SECOND DIVISION
firearm causing his instantaneous death.5
G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOEL
DOMINGO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is an Appeal1 under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
from the Decision2 dated May 31, 2012 of the Court of Appeals,
Ninth Division (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04278. The CA Decision
affirmed the Joint Judgment3 dated August 18, 2009 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 14, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 11741-14, 11742-14, 11743-14,4 which found accused-
appellant Joel Domingo (accused-appellant) guilty of two counts of
the crime of Murder and one count of Attempted Murder.
Facts
Three Informations were filed against accused-appellant and Roel
Domingo (Roel). In Criminal Case No. 11741-14, the Information
states:
That in the evening of February 26, 2005 at Brgy. Sta. Maria, in the
municipality of Piddig, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
1
feloniously shoot VIRGILIO DALERE with the use of an unlicensed
In Criminal Case No. 11742-14, the Information regarding the death
of Glenn Rodriguez6 states:
That in the evening of February 26, 2005 at Brgy. Sta. Maria, in the
municipality of Piddig, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot GLENN RODRIGUEZ with the use of an unlicensed
firearm causing his instantaneous death.7
In Criminal Case No. 11743-14, the Information, charging accused-
appellant and Roel with Attempted Murder of Roque Bareng
(Bareng), states:
That in the evening of February 26, 2005 at Brgy. #21, Sta. Maria, in
the municipality of Piddig, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot ROQUE BARENG with the use
of an unlicensed firearm but was not able to hit him, thereby
commencing by overt acts the commission of the crime of Murder
but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced it by reason of some causes other than the spontaneous
desistance of said accused.8
The CA summarized the subsequent proceedings as follows:
The three cases were originally raffled to Branch 15 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City. With the assistance of counsel, the
Accused Roel Domingo and Joel Domingo were arraigned before
Branch 15 and pleaded not guilty to each charge. ,
Subsequently, the accused through counsel filed a Motion praying
for the re-raffle of these cases to another branch since proceedings
had not gone beyond the pre-trial stage although they had been
detained for more than a year. The Motion was granted by Branch
15, and the cases were re-raffled to Branch 14 of the same Court.
Pre-trial conference ensued. There, it was agreed that the
prosecution would present its evidence in four settings of a joint
trial. The prosecution failed to present a single witness in each of
those four settings. Thus, the Court in an Order dated February
7,2007 dismissed the cases and directed the release of the two
accused.
On February 14, 2007, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that notices to the
prosecution witnesses had not been served because they constantly
transferred to other places due to persistent threats to their lives as
a result of these cases.
In an Order dated June 14, 2007, the Court granted the Motion for
Reconsideration, reasoning that "the State in the present cases was
deprived of its right to due process, for it was not given a fair
opportunity to present its witnesses. Accordingly, double jeopardy
2
cannot bar the reconsideration of the assailed Order, and due
process mandates that the prosecution be allowed to present its
witnesses."
Accused Joel Domingo was rearrested; his co-accused Roel Domingo
was not. Parenthetically, the cases against Roel Domingo were
dismissed in an Order dated April 28, 2009, after the defense
submitted a death certificate showing that he died on April 8, 2009
in Lopez, Quezon due to multiple hack wounds.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented its evidence. Its only witness
was private complainant Roque Bareng. It dispensed with the
presentation of Dr. Diophantes M. Acob who conducted the post-
mortem examination on Deceased Glenn Rodriguez and Virgilio
Dalere, upon the agreement of the parties during the pre-trial
conference that his reports thereon show the cause and the fact of
death of the two deceased.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The CA summarized the version of the prosecution as follows:
The prosecution sought to prove that three men armed with M-14
and M-16 rifles attacked and shot Roque Bareng, Virgilio Dalere,
Glenn Rodriguez and Edwin Andres at the Abadilla Farm in Brgy.
Sta[.] Maria, Piddig, Ilocos Norte, around 11:30 PM on February 26,
2005. Virgilio Dalere and Glenn Rodriguez died from gunshot
wounds. Roque Bareng, who managed to escape unharmed,
identified Joel Domingo as one of the assailants.
The prosecution's evidence showed that Roque Bareng was with
Edwin Andres, Glenn Rodriguez and Virgilio Dalere at the bunkhouse
of the Abadilla Farm at the time of the shooting incident. While
Roque Bareng and his companions were having coffee, three men
bearing M-14 and M-16 rifles appeared; one of them stayed outside
the kitchen door, while the other two entered. Roque Bareng was
on the southern edge of the kitchen, facing north; the armed men
came from the northern portion of the kitchen.
The assailant with the M-14 rifle asked, "Are you the tough guys
here?" The other one with the M-16 rifle ordered them not to
move. The assailant with the M-16 rifle pointed his firearm towards
Virgilio Dalere, and the one with the M-14 rifle pointed it towards
Glenn Rodriguez. Around two seconds after the gunmen entered,
each fired a single shot inside the kitchen.
Roque Bareng ran toward the fence. Upon reaching the fence, he
looked back and saw the assailant with the M-14 rifle pointing it at
him. He then crouched toward the irrigation and proceeded to the
house of Edwin Andres where he stayed for the night. He could no
longer recall how many gunshots were fired while he was running.
Roque Bareng testified that Edwin Andres ran ahead of him. He
further testified that Glenn Rodri[g]uez also ran away. He did not
notice Virgilio Dalere, but heard the latter moan, "Apo."
The following morning, Piddig policemen fetched him at the house
of Edwin Andres, and they proceeded to the Abadilla Farm. There,
they found the lifeless bodies of Glenn Rodriguez and Virgilio Dalere
outside the bunkhouse. He further testified that policemen found
one empty M-14 shell and one empty M-16 shell at the kitchen of
the bunkhouse.
3
After taking Roque Bareng to a hospital in Piddig for treatment of
the wounds he sustained during his flight from the bunkhouse, the
policemen brought him to the police station.
In an answer to the query of the policemen, Roque Bareng told
them that he could recognize the assailants. He also testified that
there was a fluorescent lamp just above the dining table during the
shooting, and the moon also illuminated the place.
Three (3) days later, Roque Bareng was brought to the Ilocos Norte
Police Provincial Office in Camp Juan, Laoag City, where he gave his
statement. On March 2, 2005, he was called back to Camp Juan. An
artist asked him to describe the assailants; out of that description,
the artist prepared cartographic sketches of two of the assailants.
He signed the cartographic sketches afterward.
The policemen continued interviewing Roque Bareng. They showed
him a logbook containing several photographs. He identified the
two assailants from the photographs in the logbook.
Several days later, Roque Bareng was again invited to the Piddig
police station. During his stay, he saw two persons being
interviewed. He recognized them to be the assailants with the M-14
and M-16 rifles.
During the trial, he identified herein accused Joel Domingo as the
gunman with an M-14 rifle.10
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's evidence is summarized
as follows:
The defense sought to prove that Accused Joel Domingo was
attending a social dance in Brgy. Dupitac, Piddig, Ilocos Norte when
the victims were shot at Brgy. Sta[.] Maria of that town. It also
sought to establish that the descriptions given by Roque Bareng to
the policemen and the cartographic sketches differed from the
actual appearance of the Accused Joel Domingo.
It presented Edwin Andres, Pastor Virgilio Notarte, Noel Esteban,
Norman Pablo and the Accused Joel Domingo as witnesses.
Edwin Andres testified that the shooting incident transpired while
he was having coffee with Roque Bareng, Virgilio Dalere and Glenn
Rodriguez at the bunkhouse of the Abadilla Farm in Sta. Maria,
Piddig, Ilocos Norte on February 26, 2005. Somebody arrived from
the western portion of the bunkhouse. He then heard a voice that
he did not recognize; the voice was followed by a gunshot. He
immediately ran toward the gate and took a circuitous route to his
house. Edwin Andres claimed that he was not able to see the
assailants. He could not tell how many he saw as he did not see
them.
Upon reaching his house, Edwin Andres found Roque Bareng
already there. When he asked Roque Bareng about the incident, the
latter replied that he saw the assailants and that they were "small
thin persons wearing hats". He could no longer recall how many
assailants were seen by Roque Bareng.
The following day, he and Roque Bareng went back to the
bunkhouse. They found the dead bodies of Glenn Rodri[g]uez and
Virgilio Dalere outside the building. They reported the matter to the
4
chief tanod, who in turn informed Pastor Virgilio Notarte, a
kagawad, who then called the police.
The policemen recovered the bodies and questioned Roque Bareng
and him. He told them that he did not see anything. He heard
Roque Bareng describe the assailants to the police as "small thin
persons wearing hat with a brim."
Pastor Virgilio Notarte testified that he was a barangay kagawad of
Brgy. Sta. Maria, Piddig, Ilocos Norte at the time of the x x x
shooting incident. After the chief tanod had informed him of the
matter, he reported it to the police. He accompanied the policemen
when they inspected the Abadilla Farm.
Nobody was at the Abadilla Farm when they arrived. On their way
to the barracks located on an elevated part at the center of the
farm, they passed by the body of Virgilio Dalere lying face down.
When they moved further west, they also found the body of Glenn
Rodriguez.
Pastor Notarte picked up around six empty M-14 shells east of, the
dirty kitchen and one empty M-16 shell north of that kitchen.
He heard Roque Bareng telling the policemen that he and his
companions had come from a drinking spree when he heard a dog
barking and saw two men at the dirty kitchen of the barracks. He
further heard Roque Bareng describe the assailants as "tall, thin,
wearing a hat with a brim and the other man was short and stout."
For his part, Accused Joel Domingo invoked the defense of denial
and alibi. He claimed he was at Brgy. Dupitac in Piddig, Ilocos Norte
attending a social dance between 10:00 PM of that date until 2:00
AM the next day. Fie, together with Norman Pablo and Rexon
Domingo walked from his residence at Brgy. Estancia to Brgy.
Dupitac that night.
He testified that Brgy[.] Dupitac was less than ten (10) kilometers
away from Brgy. Sta. Maria where the shooting incident happened.
Fie did not know how long it would take to travel from Brgy. Dupitac
to Brgy. Sta. Maria by foot, as he had never done it. However, he
said that if one would travel from Brgy. Dupitac to Brgy. Sta. Maria
on a motorcycle, it would take more than an hour because the route
passed through mountains.
He also averred that Brgy. Estancia, where he resided, was around
ten (10) kilometers away from Brgy. Sta. Maria where the victims
were shot. The travel time between the two barangays was more
than one hour.
He stressed that he never had any grudge or misunderstanding with
the deceased Glenn Rodriguez or Virgilio Dalere. He also opined that
the police pinned him as an author of the crime to enable them to
say that they had solved the case; he added that he was facing
other charges at that time. He learned about the incident only when
the policemen came to arrest him.
The alibi of the accused was corroborated by Norman Pablo. He1
did not take the witness stand, but the parties stipulated that if he
would testify, Norman Pablo would say that he was with the
accused from 6:00 PM of February 26, 2005 until 4:00 AM the
5
following day, that within that time frame they went from Brgy.
Estancia to Brgy. Dupitac to attend a social dance, and that the
travel time between Brgy. Dupitac and Brgy. Sta. Maria was more
than one hour on foot or by motorcycle.
Brgy. Chairman Noel Esteban of Dupitac testified that the social
dance in his barangay started around 9:00 PM on February 26, 2005
and lasted until 2:15 AM the following day. In his sworn statement
adopted as his direct testimony, the witness claimed that he saw
the Accused Joel Domingo with two (2) companions from Brgy.
Estancia. They did not dance; they merely drank with some other
persons. The witness also averred that the Abadilla Farm where the
shooting took place was around ten (10) kilometers away from Brgy.
Dupitac, and the travel time between the two, on foot or by
motorcycle, was more than an hour. He further testified that
between 9:30 PM and 2:15 AM that night, he saw the Accused Joel
Domingo several times.11
In its Joint Judgment,12 the RTC convicted accused-appellant, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 11741-14, accused Joel Domingo is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Fie is ordered to
pay the heirs of deceased Virgilio Dalere P75,000.00 as indemnity
for his death, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(b) In Crim. Case No. 11742-14, accused Joel Domingo is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to
ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Virgilio Dalere
pay the heirs of deceased Glenn Rodriguez P75,000.00 as indemnity
P75,000.00 as indemnity for his death, P50,000.00 as moral
for his death, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P30,000.00
temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
as exemplary damages.

(c) In Crim. Case No. 11743-14, accused Joel Domingo is found

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ATTEMPTED MURDER and is
(b) In Crim. Case No. 11742-14, accused Joel Domingo is found
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three years
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and is sentenced
of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is
of prision mayor as maximum. He is ordered to pay Roque Bareng
ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Glenn Rodriguez
P20,000.00 as indemnity and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
P75,000.00 as indemnity for his death, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P30,000.00
In the three cases, accused Joel Domingo is further ordered to pay
as exemplary damages.
interest on the said amounts at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum, from the finality of this Joint Judgment until full payment of
the obligation.
(c) In Crim. Case No. 11743-14, accused Joel Domingo is found
SO ORDERED.13 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ATTEMPTED MURDER and
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three
On appeal with the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC Joint Judgment with (3) years ofprision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years
modifications, as follows: and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. He is ordered to
pay Roque Bareng P20,000.00 as indemnity and P30,000.00 as
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Judgment dated
exemplary damages.
August 18, 2009 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 14, in Criminal Cases No[s]. 11741-14, 11742-14 and 11743-
14 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that:
SO ORDERED.14

(a) In Crim. Case No. 11741-14, accused Joel Domingo is found Accused-appellant notified the CA of his intention to appeal with
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and is sentenced the Court.15 Hence, this Appeal.

6
Issues
The issues that accused-appellant raised are as follows:
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT SET
ASIDE THE DISMISSAL OF THE PRESENT CASES TRANSGRESSING THE
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN RULING THAT
THE SOLE TESTIMONY OF ROQUE BARENG IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE
THE GUILT OF APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
CONSEQUENTLY, DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE
WITNESSES16
The Court's Ruling
By this Decision, the Court acquits accused-appellant principally on
the ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial, and
with the consequent dismissal17 by the RTC of the criminal cases,
the reconsideration18 of the RTC's Order dated February 7, 2007
(February Order) placed accused-appellant in double jeopardy. To
be sure, even if accused-appellant were not placed in double
jeopardy, the prosecution witness's testimony is weak and
unconvincing, while accused-appellant's alibi was satisfactorily
proven.
Right to a speedy trial
To determine whether accused-appellant's right to speedy trial was
7
violated, "four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b)
the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right;
and (d) prejudice to the defendant."19 These factors were laid down
in the US Supreme Court case of Barker v. Wingo,20 (Barker) where
Barker's prosecution was delayed for four years due to the State's
inability to prosecute one of Barker's co-accused who they intended
to tum into a state witness. The US Supreme Court ruled that
although there was a delay, Barker was not seriously prejudiced
because he was only in jail for 10 months as he was granted bail,
and that Barker himself did not want a speedy trial. In arriving at
this conclusion, the US Supreme Court laid down the four factors
above, and implored courts to apply the balancing test on an ad
hoc basis, thus:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some
of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a
particular defendant, has been deprived of his right. Though some
might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors:
Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion
of his right, and prej udice to the defendant.21
Length of and reason for delay
In Barker, the US Supreme Court observed that: "The length of the
delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some
delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless,
because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of
delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent
upon the peculiar circumstances of the case."22

