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THE HISTORY OF A DORMANT INSTITUTION:

LEGAL NORMS AND THE PRACTICE OF RECALL IN
SWITZERLAND

Uwe Serdült

To cite this article: Uwe Serdült (2015) THE HISTORY OF A DORMANT INSTITUTION: LEGAL
NORMS AND THE PRACTICE OF RECALL IN SWITZERLAND, Representation, 51:2, 161-172,
DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2015.1056219

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 THE HISTORY OF A DORMANT
INSTITUTION: LEGAL NORMS AND THE
PRACTICE OF RECALL IN SWITZERLAND

Uwe Serdült

This article mainly fills a gap in the English-speaking literature on the recall in Switzerland in order to
allow for future comparative work. After a historical introduction, the reasons for the introduction,
institutional rules as well as practice of the recall are assembled in an inductive but systematic way.
Currently the recall in Switzerland only exists in a minority of 6 of 26 cantons but not on the national
level. The procedure is usually directed at parliament, the government or both. So far there was only
one successful recall vote in the Canton of Aargau in the year 1862. This particular case is therefore
described in more detail. Furthermore, a comprehensive overview of all recall attempts and votes is
drawn up. As a conclusion stemming from the Swiss case, we can come up with three main functions
the recall fulfils in a political system: (a) catharsis in case of scandals or mismanagement, (b) political
weapon to gain public attention or to maximise votes in the next election, (c) indirect measure to
oppose a contested policy.

Recall has been introduced into only a few Swiss cantonal constitutions, mostly during
the democratic movement in the mid to late nineteenth century. As we will see in this over-
view, recall, as an institution, is dormant in most cantons, some have since abandoned it,
and only in the case of Canton Ticino has a new recall mechanism been recently introduced
at the local level. In the first instance, this article is supposed to fill a gap in the English-speak-
ing literature on Swiss direct democracy mechanisms. However, the Swiss experience will also
be used inductively in order to derive some more general patterns and hypotheses that could
then be tested elsewhere.
Switzerland is a federal state most well-known for its high degree of decentralisation and
direct citizen participation by means of popular votes (Kriesi and Trechsel [2008]; Linder
[2010]). Whereas there is abundant literature in several languages on Swiss direct democracy
(Kriesi [2005]; Papadopoulos [1998]; Serdült [2014]), much less is known about recall in this
country (Coleman and Johnston [2013: 5]; Qvortrup [2013: 84]). This lack of scholarly attention
has mainly to do with the fact that the procedure is hardly ever used. There have been only
very few attempts and most did not make it to a vote because an insufficient number of sig-
natures could be collected, as in the city of Bellinzona in 2011. In addition, most of the existing
literature on Swiss recall is written in German.1 However, as Switzerland appears to be one of
the very early adopters of recall, there is a certain merit to shedding some light on it as an inter-
esting reference point for current practice in Latin America (Welp and Serdült 2012) and else-
where in the world (Qvortrup 2011).

Representation, 2015
Vol. 51, No. 2, 161– 172, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2015.1056219
# 2015 McDougall Trust, London
162 UWE SERDÜLT

In general, recall in Switzerland is a measure of last resort, to use when all other mech-
anisms of control and accountability fail. Cases of incompetent or corrupt politicians can reg-
ularly be dealt with via the courts (in the case of criminal offences parliamentary immunity is
waived), the media may apply public pressure to step down, or there could be an internal
rearrangement within the executive for the portfolio of a minister (portfolio is reduced).
Members of parliament have absolute immunity for what they say in parliament as a part of
freedom of speech. However, parliament can levy immunity where a parliamentarian is
involved in criminal acts (relative immunity).2 In addition, political conflicts on one or the
other issue arising within the legislature are typically dealt with by an elaborate set of direct
democracy instruments, which is even more diverse at the cantonal and local level than at
the national level (Christmann [2011]; Trechsel and Serdült [1999]). The set of referendum
mechanisms thus allows politically active groups (not only political parties) to block public pol-
icies they do not approve of or to raise neglected topics via citizens’ initiatives. The availability
of direct democracy mechanisms such as referendums and initiatives therefore makes fre-
quent use of recall rather obsolete.

