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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II KMU v. ERMITA (2006)
Finals Reviewer
Introduction
The interpretation of the court controls. It is better to predict what the
Supreme Court would do than what they should do.
Article VIII – majority vote needed to declare unconstitutionality.
Without this majority, the government will win because there is a
presumption of constitutionality.
Ratio decidendi – rule coming out of the case
- A rule that states how a word will be interpreted
- Not a constitutional provision but an interpretation of the rule
- “x should be read as y” / “x shall under the conditions of y be read
as z” / “under conditions of xy, the conditions should be z” / “x
shall mean/shall not mean”
- Can endow someone with power
- A standard of behavior
- Normative than descriptive
- When repeated, becomes doctrine
- Canonical – ratio decidendi repeated among the community many
times
- Can be about a method of interpretation on (a) what the text
means or (b) how to go about interpreting it >> procedural
Reasoning – what leads to the ratio decidendi
There is a community that thinks in a particular way (community of lawyers)
and judges will think within those bounds.
Because of ambiguity, laws should be interpreted according to a set of
methods. A text has no meaning. Meaning of the text depends on the context.
Legal realism – know not only the methods, interpretations, and facts, but
also decision-makers
As opposed to Langdel’s method – researching all cases on how they are
interpreted (law as science)
THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY
OPLE v. TORRES (1998)
Held: Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System” is
declared unconstitutional for involving a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. There
was a need for an appropriate legislation.
Significance:
• Recognized the concept of a right to privacy as being the
“right to be left alone.”
• Through the ponencia of Justice Puno, there is a
presumption of unconstitutionality when the right to privacy
is infringed as against the usual presumption of
constitutionality for any act of a Constitutional organ..
• As a result, the burden to prove a “compelling state interest”
for such infringement is shifted to the government.
Note: From the text of the case, it was in Morfe v. Mutuc where the
constitutional right to privacy was adopted or recognized in our jurisdiction.
Further, Dean mentions that none of the cases really problematized the right to
privacy, but merely imported its recognition from US cases.
Held: Executive Order 420, which directs all government
agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing
ID systems, does not establish a national ID system, and is
within the constitutional power of control of the President.
Significance:
• Categorically states that Ople v. Torres is not authority to
hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in
that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly draw and
devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that
the subject matter required legislation.
• In other words, the ratio decidendi in Ople is merely with
regard to the President’s capacity in that issuance and was
declared inapplicable.
• Penned by Justice Carpio who would be the most “senior”
Justice of the SC once Chief Justice Puno retires.
Note: Dean highlights the faulty logic of Justice Carpio in justifying the
unification of the ID system. Justice Carpio concludes that the right to
privacy is not violated because we’re used to IDs. Again, Dean mentions that
there was no satisfactory examination of the possible infringement to the right
of privacy.
IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ALEJANO (2005)
Issue: WON the opening of a folded letter by a detainee
through counsel (as mere “courier”) to another individual
violates Article III, Sec. 3 of the Constitution?
Court:
• Article III, Sec. 3 is not violated by the opening of a folded
envelope by a detainee through counsel (RD)
• BUT may not open SEALED envelope (obiter but may
be persuasive)
• That a law is required before an executive officer could
intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a guarantee that is
available only to the public at large but not to persons who
are detained or imprisoned—by the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy.
Rule: Under different circumstances, the expectation of
privacy is different.
 “reasonable expectation of privacy”
Note: habeas corpus was a wrong remedy, since they were under “lawful”
custody
MERCADO v. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION
(2006)
* not discussed in class
 about letter to Chief Justice Davide Jr.
 invokes freedom of speech and privacy of communication

Significance: Letters addressed to individual Justices, in
connection with the performance of their judicial functions
become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern
for the entire court.
SILAHIS Int’l Hotel v. SOLUTA (2006)
* not discussed in class
 alleged drugs in the office occupied by the hotel
employees’ union
 searched without search warrant
 civil case for damages
Significance: Not only public officers but also private
individuals are civilly liable for violation of one’s
constitutional right (against unlawful search and seizure in this
case) as enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS (1989)
RD: The grant of executive power under Article VII, Sec. 1
shall include residual powers of the President to address
current situations absent legal prohibitions.
to prevent the return of a former President in her discretion
believing such return according to the information given to her
shall be inimical to national security or public safety.
PRIVACY: RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
PEOPLE v. MARTI (1991)
RD: The right of the people against unreasonable searches
and seizures in Article III, Section 2 only applies to searches
done by the State and/or its agents.
 Article III, Section 2 applies as a restraint only against
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
law, and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals.
As a CONSEQUENCE: The inadmissibility of evidence in
Article III, Section 3(2) (otherwise known as the
“exclusionary rule”) therefore will only apply when such
evidence was obtained through actions taken by government.
GUAZON v. DE VILLA (1990)
* not discussed in class
 saturation drives on areas where alleged subversives were
hiding
 alleged human rights abuses
 absence of clear facts, no permanent relief
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Significance: Despite the court believing it is highly probable
that some violations were committed, the majority declared
that the remedy is not to stop all police actions. There was a
brief discussion on the importance of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure.
“What is sought to be guarded is a man’s prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the
kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does
not as such have access...his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his
life.”
DISSENTS:
Cruz Saturation drives not among accepted instances where
search or arrest may be made without a warrant. Thus, such
drives are per se unconstitutional.
Sarmiento Saturation drives were not lawful and
legitimate because arrests were not accompanied by judicial
warrant despite planning by the police officers. Moreover,
such activities are conducted to fish for evidence and therefore
a warrant is necessary.
VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERS (1920)
RD: The right against self-incrimination embodied in Article
III, Section 17 is limited to be against testimonial compulsion.
Rationale: With a premise that the purpose of criminal
proceedings is to arrive at the truth, coerced confessions are
often not truthful.
STONEHILL v. DIOKNO (1967)
 “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, International Revenue Code, and the Revised Penal
Code”
RD1: Probable cause can only be determined when there is
one specific offense.
 determination of probable cause for a particular offense is
dependent on the evidence or proof presented
 if probable cause could not be determined, therefore the
judge could not issue the warrant
RD2: The description of the objects to be seized ought to be
specific enough for a judge to believe that it was used in the
commission of an offense.
 main intention is to ensure against the infringement of the
State in the implied right of privacy/autonomy
NOTE: Although not discussed as ratio decidendi, this case overturned the
ruling in Moncado, and adopted the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio.
Currently, we all know that this rule has been “constitutionalized” in Article
III, Section 3(2).

BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF (We Forum)
1. When the address contained in the search warrant is
different from that applied for and the search is done
in the place of the application, it does not make such
warrant invalid. The warrant is not invalid simply
because there is inconsistency.
2. In determining whether personal property can be
constitutionally seized, the rules to be followed are
the Civil Code provisions.
3. Description of the objects to be seized would be such
that it would curtail the discretion of law officers, so
that they cannot seize anything besides those used in
the commission of the crime.
4. Probable cause shall not be found absent personal
knowledge.
Probable cause – facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense was committed,
demanding personal knowledge of facts upon which the issuance of warrant
may be justified
Evidences: testimonial, documentary, objects
Reasonable person - a person with a judicial mind
Things to look for in a search warrant:
1. Issued by a judge (Art III Sec 2)
2. One offense only (Stonehill vs. Diokno)
3. Address corresponds to the address being raided – presumption
overturned by showing the application (Burgos vs. Chief of Staff)
4. Determine probable cause. Even if there was, the execution must
be reasonable.
VILLANUEVA VS. QUERUBIN (gambling
paraphernalia) – (not discussed) The right of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall include the
immunity of one’s person from interference by the
government and the recognition of a constitutionally-protected
area particularly one’s own home.
MHP GARMENTS VS. CA (girl scout uniforms)– The
inadmissibility of evidence shall apply to those searches and
seizures wherein there was sufficient time to obtain a warrant.
Problem: MHP instigated the raid (a private entity). The action was civil in
nature, for damages.
UY KHEYTIN VS. VILLAREAL (opium inside the table)
– (not discussed) An irregularity in the search warrant does
not justify the inadmissibility of the seized items as evidence.
20th CENTURY FOX VS. CA (pirated VHS) – In the search
and seizure of illegal copies of movies, the master copy should
be presented as evidence for comparison, so that the evidence
would not be held as inadmissible.
- The warrants should also be specific and not general.
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA (checkpoints)– The right
against unreasonable searches and seizures can only be
invoked by those whose rights have been infringed.
ANIAG VS. COMELEC (gun ban) – Evidences obtained
through checkpoints which were installed without sufficient
time for a person to know that a law had been passed banning
firearms shall be held as inadmissible.
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POSADAS VS. CA (buri bag with firearm) – “Stop and
frisk” is a reasonable search and seizure, in which the
reasonableness is determined by the police officers through
the “reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed.”
Rationale: Necessity of law enforcement
Problem: It is a figment of the imagination, only based on the minds of the
policemen. Furthermore, the man could have ran away at the sight of the
policemen approaching him.
NOLASCO VS. PANO – (not discussed) A search can be
made incident to arrest.
PEOPLE VS. TABAR (white pants) – Consensual search is
an exception to the procurement of a search warrant.
The conviction was because of the incompetence of the counsel. Try to
establish the circumstances surrounding the event. In this case, having armed
men raid one’s home couldn’t have been voluntary.
Consent required:
1. Personal (Aniag)
2. Knowing and intelligent waiver (Aruta)
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA (travelling bag with marijuana) -
For a search to be consensual, the waiver must be intelligently
made.
PEOPLE VS. YATAR (killer rapist) – The right against
self-incrimination is limited only to testimonial evidence and
excludes DNA samples obtained from the accused.
AGUSTIN VS. CA (support pendente lite) – For the Court
to compel DNA testing is not violative of the right against
self-incrimination, unless it is shown that such test is
irrelevant or oppressive.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
PURPOSES
Arrive at truth and debate on public issues
ORFANEL V. PEOPLE
• Fact-opinion dichotomy
o Fact: can be proven or disproven
o For an opinion to be protected and within
the ambit of Art 3, Sec 4, it must not be
made without factual basis; it should be
shown that it can be inferred from the facts.
• In order to escape criminal responsibility for libel or
slander, it is not enough for the party who writes a
defamatory communication to another to say that the
writer expresses therein no more than his opinion or
belief.
IN RE: EMIL (EMILIANO) JURADO
Art 3, Sec 4 of the 1987 Constitution is not violated
when the judiciary cites a newspaperman in contempt if article
is baseless and he does not verify the truth of his allegations.