23
The Court has also ruled in People v. Tampal that "[i]n determining
the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. What offends the right of the
accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which
prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time."24
Here, accused-appellant was arrested on March 3, 2005.25 When
there was a delay in the setting of the pre-trial conference, it was
accused-appellant himself who moved for the re-raffle of the cases
on August 10, 2006 because the judge of RTC Branch 15 of Laoag
City was assigned to three trial courts in different locations.26 The
judge granted this motion27 and the case was raffled to RTC Branch
14 of Laoag City.
The pre-trial conference was conducted on December 12, 2006. In
the Pre-Trial Order,28 the prosecution was given four settings to
present its evidence: January 17, 2007 at 2:00 P.M., January 26,
2007 at 9:00 A.M., January 31, 2007 at 9:00 A.M., and February 7,
2007 at 9:00 A.M.29
The prosecution, however, failed to present any evidence on the
foregoing settings. Thus, in the February Order, the RTC dismissed
the criminal cases upon motion of accused-appellant's counsel for
the prosecution's failure to present evidence on the four settings.
The February Order states:
Pre-trial conference ensued before this Branch. During that
conference, the parties agreed that the prosecution will present its
8
four witnesses in the following four settings: January 17, 2007;
January 26, 2007; January 31, 2007; and February 7, 2007.
On January 17, 2007, the prosecution witnesses failed to appear
without any justification. The public prosecutor also manifested that
the witnesses had not been responding to his communications to
them. Thus, in an Order issued that day, the Court, noting the
failure of the prosecution to present evidence, scheduled the cases
for hearing again on January 26, 2007, as previously scheduled. It
also sent a copy of the said Order to the Ilocos Norte Police
Provincial Office, which initiated the filing of the present cases. On
January 26, 2007 and again on January 31, 2007, the prosecution
witnesses still failed to appear without any justification. In an Order
dated January 31, 2007, the Court warned the prosecution that its
failure to present evidence at the hearing on February 7, 2007 shall
warrant the dismissal of these cases. A copy of the said Order was
also served on the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office. In today's
hearing, the prosecution witnesses again failed to appear without
any justification.
Consistent therefore with the warning in the January 31, 2007
Order, the Court hereby GRANTS the prayer of the defense counsel
for the DISMISSAL of these three cases for failure of the prosecution
to present even a single shred of evidence in the four settings
agreed upon during the pre-trial conference. Unless there is some
other lawful cause for their continued detention, the accused Roel
Domingo and Joel Domingo are ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED
from the custody of peace officers.
Let a copy of this Order be served on the Ilocos Norte Police
Provincial Office.
SO ORDERED.30
In the public prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration31 of the
February Order, the prosecution admitted that it failed to present
any evidence on the four settings and that no private complainant
or witness appeared before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
prior and during the hearings of these cases.32 The public prosecutor
argued, however, that the failure to present any evidence on the
four settings was because the private complainants left their places
of residence because of persistent threats to their lives, thus they
failed to receive the subpoenas sent to them:
A few days however, after the issuance of the Order, the private
complainants namely, JOSIE DALERE and ROQUE BARENG appeared
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor manifesting their
surprise of what they were informed that the accused were roaming
freely in their locality and after further verification they learned that
the cases filed against the accused were already DISMISSED.
That the said private complainants allege that indeed they have left
their former residences after the incident because of the persistent
threats on their lives owing to their personal knowledge about the
incident.
That because of the said threats, they continuously changed their
respective residences and kept their whereabouts unknown.
That as a consequence thereof they never personally received the
subpoenas sent to them or any information relative to the
9
development of these cases.
In view thereof the prosecution is constrained to ask the Honorable
Court for the reconsideration of its Order dated February 7, 2007 in
order that substantive justice may be served thereby, considering
that two lives were lost in the said incident.33
The private prosecutor also argued that "[a] perusal of the reasons
posited by private complainants of their failure to appear on the
scheduled hearings will therefore show that the same were not
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive as in fact they were justified
because of the persistent and imminent dangers o[n] their lives.
That parenthetically, the said private complainants are very able,
willing and interested in testifying before this Honorable Court and
pursue their case until the termination of the proceedings and
undertake to [be] present whenever called upon by the Honorable
Court."34
In an Order35 dated June 14, 2007 (June Order), the RTC granted the
prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC ruled that the
witnesses did not receive any of the notices from it regarding the
hearings, except for Josie Dalere (Dalere) and only for the February
Order that dismissed the cases.36
However, a thorough review of the records shows that the
prosecution unreasonably requested for the postponement of all
hearing dates given to it, and to which it had previously agreed
during the pre-trial conference. The June Order's blanket statement
that the witnesses did not receive any of the notices except for
Dalere and only as to the February Order is belied by the records.

During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution was already aware
that it had four settings to present its intended witnesses: January
17,2007, January 26, 2007, January 31, 2007, and February 7,
2007.37 Its intended witnesses were Bareng, Raymundo Tomas
(Tomas), Dalere, and one of the responding officers.38 Only Dalere
was sent a copy of the Pre-Trial Order but this was returned
unserved with a notation "moved."39
During the January 17, 2007 hearing, the public prosecutor moved
for continuance as all his intended witnesses were unavailable.
Despite the accused-appellant's opposition, the RTC granted
this.40 The RTC, however, emphasized that the prosecution had only
three more settings to present its evidence.41A review of the
records reveal that the copy of the January 17, 2007 Order was
received by the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office (Provincial
Police) on January 18, 2007 and by Tomas on January 23,
2007.42 On the other hand, the copies of the Order addressed to
Bareng and Dalere were returned unserved with a notation
"unknown" for Bareng and "moved" for Dalere.43
At the January 26, 2007 hearing, the public prosecutor manifested
that he had no available witness because the witnesses were not
responding to his notices.44 The RTC stressed that the prosecution
had only two more settings within which to present its
witnesses.45 Subpoenas were also issued to the prosecution
witnesses and a copy of the Order dated January 26, 2007 was sent
to the Provincial Police which had initiated the filing of the charges
against the accused.
10
The Provincial Police received its copy of the January 26, 2007
Order on the same day through a certain PO1 Quiao.46Tomas
received a copy of the Order and Subpoena on January 30,
2007,47 while the copies sent to Bareng and Dalere were returned
unserved with a notation "unknown."48
The public prosecutor again manifested that he had no witness
during the January 31, 2007 hearing. The RTC again reminded the
prosecution that its failure to present evidence on the next hearing
on February 7, 2007 would warrant the dismissal of the cases. Once
more, subpoenas were sent to the prosecution witnesses and the
Provincial Police was sent a copy of the January 31, 2007 Order.49
The Provincial Police received a copy of the January 31, 2007 Order
on January 31, 2007 through a certain PO2 Marlon D.
Manuel.50The subpoena and Order were received by Tomas on
February 7, 2007 and on behalf of Dalere on February 26,
2007.51 The copy sent to Bareng was returned unserved with a
notation "unknown."52
As discussed above, during the February 7, 2007 hearing, the
prosecution still failed to present evidence, prompting the RTC,
upon motion of accused-appellant, to dismiss the criminal cases and
to direct the release of accused-appellant from detention.53 Tomas
received a copy of the February Order on February 13, 2007. Copies
sent to Dalere and Bareng were returned unserved with a notation
"moved" for Dalere's copy54 and an illegible notation for Bareng's
copy.55
From the foregoing, the State's motion for postponement despite
notice to two of its witnesses is an unreasonable delay of the
prosecution of the case. It was wrong for the RTC to claim that the
witnesses failed to receive the notices and subpoenas. The
Provincial Police and Tomas received notices of hearings in the
cases. From this alone, the State cannot claim that it was deprived
of a fair opportunity to present its evidence when the RTC dismissed
the cases in the February Order.
The prosecution's failure to present a single piece of evidence in all
the four settings given to it was an unreasonable prolongation of
the length of the trial. Further, the reasons the prosecution offered
for the failure to present its witnesses are not even supported by
any evidence other than the mere say-so of the public prosecutor.
The witnesses did not even present any affidavit or any proof of the
threats to their lives which prompted them to change their places of
residence.
As stated above, prior to this, the cases were pending with RTC
Branch 15 for more than a year and no pre-trial conference was
being conducted, thus impelling accused-appellant, who was
incarcerated, to himself file a motion for the cases to be re-raffled.
The unreasonable delay of the prosecution needlessly prolonged
the incarceration of accused-appellant.
It is incumbent upon the State and the private complainants, where
applicable, to exert reasonable efforts to prosecute the case,
especially in cases where the accused is incarcerated. The Court
understands that, there are instances of delay in the ordinary
course of the trial, but the delay here shows that the prosecution
and the private complainants failed to exert the reasonable efforts
11
to even present any evidence. The reason for their failure is likewise
unsubstantiated. If, after the February Order, the private
complainants were able to talk to the public prosecutor, they could
have easily talked to him any time after the pre-trial and before the
February Order.
Assertion of right to speedy trial
In Barker, the US Supreme Court further explained the nature of the
accused's right to assert his right to speedy trial as closely related to
the other factors; and the more serious the deprivation, the more
likely the accused will complain, thus:
We have already discussed the third factor, the defendant's
responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a defendant
asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have
mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length
of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most
particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily
identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation,
the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant's
assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being
deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right
will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a
speedy trial.56
Here, on February 7, 2007, when the prosecution failed to present
any evidence during the four trial dates given to it, accused-
appellant moved for the dismissal of the cases, which was granted
by the RTC. Accused1 appellant also raised this as an issue on
appeal with the CA. In fact, as early as August 2006, accused-
appellant had already raised his right to a speedy trial when he
moved for the cases to be re-raffled because of the delay in the
conduct of the pre-trial conference.
Given the foregoing, the Court is of the considered belief that
accused- appellant had indeed asserted his right to a speedy trial.
Prejudice to accused-appellant
Prejudice to the accused is determined through its effect on three
interests of the accused that the right to a speedy trial is designed
to protect, which are: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;
and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired."57
Accused-appellant was arrested on March 3, 2005.58 Thus, at the
time of the first setting for the prosecution's presentation of
evidence, he had already been incarcerated for almost two years. As
earlier stated, accused-appellant had in fact moved for the re-raffle
of the case on August 10, 2006 because of the delay in the setting of
the pre-trial conference59 which was finally granted by the judge.60
Accused-appellant was therefore prejudiced when the prosecution
failed to present its evidence during all the settings that were given
to it. Every day spent in jail is oppressive, more so when the
reason for the prolongation of incarceration is the prosecution's
unreasonable motions for postponement.
Weighed against the prejudice to the accused is the right of the
12
State to be given a fair opportunity to present its evidence or to
prosecute the case. Otherwise stated, the prejudice to the accused
arising from incarceration or anxiety from criminal prosecution
should be weighed against the due process right of the State —
which is its right to prosecute the case and prove the criminal
liability of the accused for the crime charged.61 For the State to
sustain its right to prosecute despite the existence of a delay, the
following must be present: "(a) that the accused suffered no serious
prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and
inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice."62
Effectively, and as the Court ruled in Dimatulac v. Villon,63 the Court
must balance the interest of society and the State with that of the
accused, for justice to prevail, thus:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not
to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and,
the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial
of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice,
for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also
mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to
both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party,
on the other.64
This right of the State for fair opportunity to present its evidence is,
in fact, what led the RTC to reconsider its February Order. The RTC
ruled that although the prosecution was given an opportunity to
present evidence, it was denied a fair opportunity to do so given the
failure to serve notices to the witnesses because they had changed
addresses.65 For the RTC, the lack of effective notice to the
witnesses made the opportunity given to the prosecution to present
the witnesses more illusory than real.66
The CA agreed with the RTC and ruled that double jeopardy did not
attach because "the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case prior to the order of dismissal. The trial
court did not commit a serious error when it ordered the re-arrest
of the accused-appellant and proceeded with trial."67
The RTC held that since the State was deprived of its right to due
process, double jeopardy cannot bar the reconsideration of the
February Order68 and that "due process mandates that the
prosecution be allowed to present its witnesses."69 In support of its
conclusions, the RTC cited Portugal v. Reantaso,70People v.
Pablo,71Merciales v. Court of Appeals,72Valencia v.
Sandiganbayan,73People v. Castañeda, Jr.,74 and People v. Leviste.75
The cases cited by the RTC are inapplicable. The ratio of these cases
is that for there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion in a trial
court's dismissal of a criminal case, there should be a finding that
the State was denied a fair opportunity to present its evidence. But
in this case before the Court, the State was given a fair opportunity
to present its evidence.
The RTC's dismissal of the cases in its February Order was justified.
Again, the public prosecutor had at least a month from the date of
the pre-trial to the date of the initial presentation of evidence to
contact and prepare any of his witnesses. Further, the prosecution
witnesses knew of at least three of the hearing dates as they
13
received copies of the notices and subpoenas. The Provincial Police
were likewise notified of the proceedings. The excuse of the
witnesses about the fear for their lives is also unsubstantiated and it
was incumbent upon them to inform the RTC and the public
prosecutor of their new addresses. In fact, after the dismissal of the
cases, they went to the public prosecutor voluntarily. They could
have done so anytime from the pre-trial until the last day given to
the prosecution to present evidence. All this time, accused-
appellant was incarcerated and deprived of his freedom.
The RTC had also repeatedly reminded the prosecution that it
should present its evidence on the dates it was given and to which it
had agreed during pre-trial. The RTC aided the prosecution by
issuing subpoenas to the witnesses, which some of them received.
Again, the Provincial Police was even notified. The totality of the
foregoing circumstances show that the State was given more than a
fair opportunity to present its case.
In instances where the State has been given every opportunity to
present its evidence, yet it failed to do so, it cannot claim to have
been deprived of a fair opportunity to present its evidence. Such
failure and the resulting dismissal of the case is deemed an
acquittal of the accused even if it is the accused who moved for
the dismissal of the case. This is the Court's ruling in a series of
cases outlined in Salcedo v. Mendoza,76 (Salcedo) where the Court
held as follows:
In the present case, the respondent Judge dismissed the criminal
case, upon the motion of the petitioner invoking his constitutional
right to speedy trial because the prosecution failed to appear on the
day of the trial on March 28, 1978 after it had previously been
postponed twice, the first on January 25, 1978 and the second on
February 22, 1978.
The effect of such dismissal is at once clear. Following the
established jurisprudence, a dismissal predicated on the right of
the accused to speedy trial upon his own motion or express
consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar another
prosecution of the accused for the same offense. This is an
exception to the rule that a dismissal, upon the motion or with the
express consent of the accused, will not be a bar to the subsequent
prosecution of the accused for the same offense as provided for in
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The moment the dismissal
of a criminal case is predicated on the right of the accused to
speedy trial, even if it is upon his own motion or express consent,
such dismissal is equivalent to acquittal. And any attempt to
prosecute the accused for the same offense will violate the
constitutional prohibition that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" (New Constitution,
Article IV, Sec. 22).77 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterates and applies Salcedo. The dismissal of the cases
in the February Order, predicated on the violation of the right of
accused-appellant to a speedy trial, amounted to an acquittal which
bars another prosecution of accused-appellant for the same
offense. Thus, when the RTC reconsidered its February Order in its
June Order, the RTC placed accused-appellant twice in jeopardy for
the same offense and acted with grave abuse of discretion.
To the mind of the Court, an accused cannot be made to needlessly
14
and baselessly suffer incarceration or any anxiety arising from
criminal prosecution, no matter the duration. Any day in jail or in
fear of criminal prosecution has a grave impact on the accused.
When the prosecution is needlessly and baselessly prolonged,
causing him prejudice, the Court is constrained, as in this case, to
arrive at a finding that accused-appellant's right to a speedy trial
was violated.
Guilt of accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
In view of the foregoing, the resolution of the issue of whether the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt becomes unnecessary. Nonetheless, a
review of the evidence shows that the prosecution failed to prove
the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court has held that "[s]elf-contradictions and inconsistencies on
a very material and substantial matter seriously erodes the
credibility of a witness."78 As the Court further held in People v.
Amon79:
For evidence to be believed "must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself — such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. There is no test of the truth of
human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance."80
Here, the testimony of Bareng, the prosecution's only witness, is
inconsistent in material points making it weak and incredible.
 pointed his gun towards Glen Rodriguez, sir.
Bareng testified in open court on December 11, 2007 that the two
assailants pointed their guns towards the two other victims, Virgilio
Dalere and Glenn Rodriguez, thus:
Q Can [y]ou recall Mr. Witness how many gun shots did they fire
at you?
Q When you said they fired their gun towards you did you actually
see where the gun was pointed?

A When they were inside there were 2 gun shots, sir.

Atty. Obra:
Q What do you mean by that, Mr. Witness, can you explain to this
Court?
Misleading, Your Honor.

A The person bearing M14 rifle fired his gun first then followed by
Court: the person bearing M16 rifle, sir.

Overruled. Court:

A Yes, sir. Q How many gun shots were fired inside the house?

Q Where? A Just 2, sir.

A The person bearing M16 Dalere while the person bearing M14 Q [W]hat is meant by that?

15
A One ammo was fired by the person bearing M16 rifle and one
was fired by the person bearing M14 rifle, sir.
Q Single shot, Mr. Witness?
A I crouched, sir.81
But during cross-examination, he changed his tune and testified that
immediately after the utterance of the two assailants, the assailant
holding the M-14 rifle immediately shot at him, thus:

Atty. Obra:
A Yes, sir. Single shot.