1. Historical Origins
In the nineteenth century, Switzerland was not the quiet, orderly country we know it as
today—far from it. The territory of Switzerland was occupied by Napoleon’s and other armed
forces at the beginning of the nineteenth century and characterised by struggles between
urban and rural areas as well as religious turmoil (Dardanelli 2011). Recall is an older institution
than the veto in at least some cantons and is certainly older than the referendum or citizens’
initiative. One reason for its introduction to constitutions of the time was to prevent revolu-
tions which were still very much present in the collective memory (Hangartner and Kley
[2000: 633]; Tornic and Massüger [2013: 128]). The exact origin of the recall procedure is not
known. Rappard (1912: 134) cites the censure of public officials at the end of the eighteenth
century in Geneva (‘grabeau’) as a likely candidate. This procedure was introduced into
several Swiss cantonal constitutions by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1802 as a way to recall
members of the legislative councils. However, the right to recall an elected body in the
form as we know it today spread during the democratic movement in the 1860s.
Whether the American version of recall, which was first introduced into the city charter of
Los Angeles in 1903, was influenced by the Swiss example is also uncertain. Apparently, the
main promoter of recall in the United States, Dr J. R. Haynes, got the idea by reading ‘The
City for the People’ by Parsons (1901) in which there are a lot of references to the Swiss
example in general but no mention of recall in particular (Rappard 1912: 127). However, the
Swiss example is regularly and prominently mentioned in several works of the American
reform movement of that time as well as the literature serving as a basis for ‘The City for
the People’, so that an indirect influence at least is highly likely. In essence, in ‘The City for
the People’, Parsons suggests the following remedies to improve American democracy: to
introduce home rule for cities in local affairs and direct legislation, civil service reform, pro-
portional representation, preferential voting, the electric ballot, equal suffrage and the
popular recall (Parsons 1901: 12). Further on in his diatribe against capitalist monopolies and
corrupt governments, he states (Parsons 1901: 373):
But once in full use, the referendum will substantially rid the country of legislative abuses, and
give the people an easy path to the destroying of administrative abuses, especially if the
 THE HISTORY OF A DORMANT INSTITUTION 163

Recall or Imperative Mandate be put in vigorous use along with the legislative forms of initiat-
ive and referendum.

2. Cantonal Recall Regulations and Practice

There is no recall procedure in Switzerland at the national level. However, there is the
indirect option of launching an initiative aimed at a total revision of the constitution which
would, if successful, trigger new elections and bring down not only parliament but also
government.3 This was actually attempted by the ‘Frontists’ together with other right-wing,
nationalistic movements in 1935. However, the attempt was clearly rejected, with 72% of
the votes against.
In Switzerland, recall is thus only known at the sub-national (cantonal and communal)
level. However, contrary to recall in other countries, procedures in Switzerland do not allow
the revocation of an individual member of government or parliament but generally target
the body as a whole (see Canton Uri as a partial exception to that rule). In the canton of
Solothurn, for example, the extension of the recall to individual members of the government
or parliament was discussed in 1986 and rejected since it does not make sense in a pro-
portional rule electoral system (Kölz 1998: 76). No justification is necessary. Where the recall
is passed, all members must step down collectively and a new election is organised.
However, the newly elected body is only allowed to stand for the remainder of the term
before regular elections would again take place (Hangartner and Kley 2000: 640). Recall in Swit-
zerland therefore functions more as a vote of no confidence rather than for the purpose of
punishing individual politicians.
There are currently six cantons with recall procedures in place: Bern, Schaffhausen,
Solothurn, Ticino, Thurgau and Uri.4 The following chapters give a brief overview of the
present legislation and practice in these cantons. Three cantons have silently and without
opposition dropped recall during processes of a total revision of their constitutions: Aargau
(in 1980), Basel Landschaft (in 1984) and Lucerne5 (in 2007).

