316. Carpio vs.

Guevara, 106 SCRA 68

Facts:

Petitioners, detained at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, assailed the validity of the
warrants of arrest issued against them for violation of Article 138 of the Revised Penal Code
dealing with incitement to rebellion, P.D. No. 885, the amended Anti-Subversion Law, and
P.D. No. 33 on the possession and distribution of subversive materials.

It is the claim of petitioners J. Antonio M. Carpio and Grace Vinzons-Magana in this

application for the writ of habeas corpus filed on July 20, 1981, that their detention at Camp
Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City is illegal, there being no valid authority for the warrants of arrest
respectively issued against them on July 2 and 3, 1981. The Presidential Order of Arrest was
allegedly signed on June 26, 1981 for the violation of Art. 138 of the Revised Penal Code
dealing with incitement to rebellion, Presidential Decree No. 885, the amended Anti-
Subversion Law, and Presidential Decree No. 33 on the possession and distribution of
subversive materials. It was further alleged that petitioners were only shown a copy of what
appeared to be a radiogram, no signed copy of the order having been furnished them. It was
then alleged that there was no justification for their detention, that martial law having been
terminated on January 17, 1981 and President Marcos himself having "banned the use of
military processes of arrest and issued a letter of instruction ordering that, thenceforth, all
arrests, even for alleged crimes involving national security, must undergo normal judicial
processes.

The Supreme Court issued a writ. of habeas corpus and set the case for hearing. In
the return of the writ, the validity of the commitment order was invoked but the Solicitor
General manifested that the President had ordered the petitioners’ temporary release.
Thereafter, the Constabulary Judge Advocate wrote that petitioners have been released from
military custody.

Issue: Whether the case be dismissed on the ground of its moot and academic character.

Held:

The Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the petition, for being moot and academic.

With the release of petitioners, the prayer is justified. No further action need be taken
on the application for the writ of habeas corpus except to dismiss it for having become moot
and academic. It is reassuring to note that the President upon being informed of the
circumstances of the case decided to set petitioners at liberty. With the lifting of martial law,
the people have a right to expect that reliance on the constitutional right to peaceable
assembly would not be visited with adverse consequences. It should be safeguarded and
respected not only by courts but by other public officials, especially those entrusted with the
task of maintaining peace and order. The danger to public security that could conceivably
arise by people gathering en masse is certainly much less. It is quite true that turbulence may
mark such an event. One who is responsible certainly can be held accountable if the assembly
is utilized for illegal purposes. The guilty parties can be duly proceeded against. In the absence

1
of such a showing, it is of the essence in a constitutional government that no encroachment
on the rights of an individual is permissible.

Addtl Note:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY; NO ADVERSE

CONSEQUENCES ON THE EXERCISE THEREOF WITH THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW. — With
the lifting of martial law, the people have a right to expect that reliance on the
constitutional right to peaceable assembly would not be visited with adverse consequences.
It should be safeguarded and respected not only by courts but by other public officials,
especially those entrusted with the task of maintaining peace and order. The danger to
public security that could conceivably arise by people gathering en masse is certainly much
less. It is quite true that turbulence may mark such an event. One who is responsible
certainly can be held accountable if the assembly is utilized for illegal purposes. The guilty
parties can be duly proceeded against. In the absence of such a showing, it is of the
essence in a constitutional government that no encroachment on the rights of an individual
is permissible.

2. ID.; ID.; PARTICIPATION IN A PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY CANNOT BE PROSCRIBED. — What

was said by Chief Justice Hughes with force and eloquence in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1936) possesses relevance: ". . . The holding of meetings for peaceable political action
cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded
as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but
as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the
persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged
in a conspiracy against the public peace and order they may be prosecuted for their
conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State
instead of prosecuting them for such offenses seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable
assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge."cralaw virtua1aw
library

3. ID.; ID.; PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DISMISSAL THEREOF WHERE THERE
IS NO LONGER ANY DETENTION. — Where, as in the case at bar, the petitioners have been
released from military custody the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.

317. Nestle' Phils. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542

FACTS:

The Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-
Olalia had been conducting pickets which intensified during the period of July 8-10, 1987 outside Padre Faura
gate of the SC building. Since June 17, 1981 hey set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme
Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials
and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place
with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers
and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.

