for conventional force reductions the
parties were to emphasize reducing those elements of the two sides' military
postures which the parties consider the most threatening.
1.5 Reducing the nuclear threat in Europe: The nuclear arsenals in Europe
are awesome. Furthermore, the Commission is deeply concerned about
those nuclear postures and doctrines which dangerously and erroneously
suggest that it may be possible to fight and 'win' a limited nuclear war. In
the event of a crisis their effect could be to drive the contending forces
across the threshold of a nuclear war. The Commission is convinced that
there must be substantial reductions in the nuclear stockpile leading to
denuclearization in Europe and eventually to a world free of nuclear
weapons. A necessary precondition is a negotiated agreement on substan-
tial mutual force reductions establishing and guaranteeing an approximate
parity of conventional forces between the two major alliances.
Therefore, the Commission supports a negotiated agreement for approxi-
mate parity in conventional forces between the two alliances. Such an agree-
ment zuould facilitate reductions in nuclear weapons and a reordering of tile
priority now accorded to nuclear arms in military contingency planning.
The Commission has devoted much time and effort to examining various
alternative ways for bringing these changes about.' Among the alternatives
studied was nuclear-weapon-free zones, which are dealt with in Section 5.3
concerning regional security arrangements. It should be remembered in this
connection that some countries in Europe do not belong to any of the military
alliances and have renounced the acquisition of nuclear arms.
Here we propose a functional approach concentrating on specific weapons
and classes of weapon. Our proposal for the gradual removal of the nu-
clear threat posed to Europe includes establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-
weapon-free zone and measures to strengthen the nuclear threshold and
274 T h e Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
reduce pressures for the early use of nuclear weapons, and substantial reduc-
tions in all categories of intermediate- (medium-) and shorter-range nuclear
weapons which threaten Europe.
(a) A battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe. We call special
attention to the dangers posed by those nuclear weapons whose delivery
systems are deployed in considerable numbers to forward positions in
Europe. These are known as 'battlefield' nuclear weapons. A large portion
of NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's nuclear munitions in Europe are of this
type. The weapons are designed and deployed to provide support to ground
forces in direct contact with the forces of the opponent. Their delivery sys-
tems have ranges up to 150 kilometres, and are primarily short-range rockets,
mines, and artillery. Most of the delivery systems are dual-capable, i.e. they
can fire either conventional munitions or nuclear munitions.
Because of their deployment in forward areas battlefield nuclear weapons
run the risk of being overrun early in an armed conflict. Maintaining
command and control over such weapons in 'the fog of war' would be dif-
ficult. Pressures for delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons to local
commanders and for their early use would be strong. The danger of cross-
ing the nuclear threshold and of further escalation could become acute. It
should be remembered in this connection that the areas close to the
East-West border in Central Europe are densely populated and contain large
industrial concentrations.
The Commission recommends the establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-
weapon-free zone, starting with Central Europe and extending ultimately
from the northern to the southern flanks of the two alliances. This scheme
would be implemented in the context of an agreement on parity and mutual
force reductions in Central Europe. No nuclear munitions would be per-
mitted in the zone.2 Storage sites for nuclear munitions also would be pro-
hibited. Manoeuvres simulating nuclear operations would not be allowed in
the zone. Preparations for the emplacement of atomic demolition munitions
and storage of such weapons would be prohibited.
There also should be rules governing the presence in the zone of artillery
and short-range missiles that could be adapted for both nuclear and con-
ventional use. The geographic definition of the zone should be determined
through negotiations, taking into account the relevant circumstances in the
areas involved, but for illustrative purposes, a width of 150 kilometres on
both sides may be suggested. Provisions for verifying compliance with these
prohibitions would be negotiated. They would have to include a limited
number of on-site inspections in the zone on a challenge basis.
The Commission recognizes that nuclear munitions may be brought
back to the forward areas in wartime, and that nuclear weapons may be
delivered by aircraft and other longer range systems. However, we consider
the establishment of the ~ r o p o s e dzone an important confidence-building
measure which would raise the nuclear threshold and reduce some of the
pressures for early use of nuclear weapons. It is consistent with our rejec-
tion of limited nuclear war as a matter of deliberate policy.
Disarmament and Security Issues 275
276 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
are needed during storage and handling. This is why it is generally assumed
that chemical weapons are stored in a small number of central depots in
Europe. Information about the possible distribution of chemical weapons t o
troops in the field is both uncertain and contradictory. The development of
so-called 'binary' munitions, however, could facilitate their distribution.
These munitions are filled with two less toxic chemicals which are com-
bined t o create a lethal nerve gas only after the munition has been fired.
The Commission calls for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-frecj
zone in Europe, beginning with Central Europe. The agreement would
include a declaration of the whereabouts of existing depots and stockpiles
in Europe, adequate means to verify their destruction, and procedures for
monitoring compliance on a continuing basis, including a few on-site
inspections on a challenge basis. The training of troops in the offensive use
of chemical weapons also would be prohibited.
2.1 A comprehensive test ban treaty: The conclusion of a treaty banning all
nuclear tests would make the introduction of new weapon designs into the
armories of the nuclear-weapon states much more difficult. It would be a
major constraint on the qualitative development of more sophisticated
nuclear weapons. It also could be an important contribution to limiting the
improvement of the present stocks of nuclear weapons. Hence it would
enhance the acceptability and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which works to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
The Commission considers that efforts should be concentrated o n the
negotiation of a treaty banning all nuclear tests. Such a treaty is needed in
order to forestall a new round of nuclear weapon developments which
could exacerbate East-West relations, reduce stability, and weaken the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Commission welcomes the decision of the Committee on Disarma-
ment in April 1982 to establish an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test
ban. The Commission trusts that it will soon be possible to negotiate and con-
clude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which for more than a quarter of a
century has been awaited in vain by peoples the world over.
Disarmament and Security Issues 279
2.6 The need t o limit conventional arms transfers: The volume of arms trans-
fers has more than doubled during the past decade. Deliveries are now close
to $30 billion per annum and orders are substantially higher. More than three
quarters of all arms transfers go to the countries of the developing world.
In our view, there is an urgent need for a concerted effort to develop a
fair system of guidelines and restraints covering arms exports, based on
cooperation among recipient and supplier states.
Supplier states should open talks aimed a t establishing criteria by which
they could regulate arms transfers on an equitable basis. Restraints need to be
defined in terms of quantities and qualities, geography and military circum-
stances. The guidelines for arms transfer should include such principles as
The United States and the Soviet Union held Conventional Arms Transfer
talks in 1977-80. The Commission endorses the resumption of such talks
which should include also France, the United Kingdom, and other major
supplier states. Another need is for talks between supplier states and recipi-
ents in regions where tensions are particularly severe. There is a need for
multilateral restraints.
Recipient states should similarly undertake to develop guidelines and
codes of conduct designed to curb the flow of arms and avoid arms races.
Disarmament and Security issues 283
We are convinced of the need to strengthen the security role of the United
Nations. A new conceptual approach must be developed in order to pro-
mote common security in the world at large.
4.1 More effective use of the Security Council and the Secretary General:
Within the UN, primary responsibility for maintaining international peace
and security rests with the Security Council. Regrettably, states have tended
only t o turn t o the Council as a last resort when conflict has already, or is
on the verge of breaking out. If they are to be persuaded to shed this atti-
tude, the Security Council itself must enhance its capacity to preempt con-
flicts. The permanent members, in particular, should seek to foster a close
understanding and collaboration among themselves and encourage a mutu-
ally supportive partnership with the Secretary General to facilitate initiatives
under Article 99 of the Charter.
Article 99 specifically authorizes the Secretary General 'to bring to the
attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security'. The Security
Council should adopt an initiating resolution explicitly calling upon the
Secretary General to bring to its immediate attention potential threats to
the peace. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary General should
report t o the Council on a regular basis throughout the year. There should
be a special annual 'state of the international community' message to be
delivered in person by the Secretary General to a meeting of the Security
Disarmament and Security Issues 285
(i) O n being alerted by at least one of the disputing parties to the danger
of a possible conflict, the Secretary General would constitute a fact-
finding mission to advise him on the situation.
(ii) If circumstances warrant, and with the consent of at least one of the
disputing parties, the Secretary General would seek the authorization of
the Security Council to send a military observer team to the requesting
state to assess the situation in military terms and to demonstrate the
Council's serious concern.
(iii) In the light of circumstances and the report of the military observers,
the Security Council would authorize the induction of an appropriate
ON military force at the request of one of the disputing states with a
view to preventing conflict. This force would be deployed within the
likely zone of hostilities, in the territory of the requesting state, thereby
providing a visible deterrent to a potential aggressor.
286 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
All three phases would be covered by the political concordat among the
permanent members of the Security Council whereby they would commit
themselves to support particular types of collective security action, and thereby
placed on an assured basis.
The introduction of substantial UN forces before the outbreak of hostil-
ities would, in most cases, prevent violations of territory from occurring at all.
Nevertheless, there could be situations where violation of territory might still
take place with an attack so sudden as to preempt the possibility of effective
preventive measures. In such circumstances limited enforcement measures
would become necessary. The first objective would be to establish a negot-
iated ceasefire. The Council would call on the warring parties to cease hos-
tilities and notify them of the dispatch of collective security forces to establish
and maintain an effective ceasefire. The parties would be asked to cooperate
fully in the achievement of this objective, it being clearly understood that UN
forces would have the right of self-defence if attacked by either of the two
warring parties.
Full-scale collective security enforcement action would, of course, imply
restoration of the status quo ante through military means. This is the ultim-
ate deterrent enshrined in Chapter VII of the Charter. Although not real-
izable in the immediate future, it must remain a goal towards which the
international community works.
For the present, other means could be used to ensure that aggression does
not prevail. The introduction of a ceasefire should be accompanied by an
appeal by the Security Council to the aggressor state to withdraw its troops
to its original borders. In the event of a refusal to comply, the Council would
immediately consider ways of enforcing its will through the other provisions
of Chapter VII, including the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions.
5.2 Zones of peace: The creation of zones of peace has been proposed most
notably for the Indian Ocean and South East Asian a r e a d Within the zone,
peace should be maintained by the countries themselves through the peace-
ful resolution of disputes in a context of political and economic coopera-
tion, as well as mutual military restraint. An essential factor in ensuring its
viability, however, is agreement by outside powers to respect its purposes
and specific provisions.
Zones of peace would be a flexible mechanism for developing coopera-
tion at the sub-regional level, while the proposed Regional Conferences on
Disarmament and Security Issues 29 1
strongly urges all states concerned to adopt all relevant measures to ensure
the full application of the treaty.
Proposals for creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the South
Pacific, South Asia and the Middle East have been put forward in the
United Nations and have received support in the General Assembly. The
process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the
world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a
world entirely free of nuclear weapons.
Should it prove impossible to agree on legally defined nuclear-weapon-
free zones, states could, as an interim measure, pledge themselves not to
become the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the region. The nuclear-
weapon states would have t o guarantee the countries concerned that they
would not be threatened or attacked with such weapons.
6 Economic Security
The present condition of the world economy threatens the security of every
country. The Commission believes that just as countries cannot achieve
security at each other's expense, so too they cannot achieve security through
military strength alone. Common security requires that people live in dig-
nity and peace, that they have enough to eat and are able to find work and
live in a world without poverty and destitution.
6.1 The costs of military spending: Military competition reduces both mili-
tary and economic security. Military spending is part of the problem, not
part of the solution. The human cost of military effort has long been appar-
ent in a world where more than 1,000 million men, women and children
have n o chance t o learn t o read and write, and more than 600 million are
hungry or starving.
But the economic problems of the 1970s and early 1980s make the waste
of human effort even more intolerable. The presumed economic benefits of
military spending are a dangerous illusion. Increased military spending would
make our economic problems worse, not better. Military expenditure is likely
to create less employment than other forms of public expenditure, with greater
risks for inflation and for future economic growth. These dangers are exacer-
bated by the peculiar character of the modern military effort, with its increas-
ing emphasis in both developed and developing countries alike on expensive,
technologically sophisticated armaments. All but a very few countries now
face the most troubling choices in deciding how to spend their limited gov-
ernment revenues - on health programmes or on improving the lives of old
people, on unemployment benefits or on investment in economic growth and
development, on education or on foreign aid. The costs of military spending
must be counted in terms of these other opportunities forgone.
6.2 Disarmament and development: The link between disarmament and devel-
opment, in the new economic context of the 1980s, is close and compelling.
Disarmament and Security Issues 293
Notes
S
ince the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s, every administration
in Washington has defined American national security in excessively
narrow and excessively military terms. Politicians have found it easier
to focus the attention of an inattentive public on military dangers, real or
imagined, than on nonmilitary ones; political leaders have found it easier
to build a consensus on military solutions t o foreign policy problems than
t o get agreement on the use (and, therefore, the adequate funding) of the
other means of influence that the United States can bring to bear beyond its
frontiers.
Even the Carter Administration, which set out self-consciously to depart
from this pattern, found in its later years that the easiest way to deflect its
most potent domestic critics was to emphasize those aspects of the dilemmas
it faced that seemed susceptible to military solutions and to downplay those
that did not. Jimmy Carter's failure to win reelection may suggest not that his
instincts in these respects were faulty but merely that his conversion
was neither early nor ardent enough.
Just as politicians have not found it electorally rewarding to put forward
conceptions of security that take account of nonmilitary dangers, analysts
have not found it intellectually easy. They have found it especially difficult
to compare one type of threat with others, and to measure the relative con-
tributions toward national security of the various ways in which govern-
ments might use the resources at their disposal.
The purpose of this paper is to begin to chip away at some of these ana-
lytical problems. It proceeds from the assumption that defining national
security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly
false image of reality. That false image is doubly misleading and therefore
doubly dangerous. First, it causes states to concentrate on military threats
and to ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers. Thus it reduces
their total security. And second, it contributes to a pervasive militarization
of international relations that in the long run can only increase global
insecurity.
Source: International Security, 8(1) (1983): 129-53.
I I I I Redefining Security 297
For Hobbes it did not much matter whether threats t o security came from
within o r outside one's sown nation. A victim is just as dead if the bullet that
kills him is fired by a neighbor attempting to seize his property as if it comes
from an invading army. A citizen looks t o the state, therefore, for protec-
tion against both types of threat.
Security, for Hobbes, was an absolute value. In exchange for providing it
the state can rightfully ask anything from a citizen save that he sacrifice his
own life, for preservation of life is the essence of security. In this respect,
Hobbes was extreme. For most of us, security is not a n absolute value. We
balance security against other values. Citizens of the United States and other
liberal democratic societies routinely balance security against liberty. Without
security, of course, liberty - except for the strongest - is a sham, as Hobbes
recognized. But we are willing t o trade some perceptible increments of secur-
ity for the advantages of liberty. Were we willing to make a Hobbesian
choice, our streets would be somewhat safer, a n d conscription would swell
the ranks of our armed forces. But our society would be - and we would
ourselves feel - very much more regimented.
The tradeoff between liberty and security is one of the crucial issues of our
era. In virtually every society, individuals and groups seek security against the
state, just as they ask the state to protect them against harm from other states.
Human rights and state security are thus intimately related. State authorities
frequently assume - sometimes with justification - that their foreign enemies
receive aid and sustenance from their domestic opponents, and vice versa. They
often find it convenient, in any case, to justify the suppression of rivals at home
hy citing their links to enemies abroad.
The most profound of all the choices relating t o national security is, there-
fore, the tracieoff with liberty, for a t conflict are t w o quite distinct values, each
298 T h e Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
United States and some other nations more secure, or richer, while yet others are
left less well off. Instead, it might he "negative-sum," making all the nations
perceptibly less secure, with fewer disposable assets to spend on welfare
rather than on military forces.
To make this point is not to argue that a well-armed Soviet Union
increasingly confident of its abilities to project military power at long dis-
tances poses no potential threat to American security. Clearly it does. Nor is
it necessarily to argue (although I would do so) that much of what appears
threatening about recent Soviet behavior has its origins in Soviet responses
to American policies and force deployments. That is a topic for a separate
discussion.' But it is to argue that the present U.S. Administration - and, to
a substantial degree, its predecessor - has defined national security in an
excessively narrow way It happens also (as will be suggested later) to be a
politically quite expedient way.
A Redefinition of Threats
United States, the impetus for such organization must come from government,
the ultimate wielder of carrots and sticks.
At the root of most of the violent conflicts in history has been competition for
territory and resources. The coming decades are likely to see a diminution in
the incidence of overt conflict over territory: the enshrinement of the principle
of national self-determination has made the conquest of peoples distinctly
unfashionable. But conflict over resources is likely to grow more intense as
demand for some essential commodities increases and supplies appear more
precarious. These conflicts will also have their territorial aspects, of course,
but the territory in contention is likely either to be unpopulated or only
sparsely populated. Much of it will be under water - oil-rich portions of the
continental shelves. Those parts above water will be the ostensible prizes,
often isolated or barren islands whose titles carry with them exclusive rights
to exploit the riches in and under the surrounding seas.
Such struggles over resources will often take the form of overt military con-
frontations whose violent phases will more likely be short, sharp shocks rather
than protracted wars. In most instances they will involve neighboring states -
Chile and Argentina, Iraq and Iran, Greece and Turkey, Morocco and Algeria,
China and Vietnam, and many others. Most will be in the Third World. None
is likely to involve the United States, although American firms - oil companies
and other resource-extracting enterprises - may well be caught up on either
side of a particular dispute. Thus, if national security is defined in conven-
tional ways this country's national security is not likely to be directly affected
by such disputes.' '
Their indirect impact upon American national security is likely to be
large, however. Supplies of essential commodities will be at least temporar-
ily disrupted. Local regimes may fall, their places taken by successors often
less friendly t o the United States. Outside powers hostile to American inter-
ests, such as the Soviet Union or Cuba, may intervene to support local
clients, placing pressure on Washington to launch (or at least organize)
counter-interventions. In some quite plausible scenarios Washington might
intervene to protect local clients whether or not Moscow or Havana were
involved. Those circumstances that might lead to a direct confrontation of
Soviet and American forces are, of course, the ones most dangerous to U.S.
national security. Luckily, they are also the least likely.
"Resource wars" (as some call them) have figured prominently in dooms-
day forecasts for more than a decade. But they are only one way - and not
the most important way - in which resource issues will impinge upon
national security in coming years. It will not require violent conflict for
resource scarcities t o affect the well-being - and the security - of nations on
every rung of the development ladder. In considering ways in which such
scarcities might affect national security, analysts should distinguish those
I I 118 Redefining Security 305
that arise from expansion of demand from those arising from restrictions
on supply.
Behind expanding deniand, of course, lies the continuing rapid growth in the
world's population. Specialists note that the rate of population growth has
not yet overtaken that of the globe's capacity to feed, house, and care for its
people." But that capacity is sorely strained. Moreover, global mechanisms
for distributing or for managing resources are not effective enough to pre-
vent local catastrophic failures or to prevent the consumption of some cru-
cial renewable resources at greater-than-replacement rates. Those resources
include tropical forests and other sources of fuelwood, fish stocks, the ozone
layer surrounding the earth, and the global supply of clean air and water.
Moreover, these problems are interconnected. Here is but one example: As
Third World villagers cut down more and more forests in their search for
fuelwood, the denuded land left behind is prey to erosion. Rains carry topsoil
away, making the land unfit for cultivation. The topsoil, in turn, silts up
streams in its path. Meanwhile, the fuel-short villagers substitute dung (which
otherwise they would use for fertilizer) for the wood they can no longer
obtain, further robbing the soil of nutrients and bringing on crop failures.
Unahle to sustain themselves on the land, many join the worldwide migration
from the countryside into the cities.''
That migration - caused by many factors - has given rise to an explo-
sive growth in the population of most Third World cities. Many are ringed
by shantytowns containing millions of squatters, a high proportion of them
unemployed, malnourished, and living in squalor. Under the weight of these
enormous numbers municipal services break down and the quality of life
for all but the very rich suffers drastically. Such cities are forcing grounds
for criminality and violence. Some suffer a breakdown of governmental
authority and become virtually unmanageable. Others are governable only
by increasingly repressive means that lead, in turn, to a decline in the per-
ceived legitimacy of the regime in power. Especially is this the case in
nations that are marked by ethnic or religious divisions. When the resources
of a nation are severely strained, those at the bottom of a social hierarchy
are quick to imagine - often with justification - that those who govern dis-
tribute the benefits at their disposal in ways that favor some groups at the
expense of others.
There is a widespread assumption that these are the circumstances from
which revolutions are born. In fact, there is little evidence that any recent
revolution except perhaps the one in Iran has had urban roots. Although
rapid population growth and its attendant miseries have certainly given rise
to conflicts, particularly along communal lines, the governing authorities in
most Third World countries have been able to contain them. Rather than
forging links among urban (and rural) dispossessed persons, recent arrivals
in Third World cities have tended to be overwhelmingly preoccupied with
306 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Assessing Vulnerability
very much more difficult: different members assess risks differently, and they
may well be differently damaged by a disrupting event. An investment in
redundancy that seems worthwhile to one family may seem excessively costly
to another. Neither will know which is correct unless the crunch actually
comes. And even then they might disagree. They might experience distress
different1y.
At the level discussed in this paper, where states are the communities
involved and where the problems are for the most part considerably more
complicated than a simple disruption in an accustomed channel of supply, the
relationship between decreased vulnerability and increased security is tormid-
ably difficult to measure. Consider even the relatively simple measure of
adding crude oil to the US. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the (for the most
part) underground stockpile whose purpose is to make it possible for the
nation to ride out a cutoff in deliveries from one or more major foreign oil
suppliers. We know, of course, the cost of buying and storing a given incre-
ment of crude oil. But until mid-1981 the government of Saudi Arabia (the
world's major exporter of oil) took the position that U.S. stockpiling of oil was
an unfriendly act. It claimed that it maintained high levels of oil production to
provide immediate benefits - "moderate" prices - t o Western (and other) con-
sumers, not to make it possible for Washington to buy insurance against the
day when the S a ~ ~ leadersh~p
di might want to cut production so as, say, to
influence U.S. policy toward Israel. Successive administrations in Washington
have regarded the retention of Saudi good will as something close to a vital
American interest, on both economic and strategic grounds. They therefore
dragged their feet on filling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve."
Who can say with assurance that those administrations were wrong?
Who could measure - before the event - the effects of putting Saudi noses
out of joint? It may well have been that even so seemingly modest a meas-
ure as adding to the oil stockpile would ripple through Saudi and Middle
Eastern politics in such a manner as ultimately to bring about just that
calamity against which the stockpile is intended to offer insulation, that is,
a production cutback. Moreover, being finite in size, the stockpile may not
offer sufficient insulation against a protracted deep cutback. But, by the
same token, who can be sure that even if the reserve remains unfilled (its
level is still far below the total originally planned)," and even if the United
States takes other additional measures to mollify the Saudis, an event will
not occur that will trigger a supply disruption in any case? If that occurs,
the nation would clearly be better off if it possessed a healthy reserve of
stored oil, even one insufficient to cushion the entire emergency.
