Juris For Firme

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, NAMELY:

ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, ALL
SURNAMED SUPAPO, AND SHERYL FORTUNE SUPAPO-
SANDIGAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO
BERNARDO, AND THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER
THEM, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Esperanza Supapo

and Romeo Supapo2 (Spouses Supapo) to assail the February 25, 2011 decision3 and
August 25, 2011 resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan
de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights
under them (collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in
Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-284416 registered and titled under
the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand
nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property
Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan.7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an
overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a year.8 During one of their visits in
1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built without
their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied
one house while Macario occupied the other one.9
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the
subject lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa.
The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action)
for failure of the parties to settle amicably.10
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against the respondents for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROBERTO DE JESUS,
SUSAN DE JESUS and MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused is hereby ordered to pay a
fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the appeal was pending,
Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing
Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.15
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final.16
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the
respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. The respondents
moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied
the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's
orders denying the quashal of the writ and the respondent's motion for
reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-
Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.18 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction
is GRANTED. The orders dated June 5, 2003 and July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-45610
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby permanently ENJOINED from
further executing or implementing its decision dated March 18, 1996.
SO ORDERED.
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean
that people now have unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and
that it was not intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate
landowners.19 In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that recourse
may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.20
After filing their Answer,21 the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing22 and argued that: (1) there is another action pending between the
same parties; (2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations;
and (3) the Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC Ruling23
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. It
ruled that the arguments advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which
at best can be utilized in the course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the
respondents' motion for reconsideration.
From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC.24
The RTC Ruling25
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has
prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has
jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1)
year from the time to demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, the complaint for
recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are hereby
declared NULL and VOID.
The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 08-29245 for lack
of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.26
In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized that the court's
jurisdiction over an action involving title to or possession of land is determined by its
assessed value; that the RTC does not have an exclusive jurisdiction on all complaints
for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of the subject lot falls within MeTC's
jurisdiction.
The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the
subject lot, the Spouses Supapos' cause of action had already prescribed, the action
having been filed beyond the ten (l0)-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the
Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the actual demand to vacate was made, the
RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which the ejectment suit should have been filed
is counted from the time the certificate to file action was issued. The certificate to file
action was issued on November 25, 1992, while the complaint for accion publiciana was
filed only on March 7, 2008, or more than ten (10) years thereafter.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA.29
The CA Ruling30
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should
have been lodged before the RTC and that the period to file the action had prescribed.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2009 and Order
dated October 19, 2009 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a reconsideration of the CA

decision; hence, they came to us through the present petition.
The Petition
In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue that:
(1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the
property is located in Metro Manila; and that
(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is imprescriptible under the
Torrens system.
The Respondents' Case33
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the
wrong court; (2) barred by prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.
Issues
The issues for resolution are:
I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;

II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has
not prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.
Accion Publiciana and

the Jurisdiction of the
MeTC
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of

possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.34
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession
of the subject lot but they based their better right of possession on a claim of
ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property.35
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue
of ownership.36
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the subject
property, we will only do so to determine if they or the respondents should have the
right of possession.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we
now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving

title to or possession of real property is plenary.38
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Section 3 of the same law provides:

Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession

of real property is now determined by its assessed value.40 The assessed value of
real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is
synonymous to taxable value.41
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:
[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of
the value of the property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA — that all cases of recovery of possession
or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
property — no longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a distinction must be made
between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if
outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.43 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of the action and the
court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and
the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.44
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject
lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax
declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do
not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we
hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint
for accion publiciana.
The cause of action

has not prescribed
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for being
filed out of time.
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A possessor may lose
his possession:
xxxx
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is
not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion
publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file
action was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the Spouses
Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject property, the complaint having
been filed beyond the period provided by law.
Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the
subject property, and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they
posit that the latter have lost their right to recover possession because of laches.
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion
publiciana more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued.
Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is imprescriptible since the subject
property is registered and titled under the Torrens system.
We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system.
The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979.46 Interestingly, the
respondents do not challenge the existence, authenticity and genuineness of
the Supapo's TCT.47
In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have allegedly
been in actual, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in
the concept of an owner since 1992. The respondents contend that they built their
houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the subject lot for more than
ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be disturbed in their possession.48
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents' contentions have
no legal basis.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title

cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held
that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered
land because of Article 112649 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].51
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the
Torrens system. The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section
47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is
also entitled to the possession thereof.52 The right to possess and occupy the land is an
attribute and a logical consequence of ownership.53 Corollary to this rule is the right of
the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property.
Again, this right is imprescriptible.54
In Bishop v. CA,55 we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens
Title were aware of the other persons' occupation of the property, regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of
their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all.56
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer
of the property, we still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant
cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly-registered certificate of title
proving the alleged transfer or sale.
A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado57 in which we gave greater probative weight to the
plaintiffs TCT vis-a-vis the contested unregistered deed of sale of the defendants.
Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the respondents did not adduce a single
evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more reason therefore that we
uphold the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's title.
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo's TCT, this
Court merely recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of
real estate transactions and integrity of land registration.
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once
the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of
land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of
being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair
to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system and will
force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land
conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent.58
With respect to the respondents' defense59 of laches, suffice it to say that the same is
evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings.60 In other words, the party alleging laches must adduce in court evidence
proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue;
especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the
Spouses Supapo's petition.61 On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show
the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to exercise their right over and recover
possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to the appropriate
Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed
the action publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right to recover
possession of the subject lot is not barred by prescription.
The action is not barred

by prior judgment
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. They

contend that the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of
the action publiciana.
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to

challenge the RTC's issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to vacate the
subject property) arising from their conviction under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA
granted the petition and permanently enjoined the execution of the respondents'
conviction because their criminal liability had been extinguished by the repeal of the law
under which they were tried and convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising from
the crime had also been erased.
The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule

39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in
Rule 39, Section 47(c).62
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially
tried on the merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final
judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim,
demand or cause of action.63
The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.
Res judicata is not present in this case.

While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity
of subject matter, parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted
under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject
property.
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by

the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines.
The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses
Supapo.
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the
prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an
action to recover possession of the subject property.
And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines
filed the criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting
persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to
protect their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession.
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res
judicata has still no basis.
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of
causes of action provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.65
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two
actions is the same.66
As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint

under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this reason
alone, "collusiveness of judgment" does not apply.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties,
"conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply because there is no identity of issues.
The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents (accused therein) committed
the crime alleged in the information, while the only issue in accion publiciana is whether
the Spouses Supapo have a better right than the respondents to possess and occupy
the subject property.
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.
Final Note
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of
determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication
is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a
bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the
issue of ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and

consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and August
25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 8-28, The petition is filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
Romeo Supapo is now deceased and substituted by his heirs Rex Edward, Ronald
Troy, Romeo, Jr., Sheila Lorence, all surnamed Supapo, and Sheryl Fortune Supapo-
Sandigan.
3
Rollo, pp. 30-40. Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza penned the assailed decision, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Florito S. Macalino.
4
Id. at 42-43.
5
Id. at 62-66. The complaint filed on March 7, 2008 was docketed as Civil Case No. 08-
29245 and raffled to Branch 52, MeTC, Caloocan City.
6
Id. at 327.
7
Id. at 328.
8
Id. at 63.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 329.
11
The case docketed as Criminal Case No. C-45610 was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City Branch 131.
12
Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts dated August 20, 1975.
13
Rollo, p. 335.
14
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 19538 and raffled to the 8th Division.
15
Rollo, pp. 337-350.
16
Id. at 351. As shown in the Entry of Judgment.
17
The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 78649 and raffled to the 4th Division.
18
Rollo, pp. 353-357.
19
Citing the decision of this Court in Tuates v. Judge Bersamln, G.R. No. 138962,
October 4. 2002, 390 SCRA 458 (2002).
20
Rollo, p. 25.
21
Id. at 93-101.
22
Id. at 115-116.
23
Id. at 139 and 147-148.
24
Id. at 149-160. Docketed as C-960 and filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.
25
Id. at 276-279. The decision was promulgated on June 30, 2009.
26
Id. at 279.
27
Id. at 280-284.
28
Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
xxxx
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost
till after the lapse often years.
29
Rollo, pp. 298-310. The Spouses Supapo reiterated in their appeal arguments
previously raised in the RTC.
30
Supra notes 2 and 3.
31
Rollo, pp. 50-60.
32
Supra note 3.
33
Rollo, pp. 361-365.
34
Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 130, 140.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and For
Other Purposes" approved on August 14, 1981.
38
Abrin v Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 420, 424.
39
An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Approved
March 25, 1994.
40
See Ouano v. POTT International Investment, 434 Phil. 28 (2002); Hilario v.
Salvador, 497 Phil. 327 (2005); Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla, 618 Phil. 395
(2009); Padre v. Badillo, G.R. No. 165423, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 50, 66.
41
Hilario v. Salvador, supra note 40: BF Citiland Corp. v Otake, G.R. No. 173351, July
29, 2010, 220 SCRA 220, 229.
42
557 Phil. 650, 657 (2007).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Supra note 7.
46
Supra note 6. The Registered of Deeds of Caloocan issued the TCT on October 15,
1979.
47
Rollo, pp. 96-97 (Pages 3 and 4 of Spouses de Jesus' answer to the complaint
for accion publiciana). The respondents merely note that there is allegedly a pending
case in which the Republic of the Philippines filed an action against the Spouses
Supapo's predecessor-in-interest to annul the latter's derivative title.
48
Id.
49
Article 1126 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary prescription of
ownership or real rights shall not take place to the prejudice of a third person, except in
virtue of another title also recorded; and the time shall begin to run from the recording
of the latter.
50
Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other
Purposes, dated June 11, 1978.
51
Spouses Ragudo v. Fabeila Estate Tenants Association, Inc., 503 Phil. 751,763 (2005).
52
Supra note 34.
53
See Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code.
54
Bishop v. CA, G.R. No. 86787, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 636, 641.
55
Id.
56
See Arroyo v. BIDECO, G.R. No. 167880, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA
430; Labrador v. Perlas, G.R. No. 173900, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 265, Tolentino v.
Laurel, G.R. No. 181368, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 561; Ungria v. CA, G.R. No.
165777, July 25, 2011, 654 SCRA 314. See also Tuason v. Bolanos, 95 Phil. 106
(1954); Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-26083, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 196;
and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41233, November 21,
1979,93 SCRA 146. 490 Phil. 118, 135(2005). Casimiro Dev't. Corp. v. Mateo, G.R. No.
175485, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 676, 686.
59
Rollo, p. 364.
60
Unguria V. CA, supra note 56.
61
Id, citing Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag, G.R. No. 161237, January 14, 2009, 576 SCRA
70, 87.
62
SSS v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., 650 Phil. 50, 56 (2011), citing
Rizal
63
Commercial Banking Corporation v. Royal Cargo Corporation, G.R. No. 179756,
October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 545, 557.
63
Estate of Sotto v. Palicte, et al, 587 Phil. 586 (2008), citing Heirs ofPanfilo F. Abalos
v. Bucal, 569 Phil. 582 (2008); Anillo v. Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems, 560 Phil. 499 (2007); Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Sandiganbayan, 556 Phil. 664 (2007).
64
Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, 565 Phil. 766 (2007); Estate
of the Late Jesus Yujuico v. Republic, 563 Phil. 92 (2007); Estate of the Late
Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon, 562 Phil. 519 (2007); PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc.
v. Dai, 560 Phil. 84 (2007).
65
Supra note 62, citing Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, 26 July 2010, 625
SCRA 472 479.
66
Id., citing Antonio v. Sayman Vda. de Monje, 646 Phil. 90, 99 (2010).
January 27, 2016
G.R. No. 202426
GINAENDAYA, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNESTO V. VILLAOS, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails: 1) the January 2, 2012 Decision of the Court of
1 2
Appeals (CA) dismissing petitioner's Petition for Review in CA-G.R SP No. 110427 and affirming the
April 11, 2008 Decision and May 29, 2009 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa
3 4
City, Branch 49 in RTC Case No. 4344; and 2) the CA's June 11, 2012 Resolution denying
5
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
The CA is succinct in its narration of the facts:
Gina Endaya (hereinafter petitioner) and the other heirs of Atilano Villaos (hereinafter Atilano) filed
before the RTC, Branch 52, Palawan City, a complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of sale,
recovery of titles, and accounting of income of the Palawan Village Hotel (hereinafter PVH) against
Ernesto V. Villaos (hereinafter respondent). Docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 4162, the complaint
sought the recovery of several lots, including that on which the PVH and Wooden Summer
Homes are located.
6
The complaint in the main said that the purported sale of the affected lots, from Atilano to
respondent, was spurious.
Subsequently or on 10 May 2006, respondent filed an ejectment case with preliminary mandatory
injunction against petitioner Gina Endaya and Leny Rivera before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
7
(MTCC), Puerto Princesa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1940.
According to respondent, he bought from Atilano eight (8) parcels of land, including those where
8
PVH and WSH stood. Respondent then took possession of the lots and started to manage and
operate the said hotels. Upon taking possession of the said lots, he told petitioner and the others
who live in residential houses in the lots in question, to vacate the premises, giving them a period of
six (6) months to do so.
However, instead of leaving, petitioner even participated in a violent and unlawful take-over of
portions of PVH and WSH, thus, the filing of the ejectment case.
Denying that Atilano, during his lifetime, had executed deeds of sale involving the subject lots in
favor of respondent, petitioner stated that during the alleged execution of said deeds, Atilano was no
longer ambulatory and could no longer talk and give assent to the deeds of sale. She added that
Atilano, an educated and successful businessman, could have affixed his [signature] to the
documents and not merely put his thumbmark on it. She claims that the deeds of sale were forged
and could not have been executed with Atilano’s consent.
Petitioner further contended that the deeds of sale could not have been properly notarized because
the same were notarized in Palawan at a time when Atilano was purportedly confined at a hospital in
Quezon City. Finally, petitioner questioned the propriety of the ejectment case since according to
her, they already have filed Civil Case No. 4162 precisely to nullify the deeds of sale.
In its decision, the MTCC held that an action questioning the ownership of a property does not bar
9
the filing of an ejectment case since the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is the
physical or material possession of the property independent of any claim of ownership. Such being
the case, the MTCC had jurisdiction to decide as to who is entitled to the possession of the
residential house. It ruled that respondent had the right to the possession of the residential house
subject of the instant case and ordered the petitioners to vacate the same and pay attorney's fees in
the amount of P20,000.00.
Aggrieved by the decision, petitioners appealed before the RTC of Palawan, docketed thereat as
RTC Case No. 4344.
On 11 April 2008, the RTC promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the MTCC, holding that
10
the pendency of Civil Case No. 4162 could not be considered as ground for the dismissal of the
present ejectment case under the principle of litis pendentia because the parties therein assert
contrasting rights and prayed for different reliefs. It further ruled that the MTCC simply took
cognizance of the existence of the deeds of sale in favor of respondent without passing judgment as
to whether these deeds were valid or not.
According to the RTC, the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being notarized documents, are
considered to be public documents and carry with them the presumption of regularity.
However, the RTC deleted the award for attorney's fees, saying that there was no factual and legal
basis to justify the same.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the RTC should pass judgment on the
legality of the deeds for the purpose of deciding who between the parties has a better right to
possession even if the same issue is pending before another court.
The RTC denied the motion in its Resolution dated 29 May 2009 x x x.
11
The RTC held in its May 29, 2009 Resolution that –
Appellants’ insistence that this Court pass judgment on the legality or illegality of the deeds of sale
12
if only for the limited purpose of deciding who between the parties herein has the better right to
possession of the properties subject hereof, even if the same issue is pending before another branch
of this Court, is as highly improper as it is subversive of orderliness in the administration of justice,
as it would put the presiding judges of both this and Branch 52 of this Court in a most inconvenient
bind.
One cannot begin to think what consequences such suggested action shall spawn. Whichever way
this Court decides the matter of the validity of the deeds of sale, not only shall the same be without
any final weight and binding effect but it is likewise bound to slight, irate and/or humiliate either or
both judges involved, and/or otherwise to adversely impact on judicial capacity to decide finally the
issue with utmost freedom, which is indispensable to a fair and orderly administration of justice.
xxxx
In the end, it can even be added that when appellants decided to lodge civil case no. 4162, even
while the ejectment case was pending with the court a quo, they have empowered Branch 52 of this
Court, to which the former case was assigned, to decide squarely and bindingly the issue of the
validity or invalidity of the deeds of sale. Consequently, they must have known and understood the
legal and practical impacts of this decision of theirs on the capacity of the court a quo, and of this
Court eventually, to make a similar determination even for a limited, and especially for a limited,
purpose only.
For appellants, now, to ask both concerned branches of this Court to decide on one and the same
issue, when the latter were compelled, by the former’s aforesaid filing of action, to limit themselves
only to the issue directly affecting the particular aspect of the controversy between the same parties-
in-litigation that they are specifically handling, could be considered a myopic regard for the legal
system that everyone should try to edify and sustain. 13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 110427. Petitioner
14
later filed an Amended Petition for Review, with Supplement. She claimed that the RTC erred in
15
affirming the MTCC; that the MTCC and RTC erred in not passing upon the issue of validity of the
deeds of sale executed by Atilano in favor of respondent and declaring that said issue should be
resolved in Civil Case No. 4162 for declaration of nullity of said deeds of sale, recovery of titles, and
accounting before the Palawan RTC Branch 52; that it was necessary to pass upon the validity of
the deeds of sale even if the same is the main point of contention in Civil Case No. 4162, because
the question of possession in the ejectment case cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership; that while respondent claimed that the subject lots were sold to him, title to the same
16
remains in the name of Atilano even up to this day; and that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the
case.
In a January 2, 2012 Decision, the CA denied the Petition, stating thus:
The petition is devoid of merit.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is the
question of who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute which is
independent of any claim of ownership raised by any of the parties. If the question of ownership is
linked to the issue of possession, then the MTCC may pass on the question of ownership only for
the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Such determination is not final and does not
affect the ownership of the property. This is clearly set forth in Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. – When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
In this case, the MTCC was correct in refusing to dismiss the ejectment case despite the pendency
of Civil Case No. 4162 which is an action for declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale in another
court. The case then pending before the MTCC was concerned only with the issue of possession, or
to be exact, who between petitioner and respondent had the better right to possess the properties in
question.
Respondent has in his favour the deeds of sale which are notarized documents and hence, enjoy the
presumption of regularity. Based on the said deeds of sale, the MTCC correctly awarded the
possession of the properties in question to respondent. In effect, the MTCC provisionally ruled on
the ownership of the subject properties, contrary to petitioner’s insistence that said court completely
avoided the issue.
It cannot also be said that the RTC likewise refused to rule on the issue of ownership, or on the
validity of the deeds of sale. The RTC was one with the MTCC in ruling that the deeds of sale are
presumed to be valid because these were notarized. While it categorically refused to rule on the
validity of the deeds of sale, it may be considered to have ruled on the ownership of the properties
on the basis of the presumption of regularity that attaches to the notarized deeds.
The RTC is justified in refusing to rule on the validity of the deeds of sale since this is a matter that
pertains to Civil Case No. 4162. x x x
xxxx
To reiterate, the only duty imposed upon the RTC in resolving questions of possession where the
issue of ownership is raised is to touch on said subject matter provisionally. When it ruled on the
issue of possession on the basis of the aforesaid presumption, it cannot be said to have been remiss
in its duty.
As to petitioner’s argument that the MTCC should have dismissed the ejectment case for lack of
jurisdiction since the present case was a forcible entry case and not an unlawful detainer case, this
Court likewise finds it to be lacking in merit.
Records will show that petitioner never raised the said issue in the court below. In fact, it was raised
only for the first time on appeal before this Court. Hence, petitioner cannot now impugn for the first
time MTCC’s lack of jurisdiction based on the rule that issues not raised or ventilated in the court a
quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To do so would offend the basic rules of fair play
and justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision
dated 11 April 2008 and Resolution dated 29 May 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 49, in RTC Case No. 4344, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 17
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in its assailed June 11, 2012 Resolution, the CA held its ground.
Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioner submits that –
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the MTCC of Puerto
Princesa City and RTC Branch 49 on the issue of ownership of the subject properties.
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the issue of jurisdiction, or lack of it, of
the MTCC over the complaint for ejectment filed by the Respondent cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.18
Petitioner’s Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and set aside and that the ejectment case –
Civil Case No. 1940 – be dismissed, petitioner essentially insists in her Petition and Reply that the
19
MTCC and RTC should have resolved the issues of ownership and validity of the deeds of sale
despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 4162 because these issues will settle the question of who
between the parties has the better right of possession over the subject properties; that it was error
for the MTCC and RTC to declare that respondent had the better right of possession based on the
supposed deeds of sale in disregard of the successional rights of the Atilano heirs; that the CA erred
in declaring that the MTCC possessed jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 1940; that the issues raised in
her Petition involve questions of law which thus merit consideration by this Court and the exercise of
its discretionary power of review; and that the ejectment case should be dismissed while Civil Case
No. 4162 is pending since a determination of the issue of ownership therein will likewise settle the
question of possession.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment, respondent maintains that the CA committed no error in its appreciation of the
20
case; that the question of ownership involves a factual issue which cannot be raised before this
Court; that consequently, the Petition should be dismissed; and that since the issue of jurisdiction
was first raised only before the CA, it does not merit consideration by this Court as well.
Our Ruling
The Petition must be granted.
In resolving the Petition for Review, the CA lost sight of the legal principle that in resolving the issue
of possession in an ejectment case, the registered owner of the property is preferred over the
transferee under an unregistered deed of sale. In Co v. Militar, this Court held that –
21
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the petitioner who has a
Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in
support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title
in the name of petitioner.
In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was adopted in this
country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land
titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless
and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and
decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance
properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the
attributes of his ownership. x x x22
The same principle was reiterated in Pascual v. Coronel, which held thus -
23
In any case, we sustain the appellate court’s finding that the respondents have the better right to
possess the subject property. As opposed to the unregistered deeds of sale, the certificate of title
certainly deserves more probative value. Indeed, a Torrens Certificate is evidence of indefeasible
title of property in favor of the person in whose name appears [sic] therein; such holder is entitled to
the possession of the property until his title is nullified.
The petitioners, however, insist that the deeds of sale deserve more credence because they are
valid contracts that legally transferred ownership of the property to Melu-Jean. They argue that (a)
the 1975 Deed, being a public document, is presumed to be valid and there was no evidence
sufficient to overturn such presumption or show that it was simulated; (b) the fact that the person
who notarized the said deed of sale is not commissioned as a notary public has no bearing on its
validity; (c) registration of the deed of sale was not necessary to transfer ownership; (d) Melu-Jean is
not guilty of laches in asserting her ownership over the property since she is actually in possession
of the property through the petitioners; and (e) the filing of the annulment case is an admission that
the two deeds of sale are merely voidable, or valid until annulled.
However, it should be noted that the CA merely affirmed the power of the trial court to provisionally
resolve the issue of ownership, which consequently includes the power to determine the validity of
the deeds of sale. As previously stated, such determination is not conclusive, and the issue of
ownership and the validity of the deeds of sale would ultimately be resolved in the case for
annulment of the deeds of sale.
Even if we sustain the petitioners’ arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it
would still not bolster the petitioners’ case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the
1âwphi1
registered owners’ superior right to possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted
with a similar issue of which between the certificate of title and an unregistered deed of sale should
be given more probative weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess. There,
the Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner, as opposed to the unregistered deeds of sale of the respondents. The Court stressed
therein that the Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized.
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err
in giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-a-vis the contested
unregistered Deed of Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered owner is
preferred to possess the property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the
person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. 24
Later, in Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, a case decided by this ponente, the following pronouncement
25
was made:
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in
whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of
the property, including possession. Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab, this Court declared that the age-
old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the entire
Lot 83. Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their
claim of ownership. Thus, even if respondents’ proof of ownership has in its favor a juris
tantum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over petitioner’s
Torrens title. This has been our consistent ruling which we recently reiterated in Pascual v.
Coronel, viz[.]:
Even if we sustain the petitioners’ arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it
would still not bolster the petitioners’ case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the
registered owners’ superior right to possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted
with a similar issue of which between the certificate of title and an unregistered deed of sale should
be given more probative weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess. There,
the Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner, as opposed to the unregistered title in the name of respondents. The Court stressed
therein that the Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized.
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err
in giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-a-vis the contested
person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
As the titleholder, therefore, petitioner is preferred to possess the entire Lot 83. x x x 26
Then again, in Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Deloy, the Court held:
27
At any rate, it is fundamental that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It bears to
emphasize that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including
possession. Thus, the Court must uphold the age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens title
over a land is entitled to its possession. In Pascual v. Coronel, the Court reiterated the rule that a
certificate of title has a superior probative value as against that of an unregistered deed of sale in
ejectment cases. 28
While respondent has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight parcels of land, these deeds were not
registered; thus, title remained in the name of the owner and seller Atilano. When he died, title
passed to petitioner, who is his illegitimate child. This relationship does not appear to be contested
by respondent – in these proceedings, at least. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, “[t]he rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.” Thus, applying the
principle enunciated in the above-cited cases, petitioner and her co-heirs should have been favored
on the question of possession, being heirs who succeeded the registered owner of the properties in
dispute. Clearly, the MTCC, RTC, and CA erred in ruling in favor of respondent.
Besides, if there are strong reasons of equity, such as when the execution of the judgment in the
unlawful detainer case would result in the demolition of the premises such that the result of
enforcement would be permanent, unjust and probably irreparable, then the unlawful detainer case
should at least be suspended, if not abated or dismissed, in order to await final judgment in the more
substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. The facts indicate that petitioner and her
29
co-heirs have established residence on the subject premises; the fact that they were given a long
period of six months within which to vacate the same shows how deep they have established roots
therein. If they vacate the premises, serious irreversible consequences – such as demolition of their
respective residences – might ensue. It is thus more prudent to await the outcome of Civil Case No.
4162.
In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, the Court suspended the enforcement of a writ of demolition
rendered in an ejectment case until after a case for annulment of title involving the property to be
demolished was decided. The Court ratiocinated:
x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible
entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper
judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of
physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which
the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a
petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful
detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public
policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior
possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior
claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force,
strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.30
With the foregoing pronouncement, the Court finds no need to tackle the other issues raised by the
parties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 2, 2012 Decision and June 11,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 110427 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1940 for ejectment is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 34-57.
Id. at 58-66; penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by

