Second-Order Cybernetics

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Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology 1
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3 Bernard Scott • Center for Sociocybernetics Research, Germany • bernces1/at/gmail.com 3
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6 > Context • The field of psychology consists of many specialist domains of activity, which lack shared foundations. This 6
7 means that the field as a whole lacks conceptual coherence. > Problem • The aim of the article is to show how second- 7
8 order cybernetics can provide both foundations and a unifying conceptual framework for psychology. > Method • The 8
9 field of psychology is overviewed. There is then a demonstration of how cybernetics can provide both foundations 9
10 and a unifying conceptual framework. This entails defining some key cybernetics concepts and showing how they 10
11 have already permeated the field, largely implicitly, and showing how, when made explicit, they can unify the field. 11
12 > Results • I show how concepts from second-order cybernetics can unify “process” and “person” approaches within 12
13 psychology and can also unify individual psychology and social psychology, a unification that also builds conceptual 13
14 bridges with sociology. > Implications • The results are of value for bringing order to an otherwise inchoate field. They 14
15 afford better communication between those working in the field, which is likely to give rise to new research questions 15
16 and more effective ways of tackling them. > Constructivist content • Central to the article is a reliance on concepts 16
17 taken from the constructivist perspective of second-order cybernetics. > Key words • First-order cybernetics, second- 17
18 order cybernetics, conceptual foundations, conceptual unification, system, self-organisation, control. 18
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23 “The confusion and barrenness of psychol- lost. Also lost was the intent of the early at an early stage in his studies and who has 23
24 ogy is not to be explained by calling it a cyberneticians to look for interdisciplinary found that cybernetics can indeed provide 24
25 “young science”; its state is not compa- enrichment and transdisciplinary unity. In conceptually satisfying and practically use- 25
26 rable with that of physics, for instance, this article, I overview the field of psychol- ful foundations for psychology. It can reveal 26
27 in its beginnings. (Rather with that of ogy as it currently stands, with its many underlying similarities between problem 27
28 certain branches of mathematics. Set areas of research and application, which, situations and provide tools for modelling 28
29 theory.) For in psychology there are ex- to a large extent, exist as separate specialist those situations. It can facilitate more effec- 29
30 perimental methods and conceptual con- domains of activity (for example, the several tive communication between practitioners. 30
31 fusion. (As in the other case, conceptual subdomains that make up biologically and « 2 »  The treatment is necessarily terse 31
32 confusion and methods of proof.) The behaviourally based psychology, cognitive given constraints on the length of the ar- 32
33 existence of the experimental method psychology, social psychology, develop- ticle. The author may provide a book-length 33
34 makes us think we have the means of mental psychology, abnormal psychology treatment in the future. In the meantime, it 34
35 solving the problems that trouble us; and the study of individual differences). I is hoped that the article will generate wider 35
36 though problem and method pass one then demonstrate how cybernetics, when its discussion of the issues raised. It should 36
37 another by.” (Wittgenstein 1953: 232) contributions are made explicit, can provide also be noted that cybernetics is an abstract 37 501
38 both foundations and an overarching unify- discipline. I have not attempted to provide 38
39 ing conceptual framework for psychology. a comprehensive account of its many ap- 39
40 Introduction In order to do so, I make the distinction plications in psychology. There is a wealth 40
41 between first- and second-order cybernet- of examples in standard texts, though not 41
42 « 1 »  From the 1950s onwards, concepts ics and briefly define some key cybernetic explicitly named as such. (See for example, 42
43 from cybernetics spread throughout psy- concepts, including “system,” “self-organi- Eysenck & Keane 2015). 43
44 chology. In particular, they helped give birth sation” and “control” (Scott 2011a, 1996). I 44
45 to the domain of modern cognitive psychol- also make a broad-brushstroke distinction 45
46 ogy. Models of “information processing” between “process” and “person” approaches The story of psychology 46
47 became ubiquitous and the research inter- within psychology. I go on to show how cy- 47
48 ests of cognitive psychologists increasingly bernetic concepts can unify these approach- « 3 »  Standard histories (for example, 48
49 overlapped with those of workers in arti- es. I also show how cybernetic concepts can Miller 1962; Hunt 1993) tell us that psychol- 49
50 ficial intelligence research, helping spawn unify individual psychology and social psy- ogy emerged from philosophy as a science in 50
51 the multidisciplinary domain of “cognitive chology, a unification that also builds useful the late 19th century, a key moment being 51
52 science.” Cybernetic concepts also perme- conceptual bridges with psychology’s sister the founding, by Wilhelm Wundt, of the first 52
53 ated other domains within the broad field of discipline, sociology. I include reference to laboratory dedicated to empirical studies of 53
54 psychology. However, with rare exceptions, my personal experiences as a practitioner psychological phenomena. An emphasis on 54
55 the historical origins of the concepts were psychologist who encountered cybernetics the scientific value of empirical data, rather 55
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1 than armchair theorising, combined with
2 the controversies over the validity of data
3 derived from introspection, led to the rise of
4 behaviourism as the dominant paradigm (or
5 “school”), a dominance that lasted until well
6 into the 1950s and early 1960s. Behaviourists
7 aspired to make psychology an objective sci-
8 ence. They abjured reference to conscious-
9 ness and reference to “inner” experience and
10 studied behaviour as objectively observable
11 phenomena, using controlled experimental
12 conditions that afforded replication of find-
13 ings. For convenience, many studies were
14 carried out using animals, such as rats and
15 pigeons. The main research programme
16 of behaviourists was focused on studying
17 learning. At an extreme, explanations of how
18 and why learning occurred were eschewed
19 in favour of empirically derived “laws” that
20 afforded predictions about when and where
21 learning would occur – for example, under
22 what circumstances a rat could be most ef-
23 fectively induced to learn how to navigate a
24 maze or a pigeon’s behaviour shaped so that
25 it responded in predictable ways in response
26 to particular stimuli.
27 « 4 »  Competing paradigms included
28 structuralism, functionalism, Gestalt psy-
29 chology, depth psychologies (such as psycho-
30 analysis) and humanistic psychology. In the
31 1960s, inspired by concepts from cybernetics,
32 a new dominant paradigm arose: cognitive
33 psychology. Cognitive psychology addressed
34 issues to do with attention, perception, mem-
35 ory and problem solving, topics that had been
36 addressed in earlier decades and that had
37 amassed a wealth of empirical findings. What
38 the “new” cognitive psychology contributed
39 was new ways of talking about, and model-
40 ling, cognitive processes. The central analogy
41 ran like this, “As programs are to computers,
42 so thoughts are to brains.” Models of cogni-
43 tive processes were built that showed the flow
44 of “information” around a cognitive system.
45 Many such models consisted of static im-
46 ages of boxes and arrows. Others adopted a
47 “computational” approach and were written
48 as computer programs. Parallel work in com-
49 puter science aimed to create “artificial intel-
50 ligence” programs to solve problems, to serve
51 as “expert systems,” process images, interpret
52 natural languages and acquire “knowledge.”
53 A new field became demarcated, “cognitive
54 science,” centred on the concept that both
55 brains and computers are “physical symbol
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systems.” This work following this paradigm epistemological foundations of the several 1
continues today. I say more about these de- paradigms (see, for example, Chapman & 2
velopments below. Jones 1980; Leary 1990). 3
« 5 »  For psychology, a seminal text « 8 »  To illustrate the unchanging face of 4
was the book Plans and the Structure of Be- psychology as a field consisting of a variety 5
haviour, authored by George Miller, Eugene of topic areas and approaches, in Box 1, I list 6
Galanter and Karl Pribram (1960). Not only the contents of standard undergraduate text 7
does the book introduce key concepts rele- books: one from the 1960s (Sanford 1966) 8
vant for the new approaches in cognitive psy- and two bestselling texts from the 2000s 9
chology, it also gives an account of the origins (Hayes 2000; Gross 2010). I, myself, was an 10
of these concepts in the then emerging field undergraduate in the years 1964–1968 and 11
of cybernetics. Other texts that highlighted taught undergraduate courses in psychol- 12
the relevance of concepts from cybernetics ogy, on and off, between 1968 and 2000. I 13
for psychology were George (1960) and Pask was thus a witness to the changes that oc- 14
(1961). As in other fields, as the years passed, curred in those years. One topic not featured 15
researchers took from cybernetics those con- in Box  1 that was (and still is) commonly 16
cepts they found useful for their special ar- taught as part of undergraduate courses is 17
eas of interest, ignored or rejected others and organisational psychology. 18
very soon forgot their origins. « 9 »  In anticipation of the next section, 19
« 6 »  In more recent decades, “cognitive I wish to say a little more about the con- 20
neuroscience” and “physiological psychol- ceptual confusion that Wittgenstein above 21
ogy” (or, taken together, “biological psychol- refers to. The crux of his critique is that we 22
ogy”) have come to the fore, largely due to should look carefully at how we use words 23
the ability to map and manipulate activity in to talk about psychological events and proc- 24
the nervous system and the major advances esses, as a way of avoiding the ontologising 25
made in understanding these processes, of “mind” and “matter” (for “matter,” one 26
anatomically and physiologically, down to could also write “brain”) as different kinds of 27
the molecular level, where the interactions fundamental “substances.” This ontologising 28
of the endocrine system, the nervous sys- comes with the adoption of one of the par- 29
tem and the immune system can be seen to ticular metaphysical positions that underly 30
form a systemic whole. Because of the sys- the competing paradigms in psychology. In 31
temic nature of this whole, in what follows I brief, both functionalism and structuralism 32
frequently refer to the “brain/body system” employ dualistic parallelism (mental events 33
rather than refer to the brain as if the ner- are correlated with physiological processes); 34
vous system was all that is of interest. some dualists also advocate a Cartesian 35
« 7 »  If one considers psychology as a mind/brain interaction; mainstream be- 36
whole field, one can see that over the years haviourism is monistically materialist and 37
there has been a to-ing and fro-ing as para- reductionist (talk of mental events is not 38
digms have become more or less dominant permitted); “cognitivists” are ontologically 39
or fashionable, with the major shifts having monist, materialist reductionists in that they 40
been brought about by the impact of con- reduce the “mental” to the status of pro- 41
cepts from cybernetics. Mainstream psy- grams executed by a computer. 42
chology continues to place great emphasis « 10 »  In the unpublished essay “The 43
on empirical research. Associated theorising relevance of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 44
and model building tends to be specific to a psychology to the psychological sciences”1 45
domain or subdomain. Overall, there is still Peter Hacker provides an extended discus- 46
conceptual confusion and controversy over sion of Wittgenstein’s position and its rel- 47
what psychology is about: what it should be evance for psychology. As discussed further 48
aiming to achieve and how it should pursue below, cybernetics in its role of a metadis- 49
those aims. At a metatheoretic level, there is cipline and a transdiscipline engages in the 50
now an explicit domain of “critical psychol- kind of “philosophical ground clearing” that 51
ogy” that questions the assumptions that Wittgenstein (and Hacker) calls for. 52
underlie mainstream practice (see, for ex- 53
ample, Sloan 2000). There is also a periodic 1 |  http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/Down- 54
(and less critical) attempt to examine the loadPapers.html 55
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 Second-Order Cybernetics
Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology Bernard Scott