Ever since the OPEC embargoes of 1973-74, Western governments have
been extremely sensitive to any hint of a further cutoff of oil or, for that
matter, of other, less critically needed resources. It is not surprising that
many analysts both in Washington and in other NATO capitals interpreted
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 3 979 not simply as Moscow's
ruthless effort to handle a local political dilemma but as the start of a Soviet
march toward the Persian Gulf. Since then, both the Carter and the Reagan
3 10 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
oil and other scarce resources it prefers to leave the task to private entities.
Indeed, so opposed is the Reagan Administration to governmentally directed
resource management that it has even encouraged the depletion of the largest
oil stockpile it itself owns, the oilfields set aside as so-called Naval Petroleum
reserve^.^'
The same is true for investments in alternate energy sources. The Adrnin-
istration has drastically reduced federal allocations for energy research and
development of all sorts. Nuclear fusion, solar energy, unconventional oils -
all have had their appropriations sliced. (Only the Clinch River hreeder
reactor, a project in the home state of the Republican Senate majority
leader, has been spared.)lh Not surprisingly, in an economic climate marked
by both recession and high interest rates, the private sector shows few signs
of acting upon the Administration's preferences, ideologically congenial
though they may be. Despite bargain prices, there has been little stockpiling
of commodities. And, with a worldwide oil glut, the private sector has shown
n o inclination to invest in energy alternatives.
Opponents of the Administration's position assert that, regardless of the
economic climate, the marketplace is incapable of adequately discounting
scarcity. Therefore, they argue, the intervention of a single, authoritative
actor - by definition, the federal government - is required to build up stock-
piles and to fund research and development activities that are not likely to
pay off within commercially acceptable timeframes."
Measuring Security
Someone points out that for the price of, say, one Navy F-14 fighter it would
be possible to build a certain number of daycare centers or black-lung clin-
ics for the mining towns of Appalachia. And we know that, unlike the F-14,
the centers or clinics would be "used" (indeed, we hope the F-14 will never
enter combat). Moreover, we know quite precisely how much welfare we
purchase with a childcare center or a clinic. We can quantify it in terms of
children attending (and mothers working) or patients treated. But at that
point the comparison between guns and butter ends. We can weigh American
forces against Soviet forces, and we can compare the capabilities of one
weapons system against another. But we cannot really quantify the security
we buy with the funds we spend on an F-14 or, indeed, on an entire carrier
task group. We assume that the task group will deter hostile actions by
unfriendly nations. But it may be that a smaller American Navy will deter
them equally well, and a carrier air wing minus one F-14 may be fully capable
of meeting all the threats that ever come against it.18
This discussion has sought to show that we generally think about - and,
as a polity, dispose of - resource allocations for military and for nonmilitary
dimensions of security in quite different ways. Regarding military forces,
although analysts and interest groups may have their own ideas about such
issues as the appropriate size of the American fleet or the composition of its
air wings, there is general agreement on the principle that there must in the
end be a single, authoritative determination, and that such a determination
can come only from the central government of the polity. Because we
acknowledge that there is no marketplace in which we can purchase mili-
tary security (as distinguished from some of its components), we would not
look to private individuals or firms or legislators or regional governments
to make such a determination, even though we might disagree with the
determination that the federal government makes.
By contrast, as indicated above, there is no consensus about the need for
a single, authoritative determination regarding the nonmilitary dimensions
of security. The polity as a whole is therefore much more responsive to alle-
gations that a given investment in, say, a commodity stockpile is "inefficient"
than it is responsive to the same allegation regarding a given investment in mili-
tary forces. Moreover, the alleged inefficiency is far more easily demon-
strated. The situation is similar regarding measures for coping with the other
problems mentioned in this paper: rapid population growth, explosive urban-
ization, deforestation, and the like. Here, also, the current American
Administration - and much of the public - is committed to "efficient7' market-
place solutions rather than to solutions involving international regimes or
governmentally sponsored transfers of resources.
Changing t h e Consensus
Notes
initiate war themselves - are often subject to pillory. It may be alleged that their complacence
allowed their nations' defenses to atrophy to a point where their military forces no longer
deterred attack. O r they may be accused of recklessness that brought on a needless and expen-
sive war. But while the war is still in prospect, or while it is actually underway, there are too
seldom any questions of leaders' abilities to command the requisite resources from their per-
ceptibly threatened countrymen.
4. The same is true, it should be noted, about some "ordinary" foreign threats. In 1975
a majority of Senators and members of Congress did not believe that the presence of Soviet-
supported Cuban troops in Angola posed a significant threat t o U.S. security, and legislated
limits on potential American involvement. Three years earlier they imposed a cutoff on U.S.
bombing of targets in Cambodia and North Vietnam on the supposition that continued bomb-
ing would no longer (if it ever did) promote US. security. For a discussion of these
Congressional curbs on the President's ability to commit American military resources, see
Thomas M . Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy By Congress (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), esp. pp. 13-23 and 46-57.
5. For a recent authoritative study, see An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations
for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken (Washington: Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 1980). For a summary of current estimates, see Richard
A. Kerr, "California's Shaking Next Time," Science, Vol. 215 (January 22, 1982), pp. 385-387.
6. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) fiscal year 1983 appropriation
for civil defense was $147,407,000; for "comprehensive emergency preparedness planning"
for earthquakes it was $3,120,000. California's total budgeted expenditure for earthquake
safety for fiscal year 1983 was $13,391,000. For a detailed breakdown, see State of California,
Seismic Safety Commission, Annual Report to the Governor a n d the Legislature for July
1981-June 1982 (Sacramento: August 1982), pp. 16-21.
7. The "classic" appeal for a large U.S. civil defense program, based upon hypothes~zed
comparative U.S. and Soviet recovery rates, is T.K. Jones and W. Scott Thompson, "Central War
and Civil Defense," Orbis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1978), pp. 681-712. For a more recent dis-
cussion, see Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush a n d Nuclear War (New York:
Random House, 1982), pp. 104-1 19.
The enormous cost is one principal argument against a large-scale U.S. civil defense pro-
gram. But another relates to strategic doctrine. A civd defense program that promises to offer
effective protection might in a crisis inv~tean enemy first-str~keattack. The adversary, so thls
reasoning runs, would read large-scale civil defenses as indicating that we ourselves were pre-
pared t o initiate nuclear war. It would therefore strike at the first sign that we were beginning
to move our population into shelters, as we surely would during a severe international crisis.
Thus we enhance stability by not opting for civil defenses: the other side knows that since our
population is exposed, we would not be likely to initiate nuclear war, and the incentives for
them to strike preemptively are thereby reduced.
8. The FEMA study cited above (note 5 ) estimates that the likely damage from the most
probable (but far from the most destructive) major earthquake on the San Andreas fault might
be $17 billion, but it indicates that the figure might be low by a factor as high as three (p. 22).
9. The most authoritative generally available projection of the effects of a variety of types
of Soviet nuclear attacks on the United States is The Effects of Nuclear War (Washington,
D.C.: Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, 1979).
10. It should be noted that the currently preferred mode of avoiding nuclear war
(as distinguished from diminishing the likely effects of nuclear war) is at the far end of this
spectrum: the maintenance of a deterrent nuclear striking force is preeminently a national
responsibility - one, incidentally, beyond the grasp of all but the wealthiest nation-states.
Other modes of avoiding war, such as negotiation and d~sarmament,are also endeavors w h ~ c h
only duly legitimate national authorities, as distinguished from sub-national groupings or private
individuals, can undertake. Earthquakes differ from nuclear war in that thev cannot be either
deterred or forestalled. But societies can protect against their effects. That is why, despite obvious
differences, the comparison with nuclear war as a threat to soc~etalsecurity seems instructive.
IJllrn,iti Redefining Security 3 15
11. For a discussion of the kinds and scope of dlsputes that are likely to arise, see Ruth
W. Arad arid Uzi 8. Arad, "Scarce Natural Resources and Potential Conflict," in Arad et a/.,
Shurrn~G k ) h d Resourcas, 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relarmns (New York: R.lcC;raw-
Hill, 1979), pp. 2.5-104.
12. See the tables in the statistical annexes to Roger D. Hansen et al., U.S. Foreign Policy
(2nd the Thrrd World: Agenda 1982, Overseas Development <:ouncil (New York: I'raeger
Publishers. 19821., esn. , tables U-8 and C-I.
13. For a discussion that brings out the seamless nature of this problem, see Lester K. Brown,
"World Population Growth, Soil Erosion, and Food Security," Science, Vol. 2 14 (November 27,
19811, pp. 995-1002.
14. For a thorough survey o f extant social science research on Third World urban growth and
its relationsh~pto political ~nstabillty,see the unpublished paper by Henry Bienen, "Urbanization
and Third World Stability," Research Program in Development Studies, Woodrow Wilson
School, I'r~nceton University, December 1982.
IS. For a prototypical example, see Robert L. Hellbroner, An Inquiry into the Hrlmar~
Conditron (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), esp. pp. 4 2 4 . 5 . For a provocative var~ation,see
McCeorge Rundy, "After the Ileluge, the Covenant," Saturday Revieu~lWorltf,August 24,
1975, pp. 18-20, 1 12-1 14.
16. For the 0.E.C.D. rankings, see Hansen, Agenda 1982, tahle F-8 and figure F-18. For
population programs, see D,ina Lewison, "Sources of Population and Family Plannmg
Assistance," Populi~tionReports. VoI. I I, No. 1 (January-February 1983).
17. See David A. Deese and Joseph S. Nye, eds., t~rrergyand Security (Cambridge, Mass.:
liall~nger,I98 1 ), csp. pp. 13 1-228 and appendix R, "Worldwide Product~onand lJse of Crude
Oil."
18. See the well-documented discussion In Arad, "Scarce Natural Reso~~rce\," pp. 32-59.
For 3 widely cited earlier statement, see Stephen D. Kraner, "Oil is the Except~on,"Foreigtz
Polic-): No. 14 (Spring 19741, pp. 68-84. John E. Tilton, The trit~rreof N o t r f ~ dMin~rals
(Washungton: The Brookings Institution, 1977), reaches the same conclus~ons.
19. A concise survey of global patterns of food production m d consumptloll is in Paul
R. Ehl-lich, Anne H. Ehrlicb, and J o h n I? Holdren, .k~screncc~: Popdi~tion,Reso~irccs,Eruiron-
rirent (S.ln Franc~sco:W.H. Freeman, 1977), pp. 284-297. For a current accounting hy a IJ.S.
A g r ~ c ~ ~ l t uDepartment
rc ofticul, see Terry N. h r r , "?'he World Food Sit~lat~on , ~ n dC;lotxiI
Grain I'rospects," Scrence, Vol. 2 14 (November 27, 198 I), pp. 1087-1095.
20. See Deew and Nye, Ener<yyund Security, pp. 229-58.
2 1. Some ni~ghtargue that this 1s not the case in the strategic nuclear re1,itionship between
the Unitcd States and the Sowet Union, and that ~t is the knowledge w i t h ~ neach government
r h ~ ~t t ssociety 1s highly vulnerable to nuclear attacks by the other that keeps it from ever
I.iunchlng such a n attack itself. Security 15 thus a product of v~ilticr,lhil~ty.'This argument ha\
cons~der,ibleforce as a logiccd construct. Yet, not surprisingly, neither superpower is content
to act upon ~ t As . technological developments seem to make possible the I~mitattonof damage
from 'it le,ist some torms of nuclear attack, each pursues them for fear th'lt the other will
secure ;I momentary adv,lntage. We are therefore faced with the worst of situations, In whlch
o ~ i cor the other may be unduly optimistic regarding the degree to which it might I~mitdarn,lge
to its obvn society if it were to srr~kefirst. Decreased vulnerahilit) rzcct~ratelyassessed m'iy well
enhance security even in strategic nuclear relations; misleadingly assessed it may bring disaster.
22. See, e.g., W'llter S. Mossherg, "Kowtowing on the Oil Reserve," T / J ~VIrill/ Street
/oitrnal, May 14, 1980, p. 20, and Sheilah Kast, "Filling Our Strategic Oil Reserve,"
Washrngton S t u , February 9, 198 1, the latter quoting Secretary-of-State-ciesign'lte Alexander
M. F-la~g,Jr., as calling the Saudi positwn "oil hlackma~l."
23. The Energy Infornlation Adrnin~stratlon'sMonthly Emrg?~Rel~ieiu(Washington: IJ.S.
Department of Energy) presents a running tally of the slzc o f the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
For a technical account of how the reserve is maintained, see Kuth M. Davis, "Nation,ll
Strategic Petroleum Reserve," Sc-iencc,Vol. 2 13 (August 7, l 9 8 l ) , pp. 6 18-622. See also Deese
and Nye, Energy anti Security, pp. 326-328, 399-40.3.
3 16 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
24. For an excellent discussion of the genesis and prevention of superpower crises, see
Alexander L. George, Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crlsis Pre~nention(Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1983).
25. Richard Corrigan, "Three Bowls of Oil," National~ournal,December 5, 198 1, p. 2 167.
26. See these articles by Richard Corrigan, the National !ournalk energy correspondent:
"The Next Energy Crisis: A Job for the Government o r the Free Market?." June 20, 1981,
pp. 1106-1 109; "On Energy Policy, the Administration Prefers to Duck, Defer and Deliberate,"
July 18, 1981, pp. 1280-1283; and "Down for the Count," May 22, 1982, p. 919.
27. Corrigan, "Energy Policy," National!ournal, July 18, 1981, p. 1283.
28. Part of the difficulty of comparing guns and butter may arise from the fact that pollties
demand different orders of satisfaction from the evaluation of the two. Regarding daycare cen-
ters or clinics, officials often feel satisfied when they can certify that services of a given quality
have in fact been delivered. They seldom feel it necessary to ask whether their delivery has really
enhanced the welfare of the community, the nation, or the world: they regard the question as
either self-evident or as impossible to answer. But publics have come t o demand more of
accountings for military expenditures. After Israel's sweeping victories in Lebanon in 1982 it
was not enough to ascertain that the American-armed Israeli forces had decisively defeated the
Soviet-armed Syrians and Palestmians, nor even that the campaign had vastly enhanced Israel's
short-run security. Observers asked - and regarded the question as entirely appropriate -
whether it had really enhanced Israel's long-run security.
For a discussion of assessing the benefits of welfare programs, see Alice M. Rivlin, Syste?natir
Thinking for Social Action (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 46-63.
Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?
Mohammed Ayoob
I
11 the literature on international relations, the term 'security' has trad-
itionally been defined t o mean immunity ( t o varying degrees) of a state
o r nation t o threats emanating from outside its boundaries. In the words
of Walter Lippmann, 'a nation is secure t o the extent t o which it is not in
danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is
able, if challenged, to maintain them by such victory in such a war'.'
According to Arnold Wolfers, Lippmann's definition 'implies that security
rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, o r t o defeat it.
This is in accord with the common usage of the term." Expanding on the
concept o f security as protection of core values, in the context of small
Third World states, Talukder Maniruzzaman has stated that: 'By security
we mean the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of
any nation: political independence and territorial integrity." This position
is one that we can readily identify as the realist position in the Western and
Western-influenced literature on international relations.
However, some authors have differed significantly from this exclusively
state-centric realist perspective. They have viewed the problem of security
from the perspective of the international system and have focussed on what
has, of late, come to be called international security. By adopting this system-
centred perspective they have tried t o mitigate some of the more Hobbesian
characteristics of the realist position. They have taken their cue from views
such as those expressed by Martin Wight, who had argued that 'if there is
an international society, then there is an order of some kind t o be main-
tained, o r even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of a collective inter-
est, and security acquires a broad meaning: it can be enjoyed o r pursued in
common. Foreign policy will take some account of the common interest. It
becomes possible t o transfer to international politics some of the categories
of constit~tionalisrn.'~
Proponents of the system-oriented approaches to security have taken the
society of states ('anarchical' though it may be, t o use Hedley Bull's phrase)'
as a relevant object of security. They have argued that the security of the
invasion of Iran, would not have reached the proportions it did in the Iraqi
regime's perception had the government in Baghdad been more representative
of the majority of its population and had it not been as narrowly based as it
is today. Its invasion of Iran was largely designed to pre-empt an anticipated
popular movement against it from within - a movement that would have
owed much to the exemplary success of the Iranian revol~tion.'~
On occasion, a regime - and I make no distinction here between so-called
'right-wing' and 'left-wing' regimes - will 'externalize' threats directed at it,
in order both to portray such threats as 'illegitimate' (in the sense that they
emanate from abroad and violate the norm of state sovereignty and its corol-
lary of non-intervention by other states) and to portray its repressive actions -
often repressive in the extreme, as any student of Latin America or Africa,
or even of Syria and Iraq, would immediately recognize - as 'legitimate'.
By turning a political (and quite often a social and economic) problem into
a military one, and by presenting the military threat as coming from exter-
nal sources, regimes in the Third World quite often try to choose an arena
of confrontation with domestic dissidents that is favourable to themselves,
namely, the military arena. While this strategy might work well in the initial
stages of such confrontations, it usually leads to much bigger conflagrations
within a decade or two of the initial, usually unorganized, outbursts of polit-
ical dissent.
This characterization of the security problem as faced by the Third
World states and its differences from the pattern of security issues faced by
developed Western states has dealt so far only with what one may call the
'symptomatic' level of the question, the above-mentioned differences being
merely the symptoms of a much deeper divergence in the respective experi-
ences of Western and Third World states. These differences are related to
two major variables: (a) the history of state formation in the Third World
as compared to its counterpart in the West, and (b) the pattern of elite
recruitment and regime establishment and maintenance in the Third World
as compared to the same processes in the developed states. These major
variables have their own corollaries which will be analysed as the discus-
sion proceeds, but it is essentially the differences in these two broad inter-
related areas between Western and Third World states - differences not so
much in absolute and culture-based terms as in relative and time-based ones -
that determine the differences in the primary security orientations of the
two sets of states.
As a result of a centuries-old process of development, modern states in
the industrialized Western world (which we will call the European world, for
short, and which includes North America and Australasia) have reached a
position which can be referred to as one of 'unconditional legitimacy'."
Moreover, not only are the prevailing state-structures in the European world
legitimate, they are also strong and cohesive. In fact, the two attributes com-
plement each other. Western states are, therefore, strong states (although all
of them may not be strong powers they are strong in terms of their state
structures). By contrast, state structures in the Third World in the present
Security in t h e Third World: T h e Worm About t o Turn? 32 1
form d o not enjoy 'unconditional legitimacy' and are weak as states (once
again one must be careful to distinguish weak states from weak powers)."
There are more reasons for this major difference in respective strengths. The
first is related to the time factor. Most states in the Third World are only
recent participants in the modern system of states, which is European in ori-
gin and in its defining characteristics. Until a few decades ago they were
mere 'objects' rather than 'subjects' in international relations. Even after the
conclusion of the decolonization process, because of the enormous time gap
between the development of modern state structures in the Third World and
the development of the same structures in Europe, their capacity to act effect-
ively in a system which is defined primarily by its state-centric character is
low. The economic gulf between the developed Western and developing
Southern states, with limited and partial exceptions, adds to the latters' inef-
fectiveness as participants in the system. One can, therefore, even in the
1980s, speak with some justification of two types of actors in the inter-
national system: the primary actors (the original European members of the sys-
tem and their offshoots in North America and Australasia) and the secondary
actors (the late-comers, the bulk of the Third World).
This late development of modern state structures has meant they still
lack legitimacy (in their present form) in large parts of the Third World.
Defined, as they have been, primarily by boundaries drawn by the colonial
powers for the sake of administrative convenience or in some form of trade-
off with colonial competitors, these structures have not yet developed the
capacity to ensure the habitual identification of their populations with their
respective states and the regimes that preside over these post-colonial struc-
tures within colonially-dictated boundaries. It is no wonder, therefore, that
internal dissent and lack of identification pose such a strong threat to the
structures of Third World states.
The problem is drastically compounded when one looks at the level of
consensus on fundamental social and political issues within Third World
societies. Western societies reached the current high level of consensus on
such issues of social and political organization after centuries of internal
conflict and upheaval (the Cromwellian episode in Britain and the French
Revolution are two outstanding examples). Having gone through these tur-
moils, and having had the luxury of doing so over centuries - a luxury no
longer available to Third World states - the present high level o f consensus
has been attained. For, despite the (sometimes extreme) rhetoric of the vari-
ous political groupings in the West, their positions on vital political and
social issues vary only marginally from each other. This is why, no matter
how heated the debate and how 'real' the differences among the political
parties in Britain, the Tory victory in the June 1983 elections has not led to
any of the opposition leaders going underground to launch a campaign of
subversion and insurgency against the 'Thatcher regime'. However, with
certain limited exceptions (maverick Third World states like India for ex-
ample, and one is not sure for how long they will continue to be exceptions)
this is a norm that does not prevail in the Third World. Since fundamental
322 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
This, however, is not the end of the story. There is also a remarkable dif-
ference between the respective relationships between the security concerns
of the Third World states on the one hand, and those of the developed coun-
tries on the other, to the security and stability of the international system as
a whole. This has grave adverse effects on Third World states as far as the
systemic inputs into their security problems are concerned. I have argued
earlier that the developed states' security concerns are so firmly interlinked
with those of the international system as to make them virtually indistin-
guishable. Any major threat to the security of a developed state immediately
takes on the character of a crisis for the whole system, particularly since it
has the potential to destabilize the dominant global balance of power
between the two superpowers - a balance which in turn forms the under-
pinning of the stability and security of the international system as it is cur-
rently organized.
This is far from the case when one considers the security problems, exter-
nal or internal, of Third World states. (The possible exception to this con-
cerns some of the major oil exporters, though even in their case the linkages
between their security concerns and those of the system or of the dominant
powers appear to be of an ephemeral and very limited character. There is no
commitment in the developed world to the security of these states as states:
the only commitment seems to be to the security of access to their oil
resources.) Even in the case of the most important and the largest countries
of the Third World, the link between their security and that of the system as
a whole ( a link that is defined, whether one likes it or not, by the dominant
powers in the system) is very fragile, if not totally non-existent.
This means that conflicts, whether internal or intra-regional, or even,
sometimes, cross-regional, within and among states in the Third World are
considered permissible by the dominant powers, as long as they do not
324 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
threaten to draw the latter into direct confrontation with each other. The
only conflict in the Third World with this sort of potential is the Arab-Israeli
conflict, particularly if the balance of power in the Middle East were to
change dramatically to Israel's disadvantage. But this is not a typical Third
World conflict, for the simple reason that Israel, in terms of its ideological
origins, its pattern of colonization in Palestine, the organization of its soci-
ety and polity, the composition of its elite (even under Likud), its links with
strong and important European and American constituencies (both Jewish
and Gentile) and the intensity of one superpower's commitment to its exter-
nal security (some would argue its expansion), is a European state. Israel
may be physically located in the Third World but it is not of the Third
World. Therefore Israeli security is linked directly to issues of systemic secur-
ity, which is not the case with any other African or Asian country.'-
Thus, while setting limits to Third World conflicts (the limits being
determined by the superpowers' refusal to enter into direct confrontation
over what are considered peripheral issues), the stability of the central bal-
ance not only permits local (intra-state or intra-regional) conflicts in large
parts of the Third World, but may in fact even encourage the eruption of
such conflicts, partially as a way of letting off steam t o help cool the tem-
perature around those core issues which are considered directly relevant
and vital to the central balance and, therefore, to the international system.lx
The fragility of political institutions and state structures in the Third
World permits such encouragement, because it allows internal issues t o take
on international dimensions. Fragile polities are by definition easily perme-
able. Therefore, internal issues in Third World societies not only get trans-
formed into inter-state issues quite readily, they also lend themselves easily
to political and military intervention by the superpowers. Traditional inter-
state rivalries, compounded by the complex disputes introduced as a result
of colonially imposed boundaries, when added to the internal political
fragilities of Third World states provide very fertile ground for superpower
rivalry to be played out in the relatively 'safe' areas of the globe without the
imminent threat of direct confrontation between Washington and Moscow.