Q Will you tell this Court from the time the assailants bearing M14
Fiscal Calupig: and Ml6 rifle entered the kitchen and began shooting at you?

Q After the 2 gun shots, what happened next? A About seconds, sir.

A I heard Virgilio Dalere moaned Apo, sir. Q You mean one second?

Q Then what did you do next after hearing Virgilio Dalere moaned A About 2 seconds, sir.
Apo?

Q Of course the person holding the M14 rifle immediately shot at

A I ran going down towards the fence, sir. you?

Q What did you do? A Yes, sir after the utterance.

16

Q So you immediately jumped falling down backwards?
A Yes, sir.82
In fact, his statement during his cross-examination is the same as his
statements in his affidavit that he executed before the investigating
police officers on March 2, 2005.83 He stated in his affidavit that the
assailant with the M-14 rifle shot at him, and in fact he was shot at
three times — once after the utterance of the two assailants and
twice while he was trying to escape:
05. Q. And when these three men entered as you said, what did
they do if there was any?
A. There was sir, the one bearing M-14 armalite rifle uttered
the following "Nobody moves" and the one bearing M-14
rifle told us the following "Are you the tough guys" while
their guns were pointed towards us. The third man was
standing in front of the kitchen door.
06. Q. After that, what happened next if there is any?
A. After said utterance, they immediately fired upon the
four of us reason for which Glen Rodriguez and Virgilio
17
Dalere died, sir.
07. Q. You said that they fired at you, what if any did you do?
A. I jumped from my sit (sic) and fell on my back. I rolled
down the hill and crouched, after which, I ran away when
I notice (sic) their attention was no longer focused on
me. But when I looked up I saw the person holding an
M14 rifle pointed his gun and again fired at me so I
immediately went down with my belly on the ground
and rolled down towards the irrigation and upon
reaching the same I was again fired upon
once.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This version that he was shot at twice while he was trying to escape
is totally absent when he testified in open court. He just testified
that when he tried to escape, the assailant with the M-14 rifle
aimed at him twice yet did not shoot him, thus:
Q Mr. Witness, when you were already there, what happened
when you went to the fence north of the bunkhouse?
A When I was here on the fence I looked back and again I saw. the
person bearing M14 rifle, sir.
 describe the assailants, Bareng merely stated that they were
Q What happened next Mr. Witness?
wearing brim buri hats.86 In his affidavit dated March 2, 2005, he,
however, provided a more detailed description of both assailants as
follows:
A He again pointed his gun towards me reason for which I tried to
go out from the fence, sir.
13. Q. What are the descriptions that would make you recognize
your assailants?

Q After you were able to go out from the fence, where did you
proceed?
A The men (sic) bearing M14 rifle has a long big nose and
has a mannerism of moving his head sideways. His eyes
are big and sharp. He has a big body built and tall, while
A I crouched going down, sir.
the man bearing M16 rifle has a round face and he is a
look alike of the man holding M14 rifle, tall and big in
body built, sir.87
Q Going down to where?

Edwin Andres (Andres), one of the defense witnesses and who was
also present during the attack by the assailants, however, testified
A To the irrigation, sir.
that immediately after the incident and while Bareng was in
Andres's house, Bareng told Andres that all he saw were small thin
persons wearing hats and that he could not recognize the assailants,
Q After reaching the irrigation, what happened next?
thus:

Q Now, Mr. witness after you run (sic) from the bunkhouse
A I then again looked back and I saw them pointing their gun
towards the gate, what happen (sic) next?
towards me, sir. So I crossed the irrigation.85

Bareng's identification of accused-appellant is also questionable

A I ran towards our house, sir.
given his inconsistent statements and when weighed against the
testimony of the defense witnesses. In open court, when asked to

18
 Atty. Obra
Q After you ran to your house, what happened next?

May I withdraw my question, your Honor.

A When I reached our house Roque Bareng was already there, sir.

Q What did Roque Bareng or who did Roque Bareng see?

Q When you saw Roque Bareng at your house, what did you do?

A Small thin persons and wearing hats, sir.

A I asked him what was it.

Q And who were these small persons whom Roque Bareng saw?
Q And what was the reply of Roque Bareng?

A He could not recognized (sic) them, sir he said they are small
A I asked him if he saw and he said yes. persons.88

Pastor Virgilio Notarte also testified that Bareng described the two
Q When Roque Bareng answered you in affirmative that he saw assailants as tall and thin and short and stout the day after the
the assailant, what did you do? incident when asked by the police officers when they visited the
crime scene, thus:

Court Q And when the certain Roque arrived at the Abadilla farm, what
happened next?

There was no mention of what Roque Bareng saw?

A When Roque arrived at the Abadilla farm he was met by PO3

19
 Pascual and asked him what happened, Roque told them that
they just came from a drinking spree and when they went back
to the barracks he heard a dog barking and saw two (2) men at
the dirty kitchen of the barracks, sir.
Q After that certain Roque told to PO3 Pascual that they went to
have a drink and when they went back at the farm they saw two
(2) men at the dirty kitchen, what happened next?
A Roque described the appearance of the two (2) men whom he
saw at the dirty kitchen, one of them was tall, thin wearing hat
with a brim and the other man was short and stout, sir.89
Against the inconsistent statements of the lone eyewitness,;
accused-appellant's evidence establishing his alibi gains significance
and is, indeed, more credible. Accused-appellant testified that he
was in the barangay hall of Brgy. Dupitac, Piddig, Ilocos Norte from
10:00 P.M. of February 26, 2005 until 2:00 A.M. of the following day
and that the crimes were committed in Brgy. Sta. Maria, Piddig,
Ilocos Norte.90 He also testified that it would take an hour to travel
from Brgy. Dupitac to Brgy. Sta. Maria using a motorcycle.91 He
testified as follows:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you were at the
barangay hall of Brgy. Dupitac, Piddig, Ilocos Norte from 10:00
P.M. of February 26, 2005 until 2:00 of the following day and
you also mentioned that the crimes were committed in Sta.
20
Maria, Piddig, Ilocos Norte, kindly tell us the distance between
Brgy. Dupitac to Brgy. Sta. Maria?
A Less than ten (10) kilometers, sir.
Q And if you travel from Brgy. Dupitac to Sta. Maria by foot, how
long will it take you?
A I don't know I haven't yet experience (sic) walking going to Btgy.
Dupitac from St[a]. Maria, sir.
Q How about if you ride on a motorcycle, how long it will take you
to travel from Brgy. Dupitac to St[a]. Maria?
A It takes you more than one (1) hour because you pass through
mountains and you also have to pass around, sir.92
The fact that accused-appellant was in another barangay attending
social dance from around 9:00 P.M. of February 26, 2005 until the
early morning of the next day was corroborated by the testimony of
Norman Pablo,93 who was with accused-appellant in attending the
social dance.94
That is not all. The defense also presented the testimony of Noel
Esteban, the barangay chairman of Brgy. Sta. Maria, who also
testified that he saw accused-appellant in the social dance many
times between 9:30 P.M. to 2:15 A.M., thus:
Q Between 9:30 to 2:15 in the morning, how many times did you
see Joel Domingo?
A I have seen them many times because I could directly [see] the
place where they were seated in the camarin, your Honor[.]95
The foregoing testimonies convince the Court that accused-
appellant could not have committed the crime. Bareng's testimony,
given its material inconsistencies, cannot be given full faith and
credit. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, was able to prove his
alibi. "[W]here, as in the cases at bar, the evidence for the
prosecution is inherently weak and betrays lack of concreteness on
the question of whether or not appellants are the authors of the
crimes charged, alibi as a defense becomes significant."96 As (he
Court held in People v. Pampaluna97:
As a consequence of Our finding that Besa's testimony does not
deserve full faith and credit, appellants' defense of alibi assumes
importance since there is a total absence of positive and clear proof
that the appellants were the ones responsible for the crimes
charged in the information which gave rise to the instant appeal. Of
course, We have time and time again stressed that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses. It is easy to concoct, difficult to disprove
(People vs. Cunanan, L-17599, April 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 769, 783,
citing U.S. vs. Olais, 36 Phil. 828, 829; People vs. Pili, 51 Phil. 965,
21
966; People vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 265, 272; People vs. Bautista, L-
17772, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 522, 529; People vs. Dayday, L-20806
& L-20807, Aug. 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 935, 942). Nonetheless, where,
as in the cases at bar, the evidence for the prosecution is inherently
weak and betrays lack of concreteness on the question of whether
or not appellants are the authors of the crimes charged, alibi as a
defense becomes significant. It is noteworthy to reiterate here what
former Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for this Court in the case
of People vs. Fraga, et al. (L-12005, Aug. 31, 1960, 109 Phil. 241,
250), said: "The rule that alibi must be satisfactorily proven was
never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases;
otherwise, we will see the absurdity of an accused being put in a
more difficult position where the prosecution's evidence is vague
and weak than where it is strong." (Cited also in People vs. Bulawin,
29 SCRA 710, 722).98
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2012 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 04278 is hereby SET ASIDE. The dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. 11741-14, 11742-14 and 11743-14 by the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City, Branch 14 in its Order dated February 7, 2007' is
hereby declared final and accused-appellant Joel Domingo is
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report to the Court, within five (5) days from receipt of
this Decision, the action he has taken. Let a copy of this Decision be
sent also to the Secretary of Justice for his information. Malversation of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article
2175 of the Revised Penal Code.6 The three sets of Information are
SO ORDERED. quoted as follow:

SECOND DIVISION CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-11-CRM-0276

(For Violation of Sec. 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended)
G.R. Nos. 228494-96, March 21, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) AND CAMILO LOYOLA
SABIO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Court instituted by People of the Philippines
(petitioner), represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, assailing
the Decision2 dated April 20, 2016 and Resolution3 dated October
18, 2016 of the Sandiganbayan acquitting private respondent
Camilo Loyola Sabio (Sabio), for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
thereby denying petitioner's right to due process.
The Facts
"That on or about the period from February 14, 2006 to October 3,
2006 or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused. [SABIO], a high ranking
public officer being then the Chairman of the [PCGG] with a Salary
Grade of 30 and committing the offense in relation to and/or taking
advantage of his official position, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government
through evident bad faith by appropriating, misappropriating, and
converting to his own personal use and benefit, the following
remittances of Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation (MPLDC)
from , the proceeds of the sale of A. Soriano Corporation shares
which form part of the ill-gotten wealth of Former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies in the amount of TEN MILLION
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(Pl0,350,000.00) consisting of:

Voucher No. Check No. Date Amount

Sabio, the then Chairperson of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) with Salary Grade 30, was charged
a. Unnumbered 56626 02/14/2006 P 500,000.00
before the Sandiganbayan with (a) one count for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,4 as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (b) two counts for

22
 Fund, thereby causing damage and prejudjce to the Philippine
b. 03-45 56643 03/08/2006 1,000,000.00
Government in the aforementioned amount."7

c. 03-46 56644 03/13/2006 2,000,000.00 CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-11-CRM-0277

(For Malversation of Public Funds under Sec. 217 of the Revised
Penal Code)
d. 04-57 56659 04/21/2006 500,000.00

e. 05-86 56688 05/03/2006 700,000.00 "That on or about the period from February 14, 2006 to October 3,
2006 or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City
ofMandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
f. 05-94 56696 05/11/2006 350,000.00
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, [SABIO], a high ranking
public officer being then the Chairman of the [PCGG] with a Salary
g. 05-100 56702 05/25/2006 1,300,000.00 Grade of 30 and as such is accountable for the public funds or
property collected and received by reason of his office, committing
h. 06-125 56722 06/30/2006 1,000,000.00 the offense in relation to and/or taking advantage, of his official
position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
with grave abuse of confidence, appropriate, misappropriate,
i. 08-147 56744 08/18/2006 500,000.00 misapply, embezzle and convert to his own personal use and benefit
the following remittances of Mid-Pasig Land Development
j. 09-150 56747 09/07/2006 1,000,000.00 Corporation (MPLDC) from the proceeds of sale of A. Soriano
Corporation shares which form part of the ill-gotten wealth of
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies in the
k. 10-164 56761 10/03/2006 1,500,000.00
amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,350,000.00), consisting of:
TOTAL P10,350,000.00
Voucher No. Check No. Date Amount

which amount although he received as cash advances was supposed

a. Unnumbered 56626 02/14/2006 P 500,000.00
to be remitted to the Bureau of Treasury (BOT) as part of the CARP

23
 Fund, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the Philippine
b. 03-45 56643 03/08/2006 1,000,000.00
Government in the aforementioned arnount."8

c. 03-46 56644 03/13/2006 2,000,000.00 CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-11-CRM-02789

(For Malversation of Public Funds under Sec. 217 of the Revised
Penal Code)
d. 04-57 56659 04/21/2006 500,000.00

e. 05-86 56688 05/03/2006 700,000.00 "That on or about the period from May 30, 2007 to August 14,
2008, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
f. 05-94 56696 05/11/2006 350,000.00
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, [SABIO], a high ranking
public officer being then the Chairman of the [PCGG] with a Salary
g. 05-100 56702 05/25/2006 1,300,000.00 Grade of 30 and as such, accountable for the public funds and
property collected and received by reason of his office, committing
h. 06-125 56722 06/30/2006 1,000,000.00 the offense in relation to and/or taking advantage, of his official
position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
with grave abuse of confidence, appropriate, misapp opriate,
i. 08-147 56744 08/18/2006 500,000.00 misapply, embezzle and convert to his own personal use and benefit
the following cash advances from the [PCGG] to defray expenses in
j. 09-150 56747 09/07/2006 1,000,000.00 connection with litigation, accommodation and contingency fund in
his trip to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in the total amount of ONE
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
k. 10-164 56761 10/03/2006 1,500,000.00
SIXTY-TWO PESOS AND THREE CENTAVOS (P1,555,862.03),
consisting of:
TOTAL P10,350,000.00
Disbursement
Date Nature / Purpose Amount
Voucher No.
which amount although he received as cash advances was supposed
to be remitted to the Bureau of Treasury (BOT) as part of the CARP

24
 numerous witnesses and submitted their respective documentary
a. Emergency /
2007-05-0617 P 500,000.00 exhibits to prove the guilt of Sabio on the offenses charged.12
05/30/2007 Miscellaneous, etc.

