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I Cunfidelltial
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A Research Paper
C6nfitiential
EUR 85-10199
December 1985
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP86S00588R000300380001-5
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP86S00588R000300380001-5
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A Research Paper
Confidential
EUR 85-/0/99
December /985
Scope Note Intellectuals have traditionally played an influenti I role in French political
life. Even though they have seldom sought a dire t part in formulating
policy, they have conditioned the atmosphere in w ich politics are conduct-
ed and have frequently served as important shape s of the political and
ideological trends that generate French policy. R cognizing that their
influence on policymaking is difficult to measure, his paper focuses on the
changing attitudes of French intellectuals and ga ges the probable impact
on the political environment in which policy is m de. , - - - I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - "
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iii Confidential
EUR 85-10/99
December /985
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Key Judgments There is a new climate of intellectual opinion in rance-a spirit of anti-
I'lformation available Marxism and anti-Sovietism that will make it dif icult for anyone to
as of 15 November 1985
was used in this report.
mobilize significant intellectual opposition to US olicies. Nor will French
intellectuals be likely to lend their weight, as they id before, to other West
European colleagues who have become hostile to he United States on
broad issues like disarmament. Although Americ n policies are never
immune to criticism in France, it is clearly the So iet Union that is now on
the defensive with New Left intellectuals-and i~likelY to remain there at
least in the medium term. President Mitterrand's notable coolness toward
Moscow derives, at least in part, from this pervas·ve attitude. I
~ _ _ _ _-----J
Mitterrand's policy failures and short-lived allia ce with the Communists 25X1
may have accelerated disaffection with his gover ment, but leftist intellec-
tuals have been distancing themselves from socia ism-both the party and
the ideology-at least since the early 1970s. Led by a group of young
renegades from Communist ranks who billed the selves as New Philoso-
phers, many New Left intellectuals have rejecte Marxism and developed
a deep-rooted antipathy toward the Soviet Union Anti-Sovietism, in fact,
has become the touchstone of legitimacy in leftis circles, weakening the
traditional anti-Americanism of the leftist intelle tuals and allowing
American culture-and even political and econo ic policies-to find new
vogue·1 I 25X1
The wide acceptance of this more critical approa to Marxism and the So-
viet Union has been accompanied by a general d line of intellectual life in
France that has undermined the political involve ent of leftist intellectu-
als. Although they are now less willing to becom involved in partisan
affairs, we believe that New Left intellectuals wi I weigh in heavily on two
fronts:
• They will support moderate Socialists who are triving to create a broad-
based center-left alliance.
v Confidential
• They will oppose any effort by hardline Socialists to reforge the now
defunct "unity of the left" with the French Communist Party in the
forthcoming legislative elections.
This New Left activism is likely to increase bickering between the two
leftist parties and within the Socialist Party, and it will probably increase
voter defection from both Socialist and Communist camps.IL_ _ _ _ _ __
25X1
Confidential vi
Contents
Page
Scope Note iii
Key Judgments v
Introduction I
A Traditional Role I
A Historic Shift: The "Loud" Silence of the Leftist Intellectuals 3
The "New Philosophers" 4
"There Are No More Sartres, No More Gides" 6
Causes of Leftist Intellectual Defection 6
The Bankruptcy of Ideology 6
Anti-Sovietism 7
Prospects for Intellectual Influence 8
Decline of Intellectual Life 8
Limited Reengagement 10
French Intellectuals and US Interests 11
Appendixes
A. Cultural Aspects of New Right Thought 13
B. Important Books by Glucksmann and Levy 15
vii Confidential
There is a lethargy about intellectual life in this Figure 1. Michel FoucauI1L_ _-----"
country that is quite spectacular. Never before have I
known such silence, such emptiness. It's like a family
in which someone has died. 25X1
Alain TouraineLI _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---" 25X1
Introduction
Intellectuals matter in France, probably more than in
most Western democracies. They have traditionally
played a key role in the political process as apologists
for the positions of various parties and as important
window dressing in the quest for domestic and inter-
national respectability. Moreover, they are listened
to-talk shows and magazines featuring heavy doses
of intellectual debate are very popular. For a variety This analysis focuses on t e changing relationship
of complex reasons, the left has claimed the vast between French intellectu Is and political groups in
majority of intellectuals since World War II and has the context of broad-base intellectual change within
provided some of them with substantial leadership French society. It assesses the dramatic breakdown of
roles. French intellectuals have routinely defended the the dominant post-World ar II alliance between
domestic schemes of both Socialists (PS) and Commu- intellectuals and the left, t e more general decline of
nists (PCF), and they have led the charge against US the intellectuals' status in rench society. the pros- 25X1
policies in Europe and the Third World. President pects for a resumption of i tellectual "engagement"
Mitterrand-an intellectual in his own right-has in politics, and the implic tions of these trends for
surrounded himself with "thinkers" and offered many both French politics and S interests.1
'---------~
important positions in his government to well-known
intellectuals·1 I
A Traditional Role 25X 1
French intellectuals-a te m encompassing journal-
Even before the Socialists took office in 1981, how- ists, artists, writers, and t chers-have carved out a
ever, it was clear that this intellectual identification special role for themselves as interpreters of political
with the left was fading. The worst kept secret in PCF tradition, especially as int rpreters of the conse-
circles for the past decade was that virtually every quences and implications f the French Revolution.