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1 Understanding cybernetics Box 1: Contents of standard undergraduate text books 1
2 and its contributions 2
3
to psychology:The story Contents listing for Sanford (1966) 3
4 Part One: Introduction 1. Knowing the human being. 2. Theories of people. 4
5 of cybernetics Part Two: Biological Foundations of Behaviour 3. The developing organism. 5
6 4. Biological basis for integrated behaviour. 6
7 « 11 »  I am not aware of any single text Part Three: Methods in Psychology 5. Tests and measurements in psychology. 7
8 that gives a clear and inclusive account of 6. Experimental design and psychological statistics. 7. Intelligence. 8
9 the origins, early years and key later events Part Four: Segments of the Psychological Process 8. Motives. 9. Emotions. 9
10 concerning cybernetics. Here, I will give a 10. Sensation. 11. Perception. 12. Basic processes of learning. 13. The management 10
11 very brief summary.2 of learning. 14. Higher mental processes. 11
12 « 12 »  The story has several possible be- Part Five: Behaviour of the Whole Organism 15. Personality. 16. Adjusting. 17. Neurosis, 12
13 ginnings. One common starting point is the psychosis and psychotherapy. 18. Social psychology. 13
14 publication, in 1943, of the paper “Behavior, 14
15 purpose and teleology” by Arturo Rosen- Contents listing for Hayes (2000) 15
16 blueth, Norbert Wiener and Juliann Big- 1. Perspectives in Psychology. 16
17 elow and associated discussions that lead up Section 1: Cognitive Psychology 2. Perception and Attention 3. Memory 4. Language 17
18 to the Macy conferences on “feedback and and Literacy 5. Thinking and Representation. 18
19 circular causality in biological and social Section 2: Individuality and Abnormality 6. Intelligence 7. Theories of Personality 19
20 systems” held between 1946 and 1953. The 8. The Medical Model of Abnormal Behaviour 9. Alternatives to the Medical Model. 20
21 paper proposed that the goal-seeking be- Section 3: Physiological Psychology 10. Brain Development and Clinical 21
22 haviour that could be built into mechanical Neuropsychology 11. Consciousness 12. Sensation and Parapsychology 13. Emotion and 22
23 systems and the goal-seeking observed in Motivation. 23
24 biological and psychological systems have a Section 4: Social Psychology 14. Self and Others 15. Understanding Others 16. Social 24
25 similar form: they are structured so that sig- Influence and Social Action 17. Attitudes, Prejudice, and Crowd Behaviour. 25
26 nals about achieved outcomes are “fed back” Section 5: Developmental Psychology 18. Learning and Skill Development 26
27 to modify inputs so that, in due course, a 19. Cognitive Development and Social Awareness 20. Social Development 21. Lifespan 27
28 prescribed goal is achieved (a cup is picked Developmental Psychology. 28
29 up) or a desired state of affairs (the tempera- Section 6: Comparative Psychology 22. Introducing Comparative Psychology 23. Ani- 29
30 ture of a room or of a living body) is main- mal Behaviour 24. Animal Communication 25. Methods and Ethics in Psychology. 30
31 tained. This process is referred to as “circular 31
32 causality.” It was recognised at an early stage Contents listing for Gross (2010) 32
33 that many fields of study contain examples The Nature and Scope of Psychology: What is this thing called 33
34 of these processes and that there was value in psychology? Theoretical approaches to psychology. Psychology as a science. 34
35 coming together in multidisciplinary fora to The Biological Basis of Behaviour and Experience: The nervous system. Sensory 35
36 shed light on them, to learn from each other processes. Parapsychology. States of consciousness and bodily rhythms. Substance 36
37 and to develop shared ways of talking about dependence and abuse. Motivation. Emotion. Learning and conditioning. Application: 37 503
38 these phenomena. In 1948, Norbert Wiener, health psychology. 38
39 one of the participants, wrote a book that set Cognitive Psychology: Attention and performance. Pattern recognition. Perception: 39
40 out these ideas in a formal way that not only processes and theories. The development of perceptual abilities. Memory and 40
41 collected together many of the emerging forgetting. Language, thought and culture. Language acquisition. 41
42 shared conceptions but did so in a coherent Problem solving, decision-making and artificial intelligence. Application: cognition 42
43 way that not only facilitated interdisciplin- and the law. 43
44 ary exchanges but also stood as a discipline Social Psychology: Social perception. Attribution. Attitudes and attitude change. 44
45 in its own right: an abstract transdiscipline – Prejudice and discrimination. Conformity and group influence. Obedience. 45
46 Interpersonal relationships. Aggression and antisocial behaviour. Altruism and 46
47 2 |  As further reading, I suggest Heims prosocial behaviour. Application: the social psychology of sport. 47
48 (1991), Glanville (2002), Pickering (2010), Scott Developmental Psychology: Early experience and social development. Development 48
49 (2002, 2004) and Müller & Müller (2007). I also of the self-concept. Cognitive development. Moral development. Gender development. 49
50 recommend the 2006 biography of Norbert Wie- Adolescence. Adulthood. Old age. Application: exceptional development. 50
51 ner, written by Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman. Individual Differences: Intelligence. Personality. Psychological abnormality: 51
52 One should also consult key texts of cybernetics’ definitions and classification. Psychopathology. Treatments and 52
53 founders and early contributors: Wiener (1948), therapies. Application: criminological psychology. 53
54 Ashby (1956), Pask (1961), Foerster, Mead & Teu- Issues and Debates: Bias in psychological theory and research. Ethical issues in 54
55 ber (1953), Bateson (1972). psychology. Free will and determinism, and reductionism. Nature and nurture. 55
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1 the study of “control and communication in
2 the animal and the machine.” Wiener called
3 this new discipline “cybernetics.” Following
4 the book’s publication, the Macy conference
5 participants referred to their conferences as
6 conferences on cybernetics, keeping “feed-
7 back and circular causality in biological and
8 social systems” as the subtitle.
9 « 13 »  As the subtitle emphasises, there
10 was an interest in biological and social sys-
11 tems. The participants were interested not
12 only in particular mechanisms, they also
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics
13 looked for the general forms to be found
14 in the dynamics and organisation of com-
15 plex systems (living systems, small groups
16 and communities, cultures and societies):
17 how they emerge and develop, how they
18 maintain themselves as stable wholes, how
19 they evolve and adapt in changing circum-
20 stances. The term “self-organising system”
21 was adopted by many as a central topic for
22 discussion in later conferences (for example,
23 Yovits & Cameron 1960). Formal models of
24 adaptation and evolutionary processes were
25 proposed.
26 « 14 »  In the years following the Macy
27 conferences, cybernetics flourished and its
28 ideas were taken up by many in many disci-
29 plines. Cyberneticians also found common
30 ground with the followers of Ludwig von
31 Bertalanffy, who were developing a general
32 theory of systems (Bertalanffy 1950, 1972).
33 « 15 »  By the 1970s, cybernetics, as a dis-
34 tinct discipline, had become marginalised. A
35 number of reasons have been suggested for
36 this. I believe two are particularly pertinent.
504 37 The first is that, at heart, most scientists are
38
39
specialists. Having taken from cybernetics
what they found valuable, they concentrated
40 on their own interests. Second, in the USA,
41 funding for research in cybernetics became
42
43
channelled towards research with more ob-
vious relevance for military applications,
44 notably research in artificial intelligence.3
45 Attempts to develop coherent university-
46 based research programmes in cybernetics,
47 with attendant graduate level courses, were
48 short-lived. However, some developments
49 in the field that occurred in the late 1960s
50 and early 1970s are particularly pertinent
51 for the theme of this article.
52 « 16 »  First, it is useful to note that the
53 early cyberneticians were sophisticated in
54
55 3 |  For more on this, see Umpleby (2003).
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their understanding of the role of the observ- indeed exists as the shared reference frame 1
er. In the later terminology of Heinz von Fo- of two or more observers. With elegant, 2
erster (see below), their concerns were both succinct formalisms, Foerster, shows how, 3
first-order (with observed systems) and sec- through its circular causal interactions with 4
ond-order (with observing systems). It is the its environmental niche and the regularities 5
observer who distinguishes a system, who (invariances) that it encounters, an organ- 6
selects the variables of interest and decides ism comes to construct its reality as a set 7
how to measure them. For complex, self-or- of “objects” and “events,” with itself as its 8
ganising systems this poses some particular own “ultimate object.” He goes on to show 9
challenges. Gordon Pask, in a classic paper, how two such organisms may construe each 10
“The natural history of networks” (Pask other as fellow “ultimate objects” and engage 11
1960), spells this out particularly clearly. in communication as members of a commu- 12
Even though such a system is, by definition,4 nity of observers. 13
state-determined, its behaviour is unpredict- « 18 »  This interest in the role of the ob- 14
able: it cannot be captured as trajectory in server and the observer herself as a system 15
a phase space. The observer is required to to be observed and understood led Foerster 16
update his reference frame continually and to propose a distinction between a first- and 17
does so by becoming a participant observer. a second-order cybernetics, where first- 18
Pask cites the role of a natural historian as an order cybernetics is “the study of observed 19
exemplar of what it means to be a participant systems” and “second-order cybernetics 20
observer. A natural historian interacts with is the study of observing systems” (Foer- 21
the system he observes, looking for regulari- ster 1974: 1). Foerster also referred to this 22
ties in those interactions. Pask goes as far as second-order domain as the “cybernetics of 23
likening the observer’s interaction with the cybernetics.”5 Of relevance for us here is that 24
system with that of having a conversation cybernetics is not only, as noted above, a dis- 25
with the system. Below, we will see how this cipline in its own right that can serve as a 26
insight of Pask was the seed for his develop- transdiscipline, cybernetics can also serve as 27
ment of “conversation theory.” a metadiscipline that studies not only itself 28
« 17 »  Second, the early cyberneticians but other disciplines, too.6 I have discussed 29
had the reflexive awareness that in studying these aspects of cybernetics in some detail 30
self-organising systems, they were studying in Scott (2002). 31
themselves, as individuals and as a commu- « 19 »  Again, for the purposes of this 32
nity. Von Foerster, in a classic paper from article, it should be mentioned that others 33
1960 “On self-organising systems and their had been thinking along somewhat simi- 34
environments,” makes this point almost as 35
an aside. He notes: 36
5 |  For more detailed accounts of the events
37
that led up to Foerster’s making this distinction,
“ [W]hen we […] consider ourselves to be self-
organizing systems [we] may insist that intro-
see Glanville (2002) and Scott (2004).
38
39
6 |  It is of particular interest that, beginning
spection does not permit us to decide whether the 40
with Wundt, many psychologists have consid-
world as we see it is ‘real,’ or just a phantasmagory, 41
ered psychology to be the “propaedeutic science”
2003: 3f)
”
a dream, an illusion of our fancy. (Foerster
(Greek propaideutikos, i.e., what is taught before-
42
43
hand) because what it says about human behavior
and cognitive capabilities can shed light on how 44
Foerster escapes from solipsism by assert- science works and how it can be carried out ef- 45
ing that an observer who distinguishes other fectively by practitioners in other disciplines (and, 46
selves must concede that, as selves, they of course, in psychology itself). See, for example, 47
are capable of distinguishing her. “Reality” Stevens (1936). In more recent years “the psychol- 48
ogy of science” has emerged as an active area of 49
4 |  The fundamental tenet of systems the- research. See, for example, Gholson et al. (1989) 50
ory, cybernetics and computer science is that a and Feist (2008). Worthy though the aims of this 51
system’s next internal state and its output are a research are, it remains the thesis of this article 52
function of its current internal state and its input. that they will be best achieved if psychology itself 53
These states and inputs and outputs are as distin- is properly founded using concepts from cyber- 54
guished and modelled by the observer. netics. 55
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1 lar lines to those of Pask and von Foerster.
2 Humberto Maturana in his seminal paper,
3 “Neurophysiology of cognition” (Maturana
4 1970a), frames his thesis about the opera-
5 tional closure of the nervous system7 with
6 an epistemological metacommentary about
7 what this implies for the observer, who, as
8 a biological system inhabiting a social mi-
9 lieu, has just such a nervous system. The
10 closure of the nervous system makes clear
11 that “reality” for the observer is a construc-
12 tion consequent upon her interactions with
13 her environmental niche (Maturana uses the
14 term “structural coupling” for these interac-
15 tions). In other words, there is no direct ac-
16 cess to an “external reality.” Each observer
17 lives in her own universe. It is by consensus
18 and coordinated behaviour that a shared
19 world is brought forth. As Maturana suc-
20 cinctly points out, “Everything that is said is
21 said by an observer.” In later writings (some
22 written in collaboration with Francisco
23 Varela), Maturana uses the term “autopoi-
24 esis” (Greek for self-creation) to refer to
25 what he sees as the defining feature of living
26 systems: the moment by moment reproduc-
27 tion of themselves as systems that, whatever
28 else they do (adapt, learn, evolve), must re-
29 produce themselves as systems that repro-
30 duce themselves. In explicating his theory
31 of autopoiesis, Maturana makes an impor-
32 tant distinction: the distinction between the
33 “structure” of a system and the “organisa-
34 tion” of a system. A system’s structure is the
35 configuration of its parts at a given moment
36 in time, a snapshot picture of the system’s
37 state. The organisation of a system is the set
38 of processes that are reproduced by circular
39 causality such that the system continues to
40 exist as an autopoietic unity. In general, a
41 system with this “circular causal” property is
42
43
44
7 |  The nervous system is an example of a cir-
45 cular causal system: it is a sensorimotor system in
46 which what is done (motor “outputs”) affects what
47 is sensed (sensory “inputs”) and what is sensed af-
48 fects what is done (Dewey 1896). It is also worth
49 noting (as stressed by von Foerster) that all sens-
50 ing is a form of acting (sensory cells are primed to
51 send signals to other cells when something hap-
52 pens that may be relevant for the whole system
53 of which they are a part) and all acting includes
54 sensing (by proprioception and kinaesthesia)
55 what is being done.
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said to be “organisationally closed” (Matu- “in-formed” about its environment. It has its 1
rana & Varela 1980). own perspective on what is its environment, 2
« 20 »  The ideas of Pask are particu- its “environmental niche.” There is thus a 3
larly relevant for this article. Not only was sense in which to be alive is to cognise. Mul- 4
Pask an early enthusiast of, and contribu- ticellular organisms with nervous systems 5
tor to, cybernetics, he also had psychology that afford rapid transmission and receipt of 6
as his core discipline. As noted above, Pask signals and rapid self-referential operations 7
had an early interest in seeing interactions no doubt have greater cognitive powers. 8
between an observer and a self-organising One may speculate that the cognition of a 9
system as having the form of a conversation. porpoise (say) is qualitatively different from 10
Central in his research activity was the de- that of a tree. 11
sign of “teaching machines” and “learning « 22 »  Although much of what Foerster 12
environments” that interact with a learner, and Maturana have to say is pertinent to hu- 13
in a conversational manner, and adapt to mans, arguably it is Pask, the psychologist, 14
the learner’s progress so as to facilitate her who has given us the most comprehensive 15
learning. Pask was familiar with the work of observer-based cybernetic theory of human 16
Foerster and Maturana as a friend and col- cognition and communication. From the 17
league and drew on their ideas in creating earliest stages of his thinking, he was aware 18
his theory of conversations. As described that the human self develops and evolves in 19
below, Pask’s theory is a much more fleshed a social context and that “consciousness” 20
out and elaborated account of human cogni- (Latin con-scio, with + know) is about both 21
tion, learning and communication than is to knowing with oneself and knowing with 22
be found in the writings of either Foerster others. Throughout his writings, from the 23
or Maturana. 1960s onwards there is an acknowledgement 24
« 21 »  I shall begin my account of Pask’s by Pask of his indebtedness to the Russian 25
theory by disambiguating the terms “ob- psychologist Lev Vygotsky, who argued that, 26
server” and “observing system” as used in as a child develops, what begins as external 27
cybernetic writings. Usually, it is clear from speech eventually becomes internalised as 28
the context that “observer” refers to a hu- an inner dialogue.9 29
man observer capable of being a member « 23 »  Pask, at an early stage in his theo- 30
of a community of observers. The term “ob- rizing made a distinction between a cogni- 31
serving system” is used more generally to tive system and the “fabric” or “medium” 32
refer to autopoietic systems. A single-celled that embodies it. This distinction is analo- 33
organism, such as an amoeba, can serve as gous to the distinction between programs 34
an example. An amoeba, to maintain itself and the computer in which they run. How- 35
as a unity, distinguishes itself from its envi- ever, unlike the cognitivist science commu- 36
ronment. In its interactions with its environ- nity, where the analogy is the basis of the 37 505
ment, it adapts. The form of its organisation thesis that both brains and computers are 38
changes as a consequence of its interactions “physical symbol systems,” Pask is aware 39
(its moment by moment structural cou- that this interpretation of what is a symbol 40
pling). As long as these changes do not af- is conceptually naive.10 He stresses how im- 41
fect the organisational closure of the system, portant it is to take account of the differences 42
the system persists.8 The amoeba becomes between brain/body systems and computing 43
machinery. Brain/body systems are dynami- 44
8 |  It is worth noting that alongside the ab- 45
stract cybernetic considerations of the systemic the “glue” that holds living systems together will 46
property of organisational closure, there is ongo- continue to be incomplete, just as other theories 47
ing research in biophysics that seeks to under- in quantum mechanics and cosmology remain 48
stand the specific mechanisms by which living incomplete. 49
systems maintain themselves as coherent entities. 9 | Vygotsky’s work, carried out in the 1920s 50
See, for example, Mae Wan-Ho’s review, in which and 1930s, did not become available in English 51
she notes that none of the biophysical theories of until 1960 (Vygotsky 1962). 52
the coherence of biological systems, as developed 10 |  See Scott & Shurville (2011) for an ex- 53
so far, is “as yet complete or fully coherent” (Ho tended discussion of this conceptual confusion 54
1995: 733). I suspect the search to understand within the AI/cognitive science community. 55
column B column C
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 column A
1 cal, autopoietic systems, whose structure is
2 constantly changing, whereas computers
3 are designed to be stable. In Pask’s terms,
4 there is an interaction between a cognitive
5 system and its embodiment. A change in
6 the structure of the brain/body system af-
7 fects cognition. Changes in thinking affect
8 the structure of the brain/body system. It is
9 important to note that Pask’s distinction is
10 an analytic distinction, not an ontological
11 one. It affords a way of talking about cog-
12 nitive processes distinct from physiological
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics
column B column C
with many so-called “theories” that are to be circular causality can be found throughout 1
found in the humanities, where metaphors psychology, for example, models of perceiv- 2
and analogies are liberally deployed, with- ing, problem solving, learning, remember- 3
out formal (non-linguistic) justification. ing and skilled performance. However, their 4
Models are to be found throughout the sci- general form tends not to be highlighted. 5
ences. What makes a model “cybernetic” is There is a focus on specific subdomains, 6
the inclusion of circular causality, for exam- rather than an appreciation that the models 7
ple, in a model of a control system, such as a are part of larger general class. 8
thermostat. Non-cybernetic models feature 9
“linear causality” only, for example, models 10
that show how the magnitude of a variable Unifying “process” and 11
is a function of the magnitude of another.11 “person” approaches 12