Among the pertinent testimonies as gathered from the decision of

b. Litigation and other the Sandiganbayan are the following:
2007-08-0972 P 450,000.00
08/16/2007 related expenses
Lorna Gaerlan Reyes (Reyes), the Chief Administrative Officer of the
c. Litigation and other Collection Division of the Finance and Administrative Department of
2007-09-1122 P 500,000.00
09/30/2007 related expenses the PCGG, testified that she was called to the office of Atty. Manuel
Paras (Atty. Paras), the former General Manager of Independent
Realty Corporation (IRC) Group of Companies (one of the
Plane fare, per
surrendered companies to PCGG), to receive remittances. In
diem hotel
connection thereof, Reyes was given RCBC Check No. 955805 dated
d. accommodation,
2008-04-0358 P 55,862.03 November 23, 2006 issued in the name of PCGG from IRC in the
04/17/2008 contingency fund
amount of P26,930,670.99 and PNB Manager's Check No. 1528106
re: trip to Kuala
in tli.e amount of P13,069,329.01 representing remittances for the
Lumpur, Malaysia
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to be remitted to the
Bureau of Treasury (BOT). Thereafter, Atty. Paras asked for an
e. Litigation and other official rece pt in a total amount of P50,350,000.00 which Reye's
2008-08-0795 P 50,000.00
08/14/2008 related expenses refused to issue since she only received an amount of
P40,000,000.00. Reyes then prepared a transmittal letter addressed
TOTAL P1,555,862.03 to the BOT and had it signed by then PCGG Chairman Sabio and
Commissioner Ricardo Abcede (Commissioner Abcede). The official
Upon arraignment on January 12, 2012, Sabio entered a 'plea of not receipts were all issued in the name of IRC as payee and the checks
issued to her 'were all in the name of PCGG. The checks, on the
guilty on all the three charges filed against him.10
other hand, were deposited in the name of BOT. During cross-
After the termination of the pre-trial conference and compliance examination, Reyes admitted that the Chairman of IRC, and not
with the pre-trial order, the trial ensued between the parties.11 Sabio, determined the amount to be remitted to BOT. Sabio's
participation was only limited to the signing of the transmittal letter
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of to BOT.13

25

Primitiva Solinap Hingco-Millado (Millado), the former Cashier of
IRC, testified that she prepared the vouchers, checks (Exhibits S to
NN, PP, QQ and SS) and documents of IRC in the name of Sabio.
During cross-examination, she disclosed that Atty. Paras verbally
instructed her to prepare the voucher marked as Exhibit S, which
turned out to be MPLDC Cash Voucher dated February 14, 2007,
despite lack of supporting document. She likewise prepared a check
marked as Exhibit T, referring to MPLDC dated March 8, 2006
payable to Sabio in the amount of P1,000,000.00, upon instruction
of Atty. Paras through the IRC Chief Accountant Corazon San Mateo
Escorpizo (Escorpizo), even without the approval of the approving
officer. Similarly, she prepared MPLDC Cash Voucher No. 03-46
dated March 13,2006 in the name ofSabio amounting to
P2,000,000.00 marked as Exhibit W, PNB Check in the name of
MPLDC with Sabio as payee in the amount of P2,000,000.00 dated
March 13, 2006 marked as Exhibit X, MPLDC Cash Voucher No. 04-
57 dated April 21, 2006 payable to Sabio amounting to P500,000.00
marked as Exhibit Y, all upon verbal instructions of Atty. Paras.
During cross-examination, Millado admitted that she has no
evidence to show that the checks payable under the name of Sabio
were received by the latter.14
Escorpizo, testified that the preparation of the check voucher with
regard to cash advances and remittances to the National Treasury
depended upon the instruction of the Office of the General
Manager and/or the President of IRC. She clarified that
Commissioners Abcede and Nicasio Conti (Commissioner Conti)
facilitated the transaction of the cash advances but the checks must
be made in the name of Sabio since he was authorized as the
26
Chairman of PCGG. Escorpizo added further that she facilitated the
preparation of the checks and cash advances premised upon the
collective promise of Atty. Paras, IRC President Ernesto R. Jalandoni
(President Jalandoni) and Commissioners Abcede and. Conti that a
board resolution will be submitted to authorize the cash advance.15
Finally, Marcial Velarga Flores, the Chief Administrative Officer of
the Finance Department of the PCGG testified that he issued a
Memorandum addressed to Sabio for his failure to liquidate the
issued cash advances and the same was received by an office staff
named Wilson.16
On his part, Sabio stood as the lone witness of the defense. He
denied having misappropriated, embezzled, misapplied and
converted to his own personal use and benefit the aniount of
P10,350,000.00 as remitted by MPLDC. He explained that as the
Chairman of the PCGG, he signed and endorsed the checks to be
delivered to the cashier for encashment for the operational expense
of PCGG in view of the one-peso budget of the office for the year
2006. In the same note, he alleged that he endorsed to his office
staff the cash advance of P1,550,862.03 for proper liquidation.17
On April 20, 2016, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed
Decision,18 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and for insufficiency of evidence
engendering reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered
Acquitting herein accused [Sabio] from the charge of Violation of
Sec. 3(e), RA 3019 in Crim. Case No. SB-11-CRM-0276 and
Malversation in Crim. Cases Nos. SB-11-CRM-0277 and SB-11-CRM-
0278.
SO ORDERED.19
The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied
in a Resolution20 dated October 18, 2016. Thus:
Acting on the prosecution's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Re:
Decision dated April 20, 2016) dated May 5, 2016, this Court must
emphasize that it had already acquitted the accused after trial on
the merits. The rule against double jeopardy proscribes a
reconsideration or reversal of a judgment of acquittal on the merits.
It is well-settled that acquittal in a criminal case is final and
executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State
may not seek its review without placing the accused in double
jeopardy.
Accordingly, the subject motion for reconsideration is DENIED.21
Hence, this petition.
In this present petition for certiorari, the Office of the Ombudsman
raises the following issues:
A.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION)
COMMITTED ORAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT CAPRJCIOUSLY
AND WANTONLY RULED THAT THE PARTIAL REMITTANCES SUBJECT
27
OF CRJMINAL CASES NOS. SB-11-CRM-0276 AND SB-11-CRM-0277
WERE USED AND ISSUED TO THE PCGG AS CASH ADVANCES
B.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF JURJSDICTION OR WITH ORAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
EFFECTIVELY DENYING PETITIONER OF ITS RJGHT TO DUE PROCESS
WHEN IT CONCLUDED IN CRJMINAL CASE SB-11-CRM-0276 AND SB-
11-CRM-0277 THAT THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT SABIO
MISAPPROPRIATED OR CONVERTED THE FUNDS INVOLVED
C.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) ORAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
ITS JURJSDICTION WHEN IT RULED IN ALL THE CASES THAT THERE IS
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT SABIO MISAPPROPRIATED OR
CONVERTED THE FUNDS INVOLVED.22
In his Comment23 on the petition, Sabio refuted the arguments of
the petitioner and emphasized on his constitutional right against
double jeopardy. In addition, Sabio disproved grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when the latter
acquitted him due to insufficiency of evidence engendering
reasonable doubt.
In its Reply,24 petitioner argued that the petition does not place the
accused at risk of double jeopardy. Though it has long been settled
that the prosecution cannot appeal a decision to reverse an
acquittal, the same may be questioned in an action
for certiorari when a judgment was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, thus rendering
the assailed judgment void. The petitioner argued on
Sandiganbayan's capncwus disregard that there was indeed a
misappropriation of the money which should have been remitted to
the BOT. Moreover, Sandiganbayan failed to take in consideration
Sabio's blatant failure to liquidate the cash advances he received by
virtue of his position as PCGG's Chairperson.
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
The constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy is
enshrined in the Bill of Rights under the 1987 Constitution:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
This right was further embodied in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
28
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information. x x x.
Generally, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory.25 The prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal lest the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated.26 However, the rule admits of two exceptional grounds
that can be challenged in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court: (1) in a judgment of acquittal rendered with
grave abuse of discretion by the court; and (2) where the
prosecution had been deprived of due process.27
A cursory reading of the present petition for certiorari demonstrates
a prodding to review the judgment of acquittal rendered by the
Sandiganbayan on account of grave abuse of discretion. However,
though enveloped on a pretext of grave abuse, the petition in
actuality aims to overturn the decision of Sandiganbayan due to
perceived mistake in the appreciation of facts and evidence.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, the correction of this mistake does
not fall within the ambit of Rule 65.
In People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona,28 the Court emphasized the limitation
of review in certiorari proceeding:
Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an
error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of
judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained
of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to
fgublic respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will
not lie.29 (Citations omitted)
In this case, the prosecution was given adequate opportunity to
present several witnesses and all necessary documentary evidence
to prove the guilt of Sabio. However, Sandiganbayan warranted the
acquittal of Sabio due to insufficiency of evidence engendering
reasonable doubt on whether Sabio committed the offenses
charged.
Records show that after taking into consideration the testimonies
and evidence of both parties, Sandiganbayan arrived at a conclusion
that the participation of Sabio with respect to the P10,350,000.00
was limited to the act of signing of the transmittal letter, checks and
vouchers. The court likewise opined that the alleged untransmitted
amount of P10,350,000.00 appearing in the breakdown of
P50,350,000.00 as "remittance to the National Treasury for 2006"
was misleading. The amount was never intended for remittance to
the BOT but for the operational expenses of the PCGG.30 As can be
inferred from the testimony of Escorpizo, the cash advance of
P10,350,000.00 was put in the name of Sabio since he was the
Chairperson of PCGG under the instructions of PCGG Commissioners
29
Abcede and Conti, who in turn promised Escorpizo that they will
issue a board resolution for the authorization of the cash
advance.31 On the other hand, the charge of malversation was
likewise dismissed due to the prosecution's failure to prove that
Sabio failed to liquidate or settle the cash advance of P1,550,862.03
despite demand.32 Clearly, an action for certiorari will not lie to
reverse the judgment of acquittal which was rendered after the
court's appreciation of evidence.
Premised on the following factual findings and conclusion, the Court
finds no indication that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion when it gave a verdict of acquittal in favor of Sabio. The
"grave abuse of discretion" contemplated by law involves a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.33 Petitioner failed to discharge the burden that
Sandiganbayan blatantly abused its discretion in acquitting Sabio
such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.34
An action for certiorari does not correct errors of judgment but only
errors of jurisdiction.35 The nature of a Rule 65 petition does not
entail a review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in
an appeal.36 Misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous
conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors
were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of
discretion.37 Even granting that the Sandiganbayan erred in
weighing the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, such error
does not necessarily amount to grave abuse of discretion.38
By way of final note, the Court finds it apt to reiterate the
underlying principle behind the general rule of stay judgment of
acquittal in People v. Hon. Velasco:39
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal
by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a
jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in
unequal contest with the State x x x." Thus Green expressed the
concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in
at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the
State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is
"part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches
to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The
interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for
"repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With
this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence
rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent
proceeding.40 (Citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED.
30
G.R. No. 208146, June 08, 2016
VIRGINIA DIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
TIMOTHY DESMOND, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that
may be cured by amendment, courts must provide the prosecution
with the opportunity to amend the information.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court
of Appeals Decision2 dated January 8, 2013 and Resolution3 dated
July 10, 2013. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
Regional Trial Court Order that quashed the Informations charging
petitioner Virginia Dio (Dio) with libel because these Informations
failed to allege publication.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond) is the Chair and
Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, of which
Dio is Treasurer and Member of the Board of
Directors.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On December 9, 2002, Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for
libel.6 Two (2) separate Informations, both dated February 26, 2003,
were filed and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109.7 The
Information in Criminal Case No. 9108
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about July 6, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
with malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and
reputation of Timothy Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive
Office of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the
offended party and to other persons namely: Atty. Winston Ginez,
John Corcoran, and Terry Nichoson which read as follows:
'NOW THAT WE ARE SET TO BUILD THE HOTEL SO THAT YOU COULD
SURVIVED, (sic) YOU SHOULD STOP YOUR NONSENSE THREAT
BECAUSE YOU COULD NOT EVEN FEED YOUR OWN SELF UNLESS WE
PAY YOUR EXHORBITANT (sic) SALARY, HOUSE YOU ADN (sic)
SUPPORT ALL YOUR PERSONAL NEEDS. YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED
IN DOING THIS. AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, YOU ARE NOTHING
EXCEPT A PERSON WHO IS TRYING TO SURVIVED (sic) AT THE
PRETEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL PROTECTOR [sic]. YOU
ARE PADI (sic) TO THE LAST CENTS ON ALL YOUR WORK IN THE
WORK (sic). AT THE SAME TIME, YOU BLOATED THE PRICE OF EACH
ANIMAL YOU BROUGHT TO THE PHILIPPINES from US$500,000.00 to
US$750,000.00 each so that you could owned (sic) more shares that
you should. Please look into this deeply.
IF YOU INSISTS (sic) TO BE CALLED AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND
ANIMAL PROTECTOR IN OUR COUNTRY, THEN YOU AND YOUR WIFE
SHOULD STOP BLEEDING THE COMPANY WITH YOUR MONTHLY
PAYROLL OF ALMOST P1 MILLION A MONTH.'
The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or
constituting an act causing or tending to cause dishonor, discredit or
31
contempt against the person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8cralawred
The Information in Criminal Case No. 9109
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about July 13, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and
reputation of Timothy Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive
Office of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the
[sic] Atty. Winston Ginez and Fatima Paglicawan, to the offended
party, Timothy Desmond and to other persons namely: Hon. Felicito
Payumo, SBMA Chariman [sic], Terry Nichoson, John Corcoran, and
Gail Laule which read as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
'Dear Winston and Fatima:
UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF TIM DESMOND AS CHAIRMAN AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF SBME, AS OF THIS DATE THE
COMPANY HAD INCURRED A LOSS OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED
MILLION. A BALANCE SHEET SUBMITTED TODAY BY THEIR
ACCOUNTANT JULIET REFLECT AND (sic) ASSETS OF MORE THAN
THREE HUNDRED MILLION PESOS, 50% OF WHICH IS OVERVALUED
AND NON-EXISTENT. TIM DESMOND AND FAMILY HAD
ACCUMULATED A (sic) SHARES OF MORE THAN 70% OF THE
RECORDED PAID UP CAPITAL BY OVERVALUING OF THE ASSETS
CONTRIBUTION, PAYMENT TO THEIR OWN COMPANY IN THE USA,
ETC. AT THE SAME TIME, TIM DESMOND AND FAMILY BLEED THE
COMPANY FROM DATE OF INCORPORATION TO PRESENT FOR AN
AVERAGE OF ONE MILLION PER MONTH FOR THEIR PERSONAL
GAIN, LIKE SALARY, CAR, ET, [sic] ETC.'cralawred
The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or
constituting an act causing or tending to cause dishonor, discredit or
contempt against the person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9cralawred
On April 22, 2003, Dio filed a Petition to suspend the criminal
proceedings,10 but it was denied in the Order dated February 6,
2004.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Dio moved for reconsideration of the February 6, 2004 Order.12 She
also moved to quash the Informations, arguing that the "facts
charged do not constitute an offense."13 In its Order14 dated July 13,
2004, the trial court denied both Motions. The dispositive portion of
the Order reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Premises considered, the Motion For Reconsideration of the Order
dated February 6, 2004 and the Motion To Quash, both filed for
accused, as well as the Motion For Issuance of a Hold Departure
Order filed by the Prosecution, are hereby DENIED.
Arraignment will proceed as previously set on July 20, 2005 at 9:00
a.m.
SO ORDERED.15cralawred
32
Dio moved for partial reconsideration of the July 13, 2004 Order,
but the Motion was denied in the trial court's Order dated
September 13, 2005.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On October 11, 2005, Dio filed a Motion for leave of court to file a
second motion for reconsideration.17 She also filed an Omnibus
Motion to quash the Informations for failure to allege publication
and lack of jurisdiction, and for second reconsideration with leave of
court.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court's Order dated February 7, 2006 denied both Motions
and scheduled Dio's arraignment on March 9, 2006.19 Dio moved for
partial reconsideration.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court granted Dio's Motion for Partial Reconsideration in
its February 12, 2009 Order,21 the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Motion For Partial Reconsideration filed by the
accused in Criminal Cases (sic) Nos. 9108 and 9109, on the ground
that the Informations in the said cases fail (sic) to allege publication,
is GRANTED and, accordingly, the Informations filed against the
accused are thereby QUASHED and DISMISSED.
No finding as to costs.
SO ORDERED.22cralawred
After filing a Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2009,23 Desmond raised
before the Court of Appeals the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I that the prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect;
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
ACCUSED'S ARGUMENT THAT THE PRESENT CHARGES SHOULD BE
QUASHED FOR FAILURE OF THE INFORMATIONS TO ALLEGE
PUBLICATION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE AND QUASHING THE INFORMATIONS WITHOUT GIVING THE
PROSECUTOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND THE
INFORMATIONS.24cralawred
In its January 8, 2013 Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained that
the Informations did not substantially constitute the offense
charged.25 It found that the Informations did not contain any
allegation that the emails allegedly sent by Dio to Desmond had
been accessed.26 However, it found that the trial court erred in
quashing the Informations without giving the prosecution a chance
to amend them pursuant to Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although we agree with the trial court that the facts alleged in the
Informations do not substantially constitute the offense charged,
the most prudent thing to do for the trial court is to give the
prosecution the opportunity to amend it and make the necessary
corrections. Indeed, an Information may be defective because the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, however, the dismissal
of the case will not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require
33
the court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecution's failure
to do so. The trial court's failure to provide the prosecution with this
opportunity constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power.27cralawred
The dispositive portion reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
order of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 3 dated
February 12, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109 is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court and the
Public Prosecutor of Balanga City is hereby DIRECTED to amend the
Informations.
SO ORDERED.28cralawred
Dio moved for reconsideration,29 but the Court of Appeals denied
the Motion in its July 10, 2013
Resolution.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, this Petition was filed.
Desmond and the Office of the Solicitor General filed their
Comments,31 to which Dio filed her Reply.32 On April 2, 2014, this
Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Office of the Solicitor General filed on June 11, 2014 a
Manifestation and Motion34 adopting its Comment. Desmond and
Dio filed their memoranda on June 19, 201435 and July 10,
2014,36 respectively.