On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and
requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other individuals to appear before the Court on July 14 and then
and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the
Union of Filipro Employees, was further required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with.

2
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court with an
assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency considering that the picket
was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK, an unregistered loosed alliance of about 75
unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the UFE or KILU.

ISSUE: WON the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas be administratively dealt with.

HELD: Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions
or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrator of justice entitled to
“proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.

“It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact
and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced
in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.” (In re
Stolen). The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but equally a
violation of the constitutional right of the adverse party and the citizenry at large to have their causes tried fairly.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of
substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are
protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either
right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize
that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility
of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of
their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it
is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude
toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their
members.

The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals herein are not violated because any attempt to
pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either rights amounts to an abuse thereof and is
no loner within the ambit of constitutional protection. However, being non- lawyers, the duty and
responsibility of advising them rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record, Atty.
Espinas. It is the duty of all members of the legal profession as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients
on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice.

The contempt charges were dismiss

318. Arreza vs. Araneta University Foundation, 137 SCRA 94

FACTS:
Carmelo Arreza, Lonesto Oidem, Jacob Meimban, and Eduardo Fernando are officers
and members of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta University. They were either
leaders or participants in what respondent University referred to as a rally/demonstration held on
September 28, 1982, in front of the Life Science Building of the respondent University, but which
for them, could be more accurately described as "a continuation of the General Assembly of the
student body held the day before one authorized by the School Administration." Its purpose was
to register the opposition of the students to the abolition of the school's Institute of Animal Science,
as those taking courses therein would not be able to graduate. Such exercise of their right to

3
peaceable assembly was visited by respondent University with a refusal to let them enroll after
what for petitioners was a sham investigation of their alleged violation of school rules and
regulations. Respondent University denied granting the authorization to hold such general
assembly, or student rally on September 28, 1982, alleging that the students on said date through
the use of battery-operated megaphones criticized and lambasted the school administration,
specifically the decision of the Board of Trustees of respondent University to merge its Institute of
Animal Science with its Institute of Agriculture, ignoring the fact that the aforementioned merger
of the above-named Institutes - intended as a cost-saving measure - would not deprive the
students enrolled in the former Institute of Animal Science from earning their degrees. Moreover,
there were other rallies, according to respondent, held on September 8, 27 and 29, 1982, for the
purpose of sympathizing with the suspension of five (5) student leaders who conducted an illegal
assembly on August 27, 1982, causing additional disturbance on the campus, not only by the
disorderly conduct observed but also by the resulting boycott of classes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the students may be denied re-enrollment due to improper conduct attributed to
them in their exercise of their free speech and peaceable assembly.
HELD:
If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on,
utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable.
Student leaders are hardly the timid diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic.
They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of
the academe At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to
their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of
speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their
applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no
clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking
of disciplinary action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. As made clear from the above
excerpt, infractions of University rules or regulations by petitioner-students justify the filing of
appropriate charges. What cannot be justified is the infliction of the highly-disproportionate penalty
of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise
of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be
attributed to them.

Freedom from prior restraint

Read:
319. Newsounds Broadcasting Network vs. Hon. Ceasar Dy, April
2, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star
FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced
relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2,
Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed

4
conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio
station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayor’s permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate
Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit
conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court
to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from
agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order.
Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on
the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of
Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of
radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate
before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio
station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke
the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No.
92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s permit to submit
“either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime
agricultural land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing
the reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed
with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property
taxes based on the classification of property as commercial without objections raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character
of the property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts
had ruled that “the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this
concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by
estoppels on the grounds that the state is immune against suits.

HELD: No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or agents, there
is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances,
and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect
the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the
interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or
capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . .,
the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official
whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have
declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare
assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred when it certified that the
property had been zoned for commercial use. The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996
to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from
asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City
government that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the
local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no
valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure “approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that
the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land.”
Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners have been aggressive
in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his

5
political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial of the renewal applications on
the ground that property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from
Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court
of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby
GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners’ zoning clearances and mayor’s permits for
2004 to petitioners.

