Safety Science 51 (2013) 109–117

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Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Supervisors’ engagement in safety leadership: Factors that help and hinder

Stacey M. Conchie a,⇑,1, Susannah Moon a,1, Malcolm Duncan b
a
Institute of Psychology, Health and Society, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZA, United Kingdom
b
Laing O’Rourke, Manchester M15, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: A growing body of research supports the importance of supervisors’ safety leadership in promoting
Received 22 October 2011 employees’ engagement in safety. However, the factors that give rise to these safety leadership behaviors
Received in revised form 28 March 2012 are under-explored. The current study addressed this void by adopting a Job Demands-Resources frame-
Accepted 20 May 2012
work to identify contextual influences on supervisors’ safety leadership behaviors. Focus group data from
Available online 21 July 2012
sixty-nine supervisors recruited from the UK construction industry showed that role overload, production
demands, formal procedures, and workforce characteristics hindered supervisors’ engagement in safety
Keywords:
leadership. In contrast, social support (especially from the organization and co-workers) and perceived
Construction
Demands
autonomy promoted supervisors’ engagement in safety leadership. Exploration around these issues high-
Resources lighted a need for more training for supervisors in this role and the development of a supportive environ-
Safety leadership ment between supervisors affiliated with different parent companies.
Support Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction extent to which supervisors show energy, enthusiasm, feel a sense

The construction industry records the most accidents, injuries
and fatalities of all sectors at a European and International level
(European Agency for Health & Safety at Work, 2007; Health and
Safety Executive, 2009; National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health, 2010). To address this issue, academics and practitio-
ners have turned to safety leadership as one way to improve
employees’ safety behaviors and thereby reduce accident and in-
jury rates. This focus is consistent with research that shows initia-
tives directed at supervisors may be more effective at improving
safety than initiatives directed at employees (Zohar and Luria,
2004), and findings that supervisors within the construction indus-
try have a stronger influence than co-workers on employees’ safety
attitudes (Dingsdag et al., 2008). It is also supported by studies that
show a positive association between supervisors’ safety leadership
behaviors, such as safety coaching, sharing safety values and safety
communication, and employees’ safety behaviors (Barling et al.,
2002; Conchie and Donald, 2009; Conchie et al., 2012; Kelloway
et al., 2006; Mullen and Kelloway, 2009; Törner and Pousette,
2009).
Despite the growing interest in safety leadership, relatively lit-
tle attention has been given to the factors that influence supervi-
sors’ engagement in this role. Briefly defined, ‘engagement’ is the
⇑ Corresponding author. Address: School of Psychology, University of Liverpool,
Bedford Street South, Liverpool L69 7ZA, UK. Tel.: +44 (0)151 794 1480; fax: +44
(0)151 794 2945.
E-mail address: s.m.conchie@liverpool.ac.uk (S.M. Conchie).
1
These authors contributed equally to the research.
of inspiration, and are fully concentrated (Schaufeli and Bakker,
2004) in their role as a supervisor and more specifically, as a safety
leader. Research in non-safety domains has shown that individual
factors such as personality and emotional intelligence are impor-
tant antecedents of engagement in leadership (Barling et al.,
2000; Bono and Judge, 2004; Hofmann and Jones, 2005). In con-
trast, relatively little research has focused on contextual factors
that exist within the environment to increase (or decrease) these
behaviors (Bommer et al., 2004; Porter and McLaughlin, 2006).
Contextual factors are no less important, and research suggests
that these may account for between 41% and 70% of the variance
in leadership behaviors (Arvey et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 1998).
Thus, contextual factors are the focus of this study.
In the following sections we summarize the contextual factors
that likely impact supervisors’ engagement in safety leadership
within the construction industry. We do this in the framework of
the Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) Model (Demorouti et al.,
2001), which proposes that contextual factors may be considered
as demands that deplete a supervisor’s energy and consequently
engagement in safety leadership, or as resources that facilitate a
supervisor’s engagement. We use the term ‘safety leadership’
throughout our discussion to capture actions that have a positive
impact on employees’ safety behaviors (such as transformational
leadership; Barling et al., 2002), rather than styles that reduce
employees’ safety behaviors (such as passive or avoidant leader-
ship; Kelloway et al., 2006; Luria, 2008).
In focusing on the factors that promote safety leadership, the
study makes two important contributions. First, it addresses obser-
vations that scant research exists on the contextual antecedents of

0925-7535/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2012.05.020
110 S.M. Conchie et al. / Safety Science 51 (2013) 109–117
leadership (e.g. Porter and McLaughlin, 2006) by identifying factors
within the environment that shape leadership behaviors. In doing
this, the study contributes to the growing knowledge of factors
that promote engagement at work, which has gained increasing
attention in non-safety domains (e.g., Crawford et al., 2010; Macey
et al., 2009). Second, in identifying the factors that impact supervi-
sors’ engagement in safety leadership, the study shows areas that
may be targeted, or controlled, during intervention efforts to pro-
mote safety. More simply it identifies contextual factors that may
operate against intervention efforts if they are not controlled, or
which may help intervention efforts if they are promoted.