2
Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Danton Q. Bueser.
3
Id. at 68-85; penned by Judge Mario P. Legazpi.
4
Id. at 86-91.
5
Id. at 67.
6
Or WSH.
7
MTCC records, pp. 1-5.
Located in Puerto Princesa City and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 8940,
8
8941, 8942, 8943, 8944, 10774, 19319, and 17932.
MTCC records, pp. 423-447; Decision dated August 6, 2007 in Civil Case No. 1940, penned
9
by Judge Lydia Abiog-Pe.
10
Rollo, pp. 68-85.
11
Id. at 86-91.
12
Herein petitioner and the Atilano heirs.
13
Id. at 89-90.
14
CA rollo, pp. 3-23.
15
Id. at 287-305.
Citing Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 97637 & 98700-01,
16
April 10, 1992, 208 SCRA 108.
17
Rollo, pp. 63-65.
18
Id. at 41.
19
Id. at 232-241.
Id. at 214-230.
20
466 Phil. 217 (2004).

21
Id. at 224-225.
22
554 Phil. 351 (2007).

23
Id. at 361-362.
24
637 Phil. 131 (2010).

25
Id. at 142-143.
26
G.R. No. 192893, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 486.

27
Id. at 504.
28
Go v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 214, 226 (1998); Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation v.
29
Court of Appeals, supra note 16; Salinas v. Hon. Navarro, 211 Phil. 351, 356 (1983); Vda. de
Legaspi v. Hon. Avendaño, 169 Phil. 138, 146 (1977).
Fernando v. Lim, 585 Phil. 141, 159 (2008).

30
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204626 June 9, 2014
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, and the Heirs of
JULIET B. PULKERA, Petitioners,
vs.
CARMELING CRISOLOGO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the June 14, 2012 Decision of the
1
Court of Appeals (CA) and its November 14, 2012 Resolution which reversed the April 18, 201 1
2
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City (RTC), and reinstated the September
3
15, 2009 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Baguio City (MTCC). in Civil Case
4
No. 13209, a complaint for recovery of possession.
The Facts
Records show that Carmeling Crisologo (Crisologo), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro
Isican (Isican), filed her complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with Damages
5
against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P. Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners)
before the MTCC.
Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a
total area of approximately 2,000 square meters, described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates of
title – Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)Nos. T-13935 and T-13936;that the properties were covered
by an Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were
updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her
properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and knowledge, and constructed their
houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her daughter, Atty. Carmelita
Crisologo, and Isican personally went to the properties and verbally demanded that petitioners
vacate the premises and remove their structures thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised
to buy the said properties for 3,500.00 per square meter; that she gave petitioners time to produce
the said amount, but they reneged on their promise to buy them; that petitioners refused to vacate
the subject properties despite several demands; that the petitioners knew full well that the subject
premises they were occupying were titled properties but they insisted on unlawfully holding the
same; and that she was unlawfully dispossessed and displaced from the subject properties due to
petitioners’ illegal occupation.
On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of Crisologo were products of Civil
Registration Case No. 1, Record 211, which were declared void by the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Marcos, and reiterated in Republic v. Marcos; that the said case was later enacted into law,
6 7
Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1271, entitled "An Act Nullifying Decrees of Registration and
Certificates of Title within the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No.1, GLRO Record No. 211,
pursuant to Act No. 931, as amended, but Considering as Valid Certain Titles of Lands that are
Alienable and Disposable Under Certain Conditions and For Other Purposes" which took effect on
December 22, 1977; that Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1271 for the validation of said titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners had been in
open, actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the subject land, in
good faith; and that Crisologo was never in prior possession and had no valid title over the subject
land.
8
MTCC Ruling
On September 15, 2009, the MTCC rendered a decision in favor of Crisologo, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff directing the defendants, their
heirs, assigns, representatives and/or any person acting for and in their behalves to:
a) Immediately vacate the subject properties, and to demolish/dismantle all their houses and
other structures on the properties; should defendants refuse to comply, the plaintiff may
demolish/dismantle them at the expense of the defendants;
b) Pay reasonable rentals of the use and occupation of the subject properties at
Php4,000.00 per month from January 2006 for each of the defendants;
c) Pay Php20, 000.00 as attorney’s fees, and
d) Costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.
The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land, who, as
such, had declared these properties for taxation purposes since 1969 and regularly paid the realty
taxes thereon. It stated that with Crisologo being the owner, petitioners were illegally occupying the
land.
The MTCC added that petitioners could not question Crisologo’s titles over the subject parcels of
land in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession because such defense was a collateral
attack which was prohibited under P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. Thus, it could not inquire into the intrinsic validity of Crisologo’s titles.
Ruling of the RTC
On April 18, 2011, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It was of the view that
petitioners’ assertion of the TCTs’ invalidity was not a collateral attack. It cited the rulings in Republic
v. Marcos, and Republic v. Marcos, which perpetually prohibited the reopening of Civil Reservation
9 10
Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211, and, therefore, the registration of parcels of lands. For said reason,
the titles of Crisologo were products of illegal proceedings nullified by this Court. She also failed to
comply with the conditions set forth in P.D. No. 1271. Accordingly, the titles were void and the same
could not be a legal basis for Crisologo to justify the eviction of petitioners from the subject premises.
Having been nullified, these certificates of title ceased to be the best proof of ownership.
Ruling of the CA
On June 14, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision, setting aside the RTC decision and
reinstating that of the MTCC.
The CA held that Crisologo was entitled to the possession of the subject parcels of land. It explained
that her possession was established when she acquired the same by sale sometime in 1967 and
when the certificates of title covering the properties were subsequently issued. It added that her
payment of realty taxes due on the said properties since 1969 further strengthened her claim of
possession. Moreover, her appointment of Isican as administrator of the subject properties and her
offer to sell the lots to the petitioners showed that she had control over the same. Accordingly, the
CA concluded that Crisologo’s right to remain in possession of the subject lots should be preferred
over the petitioners’ possession regardless of the actual condition of her titles. Hence, the
petitioners, who used force in occupying her properties, should respect, restore and not disturb her
lawful possession of the subject parcels of land.
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the petitioners instituted this petition anchored on the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
(1)
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT

RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAS ACTUAL OR WAS IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE LANDS
INVOLVED CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, THE FACTS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE.
(2)
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT
THE PURPORTED EXECUTION AND REGISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC INSTRUMENTS
RELATIVE TO THE SALE IN 1967 OF THE SUBJECT LANDS AND THE SUBSEQUENT
ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN HER NAME ESTABLISH POSSESSION.
(3)

THE TAX DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS IN THE NAME OF THE RESPONDENT ESTABLISH
HER POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS.
(4)