2.1. Canton Bern

Bern was the first canton to introduce the possibility to recall parliament in 1846. Orig-
inally, 8000 signatures had to be collected within a month and citizens had to register in
person at the municipal office (Junker 1990: Chapter 3.2.4). Today 30,000 signatures are
required (2013: 4% of the electorate, no time frame given for the collection of signatures).
Bern kept recall in the totally revised 1993 Constitution and even extended the procedure
by adding the government as an institution that can be recalled. Bern’s reluctance to drop
recall had to do with a financial scandal involving the Bernese government (1984 –5) and
which was still very much present at the time of the constitutional revision.
The only case of an actual vote dates back to 1852 when the conservative regime in
power was accused by the progressive opposition of, among other things, hoarding the
state treasure that got lost during the French invasion half a century before in an unknown
place (the so-called treasure affair, Schatzgelderaffäre). These accusations were completely
unfounded and the matter was settled in court. It was, in essence, a fight between two
almost equally strong political parties over political dominance in the canton; the modernising
force of the Liberals on the one hand and the Conservatives on the other, trying to protect the
old feudal order (Junker 1990). A total of 16,000 signatures for a recall were collected, double of
164 UWE SERDÜLT

what was required. The vote on 18 April 1852, however, did not pass, with 54% of the ballots
against (Jufer 1989: 148– 9).

2.2. Canton Schaffhausen

In Schaffhausen, a recall of the executive and the legislative power has been possible
since 1876. In this small canton, 1000 signatures are enough to trigger a vote (2013: 2% of
the electorate).
So far there has been only one unsuccessful attempt to revoke the executive, in 2000.
The recall was initiated and promoted by a lawyer and member of the cantonal parliament
for the Liberal Party, Gerold Meier, who interpreted a CHFr. 4.5 million real estate transaction
between the public (but outsourced) cantonal buildings insurance and the cantonal adminis-
tration to be against the law. He tried to counter this administrative act via parliament, the
courts and finally with recall. He suspected the cantonal authorities of circumventing the
finance referendum, which in many Swiss cantons and municipalities is a binding vote
applied to legitimise single or recurring financial expenses (Trechsel and Serdült 1999).
However, the courts did not accept that and even his own party did not support him in parlia-
ment. The 12 March 2000 vote—six months before regular elections were due—supported the
government with a clear two-thirds majority against a recall (Stahlberger 2000).

2.3. Canton Solothurn

In Solothurn, a recall of both the executive and the legislature has been possible since
1869 with 6000 signatures currently required to trigger a vote (2013: 3.4% of the electorate).
First, attempts to introduce recall into the constitution failed in 1850 and 1856 (Kölz
1998: 74). The canton kept the recall provisions in the totally revised 1986 Constitution.
In total, we can observe four attempts at handing in a recall request: in 1887 the political
opposition started to collect signatures in order to build up pressure for a more democratic
constitution. In 1961 it was a committee against a military training ground, and in 1973 a
group against the nuclear power plant (Kölz 1998: 76 –7). All of them did not manage to
collect the necessary number of signatures and rather had the intention to use the recall pro-
cedure as a tool to build up political pressure.
The most recent unsuccessful attempt in 1995 aimed to revoke both the legislature and
executive. The reason behind the attempt was an official report about the financial misman-
agement of cantonal authorities in relation to the cantonal bank which accumulated a loss
of more than CHFr. 400 million over several years. Most Swiss cantons have their own state-
owned public bank. Many of them still have a state guarantee which has a mainly positive
effect on their rating, allowing them to borrow money from the financial markets at a lower
interest rate. If cantonal banks make a loss or go bankrupt, the tax payer is responsible for
saving them. During the 1990s, several cantonal banks got into serious difficulty mainly due
to a lack of controls and risky speculations during an economic boom. As a consequence,
the Cantonal Bank of Solothurn had to be saved with tax payer’s money and was later on
privatised. However, the required number of signatures to trigger a recall could not be
reached. People did not see much sense in a recall vote because the new elections would
have taken place only a few months before regular elections were scheduled. Furthermore,
parliament decided to take disciplinary measures against the individuals involved in the
scandal (Kiefer 1996).
 THE HISTORY OF A DORMANT INSTITUTION 165