1.1. Contextual influences on safety leadership
Contextual influences broadly group into the two categories of
demands and resources. According to the JD-R Model (Demorouti
et al., 2001), demands reduce an individual’s engagement though
a process of burnout (i.e., physical and emotional exhaustion),
while resources increase an individual’s engagement through facil-
itation (i.e., increasing motivation). Although the nature of de-
mands and resources may differ by specific context or domain,
this general pattern is relatively robust. Within the domain of
safety, for example, Hansez and Chmiel (2010) found that job re-
sources positively impacted employees’ safety behaviors by pro-
moting motivational involvement in the job, while job demands
promoted routine safety violations through job strain. Similarly,
Nahrgang et al. (2011) showed that employees’ safety behaviors
were negatively impacted by job demands (e.g., perceived danger
from risk and hazards and the associated psychological and energy
demands of handling and avoiding these) through burnout, and
were positively impacted by job resources (e.g., social support)
through engagement.
While job demands have traditionally been viewed as having a
negative impact on performance, Crawford et al. (2010) recently
proposed a refinement to the model stating that demands, depend-
ing upon their interpretation by the person, may act to increase
performance. They showed that demands negatively impacted
engagement when they were considered as a hindrance, and posi-
tively impacted engagement when they were considered as a chal-
lenge that promoted personal growth. The potential for challenge
demands to exist within the domain of safety was recognised by
Nahrgang et al. (2011); however their meta-analysis did not test
for this empirically. Consequently, it is unclear which demands
supervisors perceive as challenges that increase their engagement
in safety leadership, and what demands they consider to be a
hindrance.
1.2. Job demands
Job demands refer to the physical, social, or organizational as-
pects of a job that require sustained mental and physical effort
from a person, and which may lead to psychological, emotional
or physical exhaustion. Typical job demands include excessive
workloads, receiving competing demands, and situational con-
straints such as poor equipment or perceived risks and hazards.
Within the domain of safety, situational constraints have been
shown to relate positively to workplace injuries (Nahrgang et al.,
2011; Snyder et al., 2008). Also, workload has been associated with
reduced safety citizenship behaviors (i.e., discretionary safety
behaviors, such as helping; Turner et al., 2005) and an increase
in unsafe behavior (Barling et al., 2002; Choudhry and Fang,
2008; Flin et al., 2000; Frone, 1998; Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996).
Workload demands are especially problematic for safety leader-
ship. First, they deplete supervisors’ energy, availability and time,
and consequently, their safety-related interactions with employ-
ees. Research in non-safety domains shows that leaders in close
proximity to employees and with regular contact are more likely
to engage in positive leadership behaviors (Antonakis and Atwater,
2002), such as those considered here. Second, they encourage reli-
ance on coping mechanisms such as acceleration (processing infor-
mation at a faster rate), avoidance of decisions, and filtration
(subjectively selecting information for processing) (Miller, 1960).
These mechanisms result in processing less information about a
situation (Janis and Mann, 1977), and promote a focus on tasks that
are necessary to complete a job, of which safety may not be re-
garded as one. Consequently, as workload demands increase,
supervisors may be likely to show less engagement in safety lead-
ership behaviors.
Finally, and specific to the construction industry, are demands
imposed by a diverse workforce. The construction industry em-
ploys highly mobile workers with differing skill levels (Gervais,
2003), a large body of subcontractor and migrant labor (Bust
et al., 2008), and differing leadership and management hierarchies
(Evans, 2008; Iszatt-White, 2009). This cultural mix (both organi-
zational and national) brings with it differences in language, safety
training, and education, in addition to the need for cooperation be-
tween contractor companies (Schubert and Dijkstra, 2009). This of-
ten leads to disorganization, which partly emanates from the
ambiguity of who is responsible for employees’ safety and how
existing systems may be implemented within a fragmented work-
force (Dwyer, 1991).
1.3. Job resources
Job resources refer to the physical, social and organizational as-
pects of a job that aid in the completion of tasks, reduce the nega-
tive consequences of job demands and contribute to personal
growth. Two common job resources are autonomy and social sup-
port. Autonomy relates to a sense of independence while carrying
out a task, and promotes engagement in an activity because it
encourages ownership for the behavior, feelings of subjective com-
petence and a sense of relatedness to another (Deci and Ryan,
1985). According to Deci and Ryan (2000), these things contribute
to a person’s basic needs of personal growth and psychological
well-being, and reinforce behaviors that gave rise to their
fulfilment.
The benefit of autonomy for promoting safety in general has re-
ceived some support. It has been related to lower injury rates
(Shannon et al., 1997), a focus on human factors rather than tech-
nology factors (Grote and Künzler, 1996), and the appropriate han-
dling of risks (Grote and Künzler, 2000). Autonomy is proposed to
have the strongest influence on safety when target behaviors are
not rule prescribed (and so require autonomy) and when a high le-
vel of uncertainty exits (Grote, 2007). Interestingly, effective safety
leadership meets these two conditions: it is typically defined by
behaviors that expand formal role obligations, and the dynamic
nature of construction (as detailed in Section 1.2) makes uncer-
tainty inherent within the system. Given these two things, auton-
omy might be expected to act as a resource that promotes
supervisors’ engagement in safety leadership. It may do this by
buffering the negative impact of job demands by affording supervi-
sors greater control over the order, and method, by which role de-
mands are met (Karasek, 1976, 1998; Xanthopoulou et al., 2007), or
by independently energizing safety leadership behaviors.