Dio stresses that "venue is jurisdictional in criminal
cases."37 Considering that libel is limited as to the venue of the case,
failure to allege "where the libelous article was printed and first
published"38 or "where the offended party actually resided at the
time of the commission of the offense"39 is a jurisdictional defect.
She argues that jurisdictional defects in an Information are not
curable by amendment, even before arraignment. To support this
position, she cites Agustin v. Pamintuan:40
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the
Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any
allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually
residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly
committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the
Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be
allowed.41 (Citations omitted)cralawred
Dio also cites Leviste v. Hon. Alameda,42 where this Court has stated
that not all defects in an Information are curable by amendment
prior to arraignment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are
curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which
is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal.
An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial
court is likewise impermissible.43 (Citations omitted)cralawred
Dio argues that the Informations were void as the prosecutor of
Morong, Bataan had no authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the offenses charged.44 The complaint filed before
34
the prosecutor did not allege that the emails were printed and first
published in Morong Bataan, or that Desmond resided in Morong,
Bataan at the time of the offense.45 In the absence of these
allegations, the prosecutor did not have the authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation or to file the
information.46ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Dio further argues that publication, one of the elements of libel,
was not present in the case. She asserts that emailing does not
constitute publication under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code.
As there was no allegation in the Informations that the emails were
received, accessed, and read by third persons other than Desmond,
there could be no publication.47 Further, emails are not covered
under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, at the time the
allegedly libelous emails were sent, there was no law punishing this
act.48ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Finally, Dio argues that she sent the emails as private
communication to the officers of the corporation, who were in the
position to act on her grievances.49 The emails were sent in good
faith, with justifiable ends, and in the performance of a legal
duty.50ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The primordial issue for resolution is whether an information's
failure to establish venue is a defect that can be cured by
amendment before arraignment.
The Petition is denied.
I

If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can
be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment
be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall
be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite
the amendment.cralawred
This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the
opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power.51 In People
v. Sandiganbayan:52
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and
sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be cured by
amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect
pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts
constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to
automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the
prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
35
amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue
delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment,
unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result
to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process
underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v.
Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day
in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the
opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly
granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a
string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's
right to due process.53cralawred
In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus,
Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies. If the information
is defective, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to
amend it before it may be quashed.
Petitioner claims that Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
applies only to informations that can be cured by amendment. She
argues that before a court orders that an amendment be made, or
otherwise gives the prosecution an opportunity to amend an
information, it must first establish that the defective information
can be cured by amendment.
Petitioner relies on Agustin to argue the proscription of an
amendment of an information in order to vest jurisdiction in the
court. This is misplaced.
In Agustin, the accused in the criminal case was already arraigned
under a defective information that failed to establish venue.54 The
Court of Appeals held that the defect in the information was merely
formal and, consequently, could be amended even after plea, with
leave of court. Thus, this Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the
Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any
allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually
residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly
committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the
Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be
allowed.55cralawred
It cites only Agustin, which did not involve the amendment of an
information before arraignment.
Aside from obiter dictum in jurisprudence, petitioner provides no
legal basis to reverse the Court of Appeals' determination that the
defective informations may be amended before arraignment.
Although the cases petitioner cited involved defective informations
that failed to establish the jurisdiction of the court over the libel
charges, none involved the amendment of an information before
arraignment. Thus, these cannot be controlling over the facts of this
case.
II

In turn, Agustin cited Agbayani v. Sayo.56 However, Agbayani does

not involve the amendment of a defective information before or A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not a ground to
after arraignment. Subsequent cases have cited Agustin as basis quash an information. In Sasot v. People:58
that amendment of an information to vest jurisdiction in the trial
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
court is impermissible. Thus, in Leviste, this Court cited Agustin and
stated that certain amendments are impermissible even before was then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were
committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information,
arraignment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are
curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
is void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal.
An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial
court is likewise impermissible.57cralawred b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged or the person of the accused;
It may appear that Leviste supports petitioner's contention that an
amendment operating to vest jurisdiction in the trial court is
impermissible. However, the statement in Leviste was obiter dictum.