2.4. Canton Thurgau

Even though no recall has ever even been initiated since its introduction in 1869 in
Thurgau, the institution survived the total revision of the constitution in 1987. According to
the proceedings of the constitutional revision, recall should be kept because it symbolises
the fact that even the highest political bodies and institutions are subordinate to the will
of the people (Hangartner and Kley 2000: 634). To trigger a recall vote, 20,000 valid signatures
are required (2012: 12.5% of the electorate).
As a further peculiarity, the law on political rights dating from 10 January 1953, in para-
graphs 48 and 50, mentions the recall option for priests and teachers elected for life. With sig-
natures of one-fourth of the electoral body, they can be recalled at any point. Similar provisions
existed in the Canton of Ticino (Corti 1992: 19).

2.5. Canton Ticino

Recall has existed in Ticino since 1892 as a procedure allowing the recall of government
and was mainly introduced in order to prevent political turmoil which haunted the canton
since 1875 and culminated in the violent coup of 1890 (Corti [1992: 21]; Lepori [1988: 525]).
During the constitutional convention of 1892, there was also a debate regarding the introduc-
tion of a recall of parliament. This was, however, rejected since citizens already have the option
to call for a referendum in case they do not agree with legislation (Lepori 1988: 527). Since
1970, 15,000 signatures are required to trigger a recall vote (2013: 7% of the electorate). Sig-
natures must be collected within 60 days. A recall request is not allowed for one year after a
regular election and for one year before the next election. This restriction was introduced in
1954. Before this, the only restriction was that the recall was not allowed to take place in
the four months following an election.
Somewhat surprisingly for Switzerland, upon a parliamentary initiative in 2006 by the
Christian Democrat Alex Pedrazzini, recall was introduced in 2011 by a popular vote at the
local level.6 Earlier attempts in 1921 and 1994, during processes of a total revision of the can-
tonal constitution, failed. The main motivation for the introduction of recall at the local level
was to enable the unblocking of hopeless political situations. According to political commen-
tators (Jankovsky 2011), quarrels among communal executives in the Ticino seemed to be a
relatively frequent phenomenon. Signatures from 30% of all citizens collected within
60 days are required to hold the vote. The threshold for signature collection was set deliber-
ately high in order not to make it too easy to reach the required number in some of the numer-
ous small municipalities with low numbers of inhabitants. The recall vote then has to take place
within 60 days after publication of the signature collection result in the local gazette.
So far there have been three attempts to activate the mechanism at the cantonal level
(1945 by a leftist movement; 1991 by the right wing Lega dei Ticinesi; 2008 by the Swiss
Peoples Party) and one at the local level (2011 by the Green Party). However, they all failed
to collect the required number of signatures (Jankovsky [2011]; Kölz [1998: 78 – 9]).
The first attempt for a recall at the municipal level was initiated soon after its introduc-
tion into legislation in Bellinzona, Ticino’s capital and administrative centre. Three members of
the Green Party started to collect signatures (3074 required). They accused the government of
planning too big a football stadium, not being able to handle problems with the local police
and the unjustified dismissal of staff in the public administration. The initiators, in turn, were
accused of using the recall instrument to get more publicity for the upcoming cantonal
166 UWE SERDÜLT

election race (Jankowski 2011). However, the initiators stopped the signature collection
process because it did not advance as planned.