Social support is the single most consistent resource that posi-
tively affects engagement in safety across a range of different
industries (Nahrgang et al., 2011). Social support may come from
the organization (Mearns and Reader, 2008; Wallace et al., 2006),
supervisors (Turner et al., 2010; Zohar and Luria, 2004), or co-
workers (Cheyne et al., 1998). Emerging research suggests that
support from co-workers is particularly important. For example,
Tucker et al. (2008) found that co-worker support had a relatively
 S.M. Conchie et al. / Safety Science 51 (2013) 109–117
stronger influence on employees’ engagement in safety than sup-
port from supervisors. Similarly, Turner et al. (2010) showed that
support from co-workers was important for ensuring employee
safety was maintained when job demands increased. These find-
ings suggest that support in general, and co-worker support in par-
ticular, will be important in promoting supervisors’ engagement in
safety leadership. Providing supervisors with support not only re-
duces pressures from demands such as coordinating multiple con-
tractor groups, time schedules and access to resources; it also
enhances their feelings of self-efficacy to engage in leadership
behaviors that expand beyond formal requirements.
1.4. Current study
The current study sought to identify the contextual factors that
supervisors’ perceive as being a help, or hindrance, to their engage-
ment in safety leadership. The study was carried out within the
construction industry, which routinely reports the highest safety
incident rates, and which has been the target of recent and on-
going interventions to improve safety (e.g., Kines et al., 2010; Lai-
thinen and Pälvärinta, 2010). We adopted a semi-structured qual-
itative approach within the study to allow for a sensitive
exploration of context, and a detailed focus on local patterns with-
in construction (Bryman et al., 1996). Consistent with our semi-
structured approach, we did not set specific hypotheses, but ex-
pected job hindrance demands to be regarded as things that reduce
supervisors’ engagement in safety leadership and job resources to
be perceived as positive influences. While these demands and re-
sources were not determined prior to the study, we expected some
of those reviewed in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 to emerge as important.
2. Methods
2.1. Methodological approach and participants
Focus groups were used to explore the contextual factors that
supervisors perceive as being a help or hindrance to their engage-
ment in safety leadership behaviors. As a method, focus groups
provide a naturalistic and detailed snapshot of an issue by allowing
participants, in this case supervisors, to clarify issues within a
group setting. For maximum benefit, each focus group comprised
supervisors from different trades, employing companies, and levels
of experience. Using diverse groups such as this allowed for the
identification and exploration of the conditions under which a con-
textual factor had a strong influence on supervisors’ engagement,
and conditions under which this influence was minimal.
Participants were sixty-nine supervisors recruited from ten
construction projects throughout the North of England.2 Eight of
the projects were ‘new build’ and two projects were refurbishment
of existing buildings where the premises were still partially occu-
pied. The safety manager on each of the project sites circulated a
short summary of the study to all supervisors asking for volunteers
to take part in the focus groups. The summary was produced by the
research team and outlined the aim of the study, its background, the
requirements from supervisors who volunteered to take part, and
the anonymity and confidentiality of responses. It also stated that
the study sought to recruit supervisors who were directly responsi-
ble for, or the immediate level above, first-line employees (i.e., oper-
atives). This information was reiterated to supervisors at the start of
each focus group and their informed consent was obtained.
2
Saturation was reached within the focus groups, such that later group discussions
supported the importance of themes that emerged from earlier focus groups, but did
not add anything new.
111
The sample comprised 68 male and one female supervisor,
which is characteristic of the construction industry. Collectively,
the supervisors represented eight contractor companies, and had
an average tenure in the role of supervisor of 9 years (range = 9 -
months to 40 years). Supervisors’ responsibilities included over-
seeing employees’ task performance, ensuring safety policies
were adhered to, and when necessary, disciplining employees for
unsafe behavior.
2.2. Focus group procedure
Each focus group comprised between 6 and 10 supervisors and
took place in a private conference room on site. All participants
were given an information sheet at the start of the focus group out-
lining the topic for discussion and their right to withdraw at any
time. All supervisors agreed to participate and gave their permis-
sion for the discussion to be digitally recorded and later tran-
scribed verbatim (omitting any information that would allow an
individual, or their company, to be identified). Each focus group
was designed to be as open as possible, beginning with the broad
question of ‘‘in your opinion, what defines good safety leadership?’’
followed by ‘‘what factors help supervisors to engage in good safety
leadership?’’ and ‘‘what factors make it difficult for (i.e., hinder)
supervisors to engage in good safety leadership?’’ These questions
were shown in two pilot focus groups, which were carried out with
15 supervisors (n = 7 and 8) on two different project sites, to be
effective in stimulating discussion while avoiding subjectivity from
the group facilitator.
To encourage conversation during the focus groups, and to pro-
vide a point of reference for all group participants, each supervisor
was asked to provide one factor that helped and one factor that
hindered engagement in safety leadership. Supervisors were in-
formed that these factors did not have to be restricted to the cur-
rent project, or the current project’s main operating company,
but could include any of those things experienced during their
time as a supervisor. The factors that were identified by each
supervisor was discussed at a group level, in which each factor
was probed in detail to establish if it was perceived by supervisors
as being among the most important influences on safety leadership
behaviors. Each focus group lasted between 40 and 90 min.