Communist intellectual of any stature had either died Frenchmen have looked to the permanent intellectual
or defected from the party. Although Socialists man- debate about the meaning of their history as a basis 25X1
aged to snag a few of the disillusioned, the newborn for understanding French ociety, and the course of
critics of Marxism seemed to drift more easily into French politics has occasi nally been shifted by a
neutrality or even to the right. With one or two strong stand on the part 0 intellectuals (see inset).D
exceptions, important intellectuals-such as anthro-
pologist Michel Foucault-refused positions in Mit- Leftists and rightists in Fr nce maintained a balance
terrand's government. And when Socialists later tried of intellectual forces for ost of the period before
to arouse intellectuals to defend their foundering World War II. In the 19t century and in the first
policies against criticism from the right, the intellec-
tuals again refused, this time with a cascade of public
abuse on the government. I I 25X1
Confidential
~------------~
25X1
Dreyfus. a Jewish officer attached to the French
General Staff. was accused and convicted in 1896 of
passing military secrets to the Germans. Revelations
that Dreyfus was convicted on fabricated evidence
and that the government had concocted still more
evidence to cover up its subversion of justice polar-
ized French society and touched off a national soul
searching about public moralitr and historical
values·1
~--------------~
. 25X1
~--------~
25X1
This parity evaporated, however, in the war. On the
one hand, French conservatism stood discredited not
only by its xenophobic nationalism, its antiegalitarian-
ism, and its flirtation with fascism in the prewar
years, but also by the participation of many of its Figure 2. Jean Jaures. paragon of leftist
leading exponents in the collaborationist Vichy re- intellectual activism. from an article by An:"'dr'.>ce__________~
gime. On the other hand, the left (except for the PCF Glucksmann on the psychology of pacifism I~----------~
25X1
in the brief era of the Nazi-Soviet Pact) had stood
squarely against fascism and the occupation. It
formed the backbone and largest block of fighters in
the Resistance, and among these the Communists
played a commanding (if often self-serving) role. The
Confidential 2
Soviet Union, which was seen as standing alone for A Historic Shift: The "Lo "Silence
years against Germany, became a shining example to of the Leftist Intellectuals
the Resistance; former Communist and leading The situation had changed dramatically by the time
French intellectual Annie Kriegel explains, "It's true the Socialists came to pow r in 1981. It was a poorly
that the Americans liberated us-but the turning kept secret in government ircles that Socialist offi-
point in the war was Stalingrad. It was the Red Army cials were surprised and c cerned about the dearth
that gave us hope·"1 I of support from intellectua s. Only a few intellectuals 25X1
of any stature-Max Gall, Regis Debray, and An-
While the French right was intellectually shattered by toine Blanca-had accept the numerous posts of-
the war, the left emerged ready to claim the spoils of fered to them in the Mitte rand government; some
its success in the Resistance and the allegiance of all openly criticized govern me t actions and policies,
those who loved liberty and equality. In the postwar especially the decision to e trust four ministries to the
era the Socialists, and especially the Communists, Communists. More often, ntellectuals showed signs
attracted large numbers of intellectuals. The conser- of lapsing into an unchara teristic silence that quickly
vatives maintained their hold on power, however, and generated disturbing quest ons from the press about
the left settled into the role of opposition in the 1950s relations between the gove nment and its intellectual
and 1960s. Leftist intellectuals became masters at allies. Important journals f opinion, ever quick to 25X1
elaborating Socialist and Communist formulas for sense even subtle shifts in he political breezes, began
reshaping French society and of producing a constant to question whether intelle tuals were "always of the
barrage of criticism against the policies of successive left" and to note the ironic absence of intellectual
conservative governments. I I involvement in the govern ent of a leftist President
who was himself a well-est blished intellectual. '-1------,1 25X 1
The Socialist and Communist Parties also tried in two
ways to establish and perpetuate what one critic Mitterrand redoubled the ffort to enlist support from
recently dubbed a leftist "intellocracy." First, they the intellectuals after he w s forced by the failure of