In the process, however, they exacerbate the problem of security - no mat-
ter whether it is defined in maximalist or in minimalist terms - for vast
parts of the Third World.19
There are a number of secondary factors which lead the superpowers to
tolerate and, quite often, encourage conflicts in the Third World; for ex-
ample, these conflicts (a) keep the arms industry of the developed world in
business, pay for a substantial proportion of R&D investments, and help
recycle petrodollars into developed economies; ( b ) provide convenient test-
ing grounds for new weapons systems which can than be improved upon in
the light of combat experience; (c) provide a relatively safe instrument for
testing the limits of the adversary's tolerance and a rough and ready meas-
ure of its 'will' to resist political and military encroachments; ( d ) provide
opportunities for 'linkage' between issues, thereby allowing a superpower
which finds itself in a disadvantageous position in one context to choose
i Security in t h e Third World: T h e Worm About t o Turn? 325
is far more limited than their commitment to maintain the political systems and
governments in power in what can be called their 'core' allies. Washington's
commitment to Somoza or the Shah was qualitatively different from its com-
mitment to Western Europe from the days of the Marshall Plan. Similarly, des-
pite the expansion of Soviet capabilities in the 1970s, Moscow's commitment
to Mengistu in Ethiopia or the MPLA in Angola is qualitatively different
326 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
Such policies on the part of the superpowers have the potential to create
an even more dangerous situation. So far, the limited success that both
Washington and Moscow have achieved in winning friends and influencing
regimes in the Third World through their parallel policies of investing in
insecure regimes has resulted from the insulation, as argued above, of the
central balance against the negative effects of Third World conflicts and
proliferating insecurities. However, this insulation has been a function of
the relative stability of the central strategic balance, as a result of which the
relationship between the superpowers on the one hand and the Third World
on the other has so far been, by and large, a one-way street, in which the
superpowers, jointly or separately, have dictated the limits to which regional
insecurities could or could not affect their bilateral relationship.
However, the stability of the central balance itself is largely dependent
upon technological factors. For the last three decades the balance has not
tilted dangerously against either one of the contestants because the techno-
logical equilibrium between the superpowers has been, by and large, main-
tained. The overall American advantage in technological achievement has
been neutralized in the military - nuclear field by greater Soviet investment
in military-related technologies a t the expense of other sectors of society.
One cannot, however, pretend that this situation will last for ever. Given the
inherently escalatory nature of modern technology - a phenomenon we
have witnessed since the Industrial Revolution - one cannot rule out serious
disequilibrium in the military-technological balance in the near future.
-\voch Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn? 327
Destabilizing technological escalation may take one of two forms, and the
two scenarios reflect the apprehensions of the hard-liners in Washington
and Moscow respectively. Either the Soviet Union may, by a combination of
increasing investment in miltary R&D (of course, at greater domestic cost)
and greater political use of its conventional superiority in Europe, attain a
position whereby it is able to make serious political, if not military, inroads
into Western Europe; or the United States, by the sheer momentum of its
overall technological lead, may reach a stage where it is not only able to
counterbalance Soviet conventional superiority in Central Europe but also,
and more important, effectively to neutralize the Soviet Union's strategic
capability to strike at the North American continent. In both cases the sta-
bility of the central balance will be seriously compromised and all the cur-
rent wisdom about nuclear deterrence would become irrelevant.
Even if the final stages of either scenario are not reached, growing evi-
dence of a trend towards either conclusion would introduce an element of
grave uncertainty into superpower calculations. In fact, in this case, as in
others in international relations, the perceptions of a situation by the parties
concerned are more important than the actual situation itself. It would not
be wrong in this context, therefore, to note that there are increasing signs,
i f one looks at the recent rhetoric coming out of the White House and the
Kremlin, that perceptions both in Washington and Moscow tend towards
the more alarmist scenarios propounded in the United States and the Soviet
Union. These alarmist perceptions, in my view, are directly linked to the
uncertainties in the minds of superpower policy-makers and the relevant
foreign policy elites regarding the long-term effect of technological escala-
tion in the strategic arms race. The entire arms control exercise has been pri-
marily related to minimizing if not eliminating these uncertainties. However,
given the current state of mind prevalent in both Washington and Moscow
it is apparent that these attempts at arms control and limitation have not
had significant, long-term psychological effect. The failure of the US Senate
to ratify SALT 11 and the general deterioration in Soviet-American relations
since then, particularly the periodic breakdowns in bilateral communication,
have more than neutralized any benevolent effect that SAI>TI may have had
on the psychological atmosphere surrounding superpower relations.
Given this context, one can readily imagine that in a period of equilibrium
transition (which would itself be a function of perceived instability in the cen-
tral balance), that is, before the superpower strategic balance stabilizes at a
new and higher level of technological equilibrium, the two global powers,
increasingly apprehensive of the final outcome, would suffer from something
of a 'state of nerves'. This is a period which we may be entering in the second
half of the 1980s, if we have not done so already. In a state of great nervous
tension, superpower policy-makers (like all human beings) are bound to exag-
gerate out of all proportion the significance of occurrences - like conflicts and
insecurities in the Third World - which in more normal circumstances they
would tend to treat as routine in character. It is through the medium of these
quite often distorted perceptions that Third World conflicts and insecurities
328 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
could find a convenient entry point from which they might be able to affect
the course of the dominant bilateral r e l a t i ~ n s h i p . ~
This
' would not only give
them a degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the superpower relationship, it could
introduce complications into that central equation which, at a time of uncer-
tainty in the strategic balance, could prove extremely dangerous. Third World
insecurities, therefore, may in the next decade or less become a significant
form of input into the dominant global relationship, in some ways paying the
superpowers back in their own coin. The two types of instabilities (in all their
political and military, but primarily psychological, manifestations) could feed
upon each other, thus compounding the security problems of the global pow-
ers and the developed countries as well as the Third World. If, or rather when,
this happens, one could start speaking about the convergence of Western
(including Soviet) and Third World perceptions of 'security'. However, by
that time we would all be living in a much more insecure world.
Notes
1. Walter Lippmann, US foreign policy: shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943),
p. 51.
2. Arnold Wolfers, Discord & collaboration: essays on international politics (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150.
3. Talukder Maniruzzaman, The security of small states in the Third World, Canberra
Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 25 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
Australian National University, 1982), p. 15.
4. Martin Wight, 'Western values in international relations' in Herbert Butterfield and
Martin Wight, eds, Diplomatic investigations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 103.
5. Hedley Bull, The anarchic01 society (London: Macmillan, 1977).
6. For example, see Robert 0 . Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and rnterdependence
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
7. The coincidence of the two approaches is probably best reflected in Leonard Beaton,
The reform of power: a proposal for an international security system (Inndon: Chatto cYc
Windus, 1972).
8. The term 'Third World' is used in this article in a generic sense, and deliberately so. It
is undoubtedly true that there are diverse elements within the Third World; it is also true that
there are intramural problems, conflicts and antagonisms within it. However, these countries
share enough in terms of their colonial past and their unequal encounter w ~ t hthe European
powers following the Industrial Revolution to set them apart from the European states which
have traditionally formed the 'core' of the modern system of states. They also share attributes
of economic undetdevelopment and social dislocation, which are at least partially artriburable
to their encounter with the West (and which have continued even after the formal process of
decolonization has been completed). They are still inadequately linked to the issue areas which
dominate the international system as it is constituted today, despite all the rhetoric that sur-
rounds such debates as those regarding the New International Economic Order. Some of these
arguments are foreshadowed in my chapter, 'Autonomy and intervention: superpowers and the
Third World' in Robert O'Neill and D.M. Horner, eds, New directions in strategic thinking
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 104-16.
9. For a systematic account of growing East Bengali disenchantment w ~ t hthe concept of
Pakistan, see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: failure in national integration (New York: Columbia
Universitv Press. 19721.
10. 1 have argued this at some length and related it to the history of state formation and
the pattern of elite recruitment in both Iraq and Iran in my chapter, 'Regime security or
Security in t h e Third World: T h e Worm About t o Turn? 329
regional srcur~t!,Z pet-spectlves from tlie Gulf' III L h n a l d H. M.icmillen, Asimz pers/wrtir,crs rjn
intcrn~7ti0ti~~l s(,~xrity(1.ondon: h h c n ~ i l h forthcoming).
,
I I. For a most valuahle account of the orlglns ~ r l dgrowth, both In geogr'1phica1 ~ n d
chronolog~calterms, of the modern s!stem of sr,ltes centred o n the tluropc,in stares, see Martin
Wight. Systcws of st'rtrs (1.eicesrer: Leicesrer Universit) Press, 19771, chs 4 ,ind 5 . Also, tor dit-
k r e n t perspectives, ree ~ o r e p l iK. Str'iyer, O n thc nietfielwl o r ~ g i n sof t h r r71oticrn stirtc.
(Princeton, Nj: Pruiccton University Press, 1970); 1.eonarri Tivey, ed., Tlw wri!iorr-stritc: tho
fi1rni~7tionof modern politrcs (Oxford: ~ M a r r ~Robertson, n 198 I ); a n d Ralph I'ettn~~ln, St~rtc'
rind c.1~755(L.ondon: C,room Helm, 1 9 7 9 ) .
11. For ,I d ~ s c u s \ ~ oofn the concepts of w e ~ ka n d strong st'ltes '1s opposed t o weak ' ~ n d
Strong powers, sce B'lrry Bumn, I'eoplr, StL7tesanti fcdr (Krtghton, Susseu: tl,irvcstcr; 198.3),
pp, 65-9.
1.3. K.ingl,tdesh, 8tnfr.l. (:yprus, Irr~n,Nic'iragua, El S:~lv.idot-'ind G ~ ~ , ~ t e t n,1,1~1 ltestify a to
this p'ltt"".
14. Again, the examples are numerous, ranging from Iraq under tlie t l a s h e m i t c t o
Nic,iragu,i under Son~o/,i.
1.5. S o ~ n c t ~ m eben
e s the ~nainten~unce of e x ~ s t i n gsr'lre h o u n d ~ r i e sIS not c o n s ~ d e r e d,i core
v ~ l u chy Important segments of the state's population.
I h . :\mong other sources on this subject. see the t w o reports published by the Krandt
C o m m ~ s s ~ o North-.Soutl~:
n: LI p r ~ g r ~ r nf i r~ s~n r ~ ~ 1 ,(~1980)
1 1 and C:o~nniotzcrisis. North-Sorith:
c ~ ~ o p ~ ~f01. 7 tuwrld
i ~ ~ nr c ~ - o ~ v (r 1y9 8 1 , (both London, Sydney: 1',1n).
17. O n e could '11-gue chat Afghan~sranon the one hand , ~ n dSouth Afrtc.~o n the other
prolmbly have o r could h,iw similar degrees of Irnporr,ince t o the USSR 'ind the U n ~ t e dStcites
respectively. However, the Soviet refusal t o commit more than ~ h o u t100,000 troops 111
Afgh,int\r.in despite ~ t cso n t ~ g u i t yt o the Soviet U n ~ o na n d the contlnulng in\urgenc) I \ ,In ~ n d i -
cLltlon t h ~ tth ~ smay n o t he the c.lse In t h ~ instance. \ Morcovet; when the Sowet l l n i o n moved
IT\ troops into i-\fgli,~n~sr;~n, it w a s sure that tt W J S not r ~ s k i n ga direct milltar) confrontation
w ~ t hthe United States. In fact. the very d e c ~ s ~ otno d o so s i g n ~ f ~ ethat d the conflict 111
~\fgh,~nist,lnwas n o t directly related t o the central concerns of the superpower relcltionshlp.
South Africa does not threaten as yet t o hecome an 'trea of direct superpower c o n t r o n t a t ~ o n .
l lowever, when the nationaltsr struggle in South A f r ~ c ne\calatcs to \vh,it .il-e con\idcrcd d'in-
gerous proportions, the IJn~redSt'ltes m a ) d e c ~ d et o Incorporate ~ t securlry s into the US vlslon
of s)\ttviitC s e c ~ ~ r i t It ) . would d o this not s o much because of the c o u n t r ) ' ~rniner.11 resources
o r str,~regicloc,ition 3s hecduse the currently doriiinant elite s h , ~ r ern.iny ch,ir:ictcr~st~csw ~ t h
~ t 1st-nel~
r counterp,lrt which make hoth of them h , ~ s i c ~ l l'European' y s t ~ t e sL ~ n provide
d thetn
w ~ t hpowerful const~tuenciesin the Western world. It is ~nrerestingt o note in this context t h ~ t
despite the Amcric,~nc o t n n i ~ t ~ n e nofr over 500,000 troops in South Vietnam, S.iigon could he
w e a i l y ,~b,lndoned.'l.he only s,irt\factory explanation is related t o the lack ot a societal con-
scmsus in the United States reg'lrding the security of South Vietn'lm ~ n its d ruling elite c ~ ~the id
r e , i l i ~ a t ~ othat,
n ' ~ f t e rnll, what happened in V~etnarnJ l d not directly ~ f f c c the t superpower h.~l-
, ~ n c eIn the long term. This consensus IS certainly and strongly present in the United Swtes I ~ I
I\rael'\ c'ire, and one suspects in South Africa's also.
18. This argunienr h r ~ sbeen developed In Sisir Gupra, 'Great Power relat~ons,wol-Id order
~ n the d Thlrd World', F o r ~ r pAffizirs Reports, Jul./Aug. 1977. Vol. 17. Nos. 7-8.
19. t o r details o f this argument , ~ n d c'ise s t u d ~ e s d e ~ n o n s t r ~ i t i n gits v;~l~ciiry,w e
h l o h n m n ~ e dA)ooh, ed., Conflict a n d iritcrtlcwtrori in t l ~ cT l ~ i r d\vorld ( L o n d o n : L r o o m ticlni.
1980).
70. T h e late S h ~ hof Iran's hirrerncss towards the United States after his overthrow b v ~ s
the result of the talse ~ s s ~ ~ n l pthat t ~ o itn would protect him (paticularly slncc it had put him 111
pomer in 1953) irrespect~vco f the massive nrlture of the opposition t o 111s rule.
L I . In ,I curIoLIs \vrly, Henry Ktss~nger.hy p r o p o u n d ~ n gh ~ 'link,~ge' s t h e s ~ sregarding Soviet
heh,ivto~lr,might habe paved the w.iy for \uch a n occurrence; tor it is hut .l short step from
. ~ p p l > i n gthe 'I~nkage' formul,i t o Soviet polley toward specif~c~ssueslconflictsIn the T l i ~ r t l
Vl'orld t o a p p l y ~ n git generally t o Third World conflicts, particu,~rly\vhet~~t I S , ~ s s ~ l r n eth,it d
the S o ~ ~ Union et might h a \ e ,I finger in almost every 'Third World ple.
Nuclear W a r and Climatic Catastrophe:
Some Policy Implications
Carl Sagan
It is not even impossible to imagine that the effects of an atomic war fought
with greatly perfected weapons and pushed by the utmost determination
will endanger the survival of man.
- Edward Teller
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1947
The fact that no limits exist to the destructiveness of this weapon makes
its very existence and the knowledge of its construction a danger to
humanity. ... It is ... an evil thing.
- Enrico Fermi and 1.1. Rabi
Addendum, ibid.
The central point of the new findings is that the long-term consequences of
a nuclear war could constitute a global climatic catastrophe.
The immediate consequences of a single thermonuclear weapon explosion
are well known and well documented - fireball radiation, prompt neutrons
and gamma rays, blast, and fires.' The Hiroshima bomb that killed between
200,000 and 200,000 people was a fission device of about 12 kilotons yield
(the explosive equivalent of 12,000 tons of TNT). A modern thermonuclear
warhead uses a device something like the Hiroshima bomb as the trigger -
the "match" to light the fusion reaction. A typical thermonuclear weapon
now has a yield of about 500 kilotons (or 0.5 megatons, a megaton being
the explosive equivalent of a million tons of TNT). There are many weapons
in the 9 t o 20 megaton range in the strategic arsenals of the United States
and the Soviet Union today. The highest-yield weapon ever exploded is
58 megatons.
Strategic nuclear weapons are those designed for delivery by ground-
based or submarine-launched missiles, or by bombers, to targets in the
adversary's homeland. Many weapons with yields roughly equal to that of
the Hiroshima bomb are today assigned to "tactical" or "theater" military
missions, or are designated "munitions" and relegated to ground-to-air and
air-to-air missiles, torpedoes, depth charges and artillery. While strategic
weapons often have higher yields than tactical weapons, this is not always
the case.3 Modern tactical or theater missiles (e.g., Pershing 11, SS-20) and
air support weapons (e.g., those carried by F-15 or MiG-23 aircraft) have
sufficient range to make the distinction between "strategic" and "tactical"
or "theater" weapons increasingly artificial. Both categories of weapons
can be delivered by land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and aircraft;
and by intermediate-range as well as intercontinental delivery systems.
Nevertheless, by the usual accounting, there are around 18,000 strategic
thermonuclear weapons (warheads) and the equivalent number of fission
triggers in the American and Soviet strategic arsenals, with an aggregate
yield of about 10,000 megatons.
Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe 333
The total number of nuclear weapons (strategic plus theater and tactical)
in the arsenals of the two nations is close to 50,000, with an aggregate yield
near 15,000 megatons. For convenience, we here collapse the distinction
between strategic and theater weapons, and adopt, under the rubric "stra-
tegic," an aggregate yield of 13,000 megatons. The nuclear weapons of the
rest of the world - mainly Britain, France and China - amount to many hun-
dred warheads and a few hundred megatons of additional aggregate yield.
N o one knows, of course, how many warheads with what aggregate yield
would be detonated in a nuclear war. Because of attacks on strategic aircraft
and missiles, and because of technological failures, it is clear that less than the
entire world arsenal would be detonated. On the other hand, it is generally
accepted, even among no st military planners, that a "small" nuclear war
would be almost impossible to contain before it escalated to include much of
the world arsenak4 (Precipitating factors include comsnand and control
malfunctions, communications failures, the necessity for instantaneous deci-
sions o n the fates of millions, fear, panic and other aspects of real nuclear war
fought by real people.) For this reason alone, any serious attempt to examine
the possible consequences of nuclear war must place major emphasis on
large-scale exchanges in the five-to-seven-thousand-megaton range, and
many studies have done Many of the effects described below, however,
can be triggered by much smaller wars.
The adversary's strategic airfields, missile silos, naval bases, submarines
at sea, weapons manufacturing and storage locales, civilian and military
command and control centers, attack assessment and early warning facil-
ities, and the like are probable targets ("counterforce attack"). While it is
often stated that cities are not targeted "per se," many of the above targets
are very near or colocated with cities, especially in Europe. In addition,
there is an industrial targeting category ("countervalue attack"). Modern
nuclear doctrines require that "war-supporting" facilities be attacked. Many
of these facilities are necessarily industrial in nature and engage a work
force of considerable size. They are almost always situated near major trans-
portation centers, so that raw materials and finished products can be effi-
ciently transported to other industrial sectors, or to forces in the field. Thus,
such facilities are, almost by definition, cities, or near or within cities. Other
"war-supporting" targets may include the transportation systems themselves
(roads, canals, rivers, railways, civilian airfields, etc.), petroleum refineries,
storage sites and pipelines, hydroelectric plants, radio and television trans-
mitters and the like. A major countervalue attack therefore might involve
almost all large cities in the United States and the Soviet Union, and pos-
sibly most o f the large cities in the Northern Hemisphere.' There are fewer
than 2,500 cities in the world with populations over 100,000 inhabitants,
so the devastation of all such cities is well within the means of the world
nuclear arsenals.
Recent estimates of the immediate deaths from blast, prompt radiation,
and fires in a major exchange in which cities were targeted range from sev-
eral hundred million to 1.1 billion people - the latter estimate is in a World
334 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
radiation than does the slower fallout of radioactive particles from the
stratosphere.
N ~ ~ c l e explosions
ar of more than one-megaton yield generate a radiant
fireball that rises through the troposphere into the stratosphere. The fire-
halls from weapons with yields between 100 kilotons and one megaton will
partially extend into the stratosphere. The high temperatures in the fireball
chemically ignite some of the nitrogen in the air, producing oxides of nitro-
gen, which in turn chemically attack and destroy the gas ozone in the mid-
dle stratosphere. But ozone absorbs the biologically dangerous ultraviolet
radiation from the Sun. Thus the partial depletion of the stratospheric ozone
layer, or "ozonosphere," by high-yield nuclear explosions will increase the
flux of solar ultraviolet radiation at the surface of the Earth (after the soot
and dust have settled out). After a nuclear war in which thousands of high-
yield weapons are detonated, the increase in biologically dangerous ultra-
violet light might be several hundred percent. In the more dangerous shorter
wavelengths, larger increases would occur. Nucleic acids and proteins, the
fundamental molecules for lite on Earth, are especially sensitive to ultra-
violet radiation. Thus, an increase of the solar ultraviolet flux at the surface
of the Earth is potentially dangerous for life.
These four effects - obscuring smoke in the troposphere, obscuring dust
in the stratosphere, the fallout of radioactive debris, and the partial destruc-
tion of the ozone layer - constitute the four known principal adverse envi-
ronmental consequences that occur after a nuclear war is "over." There
may be others about which we are still ignorant. The dust and, especially,
the dark soot absorb ordinary visible light from the Sun, heating the atmos-
phere and cooling the Earth's surface.
All four o f these effects have been treated in our recent scientific inves-
tigation."he study, known from the initials of its authors as TTAPS, for the
first time demonstrates that severe and prolonged low temperatures would
follow a nuclear war. (The study also explains the fact that no such climatic
effects were detected after the detonation of hundreds of megatons during
the period of U.S.-Soviet atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, ended by
treaty in 1963: the explosions were sequential over many years, not virtu-
ally simultaneous; and, occurring over scrub desert, coral atolls, tundra and
wasteland, they set no fires.) The new results have been subjected to
detailed scrutiny, and half a dozen confirmatory calculations have now been
made. A special panel appointed by the National Academy of Sciences to
examine this problem has come to similar conclusions."'
Unlike many previous studies, the effects d o not seem to be restricted to
northern mid-latitudes, where the nuclear exchange would mainly take
place. There is now substantial evidence that the heating by sunlight of
atmospheric dust and soot over northern mid-latitude targets would pro-
foundly change the global circulation. Fine particles would be transported
across the equator in weeks, bringing the cold and the dark to the Southern
Hemisphere. (In addition, some studies suggest that over 100 megatons
would he dedicated to equatorial and Southern Hemisphere targets, thus
336 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
generating fine particles locally.)11While it would be less cold and less dark
at the ground in the Southern Hemisphere than in the Northern, massive
climatic and environmental disruptions may be triggered there as well.