2.6. Canton Uri

In the case of the small mountain Canton Uri, recall was introduced in 1915 on the
occasion of a ‘Landsgemeinde’ (citizen assembly) at both the cantonal and municipal levels
because of a banking scandal (Kölz 1998: 79). Since 1979, a vote can be triggered by signatures
from 10% of the electorate. The cantonal constitution states that any state institution can be
recalled. In theory, the recall can therefore, as an exception to Swiss law, also target directly
elected individuals. These are namely: the two cantonal representatives in the second
chamber of the national parliament (Council of States, ‘Ständerat’), government as a whole,
the president of the government (‘Landamman’), the vice-president of the government (‘Land-
esstatthalter’), the highest cantonal court and parliament (Hangartner and Kley 2000: 636).
Before 1929, the recall vote would have been taken at a citizen’s assembly (‘Landsgemeinde’)
by a show of hands. Nowadays it requires 600 signatures to trigger a vote (2013: 2.3% of the
electorate). Whether the cantonal delegates of the Council of States can be recalled is doubtful
from a legal point of view.7 Furthermore, the recall of the highest cantonal court is most likely
incompatible with the European Charter of Human Rights since judicial independence could
be jeopardised. However, national parliament sanctioned this cantonal constitution without
realising the problem. In a concrete case, the Federal Court will probably have to declare it
as unconstitutional (Hangartner and Kley 2000: 636).

3. Aargau and the Storm of the Little Men 1862 (‘Mannli Sturm’)
The so-called storm of the Little Men (in Swiss German ‘Mannli Sturm’) is the name for a
protest movement against the full legal emancipation of Jews in Canton Aargau and was
organised by predominantly Catholic leaders with some support from Protestant circles. It
led to the first and until now only successful recall vote in Switzerland, on 27 July 1862. We
therefore present it here in a bit more detailed narrative of the events.
The agitator of the Catholic protests, the teacher, journalist and politician Johann
Nepomuk Schleuniger and his supporters opposed the Liberals who were the founding
fathers of modern Switzerland and the dominating political force at that time. What particularly
upset the Catholics was the closing down of monasteries in 1841, which almost led to a war
with Austria but then culminated in the short war between the conservative Catholic and Pro-
testant cantons in 1847 (‘Sonderbund War’). In Aargau, the Catholics as a political minority
opposed the emancipation of the Jews on the one hand but also stood up for democratic
reforms which they thought would work in their favour on the other. They thus demanded
the introduction of the mandatory referendum. Eventually, what they achieved in 1863 was
the introduction of the optional referendum (5000 signatures required) for laws, treaties and
government bonds with a value higher than CHFr. 1 million (Staehelin 2011: 269). They
had to wait until 1876 for the introduction of the mandatory referendum and further direct
democracy rights.
All cantonal constitutions in Switzerland had to be brought in line with the new federal
constitution of 1848, which granted equal rights to all (male) citizens. In the midst of this era of
nationwide democratic reform era during the second half of the nineteenth century, the par-
liament of Aargau was supposed to grant—among other reforms such as amendments to tax
 THE HISTORY OF A DORMANT INSTITUTION 167