36

c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to
do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in
which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy
of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the
defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant's
capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.59cralawred
On the other hand, lack of authority to file an information is a
proper ground. In Cudia v. Court of Appeals:60
37
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent
that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the
first information, the offense having been committed in the
Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.
Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
"Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal
shall:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
....
(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances
within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made against the persons
accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants
shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of
witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
. . . .cralawred
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City
Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses
committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An
information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or
presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by
law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of
authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in question
is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner's plea to an information before he filed a motion
to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal
objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication,
if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line
of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information
signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites,
confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
(herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In
consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as
lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or
information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint
or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form
or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been
sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot
be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information,
the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to
petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach
where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City
Prosecutor was the error of the investigating panel and the same
should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too
familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the
38
mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. To rule
otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper
protection to the community, and give rise to the possibility of
connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information,
and not its dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by the
prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of
Appeals has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to
Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same
provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be
dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.61 (Emphasis
in the original, citations omitted)cralawred
However, for quashal of an information to be sustained, the defect
of the information must be evident on its face. In Santos v. People:62
First, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the
information which is evident on its face. The same cannot be said
herein. The Information against petitioner appears valid on its face;
and that it was filed in violation of her constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection of the laws is not evident on the face
thereof. As pointed out by the CTA First Division in its 11 May 2006
Resolution, the more appropriate recourse petitioner should have
taken, given the dismissal of similar charges against Velasquez, was
to appeal the Resolution dated 21 October 2005 of the Office of the
State Prosecutor recommending the filing of an information against
her with the DOJ Secretary.63cralawred
For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor's lack of
authority to file it, the lack of the authority must be evident on the
face of the information.
The Informations here do not allege that the venue of the offense
was other than Morong, Bataan. Thus, it is not apparent on the face
of the Informations that the prosecutor did not have the authority
to file them.
The proper remedy is to give the prosecution the opportunity to
amend the Informations. If the proper venue appears not to be
Morong, Bataan after the Informations have been amended, then
the trial court may dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction, as
well as lack of authority of the prosecutor to file the information.
III
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. - A libel
committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving,
radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to civil action which
may be brought by the offended party.cralawred
Petitioner argues that at the time of the offense, emails were not
covered under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
claims this is bolstered by the enactment of Republic Act No. 10175,
otherwise known as the Anti-Cybercrime Law, which widened the
39
scope of libel to include libel committed through email, among
others.64ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Whether emailing or, as in this case, sending emails to the persons
named in the Informations—who appear to be officials of Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority where Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium is
found—is sufficiently "public," as required by Articles 353 and 355
of the Revised Penal Code and by the Anti-Cybercrime Law, is a
matter of defense that should be properly raised during trial.
Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper
public authorities, partakes of a degree of protected freedom of
expression.65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Certainly, if we remain faithful to the dictum that public office is a
public trust,66 some leeway should be given to the public to express
disgust. The scope and extent of that protection cannot be
grounded in abstractions. The facts of this case need to be proven
by evidence; otherwise, this Court exercises barren abstractions
that may wander into situations only imagined, not real.
IV
Good faith is not among the grounds for quashing an information as
enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. It is not
apparent on the face of the Informations, and what is not apparent
cannot be the basis for quashing them. In Danguilan-Vitug v. Court
of Appeals:67
We find no reason to depart from said conclusion. Section 3, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for
quashing an information. Specifically, paragraph (g) of said provision
states that the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information where it contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification. Hence, for the alleged
privilege to be a ground for quashing the information, the same
should have been averred in the information itself and secondly, the
privilege should be absolute, not only qualified. Where, however,
these circumstances are not alleged in the information, quashal is
not proper as they should be raised and proved as defenses. With
more reason is it true in the case of merely qualifiedly privileged
communications because such cases remain actionable since the
defamatory communication is simply presumed to be not malicious,
thereby relieving the defendant of the burden of proving good
intention and justifiable motive. The burden is on the prosecution to
prove malice. Thus, even if the qualifiedly privileged nature of the
communication is alleged in the information, it cannot be quashed
especially where prosecution opposes the same so as not to deprive
the latter of its day in court, but prosecution can only prove its case
after trial on the merits. In People v. Gomez we held, inter
alia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"The claim of the accused . . . that the letter is privileged
communication is not a ground for a motion to quash. It is a matter
of defense which must be proved after trial of the case on the
merits."68 (Citations omitted)cralawred
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in disregarding petitioner's
purported good faith. This should be a matter of defense properly
raised during trial.
40
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 29,
2013 is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated January 8,
2013 and Resolution dated July 10, 2013 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177000
NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL CARANDANG and SP02
ALFREDO CARANDANG y PRESCILLA, Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated November 17,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27021,
affirming in toto the conviction of Nestor Guelos (Nestor), Rodrigo
Guelos (Rodrigo), Gil Carandang (Gil) and Senior Police Officer 2
Alfredo Carandang y Prescilla (Alfredo) (petitioners) rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan City, Batangas, Branch 83 in
its Decision3 dated January 24, 2003 in Criminal Cases Nos. P-204
and P-205. The CA Resolution4 dated March 6, 2007 denied the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Facts
On December 5, 1995, two separate Informations5 were filed with
the RTC against the petitioners for Direct Assault Upon an Agent of
a Person in Authority with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Articles 148 and 249, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). The accusatory portions of the two Informations state:
Criminal Case No. P-204
That on or about the 4th day of June, 1995, at about 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, at Barangay Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province
of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually
helping one another, [Nestor]' while armed with an Armalite Rifle,
with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
with the said firearm one SP02 Estelito Andaya, a bonafide member
of the Philippine National Police assigned at Tanauan Police Station,
while engaged in the performance of his official duties as peace
officer, and while the latter is being held from the back by [Gil] and
other companions, whose identities and whereabouts are still
unknown, thereby hitting and inflicting· upon the said SP02 Estelito
Andaya gunshot wounds on his body which caused his
instantaneous death.
Contrary to law. 6
Criminal Case No. P-205
That on or about the 4th day of June, 1995, at about 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, at Barangay Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province
of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
41
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually
helping each other, [Nestor] while armed with an Armalite Rifle,
with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
with the said firearm, one P/Chief Inspector Rolando M. Camacho, a
bonafide member of the Philippine National Police and concurrently
the Chief of Police of Tanauan, Batangas, while engaged in the
performance of his official duties as peace officer, and while the
latter is being held at the back including his two arms by [Alfredo]
and the barrel of his armalite rifle is being held by [Rodrigo],
thereby hitting and inflicting upon the said P/Chief Inspector
Rolando M. Camacho gunshot wounds on his head which caused his
instantaneous death.
Contrary to law. 7
The petitioners pleaded not guilty to the foregoing charges.
Thereafter, the joint trial of the two cases ensued. The prosecution
and the defense presented their respective versions of the case. 8
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: P02 Edgardo
Carandang (P02 Carandang), Alex Malabanan, P02 Pastor Platon
Castillo, Ruel Ramos, Ricardo Jordan, SPOl Anacleto Garcia (SPOl
Garcia), Dr. Olga Bausa, Rowena Rios, Police Inspector Loma Tria,
Dr. Hermogenes Corachea, P03 Eugenio Llarina, Marilou Reyes
Camacho and Teodora Torres Andaya. 9
On the other hand, the defense presented: Cancio Angulo (Angulo),
Juana Precilla and herein petitioners Nestor, Alfredo and Rodrigo as
its witnesses.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
In the morning of June 4, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Rolando M.
Camacho (P/C Insp. Camacho), SP02 Estelito Andaya (SP02 Andaya),
P02 Carandang and SPO 1 Garcia set off for Sitio Mahabang
Buhangin in Tanauan, Batangas to conduct their routine as peace
officers of the area. It was already 10:00 a.m. when they left
Tanauan Police Station on board a patrol car driven by SPO 1 Garcia.
While they were in Barangay Gonzales waiting for a boat that would
bring them to Sitio Mahabang Buhangin, they heard successive
gunshots apparently coming from Barangay Boot. P/C Insp.
Camacho then decided to proceed to Barangay Boot to check and to
apprehend those who were illegally discharging their firearms.
Upon arrival at the place, they were invited for lunch in the house of
Angulo. Thereafter, they stayed at the house of the incumbent
Barangay Captain, Rafael Gonzales. 10
At around 2:45 p.m., P/C Insp. Camacho instructed SP02 Andaya and
P02 Carandang to join the religious procession to monitor those
who will indiscriminately fire guns. As they were moving on with the
procession, they heard successive gunshots, which they determined
to have emanated from the backyard of Silveria Guelos (Silveria).
They went back to the house of the Barangay Captain to report to
P/C Insp. Camacho what they found out. Acting upon their report,
P/C Insp. Camacho decided to go with them to the place of Silveria.
In going to the house, they rode a passenger jeepney in order to
conceal their purpose. SPOl Garcia drove their patrol car and
followed them. 11
Upon reaching the place of Silveria who let them in, P/C Insp.
Camacho, P02 Carandang and SP02 Andaya then proceeded to the
42
back of the house where they saw around 15 persons drinking
liquor. They also noticed empty shells of armalite rifle scattered on
the ground. P/C Insp. Camacho then introduced himself as the Chief
of Tanauan Police Station and told the group that he and his men
were verifying who fired the shots. Someone from the group of
drinking men asked him: "Who are you going to pick-up here?"
Before P/C Insp. Camacho was able to respond to the taunting
question, P02 Carandang pointed to him the "empty shells" near the
comfort room located at the right side from where the group was
drinking. Consequently, P/C Insp. Camacho instructed him to collect
the scattered empty shells. 12
When P02 Carandang was about to follow P/C Insp. Camacho's
orders, the former noticed a person, whom he identified as Nestor,
wearing a white sando and blue walking shorts stand up. While P02
Carandang was collecting the empty shells, somebody hit him on his
nape which caused him to drop his armalite. When he tried to
retrieve his firearm, someone hit his hand. 13
As he was trying to stand up, he saw Alfredo tightly holding (yapos-
yapos) P/C Insp. Camacho from behind while Rodrigo grabbed the
former's baby armalite. As soon as P02 Carandang was able to stand
up, he was hit by Nestor on his left jaw, even as he received a blow
to his left eye. Thereafter, as P/C Insp. Camacho was in a helpless
and defenseless position, he was shot by Nestor causing him to fall
to the ground and later die. 14
While P02 Carandang was retreating, he saw SP02 Andaya being
tightly held by the neck by Gil. He then saw Nestor shoot at SP02
Andaya, who then fell to the ground and died. 15
P02 Carandang retreated and started to run but Nestor went after
him and shot at him. It was at this juncture when SPO 1 Garcia
arrived at the scene and returned fire at Nestor, hitting the latter
with three out of six shots. 16
For the defense, petitioners Nestor, Alfredo and Rodrigo took the
witness stand and denied the accusations. They narrated a different
story. 17
Nestor testified that at around 3:00 p.m. on June 4, 1995, he was
inside the house of his mother when he heard several gunshots. He
told his children to lie flat on the floor until it stopped. Thereafter,
he went out of the house and saw four persons lying on the ground;
he identified two of them as Gil and Alfredo. He also saw an old
man standing nearby and asked the latter what happened, but the
old man did not reply. Just when he heard that people were rushing
towards his mother's house, the old man asked him to pick up the
gun laying on the ground. He followed and picked up the same with
the intention of surrendering it to a police officer but as he was on
his way towards the gate, SPO 1 Garcia shot him instead. He was hit
three times: on his stomach, his left side, and on his left hand. 18
Alfredo, on the other hand, testified that as they were drinking, P/C
Insp. Camacho together with two other police officers came. They
entered one after the other but P/C Insp. Camacho came in first.
They were wearing civilian clothes, although he noticed that P/C
Insp. Camacho was also wearing a vest where extra ammunition-
magazines were kept. P/C Insp. Camacho was armed with a baby-
armalite, while his companions were carrying M-16 rifles. The police
officers asked who among them fired a gun to which somebody
answered, "We do not know who fired the shot." At this point,
43
Alfredo introduced himself as a fellow-member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP); he even saluted P/C lnsp. Camacho, but the
latter merely ignored the former. Instead, P/C Insp. Camacho
pointed the nozzle of his baby armalite at Alfredo's stomach and
used it to lift hist-shirt, as the former asked the latter if he had a
gun. Alfredo answered that he had none. While P/C Insp. Camacho
was frisking three other men, Rodrigo approached him to ask if he
can be of help to the former. P/C Insp. Camacho did not answer
Rodrigo's query. Rather, while he was in "port-hand position," P/C
Insp. Camacho pushed Rodrigo with his firearm; the latter was out-
balanced and fell on his back. While P/C Insp. Camacho was pushing
Rodrigo with the use of the nozzle of his "armalite rifle", the latter
swiped the said firearm as he told the former, "Baka pumutok
iyan." Thereupon, the firearm of P/C Insp. Camacho fired; a bullet
hit Alfredo's thigh. Thereafter, the latter lost consciousness and
awakened only when being transported to a nearby hospital. 19
Rodrigo testified that in the afternoon of June 4, 1995, he was
watching a religious procession in front of the gate of his parents'
house when P/C Insp. Camacho and two others, all in civilian clothes
and each bearing a long firearm, entered the premises of his
parents' house. The group went directly to the area where people
were drinking liquor. P/C Insp. Camacho introduced himself as the
Chief of Police of Tanauan, and asked who among them fired a gun.
He poked his gun at the people there and then started frisking some
of them. Alfredo stood up and introduced himself as a fellow-
member of the PNP, to which P/C Insp. Camacho responded by
poking his gun at the former, asking him ifhe had a gun. Answering
"none," Alfredo pulled-up his t-shirt to show he had no gun. His t-
shirt was lifted by P/C Insp. Camacho with the nozzle of his gun.
Rodrigo approached P/C Insp. Camacho and offered to assist the
latter, but instead, P/C Insp. Camacho pointed the gun at his face.
Rodrigo swayed the gun away from his face, but he was, in tum,
pushed back by P/C Insp. Camacho with the use of the barrel of the
same gun causing him to fall to the ground. Then he heard several
gunshots, so he covered his head with his hands. When the
gunshots stopped, he saw two persons lying, one by his left side and
the other, by his right. He then ran for help but on his way out of
the premises, he saw a wounded person whom he offered to help.
The wounded person ignored him and continued to walk towards a
jeepney. Rodrigo proceeded to approach a Barangay Tanod and
asked him to report the incident to the Barangay Captain. Soon
thereafter, the Barangay Captain arrived; police officers from
Tanauan also came and Rodrigo was invited to the Police Station for
investigation.20
On January 24, 2003, the RTC issued a Joint Decision,21 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. P-204, this Court finds accused
[NESTOR] and [GIL] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Direct
Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to
Article 48, of the [RPC], for killing [SP02 Andaya], and hereby
sentences each of the accused to suffer the penalty of eleven (11)
years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, up to eighteen
(18) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, and a fine
of One Thousand Pesos (Phpl,000.00). The accused are directed to
pay the heirs of victim [SP02 Andaya] an indemnity of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00), actual damages in the amount of
44
One Million Pesos (Phpl,000,000.00), and moral damages of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. P-205, the Court finds accused [NESTOR],
[RODRIGO] and [ALFREDO] GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with
Homicide, defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in
relation to Article 48, of the [RPC], for killing [P/C Insp. Camacho],
and hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer the penalty of
eleven (11) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, up
to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (Phpl,000.00)
each. The accused are directed to pay the heirs of victim [P/C Insp.
Camacho] an indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00),
actual damages in the amount of One Million Six Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Phpl,600,000.00), and moral damages of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC found that between the conflicting versions of the parties,
that of the prosecution is more credible; the positive declarations of
the police officers who testified for the prosecution, particularly
that of eyewitness P02 Carandang, were not impeached.23 Further,
the RTC did not find any reason for any of the prosecution witnesses
to falsely testify against the accused. The trial court observed that
said witnesses, with special reference to P02 Carandang, testified in
a straightforward manner and showed signs of candor, as compared
to the accused, who were smart-alecky and did not sound
truthful. 24 The petitioners appealed to the CA.
On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed in toto the petitioners'
conviction in its Decision25 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.26
Hence, this petition for review with the following assignment of
errors:
A. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON THE UNSUBSTANTIATED
TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS P02 CARANDANG AND
HOLDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
B. THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THE GLARING INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS.
C. THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS CONSPIRACY
BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE THE SAME.27
Forthwith, the petitioners fault the CA for affirming their conviction,
contending that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
uncorroborated by evidence sufficient to establish the petitioners'
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the petitioners allege
the following, to wit:
1. There is no direct assault of a person in authority to speak of
because the group of P/C Insp. Camacho was not in the
performance of their duties. The prosecution failed to present the
alleged mission order supporting the intelligence operation
45
conducted by P/C Insp. Camacho and his men in Barangay Boot.
Further, while the police officers were in civilian attire (shorts,
slippers and t-shirts) to go undercover, they were carrying rifles that
were not concealed;28
2. The injuries suffered by P02 Carandang, as a result of the assault
upon his person while he was in the act of collecting the empty
bullet shells, are also unsupported by evidence. The trial court
simply took the testimony of P02 Carandang as the "biblical
truth;"29 and
3. The narration of P02 Carandang on how P/C Insp. Camacho and
SP02 Andaya were killed cannot stand the test of logic. He could not
have possibly witnessed the entire event at the precise moment
that he was also assaulted and injured.30
Notably, in their Reply,31 the petitioners incorporated a motion for
new trial based on alleged new and material evidence impugning
the credibility of P02 Carandang. They averred that in the case for
Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide which P02 Carandang also
filed against Nestor, docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-401 and
pending before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tanauan,
Batangas, his testimony therein given from October 10, 2007 to July
30, 2008 was different from his testimony in the case at bar. 32
Ruling of the Court
It is clear that the petitioners basically raise only questions of fact.
Nonetheless, the Court gave due course to the instant petition due
to the following reasons:
Firstly, pursuant to the settled rule that in a criminal case an appeal
throws the whole case open for review, 33 the Court, however, finds
that this case actually presents a question of law; specifically, on
whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them
was properly observed.
Secondly, the petitioners, in the Reply, invite the Court's attention
to the subsequent testimony of P02 Carandang in the later case
filed against Nestor.1âwphi1 The petitioners assert that said
testimony should be considered as new and material evidence
which thereby makes the findings of the trial court in the instant
case as manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible. Thus, the
petitioners moved for a new trial on the ground of alleged newly
discovered evidence without, however, necessarily withdrawing
their petition.
At the outset, the petitioners' motion for new trial is denied.
Clearly, the Rules of Court proscribe the availment of the remedy of
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence at this stage
of appeal. Section 1 of Rule 121 states:
At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the
court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with
the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
Under Section 14 of Rule 124, a motion for new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence may be filed at any time after the
appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the
judgment of the CA convicting the appellant becomes final. Further,
Rule 45, Section 1 clearly provides that a motion for new trial is not
46
among the remedies which may be entertained together with a
petition for appeal on certiorari.
More importantly, the alleged newly discovered evidence is not
worthy of the Court's consideration.
The petitioners allege that in the MTC proceedings, P02 Carandang
failed to positively identify who actually hit him and/or the persons
involved in the killing of P/C Insp. Camacho and SP02 Andaya which
is a complete tum-around from his testimony in the case at bar
where he positively identified the petitioners as the perpetrators. At
any rate, aside from this alleged glaring inconsistency of P02
Carandang's testimony, said subsequent testimony is marred by
inconsistencies in itself For instance, in his cross-examination on
May 14, 2008, he stated that when he came to his full
consciousness after being unconscious or dizzy for about two
minutes, he saw P/C Insp. Camacho and SP02 Andaya lying down;
then, during his re-cross examination on July 30, 2008, he stated
that when he regained consciousness after being unconscious or
dizzy for about five minutes, he did not see where P/C Insp.
Camacho or his other teammates were. Still, on numerous
occasions, he failed to categorically answer questions as he could
not recall. Considering the value of P02 Carandang's testimony, he
being the only eyewitness to the said fateful event, there would
have been no sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the
petitioners.34
However, the Court cannot agree with the petitioners' contention
that the testimony of P02 Carandang before the MTC effectively
cast doubt upon his previous testimony or makes it a falsity. The
MTC testimony was given after 10 years from the time P02
Carandang testified in the case at bar. Considering the length of
time that had elapsed and the frailty of human memory, the Court
gives more credence to P02 Carandang's testimony in the instant
case which was given after a year and 10 months from the incident
testified upon. In fact, the drama. of the fateful incident appeared
so fresh to P02 Carandang that in the course of his direct
examination on April 22, 1997 and while he was demonstrating how
Alfredo embraced P/C Insp. Camacho, he became 'emotional' when
asked about the next thing that happened to P/C Insp. Camacho.35
Jurisprudence dictates that even if a witness says that what he had
previously declared is false and that what he now says is true is not
sufficient ground to render the previous testimony as false. No such
reasoning has ever crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is
that a witness may be impeached by a previous contradictory
statement not that a previous statement is presumed to be false
merely because a witness now says that the same is not true.
Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has
been solemnly taken before a court of justice in an open and free
trial and under conditions precisely sought to discourage and
forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had
given the testimony later on changed his mind. Such a rule will
make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the
truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.36
Thus, the Court finds no reason to give merit to the petitioners'
contentions of alleged new evidence.
37
In Sison v. People of the Philippines, the Court has held that:
47
[W]hen the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and
conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality,
unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood
or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter
the result of the case. The trial judge enjoys the advantage of
observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying, x x x
all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better
determine if such witness were telling the truth, being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it
had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule
finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
sustained by the [CA].38
For this reason alone, the petition must fail.
However, the Court cannot totally affirm the rulings of the courts
below. As forthwith stated, an appeal in a criminal case opens the
entire case for review; the Court can correct errors unassigned in
the appeal. The Court finds that the Informations in this case failed
to allege all the elements which constitute the crime charged.
The petitioners are being charged with the complex crime of Direct
Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Articles 148 and 249, in relation to
Article 48, of the RPC.
The RPC provides:
Art. 148. Direct assaults. -Any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in defining the crimes
of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion
of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding ₱l,000.00 pesos, when the assault is committed with a
weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or
when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of
these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding
₱500.00 pesos shall be imposed.
Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance
of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished
by reclusion temporal.
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
While the elements constituting the crime of Homicide were
properly alleged in the two Informations and were duly established
48
in the trial, the said Informations, however, failed to allege all the
elements constitutive of the applicable form of direct assault. To be
more specific, the Informations do not allege that the
offenders/petitioners knew that the ones they were assaulting were
agents of a person in authority, in the exercise of their duty.
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in
two ways: first, by "any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of
any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion
and sedition"; and second, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate
or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged
in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance."39 (Citation omitted)
Indubitably, the instant case falls under the second form of direct
assault. The following elements must be present, to wit:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c)
makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance;
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent;
3. That at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his
agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or
(b) is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties;
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person
in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and
5. That there is no public uprising.
In the instant case, the Informations40 alleged the following, to wit:
1. That on or about the 4th day of June 1995, at about 5:00 p.m., in
Barangay Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together,
acting in common accord and mutually helping one another, Nestor
while armed with an armalite rifle, with intent to kill and without
any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm the
victims, SP02 Andaya/P/C Insp. Camacho;
2. That the said victims are bona fide members of the PNP assigned
at Tanauan Police Station, and one of them was the current Chief of
Police ofTanauan, Batangas; and
3. That at the time of the incident, they were engaged in the
performance of their official duties.
In the course of the trial, the evidence presented sufficiently
established the foregoing allegations including the fact that the
petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a person
in authority, as the latter introduced themselves to be members of
the PNP.
Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners
came to know that the victims were agents of a person in authority
cannot cure the lack of allegation in the Informations that such fact
was known to the accused which renders the same defective. In
addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance under paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the RPC
for acts committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the
49
offended party on account of his rank to justify the imposition of an
increased penalty against the petitioners.
As the Court held in People v. Rodil:41
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew
because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he
was an agent of a person in authority, he cannot be convicted of the
complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person
in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not
allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the
time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority.
The information simply alleges that appellant did "attack and stab
PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of
his official duties, ... " Such an allegation cannot be an adequate
substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the
complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense.
Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly
and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the
absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying
circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack
on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer,
could be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt of/or
with insult to public authorities" (Par. [2], Art. XIV of the [RPC], or as
an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, ... "(Par. 3, Art. XIV, [RPC]).
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the
person attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention
to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority.42
"The Constitution mandates that the accused, in all criminal
prosecutions, shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. From this fundamental precept
proceeds the rule that the accused may be convicted only of the
crime with which he is charged. "43 This right is accorded by the
Constitution so that the accused can prepare an adequate defense
against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not
alleged while he is concentrating on his defense against the ground
alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. 44 It must be
noted that said constitutional right is implemented by the process
of arraignment45 in which the allegations in the document charging
an offense is read and made known to the accused. Accordingly, a
Complaint or Information which does not contain all the elements
constituting the crime charged cannot serve as a means by which
said constitutional requirement is satisfied. Corollarily, the fact that
all the elements of the crime were duly proven in trial cannot cure
the defect of a Complaint or Information to serve its constitutional
purpose.
Pursuant to the said constitutional precept, the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure requires that every element of the offense
must be alleged in the complaint or information so as to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense. Corollarily, qualifying
circumstances or generic aggravating circumstances will not be
appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the Information. This
requirement is now laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, to
wit:
50
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection
of the statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or om1ss1ons complained
of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly mandates
that qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language in the complaint or information.
When the law or rules specify certain circumstances that can
aggravate an offense or that would attach to such offense a greater
penalty than that ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be
both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the
increased penalty.46 Due to such requirement being pro reo, the
Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even
those charged with felonies committed prior to December 1,
2000 (i.e., the date of the effectivity of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement).47
In People v. Flores, Jr., 48 as reiterated in the more recent cases
of People v. Pangilinan49 and People v. Dadulla,50 the Court ruled
that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him cannot be waived
for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the
complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to
meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the
elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed.
For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly
proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint
or information.51 In other words, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. 52 Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, an accused's failure to raise an objection to the
insufficiency or defect in the information would not amount to a
waiver of any objection based on said ground or irregularity.
Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
procedure reads:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.-
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he
did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections EXCEPT THOSE
based in the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i)
of Section 3 of this Rule.
Indeed, the foregoing provision provides that if an accused fails to
assert all the grounds available to him under Section 3 of Rule 117
in his motion to quash, or if he, altogether, fails to file i motion a
51
quash - any I objection based on the ground or grounds he failed
the raise through a motion to quash shall be deemed waived,
except the following, thus:
SEC. 3. Grounds. - x x x: I
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;
x x xx !
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; [and] x
x xx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of
the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Therefore, the petitioners can only be convicted of the crime of
Homicide instead of the complex crime of Direct Assault Upon an
Agent of a Person in Authority with Homicide due to the simple
reason that the Informations do not sufficiently charge the latter.
[T]he real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint
or information ... it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal
appearing in the title of the information that determines the
character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the
Information. 53
Nevertheless, by reason of the fact that the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of acts committed with insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank was proven in the course of the trial, exemplary damages
should be awarded in each case in addition to such other damages
that were already awarded by the courts below. Exemplary
damages are justified regardless of whether or not the generic or
qualifying aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information.
The grant in this regard should be in the sum of ₱30,000.00.54 In the
case of People v. Catubig,55 the Court elucidated on the nature of
exemplary damages, thus:
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. x x x In common law, there is preference in
the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for
injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation
suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been
maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there
should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence
or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud - that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are
often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct.
In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to
52
deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future. 56 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Accordingly, since the petitioners are all found to be principally
liable for the crimes committed as conspiracy was duly proven,
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 should be
awarded against each of them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioners Nestor Guelos, Rodrigo Guelos, Gil
Carandang and SP02 Alfredo Carandang y Prescilla are hereby found
GUILTY of Homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (I) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The fine of ₱ l,000.00 is DELETED. In addition to the
amount of damages and civil indemnity that were already awarded
by the courts below to the respective heirs of Police Chief Inspector
Rolando Camacho and Senior Police Officer 2 Estelito Andaya, each
of the petitioners are also directed to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages to each of the victims.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 214925, April 26, 2017
JOHN LABSKY P. MAXIMO AND ROBERT M.
PANGANIBAN, Petitioners, v. FRANCISCO Z. VILLAPANDO,
JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 214965, April 26, 2017