2.3. Data analysis
Transcripts were analyzed in accordance with Thematic Analy-
sis (TA) as outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). This method has
the advantage of being flexible and unconstrained by a pre-existing
theoretical framework, as with other qualitative methods. An
inductive approach was deemed inappropriate for the current
study, as the aim was not to generate theory, but to understand
the factors that impact supervisors’ engagement in safety leader-
ship. The TA method used for the purpose of this research sits be-
tween the essentialist or realist method, reporting the experiences,
realities and meanings of the participants, and the ‘contextualist’
method, which takes into account the ways that individuals make
meaning of their experience and the ways the broader context
influences these meanings. This is particularly important for this
study, and its focus on the way that context may interact with,
and influence, behavior.
Transcripts were initially coded by sentence and then analyzed
for broader themes, patterns and meaning to aid generation of the
final themes. As per Braun and Clarke (2006), a theme was con-
structed from repeated patterns of meaning throughout the data,
focusing on those elements most frequently mentioned by partic-
ipants and those mentioned with some degree of intensity. Recur-
ring themes were identified by ‘combing’ through the data and
relating this to established literature, aiming to build a strong
112 S.M. Conchie et al. / Safety Science 51 (2013) 109–117
picture of safety leadership that is embedded within the context
and which is, or is not, complimented by current leadership
theory.
3. Results
3.1. ‘Good’ safety leadership within construction
Each focus group began by asking supervisors what they consid-
ered to be ‘good’ safety leadership. A general consensus emerged
across the groups, with most supervisors highlighting characteris-
tics reflective of transformational, charismatic or participative
styles of leadership. For example, supervisors emphasized the
importance of coaching, being available, and being approachable.
‘Talking’ was considered the best method of relationship building,
and supervisors believed that it was important for employees to
feel that they could consult them on any issue, especially those
regarding safety. Consistent with other research carried out within
the construction industry (e.g., Törner and Pousette, 2009), super-
visors emphasized the importance of developing mutual trust with
employees, and cited respect and communication as two ways to
achieve this. Illustrative quotations of these points are:
‘‘If the guys working for you think that they can’t talk to you, or if
they talk to you about a problem that it isn’t going to get dealt
with, they’re not going to talk to you and that’s when you’re going
to have an accident because things tend to get left.’’
‘‘It’s basically just speaking to them, you say ‘look, if you’re not sure
about anything, come and ask, go and ask whoever you are work-
ing with – senior lads. And just one of the main things, if you don’t
think it’s safe, don’t do it, come and ask us.’’
‘‘You’ve got to trust the guys that you’ve got and I think if you can
get a core of work, your own work guys, eventually, they obviously
trust you and you can trust them.’’
3.2. Hindrance demands: role overload, production pressure,
workforce characteristics
3.2.1. Role overload
A recurring theme throughout the focus groups was the
negative impact that multiple, and often conflicting, role responsi-
bilities have on supervisors’ efforts to engage in safety leadership.
Supervisors reported a number of responsibilities associated
with their role, which were effectively summarized by one
supervisor:
‘‘. . . you’re the supervisor, you’re the nursemaid, you’re the babysit-
ter, you’re the trainer, you’re the guy that makes sure they’re doing
the job right. So you’re the specifier, virtually, you order the mate-
rials, you’ve got to make sure they’re working with the right gear,
you’re the safety guy, you’re the manager, you’re the project
manager....’’
Multiple role responsibilities were perceived to hinder safety
leadership because they dilute the perceived importance and sal-
ience of safety, increase cognitive load, and at a more basic level,
reduce the amount of time that supervisors focus on safety. While
it is true that safety is intertwined with all aspects of work activity,
the supervisors interviewed generally regarded safety as a distinct
component that sits alongside production rather than being
embedded within it. While this is likely to reflect the nature of
the safety culture that supervisors operated within (rather than
being a general state within industry), it resulted in supervisors
regarding safety as a distinct aspect of their job that is fulfiled
when other responsibilities are few or less demanding:
‘‘You get to a point there where you have probably got ten hats and
you only do the job 10% as well as you should be doing it because
you have got that much to do.’’
‘‘Double the men, double the paperwork, double the health and
safety, you need two people. They never double the supervisors
do they? It’s always one supervisor for how many men are there
[sic].’’
Of the different responsibilities that supervisors reported for
their role, formal procedures around administration and discipline
were regarded as strong hindrances on their engagement in safety
leadership. Supervisors uniformly identified administration, specif-
ically paperwork, as a hindrance because it takes them away from
the workface and reduces the length of time that they spend on site
with employees. Consistent with other studies (e.g., O’Dea and Flin,
2001), supervisors believed that spending time with employees
helped them to prevent accidents, identify employees with train-
ing needs and offer coaching: behaviors indicative of good safety
leadership. Spending time with employees is particularly impor-
tant on projects focused on refurbishment of partially occupied
building, or when working within the public realm, as the risk pro-
file is very different from a static fully controlled site environment.
‘‘I think there’s perhaps too much time spent on the paperwork side
of safety and not enough time walking around site looking at
what’s going on ‘cos [sic] if you’re out there more, they won’t do
such silly things.’’