Dissent: It is not falsity that brings speech outside the ambit of freedom of
speech and expression but MALICE.
Malice:
o Baseless
o Reckless disregard for the truth
ADIONG V. COMELEC (decals and stickers)
When faced with borderline situations where freedom
to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against
actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the
police, local officials, and COMELEC should lean in favor of
freedom of speech.
• Regulation of communicative content must be
specific enough so as not to affect speech unrelated to
the interest of the State.
Preserve Public Institutions
US V. BUSTOS
• The “scalpel metaphor”:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is
a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its
probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.
In LIBEL, subsequent punishment is taken into consideration, and not the
Clear and Present Danger rule. For a libel suit to prosper, it must be proven
that the statements were made with malice.
Why malice and not falsity?
• False speech is within the ambit of freedom of expression.
o There’s meaning to it. Ex.: metaphor, parody
• There’s no such thing as absolute proof. Even those that have been
said to be true, at one point in time, can be disproven.
• Under different contexts, there is no way of distinguishing what is
true and what is false different meanings are involved.
• FALSITYNO ONE CAN BE SURE. Hence, the test should be
MALICE.
o Baseless
o Reckless disregard for the truth
o Journalist Code of Ethics (for journalists: verified by at
least 2 sources)
US V. PERFECTO
Art 3, Sec 4 of the 1987 Constitution protects
opinions on the maladministration of public affairs that are
based on facts, made with good motives and for justifiable
ends.
ESPUELAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Art 3, Sec 4 does not protect seditious libel that has
an immediate tendency to stir up general discontent or
disaffection among the people and induce them to resort to
illegal methods in order to redress the evils which press upon
their minds.
• The attack on the President has passed the furthest bounds of free
speech and common decency.
• The Court used the DANGEROUS TENDENCY test. Freedom of
Speech is not applied since the speech in this case had a tendency
to incite sedition (Art 142 Revised Penal Code).
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PLANAS V. GIL
Art 3, Sec 4 cannot be used as a defense against an
investigation to elicit the truth or falsity of criticisms directed
against the Government, its administration, its policies and
officials. Art 3, Sec 4 is not an unbridled license that would
render the Government powerless to act.
SANTIAGO V. FAR EASTERN BROADCASTING
Broadcasting Stations have a right to require previous
submission of manuscript of a speech to be broadcasted when
there are laws and regulations that expressly authorize them to
make such requirement.
Additional notes:
• The petitioners should have attacked the law and regulations since
the law and regulations are considered to be a prior restraint on
the freedom of speech.
• Compelling state interest for the requirement: to protect the public
—namely the listeners and the viewers. Broadcasting stations are
considered to be an educative body.
• Clear and present danger: broadcasters can say that there is an
event when in fact there is none still, they would affect the way
the public thinks.
PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO
A statute requiring persons using the public streets
for a parade or procession to procure a special license from the
local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the
rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where
the licensing authorities are strictly limited to a
consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade
or procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper
policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue
or refuse license.
Why is there a need to discuss restrictions?  Expression affects several
interests
Theories in approaching Art 3, Sec 4:
1. Purpose
2. Tests used
2 KINDS OF RESTRICTION on Communication tests developed are
different
• Communicative conduct: incidentally, every conduct has an
expressive content
• Communicative content: punished for the meaning of the content;
restricted because of its grave effect that shatters the very
foundation by which the freedom is exercised.
o How to know if this cause will have this grave effect?
o Earliest test: DANGEROUS TENDENCY
 look at the cause and effect only
 depends on the subjective notion of whoever
is making the judgment
o CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
 Requires something more from whoever
makes the judgment
 Clarity and imminence of the evil:
substantive evil
Other distinction (concerning time): look at the restriction on the speech being
madewhen is the restriction made?
• Prior restraint: regulation prior to speech
o All prior restraints have a heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality

o General rule: Challenger carries the burden of proving
unconstitutionality; but for prior restraint: government
carries the burden of proving constitutionality
• Subsequent Punishment: ex. Libel
o Burden does not shift; it is still with the plaintiff
o Re: content
There is a regulation on CONDUCT even if it seems that it regulates content.
Test is O’Brien test:
o Within the constitutional power
o Regulation is unrelated to speech
o Regulation on speech is just a tangential effect
o Restriction is not greater than what is required in the
governmental interest
Other dimensions:
• Fact-opinion dichotomy (ie Jurado and Bustos)
• Doctrine of overbreadth restriction must be so precise that it will
not affect others who make the speech but don’t cause the same
effect
o Broader than what it wants to prohibit
o This doesn’t need an actual caseexception to the
general rule of the presence of actual case
o So long as it’s patently clear that others will be
affectedcalled the facial challenge as used in Adiong
and Gonzales cases
GONZALES v. COMELEC
An amendment to the Omnibus Election Code, RA 4880 (1)
prohibits the nomination of candidates outside the election
period and (2) regulates or limits the campaign period. The
government argued that there is a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil: that of (1) too much election expenditures
and (2) rise of election-related violence. The court held that
this statute is unconstitutional as some of its provisions are
vague. Freedom of association as a form of free speech is
impaired.
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD v. CAPULONG
The movie production company wants to make a docu-drama
miniseries that depicts the events that transpired in the 1986
People Power Revolution. Enrile opposes the filming of the
series because it violates his right to privacy. The Court held
by using the balancing-of-interest test citing that the
filmmakers’ freedom of speech must have greater value over
Enrile’s privacy as he is a public figure whose involvement in
the aforesaid revolution constitutes to a legitimate public
interest. The clear and present danger fails for not specifying
the substantive evil sought t be prevented as the movie series
is still unfinished.
BORJAL v. CA
Borjal, a columnist in the Philippine Star, wrote an article
about an unidentified self-proclaimed EDSA hero who is
involved in malicious financial solicitations of a convention
involving land transportation. Although every defamatory
remark is presumed to be malicious, libel requires that the
remark must point to a specific person and not to a generic
thing. Wenceslao, although a private individual, is deemed a
public figure if he works for an office which is imbued with
public interest.
TULFO v. PEOPLE
Four counts of libel were filed by Atty. Carlos “Ding” so
against Erwin Tulfo for the defamatory remarks that the latter
said against the former in his Remate column. Tulfo called so
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the most corrupt Customs official and the worst Iglesia ni
Kristo member. Borjal cannot be applied in this case because
the prosecution produced evidence that Atty. Carlos So is the
only employee known as Ding So in the Bureau of Customs.
The Court held that an opinion should be based on factual
matters for it to fall within the ambit of protected speech. The
facts must be true (proven by empirical basis) and that there
must be no reckless disregard of the truth.
ARREZA v. GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY
(GAUF)
The demonstration conducted by the students inside a
university campus falls within the freedom of speech
contemplated in Article III Section 4 of our Constitution.
According to the Court in Non vs. Dames, the students’
freedom of speech should not be left at the school gates and
that the students are entitled to exercise such freedom through
rallies and other forms of demonstrations. The cases of Arreza
and Non are similar in the sense that both facts narrate that
some students who joined the rallies were denied admission in
the subsequent semester. The Court affirmed the doctrine of
implied academic contract which states that the contract
between the student and the university expires until the student
finishes his course and not on a per semester basis.
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING VS. AGO MEDICAL
(liabilities to society) – (not discussed) The doctrine of fair
comment is not applicable to broadcasts which are made in
reckless disregard for the truth.
Individual Enhancement
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION V.PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS
F: PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
police, to be participated in by the workers in the morning
shifts. Petitioners were found guilty of violation of CBA.
RD: Art. 3 Sec. 4 should be read to mean that the rights to
freedom of speech and peaceably assemble are more
primordial than the right to property.
To Equalize Opportunities
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V. COMELEC
F: Representatives of mass media challenged the
constitutionality of RA 6646 which made it unlawful for
publishers to sell or give free of charge for political purposes
except that Comelec shall be the one to provide for free spaces
and airtime. Court held that the challenged restrictions on
freedom of speech bear a reasonable connection with the
constitutional objective set in Art. IX (C) (4). Equality of
opportunity was also held as an important consideration.
Constitutionality upheld.

RD: Art. 3 Sec. 4 has to be taken in conjunction with Art. IX
(C) (4) during election periods. This produces the technical
effect of non presumption of invalidity of Comelec regulations
exercised for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among
candidates for political office.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V. COMELEC
F: PPI assailed the validity of Comelec Resolution No. 2772
for it violates the Constitutional prohibition on taking of
private property for public use without just compensation.
Violation on freedom of speech also raised (provision on
undue reference to candidates/political parties). Court held
that Sec. 2 (donation of ad spaces) amounted to taking of
property. Sec. 8, on the other hand, does not violate the
freedom of speech citing NPC v.Comelec.
RD:
• Art. 3 Sec. 4 is not violated where a prohibition on
“undue reference to candidate” (Comments favoring
a candidate and repeated reference to a candidate)
does not absolutely prohibit other means of reporting
about a political candidate.
• In seeking to equalize opportunities, the government
ends up making content based choices which result in
unintended consequences which are worse than the
evil it seeks to prevent.
Notes: Clear and present danger rule and Equalizing of Opportunities
Distinguished
• CPD: designed to prevent the government to do positive acts which
amount prohibition absence showing of CPD.
• Equalizing Opportunities: Designed for the government to do
affirmative actions.
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID
NG PILIPINAS (KMP) VS. ERMITA
F: KMU, Bayan, del Prado assailed the constitutionality of BP
880 (The Public Assembly Act) and the CPR. BP 880 makes it
unlawful for an organization to rally without permit. CPR, on
the other hand, allowed the gov’t to take action even before
the rallyists perform their act. Court held the validity of BP
880. CPR was struck down.
RD: Art. 3 Sec. 4 is not violated by a law which does not
absolutely ban public assemblies and merely restricts by
regulating the time, place and manner of assembly.
CPR must be struck down as it serves no purpose in lieu of
“maximum tolerance” standard already provided for by BP
880.
Notes: Court emphasized in this case that the government could only modify
the time, place and manner of assembly only upon showing CPD.
REYES V. BAGATSING
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F: JBL Reyes sought permit from the City of Manila to hold a
public assembly from Luneta to US Embassy.
RD: same with Bayan; gave guidelines on applying for a
permit to rally; Eventually adopted by BP 880
GONZALES V. KATIGBAK (Kapit sa patalim)
RD: Obscenity is outside the ambit of Art. 3 Sec. 4.
Notes: Hicklin test: Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.
Roth test (prior to Hicklin): Test is the effect of an isolated exerpt upon
particularly susceptible persons.
Hicklin standard: 1) to the average person 2) dominant effect (taken as whole)
• “Average person” difficult to determine; largely based on the
judge’s discretion; takes into consideration the context of
population;
Classification scheme- form of prior restraint; heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality
Reason why obscenity is not protected speech:
Justice Brenan in Roth v. US: All ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance- unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion- have the full protection of
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of
more important interest. But implicit in the history of the 1st Amendment is
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.
Criticism: ex cathedra
EBRINALAG V SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF
CEBU
RD:
- RA 1265 purpose: to inculcate patriotism and nationalism
- neutral regulation was tangentially affecting religion
- overturned the Gerona doctrine which dichotomized “faith – act”, where
faith (belief) is absolutely protected while any act which violates the
regulation is prohibited
 Court simply weighed the two interests, and didn’t explain further than:
“Symbolism is not as important as freedom of religion”
2 Aspects of AIII Sec. 5:
1. Free Exercise
2. Non-establishment – the State cannot support a religion, no
religious test for exercise of civil and political rights
ESTRADA V ESCRITOR (2003)
RD:
I. Strict scrutiny test
1) whether there is sincerity to the religious belief? OR
whether there is a real burden on religious belief?
2) whether there is a compelling state interest?
3) whether the regulation is the least intrusive means?
II. Religion
1. Belief in God/Maker/anything parallel to it
2. Belief in moral code based on #1