THE SUPPOSED APPOINTMENT OF PEDRO ISICAN AS ADMINISTRATOR ESTABLISHES HER
POSSESSION OVER THE LANDS IN DISPUTE.
(5)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS

THE PRESENT POSSESSOR OF THE SUBJECT LANDS REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL
CONDITION OF HER TITLES, IGNORING THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS AND
ADHERENCE TO LAW.
(6)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS

DISTURBED THE POSSESSION OF HEREIN RESPONDENT BY FORCE.
(7)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT

RESPONDENT’SSUPPOSED POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS SHOULD BE
PREFERRED DESPITE THE NATURE OR CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY AS PART OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN. 11
Petitioners’ position
Petitioners aver that Crisologo failed to show documentary or testimonial evidence that she acquired
the subject properties by sale or by any other mode of acquisition from its previous owner. Her only
bases in claiming them were the titles issued in her name, without a deed of sale.
Petitioners further argue that assuming that there was really a sale that took place, its execution and
registration cannot establish her right of possession, whether actual or constructive. First, the validity
of the subject titles was stricken down by Republic vs. Marcos cases and P.D. No. 1271.
Hence, the TCTs could not be sources of legal rights. Second, Crisologo never took actual
possession of the subject properties after the alleged sale in 1967. She appointed an administrator
over the said property only in 2006.
Moreover, petitioners claim that her tax declarations and receipts evidencing payment of taxes
cannot prove her possession or ownership over the subject properties without proof of actual
possession.
Finally, petitioners submit that there are facts and circumstances that militate against her claim of
possession. They point out that the titles over the subject properties have no encumbrances or
annotations whatsoever; that for more than forty (40) years, the subject lots have not been subjected
to any deed, agreement, contract, mortgage or any other property dealings; that the said titles are
not validated up to the present as certified by the Register of Deeds of Baguio City; that she
presented no witnesses to prove her intention to possess the subject lots; that the documents she
presented are not reliable because they were issued only in 2008; that no improvements were
introduced by her; and that she is guilty of laches due to her inaction to validate her titles.
Respondent’s position
Crisologo opposes the petition mainly on technical grounds. First, she argues that the supposed
representatives of the petitioners who filed this petition and signed the certification on non-forum
shopping have no authority to do so. Hence, they have no standing to prosecute because they are
not the real parties in interest. Second, she claims that the petitioners failed to furnish the CA a copy
of their motion for extension of time to file this petition for review.
The Court’s Ruling
The only question that needs to be resolved in this petition is – who between petitioners and
respondent Crisologo have a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land. Both
contending parties claim that they have a superior possessory right over the disputed lands.
After a careful review of the records, the Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of possession
over the subject parcels of land.
Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
When parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication,
nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to
the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to
an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not
conclusive on the issue of ownership. 12
In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she be declared in prior actual possession of the properties
in dispute and that petitioners vacate the same and demolish their houses therein. She alleged,
among others, that she was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land and that petitioners
unlawfully entered her properties by stealth, force and without her prior consent and knowledge.
Clearly, she primarily wanted to recover possession of the subject parcels of land from petitioners.
Hence, the case is an accion publiciana.
Nonetheless, the petitioners have raised the issue of ownership in their pleadings. They mainly
argue that Crisologo’s titles on the subject properties are void and that they have been in open,
actual, exclusive, notorious, uninterrupted and continuous possession over the subject properties in
good faith.
The nullity of the decrees of registration and certificates of titles in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 is not
absolute
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 invalidated decrees of registration and certificates of title within
13
the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity, however, is not
that sweeping. The said provision expressly states that "all certificates of titles issued on or before
July 31, 1973shall be considered valid and the lands covered by them shall be deemed to have been
conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners" upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by the
subject title is not within any government, public or quasi-public reservation, forest, military or
otherwise, as certified by appropriating government agencies; and 2) compliance by the titleholder
with the payment to the Republic of the Philippines of the correct assessed value of the land within
the required period.
In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land were registered on August
24, 1967. The titles are, thus, considered valid although subject to the conditions set. But whether or
not Crisologo complied with the said conditions would not matter because, this would be a collateral
attack on her registered titles, as would be discussed later.
At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are not the proper parties to question the status of the
respondent’s registered titles. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1271 expressly states that the "Solicitor
14
General shall institute such actions or suits as may be necessary to recover possession of lands
covered by all void titles not validated under this Decree."
The respondent’s certificates of title give her the better right to possess the subject parcels of land
whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
1âwphi1
described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of
the property, including possession. Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab, this Court declared that the "age-
15
old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof." 16
The records show that TCT No. T-13935 and TCT No. T-13936 bear the name of Carmeling P.
17 18
Crisologo, as the registered owner. Petitioners do not dispute the fact that she has a Torrens title
over the subject parcels of land.
The respondent’s Torrens certificates of title are immune from a collateral attack.
As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on the
same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides
that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
This rule has been applied in innumerable cases, one of which was Francisco Madrid v. Spouses
Mapoy, where it was written:
19
Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it
indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral
attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an
incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.
This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title,
through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such
judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had
been disposed of. To permit a collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the
integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a Torrens title.
The petitioners-defendants' attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs' title, by claiming that fraud
attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to
defend their possession of the properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a direct action whose main
objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. This is the attack that possession
of a Torrens Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot entertain, much less accord credit to,
the petitioners-defendants' claim of fraud to impugn the validity of the respondents-plaintiffs' title to
their property.
As the lawful possessor. the respondent has the right to eject the petitioners
The Court agrees with the CA that the only question that needs to be resolved in this suit to recover
possession is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
subject parcels of land. Therefore, the foremost relevant issue that needs to be determined here is
simply possession, not ownership.
The testimonial and documentary evidence on record prove that Crisologo has a preferred claim of
possession over that of petitioners. It cannot be denied that she bought the subject properties from
the previous owner in 1967, which was why the transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued
in her name. Records further show that she has been paying the realty taxes on the said properties
since 1969. She likewise appointed Isican as administrator of the disputed lands. More importantly,
there is no question that she offered to sell to petitioners the portions of the subject properties
occupied by them. Hence, she deserves to be respected and restored to her lawful possession as
provided in Article 539 of the New Civil Code. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member in view of the vacancy in the Third Division. per Special Order
No. 1691 elated May 22, 20 14.
1
Rollo. pp. 34-45. (Penned by Associate Justice Maritlor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred
in by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante and Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon ).
2
Id. at 46-47.
3
Id. at 264-270.
4
Id. at 224-236.
5
Id. at 48-53.
6
G.R. No. L-29675, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 517.
7
152 Phil. 204 (1973).
8
Rollo, pp. 54-59.
9
Supra note 6.
10
Supra note 7.
11
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
Asuncion Urieta Vda. De Aguilar v. Spouses Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, July 5, 2010, 623
12
SCRA 130, 140-141.
Section 1.All orders and decisions issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
13
Benguet in connection with the proceedings for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No.
1, GLRO Record No. 211, covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation, and
decreeing such lands in favor of private individuals or entities, are hereby declared null and
void and without force and effect; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that all certificates of titles issued
on or before July 31, 1973 shall be considered valid and the lands covered by them shall be
deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners upon a showing of,
and compliance with, the following conditions:
(a) The lands covered by the titles are not within any government, public or quasi-
public reservation, forest, military or otherwise, as certified by appropriating
government agencies;
(b) Payment by the present title holder to the Republic of the Philippines of an
amount equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of the assessed value of the land
whose title is voided as of revision period 1973 (P.D. 76), the amount payable as
follows: Within ninety (90) days of the effectivity of this Decree, the holders of the
titles affected shall manifest their desire to avail of the benefits of this provision and
shall pay ten per centum (10%) of the above amount and the balance in two equal
installments, the first installment to be paid within the first year of the effectivity of this
Decree and the second installment within a year thereafter.
Section 6. The Secretary of Justice, as Chairman, the Solicitor General and the Director of
14
Lands, as members, are hereby constituted as a committee which shall promulgate rules and
regulations necessary and appropriate to implement this Decree. They or their
representatives shall assure compliance with this Decree and may call upon any government
agency or office for assistance in the performance of this task.
The Solicitor General shall institute such actions or suits as may be necessary to
recover possession of lands covered by all void titles not validated under this Decree.
15
508 Phil. 612, 621 (2005).
16
Asuncion Urieta Vda. De Aguilar v. Spouses Alfaro, supra note 12 at 141.
17
Rollo, p. 205.
18
Id. at 207.
19
G.R. No. 150887, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 14, 26-27.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession: and should he be
20
disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means

established by the laws and the Rules of the Court.
THIRD DIVISION
APRIL 4, 2018
G.R. No. 195814
EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, represented by DR. GERARDO M. AQUINO, JR. (now DR.
PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF OF SANITARIUM,, Petitioner
vs
SPOUSES ANASTACIO PERLABARBARONA, Respondents
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
A case for unlawful detainer must state the period from when the occupation by tolerance started
and the acts of tolerance exercised by the party with the right to possession. If it is argued that the
possession was illegal from the start, the proper remedy is to file an accion publiciana, or a plenary
action to recover the right of possession. Moreover, while an ejectment case merely settles the issue
of the right of actual possession, the issue of ownership may be provisionally passed upon if the
issue of possession cannot be resolved without it. Any fina1 disposition on the issue of ownership,
however, must be resolved in the proper forum.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals February 17, 2011
1
Decision, which upheld the judgments of the Municipal Trial Court and Regional Trial Court ordering
2
Eversley Childs Sanitarium (Eversley) to vacate the disputed property. Eversley assails the August
31, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals for resolving its Motion for Reconsideration despite its
3
earlier submission of a Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration.
Eversley is a public health facility operated by the Department of Health to administer care and
treatment to patients suffering from Hansen's disease, commonly known as leprosy, and to provide
basic health services to non-Hansen's cases. Since 1930, it has occupied a portion of a parcel of
4
land denominated as Lot No. 1936 in Jagobiao, Mandaue City, Cebu. 5
Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona (the Spouses Barbarona) allege that they are the owners
of Lot No. 1936 by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 53698. They claim that they have
acquired the property from the Spouses Tarcelo B. Gonzales and Cirila Alba (the Spouses
Gonzales), whose ownership was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. R0-824. Per the
6
Spouses Barbarona's verification, OCT No. R0-824 was reconstituted based on Decree No. 699021,
issued to the Spouses Gonzales by the Land Registration Office on March 29, 1939. 7
On May 6, 2005, the Spouses Barbarona filed a Complaint for Ejectment (Complaint) before the
8
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Mandaue City against the occupants of Lot No. 1936, namely,
Eversley, Jagobiao National High School, the Bureau of Food and Drugs, and some residents
(collectively, the occupants). The Spouses Barbarona alleged that they had sent demand letters and
that the occupants were given until April 15, 2005 to vacate the premises. They further claimed that
despite the lapse of the period, the occupants refused to vacate; hence, they were constrained to file
the Complaint. 9
In their Answer, the occupants alleged that since they had been in possession of the property for
10
more than 70 years, the case was effectively one for recovery of possession, which was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. They likewise claimed that the Spouses Barbarona were
guilty of laches since it took more than 60 years for them to seek the issuance of a Torrens title over
the property. They also averred that the Spouses Barbarona's certificate of title was void since they,
the actual inhabitants of the property, were never notified of its issuance. 11
In its September 29, 2005 Decision, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities ordered the occupants to
12
vacate the property, finding that the action was one for unlawful detainer, and thus, within its
jurisdiction. It likewise found that the Spouses Barbarona were the lawful owners of Lot No. 1936
and that the occupants were occupying the property by mere tolerance. 13
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities also held that a titled property could not be acquired through
laches. It found that even the occupants' tax declarations in their names could not prevail over a
valid certificate of title. The dispositive portion of its Decision read:
14
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [the Spouses Barbarona] and against all
the [occupants] and ordering the latter to peacefully vacate the portion of the premises in question
and remove their houses, structures or any building and improvements introduced or constructed on
said portion on Lot 1936 covered by TCT No. 53698.
The [occupants] are further ordered to pay the following, to wit:
1. The amount of ₱10.00 per square meter for the area occupied by each [of the
occupants] as reasonable monthly compensation for the use of the portion of the
property of [the Spouses Barbarona] from the date of the filing of the complaint until
[the occupants] shall have actually vacated and turned over the portion of their
possession to the [Spouses Barbarona];
2. The amount of ₱20,000 as litigation expenses and P20,000 as reasonable