13 processes. « 27 »  The mapping between a model 13

14 « 24 »  In the late 1960s, Pask adopted and the system modelled has the form of an « 29 »  By “process” approaches, I am 14
15 a new terminology. Brain/body systems analogy relation, such as, “A is to B as C is to referring to those that set out to model and 15
16 and extensions are referred to as “mechani- D,” where A and B are parts or states of the understand some particular aspect of hu- 16
17 cal individuals” (M-individuals). Cognitive model and C and D are parts or states of the man cognition. As mentioned above, models 17
18 systems are referred to as “psychological system modelled. There may of course be a for these processes abound in contemporary 18
19 individuals” (P-individuals). M-individuals number of such relations. It is also relevant psychology, as an examination of stand- 19
20 (with extensions, such as vehicles, pens and to note that metaphors are abbreviated anal- ard texts will show (for example, Eysenck 20
21 telescopes) are the “processors” that “ex- ogy relations. For example, the term “The & Keane 2015). By “person” approaches, I 21
22 ecute” the P-individuals as cognitive “pro- ship of state” is asserting that steering a ship am referring to those that concern them- 22
23 cedures.” Both kinds of system are organisa- is analogous to governing a nation state. selves with a human being as a whole, al- 23
24 tionally closed, self-reproducing systems. As Pask tersely defines cybernetics as “The beit, possibly focusing on some particular 24
25 we shall see in later sections, Pask’s distinc- art and science of manipulating defensible set of attributes, such as “personality” or 25
26 tion between the two kinds of individual (or metaphors” (Pask 1975a: 13). Not only does “intelligence.” Whole person approaches are 26
27 unities) is very useful for the aim of provid- this definition capture the idea of construct- sometimes referred to as “humanistic psy- 27
28 ing psychology with a coherent conceptual ing and validating models, “manipulating” chology.” My proposal here is that cybernet- 28
29 framework. carries with it the idea that the observer is ics, because it deals with both the processes 29
30 « 25 »  In order to avoid some of the con- in a circular causal relation with the model that constitute the behaviour of parts of a 30
31 fusions a partial or shallow reading of Pask and the system modelled and the use of the system and the joint effects that constitute 31
32 can lead to, I refer to P-individuals as “psy- word “defensible” carries with it the idea that the behaviour of whole systems, can supply 32
33 chosocial unities” and M-individuals as “bi- the observer is a member of a community of a conceptual framework that unifies the two 33
34 ological unities” or “biomechanical unities.” observers.12 approaches. I have written about this possi- 34
35 Pask himself on occasion referred to conver- « 28 »  Prior to the advent of cybernet- bility elsewhere (Scott 2001d, 2011b, 2011c) 35
36 sation theory and his later development of ics, psychology’s bias was towards reporting and have drawn on two main sources, Pask 36
506 37 “interaction of actors theory” as theories of empirical findings. As theory, the best that and von Foerster. 37
38 the psychosocial (Pask 1996). behaviourism could offer was a model of « 30 »  In the field of “cognitive science,” 38
39 the brain as a kind of telephone exchange which subsumes artificial intelligence re- 39
40 where “stimuli” give rise to “responses.” search and certain approaches to cognitive 40
41 Cybernetics in psychology Gestalt psychologists used the concept of psychology and the philosophy of mind, 41
42 brain activity being “field”-like in an at- there have been several attempts to build 42
43 « 26 »  A key feature of cybernetic ex- tempt to explain how perceptual inputs a “unified cognitive architecture.” See, as 43
44 planations is their use of models. The cy- were reconfigured to conform to the “laws examples, Newell’s SOAR (Newell 1990),14 44
45 bernetician Frank George proposes that a of pragnanz” (good form) in perception and and Anderson’s ACT-R (Anderson 1983).15 45
46 theory is a model together with its interpre- problem solving.13 Now models featuring Both systems are built from components. 46
47 tation (George 1961: 52–56), where a model Both systems take inspiration from (and 47
48 can be anything: marks on paper, a com- 11 |  For more on cybernetic explanations can be seen as embodying) theories of hu- 48
49 puter program, a mathematical equation, and cybernetic modelling, see Klir & Valach man cognition. Both systems are “artificial 49
50 a concrete artefact. The key idea is that a (1967) and Scott (2000). 50
51 model is a non-linguistic part of the theory. 12 |  For more on the use of analogies in sci- constructed, as in the classic work of Donald 51
52 It is a form, a structure, a mechanism that ence, see Hesse (1966). For more on the use of Hebb (1949), whose models are clearly “cyber- 52
53 can be manipulated by an observer and that analogies in cybernetics, see Pask (1963). netic” in the sense used here. 53
54 maps onto the “real” system that the theory 13 |  In “hands-on” studies of the brain (neu- 14 |  See also http://soar.eecs.umich.edu 54
55 is concerned with. This is to be contrasted ropsychology), more sophisticated models were 15 |  See also http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu 55
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1 intelligences” in their own right. In SOAR,
2 every decision is based on current sensory
3 data, the contents of working memory
4 and knowledge retrieved from long-term
5 memory, where long-term memory con-
6 tains procedural knowledge, semantic
7 memory and episodic memory. ACT-R’s
8 main components are: perceptual-motor
9 modules, two kinds of memory module
10 (declarative and procedural), buffers that
11 access modules and a pattern matcher that
12 matches buffer contents to the possible ac-
13 tions (“productions”) stored in procedural
14 memory. Further details are not relevant for
15 the argument being made.
16 « 31 »  In contrast, von Foerster makes
17 clear that the components of a unified cog-
18 nitive architecture are inseparable:
19
20
21
“  In the stream of cognitive processes, one can
conceptually isolate certain components, for
22 instance (i) the faculty to see (ii) the faculty to
23 remember (iii) the faculty to infer. But if one
24 wishes to isolate these faculties functionally or lo-
25 cally, one is doomed to fail. Consequently, if the
26 mechanisms that are responsible for any of these
27 faculties are to be discovered, then the totality of
28
29 ster 2003: 105)
”
cognitive processes must be considered. (Foer-
30
31 « 32 »  More generally, von Foerster crit-
32 icises “the delusion, which takes for granted
33 the functional isomorphism between vari-
34 ous and distinct processes that happen to be
35 called by the same name.” In this context, he
36 mentions the misapplication to computing
37 machines of the terms “memory,” “problem
38 solving,” “learning,” “perception” and “in-
39 formation” (Foerster 2003: 172).
40 « 33 »  Theorising in any discipline
41 needs foundations: somewhere to begin the
42 telling of explanatory stories. In psychology,
43 it has been common practice to begin with
44 elementary building blocks, such as “habits,”
45 “expectations,” “stimulus-response bonds,”
46 “memory states,” “drives,” “thoughts,” “in-
47 stincts,” “cognitive processes,” “feelings.” I
48 believe that von Foerster provides a cyber-
49 netic foundation for psychology with his
50 concept of a “self-organising system,” as set
51 out in his 1960 paper “On self-organising
52 systems and their environments.” A self-
53 organising system “eats energy and variety
54 from its environment” (Foerster 2003: 6).
55 The rate of change of redundancy in the sys-
column A
tem is always positive. The system is always In mainstream cognitive science, concepts 1
becoming more ordered. The observer is are typically thought of as relatively static 2
continually obliged to update her reference representations.18 Pask defines a concept as 3
frame.16 He points out that, reflexively, the a procedure that recalls, recognises, con- 4
observer is just such a system. A classic ex- structs or maintains a relation. A concept 5
ample from the human domain is a human may be likened to a program or operator 6
infant exploring its environment. Of course, that solves particular problems. “Relation” 7
metabolic requirements mean it has to rest is used here as an empty slot or label for that 8
once in a while as energy and variety are as- which is being acted upon by the process as 9
similated and accommodated. input or product. 10
« 34 »  In later years, von Foerster re- « 36 »  Recursively, there are concepts 11
fined the concept of a self-organising sys- whose domain of application, whose in- 12
tem, citing the concept of autopoiesis as a put and products, are other concepts. This 13
useful way to speak about an organism as an affords the construction of hierarchies of 14
autonomous entity: “Autopoiesis is that or- concepts. Thus, there can be problem-solver 15
ganization which computes its own organi- concepts, the task of which is to construct 16
zation”; “Autopoietic systems are thermody- and select from amongst lower-level puta- 17
namically open but organizationally closed” tive problem solvers, guided by feedback 18
(Foerster 2003: 281). I believe von Foerster’s from the problem domain about the success 19
definitions are a very useful way of uniting
the earlier and later literatures.
or not of their application. Thus learning is
an evolutionary process. One of Pask’s very
20
21
« 35 »  In his studies of human learning elegant definitions of learning is that it is the 22
and cognition, which lead to the develop- construction of a hierarchy of problem solv- 23
ment of his conversation theory (CT), Pask ers (Pask 1975b). Micro and macro aspects 24
took von Foerster’s concept of a self-organ- of his theorising are married in the idea that 25
ising system and made it a cornerstone of “conceptualisation,” the process of creat- 26
his theorising about the dynamics of learn- ing and recreating concepts, is an ongoing 27
ing, arguing that humans have a “need
to learn.” He refers to his interest in the
dynamic activity. A Paskian P-individual is
a system of concepts that is self-reproduc-
28
29
whole system aspects of human cognition ing. Particular hierarchies of concepts are 30
as “macrotheory.”17 In contrast, he refers to seen to be temporary constructions and 31
his (and colleagues’) accounts of how hu- re-constructions within an overall heter- 32
man subjects construct particular cognitive archical, organisationally closed system of 33
structures as “microtheory.” Pask (1975b) processes.19,20 34
refers to the processes that are the parts of a « 37 »  In CT, in an effective learning 35
cognitive system by the general term “con- conversation, the role of the teacher (hu- 36
cept.” Pask’s usage of the term is quite unu- man or machine) is to facilitate the learner’s 37 507
sual as his concepts are dynamic processes. construction of new concepts. This is done 38
39
40
16 |  Foerster (2003: 281) refers to Varela, 18 |  Walter Freeman (2000) gives an elegant
41
Maturana and Uribe as the inventors of the idea description of the differences between represen-
and to their joint paper (Varela, Maturana & tationalist accounts of cognition and dynamic
42
Uribe 1974) as the first statement of the idea in and “enactive” accounts from the perspective of
43
English. Elsewhere (Foerster 2003: 251), he notes contemporary findings in neuroscience. His argu- 44
that the general form of the closed system of re- ments in favour of dynamic approaches are cog- 45
cursively applied operations that constitutes auto- nate with Pask’s theorising. 46
poiesis was described by Maturana before it was 19 |  Within mainstream representational- 47
named (Maturana 1970a, 1970b). ist cognitive science, there have been attempts 48
17 |  Macrotheory is crucially concerned to develop theories of concept system dynamics. 49
with giving some account of “awareness” and See, for example, Barsalou 2012). Arguably, these 50
“consciousness” as being concerned with seek- accounts are unsatisfactory because they lack the 51
ing variety and the consequent reduction of un- concept of an organisationally closed unitary sys- 52
certainty. It is not possible here to address these tem. 53
topics satisfactorily, see Pask (1981) and Scott & 20 |  For further discussion of these core ideas 54
Bansal (2014). of CT, see Scott (2009). 55
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{
1 1
2 Bernard Scott 2
3 graduated from Brunel University, UK, in 1968 with a first-class honours degree in psychology. 3
4 He completed a PhD in cybernetics from the same university in 1976. His supervisor was Gordon 4
5 Pask, with whom he worked between 1967 and 1978. Bernard is former Reader in Cybernetics, 5
6 Cranfield University, UK. He now a Senior Research Fellow with the Center for Sociocybernetic 6
7 Studies. Bernard is a Fellow of the UK’s Cybernetics Society. He is an Associate Fellow of the British 7
8 Psychological Society, a Fellow of the American Society for Cybernetics and an Academician of 8
9 the International Academy of Systems and Cybernetics Sciences. Bernard is Past President of 9
10 Research Committee 51 (on Sociocybernetics) of the International Sociological Association. 10
11 11
12 12
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics

13 13
14 by providing the learner with descrip- cybernetician, Pask abstracts from specific Bottom up, its foundations lie in the cyber- 14
15 tions and demonstrations of what is to be cases and voids the distinctions and thus netics of self-organising systems and their 15
16 learned, as part of an ongoing conversation. argues that all conversations, all dialogues, interactions as described above. 16
17 In return for these affordances to help in her all social processes are psychological indi- « 40 »  It is also worth noting that the 17
18 learning, the learner is invited to say what viduals. They are all organisationally closed, CT concept of a psychosocial unity provides 18
19 she is aiming to learn and how she intends self-producing, collectives of concepts an alternative, cybernetics-based, concept 19
20 to go about it (what strategy for learning she (psychosocial unities). Thus, in ontogeny, of a social system to that developed by the 20
21 has, if any). Periodically, the learner’s un- individuals and collectives are co-evolving sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1995). Luh- 21
22 derstanding of new concepts is assessed by psychosocial unities. For an extended dis- mann distinguishes three kinds of “auto- 22
23 requiring her to “teach back” what she has cussion of this view, see Scott (2007). We poietic” system:23 biological, “psychic” and 23
24 learned.21 With respect to this ongoing cy- can now see the usefulness of making a social. Pask’s unification of the individual 24
25 cle of learner and teacher interactions, Pask distinction between M-individuals (biome- and the social distinguishes just two kinds 25
26 not only views the two participants as self- chanical unities) and P-individuals (psy- of organisationally closed system: the bio- 26
27 organising systems in interaction, he also chosocial unities) in that the two types of logical and the psychosocial (M-individuals 27
28 views the learning conversation itself as an unity need not necessarily be in one-to-one and P-individuals).24 28
29 emergent self-organising system, a P-indi- correspondence. A single M-individual (a 29
30 vidual (psychosocial unity) in its own right. brain/body system, for example) may em- 30
31 As a generalisation, Pask then argues that body several P-individuals (the inner con- Future directions 31
32 all conversations are, at heart, learning con- versation). A single P-individual (the outer 32
33 versations. In conversations, whatever else conversation that unifies a collective) may « 41 »  There are two areas in which I be- 33
34 the participants are doing, they are learning be embodied in several M-individuals. lieve an observer-focused cybernetics can 34
35 about each other. « 39 »  CT is useful for providing a continue to contribute to psychology and 35
36 conceptual framework that helps in un- the cognitive and social sciences at large. 36
508 37 derstanding the dynamics of interpersonal One is conceptual clarification; the other 37
38 Unifying individual and perception and the pragmatics of human as a foundation for and a reframing of the 38
39 social psychologies communication (see Scott 1987, 1997). As education of psychologists. 39
40 a reflexive theory of theory building (learn- « 42 »  As so ably pointed out by Hacker 40
41 « 38 »  What is also innovative and uni- ing), CT accounts for its own genesis. Top (op. cit.), conceptual confusion abounds 41
42 fying in Pask’s conversation theory (CT) is down, it accepts that theories are the con- in psychology, cognitive science and the 42
43 the voiding of the distinction between the sensual constructions of communities of neurosciences, not least in talk about “con- 43
44 human individual and the social processes observers engaged in conversation, includ- sciousness” as an ontological essence or 44
45 that are constitutive of him/her and that he/ ing conversations about conversation. As of brains and computers having the same 45
46 she constitutes. Pask agrees with George such, it is cognate with the “discursive” ap- 46
47 Herbert Mead, Leo Vygotsky, Martin Bu- proach in the humanities and social scienc- 23 |  Luhmann takes this term from Mat- 47
48 ber and von Foerster that the psychological es (also known as social constructionism).22 urana and Varela to refer to systems that are self- 48
49 individual is dialogical in form, is a social reproducing and organisationally closed. His use 49
50 process, is constituted by an inner dia- 22 |  As examples, see Gergen (1999) and of the term is controversial. See, e.g., Buchinger 50
51 logue, is an inner conversation. As a good Gergen, Schrader & Gergen (2009). The latter is (2012) and the associated open peer commentar- 51
52 a collection of readings; authors of contributions ies. 52
53 21 |  For more details about CT’s application include Rom Harré, John Shotter, Steve Duck, 24 |  Pask and Luhmann are compared more 53
54 in the design of a conversational learning envi- Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel and Ludwig systematically in Scott (2001b) and Buchinger & 54
55 ronment, see Pask, Scott & Kallikourdis (1973). Wittgenstein. Scott (2010). 55
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 Second-Order Cybernetics
Wielding the Cybernetic Scythe Vincent Kenny

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1 ontological status as “physical symbol sys-
2 tems.” Hopefully, second-order cybernet-
3 ics will continue to do its job of conceptual
4 ground-clearing, and the ongoing empiri-
5 cal and theoretical research into “minds,”
6 “brains,” “individuals” and “societies” will
7 be better conceived and more fruitful.
8 « 43 »  Arguably, the education of psy-
9 chologists should begin with an under-
10 standing of complex adaptive systems and
11 the specific concept that humans are self-
12 organising, autopoietic wholes that in their
13 ontogeny and social interaction develop
14 organisationally-closed cognitive and affec-
15 tive systems and become psychosocial uni-
16 ties (psychological individuals).25 It should
17 then set out, in broad-brushstroke form,
18 the unifying conceptual framework I have
19 sketched out above.
20
21 25 |  Elsewhere I have outlined a curriculum
22 for “cybernetic enlightenment,” which sets out
23 some of my proposals in more detail (Scott 2014).
24
25
Conclusion ics empowered me to read widely (and, on 1
occasion, deeply) in other disciplines (logic, 2
« 44 »  I have proposed observer-based mathematics, computer science, philoso- 3
cybernetic foundations (with complemen- phy, linguistics, the natural sciences, the 4
tary first and second-order aspects) and a social sciences).26 Second-order cybernetics 5
unifying conceptual framework for psychol- helped me learn how to learn. It helped me 6
ogy and have argued for the value of my to appreciate readily the concepts and meth- 7
proposals based on the experience of how ods that inform other disciplines and their 8
cybernetics served me. As an undergradu- applications. I hope my account here will 9
ate, encountering cybernetics transformed encourage others to explore, or to continue 10
my approach to studying and understand- to explore, what second-order cybernetics 11
ing psychology. It gave psychology a con- has to offer. 12
ceptual coherence that, previously, I had 13
found lacking. In later years, as my under- Received: 20 October 2015 14
standing of cybernetics deepened, I con- Accepted: 2 May 2016 15
tinued to use second-order cybernetics as a 16
foundation and framework for my work as 17
an experimental psychologist (summarised 18
in Scott 1993) and my later work as a prac- 26 |  A propos of this, the developmental psy- 19
titioner in educational psychology (Scott chologist, Jean Piaget (1977: 136) writes, “Thus 20
1987) and educational technology (Scott cybernetics is now the most polyvalent meeting 21
2001a). The transdisciplinary and metadis- place for physicomathematical sciences, biologi- 22
ciplinary nature of second-order cybernet- cal sciences, and human sciences.” 23
24
25

Open Peer Commentaries

26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29

on Bernard Scott’s “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology”

30 30
31 31
32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
36 36
37 Wielding the Cybernetic Scythe Introduction cultural and language preferences and with 37 509
« 1 »  It is an admirable and generous very different socio-cultural and political
38
39
in the Blunting Undergrowth project to attempt to reconstitute what is intents. For example, the dominant values
38
39
40 of Psychological Confusion known as “psychology” by using the keen of psychology for the past century were to 40
41 insights from the framework of second- “predict and control,” which, every so often, 41
42
Vincent Kenny order cybernetics. However, before Bernard emerge publicly as critical moral issues in 42
43 Academia Costruttivista di Terapia Scott embarks on a book-length version of situations such as the long-running scandal 43
44 Sistemica Rome, Italy his target article, and before he sets off to use of the American Psychological Association 44
45 the glue of cybernetics to stick together psy- members secretly colluding with the CIA 45
kenny/at/acts-psicologia.it
46 chological components that might not have in the torture of prisoners (American Psy- 46
47 > Upshot • Given the fragmental state much, if anything, to do with one another, I chological Association 2015a). Historically, 47
48 of what is known as “psychology,” I think would like to add some fundamental issues we have seen in Russia the use of psychiat- 48
49 it would be an error to attempt to “uni- to his list of “conceptual ground-clearing.” ric diagnosis for the incarceration of politi- 49
50 fy” such chaos and that efforts would These issues mostly relate to the fragmental cal prisoners (Lader 1977), and many other 50
51 be better spent dissolving the illusion chaos of that which is called “psychology.” socio-political abuses of the “prediction and 51
52 that “psychology” exists and instead control” mentality (Breggin 2008; Johnstone 52
53 redesigning a genuinely psychological “Psychology” does not exist 2000; Mills 2013; Tyler 2013). 53
54 psychology that has relevance to daily « 2 »  “Psychology” uses very different « 3 »  There is no universal – or even 54
55 living. operations of distinctions with very different dominant – consensual agreement as to 55
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 column A
1 which operations of distinction are to be used
2 to bring forth any given version of a “psy-
3 chology” nor for which purposes. This raises
4 serious questions about “values” in psychol-
5 ogy, and reflects Scott’s statement that “there
6 is still conceptual confusion and controversy
7 over what psychology is about” (§7).
8 « 4 »  It is no less than extraordinary
9 that the report on the APA’s long-term in-
10 volvement in torture should raise questions
11 as to what “psychology” is. To quote the
12 chairman of the report, former federal pros-
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics
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« 8 »  “Psychology” is not a unity to be « 14 »  Therehave been continuing 1
recomposed as an “entity” because it has alarms sounded about the status of research 2
never existed as such and has never been in psychology and the level of unreliable re- 3
organised into a coherent system of knowl- search findings (Ioannidis 2005; Simmons, 4
edge. Nelson & Simonsohn 2011). An anony- 5
« 9 »  This, then, is to do with the traps mous survey of 2 000 psychologists by Les- 6
“psychology” makes for itself by its use of lie John, George Loewenstein and Drazen 7
idiosyncratic operations of distinctions that Prelec (2012) finds that “questionable prac- 8
are then obscured by the object they have tices may constitute the prevailing research 9
brought forth. norm.” And Tom Farsides and Paul Sparks 10
wonder: 11
Irrelevance of psychological 12