financed numerous journals, reviews, and newspapers his expansionary economic policies to reverse course
through which intellectuals could channel their tor- and adopt austerity measu es that drew embarrassing
rent of invective against the regime and French criticism from both the lef and the right, but espe-
society. Second, they helped to institutionalize the cially from conservatives 0 France's New Right,
leftist intellectual establishment and to make it self- where an "intellectual ren issance" was in full swing
perpetuating by underwriting the unionization of the (see inset). Almost certainI on Mitterrand's orders,
university and secondary school faculties. Both efforts government spokesman M x Gallo--a noted novelist
helped ensure that those who circulated into the and historian-editorialize in Le Monde in the sum-
French intellectual elite were ideologically atuned to mer of 1983 on the "silenc of the intellectuals."
its prejudices and partisan loyalties. This system Gallo urged leftist intellec als to speak out, arguing
worked almost flawlessly for a time; only since the that the vital issues of the ay-especially the govern-
late 1960s have renegades rejected the teachings of ment's economic policies, ut also its record on politi-
their former academic masters and led the charge cal issues such as terroris and crime--demanded a
against the left·1 I full public debate and that the absence of a leftist 25X1
rebuttal merely abandoned public opinion to the right.
1 Raymond Aron, one of the few significant thinkers to resist
Gallo's appeal drew a stro g response from intellectu-
absorption, deplored the affinity of his peers with the left-
especially their servility in accepting such outrages as the Stalinist als, most of whom explain and defended their
purges and the crushing of the Hungarian uprising, and their "silence." At least one crit c argued that Gallo and
hypocrisy in defending such shams as the Stalin personality cult. the government would be iser to accept silence from
Aron reasoned in his study of the phenomenon-The Opium of the
Intellectuals (1955)-that the contemporary left, particularly the the intellectuals as the best they could get, and that if
Communists, had succeeded in winning and holding the loyalties of
intellectuals because it had gratified two deeply felt needs: it
assured intellectuals of their relevance to the political process, and
it organized and gave full rein to their unbounded penchant for
criticism 1 I 25X1
3 Confidential
Allied to this concept of government, the new liberals threw up barricades in the university section of Paris and initiated a
period of guerrilla warfare in the streets of the Latin Quarter. The
generally applaud the devolution of the massively protest spread to other university cities; students were joined by 7
centralized French Government's powers and re- million striking workers (who occupied factories); transportation
sources to subnational governments, a slow process and public services ground to a halt; and the lO-year-old govern- 25X1
ment of General de Gaulle tottered. Marxist students looked to the
that has recently gained momentum under the So- Communist Party for leadership and declaration of a provisional
cialists (see also appendix A).I'---_ _ _ _ _ _ __ government, but PCF leaders were already trying to restrain the 25X1
worker revolt and denounced the student radicals as woolly-minded
anarchists. Many students concluded that the PCF had made a deal
leftists spoke out they would only join the legion of the
with de Gaulle, who eventually put down the riots.LI_ _ _ _ _ __ 25X1
government's critics. The failure of Gallo's effort
strengthened the growing public perception that intel-
lectuals had deserted the left. When Gallo himself
departed from the government less than a year later-
Confidential 4
Figure 5. Bernard-Henri
LevyI
~----------"
25X1
I
25X1
~------~
25X1
prestigious training school for teachers and thinkers,
the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS), and they had in
common not just their experience in the Left Bank
student movement of the 1960s but also their rejection
of the Stalinist sophistries taught at ENS.I
~---~
The New Philosophers mo e than compensated for 25X1
their often abstruse prose y becoming exciting media
The New Philosophers were motivated by two devel- personalities, defending th ir points of view in the
opments. First, the traditional leftist parties' pusilla- long, intellectualized telev sion and radio programs
nimity during the student revolt of 1968 tore the that the French relish. Th ir influence was primarily
scales from their eyes, causing them to reject their negative, however, since t ey had little to offer in the
allegiance to the Communist Party, French socialism, way of practical suggestio s for a new program.