FRANCISCO Z. VILLAPANDO, JR., Petitioners, v. MAKATI CITY
PROSECUTION OFFICE, JOHN LABSKY P. MAXIMO AND ROBERT M.
PANGANIBAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated June 13,
2014, and Resolution2 dated October 16, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131085 which reversed the
Decision3 dated May 30, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 150, Makati City in Special Civil Action No. 13-473. The RTC
affirmed the Order4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (METC), Branch
67, Makati City denying the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner
Francisco Z. Villapando, Jr. (Villapando).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Villapando is the assignee of Enhanced Electronics and
Communications Services, Inc. of Condominium Unit No. 2821 and
parking slot at the Legazpi Place in Makati City. Petitioners John
Labsky P. Maximo (Maximo) and Robert M. Panganiban
(Panganiban) are Directors of ASB Realty Corporation (now, St.
Francis Square Realty Corp.), the developer of the said
condominium unit.5
On November 23, 2010, Villapando filed before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati), a complaint6 against
Maximo and Panganiban and other directors/officers of ASB Realty
53
Corp. (ASB) for Violation of Sections 17,7 208 and 259 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 957, otherwise known as the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree.
Villapando alleged in his complaint that there was failure on the
part of Maximo and Panganiban and the other directors/officers of
ASB to comply with PD No. 957 relative to the registration of
contracts to sell and deeds of sale (Sec. 17), time of completion
(Sec. 20) and issuance of title (Sec. 25) with respect to the
aforementioned condominium unit.
The said criminal complaint for Violation of Sections 17, 20 and 25
was dismissed by the OCP-Makati in its Resolution10 dated July 12,
2011 on the ground that prior to the estimated date of completion
of the condominium unit, ASB encountered liquidity problems and
instituted a petition for rehabilitation with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) which showed good faith on the part of
ASB.11
On February 24, 2011, Maximo instituted a Complaint12 for Perjury,
Incriminating Innocent Person and Unjust Vexation against
Villapando docketed as NPS-No. XV-05-INV-11-B-00509. The
complaint was assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP)
Evangeline Viudez-Canobas.13
On October 10, 2011, Panganiban also filed a
Complaint14 for Perjury and Unjust Vexation against Villapando
docketed as NPS-No. XV-05-INV-11-C-00601. The complaint was
assigned to ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.15
The common allegation in the complaints of Maximo and
Panganiban was that Villapando committed perjury when the latter
alleged in the complaint he filed against them that they were
officers and directors of ASB at the time the Deed of Sale was
executed between ASB and Enhanced Electronics on February 28,
1997. They claimed that they were not even employees of ASB in
1997 as they were both minors at that time.
After the filing of the Counter-Affidavit,16 Reply-Affidavit,17 and
Rejoinder-Affidavit,18 ACP Canobas issued a Resolution19 (Canobas
Resolution) on August 3, 2011 finding probable cause against
Villapando for the crime of perjury but dismissed the complaints for
unjust vexation and incriminating innocent person. The Resolution
was approved20 by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor (SACP)
Christopher Garvida.
Accordingly, on August 15, 2011, an Information21 dated July 26,
2011 for Perjury was filed against Villapando before Branch 67 of
the METC, Makati City. The Information was signed by ACP Canobas
and sworn to before ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.
Meanwhile, on August 31, 2011,Villapando filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration22 of the Canobas Resolution before the OCP-Makati
alleging that the Information was filed without the prior written
authority of the City Prosecutor. He also stated that violations of
Sections 17, 20 and 25 are committed not at the time of the
execution of the contract to sell but after the execution of the
contract, and that there is no allegation in his complaint-affidavit
that Maximo was part of the "scheme in the execution of the
contract to sell."
Pending resolution of the aforesaid motion for partial
reconsideration, a warrant of arrest against Villapando was issued
54
by the METC.23 On October 14, 2011, Villapando filed a Motion to
Quash Information24 alleging that the person who filed the
Information had no authority to do so. He asserted that the
Information, as well as the Resolution finding probable cause
against him, did not bear the approval of the City Prosecutor of
Makati, Feliciano Aspi, which is contrary to Section 4 of Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court.
On October 20, 2011, Villapando filed a Supplemental Motion to
Quash Information25 on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. According to Villapando, violations of
Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing crimes, hence,
the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense and
a quashal of the same is warranted.
After the filing of the Consolidated Opposition26 by Maximo and
Panganiban, as well as the Reply27 thereto filed by Villapando, the
METC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order28 dated November
11, 2011. The METC ruled that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions should be appreciated in favor of
the public prosecutors. It found that the certification by ACP
Canobas in the Information stating that the filing of the Information
was with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor constitutes
substantial compliance with the rules. As to the allegation that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, the METC held that the
elements of the crime of perjury were sufficiently alleged in the
Information. The decretal portion of the METC Decision states:
WHEREFORE, considering that this case can still be heard and
threshed out in a full blown trial, the Court DENIES the Motion to
Quash the Information dated October 14, 2011 and its Supplements
(to Motion to Quash Information) dated October 19, 2011.
SO ORDERED.29
Villapando moved for reconsideration30of the Order of the METC
dated November 11, 2011. Maximo and Panganiban opposed31 the
motion and Villapando replied32 thereto. Also, a supplement33 to the
motion was filed on June 14, 2012.
Meanwhile, after an exchange of pleadings - counter-
affidavit,34 reply-affidavit,35 and rejoinder-affidavit,36 ACP Vermug,
Jr. issued a Resolution37 (Vermug Resolution) in NPS-No. XV-05-INV-
11-C-00601 on January 13, 2012 finding probable cause against
Villapando for the crime of perjury but dismissed the complaint for
unjust vexation. The Resolution was approved38 by Senior Assistant
City Prosecutor (SACP) Christopher Garvida who recommended for
the filing of an Amended Information before the METC to include
Panganiban as one of the complainants.
Thus, on January 19, 2012, the prosecution filed a Motion to Amend
the Information and to Admit Attached Information39 to include
Panganiban as one of the complainants in the case.
At this point, for a clear reading of the subsequent procedural
incidents, We separately state the proceedings before the
Department of Justice (DOJ) from the proceedings before the
courts.
Proceedings before the DOJ:
55
As earlier stated, the Canobas Resolution pertains to the complaint
for perjury filed by Maximo against Villapando which gave rise to
the filing of the Information before the MeTC, but a motion to
partially reconsider the said resolution was filed by Villapando.
On the other hand, the Vermug Resolution pertains to the
complaint for perjury filed by Panganiban against Villapando which
gave rise to the filing of an Amended Information. On February 13,
2012, Villapando filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration40 of the
Vermug Resolution before the OCP-Makati.
On February, 21, 2012, the OCP-Makati issued an Order41 denying
Villapando's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Canobas
Resolution. The Order stated that there was prior written authority
for the City Prosecutor in filing the Information by virtue of Office
Order No. 32 dated July 29, 2011. The finding of probable cause was
also affirmed. The Order was approved by City Prosecutor Feliciano
Aspi.
Likewise, on March 20, 2012, the OCP-Makati issued an
Order42 denying Villapando's Motion for Partial Reconsideration43 of
the Vermug Resolution. The said Order merely reiterated the ruling
in the Order dated February 21, 2012 denying the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Canobas Resolution. The said Order was also
approved by City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi.
Aggrieved, Villapando filed separate petitions for review of the
Canobas Resolution and the Vermug Resolution dated March 31,
201244and May 7, 2012,45 respectively, before the DOJ. He stated in
the petitions the same allegations in his motions for partial
reconsideration. In addition, he contended that there was even no
proof that Maximo and Panganiban were still minors at the time of
the execution of the contract to sell because they did not submit
any birth certificate.
46
On November 28, 2013, a Resolution was issued by Prosecutor
General Claro A. Arellano denying the petitions for review filed by
Villapando for failure to append to the petitions proof that a motion
to suspend proceedings has been filed in court. The copies of the
resolution and the complaint affidavit were likewise declared not
verified.
Proceedings before the courts:
As previously mentioned, Villapando moved to reconsider the denial
of his motion to quash the Information before the METC. In an
Order47 dated February 11, 2013, the METC denied Villapando's
motion for reconsideration thereby affirming the validity of the
information, and at the same time, granted the prosecution's
Motion to Amend the Information.
The Amended Information48 was signed by ACP Evangeline P.
Viudez-Canobas and sworn to before ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr.
On April 25, 2013, Villapando elevated the case to the RTC of Makati
City via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction)49 assailing the Orders of the METC dated November 11,
2011 and February 11, 2013. A Comment50 thereto was filed by
Maximo and Panganiban, and a Reply to Comment51 was filed by
Villapando.
56
Subsequently, on May 30, 2013, the RTC issued a Decision, the
dispositive portion of which states, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed 11 November
2011 order of respondent Judge in Crim. Case No. 36741 which
denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the Information with
supplement and the order dated February 11, 2013 which denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Public
Prosecutor's motion to amend Information and admit attached
amended Information are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.52
The RTC ratiocinated that from the denial of the motion to quash,
Villapando should have gone to trial without prejudice to reiterating
his special defenses invoked in his motion. In the event that an
adverse decision is rendered, an appeal therefrom should be the
next legal step. Nonetheless, it found that the presumption of
regularity exists in the filing of the information on the basis of the
certification of ACP Canobas and ACP Vermug, Jr., coupled with the
approval of the resolution by Garvida, stating that the filing of the
Information was with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor. The
RTC posited that the presumption has not been disputed by the City
Prosecutor.
Undaunted, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition53 dated July 31,
2013 was filed by Villapando before the CA. He raised before the CA
the same issues: a) that the Information was filed without the prior
written authority of the City Prosecutor; b) that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense. A comment54 on the petition was filed by
Maximo and Panganiban and a Reply55 thereto was filed by
Villapando.
Before the CA, the parties filed their respective Formal Offer of
Exhibits dated January 10, 2014 and January 14, 201456 for
Villapando and Maximo and Panganiban, respectively.57 The parties
also filed their respective memoranda.58
On June 13, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC
Decision. The fallo of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150, in Special Civil
Action No. 13-473 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 367041 pending in Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Makati City is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing
of new Information by an authorized officer.
SO ORDERED.59
Despite the dismissal of the case for perjury filed against him, and
considering that the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of
a new information against him, Villapando moved for a partial
reconsideration60 of the CA Decision. Villapando argued that the CA
did not resolve the second issue he brought before it, that is, that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense. A Comment61 to the
motion was filed by Maximo and Panganiban. Villapando62 replied
to the comment.
On the other hand, Maximo and Panganiban, as the private
complainants in the aforesaid case for perjury, filed against
57
Villapando also moved for reconsideration63 on the dismissal of the
case by the CA. An Opposition64 thereto was filed by Villapando.
On October 16, 2014, the motions for reconsideration filed by both
parties were denied by the CA.
Subsequently, Maximo and Panganiban filed a petition for review
on certiorari65 before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 214925.
Villapando followed suit and its petition66 was docketed as G.R. No.
214965.
A Motion to Consolidate67 the two cases was filed by Villapando on
April 29, 2015. In this Court's Resolution68 dated July 13, 2015, We
ordered the consolidation considering that the two cases "have
common facts and are rooted in the same issues."
G.R. No. 214925
We first resolve the petition filed by Maximo and Panganiban which
is anchored on the following assigned errors:
First Reason
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT TOOK
COGNIZANCE OF RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED
UNDER RULE 65 BECAUSE -
a. IT IS A WRONG REMEDY;
b. THE RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, BEING AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY,
WARRANTED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION:
 c. THE PETITION WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A FALSE
VERIFICATION.
Second Reason
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WAS PROPERLY FILED;
Third Reason
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
RESPONDENT DID NOT COMMIT FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE HIS
FILING OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES, FACTS, ISSUES AND
RELIEFS; and
Fourth Reason
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE TWO
INFORMATIONS WERE NOT PROPERLY FILED DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THEIR FILING AS WELL AS THE RESOLUTIONS
RECOMMENDING THEIR FILING WERE MADE WITH PRIOR
AUTHORITY OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR AND AFFIRMED BY THE CITY
PROSECUTOR WHEN HE SUBSEQUENTLY DENIED THE
RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION ON THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS.69
Maximo and Panganiban asserted in their petition that the denial of
a petition for certiorari is a final order, such that, the remedy of the
aggrieved party on a final order is to appeal the same. Even
assuming that certiorari is available, the petition with the CA should
58
have not been allowed for failure to file the requisite motion for
reconsideration with the RTC prior to the filing of the petition. They
also argued that since an action must be brought against
indispensable parties, the instant petition should be dismissed for
failure to implead the People in the petition before the RTC and the
CA.
Maximo and Panganiban further averred that Villapando committed
forum shopping because the issues raised before the CA were the
same issues brought before the DOJ on a petition for review. They
also pointed out that the petition filed with the CA was prepared
only on July 31, 2013, but the verification was executed on June 20,
2013, or forty-one (41) days prior to the preparation of the petition.
Maximo and Panaganiban also contended that the Information
bears the certification that the filing of the same has the prior
authority or approval of the City Prosecutor. The non-presentation
of DOJ Office Order No. 32 which was the basis of the authority in
filing the Information is immaterial on the ground that public
officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their functions. They also pointed out that the issuance of the Order
of the City Prosecutor himself denying Villapando's Partial Motion
for Reconsideration, in effect, affirmed the validity of the
Information filed.70
In the Comment71 to the Petition filed by Villapando, he countered
that under the circumstances of the case, appeal is not the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of law,
hence, certiorari may validly lie. He explained that this case
stemmed from a complaint that he filed with the OCP Makati City
against Maximo and Panganiban as directors of ASB for violations of
Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957. He believed that the instant
complaint was merely filed in retaliation to his earlier complaint.
Villapando declared that the petition was properly verified. He
stated that during the Oral Argument before the CA on January 7,
2014, he narrated that his counsel explained to him the contents of
the draft of the petition, and the original of the verification page
was earlier sent to him for his perusal and signature. After reading
the draft, he immediately signed the final form/original of the
verification because he had then a scheduled trip abroad. He also
emphasized that the People was represented by the Makati City
Prosecution Office before the RTC and by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) before the CA, and were duly furnished with copies
of all the pleadings.
In the Reply72 of Maximo and Panganiban, they insisted that for
failure to implead the People in the petition with the CA, the CA did
not acquire jurisdiction over the parties.
In the petition filed by Maximo and Villapando, the core issue for
this Court's resolution relates to the validity of the Amended
Information at bar.
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
states that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior
written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a
complaint or information may be filed before the courts, viz.:
Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If
the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for
trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall
certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the
59
record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he
was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record
of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days
from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties
of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
x x x73
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the
courts without the prior written authority or approval of the
foregoing authorized officers render the same defective and,
therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of
the same Rules, to wit:
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint
or information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person
of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to
do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of
the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.74
In the case at bar, Villapando is charged in the Amended
Information which reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO Z. VILLAPANDO of
the crime of perjury under THE REVISED PENAL CODE art. 183,
committed as follows:
On or about the 23rd of November 2010, in the city of Makati, the
Philippines, accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and falsely subscribe and swear to a complaint-affidavit
docketed as NPS No. XV-05-INV-10K-03327 before Assistant City
Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos of the Office of the City Prosecutor at
60
Makati, a duly appointed, qualified, and acting as such, and in which
complaint, said accused subscribed and swore to, among other
things, facts known to him to be untrue, that is: complainants John
Labsky P. Maximo and Robert M. Panganiban were one of the
officers of ASB Realty Corporation and/or St. Francis Square Realty
Corporation conspired with the other officers in the commission of
the crime of violation of P.D 957 for entering into the contract to
sell with Enhanced Electronics & Communication Services, Inc.
involving the condominium unit and failure to register the sale and
to complete the project and to deliver the title over the unit, when
in truth and in fact as the said accused very well knew at the time
he swore to and signed the said complaint that said statement
appearing therein were false and untrue because at the time when
the contract to sell was made between the parties, complainants
were not even an employee/officers of the ASB Realty Corporation
and was still under age, and the above false statements were made
in order to impute complainants to a crime they did not commit, to
their damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(signed)
BENJAMIN S. VERMUG, JR.
Assistant City Prosecutor
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have conducted a preliminary investigation
in this case in accordance with law; that I have, or as shown by the
record, an authorized officer has personally examined complainant
and witnesses, that on the basis of sworn statements and other
evidence submitted before me there is reasonable ground to
believe that the crime has been committed and that accused is
probably guilty thereof, that accused was informed of the complaint
and of the evidence submitted against him and was given the
opportunity to submit controverting evidence. I further certify that
the filing of this Information is with the prior authority or approval
of the City Prosecutor.
(signed)
BENJAMIN S. VERMUG, JR.
Assistant City Prosecutor
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of July 2011 in
the City of Makati.
(signed)
EVANGELINE P. VIUDEZ-CANOBAS
Assistant City Prosecutor
Maximo and Panganiban argued in their petition that the CA erred
in holding that the Information did not comply with the rule
requiring prior written authority or approval of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor. They pointed out that the Information bears
the certification that the filing of the same had the prior authority or
approval of the City Prosecutor who is the officer authorized to file
information in court. According to them, there is a presumption that
prior written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor was
obtained in the filing of the Information, such that, the non-
presentation of Office Order No. 32, which was the alleged basis of
the authority in filing the Information, is immaterial.
61
In the cases of People v. Garfin,75Turingan v. Garfin,76 and Tolentino
v. Paqueo,77 this Court had already rejected similarly-worded
certifications uniformly holding that, despite such certifications, the
Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing
the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to
show that they obtained prior written authority from any of those
authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.78
Therefore, there must be a demonstration that prior written