In our studies, several dozen different scenarios were chosen, covering a
wide range of possible wars, and the range of uncertainty in each key param-
eter was considered (e.g., to describe how many fine particles are injected into
the atmosphere). Five representative cases are shown in Table 1, below,
ranging from a small low-yield attack exclusively on cities, utilizing, in yield,
only 0.8 percent of the world strategic arsenals, to a massive exchange
involving 75 percent of the world arsenals. "Nominal" cases assume the most
probable parameter choices; "severe" cases assume more adverse parameter
choices, but still in the plausible range.
Predicted continental temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere vary
after the nuclear war according t o the curves shown in Figure 1 on the fol-
lowing page. The high heat-retention capacity of water guarantees that
oceanic temperatures will fall at most by a few degrees. Because tempera-
tures are moderated by the adjacent oceans, temperature effects in coastal
regions will be less extreme than in continental interiors. The temperatures
shown in Figure 1 are average values for Northern Hemisphere land areas.
?6 Yield Warhead
% Yield Urban or Yield Total
Total Surface Industrial Range Number of
Case Yield ( M T ) Bursts Targets (MT) Explosions
1. Baseline Case, 5,000 57 20 0.1-10 10,400
countervalue and
co~nterforce~~~
11. 3,000 MT nominal, 3,000 50 0 1-10 2,250
counterforce only'"'
14. lOOMT nominal, 100 0 100 0.1 1,000
countervalue only(''
16. 5000 MT "severe," 5,000 100 0 5-1 0 700
counterforce only'"- *'
17. 10,000 MT "severe," 10,000 63 15 0.1-10 16,160
countervalue and
c~unterforce'~,
a. In the Baseline Case, 12,000 square kilometers of inner cities are burned; on every square
centimeter an average of 10 grams of combust~blesare burned, and I . 1 % of the burned
material rises as smoke. Also, 230,000 square kilometers of suburban areas burn, with
1.5 grams consumed at each square centimeter and 3.6% rising as smoke.
b. In this highly conservative case, it is assumed that no smoke emission occurs, that not a
blade of grass is burned. Only 25,000 tons of the fine dust is raised into the upper atmos-
phere for every megaton exploded.
c. In contrast to the Baseline Case, only inner cities burn, but with 10 grams per square centimeter
consumed and 3.3% rising as smoke into the high atmosphere.
d. Here, the fine (submicron)dust raised into the upper atmosphere IS 150,000 tons per megaton
exploded.
1 Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe 337
Figure 1 : T e m p e r a t u r e Effects of N u c l e a r W a r C a s e s
C a s e I 1: 3000 h1T n o m ~ n d c, o u n t e r f o r c e o n l )
Case 14: I00 MT n o m ~ n a l c, i n e s onl!
TFMPCRATUKt>
---------------
FREEZINC, P O I N T OF P U R E WATER
c ~ t ~ aensd c o u n t e r t o r i e
T I M E POST-DETONATION (days)
Note: In this Figure, the average temperature of Northern Hemisphere land arc,l\ ( ~ w iron1 ~ y
coastlines) 1s shown varylng w ~ t htime after the hve Cases of nuclear war defined in Tahle 1.
T h e "ambient" temperature is the average in the Northern Hemi\phere o \ e r all latitude\ ,und
seasons: thus, normal winte1- temperatures a t north temperature latitudes are lower th,ln is
shown, a n d normal tropical remper,ltures ,Ire higher tli,ln shown. Cases described as "noniinal"
Jssume the m o \ t likely values of parameters (such as dust part& size o r the trecluency ot
firestorms) that a r e imperfectly known. Cases marked "severe" represent ,idverse hut not
~tnpl~iusihle values of these parameters. In Case 14 the curve ends when the ten1per;itures come
w ~ t h l na degree of the ambient values. For the four other Cases the curve5 are \ho\vn enduig
'~trer 300 d ~ y s hut
, t h ~ sis s ~ m p l yhecause the calculations were not extended further. In these
tour <:a\cs the curve\ will continue t o the directions thev are headed.
338 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Even much smaller temperature declines are known to have serious con-
sequences. The explosion of the Tambora volcano in Indonesia in 1815 led
to an average global temperature decline of only 1°C, due to the obscuration
of sunlight by the fine dust propelled into the stratosphere; yet the hard
freezes the following year were so severe that 1816 has been known in
Europe and America as "the year without a summer." A 1°C cooling would
nearly eliminate wheat growing in Canada.12 In the last thousand years, the
maximum global or Northern Hemisphere temperature deviations have been
around 1°C. In an Ice Age, a typical long-term temperature decline from
preexisting conditions is about 10°C. Even the most modest of the cases
illustrated in Figure 1 give temporary temperature declines of this order.
The Baseline Case is much more adverse. Unlike the situation in an Ice Age,
however, the global temperatures after nuclear war plunge rapidly and take
only months to a few years to recover, rather than thousands of years. N o
new Ice Age is likely to be induced by a Nuclear Winter.
Because of the obscuration of the Sun, the daytime light levels can fall to
a twilit gloom or worse. For more than a week in the northern mid-latitude
target zone, it might be much too dark to see, even at midday. In Cases 1 and
1 4 (Table I ) , hemispherically averaged light levels fall to a few percent of
normal values, comparable to those at the bottom of a dense overcast. At
this illumination, many plants are close to what is called the compensation
point, the light level at which photosynthesis can barely keep pace with plant
metabolism. In Case 17, illumination, averaged over the entire Northern
Hemisphere, falls in daytime to about 0.1 percent of normal, a light level at
which plants will not photosynthesize at all. For Cases 1 and especially 17,
full recovery to ordinary daylight takes a year or more (Figure 1).
As the fine particles fall out of the atmosphere, carrying radioactivity to
the ground, the light levels increase and the surface warms. The depleted
ozone layer now permits ultraviolet light to reach the Earth's surface in
increased proportions. The relative timing of the multitude of adverse con-
sequences of a nuclear war is shown in Table 2, on the following page.
Perhaps the most striking and unexpected consequence of our study is that
even a comparatively small nuclear war can have devastating climatic conse-
quences, provided cities are targeted (see Case 14 in Figure 1; here, the centers
of 100 major NATO and Warsaw Pact cities are burning). There is an indication
of a very rough threshold at which severe climatic consequences are triggered -
around a few hundred nuclear explosions over cities, for smoke generation, or
around 2,000 to 3,000 high-yield surface bursts at, eg., missile silos, for dust
generation and ancillary fires. Fine particles can be injected into the atmosphere
at increasing rates with only minor effects until these thresholds are crossed.
Thereafter, the effects rapidly increase in severity."
As in all calculations of this complexity, there are uncertainties. Some fac-
tors tend to work towards more severe or more prolonged effects; others
tend to ameliorate the effects.14 The detailed TTAPS calculations described
here are one-dimensional; that is, they assume the fine particles to move
vertically by all the appropriate laws of physics, but neglect the spreading in
IV- 1 1 7
IN VY
w H 1
W VI I/t'
H H H
H w-1
w PY T/V
H-IN H H
1 1 bV
-1 7 7
w 7
w-7 H 1
H-IAI IN 7
H-w H 7
340 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
latitude and longitude. When soot or dust is moved away from the reference
locale, things get better there and worse elsewhere. In addition, fine particles
can be transported by weather systems to other locales, where they are car-
ried more rapidly down to the surface. That would ameliorate obscuration
not just locally but globally. It is just this transport away from the northern
mid-latitudes that involves the equatorial zone and the Southern Hemisphere
in the effects of the nuclear war. It would be helpful to perform an accurate
three-dimensional calculation on the general atmospheric circulation fol-
lowing a nuclear war. Preliminary estimates suggest that circulation might
moderate the low temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere predicted in our
calculations by some 30 percent, lessening somewhat the severity of the
effects, but still leaving them at catastrophic levels (e.g., a 30°C rather than
a 40°C temperature drop). To provide a small margin of safety, we neglect
this correction in our subsequent discussion.
There are also effects that tend to make the results much worse: for
example, in our calculations we assumed that rainout of fine particles
occurred through the entire troposphere. But under realistic circumstances,
at least the upper troposphere may be very dry, and any dust or soot car-
ried there initially may take much longer to fall out. There is also a very sig-
nificant effect deriving from the drastically altered structure of the
atmosphere, brought about by the heating of the clouds and the cooling of
the surface. This produces a region in which the temperature is approxi-
mately constant with altitude in the lower atmosphere and topped by a
massive temperature inversion. Particles throughout the atmosphere would
then be transported vertically very slowly - as in the present stratosphere.
This is a second reason why the lifetime of the clouds of soot and dust may
be much longer than we have calculated. If so, the worst of the cold and the
dark might be prolonged for considerable periods of time, conceivably for
more than a year. We also neglect this effect in subsequent discussion.
Nuclear war scenarios are possible that are much worse than the ones
we have presented. For example, if command and control capabilities are
lost early in the war - by, say, "decapitation" (an early surprise attack on
civilian and military headquarters and communications facilities) - then the
war conceivably could be extended for weeks as local commanders make
separate and uncoordinated decisions. At least some of the delayed missile
launches could be retaliatory strikes against any remaining adversary cities.
Generation of an additional smoke pall over a period of weeks or longer
following the initiation of the war would extend the magnitude, but espe-
cially the duration of the climatic consequences. O r it is possible that more
cities and forests would be ignited than we have assumed, or that smoke
emissions would be larger, or that a greater fraction of the world arsenals
would be committed. Less severe cases are of course possible as well.
These calculations therefore are not, and cannot be, assured prognostica-
tions of the full consequences of a nuclear war. Many refinements in them are
possible and are being pursued. But there is general agreement on the overall
conclusions: in the wake of a nuclear war there is likely to be a period, lasting
Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe 34 1
than a year. But with the breakdown of civil order and transportation systems
in the cold, the dark and the fallout, these stores would become largely inac-
cessible. Vast numbers of survivors would soon starve to death.
In addition, the sub-freezing temperatures imply, in many cases, the
unavailability of fresh water. The ground will tend to be frozen to a depth of
about a meter - incidentally making it unlikely that the hundreds of millions
of dead bodies would be buried, even if the civil organization to do so existed.
Fuel stores to melt snow and ice would be in short supply, and ice surfaces
and freshly fallen snow would tend to be contaminated by radioactivity and
pyrotoxins.
In the presence of excellent medical care, the average value of the acute
lethal dose of ionizing radiation for healthy adults is about 450 rads. (As
with many other effects, children, the infirm and the elderly tend to be more
vulnerable.) Combined with the other assaults on survivors in the postwar
environment, and in the probable absence of any significant medical care,
the mean lethal acute dose is likely to decline to 350 rads or even lower. For
many outdoor scenarios, doses within the fallout plumes that drift hun-
dreds of kilometers downwind of targets are greater than the mean lethal
dose. (For a 10,000-megaton war, this is true for more than 30 percent of
northern mid-latitude land areas.) Far from targets, intermediate-timescale
chronic doses from delayed radioactive fallout may be in excess of 100 rads
for the baseline case. These calculations assume no detonations on nuclear
reactors or fuel-reprocessing plants, which would increase the dose.
Thus, the combination of acute doses from prompt radioactive fallout,
chronic doses from the delayed intermediate-timescale fallout, and internal
doses from food and drink are together likely to kill many more by radi-
ation sickness. Because of acute damage to bone marrow, survivors would
have significantly increased vulnerability to infectious diseases. Most
infants exposed to 100 rads as fetuses in the first two trimesters of preg-
nancy would suffer mental retardation andlor other serious birth defects.
Radiation and some pyrotoxins would later produce neoplastic diseases and
genetic damage. Livestock and domesticated animals, with fewer resources,
vanishing food supplies and in many cases with greater sensitivity to
the stresses of nuclear war than human beings, would also perish in large
numbers.
These devastating consequences for humans and for agriculture would
not be restricted to the locales in which the war would principally be
"fought," but would extend throughout northern mid-latitudes and, with
reduced but still significant severity, probably to the tropics and the Southern
Hemisphere. The bulk of the world's grain exports originate in northern
mid-latitudes. Many nations in the developing as well as the developed
world depend on the import of food. Japan, for example, imports 75 percent
of its food (and 99 percent of its fuel). Thus, even if there were no climatic
and radiation stresses on tropical and Southern Hemisphere societies - many
of them already at subsistence levels of nutrition - large numbers of people
there would die of starvation.
Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe
~l~iildi) 343
clear, there can, for such wars, be a 200 to 400 percent increment in the solar
ultraviolet flux that reaches the ground, with an increase of many orders of
magnitude in the more dangerous shorter-wavelength radiation. Together,
these radiation assaults are likely to suppress the immune systems of humans
and other species, making them more vulnerable to disease. At the same
time, the high ambient-radiation fluxes are likely to produce, through muta-
tion, new varieties of microorganisms, some of which might become patho-
genic. The preferential radiation sensitivity of birds and other insect
predators would enhance the proliferation of herbivorous and pathogen-
carrying insects. Carried by vectors with high radiation tolerance, it seems
possible that epidemics and global pandemics would propagate with no
hope of effective mitigation by medical care, even with reduced population
sizes and greatly restricted human mobility. Plants, weakened by low tem-
peratures and low light levels, and other animals would likewise be vulner-
able to preexisting and newly arisen pathogens.
There are many other conceivable synergisms, all of them still poorly
understood because of the complexity of the global ecosystem. Every syn-
ergism represents an additional assault, of unknown magnitude, on the
global ecosystem and its support functions for humans. What the world
would look like after a nuclear war depends in part upon the unknown syn-
ergistic interaction of these various adverse effects.
We d o not and cannot know that the worst would happen after a
nuclear war. Perhaps there is some as yet undiscovered compensating effect
or saving grace - although in the past, the overlooked effects in studies of
nuclear war have almost always tended toward the worst. But in an uncer-
tain matter of such gravity, it is wise to contemplate the worst, especially
when its ~ r o b a b i l i is
t ~not extremely small. The summary of the findings of
the group of 40 distinguished biologists who met in April 1983 to assess the
TTAPS conclusions is worthy of careful consideration:I8
Species extinction could be expected for most tropical plants and ani-
mals, and for most terrestrial vertebrates of north temperate regions, a
large number of plants, and numerous freshwater and some marine
organisms. ... Whether any people would be able to persist for long in
the face of highly modified biological communities; novel climates; high
levels of radiation; shattered agricultural, social, and economic systems;
extraordinary psychological stresses; and a host of other difficulties is
open to question. It is clear that the ecosystem effects alone resulting
from a large-scale thermonuclear war could be enough to destroy the
current civilization in at least the Northern Hemisphere. Coupled with
the direct casualties of perhaps two billion people, the combined inter-
mediate and long-term effects of nuclear war suggest that eventually
there might be no human survivors in the Northern Hemisphere.
Furthermore, the scenario described here is by no means the most severe that
could be imagined with present world nuclear arsenals and those contemplated
Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe 345
for the near future. In almost any realistic case involving nuclear exchanges
between the superpowers, global environmental changes sufficient to cause an
extinction event equal to or more severe than that at the close of the Cretaceous
when the dinosaurs and many other species died out are likely. In that event,
the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapicns cannot be excluded.
The better political leaders understand the nuclear winter, the more secure
are such conclusions.
If true, this should have cascading consequences for specific weapons sys-
tems. Further, the perceived vulnerability to a first strike has been a major
source of stress and fear, and thereby a major spur to the nuclear arms race.
Knowledge that a first strike is now less probable might make at least some
small contribution to dissipating the poisonous atmosphere of mistrust that
currently characterizes Soviet-American relations.
2. Sub-threshold War. Devastating nuclear wars that are nevertheless
significantly below the threshold for severe climatic consequences certainly
seem possible - for example, the destruction of 1 0 or 20 cities, or 100 silos
of a particularly destabilizing missile system. Nevertheless, might some
nation be tempted to initiate or engage in a much larger, but still reliably
sub-threshold nuclear war? The hope might be that the attacked adversary
would be reluctant to retaliate for fear of crossing the threshold.
This is not very different from the hope that a counterforce first strike
would not he followed by a retaliatory strike, because of the aggressor's
retention of an invulnerable (for example, submarine-based) second-strike
force adequate to destroy populations and national economies. It suffers the
same deficiency - profound uncertainty about the likely response.
The strategic forces of the United States or the Soviet Union - even if they
were all at fixed sites - could not be destroyed in a reliably sub-threshold war:
there are too many essential targets. Thus, a sub-threshold first strike power-
fully provokes the attacked nation and leaves much of its retaliatory force
untouched. It is easy to imagine a nation, having contemplated becoming the
object of a sub-threshold first strike, planning to respond in kind, because it
judges that failure to do so would itself invite attack. Retaliation could occur
immediately against a few key cities - if national leaders were restrained and
command and control facilities intact - or massively, months later, after
much of the dust and smoke have fallen out, extending the duration but
ameliorating the severity of the net climatic effects.
This, however, may not be the case for such nations as Britain, France
or China. Because of the marked contiguity of strategic targets and urban
areas in Europe, the climatic threshold for attacks on European nuclear
powers may be significantly less than for the United States or the Soviet
Union. Provided it could be accomplished without triggering a U.S.-Soviet
nuclear war, first strikes against all the fixed-site strategic forces of one of
these nations might not trigger the climatic catastrophe. Nevertheless, the
invulnerable retaliatory capability of these nations - especially the ballistic-
missile submarines of Britain and France - makes such a first strike unlikely.
3. Treaties o n Yields and Targeting. I would not include this possibility,
except that it has been mentioned publicly by a leading American nuclear
strategist. The proposal has two parts. The first is to ban by treaty all
nuclear warheads with yields in excess of 300 or 400 kilotons. The fireballs
from warheads of higher yields mainly penetrate into the stratosphere and
work to deplete the ozonosphere.
348 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
even for the security of the nuclear powers, much less for the rest of the
world. The prospect reinforces, in the short run, the standard arguments for
strategic confidence-building, especially between the United States and the
Soviet Union; for tempering puerile rhetoric; for resisting the temptation to
demonize the adversary; for reducing the likelihood of strategic confronta-
tions arising from accident or miscalculation; for stabilizing old and new
weapons systems - for example, by de-MIRVing missiles; for abandoning
nuclear-war-fighting strategies and mistrusting the possibility of "contain-
ment" of a tactical or limited nuclear war; for considering safe unilateral
steps, such as the retiring of some old weapons systems with very high-yield
warheads; for improving communications a t all levels, especially among
general staffs and between heads of governments; and for public declar-
ations of relevant policy changes. The United States might also contemplate
ratification of SALT I1 and of the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (ratified by 92 nations, includ-
ing the Soviet Union).
Both nations might consider abandoning apocalyptic threats and doctrines.
To the extent that these are not credible, they undermine deterrence; to the
extent that they are credible, they set in motion events that tend toward apoca-
lyptic conclusions.
In the long run, the prospect of climatic catastrophe raises real questions
about what is meant by national and international security. To me, it seems
clear that the species is in grave danger at least until the world arsenals are
reduced below the threshold for climatic catastrophe; the nations and the
global civilization would remain vulnerable even a t lower inventories. It
may even be that, now, the only credible arsenal is below threshold. George
Kennan's celebrated proposal2s to reduce the world arsenals initially to 50
percent of their current numbers is recognized as hard enough to imple-
ment. But it would be only the first step toward what is now clearly and
urgently needed - a more than 90-percent reduction (Kennan proposed an
ultimate reduction of more than 84 percent - adequate for strategic deter-
rence, if that is considered essential, but unlikely to trigger the nuclear win-
ter. Still further reductions could then be contemplated.
The detonation of weapons stockpiles near or above threshold would
be, we can now recognize, in contravention of the 1977 Geneva Convention
on The Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, signed by
48 nations and duly ratified by the Soviet Union and the United States.26
And Article 6 of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires the
United States and the Soviet Union, among other signatory states, "to pur-
sue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. ..." I d o
not imagine that these treaties can, by themselves, play a determining role
in producing major reductions in the world strategic arsenals, but they
establish some sense of international obligation and can at least expedite
urgent bilateral and multilateral consultations.
7 I 1 Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe 353
Climatic
Catdstrophe
Expected
United States and the Soviet Union would have almost identical numbers of
inventories by the late 1980s.
The uppermost (dash-dot) curve in Figure 2 shows the total U.S. and
Soviet arsenals (essentially the world arsenals) climbing upward since about
1970 with a very steep slope, the slope steepening still more if the projection
is valid. Such exponential or near-exponential runaways are expected in
arms races where each side's rate of growth is proportional to its perception
of the adversary's weapons inventory; but it is likewise clear that such rapid
growth cannot continue indefinitely. In all natural and human systems, such
steep growth rates are eventually stopped, often catastrophically.
It is widely agreed - although different people have different justifica-
tions for this conclusion - that world arsenals must be reduced significantly.
There is also general agreement, with a few demurrers, that at least the early
and middle stages of a significant decline can be verified by national tech-
nical means and other procedures. The first stage of major arms reduction
will have to overcome a new source of reluctance, when almost all silos
could be reliably destroyed in a sub-threshold first strike. To overcome this
reluctance, both sides will have prudently maintained an invulnerable retali-
atory force, which itself would later move to sub-threshold levels. (It would
even be advantageous to each nation to provide certain assistance in the
development of such a force by the other.)
As arsenals are reduced still further, the fine tuning of the continuing
decline may have t o be worked out very carefully and with additional safe-
guards to guarantee continuing rough strategic parity. As threshold inventories
are approached, some verifiable upper limits on yields as well as numbers
would have to be worked out, to minimize the burning of cities if a nuclear
conflict erupted. O n the other hand, the deceleration of the arms race would
have an inertia of its own, as the acceleration does; and successful first steps
would create a climate conducive to subsequent steps.
There are three proposals now prominently discussed in the United States:
Nuclear Freeze, Build-Down, and Deep Cuts. Their possible effects are dia-
grammed in Figure 2. They are by no means mutually exclusive, nor d o they
exhaust the possible approaches. A negotiated Freeze would at least prevent
the continuing upward escalation in stockpiles, would forestall the deploy-
ment of more destabilizing systems, and would ~ r o b a b bel ~accompanied by
agreement on immediate annual phased reductions (the curved lines in the
middle to late 1980s in Figure 2). To reduce the perceived temptation for a
first strike, de-MIRVing of missiles during arms reduction may be essential.
The most commonly cited method of following the Freeze with reductions
is incorporated in the Kennedy-Hatfield Freeze Resolution: percentage reduc-
tions. Under this approach, the two sides would agree on a percentage - often
quoted as being between five percent and ten percent - and would agree to
decrease deployed warheads by that percentage annually. The percentage
reduction method was proposed to the Soviet Union by the United States
at the Vienna Summit in June 1979 and was to be applied to the limits and
sub-limits of the SALT I1 accords until these reached a reduction of 50 percent.
Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe 357
that at least partly transcends parochial fealties in time and space. What
is urgently required is a coherent, mutually agreed upon, long-term policy
for dramatic reductions in nuclear armaments, and a deep commitment,
embracing decades, to carry it out.
O u r talent, while imperfect, to foresee the future consequences of our
present actions and to change our course appropriately is a hallmark of the
human species, and one of the chief reasons for our success over the past
million years. Our future depends entirely on how quickly and how broadly
we can refine this talent. We should plan for and cherish our fragile world
as we do our children and our grandchildren: there will be no other place
for them to live. It is nowhere ordained that we must remain in bondage to
nuclear weapons.