attorney[']s fees; and
3. The cost of suit.
Counterclaims of the [occupants] are hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 15
The occupants appealed to the Regional Trial Court. In its November 24, 2006 Decision, the 16
Regional Trial Court affirmed in toto the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities. One of the
occupants, Eversley, filed a motion for reconsideration. 17
During the pendency of Eversley's motion, or on February 19, 2007, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01503 rendered a Decision, cancelling OCT No. R0-824 and its derivative titles,
including TCT No. 53698, for lack of notice to the owners of the adjoining properties and its
occupants. 18
On April 23, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying Eversley's Motion for
Reconsideration. 19
Eversley filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Municipal Trial Court
20
had no jurisdiction over the action and that the Regional Trial Court erred in not recognizing that the
subsequent invalidation of the Spouses Barbarona's certificate of title was prejudicial to their cause
of action.
21
On February 17, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, denying the Petition. According
22
to the Court of Appeals, the allegations in the Complaint were for the recovery of the physical
possession of the property and not a determination of the property's ownership. The action, thus,
was one for unlawful detainer and was properly filed with the Municipal Trial Court. 23
The Court of Appeals held that the subsequent invalidation of the issuance of the certificate of title
was immaterial, stating:
Whether or not [the Spouses Barbarona are] holder[s] or not of a certificate of title is immaterial. The
matter of the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office in favor of [the Spouses
Barbarona's] predecessor[s-]in[-]interest has not been resolved on the merits by the RTC. [The
Spouses Barbarona,] having acquired all the rights of their predecessors-in-interest[,] have[,] from
the time of the issuance of the decree[,] also derived title over the property and nullification of the
title based on procedural defects is not tantamount to the nullification of the decree. The decree
stands and remains a prima facie source of the [Spouses Barbarona's] right of ownership over the
subject property. 24
Eversley, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Petition for Review with this
25
Court assailing the February 17, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals. It likewise prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to restrain the
26
immediate execution of the assailed judgment and to prevent impairing the operations of the
government hospital, which had been serving the public for more than 80 years.
In its May 13, 2011 Resolution, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
27
implementation of the Court of Appeals February 17, 2011 Decision. Respondents were also
directed to comment on the Petition.
In its Petition before this Court, petitioner argues that the nullification of TCT No. 53698 should have
been prejudicial to respondents' right to recover possession over the property. Petitioner claims that
since the Metropolitan Trial Comi relied on respondents' title to determine their right of possession
over the property, the subsequent nullification of their title should have invalidated their right of
possession. Petitioner maintains that even if Decree No. 699021 was valid, the effect of its validity
does not extend to respondents since there is no evidence to prove that they have acquired the
property from Tarcelo B. Gonzales, the owner named in the decree. 28
Petitioner points out that respondents' Complaint before the trial court was a case for accion
publiciana, not one for unlawful detainer, since respondents have not proven petitioner's initial
possession to be one of mere tolerance. It claims that respondents' bare allegation that they merely
tolerated petitioner's possession is insufficient in a case for unlawful detainer, especially with
petitioner's possession of the property since 1930, which pre-dates the decree that was reconstituted
in 193 9. It argues that its long occupancy should have been the subject of judicial notice since it is
29
a government hospital serving the city for decades and is even considered as a landmark of the
city.
30
On the other hand, respondents counter that the cancellation of TCT No. 53698 "does not ... divest
respondents of their rightful ownership of the subject property[,] more so their right of
possession" since their predecessors-in-interest's title was still valid and protected under the
31
Torrens system. They insist that "petitioner has not shown . . . any sufficient evidence proving [its]
ownership ... much less, [its] right of possession." 32
Respondents maintain that the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over their complaint since prior
physical possession is not an indispensable requirement and all that is required is "that the one-year
period of limitation commences from the time of demand to vacate." 33
While the Petition was pending before this Court, respondents raised a few procedural concerns
before submitting their Comment. In their Motion for Leave to File
Comment/Manifestation, respondents informed this Court that petitioner still had a pending and
34
unresolved Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, in violation of the rule against
35
forum shopping. Respondents, nonetheless, filed their Comment/Manifestation, to which this Court
36
ordered petitioner to reply. 37
Petitioner filed its Reply and submitted a Manifestation, explaining that the Court of Appeals had
38 39
issued a Resolution on August 31, 2011, denying its Motion for Reconsideration despite its earlier
40
filing on April 14, 2011 of a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, it manifested its intention to likewise question the Court of Appeals August 31, 2011
Resolution with this Court.
On November 28, 2011, this Court noted that petitioner's Reply and Manifestation and directed
respondents to comment on the Manifestation. 41
In their Comment on Petitioner's Manifestation, respondents assert that while petitioner submitted a
42
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals did not
issue any order considering petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration to have been abandoned. The
Court of Appeals instead proceeded to resolve it in its August 31, 2011 Resolution; hence,
respondents submit that petitioner violated the rule on non-forum shopping. 43
Based on the arguments of the parties, this Court is asked to resolve the following issues:
First, whether or not the nullification of the Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona's title had the
effect of invalidating their right of possession over the disputed property; and
Second, whether or not the Spouses Anastacio and Perla Barbarona's complaint against Eversley
Childs Sanitarium was for accion publiciana or for unlawful detainer.
Before these issues may be passed upon, however, this Court must first resolve the procedural
question of whether or not Eversley Childs Sanitarium violated the rule on non-forum shopping.
In City of Taguig v. City of Makati, this Court discussed the definition, origins, and purpose of the
44
rule on forum shopping:
Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation explained that:
Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits -in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or
action.
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals recounted that forum shopping originated as a
concept in private international law:
To begin with, forum-shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-
resident litigants are given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for
various reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the
defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat these less
than honorable excuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in
conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient"
or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
In this light, Black's Law Dictionary says that forum-shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have
his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable
judgment or verdict." Hence, according to Words and Phrases, "a litigant is open to the charge of
'forum shopping' whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to factual circumstances
surrounding his suit, and litigants should be encouraged to attempt to settle their differences without
imposing undue expense and vexatious situations on the courts."
Further, Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust Co. recounted that:
The rule on forum-shopping was first included in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
issued by this Court on January 11, 1983, which imposed a sanction in this wise: "A violation of the
rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party
concerned." Thereafter, the Court restated the rule in Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. Ultimately, the rule was embodied in the 1997 amendments to the Rules of
Court. 45
There is forum shopping when a party files different pleadings in different tribunals, despite having
the same "identit[ies] of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought." Consistent with the
46
principle of fair play, parties are prohibited from seeking the same relief in multiple forums in the
hope of obtaining a favorable judgment. The rule against forum shopping likewise fulfills an
administrative purpose as it prevents conflicting decisions by different tribunals on the same issue.
In filing complaints and other initiatory pleadings, the plaintiff or petitioner is required to attach a
certification against forum shopping, certifying that (a) no other action or claim involving the same
issues has been filed or is pending in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency, (b) if there is a
pending action or claim, the party shall make a complete statement of its present status, and (c) if
the party should learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, that he or she will
report it within five (5) days to the tribunal where the complaint or initiatory pleading is pending.
Thus, Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and,
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt
of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have committed forum shopping
when it filed its Petition for Review on Ce1iiorari with this Court, despite a pending Motion for
Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
According to the Solicitor General, it filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court on March 10, 2011 but that another set of solicitors erroneously filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals on March 11, 2011. Thus, it was constrained
47
to file a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw its Motion for Reconsideration on April 14, 2011, the
48
same date as its Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court. Indeed, its Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping, as certified by State Solicitor Joan V. Ramos-Fabella, provides:
....
5. I certify that there is a pending Motion/or Reconsideration erroneously filed in the Court of
Appeals, Special Eighteenth Division which we have asked to be withdrawn. Aside from said
pending motion, I have not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of my knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; and should I thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim is
pending before any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, I shall report such fact within five
(5) days therefrom from the court wherein this petition has been filed. (Emphasis supplied)
49
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, mistakenly presumed that the mere filing of a motion to
withdraw has the effect of withdrawing the motion for reconsideration without having to await the
action of the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General's basis is its reading of Rule VI,
Section 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals:
Section 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. - No motion for reconsideration or
rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari or a motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is
subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned.
This would have been true had the Office of the Solicitor General merely manifested that it had
already considered its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals as abandoned,
pursuant to its Internal Rules. However, it filed a Motion to Withdraw, effectively submitting the
withdrawal of its Motion for Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals' sound discretion. A motion is
not presumed to have already been acted upon by its mere filing. Prudence dictated that the Office
of the Solicitor General await the Court of Appeals' action on its Motion to Withdraw before
considering its Motion for Reconsideration as withdrawn.
Ordinarily, "a motion that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied." When the Court of
50
Appeals denied the Office of the Solicitor General's Motion for Reconsideration without acting on its
Motion to Withdraw, the latter was effectively denied. Petitioner, thus, committed forum shopping
when it filed its Petition before this Court despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration before the
Court of Appeals.
To rule in this manner, however, is to unnecessarily deprive petitioner of its day in court despite the
Court of Appeals' failure to apply its own Internal Rules. The Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
clearly provide that a subsequent motion for reconsideration shall be deemed abandoned if the
movant filed a petition for review or motion for extension of time to file a petition for review before
this Court. While the Office of the Solicitor General can be faulted for filing a motion instead of a
mere manifestation, it cannot be faulted for presuming that the Court of Appeals would follow its
Internal Rules as a matter of course.
Rule VI, Section 15 of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals is provided for precisely to prevent
forum shopping. It mandates that once a party seeks relief with this Court, any action for relief with
the Court of Appeals will be deemed abandoned to prevent conflicting decisions on the same issues.
Had the Court of Appeals applied its own Internal Rules, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
would have been deemed abandoned.
Moreover, unlike this Court, which can suspend the effectivity of its own rules when the ends of
justice require it, the Court of Appeals cannot exercise a similar power. Only this Court may
51
suspend the effectivity of any provision in its Internal Rules. Thus, it would be reasonable for
52
litigants to expect that the Court of Appeals would comply with its own Internal Rules.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been deemed abandoned with its filing of a Motion for
Extension of Time before this Court, the Court of Appeals' August 31, 2011 Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration, thus, has no legal effect. It is as if no motion for reconsideration was
filed at all. Considering that petitioner counted the running of the period to file its Petition with this
53
Court from its receipt of the Court of Appeals February 17, 2011 Decision, and not of the Court of
Appeals August 31, 2011 Resolution, it does not appear that petitioner "wanton[ly] disregard[ed] the
rules or cause[d] needless delay in the administration of justice." In this particular instance,
54
petitioner did not commit a fatal procedural error.
II
By its very nature, an ejectment case only resolves the issue of who has the better right of
possession over the property. The right of possession in this instance refers to actual possession,
not legal possession. While a party may later be proven to have the legal right of possession by
virtue of ownership, he or she must still institute an ejectment case to be able to dispossess an
actual occupant of the property who refuses to vacate. In Mediran v. Villanueva: 55
Juridically speaking, possession is distinct from ownership, and from this distinction are derived legal
consequences of much importance. In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer
the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of
controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them
sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It
is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession
pending this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare
over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly
dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a person supposes
himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the
party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of
competent jurisdiction; and he [cannot] be permitted, by invading the property and excluding the
actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property right.
56
In ejectment cases, courts will only resolve the issue of ownership provisionally if the issue of
possession cannot be resolved without passing upon it. In Co v. Militar: 57
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to
circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted
competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the
issue of possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive
of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action
involving possession. 58
In this instance, respondents anchor their right of possession over the disputed property on TCT No.
53698 issued in their names. It is true that a registered owner has a right of possession over the
59
property as this is one of the attributes of ownership. Ejectment cases, however, are not
60
automatically decided in favor of the party who presents proof of ownership, thus:
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the
owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property.
To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what
action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases
- forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious
means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de Jure. It
does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment
case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the
subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be
averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven. (Emphasis supplied)
61
Here, respondents alleged that their right of ownership was derived from their predecessors-in-
interest, the Spouses Gonzales, whose Decree No. 699021 was issued on March 29, 1939. The 62
Register of Deeds certified that there was no original certificate of title or owner's duplicate issued
over the property, or if there was, it may have been lost or destroyed during the Second World War.
The heirs of the Spouses Gonzales subsequently executed a Deed of Full Renunciation of Rights,
Conveyance of Full Ownership and Full Waiver of Title and Interest on March 24, 2004 in
respondents' favor. Thus, respondent Anastacio Barbarona succeeded in having Decree No. 699021
reconstituted on July 27, 2004 and having TCT No. 53698 issued in respondents' names on
February 7, 2005. 63
The Municipal and Regional Trial Courts referred to respondents' Torrens title as basis to rule the
ejectment case in their favor:
The complaint in this case sufficiently ... establish[es] beyond doubt that [the Spouses Barbarona]
are the lawful owners of Lot 1936, situated at Jagobiao, Mandaue City, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 53698 . . . .
....
A certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership and as owners, the [the Spouses
Bnrbarona] are entitled to possession of the property . . . .
This Court however cannot just simply closed (sic) its eyes into the fact presented before the trial
court that the subject lot owned by [the Spouses Barbarona] is covered by a Torrens Certificate of
Title. Until such time or period that such title is rendered worthless, the same is BINDING UPON
THE WHOLE WORLD in terms of ownership[.] (Emphasis in the original)
64
During the interim, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals to assail the reconstitution of
Decree No. 699021, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01503. On February 19, 2007, the Court of
65
Appeals in that case found that the trial court reconstituted the title without having issued the
required notice and initial hearing to the actual occupants, rendering all proceedings void. The
dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant
petition and SETTING ASIDE the Order of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City in
Case No. 3 G.L.R.O., Record No. 4030.
SO ORDERED. 66
As a consequence of this ruling, TCT No. 53698 was cancelled by the
Register of Deeds on January 25, 2011. 67
Despite these developments, the Court of Appeals in this case proceeded to affirm the Municipal
Trial Court's and Regional Trial Court's judgments on the basis that Decree No. 699021 was still
valid, stating:
Whether or not [the Spouses Barbarona are] holder[s] or not of a certificate of title is immaterial. The
matter of the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office in favor of [the Spouses
Barbarona's] predecessor[ s-]in[-]interest has not been resolved on the merits by the RTC. [The
Spouses Barbarona,] having acquired all the rights of their predecessors-in-interest[,] have[,] from
the time of the issuance of the decree[,] also derived title over the property and nullification of the
title based on procedurai defects is not tantamount to the nullification of the decree. The decree
stands and remains a prima facie source of the [Spouses Barbarona's] right of ownership over the
subject property. 68
Blinded by respondents' allegedly valid title on the property, the three (3) tribunals completely
ignored how petitioner came to occupy the property in the first place.
Petitioner, a public hospital operating as a leprosarium dedicated to treating persons suffering from
Hansen's disease, has been occupying the property since May 30, 1930. According to its history:
The institution was built by the Leonard Wood Memorial with most of the funds donated by the late
Mr. Eversley Childs of New York, USA, hence the name, Eversley Childs Sanitarium, in honor of the
late donor. The total cost was about 400,000.00 which were spent for the construction of 52 concrete
buildings (11 cottages for females and 22 for males, 5 bathhouses, 2 infirmaries, powerhouse,
carpentry shop, general kitchen and storage, consultation and treatment clinics and offices),
waterworks, sewerage, road and telephone system, equipment and the likes.
The construction of the building [was] started sometime on May 1928 and was completed 2 years
later. It was formally turned over the Philippine government and was opened [on] May 30, 1930 with
540 patients transferred in from Caretta Treatment Station, now Cebu Skin Clinic in Cebu City. 69
Proclamation No. 507 was issued on October 21, 1932, "which reserved certain parcels of land in
Jagobiao, Mandaue City, Cebu as additional leprosarium site for the Eversley Childs Treatment
Station." Petitioner's possession of the property, therefore, pre-dates that of respondents'
70
predecessors-in-interest, whose Decree No. 699021 was issued in 1939.
It is true that defects in TCT No. 53698 or even Decree No. 699021 will not affect the fact of
ownership, considering that a certificate of title does not vest ownership. The Torrens system "simply
recognizes and documents ownership and provides for the consequences of issuing paper titles." 71
Without TCT No. 53698, however, respondents have no other proof on which to anchor their claim.
The Deed of Full Renunciation of Rights, Conveyance of Full Ownership and Full Waiver of Title and
Interest executed in their favor by the heirs of the Spouses Gonzales is insufficient to prove
conveyance of property since no evidence was introduced to prove that ownership over the property
was validly transferred to the Spouses Gonzales' heirs upon their death.
Moreover, Proclamation No. 507, series of 1932, reserved portions of the property specifically for
petitioner's use as a leprosarium. Even assuming that Decree No. 699021 is eventually held as a
valid Torrens title, a title under the Torrens system is always issued subject to the annotated liens or
encumbrances, or what the law warrants or reserves. Thus:
Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of
title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject
to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
72
Portions occupied by petitioner, having been reserved by law, cannot be affected by the issuance of
a Torrens title. Petitioner cannot be considered as one occupying under mere tolerance of the
registered owner since its occupation was by virtue of law. Petitioner's right of possession, therefore,
shall remain unencumbered subject to the final disposition on the issue of the property's ownership.
III
There are three (3) remedies available to one who has been dispossessed of property: (I) an action
for ejectment to recover possession, whether for unlawful detainer or forcible entry; (2) accion
publiciana or accion plenaria de posesion, or a plenary action to recover the right of · possession;
and (3) accion reivindicatoria, or an action to recover ownership. 73
Although both ejectment and accion publiciana are actions specifically to recover the right of
possession, they have two (2) distinguishing differences. The first is the filing period. Ejectment
cases must be filed within one (I) year from the date of dispossession. If the dispossession lasts for
more than a year, then an accion publiciana must be filed. The second distinction concerns
jurisdiction. Ejectment cases, being summary in nature, are filed with the Municipal Trial
Courts. Accion publiciana, however, can only be taken cognizance by the Regional Trial Court. 74
Petitioner argues that the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the case since respondents'
cause of action makes a case for ace ion publiciana and not ejectment through unlawful detainer. It
asserts that respondents failed to prove that petitioner occupied the property by mere tolerance.
Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by the allegations stated in the