3. Sincerity of belief, effort to comply
4. Associative relationship
Notes on Strict Scrutiny:
1. Secular purpose – when applied, will tangentially affect free
exercise
2. Compelling interest – if it’s covered by a provision in the
Constitution, that’s where you find the interest; or something
suggested or implied by the police power or any inherent power
(eminent domain, taxation)
3. Least intrusive means – can it correct the evil?
Fundamental purpose of religious clause: to protect the minority
Evolution of Free Exercise Clause (thanks Eva)
1. Belief-action test
o The state was absolutely prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause
from regulating individual religious beliefs, but placed no
restriction on the ability of the state to regulate religiously
motivated conduct.
o As long as the Court found that regulation address action rather
than belief, the Free Exercise Clause did not pose any problem.
o The Free Exercise Clause thus gave no protection against the
proscription of actions even if considered central to a religion
unless the legislature formally outlawed the belief itself.
o Proved unsatisfactory since regulation of religiously dictated
conduct would be upheld no matter how central the conduct was to
the exercise of religion and no matter how insignificant was the
government's non-religious regulatory interest so long as the
government is proscribing action and not belief.
2. Deliberate-Inadvertent distinction
o Distinction is made between deliberate state interference of
religious exercise for religious reasons which was plainly
unconstitutional and government's inadvertent interference with
religion in pursuing some secular objective.
o Introduced in Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)
o Free Exercise Clause presented no problem to interference with
religion that was inadvertent no matter how serious the
interference, no matter how trivial the state's non-religious
objectives, and no matter how many alternative approaches were
available to the state to pursue its objectives with less impact on
religion, so long as government was acting in pursuit of a secular
objective.
o Gobitis was overturned in West Virginia v Barnette (1943) which
held that even inadvertent interference with religion must pass
judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause with only grave
and immediate danger sufficing to override religious liberty.
3. Two-part balancing test
o Established in Braunfeld v. Brown (1961).
o Since the burden was the indirect effect of a law with a secular
purpose, it would violate the Free Exercise Clause only if there
were alternative ways of achieving the state's interest
o The two-part balancing test of validity:
1. plaintiff to show that the regulation placed a real burden
on his religious exercise
2. burden will only be upheld if state showed that it was
pursuing an overriding secular goal by the means which
imposed the least burden on religious practices
4. Strict Scrutiny and Compelling State Interest Test
o First applied in Sherbert v. Verner (1963).
o This test was similar to the two-part balancing test but this latter
test stressed that the state interest was not merely any colorable
state interest, but must be paramount and compelling to override
the free exercise claim.
o Sherbert also firmly established the exemption doctrine.
o Significantly increased the degree of protection afforded to
religiously motivated conduct; established a strong presumption in
favor of the free exercise of religion.
o Upheld in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
C onst i t ut i ona l La w 2 R e vi e we r |7
B. Establishment Clause
Everson v. Board of Education (1947)
o The US Supreme Court's first encounter with the Establishment
Clause.
o Court adopted Jefferson's metaphor of "a wall of separation
between church and state" as encapsulating the meaning of the
Establishment Clause.
o Recall: phrase "separation of church and state" does not appear in
the U.S. Constitution. It became part of U.S. jurisprudence when
the Court in the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United States.
Lemon test
o Laid down in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971).
o The Lemon test requires a challenged policy to meet the following
criteria to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause.
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose.
2. Its primary or principal effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.
3. The statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement
with religion.'
McGowan v. Maryland (1961)
o Illustrated that in the area of government displays or affirmations
of belief, the Court has given leeway to religious beliefs and
practices which have acquired a secular meaning and have become
deeply entrenched in history.
Marsh v. Chambers (1983)
o The majority opinion did not rely on the Lemon test and instead
drew heavily from history and the need for accommodation of
popular religious beliefs
Dean’s Exercises:
- Putting up a Catholic Church inside UP
o Start with: UP is the national university, by nature a
governmental instrumentality. What it does, the State
does.
o Establishing a church can violate AII Sec 5 and AIII
Sec 5 (Non-establishment clause). Also using
government resources.
o Benevolent neutrality (Estrada v Escritor): There is a
wall of separation, religion is accepted as a reality
o Lemon Test:
 Legislative purpose (No)
 Effect on religious practice (Actual effect:
Does not favor a religion. There are other
lease agreements. It will only be violative if
there’s a special lease for religion only.)
 No excessive entanglement (If there are no
existing standards for choosing one religion
over the other, there can be an excessive
entanglement)
o How to structure policy: provide zoning, guidelines, list
of members
- Adultery case for B’Laans (1st level: It did not happen, 2nd level:
interpret what is in the RPC, 3 rd level: procedure, 4th level:
constitutional arguments)
o 3 parts of a constitutional argument: justiceability,
WON the governmental organ has the power to try the
case, transcending limitations provided by the
Constitution
- A 7 Day Adventist refuses to take an exam on Saturday (1 ST test:
th
No action for mandamus, 2nd test: Burden? Yes. Least restrictive?
No. )
- Male priesthood (Ans: It will infringe on Free Exercise if State will
compel Catholic Church to admit females as priests.)
- Display of religious icons in the office of a public officer: violative
of non-establishment
- Teaching of religion: can be allowed up to secondary level
(Constitutionally-protected)
- A moment of silence: non-violative
Dean’s advice: Clauses do not float. To operate them, you have to ask a series
of questions
 C onst i t ut i ona l La w 2 R e vi e we r |8