Acknowledgements
Notes
1. R.I? Turco, O.B. Toon, T.P. Ackerrnan, J.B. Pollack and L t r l Sagan, ITTAPS] " G l o h ~ l
Attnospher~cConsequences of Nuclear War," Science, in press; P.R. Ehrlich, M.;\. Harwell,
Peter H. Raven, Carl Sagan, G.M. Woodwell, et al., "The Long-Term Biological Consequences
of Nucle.~rWar," Scirnce, in press.
2. Saniuel Glasstone and I'hil~pJ . Dolan, The Effects o f N L I C ~ PWar,
I I I . 3rd cd., \V,l\hington:
I)epartrnent of Defense, 1977.
3. T h e "tactical" Pershing I, for example, is listed as carrying warheads with yields a s high
as 400 kilotons, whlle the "strategic" Poseidon C-3 is listed with ,I yield of only 40 kilotons.
\Vorltf Arrnarnents and Drsi~nncment,SIPRl Yearbook 1982, Stockholm I n r e r n a t ~ o n ~Pc,~ce ll
Research Institute, L.ondon: Taylor a n d Francis, 1982; J . Record, U.S. N~rclenrWcrzpons in
Enropc. W ~ s h i n g t o n :Rrookings Institution, 1974.
360 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
4. See, e.g., D. Ball, Adelphi Paper 169, London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1981; P. Bracken and M. Shubik, in Technology in Society, Vol. 4, 1982, p. 155.
5. National Academy of SciencesINational Research Council, Long-term Worldturde Effects
of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations, Washington: National Academy o f Sciences, 1975;
Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War, Washington, 1979; J. Peterson
(Ed.), Nuclear War: The Aftermath, special issue Ambio, Vol. 11, Nos. 2-3, Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences, 1982; R.P. Turco, et a/., loc. cit. footnote 1; S. Bergstrom, et ul., Effects
of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services, Rome: World Health Organization, Publication
No. A36.12, 1983; National Academy of Sciences, new 1983 study in press.
6. See, e.g., J. Peterson, op. cit. footnote 5.
7. S. Bergstrom, up. cit. footnote 5.
8. [hid.
9. R. P. Turco, et al., loc. cit. footnote 1.
10. National Academy of Sciences, 1983, loc. cit. footnote 5.
11. J. Peterson, op. crt. footnote 6 .
12. National Academy of Sciences, 1975, op. cit. footnote 5.
13. The climatic threshold for smoke in the troposphere is about 100 million metric tons,
injected essentially all at once; for sub-micron fine dust in the stratosphere, about the same.
14. The slow warming of the Earth due to a CO, greenhouse effect attendant to the burn-
ing of fossil fuels should not be thought of as tempering the nuclear winter: the greenhouse
temperature increments are too small and too slow.
15. These results are dependent on important work by a large number of sc~entisrswho
have previously examined aspects of this subject; many of these workers are acknowledged in
the articles cited in footnote 1.
16. David Pimentel and Mark Sorrells, private communication, 1983.
17. C. H. Kruger, R. B. Setlow, et a/., Causes a n d Effects of Stratospheric Ozone Reduction:
An Update, Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1982.
18. P. Ehrlich, et a[., loc. cit. footnote 1.
19. The term "Doomsday Machine" is due to Herman Kahn, Thinking About the
Unthinkable, New York: Horizon Press, 1962.
20. Aviation Week a n d Space Technology, May 15, 1978, p. 225.
21. Ihid.
22. S. Glasstone and P.J. D o h , op. cit. footnote 2.
23. The distribution of the coldest regions will vary with time and geography. In one recent
but still very crude three-dimensional simulation of the nuclear winter, the temperature has, by
4 0 days after the war, dropped by 15 to more than 4 0 centigrade degrees over much of the
globe, including a vast region extending from Chad to Novosibirsk, from the Caspian Sea to
Sri Lanka, embracing India, Pakistan and western China, and having its most severe effects in
Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. V. V. Alexandrov and G. 1. Stenchikov, preprint,
Computing Center, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1983.
24. Richard Garwin, testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security and
Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Congress, November 10,
1983; Hans Bethe, manuscript in preparation.
25. George F. Kennan, "The Only Way Out of the Nuclear Nightmare," Manchester
Guardian Weekly, May 31, 1981. This is Kennan's acceptance speech for the Albert Einstein
Peace Prize on May 19, 1981, in Washington, D.C.
26. Article 1, paragraph 1, states: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to
engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental mod~ficationtechniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to
another State Party." Paragraph 2 goes on: "Each State Parry to this Convention undertakes
not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to
engage in actwities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 ..."
27. Since higher-yield tactical warheads can also be used t o burn cities, and might do so
inadvertently, especially in Europe, provision for their elimination should also eventually be
made. But initial attention should be directed to strategic warheads and their delivery systems.
Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe 36 1
The Hypotheses
suggested that the superiority of the defense may leave both sides with no
incentive to attack and thus 'tame the elementary impetuosity of War.'
More explicit propositions were made by the proponents of the 'qualitative
principle' in the 1920s and 1930s. Their argument that offensive and defen-
sive weapons can be distinguished and that the former (and only the for-
mer) should be abolished was based on the explicit assumption that
offensive but not defensive weapons are conductive to war, an assumption
shared by most of the participants at the 1932 League of Nations Conference
for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Wheeler-Bennett, 1935;
Boggs, 1941). Hart, for example, wrote that 'any strengthening of the de-
fensive at the expense of the offensive is a discouragement to aggression'
( 1932: 72).
A more systematic attempt to delineate the consequences of the offen-
siveldefensive balance of military technology was suggested by Wright in his
classic A Study of War. He argues that the superiority of the offense generally
results in the following: an increase in the probability of war; political expan-
sion, unification, and empire building; a decrease in the number of states
in the system; and shorter duration and lower costs of wars. Superiority of
the defense, on the other hand, results in a strengthening of loci1 areas jnd
thus facilitates revolts, the disintegration of empires, and the decentralization
of states; an increase in the number of states; decrease in the decisiveness of
wars and their importance for world politics; strategies of protracted stale-
mates and mutual attrition, which result in wars of longer duration and greater
destructiveness (Wright, 1965: 129, 292-93, 673, 797, 1520). Similarly,
Andreski (1968: 75-76) argues that
other things being equal, the predominance of the attack over defence
tends to diminish the number of independent governments within a
given area and to widen the areas under their control, and/or facilitates
the tightening of control over the areas already under their domination;
while the superiority of defence tends to produce opposite results.
Gilpin also argues that the offensiveldefensive balance affects the costs of
changing the status quo, and that the higher the costs the fewer incentives for
war (1981: 60-62). This is similar to Bean's (1973: 207) argument that defen-
sive superiority increases the costs of conquest and consequently reduces the
number of conquests, though those that d o occur take longer. The strong
implication is that defensive superiority reduces the likelihood of war.
Jervis provides the most systematic effort to trace the theoretical impact
of the offensiveldefensive balance on the likelihood of war. Using the con-
ceptual device of the security dilemma, Jervis (1978: 188-190) identifies a
number of related linkages between offensive superiority and war. Most
importantly, offensive superiority increases the benefits from striking first and
increases the costs of allowing the adversary to strike first. This increases in
turn the incentives to strike first and therefore the likelihood of war.
Defensive superiority reduces both the benefits to the attacker who initiates
a war and the costs to the defender who waits and absorbs the first blow,
leaves neither side with an incentive to strike first, and thus reduces the like-
lihood of war (Quester, 1977: 211). The likelihood of war is also increased
by the erroneous perception of offensive advantage.
Second, offensive superiority contributes to arms races, which are them-
selves assumed to lead to war. The expectation that war will be frequent and
short places a premium on high levels of existing armaments and on a quick
response to an adversary's increases in armaments. When the defense is super-
ior, however, inferior forces are sufficient for deterrence. Defensively superior
weapons may further provide a dampening effect on the arms race because in
such a situation security does not require the matching of the adversary arm
for arm. Third, Jervis argues that offensive superiority increases the incentive
to seek alliances in advance (Osgood, 1967: 81), which contributes to polar-
ization, tensions, and an increased probability of war.' It can also be argued
that all of the destabilizing dimensions of the spiral model, including the psy-
chological dynamics that reinforce them (Jervis, 1978: 67-66), work to the
fullest extent when the offense is superior.
There are numerous historical examples which are said to illustrate the
destabilizing consequences of offensive superiority.' Perhaps the most widely
cited is World War I. The perceived advantages of the offense (Hart, 1932: 72;
Farrar, 1973; Quester, 1977: 103; Jervis, 1978: 190-1 91) created enormous
pressures for early mobilizations, which were widely believed to make war
inevitable (Fay, 1928: 11, ch. X; Levy, 1983b). Israel's preemptive strike
against Egypt in 1967 may have been encouraged by the perceived advantages
of the offense. The stability of the nuclear balance is widely believed to derive
from the absence of incentives to strike first, incentives which are reduced
by the existence of invulnerable retaliatory capabilities and countervalue
potential.
While many of the hypotheses regarding the consequences of the offen-
siveldefensive balance are inherently plausible, there are critical analytical
problems which must be resolved before they can be accepted as meaningful or
valid. These problems have to do with the theoretical logic of the hypotheses,
T h e Offensive/Defensive B a l a n c e of Military Technology 365
... it is difficult to judge the relative power of the offensive and defensive
except by a historical audit to determine whether on the whole, in a
given state of military technology, military violence had or had not
proved a useful instrument of political change. ... During periods when
dissatisfied powers have, on the whole, gained their aims by a resort to
arms, it may he assumed, on the level of grand strategy, that the power
of the offensive has been greater. During the periods when they have not
been able to d o so, it may be assumed that the power of the grand stra-
tegic defensive has been greater.
Territorial C o n q u e s t
Wright (1965: 793) lncludes these notions of defeat of enemy forces and
territor~alselzure In h ~ rather
s complex definition:
and conquest of territory. One answer is provided at the tactical level, based
on movement towards the armed forces, possessions, or territory of the enemy.
A condition of relative passivity and immobility in waiting for the enemy
to attack defines the strategic and tactical defensive (Wright, 1965: 807).
Clausewitz (as quoted in Boggs, 1941: 68) states:
What is defense in conception? The warding off a blow. What is then its
characteristic sign? The state of expectancy (or of waiting for this blow) ...
by this sign alone can the defensive be distinguished from the offensive in
war. ...
Clausewitz also writes: 'In tactics every combat, great or small, is defensive
if we leave the initiative to the enemy, and wait for his appearance on our
front' (as quoted in Boggs, 1941: 68).
Both offensive and defensive modes of war on the tactical level are neces-
sary, of course, for the achievement of either offensive or defensive object-
ives. The pursuit of any offensive goal requires a supporting defense, and the
defense alone can never bring victory but only stalemate. Mahan refers to
'the fundamental principle of naval war, that defense is insured only by
offence' (Boggs, 1941: 70). Clausewitz writes that an absolute defense is an
'absurdity' which 'completely contradicts the idea of war' (Boggs, 194 1: 71 ).
At some point it is necessary to seize the tactical offensive in order to avoid
defeat.'Thus the familiar maxim: the best defense is a good offense. It is nec-
essary, however, to distinguish between the strategic and tactical levels.
A general fighting offensively in strategic terms needs only to invade and then
hold territory to enable him to adopt the tactical defensive (Strachan, 1983).
It may be strategically advantageous to maneuver the enemy into a position
in which he is forced to take the tactical offensive under unfavorable condi-
tions. As the elder Moltke stated in 1865, 'our strategy must be offensive,
our tactics defensive' (Dupuy, 1980: 200). In addition, military tactics may
be offensive in one theater and defensive in another. The Schlieffen Plan, for
example, required a holding action against Russia in the east in order to
move against France in the west. Nevertheless, with certain types of weapons
systems more movement and tactical mobility is possible than with others.
It is difficult to measure movement historically while controlling for non-
technological f a ~ t o r s however.
,~ This leads us to the question of whether the
offensive/defensive balance can be defined by the characteristics of weapons
systems themselves.
T h e Characteristics of Armaments
While nearly all weapons can be used for either the strategic or tactical offen-
sive or the strategic or tactical defensive, the question is whether there are
some weapons systems which contribute disproportionately more to one than
to the other. As stated by the Naval Commission of the League of Nations
T h e OffensiveDefensive Balance of Military Technology 369
Hart (1932: 73) argues that certain weapons 'alone make it possible under
modern conditions to make a decisive offensive against a neighboring coun-
try.' What are the characteristics of such weapons?
Both Fuller and Hart identify mobility, striking power, and protection as
the essential characteristics of an offensive weapon (Wright, 196.5: 808).
Striking power (the impact of the blow) is not alone sufficient. A mobile
gun contributes more to the tactical offensive than an immobile one, and its
penetrating power is further enhanced if it is protected. But protection is
even more important for the defense. Mobility and protection are inversely
related, for it is easier to protect immobile weapons and wait passively for
the enemy to attack. The offensive value of the medieval knight ultimately
was negated by the heavy armor which protected him but restricted his
mobility. Thus Dupuy and Eliot (1937: 103) give particular emphasis to the
offensive advantages of mobility and striking power, noting that they too
may be in conflict. Roggs (1941: 84-85) argues that 'the defense disposes
especially of striking power and protection, to a lesser degree of mobility,
while the offense possesses mobility and striking power, and protection to
a lesser degree.' He concludes that mobility is the central characteristic of an
offensive weapon and arg~lesthat 'armament which greatly facilitates the
forward movement of the attacker might be said tentatively to possess rela-
tively greater offensive power than weapons which contribute primarily to
the stability o f the defender' (Boggs, 1941: 85). Our later survey of attempts
by military historians to identify the offensiveldefensive balance in various
historical eras will show that tactical mobility is the primary criterion used
to identify an advantage to the offense.
In terms of the characteristics of armaments, then, tactical mobility and
movement toward enemy forces and territory are the primary determinants
of the offense, at least in land warfare; protection and holding power con-
tribute more to the defense. Other weapon characteristics such as striking
power, rapidity of fire, and the range of a weapons system do not contribute
disproportionately to either the offense or the defense.' Much more work
needs to be done here, however, because of the lack of precision of some of
these concepts.
The classification of weapons systems by their contribution to mobility
and tactical movement toward enemy forces and territory is much less useful
for naval warfare. This was evident from the proceedings of the League of
370 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Gilpin distinguishes between the offense and the defense in terms of an eco-
nomic cost-benefit framework. 'To speak of a shift in favor of the offense
means that fewer resources than before must be expended on the offense in
order to overcome the defense' (Gilpin, 1981: 62-63). Gilpin goes on to say
that 'the defense is said to be superior if the resources required to capture ter-
ritory are greater than the value of the territory itself; the offense is superior
if the cost of conquest is less than the value of the territory' (p. 63).
Clearly the second definition does not follow from the first. Whereas the
first uses the relative costs of overcoming the defense at two different times
and independently of the resulting benefits, the second definition introduces
an entirely new concept - the actual value of the territorial conquest itself.
The value of territorial conquest is undoubtedly an important variable lead-
ing to war but it is analytically distinct from military technology and ought
to be treated separately. Under Gilpin's second definition the hypothesis
becomes equivalent to the statement that a positive (expected) utility of ter-
ritorial conquest increases the likelihood of war. This may be true (Bueno de
Mesquita, 1981), but it is not the hypothesis under consideration here.
Moreover, the definition of the offensiveldefensive balance by the utdity of
372 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
reason why any attempt to use such a concept must first define it explicitly
and be very clear regarding precisely which hypotheses are relevant.
The third section of this article surveys a variety of efforts to classify the
offensiveldefensive balance of military technology in the Western inter-
national system over the last eight centuries." This survey will be useful
because of the absence of any previous review of this body of literature and
because of the general failure of earlier studies to acknowledge or build upon
each other. More importantly, it may reveal whether or not the concept has
acquired an informal definition in its empirical application, in spite of the
conceptual ambiguity demonstrated above. While the concept of the offen-
siveldefensive balance of military technology has taken on a variety of mean-
ings, the question arises as to how that concept has been used in attempts to
classify the offensiveldefensive balance in past historical eras. If different
authorities have generally used the offensiveldefensive balance to mean the
same thing (even in the absence of any formal nominal or operational defin-
ition), and if they have generally agreed on the state of the balance in various
historical eras, then it can be concluded that the ambiguity of the concept has
not precluded its effective use in empirical analysis. Consistent usage and
agreement by various authorities on the state of the balance in different his-
torical eras would permit 'intercoder agreement'to be used as the basis for
accurate historical measurement (provided these measurements are inde-
pendent)." Lack of agreement on classification, however, would suggest that
the collective judgment of authorities cannot he used as the basis for measure-
ment. It would also support the earlier conclusion that the offensiveldefensive
concept needs to be defined much more explicitly and rigorously before it can
be used in historical analysis.
There is little dissent from the view that the late Middle Ages was charac-
terized by the ascendancy of the defense over the offense in war. The Crusades
had stimulated a revival in military architecture, and advances in the art of for-
tification outpaced increases in destructive power and improvements in siege
tactics (Fuller, 1945: 68; Montross, 1960: 161-163; Ropp, 1962: 20; Nef,
1963: 185; Wright, 1965: 795, 1525; Osgood, 1967: 43; Brodie and Brodie,
1973: 31; Bean, 1973: 207; Preston and Wise, 1979: 68-69, 78, 8 1; Gilpin,
1981: 62; Montgomery, 1983: 166-171). As a result, only a small percentage
of sieges were successful (Montgomery, 1983: 169). The defensive power of
the new concentric stone castles was reinforced by logistical considerations.
Armies could not be maintained in the field for long periods and invading
armies could not easily bypass the feudal castles (Bean, 1973: 218). In addi-
tion, the replacement of chain mail by plate armor to protect the knight greatly
reduced his mobility (Montross, 1960: 163; Preston and Wise, 1979: 85) and
the pike-phalanx system was becoming increasingly invulnerable to cavalry
charge (Bean, 1973: 206). It has also be argued that the success of the English
376 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
with the longbow increased the tactical superiority of the defense (Dupuy,
1980: 88), presumably because its range made it more difficult for the offense
to close. For these reasons, all of the above authorities accept Oman's (1953:
356) argument that 'by 1300 the defensive obtained an almost complete mas-
tery over the offensive. l 8
By the mid-15th century fire power had moved from an auxiliary role to
one where it was central and decisive (Howard, 2976: 33). Developments in
heavy artillery led to a sharp resurgence of offensive superiority. This was sym-
bolized by the seige of Constantinople in 1453, where the greatest of all
medieval fortifications was reduced by the Turks in less than two months.
Dupuy (1980: 107) argues that by the end of the 15th century artillery had
made medieval fortifications obsolete. In addition, greater mobility, and hence
greater offensive capability, of this artillery is evidenced by the use of horse-
drawn artillery and chains of 'wagon forts' as mobile fortifications employ-
ing bombards (Montross, 1960: 189; Brodie, 1973: 51; Quester, 1977: 4 7 4 8 ;
Dupuy, 1980: 100). Small firearms also began to have a significant effect on
battle at the end of the 15th century, dominating over the pike and leaving
the armored knight vulnerable and lessening his local defensive effectiveness
(Nef, 1963: 29; Quester, 1977: 48-49). Thus a drastic change in the offensive1
defensive balance is said to occur close to 1450 (Fuller, 1945: 81-87; Montross,
1960: 193-95; Nef, 1963: 185-186; Wright, 1965: 294; Bean, 1973: 207;
Quester, 1977: 47-49; Preston and Wise, 1979: 91-92; Dupuy, 1980: 99,
106-107; McNeill, 1982: 83; Montgomery, 1983: 224).
There is much debate regarding how long this period of offensive super-
iority lasted. Wright (1965: 294-295, 795) argues that it lasted for two cen-
turies until 1648, a view supported by Nef (1963: 185) and Quester (1977:
49). Wright (1965: 294-95) points to the increase in mobility of infantry gen-
erated by the gradual abandonment of medieval armor; the disappearance of
pikemen, halberdiers, and heavy cavalry; and the adoption throughout Europe
of Turkish Janissary tactics, with armies equipped with cutlass and longbow
and supported by light cavalry and artillery. Mobility was further increased in
the first half of the 17th century after Gustavus Adolphus reduced the weight
of weapons, introduced the light field gun and the concept of mobile massed
artillery fire, and adopted a more flexible tactical organization (Dupuy, 1980:
137-38; McNeill, 1982: 123).
These arguments are rejected by other authorities who instead argue
that the science of fortification soon overcame the new developments in
artillery, leading to a shift back to the defense by 1525 or so (Hale, 1957:
274; Montross, 1960: 211, 250-54; Bean, 1973: 208; Howard, 1976: 35;
Preston and Wise, 1979: 106; McNeill, 1982: 90; Montgomery, 1983: 224).
Dupuy and Dupuy (1977: 455) argues: 'A 16th-century fortress, if provided
with adequate stocks of food and ammunition, was as impregnable as the
13th-century castle had been in its day.' Thus there is no consensus as to
whether the balance of military technology throughout most of the 16th
century and the first half of the 17th century favored the offense or the
defense.
I , The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology 377
Authorities generally agree that for nearly a century after 16.50 the bal-
ance of military technology lay with the defense." This was largely due to
the development of a new science of fortifications by Vauban and other mili-
tary engineers in the late 17th century (Guerlac, 1969). These elaborate for-
tifications became increasingly invulnerable to artillery, and frontal assault
became nearly impossible. This was the age of geometric warfare, of pos-
ition and maneuver rather than pitched battle. Military operations were
centered around fixed fortifications and were restricted by poor logistical
systems and short supply lines, and guns were deficient in range, accuracy,
and penetrating power (Preston and Wise, 1979: 1 4 2 4 4 ; Dupuy, 1980: 144).
Vauban also developed the science of siegecraft with his system of approaches
by parallels, but such systems generally remained one step behind systems
of fortifications.
The balance did not turn against the defense until 1789 (Nef, 1963: 185;
Wright, 1965: 295; Osgood, 1967: 46; Howard, 1976: 55; Quester, 1977: 57;
Preston and Wise, 1979: 142-143). This view is inconsistent, however, with
the general characterization of the warfare of Frederick the Great as offen-
sive in nature, based on Frederick's emphasis on the decisiveness of the bat-
tle rather than static maneuver, his willingness to take risks, his use of the
oblique order as a tactical device, and his emphasis on mobility (Dupuy, 1980:
148-1.54). Preston and Wise (1979: 147-149) recognize this and say simply
that Frederick differed from the norm of 18th-century warfare. The hesi-
tancy to characterize the military balance during this period as offensive
probably derives from the fact that Frederick's innovations were primarily
tactical and strategic rather than technological, and because niost historians
describing the military balance focus on the latter rather than the former.
Still, it cannot be denied that Frederick demonstrated what was possible
given the technology of the time. The recognition by many that Frederick
constitutes an exception to the static character of 18th-century warfare sug-
gests that the characterization of the entire 18th-century military balance as
defensive is open to question.
The Napoleonic period presented a similar set of problems; Napoleonic
warfare was characterized by mobility and the tactical offensive hut this had
little to do with military technology itself (Howard, 1976: 76). Preston and Wise
(1979: 189) argue that in some respects Napoleon was an 'arch-reactionary
toward new weapons and technological progress in the material of war' and
that his successes came through a 'more efficient use of well-known weapons.'