delegation or authority was given by the city prosecutor to the
assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the information.
We have recognized this valid delegation of authority in the case
of Quisay v. People,79viz.:
In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion
to quash on the grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor of Makati may
delegate its authority to approve the filing of the Pabatid
Sakdal pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati
Office Order No. 32; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a
Certification stating that its filing before the RTC was with the prior
written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.
The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA
10071, which gave the City Prosecutor the power to "[investigate
and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within
their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information
or complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons
accused," he may indeed delegate his power to his subordinates as
he may deem necessary in the interest of the prosecution service.
The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this
provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati
Office Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs or review
prosecutors "authority to approve or act on any resolution, order,
issuance, other action, and any information recommended by any
prosecutor for approval," without necessarily diminishing the City
Prosecutor's authority to act directly in appropriate cases. By virtue
of the foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated
SACP Hirang, Deputy City Prosecutor Emmanuel D. Medina, and
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review
prosecutors for the OCP-Makati.
In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to
indict petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made as it bore
the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-
Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.
In the case at bar, if indeed there was no proof of valid delegation of
authority as found by the CA, We are constrained not to accord the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions in
the filing of the Amended Information. The CA ruling states:
x x x We scoured the records of the case and We did not find a copy
of the purported Office Order No, 32 allegedly authorizing the
Assistant City Prosecutor to sign in behalf of the city prosecutor.
While We, too, are not oblivious of the enormous responsibility and
the heavy volume of work by our prosecutors, We believe that such
reality does not excuse them to comply with the mandatory
requirement stated in our rules of procedure. Moreover, the said
Office Order No. 32 is not a matter of judicial notice, hence, a copy
of the same must be presented in order for the court to have
62
knowledge of the contents of which. In the absence thereof, We
find that there was no valid delegation of the authority by the City
Prosecutor to its Assistant Prosecutor.80
xxxx
Applying the foregoing lessons from our jurisprudence, We certainly
cannot equate the approval of the Assistant City Prosecutor to that
of his superior. Clearly, we see nothing in the record which
demonstrates the prior written delegation or authority given by the
city prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing
of the information.
For the lack of such prior written authority, the inescapable result is
that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because
there is a defect in the Information. It is for the same reason that
there is no point in compelling petitioner to undergo trial under a
defective information that could never be the basis of a valid
conviction.81
Furthermore, We find untenable the argument of Maximo and
Panganiban that the issuance of the Order dated February 21, 2012,
bearing the signature of the City Prosecutor, denying Villapando's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration, in effect, affirmed the validity of
the Information filed.82
The case of People v. Garfin,83firmly instructs that the filing of an
Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the
same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by
silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. In the
said case, We lift the ruling in Villa v. Ibañez, et al.:84
x x x Now, the objection to the respondent's actuations goes to the
very foundation of the jurisdiction. It is avalid information signed by
a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the
subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an
infirmity in the information cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.85
An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. The court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the
Information.86 There is no point in proceeding under a defective
Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction.87
As to the issue raised by Maximo and Panganiban which relates to
the propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by Villapando
in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash,
We find the same untenable.
In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed
by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a
judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower courts' decision of
conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his
motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court
but as an added ground to overturn the latter's ruling.88
In this case, Villapando did not proceed to trial but opted to
immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
63
It is also settled that a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion
to quash an information. The established rule is that when such an
adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort
forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case
in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to
take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.89
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order
and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory order is not
allowed under Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.90 Neither
can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be
used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain
and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an
interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.91
Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an
exception rather than the general rule, and is a recourse that must
be firmly grounded on compelling reasons.92
However, on a number of occasions, We have recognized that in
certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to
quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following
exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest
of a more enlightened and substantial justice; (d) to promote public
welfare and public policy; and (e) when the cases have attracted
nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch
in the consideration thereof.93
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the
petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or
order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate
and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing
that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the
cited instances.94
In the case at bar, We find that there was a compelling reason to
justify a resort to a petition for certiorari against the Order of the
METC. Villapando was able to show that the factual circumstances
of his case fall under any of the above exceptional circumstances.
The METC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to quash filed by Villapando. We adopt the ruling of the CA
on this matter:
In this petition, petitioner insists that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing his Petition for Certiorari despite
the lack of authority to file the information from the City
Prosecutor, on the basis of the principle of "presumption of
regularity". Verily, the issue raised in this Petition goes into the very
authority of the court over the case. This is because a finding of the
lack of authority for the assistant prosecutor in approving the
probable cause resolution necessarily invalidates the information,
and thereby ousts the court of jurisdiction to try and decide the
case.95 As will be discussed later, petitioner was able to establish the
merit of his contention.
64
Likewise, We cannot ignore the fact, as admitted by the private
respondents, that this case stemmed from a complaint filed by
Petitioner with the Makati City Prosecution Office against private
respondents, as directors of ASB for violations of Secs. 17, 20 and 25
of PD No. 957 or the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's
Protective Decree. Petitioner since the inception of this case, has
been insistent that the criminal complaints filed by private
respondents were merely filed in retaliation of his earlier complaint.
Thus, to deny petitioner the relief of a writ of certiorari and force
him to go to trial would be self-defeating. To require Petitioner to
go to the prescribed route of undergoing trial and filing an appeal
thereafter, will undoubtly expose him to the injuries which he seeks
to promptly avoid by filing the instant Petition.96
As correctly held by the CA, the METC committed an error of
jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Villapando's
motion to quash the Information as will be shown in the succeeding
discussion.
Moreover, We recognize that the petition for certiorari filed by
Villapando before the RTC was an original action whose resulting
decision is a final order that completely disposed of the petition.
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,97 states that cases decided
by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction must be
appealed to the CA. Nonetheless, We have allowed exceptions for
good cause that could warrant the relaxation of the rule as in this
case.98 As discussed above, the RTC gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing the petition of Villapando thereby affirming the denial of
his motion to quash before the METC. We note that Villapando's
liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal
proceedings against him such that a resort to a petition
for certiorari is recognized.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board,
or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.99
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction,
or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts which courts have
no power or authority in law to perform.100
Anent the issue on forum shopping, We held in the case of Flores v.
Secretary Gonzales, et al.101 that there is no forum shopping when a
petition is filed with the CA while another petition is pending with
the DOJ Secretary, thus:
We wish to point out that, notwithstanding the pendency of the
Information before the MTCC, especially considering the reversal by
the Secretary of Justice of his May 31, 2006 Resolution, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, anchored on the
alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of Secretary of Justice, was an available
remedy to Flores as an aggrieved party.
In the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals is not being asked
to cause the dismissal of the case in the trial court, but only to
resolve the issue of whether the Secretary of Justice acted with
65
grave abuse of discretion in either affirming or reversing the finding
of probable cause against the accused. But still the rule stands the
decision whether to dismiss the case or not rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court where the Information was filed. As
jurisdiction was already acquired by the MTCC, this jurisdiction is
not lost despite a resolution by the Secretary of Justice to withdraw
the information or to dismiss the case, notwithstanding the
deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the accused and
further proceedings, and not even if the Secretary of Justice is
affirmed by the higher courts.
Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed
by the appellate courts, since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or
disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would
be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to
determine a prima facie case. Thus, the trial court may make an
independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the
affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended
to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the
court may order the latter to produce before it; or any evidence
already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the
motion is filed by the public prosecutor. The trial court should make
its assessment separately and independently of the evaluation of
the prosecution or of the Secretary of Justice.102
The filing of an appeal with the DOJ as well as the filing of the
petition with the CA would not constitute forum shopping for the
reason that the finding of the DOJ would not be binding upon the
courts. In other words, even if the DOJ recommends dismissal of the
criminal case against petitioner, such resolution would merely be
advisory, and not binding upon the courts. The DOJ ruling on the
petition for review would not constitute as res judicata on the case
at bar, neither can it conflict with resolution of the court on the
propriety of dismissing the case.
Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and
possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or
the special civil action of certiorari. There can also be forum
shopping when a party institutes two or more suits in different
courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the
courts to rule on the same and related causes and/or to grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs on the supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a
party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action.103
Maximo and Panganiban additionally raised the issue that the
People of the Philippines was not impleaded as a respondent in the
case nor was the Office of the Solicitor General furnished a copy of
the petition.
Section 5,104 Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that
all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is thus the
concern of the government prosecutors. The purpose in impleading
the People of the Philippines as respondent in the RTC and in the CA
is to enable the public prosecutor or Solicitor General, as the case
may be, to comment on the petitions.105 Evidently, in this case, the
People was represented by the Makati City Prosecution Office
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before the RTC and by the Office of the Solicitor General before the
CA and were duly furnished with copies of all the pleadings.
Lastly, We find in the negative the issue of whether the non-filing by
Villapando of a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision is
fatal to his petition for certiorari,106 While a motion for
reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition
for certiorari, this Court has recognized exceptions to the
requirement and cannot unduly uphold technicalities at the expense
of a just resolution of the case.107
In addition, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. Thus, in several cases, this Court has ruled
against the dismissal of petitions or appeals based solely on
technicalities. Technicalities may be set aside when the strict and
rigid application of the rules will frustrate rather than promote
justice.108
The foregoing considered, We deny the petition filed by Maximo
and Panganiban on the ground that, as found by the CA, the records
of the case is bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of
Makati had authorized ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr. to file the
subject Amended Information. Thus, the instant defective Amended
Information must be quashed. The CA did not err in finding grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in affirming the denial of
Villapando's motion to quash the Amended Information.
G.R. No. 214965
We now turn to the petition filed by Villapando which raised the
following arguments:109
I. Violations of Section 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. 957 are
committed not upon the execution of the Contract to Sell
between the Developer and Buyer, but thereafter. They
continue to be committed until full compliance of the
requirements and mandate of law.
II. Violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. 957 are
continuing offenses.
III. Violations of Section 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. 957 are
continuing offenses, hence, the allegations of the
Information and amended Information against petitioner do
not constitute the offense charged (perjury).
IV. The CA should not have skirted but resolved the foregoing
substantial legal issues.
Villapando asserted in his petition that it was necessary for the CA
to have resolved the nature of the violation of Sections 17, 20 and
25 of P.D. No. 957 to determine whether he could be held liable for
the crime of perjury. He stated that nothing in P.D. No. 957 would
suggest that violation of its provisions is committed at the time of
the execution of the contract to sell between the developer and the
buyer. According to him, there can be no violation at the time of the
execution of the contract because it could not yet be determined if
the developer will not comply with the law. Violations occur from
the time the developer fails to comply with the law, and continue to
be committed until the developer shall have fully complied with the
law.
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Villapando argued in his petition that assuming arguendo that
Maximo and Panganiban were not employees/officers of ASB at the
time of the execution of the contract to sell between ASB and
Enhanced, they may still be held liable being undisputedly directors
of ASB at the time the complaint was filed against them, during
which, there was alleged continued non-compliance with Sections
17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957. Nonetheless, Villapando insisted that
he never alleged in his complaint that Maximo and Panganiban
were employees/officers of ASB at the time of the execution of the
contract to sell. Instead, the two became officers only in 2010 as
evidenced by the Articles of Incorporation he attached to his
complaint. He further argued that the said issue is not material to
the charge for violation of P.D. No. 957, and thus, no crime of
perjury was committed.
In the Comment110 of Maximo and Panganiban, they argued that
Villapando misconstrued the concept of continuing crimes. A
continuing crime requires a series of acts which stems from a single
criminal resolution. The alleged violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25
of P.D. No. 957 consist of omissions such that the non-compliance
thereof cannot constitute a continuing crime. They stated that the
issue as to whether the violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D.
No. 957 are continuing offenses is a matter of defense which cannot
be raised in a motion to quash. They also stressed that the
complaint of Villapando against the ASB had already prescribed as
ruled by the DOJ in its Resolution dated. December 12, 2014.111
In Reply112 to the Comment of Maximo and Panganiban, Villapando
insisted that violation of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 has
not yet prescribed. He learned that there was violation of Section 17
of P.D. No. 957 only when he received the certification of the
Makati City Register of Deeds dated May 12, 2010 stating that the
contract to sell has not been registered with its office. He also
stated that the DOJ Resolution dated December 12, 2014 was
brought before this Court on February 18, 2015 via a petition
for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 216546 entitled Francisco Z.
Villapando, Jr. v. Hon Leila de Lima.113
In the Comment114 filed by the OSG, it contended that unless and
until the City Prosecutor files a new information for Perjury against
Villapando, there would be no actual case to speak of and there
would be no need for the court to resolve the issue regarding the
nature of the violation of the provisions of P.D. No. 957.
In the Reply115 to the Comment of the OSG, Villapando averred that
it is proper for this Court that the legal issue be resolved to avoid a
circuitous and vexatious litigation.
Basically, the petition of Villapando imputes grave error on the part
of the CA in not resolving the substantive issue as to whether
violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing
offenses.
The argument need not detain Us. This Court's power of review may
be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies
dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented.116
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an
opposite legal claim susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
68
legal interest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief.117
We agree with the argument proffered by the OSG that unless and
until the City Prosecutor files a new information for perjury against
Villapando, there would be no actual case to speak of and there
would be no need for the court to resolve the issue regarding the
nature of the violation of the provisions of P.D. No. 957. The
resolution on whether Sections 17, 20 and 25 of P.D. No. 957 are
continuing offenses would necessarily pre-empt the outcome of the
trial before the proper court should an information be re-filed by
the City Prosecutor.
Quite notable is the statement of Villapando in his Reply that he
filed a petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R. No.
216546 questioning the ruling of the DOJ Secretary in sustaining the
denial of his complaint for violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25 of
P.D. No. 957. Apparently, the arguments he raised in G.R. No.
216546 as to the nature of the violations of Sections 17, 20 and 25
of P.D. No. 957 are the same arguments he is raising in the instant
petition.
Based on the foregoing, We deny the petition filed by Villapando
and imputes no grave error on the part of the CA in not resolving
the substantive issue as to whether violations of Sections 17, 20 and
25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing offenses. We, therefore, uphold
the ruling of the CA that since the Amended Information was
defective on its face for having been filed by an unauthorized
person, there was no need to resolve whether Sections 17, 20 and
25 of P.D. No. 957 are continuing offenses without pre-empting the
trial court should an Information be filed by the prosecution.
As a final note, We need to state that had the prosecutor and the
MeTC presiding judge been aware of the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court on the matter, the defect in the Information could
have been cured before the arraignment of the accused by a simple
motion of the public prosecution to amend the Information; the
amendment at this stage of the proceedings being a matter of right
on the part of the prosecution, or for the court to direct the
amendment thereof to show the signature or approval of the City
Prosecutor in filing the Information. Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court mandates that if the motion to quash is based on the
alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured
by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
Had either of these two been done, this case should have not
unnecessarily reached this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 13, 2014, and Resolution

dated October 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
131085 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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