320. Bro. Eliseo Soriano vs. MTRCB, April 29, 2009 (Read also
the dissenting opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio)
Facts:
Libel charges have been filed against "Ang Dating Daan" leader Bro. Eliseo "Eli" Soriano for
allegedly calling four ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) "stupid" in his television program.
The present controversy emanated from the alleged splicing of a video recording wherein
petitioner was supposedly made to appear as if he was asking for contributions to raise 37 trillion
pesos instead of the allegedly true amount of 3.6 million pesos. The video was played by
ministers of Iglesia ni Cristo in their television program "Ang Tamang Daan."
The following were the utterances of Bro Eli Soriano:

Bro. Eli Soriano:

Hindi ko kontrata iyang babayaran na iyan. I am not even a signatory to that contract.
Pagkatapos para pagbintangan mo ako na humingi ako para sa pangangailangan ko,
gago ka talaga Michael. Masahol ka pa sa putang babae. O, di ba? Yung putang babae
ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!
O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan.
Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. Sige, sumagot kayo. At habang
ginaganyan ninyo ako, ang mga miyembro ninyo unti-unting maliliwanagan. Makikita
n'yo rin, magreresulta ng maganda iyan.

Issue:

Whether the utterances of brother eli is a form of freedom of expression?

Held:

The court noted that the ratings and regulation of television broadcasts take into account the
protection of the child, and it is from the child’s narrow viewpoint that the utterances must be
considered, if not measured. The ratings "G," "PG" (parental guidance), "PG-13," and "R"
(restricted or for adults only) suggest as much. The concern was then, as now, that the program
petitioner hosted and produced would reach an unintended audience, the average child, and so it
is how this audience would view his words that matters. The average child would not be
concerned with colorful speech, but, instead, focus on the literal, everyday meaning of words
used. It was this literal approach that rendered petitioner’s utterances obscene.

6
 321. MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, 448 SCRA 575

Facts:
Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program “The Inside Story” produced
and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable
them to pay for their tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the façade of the PWU building
served as the background of the episode. This caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed a
letter-complaint to the MTRCB.
MTRCB alleged that respondents
1) Did not submit “the inside story” to petitioner for review
2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and some sections of
MTRCB rules and regulations
ABS-CBN averred:
1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, its airing is
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press
2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon
respondents.
After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB investigating committee ordered the
respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program
MTRCB affirmed the ruling
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and
decreeing that certain sections of PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program “Inside Story”, they
being a public affairs programs which can be equated to a newspaper
Hence, this petition
Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story” prior its exhibition or
broadcast by TV.
Held:
Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board:
Xxx
b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV programs, including publicity
materials
The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review and examine ALL TV
PROGRAMS
LESSON where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt something therefrom,
unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
Thus, when the law says “all TV programs”, the word all covers all tv programs whether religious, public
affairs, news docu, etc
It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to review it
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power to review are those mentioned in Sec 7 of PD 1986
1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or departments and agencies
2) Newsreels
In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls under the category
of newsreels.

7
MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as “straight news reporting, as distinguished from analyses,
commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels.
Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and within petitioner’s power
of review.

322. Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 71

Facts:

Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed that his film Kapit sa Patalim, was rated for adults
only by a subcommittee of the movie review board together with the required cuts and scene deletions.
He justified that these requirements were without basis and were restrains on artistic expression. He
adduced that the film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now
offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis
even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its classification.

He appealed to the movie review board but the same affirmed the decion of the sub committee. When
Gonzales appealed to the supreme court, the board claimed that the deletions were removed and the
requirement to submit the master negative was taken out but the film was still rated for adults only. The
petition was amended to contest the rating only.

Issue : WON the rating made with grave abuse of discretion

Held :

Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is
not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of
absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and
public concern. In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a
standard. Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed
strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the State. Given this constitutional
mandate, It will be less than true to its function if any government office or agency would invade the
sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality.
It is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art
and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen
or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent
rightfully may be considered obscene.

On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be
construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a
recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied
when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of
which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. There can be no

8
valid objection to the controlling standard. There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board
and its perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive. But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES
TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the fact
that some scenes were not for young people. They might misunderstand the scenes. The respondents
offered to make it GP if the petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused. The
ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of
this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so
because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home
where there is a set. It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult
population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an
attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.