‘‘It stops you going around and seeing what’s happening on site.
And if you’re on site, then you can stop something going wrong.’’
A second procedure raised in several focus groups related to dis-
cipline. Supervisors discussed the conflict between formal disci-
pline procedures, which centered on issuing ‘cards’ for non-
compliance with safety, and their preferred style of safety leader-
ship that focused on coaching and communication. Some supervi-
sors believed that issuing cards to employees created ill feelings
among employees and between employees and supervisors, de-
motivated staff, and generated a tension with their preferred style
of leading. Typical quotes that emerged during these discussions
were:
‘‘... if your lads are working under you, you should be able to speak
to them, otherwise you shouldn’t be a supervisor and it’s as simple
as that. You shouldn’t need to issue them with cards.’’
‘‘I think the most important thing we’re missing here is, with all
these rules and regulations, we’ve got to motivate these blo-
kes . . . and you’re getting all these rules and regulations, and rebel-
ling against them, and it’s just like, making life harder for us
because at the end of the day, we’ve still got to be there, talk to
them, motivate them and get the job done.’’
‘‘If you shout at them saying ‘you’ve done wrong, there’s your card,
go for induction’ then, you know, they don’t understand what
they’ve done wrong. It’s about education.’’
3.2.2. Production pressure
Intensifying the negative effects of role responsibilities is pres-
sure to complete jobs to tight deadlines within an ever-changing
context of team members and risk. The problem of time pressure
for safety is not a new discovery, and is intensified within the con-
struction industry due to planning inadequacies or misjudgements,
the suspension of work due to bad weather, and errors in delivery
dates and times; all of which cause delays. These delays hinder
supervisors’ engagement in safety leadership as supervisors con-
tinue to work to the same completion date, which prompts a focus
on ‘getting the job done’ with less respect for safety. As commented
 S.M. Conchie et al. / Safety Science 51 (2013) 109–117
by one supervisor, ‘‘If you get behind them jobs, pressure increases
and safety does get lax because everybody is pushing and your empha-
sis on safety is not the same. . .’’ The extra work required to compen-
sate for lost time hinders supervisors’ engagement in safety
leadership as it narrows their focus on completing the job, which
tends to manifest in laboring alongside employees (‘It’s all hands
on’). According to some of the supervisors within the focus groups,
during times of high pressure they have less opportunity to ‘watch’
employees and coach them on completing jobs safely. The focus
during these times is production.
3.2.3. Workforce characteristics
Workforce characteristics, specifically subcontractor safety atti-
tudes, inadequately skilled employees, and language barriers,
emerged as another hindrance demand. Supervisors believed that
their efforts to engage in safety leadership are hindered by subcon-
tractor attitudes that manifest as resistance to safety. In such cases,
supervisors reported feelings of frustration and a tendency to
adopt a more directive, than consultative, leadership approach.
Similar frustrations were reported when employees were inade-
quately skilled for the job:
‘‘Er unfortunately it’s price work, so if they [subcontractors] don’t
do the work, they don’t get paid, so they’re always in a rush, it’s like
because they’re rushing, because they’re not thinking, they’re not
calm, accidents happen, it’s got to be controlled. It’s harder for us
to supervise, it’s harder for us to say ‘whoa’, you know?’’
‘‘I feel frustrated if I know for a fact that I’ve got somebody in a
position that somebody else in that position [sic], and I’ve got to
supervise them and I know they’re no good in that position. Then
I get frustrated because I’m fighting a losing battle.’’
Challenges to supervisors’ engagement in safety leadership also
come from migrant labor and language barriers. Supervisors with
experience of working with migrant labor discussed their uncer-
tainty regarding whether or not employees understood their guid-
ance regarding safety. This prompted a tendency among
supervisors to reduce their engagement in safety coaching and
training in favor of a simpler directive approach. This change in
leadership style was reported irrespective of whether or not a
‘translator’ was present on site (typically a member of the work-
group who can translate English), as supervisors were unable to
tell how much of their original instruction had been effectively
communicated.
‘‘But I mean trying to communicate what you want them to do,
how you want them to do it, how you want them to go about it
safely as well and getting them to understand it. You know, some-
times you can explain it to them and they might nod and agree, but
it’s, it’s that, it’s that question whether they have understood it or
are they just nodding.’’
‘‘On my gang I’ve got quite a few foreign labor and that’s quite an
issue, there’s a language barrier. There’s nothing wrong with the
labour, it’s just the communication.’’
The tendency of supervisors to adopt a directive approach of
telling rather than consulting presented as a coping mechanism
that fulfils supervisors’ responsibility for safety, but also preserves
their energy. For example, if the time spent coaching employees on
safety resulted in no obvious gains—above and beyond those ac-
quired with a more directive approach—then supervisors invested
less energy in these actions (from a mere survival perspective it
would be difficult to self-rationalize investing energy in behaviors
with no obvious additional gains). Instead, this energy was in-
vested in other demands, or for situations in which benefits might
113
be observed with extra effort. The ability of supervisors to adapt
their leadership approach to the situation or employee is known
(e.g., Dansereau et al., 1975; Graen and Cashman, 1975), and is sug-
gested by these results to serve as a possible coping mechanism
when faced with multiple role demands.