1. Equal protection – classification or discrimination RD: Pictures depicting how natives dress and live in real life
2. Due process – procedural or substantive (purpose, measure,
are not obscene, using the Hicklin Test.
method is rational)
3. Freedom of expression – conduct, content
4. Religion – special content, quite related to free expression Hicklin Test
(1) WON the tendency of the matter charged to be obscene is
In the case of Escritor, it is a facially-neutral law and the petitioner wants to
carve out an exception based on religion.
to deprave or corrupt the minds of those whose minds are open
A full rationalization of the doctrine on exemption. to such immoral influences
(2) That which shocks the ordinary and reasonable man
DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Obscene – something offensive to chastity, decency, and delicacy
RD: Overbreadth doctrine (chilling effect) only applies to free
speech cases, and used sparingly. PITA V CA (1989)

Theory behind the President being sued: President in clear violation of the RD: Law enforcement officers cannot confiscate obscene
Constitution. An attempt to create a doctrine. materials without a warrant wherein the court must determine
Commander-in-chief powers: whether or not the materials to be confiscated is indeed
1. Calling-out – contemplated in PP1017
2. Suspend the writ of habeas corpus - WHC: order to
obscene.
produce the body; a provisional remedy
3. Declare martial law Miller v California Test
(1) WON the average person, applying community
BABST V NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD standards, would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest
RD: None. Case was rendered moot and academic because (2) WON the work depicts / describes in a patently offensive
investigation proceedings involving reporters have ended. Re way, sexual conduct
libel claims: Injuction will not lie if there are other alternatives (3) WON the work taken as a whole lacks serious literary,
available for the defendants. artistic, political, or scientific value.

An example of the abuse of the judiciary of its power. Guidelines for A201 RPC to apply:
Exercise: Freedom of the press is not curtailed if a letter of invitation is sent 1. Search warrant from the judge if obscenity rap is in order
by a military officer in relation to a failed coup d’ etat. There is no 2. Authorities must convince the court that the materials indeed are
infringement yet. obscene to warrant state interference
3. Judge determines #2
PHCAP V DUQUE III 4. Upon finding probable cause, warrant can be issued
5. Suit based on A201 RPC
6. Conviction is subject to appeal
RD: Public international law
OSMENA V COMELEC (RA 6646/COMELEC Time,
What’s relevant? Puno’s concurring opinion on commercial speech. Space)
Test for evaluating validity of regulations of commercial speech (Central
Hudson Case)
1. Commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be RD:
misleading (Dean: There are certain types which are misleading)
2. Asserted governmental interest must be substantial O’Brien Test (test for content-neutral regulations)
3. Whether state regulation directly advances governmental
interest asserted
(1) WON the governmental regulation is within the
4. Whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that constitutional power of the government
interest (2) WON the regulation furthers a substantial
Applied in the case: government interest
1. Not unlawful, RIRR and Milk Code concedes that there are
instances when breastmilk substitutes (IFs) may be necessary
(3) WON the governmental interest is unrelated to the
2. Substantial interest of state in taking care of the young, preserving suppression of free speech
and promoting health of its citizens (4) WON the incident restriction is no greater than is
3. Rationale of absolute ban: prevent mother from succumbing to essential to the furtherance of the interest
suggestive and misleading marketing and propaganda
4. Absolute ban is unduly restrictive, cuts deep on free speech. Applied:
1. Power to regulate communication and information
Sec. 4 can refer even to speech of juridical persons. 2. Ensuring equal opportunity, time, and space
Ponencia: 2nd level of constitutional argument (ultra vires / beyond power) 3. Unrelated interest to free speech
Problem: WON the existing laws allow DOH to go beyond its power (EO51, 4. Yes.
Admin Code, Constitution)
Test for passing due process: (1) legitimate purpose (2) means
meet such a purpose. MTRCB V ABS-CBN (Prostituition)
Total ban is unconstitutional because it goes beyond the powers
given to DOH. However, DOH can regulate. RD:

PEOPLE V KOTTINGER (1923) ABS-CBN V COMELEC (Exit polls)

 C onst i t ut i ona l La w 2 R e vi e we r |9

RD: RD: An announcement of a public figure to prohibit the media

to issue a specific kind of statement amounts to prior restraint,
SWS V COMELEC which is violative of the right to free press.