323. New York Times vs. U.S., 403 U.S. 713

Facts: In 1971, during rising tensions over the undeclared Vietnam War, the New York Times
attained copies of a 7,000 page top-secret articles based on the 1968 study, “History of U.S.
Decision Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." The New York Times analyzed the articles for
several months, and on June 13, 1971, it began to print series of articles about the document.
President Richard Nixon, claiming that the articles could harm national security and the ongoing
war in Vietnam, obtained injunctions against each publication, seeking to prevent each from
publishing any further information about the document in question.
The next day, the United States obtained a restraining order prohibiting further publication until
June 19.
Shortly after, the District Court denied the government’s request for a preliminary injunction, but
a Circuit Court judge prolonged the restraining order to give the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia adequate time to consider the government’s case. On June 22, the Circuit Court
remanded the case to the trial court for determination of whether any of the future publications
“posed such grave and immediate danger to the security of the country as to warrant prior
restraint and a continued stay of publication." The New York Times appealed the Circuit Court’s
decision to the Supreme Court in which the Supreme Court issued a ruling just four days after
hearing arguments.
Issue: Is the First Amendment violated when the United States, during wartime, prohibits a
newspaper from publishing sensitive articles which may cause security concerns for the United
States?

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the U.S. government carries a
heavy burden to justify the need to infringe upon the rights protected under the First
Amendment, a burden it failed to meet in this case. Therefore, the New York Times and
the Washington Post were protected by the First Amendment and were allowed to publish the
contents of the classified study.

Most notably, Justice Black in his concurrence argued that the First Amendment protection of
the freedom of the press is an essential function of U.S. democracy. Black stated that the
purpose of the freedom of the press is to serve the people and to preserve the right to censure

9
the government. The First Amendment abolished the government’s ability to censor the press in
order to ensure that the people have access to information that is free from government bias
and to allow people to hold open public debates. The rights protected in First Amendment
triumph over the government’s interest in security or civil obedience.

In his concurrence, Justice Douglas noted that secrecy in government is undemocratic, as is the
government’s attempt to kept relevant information out of the public debate surrounding the
Vietnam War. Justice Brennan differed in his concurrence, stating while the First Amendment
acts as an absolute bar in the present case, this may not be the case for a temporary prevention
of publishing information in the interest of national security, or if one of the exceptions
established in Near v. Minnesota applies.Justice Stewart asserted in his concurrence that if the
disclosure would cause a direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to the U.S. or to U.S.
citizens, then the outcome may be different in the future. Justice White stated in his concurrence
that the fact that information is sensitive to national security does not prevent the press from
exercising its First Amendment rights.

Finally, Chief Justice Burger in his dissent argued that the First Amendment is not absolute in all
cases: there are exceptions to the First Amendment, and these exceptions should be debated
in the court system.

In Near v. Minnesota, the Court outlined three exceptions to the First Amendment protection of
freedom of the press: if the publication is obscene, would jeopardize national security in
wartime, or threatens to incite violence and/or the overthrow the government. Here, the Court
found that none of these exceptions applied.

324. Near vs. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697

A Minnesota law that “gagged” a periodical from publishing derogatory statements about local public officials
was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). The freedom of press is
essential to the nature of a free state but that freedom may be restricted by the government in certain
situations.

Facts: The Saturday Press (the Press) published attacks on local officials. The Press claimed that the chief of
police had “illicit relations with gangsters.” Minnesota officials obtained an injunction in order to abate the
publishing of the Press newspaper under a state law that allowed this course of action. The state law
authorized abatement, as a public nuisance, of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, or other
periodical. A state court order abated the Press and enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press
(Defendants), from publishing or circulating such “defamatory and scandalous” periodicals.

Issue: Whether a statute authorizing such proceedings is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the
press as historically conceived and guaranteed?

Held: No. Judgment of the state court reversed. The fact that the liberty of press may be abused by miscreant
purveyors of scandal does not effect the requirement that the press has immunity from previous restraints when
it deals with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate
remedy, consistent with the constitutional privilege. Therefore, a statute authorizing such proceedings is not
consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed and is thus,
unconstitutional. The statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is permitted
to show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is published with good motives and for
justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld, could lead to a complete system of censorship. Thus, the statute is a
substantial infringement on the liberty of the press and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.