13
14
ecutor David Hoffman, who says that their
investigation “will help define the meaning
research
« 10 »  What has been produced over a
“ Consider the roll call of those who have in re- 13
cent years had high-status peer-reviewed papers 14
15 of psychology,” he feels it necessary to warn century of research amounts to little more retracted because of confirmed or suspected fraud: 15
16 that when the psychology profession allows than a mass of trivialities having little or Marc Hauser, Jens Förster, Dirk Smeesters, Karen 16
17 for the possibility that psychologists will in- nothing to do with people’s actual experi- Ruggiero, Lawrence Sanna, Michael LaCour and, 17
18 tentionally inflict pain on defenceless peo- ence of living their lives. That is, the domi- a long way in front with 58 retractions, Diederik 18
19 ple “…faith in the profession can diminish nant form of “chapter-heading psychology” Stapel. […] Could most of what we hold to be true 19
20
21
quickly” (American Psychological Associa-
tion 2015b: 72).
– which reduces the person to convenient
segments – has entirely failed to deal with its sides & Sparks 2016: 368).
”
in psychology be wrong (Ioannidis 2005)? (Far- 20
21
22 « 5 »  The absence of any consensual proper subject. 22
23 agreements has had the effects of generating « 11 »  Apart from the stark irrelevance The replication crisis 23
24 countless versions of what “psychology” is of academic research psychology to the ac- « 15 »  Apart from the sheer volume of 24
25 understood to be. Donald Bannister and Fay tual living experiences of people, there has faked results, we also have the enormous 25
26 Fransella observe: not been very much connection between problem of replicability – or rather of the 26
27 the world of research on the one hand, and non-replicability of experimental results 27
28
29
“  In the past, the carving up of the field into
mini-psychologies has allowed a ‘live and let live’
clinical psychology and psychotherapy prac-
tice on the other hand (Tavris 2004). That is,
in “psychology.” This problem was already
flagged by Hans Eysenck 60 years ago when
28
29
30 policy. Each psychologist has been free to stake clinicians have not found much help from he warned that… 30
31 his own claim and produce work which had no their research colleagues in their daily task 31
32 implications, nice or nasty, for the endeavours of to be of some helpful relevance to people “  the root of many of the difficulties and disap- 32
33
34 sella 1971: 56.)
”
those in other territories. (Bannister & Fran- in dealing with their ongoing states of suf-
fering. Robert Joynson (1974: 34) observes
pointments found in psychological research, as
well as the cause of the well-known difficulties in
33
34
35 that: “… the psychologist’s findings seem ei- duplicating results […] lies in this neglect of indi- 35
36 « 6 »  With such unilateral attitudes, it ther to be a mere repetition of what ordinary vidual differences[…] 36
510 37 is clear that “psychology” is not a coherent good sense already knew, or, regrettably, a Hundreds of extremely able psychologists spent 37
38 entity, and is not a “unity.” “Psychology” distinctly inferior brand of information.” time, energy, and a considerable amount of mon- 38
39 does not exist in the way that we understand ey […] apparently quite pointlessly; must this sort 39
40 physics, chemistry, etc. to be existing – as an Cooking the books of thing be repeated endlessly before we learn the 40
41 accumulated body of knowledge that is reli- « 12 »  Going back to the last century in lesson that individual differences […] may not 41
42 able and experimentally replicable. Instead, British psychology, we find the infamous be pushed aside and forgotten when experiments 42
43 there is a proliferation of “mini-theories” case of Sir Cyril Burt, whose research work are designed which purport to reveal universal 43
44 about highly selective areas of human ex- on the heritability of intelligence was shown truths?” (Eysenck 1966: 26) 44
45 periencing (“memory,” “motivation,” etc.) to have been fabricated. Leslie Hearnshaw, 45
46 which has been described as “the sickness a fellow psychologist and his official biog- « 16 »  It is just as well that Eysenck is 46
47 of chapter-heading psychology which has rapher, concluded that most of Burt’s data not around anymore to learn that indeed 47
48 made a textbook convenience the limits of from after World War II were unreliable or it seems that psychologists are condemned 48
49 our imagination” (Bannister & Fransella fraudulent (Hearnshaw 1979). to repeat the same errors endlessly, getting 49
50 1971: 15). « 13 »  Most recently, we have seen the nowhere with the replication issue 60 years 50
51 « 7 »  Scott himself illustrates this in his case of Diedrik Stapel, who was shown to later! Psychologists are supposed to know 51
52 observations of the “unchanging face of have fabricated his research to the extent something about “learning,” but if they 52
53 psychology as a field” (§8) – that is, that the of rendering at least 30 of his publications do they certainly do not know how to re- 53
54 textbooks still continue today with the same fraudulent, and throwing much doubt on flexively apply their learning schedules to 54
55 “chapter-heading” limitations. many other publications (Stapel 2014). themselves. 55
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Wielding the Cybernetic Scythe Vincent Kenny

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1 « 17 »  Farsides and Sparks also com- He continues: “discover” something that will replace the 1
2 ment on the very serious problem of repli- common understandings. “Psychologi- 2
3
4
cability in psychological research. “  Professionals assert secret knowledge about
human nature, knowledge which only they have
cal science,” after more than a century of
research, has significantly underwhelmed
3
4
5
6
“  Few successful attempts have been made to
rigorously replicate findings in psychology. Re-
the right to dispense. They claim a monopoly over
the definition of deviance and the remedies need-
the layperson because whatever they have
“discovered” is either something already
5
6
7 cent attempts to do so have suggested that even ed […] Public affairs pass from the layperson’s well known (the layperson’s understandings 7
8 studies almost identical to original ones rarely elected peers into the hands of a self-accrediting were correct) or they discovered something 8
9 produce reassuring confirmation of their reported
”
élite. (ibid: 19f.) so banal that it had little or no relevance to 9
10
11
”
results. (Farsides & Sparks 2016: 370)
« 21 »  So here we have the serious prob-
the way people live their lives. Instead of
perpetuating “segmented man” in the guise
10
11
12 « 18 »  Commenting on the fact that the lem of a professional psychological élite that of “physiological psychology,” “neurological 12
13 Reproducibility Project has revealed that exerts the powers conceded to it to demar- psychology,” etc., we need a psychology that 13
14 only 36 per cent of findings in psychology cate territory, controls who can work within is capable of being “psychological”! 14
15 appear to stand up to a replication attempt: this territory, establishes and imposes price- « 25 »  We need new ideas of what a psy- 15
16 lists, and operates to expropriate the compe- chology could be and what kind of psychol- 16
17
18
“  [F]or any recently published significant result
in a leading psychology journal, there is only a
tencies and self-governing understandings
and skills that have always existed in the
ogy is needed for the forms of mentality/ex-
periencing of this century. We need to throw
17
18
19 one in three chance that the research, if repeated, common-sense domain of human living. away the stale, outmoded notions of over 19
20 would produce a statistically significant replica- « 22 »  The extensive fragmentariness 100 years ago. People today have very little 20
21 tion. […] Furthermore, the effect size of the re- of “psychology” is hidden and obscured in common with people of the Victorian 21
22 peated study is likely to be less than half of that by the operations of psychology organisa- era. What it means to be “human” has radi- 22
23
24
”
originally reported. (Morris 2015: 858) tions, which create the social illusion that
there does in fact exist a coherent scientific
cally changed, along with the kind of world
within which we must find novel adapta-
23
24
25 Instead of “giving psychology away” as body of work that legitimises their claims to tions. This applies especially to those born 25
26 George Miller (1969) once tried to do – and “expertise” (when the opposite is the case). after the commencement of this millen- 26
27 who would want it even for free? – must we These are self-declared “experts” with little nium. Anyone who works in psychotherapy 27
28 now think of just “throwing it away”? scientific or other basis for their claims to the and who deals with young people will know 28
29 right to expropriate that which belongs to the exactly the profound irrelevance of trying 29
30 “Guild-ing the wily” common citizen (McCann, Shindler & Ham- to apply psychological models from the last 30
31 « 19 »  So arising from the fact that “psy- mond 2004). century to their experience of living today. 31
32 chology” is not what it pretends to be, and « 23 »  Criticising the tendency among « 26 »  Cybernetics would be better used 32
33 that it has produced very little of relevance “psychology professionals” to prefer the sen- not as a “glue” for sticking together things 33
34 to people’s daily experiencing, one of the sation of certainty arising from the exercise that cannot belong together – into a “Psy- 34
35 major tasks in hand is to deal with the guild- of control over others rather than face the choFrankenstein” – but rather to create a 35
36 like functioning of “psychological societies” uncertain task of creating personal signifi- completely different understanding of what 36
37 or “associations,” usually organised at a na- cance in one’s living, Kelly observes: a genuinely useful psychology could be for 37 511
38 tional level, who perpetuate the illusion of this new era. 38
39
40
“psychology” as a “science.”
« 20 »  In describing what he calls “dis-
“ We would rather know some things for sure,
even though they don’t shed much light on what Vincent Kenny is the Director of the Accademia
39
40
41 abling professions,” Ivan Illich notes that is going on. Knowing a little something for sure, Costruttivista di Terapia Sistemica in Rome. His current 41
42 they go beyond the type of powers operated something gleaned out of one’s experience is often activities involve applying psychology and philosophy 42
43 by guilds and unions in that: a way of knowing one’s self for sure, and thus of to three areas of human conflict: firstly to individuals’ 43
44 holding on to an identity, even an unhappy iden- interpersonal difficulties between themselves and others 44
45
46
“  They claim special, incommunicable author-
ity to determine not just the way things are to be
tity. And this in turn, is a way of saying that our
identities often stand on trivial grounds. If I can’t be
(known as “psychotherapy”); secondly to problems in
organisational communications between and within
45
46
47
48
made, but also the reason why their services are
mandatory. Many professions are now so highly
”
a man I can, at least, be an expert. (Kelly 1977: 7) networks of conversations (known as “organisational
consulting”); and thirdly to problems of professional
47
48
49 developed that they not only exercise tutelage Conclusion: A genuinely tennis players who run into difficulties of self- 49
50 over the citizen-become-client, but also deter- psychological psychology interruption in the tennis courts of the ATP/WTA circuits 50
51 mine the shape of his world-become-ward. « 24 »  So what is necessary in any new around the world (known as “tennis psychology”). 51
52 A profession, like a priesthood, holds power by psychology is a return to the common un- 52
53 concession from an élite whose interests it props derstandings of the “layperson” as opposed Received: 12 June 2016 53
54
55
”
up. (Illich 1977: 16f) to perpetrating the pretence that “psy-
chological science” has ever, or will ever,
Accepted: 15 June 2016 54
55
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1 To What Extent Can Second- « 3 »  We highlight that Scott’s diagno- ferent fields of psychology, starting from 1
sis, although disciplinarily focused on psy- those with a cognitive orientation. He ar-
2
3
Order Cybernetics Be chology, represents a general condition in gues that these assimilations have been
2
3
4 a Foundation for Psychology? human and social sciences. Scott argues that used in research and applied areas regard- 4
5 up to now, these disciplines have seemed less of their foundations or their subsequent 5
6
Marcelo Arnold-Cathalifaud to be content with developing increasingly developments. Undoubtedly, this is correct 6
7 University of Chile, Chile sophisticated methods, whose applications but it could be argued that cybernetics, as 7
8 marnold/at/uchile.cl accumulate specialized but disconnected well as systems theory, does not have a uni- 8
9 knowledge. Certainly, and agreeing with fied conceptual body. In fact, cybernetics 9
10
Daniela Thumala-Dockendorff Scott, all these disciplines could be seen to and systems theory are full of contradic- 10
11 be in a pre-paradigmatic phase, as well as tions and open disputes (Cadenas & Arnold 11
12
University of Chile, Chile lacking internal unity, not only among its 2015). Finally, is Gordon Pask’s cybernetics 12
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics

13 dthumala/at/u.uchile.cl specialties but also within them. Although (to which Scott refers) not just a version of 13
14 this generalization may be correct, we can cybernetics? How could a single version 14
15 > Upshot • Scott’s proposal is well- still envision some cases that depart from satisfy the need for a unified psychology? 15
16 founded and opens interesting possibili- this pattern. For example, linguistics and « 6 »  The guidelines for distinguishing 16
17 ties. We selected some critical aspects economics seem to have more internal between systemic and constructivist per- 17
18 of his argumentation and discuss them consistencies than other social disciplines. spectives such as “second-order observa- 18
19 in the context of the constructivist per- How could they come to this? Perhaps Scott tion,” “self-organized systems” and general 19
20 spective. We highlight as Scott’s “blind could shed light on this question and ven- indications about “observer systems” are 20
21 spot” his statement – presented with- ture some comparisons. very powerful and yet problematic. Can psy- 21
22 out further argument – of the need for « 4 »  Moreover, a possible “blind spot” chology integrate them? Or would it need to 22
23 a conceptual and theoretical unification in Scott’s diagnosis can be found when he ignore the differences between the notions 23
24 of psychology from the perspective of implicitly and arbitrarily assumes a posi- of “self-organized systems” and “autopoi- 24
25 second-order cybernetics. We find this tive value for the conceptual and theoretical etic systems”? Specifically, would it need to 25
26 especially worrisome as it is based on unification of disciplines such as psychol- ignore the differences between the classical 26
27 only one version of cybernetics. ogy. Although this may sound acceptable distinctions of “circular causality” of sec- 27
28 (and could even be partly shared by us) it ond-order cybernetics and the notions of 28
29 « 1 »  Bernard Scott’s target article is is not enough to justify the need for some- “operative closure,” “structural determina- 29
30 among the few works of psychologists who thing that has not prevented psychology tion” or “structural coupling” developed by 30
31 discuss a possible unification of psychology from becoming an autonomous discipline. Humberto Maturana and his colleagues (for 31
32 in a reflexive way. Scott does not refer to an Even more so, how is it possible to explain example, Varela, Maturana & Uribe 1974; 32
33 “imagined identity,” nor does he argue from that the coexistence of organizational and Maturana 2002), especially when these no- 33
34 a historical background or from consider- disciplinary spaces of many “psycholo- tions are transferred from machines and 34
35 ations following in the footsteps of pioneers gies,” some of them almost isolated from organisms to human and social systems? 35
36 of contemporary specialties or “schools.” In each other, has not fractured psychology? What is Scott’s perception of the emergence 36
512 37 other words, he is not trying to create nos- In other words, is that unity useful? Or is of these new levels of complexity? Or does 37
38 talgia or feelings of loss. Instead, his work it just a matter of values and preferences he only propose a metaphorical use of such 38
39 is strongly proactive. The focus is therefore of those who attempt to give coherence to advanced second-order cybernetic notions? 39
40 on proposing adherence to a theoretical their choices? Finally, we wonder, do the « 7 »  When we take Scott’s perspective 40
41 construction – second-order cybernetics – most “mature” sciences such as physics or to a particular field of psychology, for in- 41
42 warning that it could set strong demands biology enjoy unity? In short, the “obvious- stance clinical psychology and, in particu- 42
43 and cause changes in the current mode of ness” of the need for a coherent conceptual lar, to psychotherapy, more specific ques- 43
44 the discipline of psychology. discipline, as well as the benefits that would tions arise. Many diverse psychotherapeutic 44
45 « 2 »  Scott’s arguments, while brief and result from having general theoretical mod- models and schools are widely recognized, 45
46 focused, incorporate many aspects that els, are arguable. Scott seems to have a per- some of which have shown more clinical ef- 46
47 evidence long work and reflection on these spective, but this perspective would need to fectiveness than others. However, the per- 47
48 issues. In this commentary, we assume the be cleared up. sistence of this diversity of approaches (and 48
49 position of the Devil’s advocate in order to « 5 »  The main argument of the article its increase) shows the complexity implied 49
50 encourage further discussion on the sub- is that second-order cybernetics has the in the distinction between psychological 50
51 ject. To do this, we have selected some in- characteristics to unify the scattered field problems and their treatments. From most 51
52 dications and critical aspects of the text, es- of interests and applications of modern psy- orthodox versions of behaviorism to the 52
53 pecially those that can lead to a productive chology. The author notes some progress most orthodox versions of psychoanalysis, 53
54 exchange of opinions in a diverse, yet con- when he documents that certain cybernetic the approaches cover multiple visions of 54
55 structively oriented, academic community. concepts have prematurely permeated dif- a mental health and mental illness, 55
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 Second-Order Cybernetics
A Foundation for Psychology? Marcelo Arnold & Daniela Thumala

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1 b the therapeutic objectives that must be sense, the question arises of whether Scott, Marcelo Arnold-Cathalifaud is a professor at the 1
2 reached, when comparing the works of Luhmann Department of Anthropology at the University of 2
3 c notions of change and its possibilities in and Pask, puts both at the same level. And Chile. His research is focused on the development of 3
4 therapy, and in what way does he appreciate their simi- sociopoiesis, constructivist epistemology, organizational 4
5 d the role of the therapist and methods of larities and differences? systems, emerging complexities of contemporary society 5
6 intervention, among others. « 9 »  Finally, in our opinion, even con- such as social effects of biosciences on societies, 6
7 Can second-order cybernetics provide a sidering our own proximity to Luhmann’s organisms and environment, changes in social 7
8 sufficiently broad and integrative frame- theory, we believe that the complexity of collaboration and solidarity; politics, social inequity 8
9 work and at the same time be specific the matters we intend to deal with is too and exclusion; development of regional social sciences; 9
10 enough to guide the generation of knowl- great to be confined to a single theoretical and, lately, the impacts of population ageing. 10
11 edge and psychotherapeutic practices? observation program irrespective of its so- 11
12 « 8 »  Considering Niklas Luhmann’s phistication. However, we agree with Scott Daniela Thumala Dockendorff is a clinical psychologist 12
13 perspective (1984, 1986), it is interesting that systemic, cybernetic and constructiv- and a full-time assistant professor at the Department of 13
14 that by recognizing the unity of “psychic ist notions are priceless contributions that Psychology at the University of Chile. She has participated 14
15 systems” as “autopoietic systems,” this so- deserve our full attention and dedication to in various research programs and publications in the 15
16 ciologist has also somehow demarcated develop them and apply them to disciplines field of aging from a constructivist systemic perspective. 16
17 a disciplinary field for psychology and such as psychology, especially due to the Currently, she is a member of the research team FONDAP- 17
18 related disciplines into something that normative character of many of its applica- Geroscience Center for Brain Health and Metabolism. 18
19 we call “psycho (auto) poiesis” (Thumala- tions. It remains to be seen how the author She has worked in several academic programs in 19
20 Dockendorff 2010; Arnold 2010) as an will continue his approach by applying it to the field of psychology and social sciences at several 20
21 emerging and distinguishable unit. Luh- the development of knowledge in different universities and has contributed to the establishment 21
22 mann’s demarcation involved a conceptual fields of psychology. As Scott’s proposal is of the clinical field of psychogerontology in Chile. 22
23 re-specification of the notion of autopoiesis well-founded and opens interesting ques- 23
24 that up to now has been very controversial tions and possibilities, the conversation Received: 6 June 2016 24
25 (Arnold, Urquiza & Thumala 2011). In this remains open. Accepted: 12 June 2016 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
30 The Importance – itself, but with the exclusion of circular cau- early steps leading to the complex disciplines 30
sality and other cybernetic concepts from of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology,
31
32
and the Difficulty – of Moving science. Science, including psychology, is and so on, one thing remains: the assump-
31
32
33 Beyond Linear Causality rooted in the eighteenth and nineteenth tion that everything can be understood as a 33
34 century reductionist idea that the universe physical mechanism and that the role of sci- 34
35
Robert J. Martin is a giant clock. The assumption was that if ence is to uncover or reveal the underlying 35
36 Truman State University, USA you understood the constituent parts of the causality that underlies all phenomena. It is 36
37 rmartin/at/truman.edu clock, you understood the clock and you this assumption that second-order cyber- 37 513
38 could predict the operation of the clock. netics questions. 38
39 > Upshot • This commentary considers Keep in mind that “clock” at this time does « 4 »  Surrounded by physical mecha- 39
40 linear causality as an underlying model not have to mean only a clock: watch and nisms that modeled the universe, it seems 40
41 in science and in psychology and the dif- clock makers built a variety of automata us- understandable that the metaphor of physi- 41
42 ficulty of changing paradigms to include ing clockwork mechanisms. One example is cal mechanisms would have come to influ- 42
43 circularity and other concepts. the orrery, a model of the solar system that ence or even dominate the thinkers who 43
44 both modeled the relationships of the plan- lived in these centuries. Of course, mecha- 44
45 « 1 »  We owe a debt of gratitude to Ber- ets and, like a clock, predicted their posi- nistic models could not explain human 45
46 nard Scott for opening a conversation on the tions in real time. thinking, so, perhaps in an effort to make 46
47 failure of the foundations of psychology to « 3 »  Physics was seen to reveal cause room for human thinking, Descartes pro- 47
48 move beyond linear causality toward circu- and effect in a game of billiards, chemistry posed a dualism of mind and body. Reject- 48
49 lar causality and other concepts central to was seen to reveal the secrets of molecules ing the notion of a non-material mind, mod- 49
50 cybernetics. and how to make them, biology was seen ern science has identified the mind with the 50
51 to reveal the relationship between stimulus brain and proceeds on the assumption that 51
52 Linear causality: The underlying and response (for example, as demonstrated the mind/brain can be understood in reduc- 52
53 paradigm of science by making the legs of a recently dead frog tionist fashion as a physical mechanism. 53
54 « 2 »  The concern with linear causality twitch when an electrical charge is applied). « 5 »  Differences are not physical enti- 54
55 in this commentary is not with the idea in While these examples are now viewed as ties. Anthropologist Gregory Bateson, one 55
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 column A
1 of the founders of cybernetics, was deeply
2 troubled by this reductionism. Bateson
3 (1972) argued that science excludes human
4 beings (as living systems). By this I believe
5 he meant to point out that the assumption
6 that everything can be understood as a
7 physical mechanism prevents the study of
8 those processes that characterize human be-
9 ings and that are usually identified as “mind”
10 in the dualism of mind/body. On the one
11 hand, Bateson was against any supernatural
12 explanation of mind; on the other hand, he
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics
column B column C
cian may not need an adequate understand- as self-organizing systems whose circularity 1
ing and description. In other words, the is intrinsic and foundational, not peripheral. 2
adequacy of a description depends upon the « 12 »  The rise of information process- 3
user’s goal and the user’s view of what serves ing took place when the possibility of writ- 4
as an adequate description. ing digital computer programs capable of 5
« 9 »  Technological cultures use the solving problems (e.g., playing checkers or 6
tools and metaphors appropriate for the chess) arose: Can we write a software pro- 7
task at hand. People use the understanding gram to do X? The need for circular pro- 8
they need to accomplish the goal they have cesses in writing software is understood: 9
in mind. In cybernetics we regularly refer to that is what a software program is – a se- 10
the thermostat as an example of feedback, ries of loops that produce a result through 11
but we need to keep in mind that just as we iteration. Still, the underlying thinking is 12