and even the essential tenets of Marxism. Second, by Despite their sweeping de unciation of what Levy
the early 1970s most had also moved toward a called the blindness of the left, the New Philosophers
searching critique of the Soviet Union, a trend accel- professed continuing anti thy for Gaullism and only
erated by the publication in France of Solzhenitsyn's a lesser-of-evils acceptanc of capitalism. Levy be-
Gulag Archipelago in 1975. Under these stimuli they came chief editor at the rasset publishing house-
reexamined the entire French and European leftist one of France's largest- here he was able to ensure
trad~tion. Two leaders of 1968, Bernard-Henri Levy that New Philosopher vie s found easy access to the
and Andre Glucksmann, wrote a number of popular public. Books by New Phi osophers became immedi-
books that tried to lay bare the fallacies of the leftist ate best sellers-an amazi g feat in an era when most
intellectual tradition. They argued that no socialism
existed in France that was not implicitly Marxist and
that all Marxist thought is ultimately totalitarian.
I I
25X1
5 Confidential
L
_ _ _ _ _ _ _- - - " mission. Although both structuralism and Annales 25X1
methodology have fallen on hard times (critics accuse
Causes of Leftist Intellectual Defection them of being too difficult for the uninitiated to
The Bankruptcy of Marxist Ideology. Disaffection follow), we believe their critical demolition of Marx-
with Marxism as a philosophical system-part of a ist irifluence in the social sciences is likely to endure
broader retreat from ideology among intellectuals of as a profound contribution to modern scholarship
all political colors-was the source of the particularly both in France and elsewhere in Western Europe.
strong and widespread intellectual disillusionment I I 25X1
with the traditional left. Raymond Aron worked long "=========;;;;...__________
years to discredit his old college roommate Sartre
and, through him, the intellectual edifice of French Leftist intellectuals who were not already hostile to
Marxism. Even more effective in undermining Marx- socialism-Max Gallo may be the best example-
ism, however, were those intellectuals who set out as were driven to defection by the obvious failure of
true believers to apply Marxist theory in the social leftist ideology implicit in Mitterrand's early attempts
sciences but ended by rethinking and rejecting the to socialize France. By 1983 most Socialists were
entire tradition (see inset). 1
"-----------~
ready to admit that their program of economic expan- 25X1
sion and beefed-up budgets for social welfare would
4 Althusser, who was Levy's and Glucksmann's mentor at ENS, not work, and the dose of austerity that these policies
strangled his wife in 1980 and spent the next five years in prison. In
his last television interview Sartre admitted that Marxism had eventually forced rang the death knell of leftist
proved a failure.1 I ideology for many informed observers. Alain Tou- 25X1
raine-leftist sociologist and sometime editorialist for
25X1
Confidential 6
7 Confidential
Confidential 8
9 Confidential
Confidential 10
In particular, deep anti-PCF sentiment among intel- intellectuals have taken to calling "primitive anti-
lectuals may prove decisive in subverting machina- Americanism"-is now id ntified with the Commu-
tions by Socialist Party chief Jospin and others on the nist daily I'Humanite and is considered bad form.