10
 325. Times Film vs. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43

FACTS:

The Municipal Code of Chicago, 155-4, requires submission of all motion pictures for examination or censorship
prior to their public exhibition and forbids their exhibition unless they meet certain standards. Times Film Corp.
(plaintiff) applied for a permit to exhibit its film “Don Juan,” a certain motion picture and tendered the required
license fee; but the permit was denied, solely because Times Film refused to submit the film for examination.
Petitioner sued in a Federal District Court for injunctive relief ordering issuance of the permit without submission
of the film and restraining the city officials from interfering with its exhibition. It did not submit the film to the
court or offer any evidence as to its content. Times Film also claims that the ordinance constitutes an
unconstitutional prior restraint. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that neither a
substantial federal question nor a justiciable controversy was presented.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint.

HELD: No.

In Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952), we held that motion pictures are included "within the
free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Admittedly, the challenged section
of the ordinance imposes a previous restraint, and the broad justiciable issue is therefore present as to whether
the ambit of constitutional protection includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and
every kind of motion picture. It is that question alone which we decide. We have concluded that 155-4 of
Chicago's ordinance requiring the submission of films prior to their public exhibition is not, on the grounds set
forth, void on its face.

Petitioner's narrow attack upon the ordinance does not require that any consideration be given to the validity of
the standards set out therein. They are not challenged and are not before us. Prior motion picture censorship
cases which reached this Court involved questions of standards. The films had all been submitted to the
authorities and permits for their exhibition were refused because of their content. Obviously, whether a particular
statute is "clearly drawn," or "vague," or "indefinite," or whether a clear standard is in fact met by a film are
different questions involving other constitutional challenges to be tested by considerations not here involved.

Moreover, there is not a word in the record as to the nature and content of "Don Juan." We are left entirely [365
U.S. 43, 47] in the dark in this regard, as were the city officials and the other reviewing courts. Petitioner claims
that the nature of the film is irrelevant, and that even if this film contains the basest type of pornography, or
incitement to riot, or forceful overthrow of orderly government, it may nonetheless be shown without prior
submission for examination. The challenge here is to the censor's basic authority; it does not go to any statutory
standards employed by the censor or procedural requirements as to the submission of the film.

In this perspective we consider the prior decisions of this Court touching on the problem. Beginning over a third of
a century ago in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), they have consistently reserved for future decision
possible situations in which the claimed First Amendment privilege might have to give way to the necessities of the
public welfare. It has never been held that liberty of speech is absolute. Nor has it been suggested that all previous
restraints on speech are invalid. On the contrary, in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 -716 (1931), Chief Justice
Hughes, in discussing the classic legal statements concerning the immunity of the press from censorship, observed

11
that the principle forbidding previous restraint "is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be
prohibited. . . .

[T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized
only in exceptional cases." These included, the Chief Justice found, utterances creating "a hindrance" to the
Government's war effort, and "actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of
transports or the number and location of troops." In addition, the Court said that "the primary requirements of
decency may be enforced against obscene publications" and the "security of the community life may be protected
against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force [365 U.S. 43, 48] of orderly government."
Some years later, a unanimous Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Murphy, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571 -572 (1942), held that there were "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or `fighting' words - those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Thereafter, as we have mentioned, in
Joseph Burstyn, Inc., v. Wilson, supra, we found motion pictures to be within the guarantees of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, but we added that this was "not the end of our problem. It does not follow that the
Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places." At
p. 502. Five years later, in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957), we held that "in light of . . . history, it is
apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance."
Even those in dissent there found that "Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is
so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it." Id., at 514. And, during the same Term,
in Kingsley Books, Inc., v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957), after characterizing Near v. Minnesota, supra, as "one
of the landmark opinions" in its area, we took notice that Near "left no doubts that `Liberty of speech, and of the
press, is also not an absolute right . . . the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.' . . .
The judicial angle of vision," we said there, "in testing the validity of a statute like 22-a [New York's injunctive
remedy against certain forms of obscenity] is `the operation and effect of the statute in substance.'" And as if to
emphasize the point involved [365 U.S. 43, 49] here, we added that "The phrase `prior restraint' is not a self-
wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test." Even as recently as our last Term we again observed the
principle, albeit in an allied area, that the State possesses some measure of power "to prevent the distribution of
obscene matter." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959).