RD:
DUE PROCESS
INC V CA
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V DAR
RD: “All television programs” covers all programs whether
religious, public affairs, or documentaries. RD:

TOLENTINO V SEC OF FINANCE “No person” – implies a power inherent in the State since it is stated in the
negative
“due process” – substantive (reasonability/absence of arbitrariness) or
RD:
procedural (fairness)
If the purpose is stated in the Constitution, due process is met. (?)
WEBB V DE LEON
Police Power Expropriation
RD: Restriction of rights Juridical physical possession
Prevented from doing liberties
Deprivation suffered by the citizen Prevented from using property for the
SENATE V ERMITA benefit of the public

RD: Modern trend: expropriation as a tool of police power

Police power – inherent power of the State to provide for the general welfare
Why need expropriation? The instrumentalities of the State cannot operate
Freedom of information – cognate of freedom of expression without resources
The public’s right to know is different from the power of Congress to summon Just compensation – fair market value (canonical)
officials in aid of legislation Eminent domain – can also be used for police power purposes (only test is
whether there is a legitimate purpose and the rationality of means)
NERI V SENATE
Arguments in ASL:
RD: 1. Public land first before private land – not a legal argument. Cite
the text.
I. Laid down the three elements of presidential 2. Who decides what is just compensation? Court.
communications privilege: - Full payment = transfer of title
1. protected communication must be quintessential and 3. Mode of payment – cash, unless there is revolutionary taking (can
non-delegable presidential power be bonds or other forms of security)
2. communication must be authored or “solicited and
RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD
received” by an advisor in operational proximity with
the president
RD:
3. presidential communications privilege remains a
1. The term “Non-Christian” shall mean lack or low
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
degree of civilization, and does not have a religious
showing of adequate need such that the information
connotation.
sought likely contains important evidence and
2. The right to liberty shall not be available to
unavailability of the information elsewhere
individuals who are uncivilized.
II. Claim of executive privilege is properly invoked by
CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
Neri applying the three elements in the case
1. authority of the President to enter into executive
RD: The right to property can pertain to undocumented
agreement is recognized in Phil. Jurisprudence
property which was acquired since time immemorial.
2. Neri is considered a close advisor, being a member of
the President’s cabinet Definition of property for purposes of due process
3. No adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the ANG TIBAY V CIR
unavailability of information
RD: There are 7 primary rights that Administrative Bodies
PUNZAL V ITCSI
must adhere to in complaints presented before them. These
are:
RD:
1. That the right to a hearing involves the right to present a
case and adduce evidence thereof.
CHAVEZ V GONZALES (Garci tapes)
2. That the court must consider the evidence presented.
3. That the duty to deliberate includes the duty to determine
which of the presented evidences supports a conclusion.
 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w 2 R e v i e w e r | 10

4. That the evidence relied upon by the court is substantial. TANADA V TUVERA
Substantial evidence is the relative evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate in support of a conclusion. RD: Publication in a newspaper of general circulation is an
5. That the evidence relied upon by the court was presented at additional requirement for a law to meet procedural due
the hearing or at least in the records thereof and made process.
available to the parties.
6. The court and its judges must rely upon their own There may be laws which do not have any effect because of the requirements
of the due process clause.
consideration of the law and facts and not depend upon the Need to publish: As notice to the entire public, to find law whenever it is
conclusion of its subordinates. necessary.
7. The court must promulgate a decision in a manner wherein
the parties can determine the issues involved and the reasons ERMITA MALATE V CITY OF MANILA
for the conclusion.
RD: Regulation requiring the registration of name and age is
Due process requires procedural fairness; a case concerning administrative not unconstitutional and passes the requirements of
proceedings before a quasi-judicial agency. substantive due process.
“Seven cardinal principles”
See White Light for test.
NON V DAMES II
MAGTAJAS V PRYCE PROPERTIES
RD: the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires the
observance of procedural due process: RD:
a. Students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them CARLOS SUPERDRUG V DSWD
b. They shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel if RD: A reduction of income by giving discounts to senior
desired citizens does not amount to taking of private property without
c. They shall be informed of the evidence against due process of law because such reduction is merely
them speculative and passes the test for substantive due process.
d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf Limits of taking private property:
e. Evidence must be duly considered by their 1. Public use
investigating committee 2. Just compensation
Substantive due process test:
Moreover, penalty must be proportionate to the offense 1. Legitimate purpose – welfare of senior citizens constitutionally
committed. provided
2. Method – reasonable

Due process with respect to academic institutions MMDA V VIRUN TRANSPORT

ROXAS & CO V CA RD:
RD: Procedural due process must also mean that whenever SJS V ATIENZA
there is an administrative order prescribing mechanisms for
deprivation of property, the regulator must subscribe to that RD:
process.
WHITE LIGHT V CITY OF MANILA
Roxas Ang Tibay
No case 2 private parties
Procedure of administrative regulation Procedure of hearing RD: A city ordinance prohibiting short-time and wash-up time
in motels does not meet the rational relationship required to
How can procedural rules violate substantive due process? Rules may require pass the test of substantive due process.
something substantive.
Do all acts of authorities amount to deprivation of life, liberty, and property?
No. Levels of Analysis employed in substantive due process:
People vs. Marti – Sec. 2 is invoked against the State and not 1. Rational relationship test – relationship of ends to means; more
private individuals liberal, in favor of the regulator, least protective of rights
Non vs. Dames – Due process clause can be applied as to its effect 2. Strict scrutiny – colorable interest compelling enough
on the individual, government was empowered to decide on 3. Heightened scrutiny – stricter analysis of means, allows the Court
constitutional implications of acts of a private individual (same to dictate on matters of wisdom
with ISAE) In this case, the relationship is not even rational (prohibition also applies to
Dean’s Exercise: Student given a 5.0 arbitrarily married couples, travelers, who may have legitimate purposes to stay in
1. “No person” WON a person was involved – student is a person motels)
2. What is involved (life, liberty, or property)
3. WON there was deprivation - No
4. Due process – 2 levels (reasonability/procedural)
EQUAL PROTECTION
 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w 2 R e v i e w e r | 11