and poverty laws—full citizens’ rights to Jews who lived mainly in two villages, Endingen and
Lengnau (Staehelin 2011: 268).8 These were the only two villages in Switzerland where in the
decades before 1798 Jews were allowed to settle. The two villages were located in the middle
of a predominantly Catholic district. In around 1860, Jews made up a little more than half of the
total population. Jews had their own corporation and school but faced severe economic and
day-to-day restrictions (e.g., a night curfew and requiring permission to get married).9 One has
to bear in mind that the conflict between Christians and Jews in those two villages was not
only of a religious or cultural nature but also economic. This was a poor, agricultural area,
and Christians were very keen to keep Jews away from natural resources such as the surround-
ing woods, as well as from financial support for the poor, which, in the federal order of the
Swiss state, was and still is a municipal matter (Mattioli 1998: 138).
Draft legislation in the cantonal parliament suggested not to fully integrate the Jewish
population into the municipality but to draw up a special commune for Jews, eventually
giving them their own land. When the cantonal government, as a consequence of these
plans and somewhat prematurely, sent in a surveyor in order to separate the Jewish from
the Christian land, rioting started. The Christian population was not willing to give away
land under any circumstances. The visit by the governmental surveyor led to threats and
turmoil that lasted for several weeks. Windows were smashed and Jewish homes in Endingen
were vandalised. The central authorities from the cantonal capital Aarau tried to calm the situ-
ation down by sending in extra police and threatened to send in the army. The local political
authorities rather conspired with the organisers of the riots (Mattioli 1998: 141). As a conse-
quence of the riots, the draft law was amended by a paragraph stating that the rights of
the Christian communes in Oberendingen and Lengnau ought not to be changed. In practice,
this first reading of the law in parliament made the emancipation of Jews void.
In the following months, the movement against the emancipation of the Jews spread
across the whole canton. Committees were formed and anti-Semitist rallies attended by hun-
dreds of people were held (Mattioli 1998: 147). The name for that movement, ‘Mannli’ (little
men, -li being the Swiss diminutive), was given to them by their opponents, the Liberals, in
order to belittle and ridicule them in public. However, later on they started to use—as a cam-
paign strategy—this very name themselves in order to demonstrate the arrogance of the men
in power. The second reading in parliament took place on 15 May 1862. The Liberals made it
clear that political and citizens’ rights cannot be a matter of religion and must be granted to
Jews as well. The result of the vote was a clear 113:2; however, an unusually high number of 50
parliamentarians abstained (Binnenkade 2009: 227). The law came into force on 1 July 1862.
As a reaction, the conservative opposition made use of the few direct democratic instru-
ments the 1852 Aargau constitution had to offer. Namely, the provision for recall (6000 signa-
tures required, see: Kölz 1998: 72]) and a somewhat complicated version of the optional
referendum to completely abrogate or partly change parliamentary acts (5000 signatures
required). A committee of conservative Catholics launched a campaign for both instruments,
the recall and the referendum, and managed to collect roughly 9000 signatures for each in a
record time of less than a month. For a time when civil society was not yet very well organised
and political parties were better described as political movements, this was a remarkable
achievement. Most signatures were collected in the poorer, rural, catholic municipalities
where resources were scarce and many had emigrated in order to try their luck overseas
(Mattioli 1998: 153).
The recall vote took place on 27 July 1862. The Aargau parliament was sacked by a clear
majority of 63% in favour. As a consequence, the government voluntarily stepped down. In the
168 UWE SERDÜLT

subsequent new elections on 12 August 1862, two-thirds of the seats were replaced. Several
prominent political figures were not re-elected (Staehelin 2011: 269); however; the Liberals
still had the political majority. The same happened with the election of the government.
The recall was thus a vote about a particular policy, in this case the emancipation of the Jews.
The actual referendum vote on the emancipation law took place on 11 and 12 November
1862. Turnout was very high at 83%. In none of the 11 districts and in only four of 230 munici-
palities did the emancipation law stand. A somewhat cumbersome twofold questioning estab-
lished large majorities, first, for changing the law in principle and, second, for rejecting it as a
whole (not only in part) (Staehelin 1978: 130). The clearly anti-Jewish voting results got noticed
far beyond cantonal borders and now stood in open conflict with the federal law (24 Septem-
ber 1856) declaring Jews to be Swiss citizens and asking cantons to bring their legislation in
line with this requirement.
The new government therefore had to propose legislation on this matter attempting to
respect both the superior federal law and the verdict of the ballot. The emancipation law was
cancelled, the two Jewish corporations reinstituted and as compensation for not receiving
their rights as municipal citizens, the Jewish population was given the freedom to settle any-
where in the canton and no longer had to ask for permission to get married (Mattioli 1998:
159). However, voting rights in cantonal and national matters were taken out of the new
law in parliament. Back to square one! Such a version was again clearly against federal legis-
lation. The Federal Council ordered Aargau to fully comply with the higher norms and to
grant cantonal and federal voting rights as well as other freedoms for Jewish citizens.
Except for local citizenship, the cantonal parliament finally gave in and changed the respective
law on 28 August 1863. It took yet another attempt—this time by the Federal Court—to settle
the issue because local citizenship rights were still not granted. The court decision upgraded
the two Jewish corporations to full municipalities. In the meantime, the totally revised Swiss
Constitution of 1874 came into force. Finally, the Jewish and the Christian corporations of End-
ingen and Lengnau were merged into one municipality with effect from 1 January 1879 (Mat-
tioli 1998: 161).