complaint. Respondents' Complaint before the Municipal Trial Court states:
75
That [the occupants] are presently occupying the above-mentioned property of the [Spouses
Barbarona] without color [of] right or title. Such occupancy is purely by mere tolerance. Indeed, [the
occupants'] occupying the lot owned by [the Spouses Barbarona] is illegal and not anchored upon
any contractual relations with the [Spouses Barbarona.] 76
Indeed, no mention has been made as to how petitioner came to possess the property and as to
what acts constituted tolerance on the part of respondents or their predecessors-in-interest to allow
petitioner's occupation. In Carbonilla v. Abiera:
77
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be
originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right
to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful
possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere
tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondents' possession was based on his alleged tolerance. He did
1âwphi1
not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit of the Garcianos attesting that they tolerated
respondents' entry to and occupation of the subject properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not
suffice. Plaintiff must, at least, show overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor's permission to
occupy the subject property . . . .
....
In addition, plaintiff must also show that the supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from
the very start of the possession - from entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession was
unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Notably, no
mention was made in the complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Neither was there any evidence showing such details.
In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession of his
property by filing an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to recover the better right
to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. We stress,
however, that the pronouncement in this case as to the ownership of the land should be regarded as
merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the land.
78
The same situation is present in this case. Respondents failed to state when petitioner's possession
was initially lawful, and how and when their dispossession started. All that appears from the
Complaint is that petitioner's occupation "is illegal and not anchored upon any contractual relations
with [respondents.]"79
This, however, is insufficient to determine if the action was filed within a year from dispossession, as
required in an ejectment case. On the contrary, respondents allege that petitioner's occupation was
illegal from the start. The proper remedy, therefore, should have been to file an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria to assert their right of possession or their right of ownership.
Considering that respondents filed the improper case before the Municipal Trial Court, it had no
jurisdiction over the case. Any disposition made, therefore, was void. The subsequent judgments of
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which proceeded from the void Municipal Trial
Court judgment, are likewise void.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 17, 2011 Decision and August 31, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 02762 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated May 13, 2011 is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN SAMUEL R. MARTIRES

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 23-55.
Id. at 57-66. The Decisio'1, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 02762, was penned by Associate
2
Justice Socorro 8. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and
Edwin D. Sorongon of the Special Eighteent Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
11
3
A copy of this Resolution was not submitted before this Court.
Department of Health, Eversiey Childs Sanitarium, About Us, <http://ecs.doh.gov.ph/ 13-

4
about-us?start=4> (last accessed Mardi 23, 2018).
5
Rollo, p. 26.
6
Id. at 59. The CA Decision spelled the Spouses Gonzales’ names as "Tarcilo" and
"Cirilia." See rollo, p. 58. Id. at 58-59.
7
8
Id. at 72-77
9
Id. at 58 and pp. 101-102, MTCC Decision.
10
Id.at78-83.
11
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 100-109. The Decision, docketed as Civil Case No. 5079, was penned by Judge
12
Wilfredo A. Dagatan of Branch 3, Municipat Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City.
13
Id. at 106-108.
14
Id. at 108.
15
Id. at l09.
Id. at 110-118. The Decision, docketed as Civil Case No. Man-5305-A, was penned by
16
Judge Ulric R. Canete of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City.
17
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31-32 and 63.
18
Id. at 32 and 135.