The offensive character of Napoleonic warfare derived from the generalship of
Napoleon and his changes in military organization, strategy, and tactics,
including the democratization of war and mass mobilization. The divisional
formation, the employment of light infantry, the use of the column of attack
instead of the line, a more flexible use of artillery on the battlefield to gain
a superiority of fire at a given point, and the logistical advantages of living
off the country were particularly important in contributing to mobility
(Fuller, 1961; ch. 3; Hart, 1964: ch. 8; Ropp, 1962: 98-102; Howard, 1976;
Quester, 1977: ch. 7; Preston and Wise, 1979: ch. 12; Strachan, 1983: ch. 4).
378 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
Conclusions
Author's Note
Notes
4. For this reason I am not concerned here with Boggs' (1941: 63-72) distinction between
the offensive and defensive on the 'grand strategic level', which he sees as based on a 'political'
or Clausewitzian theory of war. Boggs suggests that on this level the offensiveldefensive dis-
tinction is based on the political objectives toward which military operations are conducted,
and that the concept is generally defined this way by military theorists: 'The difference between
offensive and defensive is a difference in objectives, not a difference in the means employed to
reach the objective.' (Boggs, 1941: 72). This conceptualization not only involves the analytical
problem of distinguishing in principle between 'offensive' and 'defensive' policies (which vary
from theater to theater and during the course of a war) and the enormously difficult methodo-
logical problems involved in determining a state's objectives o r intentions. It also confounds
the two important concepts of the motivations o f statesmen and the offensiveldefensive bal-
ance, and deprives the latter of any independent meaning.
5. Several aspects of Wright's definition are open to question. The offensive character of a
weapon system cannot be judged only by its effectiveness against an enemy unit like itself, as
examples of submarines o r antitank weapons clearly indicate. Wright's focus on commerce as
the object of naval warfare (p. 793) can be questioned on the grounds that the primary aim of
seapower is the defeat o f the adversary's naval forces (Mahan, 1957). Nor is the notion of an
attack on enemy morale very useful.
6. Similarly, it is not at all clear that territorial conquest and defeat of enemy forces should
both be included in a single definition, for they do not necessarily go hand in hand. One obvi-
ous problem concerns naval and air warfare, where the defeat of enemy forces may be directed
toward control of sea lanes o r control of the air, but certainly not territorial conquest per se.
Even in land warfare, however, one can conceive of a strategy of deep territorial penetration
that aims to bypass enemy military forces rather than defeat them (see, for example, Vlgor,
1983), o r a strategy aimed to defeat enemy forces without seizing territory. The latter is also
relevant to the nuclear age, for a counterforce strategy may be aimed at destroymg enemy
forces for its own sake and independently of both territorial control or even coercion.
7. When Clausewitz (1976: 114) argues repeatedly that the defense is the stronger form of
warfare, he conceives of defense not in static terms as the warding off of blows, but rather as
a dynamic conception of a holding action until conditions are ripe for a counter-offensive
(Boggs, 1941: 71; Howard, 1983: 54).
8. One objective indicator of such movement is the relative rates of advance of armies in
different periods. Record (1973), for example, has surveyed historical rates of armored advance
in thls century. These rates are affected as much by the numbers of troops on each side, geo-
graphical terrain, and political considerations as they are by the balance of military technology,
so that its use as an indicator of the offensiveldefensive balance is open to question.
9. Wright (1965: 808) notes that Fuller also includes holding power (the ability to hold
captured territory) as an important element of an offensive weapon. If newly acquired terri-
tory cannot be held there is little net gain for the offense, yet by definition it is even more
important for the defense to hold territory. Wright (1965: 808) also argues that rap~dityof fire
is another weapons characteristic that provides an advantage to the defense, but it is not clear
whether this generalization applies beyond the case of the machine gun and the static warfare
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In addition, Wright (1965: 808) argues that the range
of a weapon contributes a net advantage to the defense because it keeps the offense at a dis-
tance and restricts its mobility. But long-range weapons may contribute equally to the pene-
trating power of the offense by weakening defensive fortifications from a distance. Boggs
(1941: 86), for example, argues that while heavy mobile artillery contributes t o both the tac-
tical offensive and defensive, its striking power against enemy fortifications dominates, thereby
favoring the offense. More generally, Fuller (1945: 9 ) argues that range IS the dominant char-
acteristic of an offensive weapon.
10. A more esoteric example of tactical doctrine precluding the optimal use of available
military technology can be found in McNeill (1982: 9-11). The Asians' use of war chariots as
fighting platforms as well as for transport increased their mobility and firepower beginning in
the 18th century BC, but the Europeans lost these offensive advantages because of a doctrine
which led them to dismount from the chariots and fight o n foot as infantry.
I \ The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology 383
1 1. Note that the greater the extent t o which the offensiveldefensive halance is affected by
doctrtnnl considerat~ons,the less its utility as a systemic-level concept.
12. O n e obvious prohleni here is what is meant by 'overcoming an adversary'. Here 1 mean
the minimum ratio of forces necessary t o give the attacker a higher probability o f winning than
los~ng,recognlzlng that stalemate I S also a possible outcome. Other definitions are possible, o f
course ( a .iO% chance of victory, or of avoiding defeat, for example), but the specif~ccriterion
is less important than its consistent application. It is recogn~zed,of course, that we must make
the ceterrs parihrts assumption in order t o control for asymmetries in terrain, logistics, morale,
tra~ning,and leadership, whlch are also important.
13. The fact that a one-to-one ratio is widely regarded to he insufficient tor attack pro-
vides a basis for an interpretation of the cornmon argument that the advantage in war always
lies with the defense (Clausewitz, 1976: 114, 128; Machiavell~,Discourses, bk i, ch. XLV;
Dupuy, 1980: 326). To say this does not mean, however, that the extent of the advanmgc to
the defense 1s constant.
14. The theoret~calconsequences of an incentive t o strike first have heen thoroughly
explored by deterrence theorists (Ellsherg, 1960; Schelling, 1960; Wagner, 1983).
15. This point was emphasized to me by Harrison Wagner.
16. This survey begins in the late M ~ d d l eAges because references t o the offensive1
defensive balance in earlier times are few and scattered, as are references t o non-Western
systems.
17. This assmes that the authorities consulted reflect a representative sample of viewpoints
and they make independent evaluations of the offensiveldefensive balance over time. hdm~ttedly,
there may he some bias in the authorities consulted 111 the following survey, for a11 are
Anglophones who deal prl~narilywith land warfare and basically ignore naval and air consider-
attons. The land focus is n o t a problem, for most theoret~caltreatments of the offensiveldefen-
slve h;il,ince define it in these terms. Nor is there good reason .to believe that continental military
h~storianswould reach fundamentally different conclusions, particularly since they also would
tend to Ignore naval and alr considerations. More serious, however, is the questlon of ~ndepend-
cnt measurement. I'resumahl!: there is some reciprocal and cumulative relation\hip between
these authorities, so that their classifications of the offenslveldefensive balance are not truly inde-
pendent. This is particularly likely glven the absence of rigorous nominal or operational defin-
itions guiding their analyses. It is in this sense that a greater variety of sources rn~ghthe valuable.
The relative absence of expltcit references to others' work, however, and the incoris~stencyof
their conclusions, suggests that this problem is not too serious.
18. Gilpin ( 198 1 : 6 2 ) argues that the 14th century marked a resurgence o f otfensive cap-
a b i l ~ t ~ because
cs of the invention of gunpowder and artillery, hut most would r e g d his view
as premature by a century.
19. One exception here may be Montross (1960: 327), who implies that by 1670 there
may have heen 'advantages t o be gained by striking first'.
20. O n e exception is Quester (1977: ch. 11-12), who seems to suggest that the balmce
may have favored the defense.
21. There is considerable evidence contradicting the assertion that the entire German
General Staff recognized the superiority of the offens~ve(Howard, 1976: 13 1-33; Questcr,
1977: ch. 12).
22. The year 1495 marks the origins of the modern great power system (Lxvy. 198.33: ch. 2 ) .
The period before 1495 is excluded because the basic criter~onof a European sovereign state
system is not satisfied, so that earlier warfare cannot easily he compared with modern war
behavior.
2.1. For this analysis the period 1850-1890 is liberally credited to the detense and
1790-1815 is cred~tedto the offense, rather than being labelled uncertain. The 1495-1525
period is classified as offensive, and the 1650-1740 period is classified as defensive. The periods
1525-16.50, 1740-1850, and 1890-1945 have been classified 21s uncertain.
24. More technically, the offensiveldefensive balance is a multidimensional concept,
but theories should be based o n unidimensional concepts if at all possible (Shively, 1974:
ch. 3 ) .
384 The Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
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Why Even Good Defenses may be Bad
Charles L. Glaser
nce again, the United States is in the midst of a debate over whether
t o deploy defenses designed to protect U.S. cities and population
from Soviet missile attack. This debate is, most immediately, the result
of President Reagan's "star wars" speech, in which he asked the rhetorical
question: "wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them?" He offered
a future vision of "truly lasting stability" based upon the "ability to counter
the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive."' Just six
months later a senior interagency group recommended to the President that
the "U.S. embark on early demonstrations of credible ballistic missile defense
technologies to its allies and the Soviet U n i ~ n . " ~
There is, in addition to this most recent catalyst, a deep-seated, endur-
ing reason why the possibility of defending the United States from Soviet
nuclear attack is a recurrent issue. Put most simply, it is quite natural for
the United States to want t o remove itself from a situation in which the
Soviet Union has the capability t o virtually destroy it. The United States
cannot, today, physically prevent the Soviet Union from wreaking such
destruction. U.S. security therefore depends upon its ability to deter Soviet
nuclear attack. If deterrence works, then the United States will be able to
avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the possibility that
deterrence could fail cannot be easily dismissed. Deterrence will have to
work for decades and centuries - that is, unless the current situation, in
which the United States is vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, is dramat-
ically altered. While one cannot specify with confidence the way in which
the superpowers' nuclear arsenals might come to be used, knowing that
deterrence could fail in a variety of ways is sufficient to create a feeling that,
given enough time, deterrence will fail. Consequently, as long as the United
States remains vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, the possibility of nuclear
attack will create an interest in defense against it.
The current debate over the deployment of ballistic missile defense
(BMD), like the one in the late 1960s, is highly polarized. Defense, accord-
ing to its opponents, is undesirable on all scores. They argue that defense
Source: International Security,
iJl,iic,c Why Even Good Defenses may be Bad 387
will not work effectively, will increase the probability of war, and will cause
arms races. Proponents, on the other hand, see few, if any, disadvantages
with defense. They argue that defense will reduce the damage the Soviet
Union could inflict on the United States, will not increase the probability of
war and might decrease it, and might even improve the prospects for achiev-
ing arms control agreements which limit offensive nuclear forces.'
T h e vast m a j o r i t y of t h e d e b a t e h a s pivoted on t h e technological feasibility
of effective BMD. The implicit assumption is that if effective BMD could be
developed and deployed, then the United States should pursue the BMD route
and the associated change in its nuclear s t r a t e g ~ .The
~ principal argument
against defenses is that they will not work. Opponents of defense, presumably
because they believe that effective defense is infeasible, tend not to examine
carefully either the advantages or the disadvantages of effective defense. As a
result, examination of a world in which the superpowers have deployed effect-
ive defense has been left to the advocates of defense, and a question of fun-
damental importance continues to be overlooked by the debate:
I am using the term "defense" to refer only to area defense, i.e., systems
designed to protect cities and other value targets. BMD that would protect
the United States by reducing the Soviet Union's ability to inflict damage is
an area defense. By contrast, a point defense is designed principally to pro-
tect nuclear force capabilities.'
By "effective defenses," 1 have in mind systems that are capable of deny-
ing one's adversary an assured destruction capability. Defenses which can-
not eliminate assured destruction capabilities are far less interesting because
they would not s~gnificantlyreduce the damage the United States would suf-
fer in an all-out nuclear war.h Another way, then, of stating the above ques-
tion is: Could the United States be more secure than it is today if, as a result
of mutual deployment of defenses, neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union had assured destruction capabilities?
Perfect Defense
and conventional wars with and without perfect defenses, estimates of the size
and costs of these wars, and the availability of options for reducing the prob-
ability and costs of conventional war. The objective of this short discussion
is to call attention to this trade-off, not to resolve it.
In short, then, what are commonly called perfect defenses would have
two shortcomings. First, they would probably not be truly perfect, but
instead only temporarily impenetrable. The undermining of one country's
defense would create a situation in which the incentives to initiate a nuclear
war would be greater than today. Second, even if the temporary nature of
impenetrable defenses is ignored, the net effect of both superpowers' deploy-
ing impenetrable defenses remains unclear because major conventional wars
could become more likely.
Consider a nuclear situation in which Soviet defenses could deny the United
States an assured destruction capability. In this situation, the most basic and
generally accepted U.S. deterrent requirement (that is, possession of an assured
destruction capability) would not be satisfied. A natural conclusion is that the
U.S. deterrent would be inadequate. This belief fueled opposition to strategic
defense during the earlier BMD debate.I4 But closer examination of nuclear
situations in which both superpowers deploy defenses shows that U.S. deter-
rent requirements could be satisfied without U.S. possession of an assured
destruction capability.
Why Even Good Defenses may b e Bad 393
The requirement that the United States have an assured destruction cap-
ability implicitly assumes that the Soviet Union can annihilate the United
States: the standard argument is that t o deter a n annihilating attack, the
United States should be able t o threaten credibly to annihilate the Soviet
Union in retaliation. But if the United States could, by deploying defenses,
eliminate the Soviet Union's annihilation capability, then deterrence of this
attack would not be necessary. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine any other
Soviet actions the deterrence of which requires the United States to threaten
the annihilation of the Soviet Union. So, if the Soviet Union did not have
the ability t o annihilate the United States, then the United States would not
need t o be able t o annihilate the Soviet Union in retaliation. Consequently,
a mutual deployment of defenses that eliminated both U.S. and Soviet annihi-
lation capabilities need not result in a n inadequate U.S. deterrent. The United
States would, of course, still need a nuclear retaliatory capability to deter
other Soviet nuclear attacks.
What capability would the United States need to deter attacks against its
homeland when defenses had denied the Soviet Union an annihilation
capability? Deterrence requires that the United States have the ability fol-
lowing any Soviet attack t o inflict costs greater than the benefits the Soviet
Union would achieve by attacking. To determine the U.S. retaliatory require-
ment, we must estimate the value the Soviet leaders would place on attacking
the United States. We need to consider why the Soviet Union might attack the
United States and what it would hope to gain by doing so. In the most general
terms, the Soviet Union could use its nuclear force to damage or weaken the
United States and to coerce the United States. The U.S. forces required to deter
these actions are examined briefly below.
For all of the concern about attacks against U.S. cities, it is not clear why
the Soviet Union would ever launch a n all-out countervalue attack. Still
such an attack is not impossible, s o we need t o estimate the value the Soviet
Union might place on attacking U.S. cities. O n e possible reason for attack-
ing U.S. cities would be to weaken the United States, thereby reducing the
U.S. ability t o oppose the Soviet Union's pursuit of its foreign policy object-
ives. Presumably people believe the Soviet Union is interested in annihilat-
ing the United States because this would make it the dominant world power.
The analogy, if U.S. defenses had eliminated the Soviet ability to annihilate
the United States, would be a countervalue attack designed t o weaken the
United States.
To deter this type of attack, the United States would need a retaliatory
capability that could weaken the Soviet Union as much as the Soviet counter-
value attack could weaken the United States. A countervalue capability
roughly equivalent to the Soviet countervalue capability should be sufficiently
large to satisfy this requirement. In fact, this is a very conservative requirement
because U.S. retaliation would not only deny the Soviet Union the desired
increase in relative world power, but would also inflict direct costs by destroy-
ing Soviet value targets. Because the Soviet Union could first attack U.S. forces,
and then attack U.S. cities, the United States should have forces that provide a
394 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
countervalue capability essentially equal to the Soviets' both before and after a
Soviet counterforce attack.15 I will call this an "equal countervalue capability."
The second way in which the Soviet Union might use its nuclear capa-
bility is to coerce the United States. While the benefits to the Soviet Union
of attacking U.S. cities can be questioned, the potential benefits of coercing
the United States are far more obvious. If the Soviet Union could inflict
enormous damage on the United States and the United States lacked the
ability to deter these attacks, then the Soviet Union might be able to com-
pel the United States to compromise its security and vital interests.
As in other cases, deterrence would require that the United States be able
to threaten the Soviet Union with expected costs greater than expected bene-
fits. In the case of coercion, however, the United States could deny the
Soviet Union any benefit simply by refusing to perform the action the Soviet
Union demanded. The costs threatened by the United States need not be
greater than the benefits the Soviet Union hopes to gain through its coercive
demand because any U.S. attack combined with refusal of the Soviet demand
would result in a net Soviet loss. If faced with a coercive threat, the United
States could refuse the Soviet demand and tell the Soviet Union that attacks
against value targets would be reciprocated. To adopt this strategy, the United
States would have to be confident that it could deter the Soviet Union. This
would require that the United States believe that the Soviet Union finds the
U.S. retaliatory threats credible.
A large disparity in U.S. and Soviet countervalue capabilities could
undermine U.S. credibility. So, a reasonable force requirement for denying
the Soviet Union the coercive use of its nuclear forces is that the Soviet
Union not have an advantage in countervalue capabilities: an advantage
should not exist in the deployed forces, nor should the Soviet Union be able
to gain a countervalue advantage in surviving forces by launching a counter-
force attack. Therefore, U.S. forces which satisfy the equal countervalue
requirement should be sufficient to deny the Soviet Union a capability which
enables it t o coerce the United States.16
In summary, a reasonable requirement for deterrence of Soviet attacks
on the United States is possession of an equal countervalue capability."
Requiring that the United States possess an equal countervalue capability is
significantly different from requiring an assured destruction capability. The
equal countervalue requirement explicitly couples U.S. and Soviet capabil-
ities t o inflict countervalue damage. The equal countervalue requirement
could be satisfied by both the United States and the Soviet Union at all levels
of vulnerability to attack. In contrast, the assured destruction requirement
demands that the United States have a retaliatory force capable of inflicting
a specific level of countervalue damage independent of the size of the Soviet
ability to inflict damage. According to the equal countervalue requirement,
if the United States can reduce the Soviet Union's ability to inflict counter-
value damage, then the United States can afford to have its ability to inflict
countervalue damage in retaliation reduced. Moreover, improvements in
:81+.e~ Why Even Good Defenses may b e Bad 395
Soviet defenses which reduce the damage the United States could inflict on
the Soviet Union could be compensated for by improvements in U.S. defenses.
The assured destruction requirement, on the other hand, demands that im-
provements in Soviet defenses be offset either by an increase in the size of the
U.S. offense or by an increase in the ability of the offense to penetrate the
Soviet defense.
retaliatory strike would be no less than if he had struck first - that is, the costs
to one's own country of suffering an all-out countervalue first strike or second
strike would be equal. So, because the adversary's forces were invulnerable,
there would be no incentive to preempt. This would be true when defense had
not been deployed, even if the adversary's ability to inflict countervalue dam-
age were far below the annihilation level. Deploying defenses would reduce
the adversary's ability to inflict damage, but would not create an incentive to
preempt. This example shows, at least in principle, that defenses that reduce
the adversary's retaliatory capability below the annihilation level would not
always decrease crisis stability.
The practical significance of this observation should not be overesti-
mated. An invulnerable retaliatory capability requires not only that the
forces be invulnerable, but also that attacks against the command and con-
trol system would not reduce the size of the possible retaliatory attack.
These conditions might not be achievable. Submarines in port are vulner-
able t o attack and much of the command system is now highly vulnerable.
The combination of one's effective defenses with the adversary's offensive
force vulnerabilities would result in an incentive to preempt. Consequently,
while in theory defenses that eliminated assured destruction capabilities
need not decrease crisis stability, in practice they probably would.
The fundamental insight we can draw from this discussion is that defenses
d o not by themselves create incentives for preemption. The source of pre-
emptive incentives is offensive force vulnerabilities. Therefore, the effect of
defenses on crisis stability should not be evaluated without considering the
vulnerabilities of the offensive force to a counterforce attack. By reducing
retaliatory capabilities, defenses can increase the significance of offensive
vulnerabilities.
Because reducing the degree of offensive force vulnerability would
enhance crisis stability, one way to offset the decrease in crisis stability that
would result from deploying effective defenses would be to accompany the
deployment with programs to reduce offensive force vulnerabilities. One
approach for reducing force vulnerability is to protect offensive forces with
active defenses. Area defenses, although not designed specifically for this
mission, could increase force survivability. In addition, there are many other
ways to increase force survivability, including deploying point defenses. If
effective area defense were feasible, then defenses that could provide a high
degree of force survivability, including survivability of command and con-
trol, would also be feasible. In this case, the reduction in crisis stability that
would result from deploying effective defenses could be small.
In summary, effective defenses would be likely to decrease crisis stabil-
ity. It would probably be possible, however, to keep this negative effect of
defenses quite small. The source of preemptive incentive is offensive force
vulnerability. Therefore, if offensive forces could be made highly survivable,
then the effect on crisis stability of defenses that eliminate assured destruc-
tion capabilities would be small.
I I Why Even Good Defenses may be Bad 397
The discussion of perfect defenses focused on the first factor, the magnitude
of the change, and argued that even small changes could have strategic sig-
nificance. Situations in which imperfect defenses had been deployed would
suffer, although less severely, from the same sensitivity. The following ex-
ample illustrates this observation. Imagine three nuclear situations, one in
which both superpowers have impenetrable defenses, one in which each
superpower can penetrate the other's defense with ten warheads, and one in
which both superpowers have assured destruction capabilities. Now con-
sider how a change in one country's nuclear force that enabled it to pene-
trate the adversary's defense with ten additional warheads would affect the
adversary's security in each situation. The addition of ten warheads of
countervalue capability to one country's force would be less significant
when added to the nuclear situation in which both countries started with
ten penetrating warheads than when added t o a situation in which both
countries had perfect defenses. The advantage in countervalue capability
would be harder to use coercively when the adversary would be able to
threaten retaliation against one's own value targets.
In contrast, the addition of ten penetrating warheads to one force when
both countries had assured destruction capabilities comprised of thousands
of warheads would be far less significant than when added to the nuclear
situation in which both countries had ten penetrating warheads. The addi-
tion to the mutual assured destruction situation might not even change the
country's ability to inflict damage; the addition in the ten warhead situ-
ation, while it might be difficult to use coercively, could result in a significant
difference in the two countries' ability to inflict damage.
The general conclusion t o be drawn from this specific example is that
the lower the vulnerability of value targets in a given nuclear situation, the
smaller the change in their vulnerability required t o gain an advantage. This
conclusion can be restated specifically in terms of defenses: the smaller the
number of warheads that could penetrate a country's defense, the more sen-
sitive that country's security would be to offensive changes that reduce the
effectiveness of its defense.
