Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Share this:
Underlying agreement
Subcontractor agreement
The engineering firm then entered into a subcontract agreement with the
designated subcontractors, one of whom was GE Energy. This
subcontract called for GE Energy to manufacture and install nine electric
motors to be used in the cold rolling units, which GE Energy delivered in a
timely manner. The subcontract did not contain an arbitration clause, and
GE Energy was not a signatory of any agreement between Outokumpu
Stainless or its predecessor and the engineer.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
granted the motion to compel and dismissed the lawsuit, 2 finding that
there was an “agreement in writing” within the meaning of the
Convention’s Article II 3 based on the existence of the requisite written
agreement between Outokumpu Stainless and the engineer that specified
GE Energy as an approved/required subcontractor and the
corresponding status of GE Energy as suitably identified within the
arbitration contract’s definitions of “Buyer” and “Seller.”
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this
decision and rejected GE Energy’s effort to invoke arbitration. The
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the propriety of invoking the equitable
estoppel doctrine in domestic arbitrations, citing Arthur Andersen LLP v.
Carlisle. 4 However, it construed that decision as endorsing equitable
estoppel in a domestic arbitration only because Chapter 1 of the FAA 5
does not expressly restrict arbitration to the signatories to an agreement.
It accordingly ruled that such a restriction existed in the New York
Convention, with the result that only a party to an arbitration agreement
could invoke the arbitral process. Since GE Energy lacked this status as a
non-signatory, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that GE Energy could not
rely upon Alabama equitable estoppel principles to override the New
York Convention’s signatory requirement. 6
Applying such tools, the Court held that only one Article in the
Convention, Article II, even addresses arbitration agreements and, further,
that the Convention does not address at all the potential role of a non-
signatory in attempting to enforce an arbitration agreement. It construed
this “silence” to support dispositively the use of the “domestic” doctrine of
equitable estoppel in an international arbitration case. It held that nothing
in the Convention’s text excludes application of such a doctrine or
displaces application of domestic doctrines. It accordingly ruled that a
state law equitable estoppel doctrine does not conflict with §208 of the
Convention. 9
To bolster its decision, the Court took into consideration the drafting
history of the Convention. It found little guidance from the treaty’s choice
of language in Article II, noting only that “the drafters sought to impose
baseline requirements on contracting states.” 10 It specifically stated
that “nothing in the drafting history suggests that the Convention sought
to prevent contracting states from applying domestic law that permits
non-signatories to enforce arbitration agreements in additional
circumstances.” 11
The Court concluded by noting that the Eleventh Circuit had not
determined whether GE Energy could compel arbitration using the
equitable estoppel doctrine, and that as a result, the Court of Appeals
could address this issue on remand. The case therefore returns to that
court for a consideration of Alabama’s doctrinal law.
Concurrence
Aftermath
TOPIC:
Endnotes
Authors