3.3. Challenge demands
Although supervisors discussed the problems of subcontractor
employees for safety leadership, not all supervisors shared this
view. Some supervisors regarded their work with subcontractors
as a challenge, and reported sustained efforts to engage in safety
leadership:
‘‘But I think you tend to find you’ve got to look after sub-contrac-
tors probably a bit more than we should do. On site we’re respon-
sible for them for the work has to be carried out, but their
supervisor should still come to site and go through the work with
them.’’
‘‘People with bad attitudes, you feel like you’re wasting time talking
to them, but you’ve still to keep going back and telling them. You
know it’s a complete waste of time, you still got to do it.’’
‘‘Because it’s the mentality of ‘‘I’ve heard it all before.’’ But you take
the time and sit and listen, [and say to employees that] it might
just save your life.’’
‘‘But I think there’s . . . sometimes you go out on site, it’s like having
a classroom full of children and you’re the teachers. And you’ve got
to treat each one individually.’’
The difference in perceptions regarding subcontractors ap-
peared to be related to a supervisor’s level of self-esteem, locus
of control and felt responsibility. For example, supervisors who
presented high self-esteem (confidence in their own ability to
shape another’s safety), expressed a felt responsibility for safety,
and adopted an internal locus of control for safety reported more
examples during the focus groups of their engagement in safety
leadership with all employees. Although tentative, these links sug-
gest that the way in which supervisors’ interpret and respond to a
situation may be a function of these individual factors.
3.4. Helpful resources: social support and autonomy
Two main resources that emerged across the focus groups were
social support and autonomy. Consistent with Nahrgang et al.’s
(2011) meta-analysis, and Törner and Pousette’s (2009) interview
findings from construction, supervisors discussed social support
as an important moderator of role demands. Support from the
organization was discussed in relation to a behavioral change pro-
gramme that is used by some companies within the construction
industry to raise awareness of personal responsibility for safety
and ultimately promote a positive safety culture. From the per-
spective of the supervisors included in the focus groups, the pro-
gramme supported their engagement in safety leadership for
three main reasons.
First, it conveyed a message that safety is a top priority of the
organization and is something that is expected from supervisors
as part of their role. Second, the programme equipped supervisors
with the necessary skills and knowledge to lead on safety, and pro-
vided them with the tools on how to approach employees with
safety issues. For some supervisors, a lack of experience and formal
training in how to be a supervisor was regarded as something that
reduced their engagement in safety leadership. The programme
addressed this by providing supervisors with both the knowledge
and confidence to lead employees:
114 S.M. Conchie et al. / Safety Science 51 (2013) 109–117
‘‘And you do feel it’s part of your job to keep reminding them – it’s
not just ‘put your goggles on because you have to’, [it’s] put your
goggles on because you might lose your eye or. . .’’
Third, supervisors believed that the programme increased
employees’ (i.e., operatives) safety awareness, positive safety atti-
tudes, and consequently their receptivity to supervisors’ safety
leadership behaviors. As mentioned by one supervisor: ‘‘When it
came out 5 years ago you’d thought ‘oh god, what’s this now?’ . . . it
does make people think . . . and it takes time but it’s becoming more
and more, like within people now. It’s culture change isn’t it?’’ Such
observations suggest that organizational support—through the
implementation of safety programmes—has both a direct impact
on supervisors’ safety leadership by equipping them with tools
and skills, but also has an indirect impact by increasing employees’
receptivity to safety and creating the foundation of a positive
safety culture in which safety is held as an important value.
Similar to organizational support, supervisors recognized the
importance of support from managers and co-workers (i.e., other
supervisors). All supervisors agreed that having a supportive man-
ager was crucial in their efforts to engage in good safety leadership
as it enhanced confidence that their actions would be ‘‘backed-up.’’
However, disagreement emerged in relation to the extent to which
supervisors felt supported at this level. Analysis of the data sug-
gested that these differences were related to project size, the pro-
ject phase, and the experience of the supervisor. More specifically,
supervisors believed that managers were more supportive on
smaller projects, at the start of projects, and with supervisors
who have less experience. Most supervisors agreed that managers
could give more support, and that this may be as simple as offering
verbal recognition for safety. While supervisors agreed that verbal
recognition did not initiate their engagement in safety, they be-
lieved that it contributed to its maintenance:
Supervisor A: ‘‘It wouldn’t hurt for the higher
management to acknowledge the fact
that we’re working safe though
would it?’’
Supervisor B: ‘‘Yeah, just a pat on the back.’’
Supervisor C: ‘‘A pat on the back.’’
Supervisor D: ‘‘You know, you guys are working
safely, well done.
Well done. Something like that.’’