The second factor affecting robustness, the technical difficulty of chang-
ing countervalue capability to gain an advantage, depends upon the type,
size, and number of changes required to achieve a strategic advantage. The
type of change is determined by whether the status quo is an assured
destruction situation or a defensive situation. In assured destruction situ-
ations, it is the difficulty of reducing the adversary's offensive threat that
affects robustness. In defensive situations, on the other hand, both the dif-
ficulty of further reducing the adversary's offensive threat and the difficulty
of penetrating the adversary's defense would affect robustness.
Assessing the relative difficulty of penetrating a specific defensive sys-
tem with an offensive system or of defeating a specific offensive system with
a defensive system is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, such an
assessment would necessarily be highly speculative because effective defen-
sive systems have not yet been developed. Consequently, it is impossible to
( ILii r Why Even Good D e f e n s e s may b e Bad 399
compare the difficulty of defeating those defensive systems with the difficulty
of developing defensive systems to defeat today's offenses or the offenses of the
future. One fact that bears upon this issue should, however, be mentioned.
Even if defenses were developed that were perfect against currently deployed
offenses, experts believe that the task of developing offensive countermeasures
to defeat those defenses would be relatively easy." The defensive system \vould
be understood by its adversary, enabling the development of countermeasures
designed specifically with the defense in mind. The defense, by contrast, to
remain effective, would have to be able to overcome the full range of possible
countermeasures. This asymmetry means that defenses may always be at a dis-
advantage, that is, the development of effective defenses against a competitive
threat may always be more difficult than developing offenses that can pene-
trate defenses.
The size o f the change required to gain a strategic advantage affects the
technical difficulty of achieving the change. (This is why the two factors
affecting robustness are interdependent.) A defense which must reduce the
offensive threat by a large amount is harder to build than one that must
reduce the same offensive threat by a small amount. Similarly, a new offen-
sive system which must be able to penetrate the adversary's defense with
many weapons would be harder to build than one that had to penetrate the
same defense with only a few weapons. Even taking into account the likely
asymmetry hetween offense and defense mentioned above, it is not possible
to say with certainty whether the changes required to gain an advantage in
an assured destruction situation would be easier or harder to achieve than
in a defensive situation. As discussed above, however, the size of the requis-
ite change in assured destruction situations is larger than in defensive sitii-
ations. Due to this difference, gaining an advantage will tend to be more
difficult in assured destruction situations than in defensive situations.
The larger the number of changes in a country's forces required to gain
an advantage, all else being equal, the harder the advantage will be to
obtain. The number of force changes required to achieve an advantage
depends upon the diversity of the adversary's forces. In assured destruction
situations, ensuring one's ability to destroy large numbers of the adversary's
value targets is the strategic requirement. Diversification of one's offensive
force helps to ensure the continuing achievement of this objective by
increasing the number of defensive changes that are required before the
adversary could eliminate one's assured destruction capability. For example,
an offensive force which could annihilate the adversary with either an air-
breathing threat or a ballistic missile threat requires that the adversary
develop two types of highly effective defense. Obviously, this is a harder
task than developing an effective defense against a single threat.
This article has discussed defenses in general, not defenses against spe-
cific types of offensive threats. But when we think about the feasibility of
defense, it is crucial to keep in mind the potential diversity of offensive
threats. If BMD were technologically feasible, but defense against advanced
technology bombers or cruise missiles were impossible, then the strategic
400 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Union: 1) the U.S. ability t o deter premeditated attacks; 2) the crisis stability
of the nuclear situation; and 3) the robustness of the nuclear situation. I then
evaluated how the deployment by both superpowers of effective defenses,
that is, defenses sufficiently capable to deny the adversary an assured destruc-
tion capability, would affect these factors. The findings of this evaluation are:
would decrease the damage of certain wars, they would thus have some
positive effects as well as negative ones.
To illustrate this in greater detail, I will examine briefly each path to
nuclear war. Consider first a nuclear situation in which effective defenses have
been deployed, the equal countervalue requirement is satisfied, and assume this
situation characterized by offensive and defensive forces of a given size and
capability is maintained, that is, neither country builds forces that increase its
countervalue capability. Deterrence could fail even when the equal counter-
value requirement was satisfied: this is true today when the assured destruc-
tion requirement is satisfied, and it would be true in a defensive situation in
which the equal countervalue requirement was satisfied. The damage in an
all-out countervalue war, however, would be lower in the nuclear situation
with defenses. Since the probability of premeditated nuclear war might not be
greater in the defensive situation, the expected costs along this path to nuclear
war would be lower than in an assured destruction situation.
In this defensive situation, the damage from a preemptive attack would
be lower than in an assured destruction situation. The probability of pre-
emptive war, and therefore the expected costs of a preemptive attack, would
depend upon the situation's crisis stability. If the defensive situation were
less crisis-stable than an assured destruction situation, then the probability
of preemptive attack would be higher. In this case, the defensive situation
would have a higher probability of preemptive attack and lower costs if the
preemptive attack were to occur. Therefore the comparison of expected
costs from preemptive attack in defensive and assured destruction situations
would be indeterminate. If, on the other hand, the defensive situation were
as crisis-stable as the assured destruction situation (which is possible if the
retaliatory capability is invulnerable), then the expected cost along the pre-
emptive path would be lower than in an assured destruction situation.
Now consider the case in which we drop the constraint that the status
quo defensive situation would be maintained, that is, we include the possi-
bility that countries might deploy forces that increase the adversary's vul-
nerability or decrease their own. Unlike the preceding case, in this case the
damage in defensive situations might not be lower than in assured destruc-
tion situations. The changes in the countries' forces might return the defen-
sive situation to an assured destruction situation. The potential damage
would not be determined by the status quo forces. If a country could build
its way out of the defensive situation (i.e., regain its assured destruction
capability), then the damage to the adversary could be the same as in a
mutual assured destruction situation. The expected costs of nuclear wars
resulting from changes in the status quo could be greater in defensive situ-
ations than in assured destruction situations: the damage in defensive situ-
ations is not constrained by the status quo forces and might not be lower
than in assured destruction situations; and, due to the lack of robustness in
defensive situations, the probability of nuclear war along this path is higher.
In summary, defenses could reduce the damage that could occur in cer-
tain types of wars. This positive effect would, however, tend to be offset by
Why Even Good D e f e n s e s may b e Bad 405
This examination of strategic defense has analyzed a best case for defense.
Effective defense was hypothesized to be technologically and economically
feasible. Even with these highly controversial assumptions, the decision to
pursue the deployment of defense and to make the associated fundamental
shift in nuclear strategy is found to have serious shortcomings. The case for
effective defense and for starting to deploy defenses in the foreseeable future
is further weakened by a number of factors:
( 1 ) Uncertainty. The effectiveness of U.S. defenses would be uncertain
and small uncertainties would be highly significant. In addition to the
uncertainties inherent in the operations of complex systems, the effective-
ness of defenses would be uncertain due to the severe limits on testing. The
defense could not be tested against a full scale attack or against Soviet offenses.
And while estimates could be made of effectiveness against deployed Soviet
offenses, there would always he reasonable questions about Soviet penetration
aids that could be quickly added to their offensive force.
Small uncertainties would be significant because, with the large offensive
forces which are currently deployed, a small difference in the percentage of
penetrating weapons would translate into a large difference in destructive
potential. The uncertainties involved with a defense which was in fact per-
fect would be likely to be large enough to leave the United States unsure
about whether it was vulnerable to an annihilating attack by the Soviet
Union.
406 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
Conclusion
Author's Note
The author would like to thank Robert Art, Albert Carnesale, Lynn Eden, M~chaelNacht,
Thomas Schelling, Stephen Van Evera, Stephen Walt, and the members of the Avoiding Nuclear
War working group for their helpful comments on earher drafts of this article.
Notes
Influential arguments made in opposition to BMD in the earlier debate are found in: Abram
Chayes and Jerome Wiesner, eds., ABM: A n Evaluation of the Decrsron to Deploy Anti-Ballrstrc
Missile Systems (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); and Richard Garwin and Hans Bethe,
"Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," Scientific American, March 1968, pp. 164-174. Arguments in
favor of BMD were presented in Johan J. Hoist and William Schneider, Jr., eds., W h y ABM?
Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1969). A recent
book on the subject which does not promote any specific BMD policy is Ashton B. Carter and
David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984).
Recent arguments against BMD are found in: Space-Based Missile Defense, A Report by the
Union of Concerned Scientists (Cambridge, Mass.: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1984); and
William E. Burrows, "Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62,
No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 843-856. For current arguments in favor o f BMD, see Keith B. Payne
Why Even Good D e f e n s e s may be Bad 409
and Colin S. Gray, "Nucle,~rPolicy and the Detenswe Tr,lnsit~on,"Foreign Afhzirs, Vol. 62, No.
4 ( S p r ~ n gI 984), pp. 820-842.
4. For a n explicit st,itement of rhis helief from strong opponents of IIML), see S p a c r - R a s c ~ i
h / l i s ~ i 1)cfensc,
l~~ in w h ~ c hthe Llnion of Concerned Scientists states, "if it were possible t o put
In place o\'ernight a tnll! etfccrive, invulnerable defense against nuclear weapons, there could
lir~rdlybe serlous oblections t o doing this" ( p . 7 1).
5. This d~srinctionis important because these t w o types of detense h ~ v teu n d m i r n t ~ l l yd ~ f -
fercnt ~ t r ~ i t e g i c~ n ~ l ~ c a t i o1'n scountry's
: area defense, if suiiic~entlyeffective, could reii~ic-rthe
si/e o t the ~ ~ d v e r s a r ydeterrent
k threat; a country's pomt detense, hy incre'ls~ngthe s ~ / eot it\
offensive torce that cvould survive a counterforce attack, could rncreasc the size of the cori~try's
deterrent threat.
6. An assured destruction i a p a b ~ l i t yis generally understood t o he the capalxliry, f o l l o w ~ n g
' full sc,ile counterforce attack against one's forces, t o inflict a n extremely high h e 1 of d ~ n i a g e
1
upon one's adversary. T h e levels of potential damage which analysts believe assured desrruct~on
require5 are u s u ~ l l ysimilar t o those prescribed by Robert McNam'lra, U S . Secret~r! of Defense
from 1960 t o 1968. McNamara's criteria for assured dectrucrion, which were influenced b! the
J i m i n ~ s h i n grnarg~naldarnage potenti,ll of increasmg the size of the U S . force, rcqu~redthat the
U n ~ r e dSr'ltes be able t o destroy, In a retaliatory attack, .~pproximately2.5 percent of the S o v ~ c t
n 50 percent of Soviet industry. H e judged that such a level of destruction \voultl
p o p ~ ~ l a t i oand
he ~ntolerablet o the Soviet Umon and, therefore, thar the c,ipabiliry t o inflict this level of dani-
.igc would he suff~cientt o deter deliberate Soviet nuclear a r t ~ c k so n the United St,~tes.See A h i n
C:. Enthoven and K. W < ~ y n cSmith, H o u , Much IS t m m g h ? S h a p r t ~t ~l l~I ~ ~ f &PYO~IZIIII s~
1961-1960 ( N n v York: Hdrper and Kow, 1971), pp. 172-1 84, 207-210.
A rel,lted, but conceptually distinct, interpretation of assured destruction focuses o n the
r c l a t i o n s h ~between
~ the costs a decision-maker associates w ~ t hthe nuclear ~ t t a c k, ~ n dthe
dani'ige thar cvould result tram such a n attack. Assured dcstruct~on In this Interpretatton
req~liresthat the potential damage in one's retaliatory capab~lityshould be sufficiently high
that ~ncreasingthe potential d'lmage would not result in significantly higher costs t o the adver-
sary. In this article, assured destruction is intended t o have this second me,inlng. Cle,lrly, an!
evaluation of the costs associated w ~ t hsuch unprecedented damage is hrghlj. s ~ ~ h j e c t i vMan! r.
people believe t h a t the United States would have t o he able t o reduce damage t o itselt far helow
the Levels specificd by M c N a m a r a before it could significantly improve the outcome o f ,in all-
o u t war; others belleve that .iny r e d u c t ~ o nin damage, even if d:iniage renuineci well a h o \ e
these levels, would he sigmficant. T h e t w o d~fferentunderstmdings of assured destruction 'Ire
often n o t dlstinguished bemuse M c N a m a r a said that a n assured destruction ccipcil>~lity would
he suffic~entlv . ltlrrre
<>
t o a n m h ~ l a t eone's adversarv in retallation and because analvsrs rend t o
~ s s u ~ thdt n e costs t o one's adversary could not be increased if the advers,lry could '~lreadyhe
annih~lated.
T h e arguments in this a r t ~ c l ed o not depend upon ,I specific assessment of the Iwel of rer,ll~-
atory datiiage required tor ;~ssureddestruction. Instead, the arguments \ i e w the level of dam-
age required for assured destructioll as a n i~llpreciseboundary, above which ,~dditlon.lld,lmajie
does nor signif~caritlyincre,~sethe costs of a n attack, c ~ n helow d which reductions In damage
would signdicanrly reduce the costs. People disagree o n the loc'lriion of rhis houndar); but thr
argument\ apply in :]I1 c,lses.
7. For an authoritative an,llysis of the technical feas~hilityot RML), see Ashron K. Llrter,
Ilirei-teti t n e r g y Missile Dcfertse 112 Space (Washington, D.C.: 11.5. Government P r i n t ~ n gOffice,
1984). (:arrer judges 'is "extremely remote the prospect that directed-energy KhlD (in concert
with other layers it necessary) will succeed In reducing the vulnerahliry of 0.5. popu1,lrion c~rnd
wciety t o the neighborhood of 100 megatons o r less" (p. 68). See also: SPLITC-ht~s~d MISSIIC
Drfiwse; Spurgeon M. Keeny and Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, " M A D Versus NUTS," I ~ ) r c r j i r ~
Affairs, VoI. 60, N o . 2 (Winter 1981-82). pp. 297-303; and Carter and S ~ h w ~ ~Bnllist~c rt~,
Mrssilc l k f i w s e , in which Carter concludes: "the prospect thar RML) will thw'lrr the rnutu.11
h o s r ~ g erelationsli~p- I I thrs is taken literall? t o mean the ab~liryof e'lch superpowel- t o d o
socinll! ~ n o r t a ldamage t o the other with nuclear weapons - is s o remote '1s t o he of n o prxtical
111terest" ( p . 1 I ) .
4 10 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
8. It should not go unmentioned that many of the advocates of BMD favor asymmetric
deployment - that is, situations in which the United States can gain a strategic advantage by
deploying BMD which is superior to Soviet BMD. See, for example, Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear
Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979),
pp. 54-87; and Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory Is Possible," Foreign Policy, No. 39
(Summer 1980), pp. 14-27. In contrast to these earlier articles, in the recent "Nuclear Policy and
the Defensive Transition," Gray and Payne argue as though the defensive sltuatlon they advocate
would be symmetric. They do not explain the origins of this apparent inconsistency.
9. The following discussion assumes that both countries would know the effectiveness of both
their own defense and the adversary's defense. This is admittedly unrealistic, since there would
always be uncertainties about the effectiveness of the defenses, and because the implications of
these uncertainties could be significant. The reason for assuming that the effectiveness of the
defenses would be known, however, is to focus the examination of perfect defenses on other
issues. This assumption of certain information strengthens the arguments for perfect defense and
therefore reinforces the best case assumptions used in this analysis. Some of the comphcations thar
would likely result from uncertainties about effectiveness are discussed later in this articlc.
10. Many advocates of pursuing h~ghlyeffective defense argue that even ~f the prospects
for effective defense do not look extremely promising today, history suggests that major
technological changes should be expected. For example, Payne and Gray observe In "Nuclear
Policy and the Defensive Transition" that: "All of recorded history has shown swings in the
pendulum of technical advantage between offense and defense. For the strategic defense t o
achieve a very marked superiority . . . would he an extraordinary trend in the light of the last
30 years, but not of the last hundred o r thousand years. Military history is replete with ex-
amples of defensive technology and tactics dominating the offense" (p. 826). This argument
would, however, apply at least as well t o the maintenance of the defensive world they advo-
cate and points to the major problems that would exist in defensive sltuations.
11. For an insightful discussion of why large nuclear arsenals reduce the probability of
superpower conventional wars, even when neither superpower has an advantage in purely
military terms, see Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 617-633. At the other end of the spectrum,
Gray and Payne in "Victory Is Possible" find the U.S. strategic force inadequate to meet its
extended deterrence commitments, but admit that U.S. strategic nuclear forces d o contribute
to deterrence of Soviet conventional attack in Europe (p. 16).
12. This assertion depends on the assumption made above that both countries know thar
the defenses are perfect. If defenses were not known to be perfect, although in fact they were,
then nuclear attack might be carried out (but would not result in damage) and nuclear threats
might be used coercively.
13. The probability of preemptive nuclear war depends on the probability of crises, as well
as the crisis stability of the nuclear situation. For example, a change in the nuclear s~tuation
which increases crisis stability but also increases the probability and severity of crises could
increase the probability of preemptive nuclear war. The following comparison of the prob-
ability of nuclear war in defensive and assured destruction s~tuationsdoes not take into con-
sideration the relative probability of crises. Because defensive situations are likely t o increase
tensions between the superpowers and because superpower cooperation will he more difficult
than in assured destruction situations, the effect of not including the probability of crises in
this analysis probably favors defensive situations. Therefore, this simplification tends to re-
inforce the best case which t h ~ analysis
s makes for defensive situations.
14. That deterrence requires assured destruction capabilities was rarely made as a separate
argument. It was, however, an integral part o f the argument that BMD would necessarily result
in an arm race. The inevitability of this arms race was based in part on the assertion that each
superpower, to maintain an effective deterrent, would have to possess an enormous retaliator!
capability. See, for example, Chayes and Wiesner, eds., ABM, pp. 49-54.
IS. A similar argument is made by Donald Brennan in "The Case for Population Defense," In
Hoist and Schneider, Why ABM?, pp. 100-106. An earlier version of this argument appeared in
Donald Brennan and Johan Hoist, Ballistic Missile Defeme: Two Vietc,s, Adelphi Paper KO.43
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), pp. 9-1 1.
\,l,i-i t Why Even Good D e f e n s e s may b e Bad 41 1
indicator of the likelihood andlor intensity of arms races that will occur in a specific nuclear
situation. Arms races, however, can occur for a variety of reasons which are only peripherall!-
related to the effect of building nuclear forces on the adversary's security. Consequently, arms
races can occur In highly robust nuclear situations, as has occurred in our current highlv redundant
and diversified assured destruction situation.
Second, use of the term "arms race stability" can connote a belief that arms races cause
wars. Whether arms races actually cause wars is a theoretical issue on which there is substan-
tial disagreement. But one can assert that the probability of war depends upon the robusmess
of the nuclear situation without believing that, in general. arms races cause wars. Robustness
is a measure of how sensit~vea country's security would be to the adversary'c buildup of forces.
It does not imply that the process of competitive armament itself leads to w ~ r Rather,
. assum-
ing a force buildup takes place either competitively o r un~laterally,a war IS more likely when
the initial nuclear situation is less robust.
22. On the existence of countermeasures, see Carter, Directed Energy M~ssilrDefense 172
Space, pp. 69-70.
23. For a discussion of how arms control might help to Increase the robustness of deten-
sive situations see Charles L. Glaser, "The Implication of Reduced Vulnerabil~tyfor Security in
the Nuclear Age," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1983, pp. 217-228.
24. For a discussion of the factors which affect the probab~litythat countries will be able
to cooperate, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politrcs,
Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.
25. This formulation of objectives assumes that the United States IS a strictly status quo
power. This may not he entirely accurate, but is a reasonable assumption for this discuss~onof
nuclear weapons policy. A further concern about this formulation is that it does not mclude
the objective of minimizing losses that could result from nuclear coercion. W h ~ l et h ~ iss clearly
an objective of U.S. policy, the nuclear capabilities required to achieve ~tclosely resemble those
required t o minimize the probability of nuclear war. Consequently, not explicitly ~ n c l u d ~ nthic
g
objective does not bias the analysis.
26. For a more complete analysis see Glaser, "The Irnpl~cationsof Reduced Vulnerahil~ty
for Security In the Nuclear Age."
27. The transition to a defensive situation deserves extensive analysis that is beyond the scope
of this paper. The preceding analysis can, however, be used to analyze U.S. securlty durmg a sym-
metric transition. A symmetric transition would likely be the safest possible transit~on.Therefore,
because a transition would probably not be symmetric, the significance o t the symmetric tr'in-
sition should not be overestimated. However, because the transition to a defense situation is
generally believed to be very dangerous, it is interesting to briefly consider this best case.
Secur~tyin transition states would be determined by the same factors as In the defensive
situations already studied. Applying the conclusions o f the analysis of defensive s~tuationsto
the transition, we find: 1 ) Premeditated attacks could be deterred equally well throughout the
transition; 2 ) Crisis stability m ~ g h tnot decrease during the transition; and 3 ) Robustness
would decrease during the transition. It follows that the probab~lityof nuclear war In the final
state of the transition is likely to be greater rhan in any of the transit~onstates.
The analysis of defensive situations presented in this art~cleturns the convenr~onalwisdom
about strategic defenses on its head. It finds that the desirability of effective defenses, which is
usually taken for granted, is at best highly questionable; and that the probability of war dur-
ing a symmetric transition, which is usually believed to be high, could he lower rhan in the
final defensive state.
28. For a discussion of the likely alliance reaction to extensive U.S. homeland defense, see
David S. Yost, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance," International Security, Vol. 7,
No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 154-158.
29. The New York Times, March 30, 1983, p. 14.
Transarmament: From Offensive to Defensive Defense
Johan Galtung
1 . Reactions to a n Attack
total
destruction
offensive
violent
1 1 1 ------------ ----
conventional
military
defense ( C M D )
defensive para-military
defense (PMD)
now non-military
violent defense (NMD)
I\
....................
no
resistance
area (of the weapon itself, whether it is a classical impact weapon, an incen-
diary weapon, a high explosive or weapons of mass destruction - chemical1
toxic, biological, radiological, nuclear or geophysical). If we now divide 'range'
into immobile/short/long and 'impact area' into local/limited/ extended, then we
arrive at the nine combinations in Figure 11, four of them defensive according to
the approach taken above, five of them offensive.
Naturally, it all depends on where the borderline between 'short' and
'long' on the one hand, and between 'limited' and 'extensive' on the other, is
located. An indication is already given above: the effects of the reaction to an
attack should be within one's own country.' Of course, there may be coun-
tries so small that almost any weapon system wo~lldreach outside and/or
have an impact area that would also include adversary territory. In general
this would call for research into other types of weapon systems, for the use
of highly immobile systems with only local impact along the borders (border
fortifications are a classical answer in this connection), leaving the 'short'/
'limited' combination to core areas of the country. But even if some of this
should reach into some minor parts of the adversary's territory, this does not
in any major way affect the type of reasoning we are trying to develop here.
In order to discuss this more fully let us contrast the extremes in Figure 11.
On the one hand, in the upper right hand corner, are very long range
weapons systems with extensive impact areas: intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, long range bombers and submarines, all of them with dual capability,
i.e. useahle for weapons of mass destruction. They would certainly be clas-
sified as offensive by anybody.