o Mere notice (much less implied notice) of intention to

PEOPLE V CAYAT (1939) expropriate the lands in the future does not bind the
landowner, nor bind the land itself.
 Expropriation must be commenced in court
RD: Equal Protection is not violated by a • THIRD: WARRANT OR COLOR OF LEGAL AUTHORITY Θ
legislation/regulation based on “reasonable classification” • FOURTH: DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USE Θ
1) must rest on substantial distinctions o Used by the AFP—considered public use
2) must be germane to the purpose of the law • FIFTH: OUST AND DEPRIVE OWNER OF BENEFITS
3) must not be limited to existing conditions only o Castellvi remained the owner of the property
 Occupation was provisional—had to be
4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
renewed yearly
o Castellvi received monthly rentals
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ • CONCLULSION: Taking did NOT commence in 1947
o A lease on a year to year basis cannot give rise to a
RD: permanent right to occupy
o The right of eminent domain may NOT be exercise
simply by leasing the premises to be expropriated
TATAD V SECRETARY OF DOE o Republic did not need to enter into a simulated contract
of lease—It already had the power of expropriation
RD: Equal protection does not compel the government to • Real purpose: to get a cheaper price
equalize situations which are already existing, but works on o Sec 4, Rule 67 [RoC]. “just compensation it to be
laws produced by the State. determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint
o when the expropriation coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or
Equal Protection Clause takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint—
1. Valid classification – see P v Cayat just compensation must be determined as of the date of
2. Discrimination the filing
Court in this case did not rule on EP but brought the argument on Sec. 19 of
 Compensation must be determined as of
AXII (anti-trust)
1959 NOT 1947
 Same with Gozun property
ISAE V QUISUMBING (2000)
Other issue: WoN the recommended price of P10/sqm is just
RD: People who work with substantially equal qualification, compensation
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, • The lands in question are residential—steps taken to develop the
same prior to the filing
should be paid similar salaries.
• The provisional value is DIFFERENT from the fair value
 “equal pay for equal work” o Tentative—only serves as basis for the immediate
occupancy
Notes: As a general rule, private sector could be discriminatory, subject only • HOWEVER Commissioner’s recommendation value was too high
to their Board. However, this case was a labor dispute where the Department o Report not binding; merely advisory
of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction which eventually reached the o Fair value reduced to P5/sqm
Supreme Court on Certiorari (Rule 65). Held: Decision appealed from is MODIFIED.
• Lands declared expropriated for public use
EMINENT DOMAIN • Fair market value is P5/sqm
• RP must pay Castellvi and Gozun
REPUBLIC V VDA. DE CASTELLVI o Respective value of the land
o Minus provisional value already received
o With 6% interest from the day of the deposit of the
Taking (Elements) provisional value until full payment
o Entering upon private property • Attorney’s lien is enforced
o For more than a momentary period • Costs to RP
o Under warrant (color of legal authority)
o Devoting it to public use DE KNECTH V CA
o Substantially oust the owner and deprive
him off all beneficial enjoyment of the same RD:

• FIRST: ENTRY Θ REPUBLIC V TAGLE (1998)

o By virtue of the lease agreement
• SECOND: MORE THAN A MOMENTARY PERIOD
o Period of 1 year, renewable from year to year
o The entry was merely temporary and transitory
 Over the “intent” inferred from the
stipulation that RP should return land in the
same condition BUT still allowed permanent
structures to be erected thereon
o Contemporaneous and subsequent acts
 If RP really intended to take the land in
1947, it should’ve expropriated it then—it
didn’t need to enter into lease contract
RD: Expropriation of real property is not the mere physical
entry, occupation, or possession of land but also includes the
bundle of legal rights of ownership to completely own the
property.
Relevant Law: E.O. 1035, Sec. 7 states that is the ministerial duty of courts
to issue a writ of possession within 5 days from deposit of 10% of just
compensation payable.
Brief Background: CMDC (gov’t) rented land of Benitez. After expiration
of Lease Contract, negotiations were held for sale. Benitez agreed and agreed
 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w 2 R e v i e w e r | 12

that payment of rentals would cease, but when CMDC prepared Deed of
Absolute, Benitez did not sign. After 5 years, Benitez demanded arrears in
rentals and for CMDC to vacate the property within 30 days. She also filed an
unlawful detainer suit. As a result, CMDC had to file a suit for Eminent
Domain after depositing the provisional value of the land. The Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession was initially issued but Judge Tagle
subsequently reversed himself upon Benitez’ motion for reconsideration. His
reason for quashing the issued writ was because CMDC was already
occupying said land.

Disposition: SC reversed the ruling of Judge Tagle; quashing the writ is void
for being with grave abuse of discretion.

NPC V HENSON

RD: Indirect expropriation amounts to removing an ownership

right which partakes some expectation on the property.

Court to determine public use:

1. WON it can expropriate
2. WON property to be taken is for public use
3. WON there is just compensation
Public use – net benefit to the entire public
Public necessity – no other means for the government

DIDIPIO

RD: Taking by means of mining concessions entered into by

the government can be ruled upon by the court upon showing
of an actual case.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

PEOPLE V ECHEGARAY

RD:

ECHEGARAY V SECRETARY

RD: Standards for cruelty:

(1) Punishment for an offense
(2) Ordinary perception of the community

Dissents: Implementing mechanism of Lethal Injection Law is extraordinary,

mother law is unconstitutional

By: A2012 (Compiled by Constitutional Law 2 Digest Group)

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angelasandalo.rongarcia.loumacabodbod.kristoffermadrid.