More important than manager support, and consistent with
emerging findings (e.g., Tucker et al., 2008; Turner et al., 2010), is
support from other supervisors. Across all of the focus groups,
supervisors identified co-worker support as a resource that helps
them to engage in safety leadership. Support at this level is partic-
ularly important due to the high inter-dependency between super-
visors for the completion of tasks and the coordination of work
teams. The importance of both professional and personal relation-
ships with co-workers was emphasized and supervisors reported
feeling at an advantage for holding long-term relationships with
their co-workers. This was often attributed to the fact that they
shared similar views regarding safety and working procedures,
and felt able to raise safety issues with little confrontation. The sit-
uation described by supervisors was akin to the feelings of ‘psycho-
logical safety’ identified by Edmondson (1999), in which
supervisors are able to raise their concerns about safety in a sup-
portive environment. Example quotations are:
‘‘I mean like myself, these two guys here, we have shared ups and
downs about everything haven’t we? In and out of work, you know
what I mean and it does make a big difference. So there is never
sort of, any barriers up, it makes a big difference, hell of a
difference’’
‘‘You try and get on with everyone I think. You know, I mean we all
work together here, and er, we’re all good friends. . .mostly
[laughter]’’
One caveat to co-worker support, as suggested by supervisor
comments, is that it currently exists within-company relationships
only. Many supervisors reported support from those employed by
the same company, but reported relatively less support from other-
company supervisors. This lack of support was attributed, in part,
to the absence of familiarity, trust, and knowledge, which supervi-
sors typically share with those from the same company. These
qualities are less likely to develop with other-company supervisors
due to limited interaction, lack of close proximity, and perceived
differences in values attached to safety and production. Group
membership (i.e., in-group/out-group) has long been know to
shape attitudes and feelings towards others (Brewer and Silver,
1978; Platow et al., 1990), and is prominent within the construc-
tion industry owing to the way in which the workforce is
configured.
In addition to supportive environments, supervisors discussed
the importance of having autonomy in their role. Some discussed
this in relation to being able to contribute to method statements,
pace of work and materials used, while others discussed this in
relation to having the freedom to decide how employees should
be supervised. This was often discussed in relation to procedural
constraints, such as the discipline procedures discussed earlier,
and how a lack of autonomy can frustrate safety leadership.
4. Discussion
This study sought to address a gap within the safety literature
relating to the contextual factors that impact supervisors’ engage-
ment in safety leadership. We did this within the framework of the
JD-R Model, which has been used to explain general work perfor-
mance, and more recently, safety performance (Hansez and
Chmiel, 2010; Nahrgang et al., 2011). Consistent with this model,
and providing initial support to its use in understanding leadership
engagement, we found that contextual factors relating to role over-
load and production pressures hindered supervisors’ engagement
in safety leadership, while social support and autonomy promoted
supervisors’ engagement. Mixed results emerged for the effects of
workforce characteristics, which were presented as both a hin-
drance demand and a challenge demand. Workforce characteristics
that reflected inadequate skill for a task or poor English (i.e., non-
native English speakers) were regarded as demands, whereas char-
acteristics indicative of a negative or blasé attitude towards safety
were regarded as a challenge. One apparent difference between
these two groups is that the former is arguably beyond a supervi-
sor’s capacity to change,3 while the latter is within their capacity to
change. If true, this suggests that the interpretation of demands as a
hindrance or a challenge may depend, in part, on the extent to which
supervisors feel able to alter the situation.
Supervisors discussed the importance of leadership behaviors
associated with coaching, consultation, respect, and believing in
the effectiveness of the safety systems so that communication with
employees regarding these systems is genuine. Of particular inter-
est was the finding that these behaviors may be thwarted, not only
by role demands and production pressure, but also by formal pro-
cedures concerning discipline. Discussions around discipline pre-
sented a picture similar to Chitayat and Venezia’s (1984)
3
A lack of skill is regarded, in this incidence, as being beyond a supervisors’ ability
to change due to factors such as a lack of time, lack of supervisor expertise in a
specific trade (applicable to supervisors responsible for multiple trades), lack of
access to resources, such as training programmes for employees, and lack of power to
challenge the organization on the employees they appoint.
 S.M. Conchie et al. / Safety Science 51 (2013) 109–117 115

proposal that leadership reflects a ‘‘lack of power’’ caused by rules et al., 2008; Turner et al., 2010), our findings stress the need to de-
and procedures, and the norms of an organization’s climate. For velop a supportive environment. Of particular importance is sup-
example, the supervisors in this study discussed discipline proce- port from co-workers, namely other supervisors. Support at this
dures according to their ‘‘power to’’ act in certain ways (or lack level offers practical benefits of facilitating the coordination of
thereof), rather than their ‘‘power over’’ employees. This finding tasks and work teams, and emotional benefits of boosting self-es-
stresses the need for organizations to consult with supervisors teem. This type of support exists between supervisors from the
about the effectiveness of procedures, and seek suggestions for same company, and lesser so, between supervisors from different
improvement. In doing this, organizations may increase supervi- companies. One way to address this may be through supervisor
sors’ feelings of autonomy in their role, which was found in this forums, in which issues related to safety may be raised and best
study to be important for promoting safety leadership. practices shared. It may also be possible to foster co-worker sup-
Comments from supervisors suggested that autonomy in the port by engendering greater communication and cooperation be-
way that employees are lead on safety is more important than tween trade contractors at the organizational level. For example,
autonomy in how tasks are carried out or the order in which jobs stronger partnerships between companies and a shared apprecia-
are completed. Allowing supervisors this freedom does not imply tion of the importance of safety may cascade to supervisor rela-
a situation in which discipline is absent, as many supervisors rec- tionships and manifest as increased support at this level.
ognized the benefits of discipline especially when an employee is
‘acting like a complete lunatic.’ However, it does involve them in
4.2. Limitations
the decision-making process, increases their ownership for safety
and ultimately promotes effective safety leadership.