left of the party to rekindle enthusiasm for the "union Anti-Americanism former y also stood as a mark of
of the left"-the myth that the Socialists came to intellectual status, separat ng thinkers from ordinary
power in 1981 only through their alliance with the folk (who were generally s llspected of harboring good
PCF and that the left can only achieve power in the opinions of the United Sta es, even in the Vietnam
future through unity.8 Intellectuals are likely to weigh era). Now, just the opposi e is true; finding virtues in
in heavily against this notion and will probably sup- America---even identifyin good things about US
port overwhelmingly the strategy-long touted by Government policies-is l( oked upon as an indication
Socialist dissident Michel Rocard, but now apparently of discerning judgment. A tempts by some to revive
accepted by both Mitterrand and Prime Minister significant and sweeping c iticisms of US policies are
Fabius-that the long-term future of Socialism lies in seen as transparent efforts to divert critics from their
forging a center-left alliance. I I legitimate target, the acti, ities of the Soviet Union. 25X1
I
25X1
II Confidential
Appendix A
Cultural Aspects
of New Right Thought
The more esoteric side of New Right intellectuality
has focused surprising energy on demands for cultural
renewal, arguing that what is essentially wrong with
France is that its culture has been eroded by external
influences and degraded by neglect. Conservative
writers, many of them associated with the Group for
Research and Study of European Civilization
(GRECE) and the Clock Club (Club de l'Horloge)-
both composed mainly of young graduates of France's
elite school of administration, EN A-have found an
outlet for their arguments in Hersant publications,
notably Figaro Magazine, which is edited by GRECE
kindred spirit Louis Pauwels. I I ' 25X1
Pauwels and two proteges, Jean-Claude Valla and
Alain de Benoist, have worked overtime to give the recent COIlservat,ive .functio'n.1 25X1
New Right a stridently elitist ethic. Led by Benoist,
all three charge that cultural decline in France is GRECE.9 In our view, is little prospect that
linked directly to egalitarianism-to the allegedly many will do so in the notwithstanding occa-
foolish denial of the essential superiority of some men, sional similarities and allj~nlces of viewpoint. Recent-
and to the imposition of man-in-the-street mediocracy ly, New Right· have played down the
on French society. Pauwels and others have encour- antiegalitarian and even Christian elements of
aged rightist anthropology that looks beyond the GRECE/Horloge thinki , but leftist intellectuals
Revolution to Christianity as the source of egalitarian and conservatives like who consider themselves
weakness in European civilization. Pauwels and Ben- "men of the left" are still to egalitarianism as
oist have often praised the "perceptive elitism" in pre- the essence of the tic-republican tradition in
Christian European societies as the source of cultural France. Conservative ns avoid opportunities to 25X1
virtues to which modern Europeans should look for gladhand the faithful at functions, and even
revival and renewaL! I Pauwels seldom rumina the virtues of
paganism and elites.
~--~--------------~
25X1
This insistence on the reasonableness of elitism dove-
tails with the New Right's predilection for classic
liberalism in the vision of a society in which govern-
ment refuses to impose an artificial equality on
citizens and in which individuals are free to realize 25X1
the full advantages of their talents. Some New Right
intellectuals argue also that because egalitarianism is
artificial it requires a heavyhanded, enforcer role for
government. This they believe is the root of totalitar-
ianism·1 I 25X1
Elitism in the thinking of the New Right is almost
certainly one important reason that few French intel-
lectuals have made the journey from the left to
13 Confidential
Confidential 14
Appendix B
Andre Glucksmann La cuisiniere et Ie mangeur-d'hommes (The Cook and the Man-Eater), 1975.
Read as a commentary on The Gulag Archipelago, thi "essay on the relations be-
tween the state, Marxism, and the concentration camp" is a painstakingly
detailed survey of the disastrous economic and politica history of the USSR, as
seen against the high-minded declarations of its leader.
Bernard-Henri Levy Barbarie a visage humain (Barbarism With a Human ace), 1977. Levy locates
the roots of modern totalitarianism in the optimism an rationalism of the 18th-
century Enlightenment, which, he argues, first defined the state as the agent of
progress. In this role, says Levy, the state has invariab y demanded absolute
power, and in one degree or another has diminished the authority of the individual.
25X1
15 Confidential
.1.
Confidential