4. Conclusion
As is clear from the case descriptions above, the use of recall in Switzerland is sporadic at
best (see Table 1). Summarising the little use there has been, we can state the following: The
only successful recall case was in Aargau dating back to the nineteenth century. This very
canton later left out recall in its revised constitution of 1980 (likewise Lucerne and Basel Land-
schaft). In the cases of Bern and Schaffhausen, initiators managed to collect the necessary
number of signatures but then lost at the ballot. All the remaining cases are only attempts
which failed signature collection stage (Solothurn and Ticino). Although the institution formally
exists in Thurgau and Uri, there has not been one single attempt during the past 100-odd years.
The signature thresholds have been occasionally adapted alongside general revisions of
other direct democracy mechanisms such as referendums and initiatives in order to bring
them up to date with the growing size of the electorate. However, thresholds are—certainly
nowadays—rather low, with the exception of the municipal recall in Ticino. Rules regarding
the time frame for signature collection are diverse. Most cantons do not have a time limit
for signature collection; however, Solothurn and Ticino still have one. In general, the
demand for a recall does not need to be accompanied with any legal or political justification.
The long-term diachronic trend for this political institution in Switzerland is that it will either
 THE HISTORY OF A DORMANT INSTITUTION 169

TABLE 1
Overview of recall regulation and practice in Switzerland (1846–2013)

Canton Start End Signatures Electorate (%) Body Time Attempts Votes Recalls

AG 1852 1980 1852a: 6000 11 Parl – 1 1 1

1885a: 5000 8
1980: 5000 1.8
BE 1846 – 1846a: 8000 6 Parl 1m 1 1 0
1893a: 12,000 8 Gov –
1993: 30,000 4 –
BL 1863 1984 1863a: 1500 10 Parl – 0 – –
1984: 1500 1
LU 1875 2007 1875a: 5000 12 Parl – 0 – –
2007: 5000 2
SH 1876 – 1876a: 1000 10 Parl – 1 1 0
2013: 1000 2 Gov
SO 1869 – 1869a: 4000 19.5 Parl – 4 0 –
1977: 8000 6 Gov –
1986: 6000 4 6m
TG 1869 – 1869a: 5000 19 Parl – 0 – –
1953a: 20% 20 Gov 3m
1987: 20,000 16.6 3m
TI 1892 – 1892a: 11,000 50 Gov 60 d 3 0 –
1954a: 11,000 23
1970: 15,000 11.1
TIm 2011 – 2011: 30% 30 Gov 60 d 2 1 0
UR 1915 – 1929a: 150 2.0 Any – 0 – –
1955a: 300 2.6
1997: 600 2.4
URm 1915 – 1979: 10% 10 Any 0 – –
a
Only men had voting rights at that time.
Notes: AG, Aargau; BE, Bern; BL, Basel Landschaft; LU, Lucerne; SH, Schaffhausen; SO, Solothurn;
TG, Thurgau; TI, Ticino; UR, Uri.m ¼ municipal level.
Sources: Cantonal constitutions on www.verfassungen.de; size of the electorate from Office of
Statistics (census data 1870, 1900, 1950; for TI, see Corti 1992, FN 39) or for more recent years on
www.c2d.ch.