326. Freedman vs. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51

Facts: Freedman was convicted because he showed a movie without first submitting it to the
Maryland State Board of Censors and securing a prior approval.
Freedman showed the film “Revenge at Daybreak” in his theater in
Baltimore without following the procedures laid out by the state.
The State of Maryland concedes that the movie does not violate any statutory standard for
movies and would actually receive a license if it had been submitted to them.

Issue: WON the submission of a film to the Maryland State Board of Censors is avalid
exception to the constitutional prohibition of prior restraint.

Held/Ratio:

12
No. It is not a valid exception. The Board of Censors rules did not follow the safeguards
required by the law in order for their action to be exempted in the prohibition of prior restraint.

The prior submission of a film to a censor can only be valid if it follows these two guidelines:
First -“The burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor.”
Second - The State can advance the submission of all films in order toregulate and bar those
which are considered as unprotected films. However, they are not allowed to provide a finality to
its censorship – i.e. banning it. Courts are the only entities that could provide a valid final
restraint because only a judicial determination can ensure the sensitivity to such an issue.

The Maryland Board violates the prohibition on prior restraint on three grounds:
First, if the board disapproves the film, the exhibitor has the burden of initiating a judicial
proceeding in order to persuade the court of the non-obscene status of the film or that it is
protected expression.
Second, when the Board has acted on the film and has ruled against it being shown, the
exhibitor could not show it lest he be charged of a violation of the law. The exhibitor could also
be charged if he show edit, in lie u with unsuccessfully getting a license, absent any judicial
decision in the film’s obscenity.
Third, the Board does not ensure any judicial determination that could validly make a final
determination regarding the film’s status.

Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule

Read

327. Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152

FACTS:
Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of Germiniana Fernandez from a parcel of
land. He later wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) regarding the
delay in the disposition of his case before the CFI Pangasinan. The judge ordered Cabansag and his
lawyers to show cause why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending such letter which
tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President (Magsaysay) and the people. After due hearing,
the court rendered a decision finding Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of contempt and sentencing them
to pay a fine.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Cabansag’s letter created a sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice.

13
RULING:
NO. The letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of the precarious
predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would
have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such
act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has “a dangerous tendency” to belittle the court
or undermine the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to
petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance.

Petition is GRANTED and appealed decision is REVERSED.

Read again the Reyes and Ruiz cases, supra

Read again
328. Zaldivar vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the
Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct
an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the
Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was
asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to
refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will
embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone
by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court."
Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the
justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can
get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished
for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to
get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias
and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing
upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court
has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt
of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his
freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible
tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.

Held:
There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency,"
it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety
of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

14
 Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held
that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the
authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct
required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.

329. Zaldivar vs Gonzales

FACTS:
Hon. Raul Gonzales was found guilty of contempt of court and gross misconduct as an officer of
the court and member of the bar. He contends that the court was wrong in applying the visible tendency
rule rather than the clear and present danger rule in disciplinary and contempt charges.

ISSUE:
 Clear and Present danger doctrine

HELD:
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation
which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of
claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is
invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has been an
accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain
contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts.
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we believe that
the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit
in the per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil"
which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of
physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public order.

The balancing-of-interest test Read:

330. A YER PRODUCTION VS. JUDGE CAPULONG, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, ET AL., 160 SCRA 861

FACTS:

15
Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions,
envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the
historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also
signified his approval of the intended film production.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style,

creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of
New South Wales) is an American historian has developed a script.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. McElroy acceded to this demand and the name of
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture.

On 23 February 1988, Enrile filed a Complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial Court, seeking to enjoin Ayer Production from producing the
movie "The Four Day Revolution". Enrile alleged that petitioners' production of the mini-series without
Enrile’s consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. Hence, the
trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for
preliminary injunction.

On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary
Injunction contending that the mini-series film would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile or
that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free
expression. Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the
mini-series had not yet been completed.

In an Order dated 16 March 1988, RTC issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners.
On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions came to the Supreme Court by a Petition for certiorari
with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, and a day later, or on 23 March
1988, Hal McElroy also filed separate Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction.