While this study has identified important influences on safety
Although the current study adopted a JD-R model to explain the
leadership, it is not without its limitations. First, the study focused
emergence of safety leadership, the results may also relate to mod-
on contextual factors that impact supervisors’ engagement in
els such as the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
safety leadership and as such, said little about individual factors.
(HFACS; Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000) or ABC models of human
Research in non-safety domains has shown that leadership behav-
behavior. For example, HFACS proposes that unsafe acts (which
iors may be influenced by an individual’s personality, self-efficacy
may be considered as poor, or absent safety leadership here) can
and emotional intelligence (e.g., Barling et al., 2000; Barbuto and
be traced to three levels of failure: immediate preconditions for
Scholl, 1998; Bono and Judge, 2004; Hofmann and Jones, 2005; Ho-
unsafe acts (environmental, conditions of operators, and personnel
well and Avolio, 1993). More specifically, these studies show that
factors), unsafe supervisors, and organizational influences. In the
the types of leadership behaviors we considered here (e.g., coach-
context of the current study, unsafe conditions may include role
ing, sharing values, support), are more prevalent among those high
overload (which may promote burnout) and inadequate resources,
on extraversion and emotional intelligence, and those with a
unsafe supervision may include a lack of support or examples of
strong belief in their ability to influence another’s behavior. That
poor leadership from managers, and organizational influences
we did not focus on these factors in detail during the focus groups
may include a poor safety culture or the selection of employees
was due, in part, to our interest in contextual factors. It was also
who are ill skilled for tasks. As suggested by HFACS, and discussed
due to the fact that the supervisors we interviewed rarely men-
earlier, the outcome of these failures is likely to be a reduction in
tioned individual factors as having any influence on their engage-
safety leadership. Presented in this way, it might be possible to
ment in safety leadership behaviors. This may reflect a general
determine the extent to which supervisors are likely to engage in
tendency among supervisors within construction to attribute their
safety leadership from factors that exist within the local and more
behaviors externally. However, it may simply reflect the fact that
distal (organizational) environment. Similarly, the extent to which
supervisors’ behaviors within construction are most strongly influ-
safety leadership is likely will be indicated by the state of the orga-
enced by contextual factors. Future research should compare the
nization’s safety culture, which when positive (e.g., management
contextual factors identified here with the individual factors iden-
support for safety, employee involvement in safety) will be related
tified in other work. Moreover, this research should consider the
to greater engagement from supervisors.
interaction between the two to identify how contextual factors
influence the effects of individual factors, and the same in reverse.
4.1. Practical implications
A second limitation is that our study focused on the construc-
tion industry and so it is not clear how far our findings generalize
The findings have important practical implications. First, our re-
to other contexts. However, the similarities between some of the
sults suggest that demands may have a positive impact on leader-
finding reported here and those reported for other industries and
ship if they are regarded as a challenge by supervisors. These
other countries (Nahrgang et al., 2011) suggest that the findings
perceptions appear to develop when supervisors’ believe that they
will be applicable to other contexts. While some idiosyncrasies will
have the capacity to address, or change, a situation. Possible ways
emerge (such as the language barriers with migrant labor reported
that organizations may develop these perceptions is through sup-
here), the general factors of role overload, support and autonomy
portive environments, or by providing training that equips super-
are likely to be relatively robust. We would therefore expect safety
visors with the necessary interpersonal skills in how to approach
leadership behaviors in other contexts to be shaped by the same
employees about safety. Training might also be used to address
broad factors that we identified in the construction industry.
hindrance demands such as paperwork (by providing training in
how to complete paperwork more efficiently), and habitual behav-
iors that demote safety. For example, training in a supervisory role 5. Conclusion
will help prevent supervisors, particularly those promoted to the
role through good performance in their trade, from reverting to A number of studies have focused on factors that impact safety
previous role-behaviors when time pressures are high and associ- behaviors within industry. The majority of these studies focus on
ated stress increases. In most cases, these previous behaviors are front-line employees. The current study adopted a different focus
production-focused, and when adopted by supervisors, lead them and concentrated on supervisors’ safety leadership behaviors.
to labor alongside employees rather than supervise them on safety. Through focus group discussions with first-line supervisors within
Second, and in agreement with a number of previous studies the construction industry we identified role overload, production
(e.g., Christian et al., 2009; Mearns and Reader, 2008; Tucker pressure and certain workforce characteristics as hindrances on
116 S.M. Conchie et al. / Safety Science 51 (2013) 109–117
supervisors’ safety leadership behaviors. The findings suggest that
reducing demands placed on supervisors is one way for organiza-
tions to promote supervisors’ safety leadership. Our findings also
suggest that the negative effects of demands may be reduced by
increasing support between supervisors and offering training in a
supervisory role. In doing this, organizations may expect to see
an increase in safety leadership behaviors.
Acknowledgements
This study was funded by a research grant provided by the Insti-
tution of Occupational Safety and Health. However, the findings,
views, and conclusions reported in this paper belong only to the
authors and should not be regarded as being endorsed by the fund-
ing body or organizations to which the authors are affiliated.
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