O n the other hand, in the bottom left hand corner would be such weapons
systems as land, sea, or air mines with local impact only, or a pipeline buried
underground that can easily be filled with an explosive, ignited and make
hundreds of kilometres unpassable for tanks. As mentioned, fortifications
also belong in this category, but some of them would have guns with an
impact area that would no longer be 'local', but 'limited'. Real long range
guns would be alien to the logic of purely defensive defense, however.
extensive of fe n
2.
limited de fen
<
local si ve cc
> YLZiZRL'
immobile short long
41 6 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Then there are all the in-between categories, and they are numerous.
However, they are not that difficult to handle from the point of view of the
present analysis. Long range weapons systems with local impact would clearly
be offensive: a Pershing I1 is still an offensive weapon when equipped with a
conventional warhead with a highly local impact: a very long range gun with
a nuclear warhead would be an offensive weapon even if stationed 'at home'.
More important is the 'short'/'limited' combination since that would bring
us to the borderline between offensive and defensive. The 'immobile'/'exten-
sive' combination, the nuclear mine or short range nuclear arms seem useless
both for defense and offense. They are 'thought-errors', leading mainly to self-
deterrence.
'Short range' means mobile, but mobility should not be useful for offen-
sive purposes. One would be thinking in terms of jeeps and similar vehicles
on land, motor torpedo boats on water, small submarines, and small air-
craft using roads as airstrips, possibly with vertical take-off and landing,
possibly helicopters. There would be nothing against these means of trans-
portation being very quick: the problem is not speed, but range. In speed
there is protection, and the possibility of coming quickly to the rescue where
defense against aggression is needed. Speed is certainly also important in
aggression, but only useful when combined with sufficient range t o reach
outside one's country.
Hence, one would be thinking in terms of highly mobile and small units
with limited range, on land, in the water, in the air. In order to compensate
for the limited range, they would have to be well dispersed all over the
national territory, but, because of the limited range, essentially with local or
district (sub-national) functions alone. If the length from one end of a coun-
try to another is so long that the range can also reach possible adversary ter-
ritory sideways - Chile, Norway and Sweden being obvious examples -
then one should renounce on weapons systems with ranges of that type, let-
ting the non-offensive character of the system take priority over the wish to
use all systems all over the national territory - and deploy systems with
shorter range, dispersed. However, if they are to operate in a dispersed and
essentially local manner, they also have to be relatively autonomous. This
does not mean that they are not under national command, only that they
are capable of operating even if that command should be seriously impaired
through adversary attack. And this, in fact, means that the whole C31sys-
tem - command, communication, control, and intelligence - also has to be
dispersed, less centralized, and that the country should not depend on out-
side suppliers for armament^.^
Having now established that they should have short range but possibly
be very quickly mobile, well dispersed, small, local and autonomous, we can
turn to the impact area of the weapons. This should be 'limited' for the very
simple reason that it is limited how much one wants to destroy of one's own
territory even if a more extensive impact area were to be more destructive to
adversary forces. This, then, would point in the direction of very efficient,
precision guided weapons with considerable destructive power but limited
impact area, an example being 'smart rockets'. They certainly exist today
I Transarmament 4 17
and are generally seen as very effective against tanks in the form of antitank
weapons, and against ships, but perhaps less so against aircraft, particularly
when they make use of the old trick of interposing themselves between
defensive forces and the sun. However, there would be ways of dealing also
with this problem. Let it only be added that such forces in addition would
have weapons with a highly local impact such as ordinary guns, thereby
completing the four cells in the defensive area of Figure 11.
Of course there is a gray zone in between. There is the famous case of the
anti-aircraft guns that are defensive when pointing upwards, yet can be
used as highly offensive weapons when mounted with a different angle for
targets on the ground on a carrier (a ship, for instance) with a long range.
This, however, is no argument at all against the distinction made. What has
happened in that and similar cases is that a new weapon system has been
created, from something immobile with limited or even local impact area to
something long range with limited impact area. That one major physical
component in two weapons systems could be the same, or the same with a
minor modification, is trivial. A country that wants to base its security on
defensive forms of defense would simply not undertake that type of trans-
formation of the weapons systems, and try to make them so that they can-
not be suspected of making such a move either. At the same time, however,
this serves as a warning not to be naive in believing that any component of
a weapon system is inhevently defensive or offensive; it depends on the total
system. It should not, however, depend on motivation. As motivations
change so may the objective character of the weapons system - hence it is
an engineering problem to make systems that are highly resistant, 'robust',
to such changes, retaining the defensive character over a vast range of trans-
formation of the components.
Going back to Figure 11, there are still a number of clarifications to be
made. More particularly, if we make use of all three cuts that have been
made on this single dimension, cutting the dimension in four regions, some
comments about each of the four regions might be appropriate to bring out
the issues.
Fivst, there are the weapons of mass destruction, with most of the public
debate and action concentrated on nuclear arms. They are classified here as
offensive, and that is not entirely unproblematic. The reasoning was indicated
above: weapons of mass destruction are so destructive that nobody in his right
mind would use them at home, at most against an adversary, and even then
only against a very much hated adversary. One reason for this is that the
weapons are not only destructive of the homosphere (human beings and their
settlements) but also of the biosphere, lithosphere, and the hydrosphere - in
other words of the whole environment (the atmosphere too for that matter,
but that effect will be dispersed unless there is a 'nuclear winter'. In other
words, nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction for that
4 I8 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
4. Non-Military Defense
Then there is the fourth category, non-military defense (NMD). Most models
of that type of defense would also operate on the assumption of small units,
local and autonomous, dispersed - in other words the same structure that
has already been argued for CMD and PMD. One might say that there are
two reasons underlying this: never to offer the adversary any targets with
such a high concentration of defense potential that it would be worthy of
a nuclear attack, and at the same time being able to resist an attack in all
corners of the country. (Of course, he may destroy the whole country, but
he may d o that anyhow.) For the case of non-military defense this obviously
means not only territorial defense in the sense of resistance in geographically
well defined units, but also social defense in the sense of all organizations
and associations in a country finding their own ways of resisting attack by
not producing goods or services for the adversary etc. Clearly this IS defen-
sive as it is only meaningful in one's own society. This becomes even more
clear when one looks at the following short list of 12 fundamental strategies
for NMD, organized in three groups with four strategies in each.'
by the local population against its own leaders. It is more like sending a book
across the border, or a teacher, less like sending a nuclear-tipped missile.
Looking at the total dimension, again, the case has now been made that
on the one hand there are offensive reactions to an attack, with weapons of
mass destruction (including nuclear weapons) and with conventional offen-
sive weapons. O n the other there are defensive reactions, and they are of
three types: conventional military defense, paramilitary defense, and non-
military defense. Just like an offensive reaction today is conceived of as
including both nuclear and conventional weapons (in Soviet/ WTO strategy
nuclear weapons are not for first use, whereas in USINATO strategy nuclear
weapons are possibly for first use), a defensive reaction could include all
three types, combining CMD, PMD and NMD. The problem of whether
they are combinable is an important one, just as it is for offensive strategies.
That problem, however, will be taken up below.
The basic point to be discussed here is not so much the structure of
offensive vs. defensive systems, as their function. The key difference is that
offensive systems can be used for attack. They are potentially aggressive,
and hence provocative. Whether they will be used for attack is another mat-
ter; the important point is that any possible adversary may have reasons to
suspect that they can be used for attack simply because what is possible may
also become reality. What is impossible may not; this is the whole point
underlying an objectively defensive posture.
At this point some comments about the ambiguities of the two import-
ant words 'defense' and 'deterrence' may be in order.
The word defense obviously has two meanings: any reaction to an
attack, in other words the use of any weapon system from any point on the
dimension of Figure I (including the bottom point which may also be some
kind of defense, perhaps in the longer run); and then the other meaning a
limited part of the spectrum only, what is here somewhat clumsily referred
to as 'defensive defense'. And this spills over into the double meaning given
to the word 'deterrence': deterring an attack through the threat of effective
retaliation (German: Vergeltung), or deterring attack through the promise
of effective resistance (German: Verteidigung, not including 'Vergeltung').
One may say that there is a broad use of the terms defenseldeterrence cov-
ering all points on the spectrum, and the narrow use limiting it to the
(purely) defensive systems only.
It is probably not possible to change the semantics since word usages are
so deeply ingrained at this juncture. But it is absolutely impermissible when
people participating in the debate d o not clarify what they mean. At any
point where the words 'defense' and 'deterrence' are used it should be made
clear whether the terms are limited to (purely) defensive systems, or also to
systems operating on the territory of the adversary.
Offensive defense is offensive, in both senses of that term: it can be used
to start an offensive in the sense of aggression, and it is offensive in the sense
of provoking the other side. It is not the manpower, capital, research, and
organizational work that go into a military system in general that provokes;
~ , , I Ii Ir t l _ Transarmament 421
In order to appreciate better the Swiss doctrine, the reader is also referred
to the quotes given in footnotes 3 and 4 and Fischer 1982. The latter, how-
ever, also points out how all is not well with the Swiss case: conscientious
objection is not admitted; a heavy military hierarchy paralleling and partly
doubling the civilian one; arms exports; gross cost overruns by the military;
no preparation for non-military defense; little or no peace and conflict
research.
The Swedish doctrine is somewhat weaker, based on the idea that
'Defense should not be perceived as a threat by anybody, and it should
be elaborated in such a way that the exclusively defensive purpose - to
defend one's own country - becomes absolutely clear' (Totalfiirsvarets
upplysningsnamd, p. 8 ) . What is missing here is a discussion of doctrine and
of objective capability, not of the subjective perception, with Swedish
422 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear Deterrence
Let us now have a closer look at this type of defense, a triad consisting of
conventional, paramilitary and non-military defense. The major arguments
in favor are obvious: a defense of this kind is not provocative since it can-
not be used for an attack, hence should not lead to any arms race. Within
this type of defense doctrine it would be entirely possible for both parties
to have not only a high level of security but also a relatively equal level of
security. In addition it is possible for them to cooperate: it would be in the
interest of either party to make the other party feel secure, which would
mean that there could even be an exchange between adversaries of tech-
niques of defensive defense (but not necessarily giving information about
424 T h e C o l d War a n d N u c l e a r D e t e r r e n c e
their exact location). This means that a setting is given for common security
(Galtung 1984, Section 3.4) and that is already something
With this approach there would still be arms and even armament as a
process, but with the distinct possibility that a stable plateau can be achieved,
in other words not only common security but a stable and common security.
Of course, in world history this mutually defensive posture has probably been
a normal state of affairs for most pairs of neighboring countries, the accu-
mulation of offensive arms and offensive arms races being an exception. But
in addition to this, a strong defensive defense should have a high deterrent
value, 'deterrence' then taken not in the sense of retaliation, but in the sense
of being able to stave off an attack. Nevertheless, should the attack come,
and that would be the third line of argument, then the level of destruction
would be lower since there would be no incentive (except for pure terrorism)
to use nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction. Not only the
defense system but also the social system itself (Galtung 1984, Section 5.4)
would be organized in such a way that no immediate target would present
itself as being worthy of a nuclear attack.
This, however, does not mean that the type of defense advocated here is
unproblematic. The following is a short list of some basic and critical con-
siderations, for a debate that should now take place not only within the
peace movement but in our societies in general.
First, defensive defense presupposes a high level of national self-reliance
in defense matters. If weapon systems are not supposed to be quick, long
range, and mobile, then they cannot be transported from one country to
another in order to help that other country (rather than attacking it) either.
Under a doctrine of defensive defense military alliances based on high levels
of mobility are severely curtailed. This, of course, does not mean that there
cannot be all kinds of diplomatic, otherwise political, and economic sup-
port in case of an attack. World public opinion would still function, and
even more so than before because a country with purely defensive defense
cannot possibly be accused of having provoked an attacker. This may look
like a severe reduction of defensive capability, but could also be seen in
exactly the opposite manner. Clearly, a country which is used to relying on
allies, and particularly on a superpower ally, will not mobilize all its defense
resources. This is true in times of peace and even more so in times of war.
Military forces in a client country in an alliance, given the idea that 'I have
to fight for 24 hours till help comes from the superpower, possibly even
with superweapons', will certainly not exercise their defense potential to the
maximum. Rather, the strategy would be to put up a decent show but try-
ing to do so in such a way that national and personal honors are preserved,
yet one manages to survive till the major burden of the battle is taken over
by the superpower. A policy of national self-reliance would rule this out.
I Transarmament 425
If one really means what one says, that freedom is worth a fight, then that
fight has to be done by nobody else than oneself. The triad advocated above
(CMD, PMD, and MND) is so diverse, and on the other hand so dispersed
throughout the country, that it should serve exactly as a network capable of
mobilizing all kinds of defense potentials. Not only is it capable of mobil-
izing women, but also all or most of those who are dismissed from military
service for health reasons. Military 'defense' in today's offensive form is
simply incapable of mobilizing the population.
Second, a policy of defensive defense presupposes a high level of local
defense self-reliance. If the units are to be small, dispersed, and locally sup-
ported, very often also locally based, there has to be a high local capacity
to keep a fight going even if the national center has been rendered incapable
of doing so. Again the same reasoning applies: in a highly hierarchical
national defense system, itself possibly a replication of highly hierarchical
international defense systems, the local units might tend to wait for support
from the center and thus yield much less resistance than they otherwise
could do. If no such support is forthcoming they might give up, capitulate.
But if everything has been prepared in advance they might not only con-
tinue the struggle, but also, knowing that they have only themselves to rely
upon, d o more than otherwise could have been expected of them. Hence, it
is obvious that a policy of defensive defense presupposes not only a higher
level of national self-reliance, but also of local self-reliance. This type of
military doctrine, hence, is structurally compatible with a social structure
much more based on national and local self-reliance in general, just like the
vertical alliance pattern with hierarchical organization inside a country is
compatible with the social structure one finds, for instance, in transnational
organizations. Obviously the economic structure does not completely deter-
mine the military structure, but there is a relation between the two. A com-
plete change in defense structure would presuppose at least some change in
economic, political and social structure in general. It may be argued that
this is to ask for too much. It may also be argued that this type of change
probably will have to take place anyhow as a reaction to the general world
crisis, and that the change is not that fundamental.
Third, a defensive defense is vulnerable t o a n enemy w h o attacks the sys-
t e m with offensive arms from his o w n country. As a matter of fact, all the
adversary would have to do would be to set up a long range gun on his own
territory, capable of hitting targets in a systematic manner, and destroy
them from one end of the country to another. Aircraft would have to oper-
ate over the territory; a long range gun (or battery of missiles) would not.
Hence, it stands to reason that a defensive defense would have to be sup-
plemented by some element of interdiction capability. These are counterforce
weapons, for instance aircraft capable of hitting the gun just mentioned. And
then we are, of course, back to the problem; any interdiction capability would
also be an offensive capability, and hence could be provocative. Consequently
it is a question of having as little as possible, making weapons very counter-
force and not countervalue, building them into the military doctrine down to
426 T h e Cold War a n d Nuclear D e t e r r e n c e
the letter and verse of the instruction manuals, at all levels of the military
organizations, as interdiction weapons only. How much is necessary and how
much is sufficient is difficult to say; military experts close to the peace move-
ments would be the ideal persons to advise on this. Clearly, very soon an
offensive capability becomes too much, and becomes too provocative.
Fourth, a policy of defensive defense is not offensive against an outside
adversary, but could be highly offensive against an inside adversary. The
types of weapons that are described above as being defensive are defensive
because they cannot reach outside national borders in any significant man-
ner. But they can certainly hit inside those borders, otherwise they would
not have any capability at all. And they would not necessarily distinguish
between external and internal foes of the regime. As a matter of fact, they
are exactly the type of weapons that a repressive government might use
against insurgent forces, whether their claims are justifiable or not. They
are more adequate than offensive weapons: the case of the Iranian revolu-
tion showed rather convincingly how helpless the Shah was with his 'mod-
ern' weaponry designed for long range operations against a levee en masse
of the population. Clearly this is an important problem, and a typical ex-
ample of how a policy designed go solve one problem may not only not solve
another one but also aggravate it. The only solution I can imagine would
be to make the country less vulnerable, simply by reducing or even elimin-
ating major contradictions within the country (Galtung 1984, Section 5.4).
That would permit distributing the control over these means of destruction,
the weapons, in a more equitable manner in the population, not regarding
it as a total monopoly of the government. This does not necessarily mean
going so far as one does in Switzerland in the sense of people having arms
at home. That would be too similar to the US situation where a country-
wide dispersion of firearms has proved to increase the level of insecurity
considerably. What may not work in the US seems t o work in Switzerland
and Norway where militia arms are not used for private violence either.
Fifth, a defensive defense policy presupposes a higher level of readiness
for defense in the population. It clearly supposes a higher level of mobiliza-
tion: self-reliance at the national and local levels, and consensus. But this
does not necessarily mean militarization. I do not think that it can be said
a highly mobilized Norwegian population against nazi and quisling rule
was militarized because it wanted t o defend itself. Militarization would
have much more to do with excessive Military - Bureaucratic - Corporate -
Intelligentsia complexes, over-armament, offensive armament and such things.
Nor is it necessarily the case that this type of defense presupposes a con-
stant Feindbild. In times of peace a policy of non-alignment and even neu-
trality would serve to build down such Feindbild. In times of war it would
come about anyhow, only that the non-military component of defense
would try to see to it that it would be directed against the enemy as a soldier
and not the enemy as a person. But what is absolutely clear is that a defensive
policy, because it relies much more on popular participation, would pre-
suppose a high level of consensus. That, of course, has the major advantage
Galt ung Transarmament 427
that mobilization of the military potential cannot happen against the popular
will, as when forces are used offensively in total disregard and contempt of
what a population might feel, relying o n professional soldiery and a general
decoupling of military society from civilian society. International adventurism
would be impossible.
Sixth, a defensive defense with three different components presupposes
that the three components do not work at cross purposes. This is the famous
problem of the Mix between military and non-military types of defense.
Suffice it here only to say that the problem may be more important in theory
than in practice. In practice there are several possibilities. There is the Mix in
space: conventional defense along the borders and in thinly populated areas,
with PMD and N M D elsewhere. There is the Mix in time: conventional
defense first, then PMD and N M D as fall-back possibilities. There is the Mix
in what one might call functional space: conventional defense for geographic
and precise targets, PMD and N M D for more diffused and dispersed targets
such as the population as a whole, society as a whole, nature: then C M D and
PMD for more offensive purposes inside one's own territory, NMD for more
defensive purposes. There is the Mix of all these mixes - the question of
course being whether it becomes mixed-up. War time experience seems to
indicate that it does not, that the population is able to entertain different
types of defense at the same time, and that the adversary also makes a dis-
tinction between the three, perhaps behaving in the most aggressive way
against PMD, less so against C M D and much less so against NMD. It could
also be the other way round under certain circumstances. In any case, the task
remains that of making the country indigestible, like a hedgehog, not appe-
tizing to a wolf, and highly inoffensive to each other.
That, however, is a discussion that would lead far beyond the scope of
this article. Suffice it here only to say that the strength of this type of
defense is precisely its versatility, and that the enemy of it would be those
whose thinking has become so one-dimensional that they can only think in
terms of one foot of the tripod, not in terms of all three. In fact, the argu-
ment against it is probably not so much that it is ineffective as a deterrent
and as a defense. The argument might rather be the opposite; it is so effect-
ive that it could also be successfully turned against the countries' own gov-
ernments. In other words, the opposite of the argument above where the
emphasis was on conventional military defense as an instrument which in
the hands of the government could be used to crush a rebellion. Paramilitary
defense and non-military defense, meaningless unless they are in the hands
of the population itself, could also be used to topple a government. One
might say that this already constitutes a balance of power, that one type of
defensive defense may be the answer to the other in internal power struggles.
But the much better answer, of course, would be to say that a condition for
a purely defensive form of defense is that the country has come so far in rid-
ding itself of basic internal contradictions that neither a government, nor the
population, would use force in order to provoke some basic discontinuity in
the history of the country.
428 The Cold War and Nuclear Deterrence
Author's N o t e
The ideas developed in this article should be seen in a broader context of alternative security
policies. My book on that topic, There Are Alternatives!, (Spokesman, Nottingham, 1984) from
which the present article is taken and references to current literature are added, is an effort to
develop a more comprehensive approach. This is important lest one IS led to believe that the
road out of the present highly dangerous situation is a question of new types of military hard-
ware only. I am indebted to Nils Perter Gleditsch and Jan Oberg for helpful editorial comments.
i 4,1i I !Iiic Transarmament 429
Notes
I. The experience in Norway during the 1940-45 occupatloll can be summarized as fol-
lows: c ~ v i l ~ a nnonviolent
, resistance was very effective agalnst n,izification of civilian soclety
hy the Quisling regrme, hut ineffect~veagainst the German occupation - a s was also the mili-
tary reslstmce. Militxy liberation from the outside was both necessary and sufficient.
2. O f course, the idea o f defensive defense is not a t all new, and played a consider.ihle role
111 the debates and cornn~iss~ons o f the L e a g ~ ~ofe N a t ~ o n sin the 1930s. See, for instance,
Gr~ffin( 1936).
.3. 'The O f f ~ c ~Swiss
al p u h l ~ c . ~ t ~(Ze~itralstelle
on fur Gesanirverteid~gung19731, is very clear
o n this point 'The army as ,I whole has a defensive rnissron and its preparations are made with
a view towards fighting o n l ) ~within its o w n territory' (p. 28).
The document also rnentlons the possibility of non-military defense as a last resort, hut
does not take up the sticky issue of whether this could be one way of making use of the defen-
sive potenti'il of conscientious oblectors.
4. Again, the SWISSmake thc point: '... we have t o guarantee a minrntol de,qiw o f self-
sttfficicnq w ~ t hregard t o armaments. Sufficient supplies must be kept in order t o malnt;iln the
combat-effectiveness of our army in case of war' (ihid. p. 29).
5.For a general review of the effects of nuclear war, see Galtung (19841, particularly sec-
tions 2.4, 3.4. and 4.4 For the effects of nuclear war on the climate, see Sagan (198,3184);~ l s o
N PS C ~ I P I I ~3I Novemher
S~, 1983.
6. See lohan Galtung (1978), chapters 12, 13, 15 for an analysis of nonm~litarydefense,
also Galtung ( 1980), sectlon 4.4.
7. @berg (1983) p. 167 points out how 'nonviolence as well ,is the philosophy of defensive
defense ha\ its origin In the Orient, not in our culture'. I agree, hut one should not underestimate
the importmce of defensive defense as the defense of the weaker parties, and the parties with les\
aggressive inclinations even if there is n o trace of Oriental thmking - like in the case of the Swiss.
References
Sagan, Carl 1983184. 'Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 257-292.
Sozialdemokratischer Informationsdienst 1982. 'Argumente fiir eine alternative
Verteidigungspolitik', Frau und Geseelschaft, September.
Spannocchi, Emil 1976. Verteidigung ohne Selbstzer storung. MiinchedWien: Hanser.
Svenska Fredsoch Skiljedomsforeningen 1982. Ett forsvarspolitiskt program for fred. Stockholm.
Totalforsvarets Upplysningsnemnd (no date). Sveriges Sakerhet. Stockholm.
Zentralstelle fiir Gesamtverteidigung 1973. General Defense. Bern.
Oberg, Jan 1983. At udvikle sikkerhed og sikre udvikling. Copenhagen: Vindrose.