By a Resolution, the petitions were consolidated and Enrile was required to file a consolidated Answer.
Further, in the same Resolution, the Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order partially enjoining the
implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued therein, and allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the
projected mini-series which do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any
fictitious character based on or respondent.

Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are exercising their freedom of
speech and of expression protected under our Constitution. Private respondent, upon the other hand,
asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would
constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.

ISSUE:

Whether freedom of speech and expression was violated?

HELD:

16
Yes, this freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture
companies. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial
activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and
of expression. In our community as in many other countries, media facilities are owned either by the
government or the private sector but the private sector-owned media facilities commonly require to be
sustained by being devoted in whole or in plait to revenue producing activities. Indeed, commercial media
constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude commercially owned
and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected of speech and of expression can only
result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country.

The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It was demonstrated sometime ago by
the then Dean Irene R. Cortes that our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a right of privacy. It
is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope and content of this right in differing types of
particular situations. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right of free expression, is
not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist
publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right
of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private
affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.

The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass
media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test". The principle "requires a
court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given
situation or type of situation"

In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of
freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold
that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the
Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld
particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon
matters of essentially private concern."

Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied in respect of the
instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The production and
filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy."

Read also:
331. Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476

FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the production of a movie
entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book
of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises
Padilla Story".
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla who was
then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the

17
Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book,
Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were
portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his
mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his
girlfriend.
On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and in behalf of
her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and
deletions in the movie.
On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining, the petitioner and private
respondent executed a “Licensing Agreement” where the petitioner agreed to pay the private
respondent the sum of P20,000.00 payable without need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00
on or before Oct. 10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before
November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants authority and permission to
Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of
producing the PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental to said production, such as
advertising and the like, as well as authority and permission for the use of LICENSOR's name in
the PICTURE and have herself portrayed therein, the authority and permission hereby granted,
to retroact to the date when LICENSEE first committed any of the acts herein authorized.
After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown in different theaters
all over the country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on
December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for
judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal
interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the
picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent
to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted
in the movie were matters of public knowledge and was a public figure; that private respondent
has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause
or consideration and that he signed the same only because of the coercion and threat employed
upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement as
it constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private respondent.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and of the press.

RULING:
No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the
right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech
and of the press. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it
should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes
such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests
test." The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay
of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent
and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of
those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the
obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

18
 332. Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652, including the criticism on
this test by Justice Holmes

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Gitlow (Petitioner), published a communist manifesto for
distribution in the United States. He was charged with plotting to overthrow the United States
government.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. State statutes are unconstitutional if they are arbitrary and
unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the state to protect public interests.

Facts. The Petitioner was charged with criminal anarchy because he was an advocate of socialist
reform in the United States. The Petitioner is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist
Party. He served as the business manager for the paper that was run by the organization. In 1919
he published the group’s manifesto and prepared for widespread distribution from the New York
City headquarters.

Issue. Did the statute prohibiting such activity deprive the Petitioner of his First Amendment
constitutional right to freedom of expression?

Held. No. The current statute is not an unreasonable or arbitrary means of exercising the state’s
police power. It is within the state’s power to prevent the disturbance of the peace and regulate
speech that may incite crime even if the threat of such action is not immediate.

Discussion. Freedom of speech and press do not confer an absolute right to publish or speak
without being held responsible for the results of such speech. The state may regulate to
protect its interests in general welfare of its citizens

See also Zaldivar case above

OVERBREADTH AND VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE:

333. PEOPLE VS. SITON, G.R. No. 160364, September 18, 2009

Instead of filing an answer against the criminal charge against Evangeline siton and Krystel sagarano they instead
filed a separate motion to quash and challenge the validity of the Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code or also
known as Vagrancy and Prostitution paragraph specially paragraph 2 Any person found loitering about public or
semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support; for which they are charge, for it was a violation of their due process for being void and overbreath. Spo1
Plaza who apprehended them allege that they counducted a prior surveillance conducted to the two accused in an
area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. The Solicitor General
allege that the void and vagueness doctrine applies only to free speeches cases and not to penal statute. The RTC
declared the law unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not the Vagrancy law is unconstitutional

Ruling:

19
No, This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."

The first statute punishing vagrancy – Act No. 519 – was modeled after American vagrancy statutes and passed by
the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country up to
December 31, 1931 did not contain a provision on vagrancy. While historically an Anglo-American concept of crime
prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised
Penal Code in Article 202 thereof.

