22. Gonzales v. COMELEC 2.
Usual trend in jurisprudence is to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude to
G.R. No. L-27833 | 18 April 1969 | Fernando, J.
Aggy | Topic: Freedom of Expression
Doctrine:
The freedoms of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly are not to be limited except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
Facts:
1. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the two new sections of the Revised Election Code, under
R.A. 4880 (this act amends the REC), which prohibits the too early nomination of candidates and
limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity.
a. Under the code, election campaign or partisan political activity refers to acts designed to
have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public
office.
2. The statute also included 2 provisos which said:
a. “Simple expression of opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered
as part of an election campaign.”
b. “Nothing stated in the Act shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his
views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the
candidates for public office whom he supports.”
3. Petitioners are Felicisimo Cabigao (who was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for
Vice Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on 11 November 11, 1967), and
Arsenio Gonzales (political leader of Cabigao).
a. They claim that the enforcement of RA 4880 would prejudice their basic rights such as
freedom of speech and of assembly, and right to form associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law. (because they say nothing in the spirit of the RA will justify its passage
and it is nothing but a clear abridgement of their rights)
4. Sen. Lorenzo Tanada was asked to appear as amicie curiae.
a. He argued that there exists undeniable conditions that imperatively calls for the regulation
of the electoral process.
b. He admits the limitations it imposes on the rights of the people but argues that under the
“clear and present danger” doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, the passing
of the R.A. is well justified.
5. COMELEC maintains that the R.A. was an exercise of police power, designed to insure a free,
orderly, and honest election by regulating conduct which Congress has determined harmful.
a. They seek to address the issues on: huge expenditures of funds on the part of the
candidates, violence, corruption, and other direful consequences brought about by purely
partisan pursuits.
Issue:
W/N the constitutional rights of the petitioners were violated? – Yes, but NO. (Majority of the SC
justices wanted to declare the statute unconstitutional but they did not meet the required 2/3
votes in annulling statutes, so they had no choice but to declare it constitutional)
Holding:
Freedom of Speech (Art III, Sec 4)
1. Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There can be no previous restraint on
the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or
action for damages, or contempt proceedings, unless there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
this constitutional guarantee.
3. “It is the freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us”
4. However, the freedom of speech and of the press are not absolute. There are other societal values
that press for recognition.
5. SC cites the case of Cabansag:
a. Clear and present danger rule
i. Evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be “extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high.
ii. Evil must be so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable
iii. Clear – causal connection between the danger of the substantive evil and the
utterance.
iv. Present – time element.
v. (From what I understand, it will be considered imminent when the dangers posed by
the speech is of such nature that you will have no opportunity to avert the evil through
a full discussion, kaya there’s a need to limit the freedom)
b. Dangerous tendency rule
i. If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable.
ii. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of violence or unlawfulness
be advocated. It is enough that such acts be advocated in general terms.
iii. It is not necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons.
It is enough that the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring
about the substantive evil which Congress seeks to prevent.
Freedom of Assembly (Art. III, Sec. 4&8)
1. This means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs.
2. It was not by accident that the rights to free speech and free press were coupled with un a single
guarantee with the rights of the people to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical are inseparable. They are cognate rights and the
assurance afforded by this constitutional provision applies to all. Like freedom of expression, this
right is not to be limited except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
3. The constitution itself limits this freedom (form associations or societies) through the phrase “unless
contrary to law” which means that there may be an abridgement of this freedom
ON THE CASE:
1. Prohibition of too early nomination of candidates affects the right of association since political parties
will have less freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates, but such
curtailment is not to the point of rendering the right meaningless.
a. The scope of their activities are not unduly narrowed.
b. Their right to assemble is also not infringed because they can assemble, but only not for
such purpose (nominating candidates).
c. With regards with this, SC sustains the validity unanimously
2. On its face, the provision (Sec. 50-B of the Revised Election code, see Relevant provisions) on the
limitation on the period of election campaign or partisan political activity is constitutionally infirm for
being vague (what is partisan political activity?). However, SC notes that its vagueness is cured by
the enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms election campaign or partisan political
activity.
 a. SC held that most of the enumerated activities (see relevant provisions) to be free from
constitutional infirmity. It focused on (c) and (e), holding that it suffers from the corrosion of
invalidity. However, as I mentioned above, they lacked the required 2/3 votes (they only
reached a majority)
b. It held that it could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices more precisely
delineated. They find the provisions unconstitutional on their face inasmuch as they appear
to range to widely and indiscriminately across the fundamental liberties associated with
freedom of the mind.
c. SC recognizes the evils that the legislative wanted to address, but that it should nonetheless
not abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
3. (So basically if only Sec. 50-B lang it’s obviously unconstitutional kasi in itself it will be vague, it was
somehow cured when the legislature also included the enumeration of what would be considered a
partisan political activity. Pero the majority of the SC still thinks it not narrowly drawn enough to be
constitutional. But as I said, they did not reach the required 2/3 votes, so they had no choice but to
still declared the R.A constitutional)

Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED. R.A. 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional.

Relevant Provisions:
Revised Election Code
Sec. 50-B. Limitation upon the period of Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity. It is unlawful
for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether
or not a political party or political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political
activity except during the period of one hundred twenty days immediately preceding an election
involving a public office voted for at large and ninety days immediately preceding an election for any
other elective public office
(R.A. 4880)
Sec. 1
xxxx
The term 'Election Campaign' or 'Partisan Political Activity' refers to acts designed to have a candidate
elected or not or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office which shall include:
"(a) Forming Organizations, Associations, Clubs, Committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
candidate;
"(b) Holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a any candidate or party;
"(c) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election
of any party or candidate for public office;
"(d) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
"(e) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
any candidate or party;
"(f) Giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign purposes, either directly or
indirectly. Provided, That simple expressions or opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not
be considered as part of an election campaign: Provided, further, That nothing herein stated shall be
understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or
from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he supports."