disappear or remain dormant. Only in Ticino, the canton with the most attempts at the canto-
nal level, where the political elite can be involved in particularly fierce political quarrels from
time to time, has the recall mechanism recently been extended to the local level. Ticino is
also the only canton with the restriction that recall can only be used in years two or three
of a legislative term.
Even though the use of recall in Switzerland is very scarce, this historical overview allows
us to identify at least three functions of recall which could be compared internationally and
most likely be amended by empirical patterns stemming from other cases:
(1) The recall vote can function as a catharsis in the case of scandals or obvious mismanage-
ment by political elites. In performing that function, recall may help us to channel and in
the end avoid acts of physical violence. In some cases it was also a tool that helped
channel the energy of individuals who were on a sort of ‘crusade’ (justified or not)
against political authorities.
(2) Not surprisingly, recall is also a tool used by organised political interests, especially by
political parties. Recall provides them with an additional option as they strive for
public attention and ultimately for the maximisation of their share of votes in an
170 UWE SERDÜLT

election. Smaller parties might use recall in the first instance to make themselves known,
bigger ones might see recall as an opportunity to call for an early election, especially if
they are almost equally strong as the biggest party. The closer the two or three leading
political forces are regarding vote shares the higher their propensity to opt for recall.
(3) Recall can also fulfil an unintended function; it can turn into a so-called second order recall.
In that format, the recall vote is actually targeted at a policy and not the political authority
per se. This would then lead us to suspect that recalls tend to become rather obsolete in
legislation providing an at least equally accessible set of direct democracy mechanisms
such as is the case for Switzerland. The more direct democracy options there are, the
less the political antagonising forces will resort to recall as a political weapon.

NOTES

1. The linguistic barrier is also responsible for a lack of information on the Polish (Piasecki 2011:
131) and German cases (Fuchs [2007]; Wollmann [2004: 155]) where the use of recall is also on
the rise.
2. There has been only one case at the national level so far: Elisabeth Kopp, the first women
elected into national government, had to step down in 1988 because of her husband’s
business activities.
3. The same indirect procedure existed for Canton Zurich in its 1869 Constitution. A successful
citizens’ initiative for a total revision of the constitution led to new elections (see Art. 65, Sec. 2)
and thus represented an indirect recall of parliament (Hangartner and Kley 2000: 640). In many
other cantons, the same approach would have led to the election of a constitutional assembly
(Kölz [1998: 68]; Tornic and Massüger [2013]). Also: Corti (1992: 19) for the Canton of Ticino.
4. Several other cantons discussed the introduction of recall but in the end did not incorporate it
into their constitutions: Vaud in 1845, Geneva in 1847 (Kölz 1998: 70 –72), then Vaud again for
its most recent 2003 Constitution.
5. However, the provision for recall was still listed in the draft version of 2004 (§33).
6. This change of the cantonal constitution triggered a mandatory constitutional referendum.
Recall as a new direct democracy mechanism at the local level was accepted on 7 March
2010 with 58.5% in favour (see: www.c2d.ch).
7. The option to recall Council of State members was available in Canton Vaud until 1931 and
Canton Neuchâtel until 1944 (Hangartner and Kley 2000: 637).
8. The bill was also a reaction to increasing diplomatic pressure and complaints from the USA,
France and The Netherlands (Mattioli 1998: 137).
9. Before the 1848 Constitution discrimination of Jews in Swiss cantons was the norm rather
than relating particularly to Aargau. Bern was the first to abrogate special laws for Jews in
1847 and Vaud has never even had any since becoming a proper canton in 1803 (Mattioli
1998: 135).

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ORCID
Uwe Serdült http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2383-3158

Uwe Serdült is vice-director of the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (www.c2d.ch). He
holds a doctoral degree in Political Science from the University of Zurich, worked as a
senior researcher and lecturer at the ETH Zurich, as well as the Universities of Zurich
and Geneva, respectively. Research stays lead him to Poland (PU Krakow), Japan
(Waseda and Ritsumeikan University) and the USA (University of Pittsburgh, PA). His
research interests include direct and electronic democracy. Last year, he published the
Swiss chapter on direct democracy in Matt Qvortrups edited book Referendums Around
the World. E-mail: uwe.serdult@zda.uzh.ch