This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined "vagrant" as "every
person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the
country without visible means of support." The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that
the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general terms – public or semi-public
places.

it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior
to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For this
reason, we are not moved by respondents’ trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police
abuse in their case.

Chapter VI

THE NON- ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE

Religious freedom in relation to impairment of contracts and

the right to join associations , 36 SCRA 445

Read:

334. DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS. COMELEC, January 21, 2015

FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a checkmark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates
for that election.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon
this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on
such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to
its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form
of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or
institution’s religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”

335. IMBONG VS. OCHOA, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014

FACTS:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

ISSUE: Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating
the: Right to life, Right to health, Freedom of religion and right to free speech, Right to privacy (marital

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privacy and autonomy), Freedom of expression and academic freedom, Due process clause, Equal
protection clause, Prohibition against involuntary servitude

HELD: Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive,
and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent
the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The
RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation
but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The
RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave
the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA
4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done
following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after
these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

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The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s
dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any
one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population
control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy
and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly,
Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found
a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and
(b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making,
and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-
of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services.
Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and
may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an
exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the
State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators
might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing
their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather
than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

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By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several
terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law)
as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does
not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide
priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to
render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow
them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

336. ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.

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However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201. A motion for
reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65
oftheROC. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion
by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights
to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation. In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed
on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element
is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Our Constitution provides in Article III,
Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion
of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose. Respondent has
failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required
for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric
of society. We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
“any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation
of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of
violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

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As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest

337. Estrada vs. Escritur, 408 SCRA 1 and 492 SCRA 1

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a
man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s
husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution.
As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing
its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts
to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and
secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only
to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has
to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise
is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom
of religion.

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 338. Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64
• Phil. 201
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of
prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic
Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such
issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature,
contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the
purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the
government just took advantage of an event considered of international
importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation
of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a
constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino
people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

339. Garces vs. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for
the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election
of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the
saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s

27
property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against
the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and
Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image,
therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided
to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship
and banning the use of public money or property.

340. INC vs. Gironella, 106 SCRA 1

FACTS:
This case started when the respondent Judge Leopoldo Gironella of the Court of First
Instance of Abra, in a criminal case of rape acquitted the accused for Triple Rape. Thus he said:
"it will also be observed that Florencio Ola was released on July 27, 1979, yet no action was taken
by him from July 28, 1979, to August 21 to denounce to the proper authorities what allegedly had
happened to his wife Merlinda Ola. Merlinda Ola, however, is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
Her husband Florencio Ola and her in-laws were still in the process of being convinced to become
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. As testified to by complainant Merlinda Ola, she also consulted
her brothers of the Iglesia ni Cristo as it was thru their assistance that made possible the institution
of this action. Her husband and in-laws are now members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It cannot,
therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing to
the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo
unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her problem."

ISSUE:
Whether the administrative complaint against the honoroble judge will prosper.

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RULING:
This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution. The use of the word
"gimmick" could offend the sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to
state that as understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack
of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a course of action, which without it
may not be acceptable. While it would be going too far to assert that intentional deceit is
employed, it could have that effect. The Latin maxim, Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri, comes
to mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain
converts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed.
No one, much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a
derogatory sense. It should not be lost sight of either that the attendance at a trial of many
members of a religious sect finds support in the Constitution. The right to a public trial is
safeguarded by the fundamental law. No adverse implication can arise from such an occurrence.
It goes without saying that if their presence would create disorder, it lies within the power of a trial
judge to maintain the proper decorum.

WHEREFORE, Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella is hereby admonished to be much more careful in

the use of language likely to offend an individual or religious sect.

341. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 398

Facts:

American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November,
1898. American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout
the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialect. City Treasurer of Manila informed
American Bible Society that it was violating several Ordinances for operating without the necessary permit
and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and license fees covering the period.
To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license fees
under protest. American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the
Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They
contended:

“a. They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or sales tax”

“b. it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles”

Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

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It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in
some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court
believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to
appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon
the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of
Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of
plaintiff Society.

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