19
Id. at 137-149
20
Id. at 60-61.
21
Id. at 57-66.
22
Id. at 61-62.
23
Id. at 64.
24
Id. at 23-55.
25
Id. at 50-51.
26
Id. at 180-182. The Office of the Solicitor General informed this Court in a Manifestation
27
dated May 7, 2012 that the Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated March 15, 2012
granting respondents' Motion for Execution pending appeal, rollo, pp. 314-318. The trial
court, however, recalled its March 15, 2012 Order on May 3, 2012, ratio, p. 323.
Id. at 36-37.
28
Id. at 39-46.
29
Id. at 48-49.
30
Id. at 210.
31
Id. at 211.
32
Id. at 213.
33
Id. at 183-185.
34
Id. at 190-202.
35
Id. at 186-189 and 208-216.

36
Id. at 207.
37
Id. at 275-295.
38
Id. at 296-300.
39
A copy of this Resolution was not submitted before this Court.

40
Rollo, p. 307.
41
Id. at 308-312.
42
Id. at 309-310.
43
44
G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016,<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/june2016/208393.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
Id. at 10-11, citing Top Rate Construction & General Services. Inc. v. Paxton Development
45
Corporation, 457 Phil. 740 (2003) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]; First Philippine

International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division]; and I'rubanker.1· Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust Co., 361 Phil. 744
(1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
Yap v. Chua, 687 Phil. 392, 400 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division] citing Young v.
46
John Keng Seng, 446 Phil. 823, 833 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
Rollo, p. 297.
47
Id. at 296
48
Id. at 54.
49
Orosa v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 67. 72 (1996) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
50
See CONST, art. VIII, sec. 5(5) on the power of this Court to promulgate rules on pleading
51
and practice and Vda. De Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275 (1936) [Per J. Abad Santos,
En Banc).
See 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Rule VIII, sec. 11. Section 11.
52
Separability Clause. - If the effectivity of any provision of these Rules is suspended or

disapproved by the Supreme Court, the unaffected provisions shall remain in force.
See Rodriguez v. Aguilar, 505 Phil. 468 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
53
Philippine Public School Teachers Association v. Heirs of Iligan, 528 Phil. 1197, 1212
54
(2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
37 Phil. 752 (1918) [Per J. Street, En Banc].

55
Id. at 757.
56
466 Phil. 217 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

57
Id. at 223-224, citing Spouses Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete and Spouses

58
Andres and Filomena Balanon-Mananquil v. Pedro Balanon, 450 Phil. 615 (2003) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Embrado v. Court ofAppeals, 303 Phil. 344 (1994) [Per J.
Bellosillo, First Division]; and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 305 Phil. 611 (1994) [Per J. Bid
in, En Banc].
Rollo, pp. 262-263.
59
See Co v. Militar, 466 Phil. 217 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

60
Carbonilla v. Abiera, 639 Phil. 473, 481 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division] citing
61
Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 183 (200 l) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third
Division] and David v. Cordova, 502 Phil. 626 (2005) [Per J. Tioga, Second Division].
Rollo, p. 258.
62
Id. at 259-262.
63
Id. at 107 and 117.

64
Id. at125.
65
Id. at 131.
66
Id. at 263.
67
Id. at 64.
68
Department of Health, Eversley Childs Sanitarium, About Us, <http://ecs.doh.gov.ph/J 3-

69
aboutus? start=4> (Accessed March 23, 2018).
Proc. No. 1772 (2009), also known as Amending Proclamation No. 507 dated October 21,
70
1932 which Reserved Certain Parcels of Land in Jagobiao, Mandaue City, Cebu as
Additional Leprosarium Site for the Eversley Childs Treatment Station, by Excluding Portions
thereof and Development and Socialized Housing Site Purposes in Favor of Qualified.
Beneficiaries under the Provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 Otherwise Known as the Urban
Development Housing Act.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 717

71
Phil. 141, 207 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
Republic v. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296, 307 (2006) [Per J. Garcia, Second

72
Division] citing Noblejas. LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 32 (1986).
See Bejar v. Caluag, 544 Phil. 774, 779 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division].
73
See Bejar v. Caluag, 544 Phil. 774, 779-780 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First
74
Division].
See Encarnacion v. Amigo, 533 Phil. 466 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
75
Rollo, pp. 73-74.
76
639 Phil. 473 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].

77
Id. at 482-483, citing Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet, 482 Phil. 853 (2004) [J.
78
Panganiban, Third Division]; Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 39 (2006) [Per J.

Chico-Nazario, First Division]; and Asis v. Asis Vda. de Guevarra, 570 Phil. 173 (2008) [Per
C.J. Puno, First Division].
Rollo, p. 74.
79
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164402 : July 5, 2010
ASUNCION URIETA VDA. DE AGUILAR, represented by ORLANDO U.

AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES EDERLINA B. ALFARO Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In an action for recovery of possession of realty, who has the better right of possession, the registered
owner armed with a Torrens title or the occupants brandishing a notarized but unregistered deed of
sale executed before the land was registered under the Torrens system?
As we previously ruled in similar cases,1 we resolve the question in favor of the titleholder.
cralaw
Factual Antecedents
On August 3, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages2 before the
cralaw
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. She alleged that on May 16, 1977, her
husband Ignacio Aguilar (Ignacio) was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-93543 over a cralaw
606-square meter parcel of land designated as Lot 83 situated in Brgy. Buenavista, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro. Prior thereto, or in 1968, Ignacio allowed petitioner's sister, Anastacia Urieta
(Anastacia), mother of respondent Ederlina B. Alfaro (Ederlina), to construct a house on the southern
portion of said land and to stay therein temporarily.
In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition Lot 83. Petitioner thus asked the respondents,
who took possession of the premises after the death of Anastacia, to vacate Lot 83. They did not heed
her demand.
Thus, petitioner filed a case for accion publiciana praying that respondents be ordered to vacate
subject property, and to pay moral, temperate, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees
and the costs of suit.
In their Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses,4 respondents did not dispute that
cralaw
Ignacio was able to secure title over the entire Lot 83. However, they asserted that on April 17, 1973,
Ignacio and herein petitioner sold to their mother Anastacia the southern portion of Lot 83 consisting
of 367.5 square meters as shown by the Kasulatan sa Bilihan5 which bears the signatures of
cralaw
petitioner and Ignacio. Since then, they and their mother have been in possession thereof.
Respondents also presented several Tax Declarations6 in support of their allegations.
cralaw
Respondents also raised the defense of prescription. They pointed out that accion publiciana or an
action to recover the real right of possession independent of ownership prescribes in 10 years.
However, it took petitioner more than 25 years before she asserted her rights by filing accion
publiciana. As alleged in the complaint, they took possession of the disputed portion of Lot 83 as early
as 1968, but petitioner filed the case only in 1995.
By way of counterclaim, respondents prayed that petitioner be directed to execute the necessary
documents so that title to the 367.5-square meter portion of Lot 83 could be issued in their name.
They likewise prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.
In her Reply and Answer to Counterclaim,7 petitioner denied having signed the Kasulatan sa Bilihan
cralaw
and averred that her signature appearing thereon is a forgery. She presented an unsworn written
declaration dated January 28, 1994 where her husband declared that he did not sell the property in
question to anyone. As to the issue of prescription, she asserted that respondents' occupation of
subject property cannot ripen into ownership considering that the same is by mere tolerance of the
owner. Besides, the purported Kasulatan sa Bilihan was not registered with the proper Registry of
Deeds.
During the trial, petitioner presented the testimonies of Orlando Aguilar (Orlando) and Zenaida Baldeo
(Zenaida). Orlando testified that he has been staying in Lot 83 since 1960 and had built a house
thereon where he is presently residing; and, that his mother, herein petitioner, denied having sold the
property or having signed any document for that matter.
Zenaida also testified that in 1981, her father (Ignacio) and Ederlina had a confrontation before the
barangay during which her father denied having conveyed any portion of Lot 83 to anybody. She
further testified that she is familiar with the signature of her father and that the signature appearing
on the Kasulatan sa Bilihan is not her father's signature.
For their part, respondents offered in evidence the testimonies of Estrella Bermudo Alfaro (Estrella),
Ederlina, and Jose Tampolino (Jose). Estrella declared that she was present when Ignacio and the
petitioner affixed their signatures on the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, which was acknowledged before Notary
Public Juan Q. Dantayana on April 17, 1973. She narrated that her mother actually purchased the
property in 1954, but it was only in 1973 when the vendor executed the deed of sale. In fact, her
father Francisco Bermudo was able to secure a permit to erect a house on the disputed property from
the Office of the Mayor of Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro in 1954. 8 She was surprised to learn though
cra cralaw
that their property is still registered in the name of the petitioner.
Ederlina corroborated the declarations of Estrella. She also alleged that her parents occupied the
property in 1954 when they built a hut there, then later on, a house of strong materials.
Jose corroborated the declarations of the other witnesses for the respondents that the disputed
portion of Lot 83 is owned by Anastacia.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision9 dated September 21, 1998, the court a quo ordered the respondents to vacate subject
cralaw
premises and denied their counterclaim for reconveyance on the grounds of prescription and laches. It
held that the prescriptive period for reconvenyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. In this case, however, it is not
disputed that OCT No. P-9354 covering the entire Lot 83 was issued to Ignacio in 1977. The trial court
likewise held that respondents are guilty of laches and that the reconveyance of the disputed property
in their favor would violate the rule on indefeasibility of Torrens title.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads: chan robles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, and in the light of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, to wit:
1. Ordering the defendants and any person claiming right under them to vacate the premises in
question and surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff;
2. To pay the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as and for reasonable attorney's fees;
3. To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 10 cra
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 7, 2004, the CA promulgated its Decision11 reversing the trial court's Decision and dismissing
cralaw
the complaint, as well as respondents' counterclaim. The CA upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa
Bilihan since it is a notarized document and disputably presumed to be authentic and duly executed.
In addition, witness Estrella categorically declared that she was present when petitioner and Ignacio
signed the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. The CA elaborated that in order to disprove the presumption accorded
to a notarized document, the party contesting its authenticity and due execution must present a clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, which the petitioner failed to do.
The CA likewise disagreed with the court a quo that respondents' counterclaim should be dismissed on
the ground of indefeasibility of title. It emphasized that the Torrens system was adopted to protect
innocent third parties for value and not to protect fraud. Nonetheless, the CA did not grant the relief
sought in respondents' counterclaim considering that not all interested parties were impleaded in the
case.
The dispositive portion of the CA's Decision reads: chan robles virtual law library
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is REVERSED, and a new one ENTERED
dismissing the complaint and counterclaim.
SO ORDERED. 12 cra
Issue
Without seeking reconsideration of the CA's Decision, petitioner interposed the present recourse
raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE

VALIDITY/GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE PURPORTED DEED OF SALE OF THE PORTION
OF THE LOT DESPITE THE VEHEMENT DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VENDORS. 13 cra
Petitioner contends that the CA grievously erred in upholding the validity and genuineness of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan. She alleges that she wanted to take the witness stand to disclaim in open court
her purported signature appearing on respondents' Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but could not do so because
she is too old, bed-ridden and has to bear a tortuous five-hour drive to reach the court. Nevertheless,
she executed a sworn statement declaring that she and her husband never sold any portion of Lot 83
and that their signatures appearing on said deed were forged. She avers that the assistance of an
expert witness is not even necessary to detect the patent dissimilarities between said forged
signatures and their authentic signatures.
Petitioner likewise argues that the CA erred in taking into consideration the appearance and condition
of the paper where the Kasulatan sa Bilihan is written. She posits that the fabrication of an ancient-
looking document nowadays is no longer difficult. She also points to several circumstances which cast
doubt on the authenticity and due execution of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but which the CA inexplicably
ignored.
Furthermore, petitioner maintains that her title is indefeasible. And while there are exceptions to the
rule on indefeasibility of title,14 she emphasizes that respondents never disputed her title. With regard
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to the tax declarations presented by respondents, petitioner asserts that it has been the consistent
ruling of this Court that tax declarations are not necessarily proof of ownership.
In their comment, respondents assert that in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law can be raised. Factual issues are prohibited. From the arguments advanced by the
petitioner, however, it is clear that she is asking this Court to examine and weigh again the evidence
on record.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
This case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme Court may review factual issues.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari. 15 It is settled that cra cralaw
in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case. 16 This rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions,17 one of which is when
cra cralaw cralaw
the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, like in the present case.
Nature and purpose of accion publiciana.
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion,18 accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to cralaw
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. 19 It refers to an ejectment cra cralaw
suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty. 20 cra cräläwvirtualibräry
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. 21 However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the
cra cralaw
issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication,
however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose
of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. 22 The adjudication, in short, is not cra cralaw
conclusive on the issue of ownership. 23 cra cräläwvirtualibräry
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential guideposts, we shall now resolve the arguments raised by the
parties in this petition.
As against petitioner's Torrens title, respondents' Kasulatan sa Bilihan cannot confer better right to
possess.
whose name the title appears. 24 It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land
cra cralaw
described therein. 25 It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of
cra cralaw
the property, including possession. 26 Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab,27 this Court declared that the
cra cralaw cralaw
"age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof."
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the entire
Lot 83. Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their
claim of ownership. Thus, even if respondents' proof of ownership has in its favor a juris tantum
presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over petitioner's Torrens title.
This has been our consistent ruling which we recently reiterated in Pascual v. Coronel,28 viz: cralaw
Even if we sustain the petitioners' arguments and rule that the deeds of sale are valid contracts, it
would still not bolster the petitioners' case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered
owners' superior right to possess the property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a
similar issue of which between the certificate of title and an unregistered deed of sale should be given
more probative weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess. There, the Court
held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner, as
opposed to the unregistered title in the name of respondents. The Court stressed therein that the
Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure
to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership
is established and recognized.
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err in
giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-à-vis the contested
person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. (Citations omitted.) chanroblesvirtualawlibray
As the titleholder, therefore, petitioner is preferred to possess the entire Lot 83. Besides, there are
telltale signs which cast doubt on the genuineness of the Kasulatan. To cite a few:
1. The date of its execution unbelievably coincides with the date the buyer, Anastacia, died;
2. Despite its alleged execution on April 17, 1973, respondents brought up the Kasulatan only when
petitioner asked them to vacate the disputed premises. Prior thereto, they neither asserted their rights
thereunder nor registered the same with the proper Registry of Deeds;
3. The lawyer who notarized the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, as well as the witnesses thereto, was not
presented in court; and,
4. The District Land Officer who signed OCT No. P-9354 by authority of the President is a public officer
who has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing said title.
Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.
Moreover, respondents' attack on the validity of petitioner's title by claiming that their mother became
the true owner of the southern portion of Lot 83 even before the issuance of OCT No. P-9354
constitutes as a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their
possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action whose main objective is to
impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. 29 This cannot be allowed. Under Section 48 of
cra cralaw
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, a certificate of
title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident to
the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title. 30 This manner of attack
cra cralaw
is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action
whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet
implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed
of. 31 Thus, in Magay v. Estiandan,32 therein plaintiff-appellee filed an accion publiciana. In his
cra cralaw cralaw
defense, defendant-appellant alleged among others that plaintiff-appellee's Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2004 was issued under anomalous circumstances. When the case reached this Court, we rejected
defendant-appellant's defense on the ground that the issue on the validity of said title can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Also, in Co v. Court of Appeals33 we arrived
cralaw
at the same conclusion and elaborated as follows:
In their reply dated September 1990, petitioners argue that the issues of fraud and ownership raised
in their so-called compulsory counterclaim partake of the nature of an independent complaint which
they may pursue for the purpose of assailing the validity of the transfer certificate of title of private
respondents. That theory will not prosper.
While a counterclaim may be filed with a subject matter or for a relief different from those in the basic
complaint in the case, it does not follow that such counterclaim is in the nature of a separate and
independent action in itself. In fact, its allowance in the action is subject to explicit conditions, as
above set forth, particularly in its required relation to the subject matter of opposing party's claim.
Failing in that respect, it cannot even be filed and pursued as an altogether different and original
action.
It is evident that the objective of such claim is to nullify the title of private respondents to the
property in question, which thereby challenges the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.
This is apparently a collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the
validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose. Hence, whether or not petitioners have the right to claim
ownership of the land in question is beyond the province of the instant proceeding. That should be
threshed out in a proper action.
The lower courts cannot pass upon or grant respondents' counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction.
Both the trial court and the appellate court considered respondents' counterclaim as a petition for
reconveyance. In which case, it should be treated merely as a permissive counterclaim because the
evidence required to prove their claim differs from the evidence needed to establish petitioner's
demand for recovery of possession. Being a permissive counterclaim, therefore, respondents should
have paid the corresponding docket fees. 34 However, there is no proof on record that respondents
cra cralaw
paid the required docket fees. The official receipts were neither attached to nor annotated on
respondents' Answer with Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses35 which was filed via registered
cralaw
mail36 on August 19, 1995. It has been our consistent ruling that it is not simply the filing of the
cralaw
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the full amount of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. 37 The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
cra cralaw
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. 38 cra cralaw
On a final note, and as discussed above, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the
issue of determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not
a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties to
file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership where the validity of the Kasulatan sa
Bilihan and of OCT No. P-9354 can be properly threshed out.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 7,
2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the September 21, 1998 Decision of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, insofar as it orders the respondents to vacate the premises
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
cralaw Endnotes:
1
Co v. Militar, 466 Phil. 217 (2004); Umpoc v. Mercado, 490 Phil. 118; Arambulo v. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581,
cralaw
September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 640; Pascual v. Coronel, G.R. No. 159292, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 474. cralaw
2
Records, pp. 1-4. The case was raffled to Branch 46 and docketed as Civil Case No. R-924.
cralaw cralaw
3
Id. at 5.
cralaw cralaw
4
Id. at 12-16.
cralaw cralaw
5
Id. at 128.
cralaw cralaw
6
Id. at 129-138.
cralaw cralaw
7
Id. at 21-24.
cralaw cralaw
8
Id. at 139.
cralaw cralaw
9
Id. at 153-161; penned by Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan.
cralaw cralaw
10
Id. at 161.
cralaw cralaw
11
CA rollo, pp. 82-89; penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V.
cralaw
Cosico and Santiago Javier Ranada.
12
Id. at 89.
cralaw cralaw
13
Rollo, p. 201.
cralaw cralaw
14
Such as when a land in possession of a rightful possessor in the concept of owner is fraudulently registered in the name
cralaw
of another. cralaw
15
Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 1.
cralaw
16
Santos v. Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 408, 420.
cralaw
17
The recognized exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
cralaw
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same [are] contrary to the admissions of
both parties; (7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10)
when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record. (Sering v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 467, 471-472; Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997)). cralaw
18
Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 17, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, 90; Barredo v. Santiago, 102 Phil. 127, 130
cralaw
(1957). cralaw
19
Bejar v. Caluag, id.; Sps. Cruz v. Torres, 374 Phil. 529, 533 (1999); Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291
cralaw
(1906); Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618, 620 (1908). cralaw
20
Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 172, 179; Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No.
cralaw
152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543. cralaw
21
Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, 25 (2002).
cralaw cralaw
22
Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404, 412 (2003).
cralaw cralaw
23
Umpoc v. Mercado, 490 Phil. 118, 136 (2005).
cralaw cralaw
24
See Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398, 410 (2004).
cralaw cralaw
25
Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 582, 594 (1997).
cralaw cralaw
26
Supra note 24.
cralaw cralaw
27
G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 648.
cralaw cralaw
28
G.R. No. 159292, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 474, 484-485.
cralaw
29
Ugale v. Gorospe, G.R. No. 149516, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 376, 386; Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
cralaw
140752, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 543, 550; Baloloy v. Hular, 481 Phil. 398, 410 (2004) and Civil Code, Article 428. cralaw
30
Teoville Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Ferreira, G.R. No. 140086, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 459, 474.
cralaw cralaw
31
Id.
cralaw cralaw
32
161 Phil. 586, 587 (1976).
cralaw cralaw
33
274 Phil. 108, 116 (1991).
cralaw cralaw
34
See Alday v. FGU Insurance Corporation, 402 Phil. 962 (2001).
cralaw cralaw
35
Records, pp. 12-16.
cralaw cralaw
36
Id. at 20.
cralaw cralaw
37
Sun Insurance Office v. Asuncion, 252 Phil. 280, 291 (1989).
cralaw cralaw
38
Id.
cralaw

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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015

ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, NAMELY:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Esperanza Supapo

The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.20

The MeTC Ruling23

The RTC Ruling25

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a reconsideration of the CA

The Respondents' Case33

The issues for resolution are:

I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;

The petition is meritorious.

Accion Publiciana and

Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of

Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving

Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:

Section 3 of the same law provides:

In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession

In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:

The cause of action

We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title

The action is not barred

As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. They

To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to

The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.

Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule

The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:

(1) The former judgment or order must be final;

(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;

Res judicata is not present in this case.

First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by

As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint

For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

January 27, 2016

G.R. No. 202426

petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The CA is succinct in its narration of the facts:

(MTCC), Puerto Princesa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1940.

The RTC held in its May 29, 2009 Resolution that –

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a January 2, 2012 Decision, the CA denied the Petition, stating thus:

The petition is devoid of merit.

Petitioner submits that –

The Petition must be granted.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Id. at 58-66; penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by

Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Danton Q. Bueser.

8941, 8942, 8943, 8944, 10774, 19319, and 17932.

by Judge Lydia Abiog-Pe.

April 10, 1992, 208 SCRA 108.

466 Phil. 217 (2004).

554 Phil. 351 (2007).

637 Phil. 131 (2010).

G.R. No. 192893, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 486.