13 was against any assumption that mental pro- think of the thermostat – and feedback – as not necessarily (or even usually) based on 13
14 cesses – or any processes that require com- an example of circularity, most people con- the understanding of cognition as a process 14
15 putation of a difference – could be reduced tinue to think of the thermostat as a cause that is circular, and the metaphor that “the 15
16 to physics or chemistry. Bateson argued that and effect mechanism. The point is that we brain is a computer” is a return to the idea 16
17 relations are not material; they arise through live in a technological culture where we are that learning, thinking, and remembering 17
18 the computation of a difference, and those surrounded by circular systems that are are identical to computer processes such as 18
19 differences (which are not things) are what thought of as linear causal mechanisms that storage, input, output, and retrieval. 19
20 make possible the formation of a hand from we, the users, control, and this dominant « 13 »  The gold standard – and the pres- 20
21 a genetic instruction, the ability of a tree to metaphor of technological cultures influ- tige that follows from meeting the gold stan- 21
22 reach toward the light, or the ability of hu- ences our thinking at a deep level (see Mar- dard – belongs to the laboratory and the 22
23 man beings to think. Bateson was not deny- tin 2015). field experiment, with their emphasis on 23
24 ing that these things are based on physical « 10 »  Implicit and unexamined para- linear cause and effect. Even in those many 24
25 processes; the point is that they cannot be digms are powerful. Much of what an in- studies designed to provide correlations, the 25
26 explained by physics or chemistry, but only dividual knows is implicit; much of what underlying idea is still to answer questions 26
27 by higher-order complexity. an individual knows is performative and such as: Which method works best? For ex- 27
28 « 6 »  Predictions are not explanations. implicit; that is, it reveals itself in how she ample, which method of teaching reading 28
29 In the example of the orrery, prediction behaves. Even as a scientist, much of what works best? Does more homework produce 29
30 could also be considered an explanation: ones does is performative and implicit. For better scores? Is this anti-depressant better 30
31 this is how and when the planets move. In example, in designing research, writing a than a placebo? 31
32 the case of behaviorism, as Scott points out grant, writing a paper, and so on, what one « 14 »  It is important to understand that 32
33 in §4, “explanations of how and why learn- knows is embodied in the skills one uses to in §1 Scott is not talking only about revising 33
34 ing occurred were eschewed in favour of produce the artifacts (such as this commen- the historical foundations in order to create 34
35 empirically derived ‘laws’ that afforded pre- tary) that come from the performance of a coherent discipline (though he is certainly 35
36 dictions about when and where learning one’s skill set. As I pursue my work, I follow wants that to happen). In §44 Scott is also 36
514 37 would occur.” Explanations were eliminated the strategies I have learned through study concerned with how research is carried 37
38 in favor of predictability. and apprenticeship within my profession. out in the present. The study of cognition 38
39 « 11 »  One can understand and agree cannot advance until we see living systems 39
40 Why a paradigm shift is worthwhile with a concept without incorporating the and cognition as more than the result of 40
41 but difficult to achieve implications of that concept into the perfor- cause-and-effect processes that inciden- 41
42 « 7 »  Granted that circular causality and mative aspects of how one does research. We tally include circular loops (e.g., practice 42
43 other concepts need to be folded into the are immersed in a worldwide culture that in learning). If researchers are embedded 43
44 foundations of psychology, the foundations recognizes circularity in specific processes in a system of proposal, funding, research, 44
45 of cognitive science, and even into science in but typically treats them as something that and publication that rewards proposals and 45
46 general, we need to ask the question: What can be controlled through an understand- papers that follow only certain established 46
47 interferes with this happening? The follow- ing of linear causality. Recognizing circular- paradigms, those paradigms will tend to 47
48 ing interlocking answers suggest possibili- ity in learning, cognition, problem solving, preserve themselves through many genera- 48
49 ties. etc., does not by itself change a rootedness tions of researchers. 49
50 « 8 »  Use conditions understanding. in linear causality. Scott (§4) points out « 15 »  Findings that point toward con- 50
51 When we use technology, we probably think that psychology has moved in the direction structivist concepts are thought of as anoma- 51
52 of that technology in terms of use through of accepting circularity in processes such lies. Decades of research on perception have 52
53 controlling a switch, button, lever, knob, or as perception, memory, problem-solving. revealed that color vision does not have 53
54 key rather than in terms of understanding However, the issue is that psychology has an isomorphic correspondence with elec- 54
55 the underlying mechanism. Even a techni- not embraced the concept of human beings tromagnetic frequencies (Gregory 1970). 55
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 Second-Order Cybernetics
column A
1 Decades of research also show many other
2 examples of how we see what we expect to
3 see, not what is supposedly there (Eagleman
4 2015). If these research findings were not
5 considered anomalies – features of human
6 perception rather intrinsic properties of cog-
7 nition – could scientists still think of them-
8 selves as representing an external reality?
9 « 16 »  Our preference as human beings,
10 whether individually or in groups, has been
11 to try to control others, and our environ-
12 ment, both social and physical. Incorporat-
13 ing circular causality and self-organization
14 would threaten the belief that humans can
15 control others and nature through appropri-
16 ate understanding of linear cause and effect.
17 This belief is embedded at all levels of think-
18 ing in our cultures: parenting, the law and
19 justice, business management, science, and
20 the technology of modern life – children,
21 employees, criminals, one’s toaster, one’s au-
22 tomobile, and the earth itself – can be un-
23 derstood and controlled.
24 « 17 »  Given all of the barriers to the
25 acceptance of non-linear causality within
26 psychology, it is all the more surprising that
27 there has been a small but increasingly im-
28 portant thread of psychology that is built
29 on the concepts of constructivism and cir-
30 cular causality based on the work of Jean
31 Piaget. What I would like to add to Scott’s
32 history is that during the same period that
33 behaviorism became the dominant model
34 of learning and, later, information process-
35 ing became the dominant model of cogni-
36 tion, Piaget was evolving a theory of cog-
37 nition based on ideas of self-organization
38 (the mind organizes itself through a series
39 of assimilations of and accommodations to
40 the environment). Piaget’s fieldwork and
41 the theory that flows from his fieldwork is a
42 constructivist theory of learning and cogni-
43 tion that incorporates the ideas of circularity
44 and self-organization, though without using
45 those terms. Piaget was very clear that the
46 mind organizes itself – and this organiza-
47 tion creates our understanding of the world.
48 Piaget (1974) titled one of his books: To Un-
49 derstand Is To Invent. Ernst von Glasersfeld
50 – who coined the term and the notion of
51 radical constructivism, and was also a Piaget
52 scholar and a director of doctoral theses us-
53 ing Piaget’s constructivist assumptions, in-
54 corporates the notion of the mind organiz-
55 ing itself according to its goals (we might use
column A
Moving Beyond Linear Causality Robert J. Martin
column B column C
other terminology today) into radical con- of science and the objective results of tech- 1
structivism (Glasersfeld 1984). In the last nologies onto the subjective experience of 2
four decades, the importance of Piaget and cause and effect: I do something and I see 3
neo-Piagetians has increased, though Piaget a result. The assumption of cause and effect 4
continues to be thought of as a stage theorist is a phenomenon that permeates almost all 5
in the area of cognitive development rather theory and all practice in modern life. 6
than a researcher and theorist of cognition « 20 »  By the end of the twentieth cen- 7
and learning. tury, psychology’s concern with learning 8
« 18 »  An important idea in Scott’s tar- and cognition had three main very differ- 9
get article is his consideration of concepts ent approaches to learning and cognition: 10
of procedures. Scott mentions Gordon Pask, the reductionist approaches of behaviorism 11
but not Piaget, in his consideration of con- and information-processing, and the non- 12
cepts as procedures. Piaget also thought of reductionist, constructivist approaches of 13
concepts as procedures – procedures in a Piaget and Vygotsky and those influenced by 14
constant process of change and develop- them. Behaviorism has expanded to include 15
ment. This is not to take away anything mental behaviors, especially in the field of 16
from Pask, but to point out that in Piaget, mental health, and virtually all behaviorism 17
there is no conceptual difference between includes cognitive behavioral strategies. In- 18
motor schemes and conceptual schemes: formation processing/artificial intelligence 19
both change through interaction, both can has developed enormously more power- 20
be thought of as operators. In fact, this is ful software, but has not changed its stance 21
Piaget’s central idea: we know the world not vis-a-vis cognition as a self-organizing sys- 22
through representation but through opera- tem. Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s work has been 23
tion on it using motor and concept schemes embraced by some in the education com- 24
– and conceptual schemes develop through munity, especially those concerned with 25
using motor/conceptual schemes to process teaching science, because a constructivist 26
the environment. I think we can make a bet- approach works better than the traditional 27
ter argument for including cybernetic and “transmission of information” approach that 28
constructivist concepts into the foundations continues to dominate the rest of education. 29
of psychology by pointing out that these Behaviorism and information processing 30
ideas have also been implicit in the work of could profit from including the concepts 31
Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. of self-organization and circular causality 32
in their core understanding. Piaget’s work 33
Conclusion already incorporates the concepts of self- 34
« 19 »  The history of humanity is a his- organization and circular causality and the 35
tory of changing technologies, including construction of knowledge, but researchers 36
bookkeeping, mathematics, and writing, influenced by Piaget could benefit from us- 37 515
which allow for greater control of time, ing specific terms such as self-organization 38
people, and resources. In all of these efforts, and circular causality to inform their teach- 39
assumptions of control through cause and ing and research. Piaget, Heinz von Foerster, 40
effect are almost universal. A causes B. Push Pask, Humberto Maturana, Glasersfeld, 41
the button and your car starts, the bomb and other constructivists and second-order 42
drops, the vending machine delivers a candy cyberneticists have important insights, but 43
bar, and so on. Never mind that A does not their insights tend not to affect the research 44
cause B, it merely initiates a sequence of done by cognitive scientists. 45
events; this is how we human beings prefer « 21 »  In closing, I agree with Scott that 46
to understand “reality.” In the nineteenth psychology needs to incorporate circular 47
century, the idea of science as a rational way causality and other concepts from cybernet- 48
to discover how nature worked established ics – both first- and second-order (§44) – but 49
the idea that the discovery of cause and ef- this may not create a paradigm shift. Many 50
fect relationships could be made into objec- areas of psychology are aware of circular pro- 51
tive process from which neither humans or cesses, as Scott (§28) points out. The prob- 52
nature could escape. Thus were cemented lem is that psychology (i.e., the structure of 53
together two key components of modern psychology as represented by various groups 54
human life: grafting the objective findings with power and influence, not just individual 55
column B column C
http://constructivist.info/11/3/601.scott
 column A column B column C
1 psychologists) needs to see clearly that the Obstacles to Cybernetics I propose four additional reasons for this 1
reductionist model that underpins much of status quo of the marginalising of explicit
2
3 the research interferes with incorporating
becoming a Conceptual cybernetics in psychology disciplines. I be-
2
3
4 circularity, self-organization, and other cy- Framework and Metanarrative lieve these obstacles are still at play and act 4
bernetic concepts into the underlying psy- as boundaries to Scott’s ideal of cybernetics
5
6 chological understanding of human beings
in the Psychologies providing both a conceptual tying together
5
6
7 as self-organizing, circular systems. Philip Baron of competing psychology approaches as well 7
8 « 22 »  A more flexible way of think- as becoming a meta-view for psychology. 8
University of Johannesburg, South
9 ing about human beings can continue to Also presented are some findings from the 9
10 use designs and methodologies that allow Africa. pbaron/at/uj.ac.za South African context in order to balance 10
11 researchers to move forward. For example, the Americentric and Eurocentric context. 11
12 while using the traditional tools of psycho- > Upshot • Scott’s ideas of a unifying 12
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics

13 logical research, positive psychology also conceptual framework and metanarra- Obstacle 1: Teacher and learner 13
14 uses concepts related to constructivist and tive for the seemingly divergent psychol- challenges 14
15 cybernetic concepts. These researchers do ogy fields may be met with challenges. « 2 »  Second-order cybernetics is chal- 15
16 empirical research that accepts and inves- Four obstacles are presented, which can lenging for students to grasp and for educa- 16
17 tigates the circular nature of remembering. be addressed in order to mitigate resis- tors to teach (Baron 2015). This may be due 17
18 Our anticipation of satisfaction and our tance to Scott achieving his goal of cy- to the epistemological shifts that are usu- 18
19 memory of satisfaction in participating in bernetics fulfilling these dual roles in the ally required upon embracing cybernetics, 19
20 an event have been found to be more closely psychologies. not as a model that can be objectified, de- 20
21 related to one another than they are to our scribed, and then applied as something sep- 21
22 satisfaction at the time of the event; in other The sidelining of cybernetics arate from the observer but as both a theory 22
23 words, our memories are more closely re- « 1 »  Bernard Scott (§5,15) posits two and a lived experience, addressing both the 23
24 lated to our internal expectations than to reasons for cybernetics becoming side-lined sophia and phronesis of knowledge (Baron 24
25 external events – we do not remember what during the 1970s. 2014; Glanville 2015). Students (and oth- 25
26 we experienced, we remember what we ex- a Scientists used only what they deemed ers) grapple with the idea that cybernetics 26
27 pected to experience. fit for the paradigms within which they may be something that can be used to frame 27
28 « 23 »  Finally, conversation is essential were working and thereafter concen- everything else, while still being personally 28
29 in developing these ideas. I came to under- trated on their own interests, ignoring connected to this very frame.1 Scott (§43) 29
30 stand the ideas in Scott’s article and in my the roots of their specialisation and use rightly argues that education in psychol- 30
31 commentary by writing about them – a con- of cybernetics. ogy should begin with topics on autopoi- 31
32 versation with myself – and by listening to b Funding models in the USA have fa- etic wholes and complex adaptive systems; 32
33 others having conversations with them. The voured research geared to military however, would it be reasonable to expect 33
34 important task is that professional commu- exploits over research in psychology learners to grasp these principles when they 34
35 nities undertake to reflect on the assump- – although cybernetics was also a pro- have not yet learned cognitive and social 35
36 tions that underlie their practice. ponent in the military research domain. psychology? How does one present these 36
516 37 Scott (2012: 75) believes that in the cybernetic topics when the learners do not 37
38 Acknowledgement 1970s the “new cybernetics” literally yet have knowledge of human mental proc- 38
39 Extensive editorial suggestions by bi- went unnoticed in circles outside of the esses, memory, and perception? Language, 39
40 ologist Dr. Suzanne Martin are gratefully systems movement. too, is a major feature in cybernetics, both 40
41 acknowledged. Scott’s (§15) two reasons are fair; however, in the manner in which much cybernetics 41
42 with more than 40 years elapsing since the text is written – the specificity of words, 42
43 Robert J. Martin is a composer, psychologist, and heralding of the “second order,” there still phrases, and their intended meanings – 43
44 professor emeritus at Truman State University. He remains limited explicit intermingling of cy- and in the topics of cybernetics research 44
45 completed a doctorate in educational psychology at bernetics in mainstream psychology, which on communication systems (conversation 45
46 the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign with an is exactly what Scott (§§7, 10) is concerned theory, for example). This is especially chal- 46
47 interdisciplinary thesis guided by Heinz von Foerster and about. There is no denying that many cyber- lenging when the learners have a different 47
48 Herbert Brun. He has a life-long interest in composition, netic principles can be found dappled across 48
49 creativity, learning, psychotherapy, constructivism, the psychologies, but as Scott (§1) notes, 1 |  This statement is based on the feedback 49
50 and cybernetics/systems science. He has written there is almost no awareness that such prin- from visitors (mainly students) who have visited 50
51 two books, numerous articles, and composed music ciples and other evolved derivatives have www.ecosystemic-psychology.org.za This website 51
52 for a variety of solo instruments and ensembles. originated from cybernetics. Cybernetic is a resource for people who are interested in eco- 52
53 approaches are thus rarely found as a com- systemic psychology and cybernetics in therapeu- 53
54 Received: 9 June 2016 plete curriculum in psychology studies in tic psychology. The site traffic averages 49 page 54
55 Accepted: 12 June 2016 either American or European universities. views/day. 55
column A column B column C

Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°3


column A
1 mother tongue than the teacher’s, which is
2 often the case in large multicultural uni-
3 versities, in particular in the South African
4 context. The educators and practitioners
5 themselves would need to re-think their
6 teaching and learning, as many of them may
7 have already become entrenched in a par-
8 ticular paradigm of knowledge, the same
9 paradigms that Scott (§4) believes have not
10 acknowledged cybernetics.
11 « 3 »  Educators and scientists who are
12 interested in cybernetics may find the ob-
13 server-dependent realities, non-purposeful
14 drift, structural determinism and coupling,
15 entropy/negentropy, equifinality and equi-
16 potentiality all troubling aspects to incor-
17 porate into their research and hence their
18 teachings. This forms part of the first ob-
19 stacle. Thus, it may be beneficial to create a
20 guide for educators on how to present these
21 cybernetic topics, as well as an introduc-
22 tory book for learners in a format that is at a
23 low level and not intimidating (“conceptual
24 ground-clearing,” §42), such as the popular
25 mainstream book brand For Dummies. The
26 introductory titled book on cybernetics is
27 Ashby’s (1956) An Introduction to Cyber-
28 netics, which is an important text, but may
29 be too mathematical for a new student in
30 the psychologies.2 Scott (§2) does mention
31 that he may provide a book on the topic he
32 proposes regarding cybernetics as a unify-
33 ing framework for psychology, but being an
34 avid researcher in education himself, he may
35 also consider something of the order of: Cy-
36 bernetics for Dummies: A Guide for Teachers
37 and Learners. This can assist in overcoming
38 the adoption of explicit cybernetics into
39 mainstream psychology curriculums, and
40 may solve the problem of favouritism of
41 some cybernetic topics while other equally
42 valuable topics go ignored, possibly owing
43 to their perceived complexity. Humberto
44 Maturana and Francisco Varela (1992) did
45 well in simplifying their work and opening
46 it up to a wider audience with their book
47 titled: The Tree of Knowledge.
48
49
50 2 |  There is another, lesser-known book with
51 same title as Ashby’s. This translated book was
52 written by Viktor Glushkov and published in 1966
53 as document No. FTD-TT-65–942, Air Force Sys-
54 tems Command, Foreign Technology Division,
55 Wright-Patterson, Airforce Base, Ohio.
column A
Second-Order Cybernetics
Obstacles to Cybernetics Philip Baron
column B column C
Obstacle 2: Traditional universities and thus engaging with the different styles 1
« 4 »  The second barrier, dependent of learning that each learner demonstrates. 2
on the first, rests on the structure of tradi- However, this is particularly difficult in 3
tional university curriculums. Scott (§§26, distance-learning universities, where verbal 4
28) notes that psychology studies are popu- conversations are a luxury. 5
lated with various theories and their mod- « 5 »  In undergraduate years, there 6
els, which is part of the reason for Scott’s may be an introductory module provid- 7
quest to delineate the commonalities across ing an overview of the main approaches 8
the different psychology approaches in the in psychology theorists of the last century. 9
first place. However, in keeping with the For example, in South African public uni- 10
traditional university style of compart- versities, a personology course would con- 11
mentalising knowledge areas by separating sist of the depth psychology approaches 12
disciplines, presenting topics independ- (Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Alfred Adler, 13
ently from other topics without addressing Erich Fromm, and Erik Erikson), the be- 14
their connections,3 and often disregarding havioural and learning theory approaches 15
individual learning styles, many students (BF Skinner, Julian Rotter, Albert Bandura, 16
thus also address their coursework in the and Walter Mischel), the person-orientated 17
same serial manner – learning to compart- approaches (Abraham Maslow, Carl Rog- 18
mentalise their studies. This is further ex- ers, George Kelly, and Viktor Frankl), and 19
acerbated when the educators specifically then lastly the alternative approaches (East- 20
create assessments that ask questions in an ern, African, and ecosystemic) (see Meyer, 21
outcomes-based approach that further iso- Moore & Viljoen 2008). What is notable is 22
lates the parts of a single curriculum, often that the ecosystemic approach reflects the 23
required for the auditing bodies who want to explicit cybernetic approaches, which is 24
measure the learners’ performance against a unfortunately presented as a separate sec- 25
pre-determined scale for each course out- tion in this particular personology module. 26
come or knowledge area. Students get accus- Thus, in addressing Scott’s (§§43f) goals, the 27
tomed to the disconnect between themselves textbook would need to be re-written from 28
and their study areas, missing the point that Scott’s (§§1,7,10,43) view of tying the cyber- 29
knowledge and knowing are not synony- netic tenets that are implicitly used within 30
mous, for knowing requires a knower and is some of the neighbouring approaches and 31
tied to context and epistemology (Glasers- concluding with cybernetics as a meta-view, 32
feld 1990). Thus, in the uncommon event instead of simply being a separate independ- 33
of explicit cybernetics being a topic within ent approach. The mega university in ques- 34
a certain module of a university degree/di- tion is called the University of South Africa 35
ploma, it simply forms the next topic placed (UNISA),5 which has student numbers of 36
adjacent to the others in the list of knowl- over 300  000, with 89  000 of these enrol- 37 517
edge areas in which the learner must achieve ments in the humanities (DoHET 2013: 38
competence.4 Further, the same method of 4f). Two out of the three top universities in 39
“applying” each paradigm/theory to a psy- Africa (the University of Cape Town, the 40
chology case study, for example, now takes University of the Witwatersrand, and the 41
place with cybernetics as the tool, resulting University of Pretoria) have systems theory 42
in abundant confusion. If educators were explicitly as part of their curriculums, how- 43
versed in conversation theory as Scott (§37) 44
describes, tools such as Teachback, analogy 5 |  While this is an African university, it re- 45
learning, etc. could be used in a widespread flects international Western trends in curriculum 46
fashion, assisting in steering the learners structure. This particular university is also one 47
of the only universities on the African continent 48
3 |  Pask (1976: 101) noted this point with to offer their clinical psychology master’s degree 49
regards to mechanics and electricity in university from an ecosystemic approach (cybernetic); yet 50
curriculums. from browsing the undergraduate curriculums, 51
4 |  Pask (1976: 96) was concerned about how one would not assume this fact. This in turn 52
modules are structured for students to learn seri- means that only learners who achieve the master’s 53
ally/operationally. This topic is still relevant even degree would have had an opportunity to engage 54
40 years later. in a cybernetic approach to clinical psychology. 55
column B column C
http://constructivist.info/11/3/601.scott
 column A
1 ever with a limited scope. In these two in-
2 stances, the explicit use of cybernetics (first-
3 order) is within family therapy or group
4 therapy praxis. Thus, Scott’s (§§29, 44) at-
5 tempt at grounding the competing psychol-
6 ogy paradigms within cybernetics, whether
7 process- or person-orientated, is not with-
8 out merit, also allowing for an appreciation
9 that many models are part of a larger class
10 with the goal of addressing whole systems.
11 A review of traditional university psychol-
12 ogy curriculums and the prescribed texts
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics
column B column C
way into psychotherapy with the “manu- tial humanist psychologists noted, “In our 1
alisation” of process to provide a cheaper technological society, people’s behaviour 2
intervention (Soldz 1990; Werbert 1989). can be shaped, even without their knowl- 3
In terms of therapy practices, there is an edge or approval” (Rogers 1980: 140). Thus, 4
increasing need for psychology as a profes- the linearity of technology programming, 5
sion to demonstrate that its interventions too, may be a barrier to embracing circular 6
yield tangible and measureable results to causality in research. 7
clients and their families, as well as to hu- Second-order cybernetics is, however, 8
man rights groups in light of inhumane an important approach to research. Some 9
practices of some psychiatric institutions or anthropologists have recently realised the 10
abusive traditional healing practices in some importance of acknowledging research 11
low- to middle-income countries (Kagee & methodologies from their sister disciplines 12

13 may need to go hand in hand in overcoming Lund 2012: 103).6 Cybernetic approaches in addressing past mistakes, especially in 13
14 this barrier of introducing cybernetics as a in research methodology have the scope terms of ethnographic works that arrive at 14
15 conceptual framework in the psychologies. for an ethical approach; however, compar- conclusions that upon revisiting do not hold 15
16 ing measureable success against other ap- their ground (Lembek 2014). This “new 16
17 Obstacle 3: Linear causality, proaches almost requires a different set of insight” into new observer-dependent re- 17
18 research methodology, and measurement criteria, or at least an under- search methodologies further depicts the 18
19 technological efficacy standing of systems thinking. lack of adoption of cybernetics in other dis- 19
20 « 6 »  My third proposed barrier rests on « 7 »  The move to technological efficacy ciplines too, now expanding Scott’s scope. 20
21 the well-established linear research meth- (see Ellul 1964) brings forth an epistemol- One of the earliest advocates of the second 21
22 odology. Sigmund Koch (1976: 485) stated, ogy of highly controllable, linear, predict- order was an anthropologist herself – Mar- 22
23 “at the time of its inception, psychology able, and structured systems that do not garet Mead – who advocated the importance 23
24 was unique in the extent to which its insti- readily adapt for humanness. Artificial in- of alignment in both the theorising and the 24
25 tutionalisation preceded its content and its telligence supported by cognitive science praxis of research for the fruits of cybernet- 25
26 methods preceded its problems.” Empirical does have a history of cybernetics as an ics to be realised (Mead 1968). Thus, while 26
27 research is a major activity within psychol- important proponent in this endeavour, as Scott focuses on the psychologies, one won- 27
28 ogy as Scott (§§3, 4, 7, 28) notes, however highlighted by Scott (§30). However, in his ders if his argument also applies to other 28
29 Scott (§42) would like it to be informed by unpublished manuscript “Metadesign,”7 disciplines. 29
30 second-order cybernetics. With abundant Maturana stresses the term “consensual” in 30
31 psychology research and what Scott (§4) explaining existence: consensual living, con- Obstacle 4: Personal preference, 31
32 refers to as “a wealth of empirical findings,” sensual emotions, consensual co-ordina- ethics, and responsibilities 32
33 one wonders how rich these enquiries are tions, consensual behaviours, and consen- « 8 »  The last obstacle rests on personal 33
34 when mostly undertaken according to an sual conversations. It seems that humanity, preference. Scott may do well to provide a 34
35 epistemology that has not accounted for in the presence of machines, still has a lot coherent conceptual framework for the psy- 35
36 observer-dependent realities and contexts. to achieve for consensual existence to occur. chologies, but there may be an audience – as 36
518 37 Dorothy Becvar and Raphael Becvar (2006) The structure of the majority of technology always – who choose not to acknowledge 37
38 call for re-research, alluding to the idea that is not readily consensual (Baron 2013). With cybernetics, or who dismiss it simply as a 38
39 when research findings are understood from humans at the receiving end of technology, type of post-modernism. Scott (§18) would 39
40 a frame of reference that does not account humanity may become conditioned to what like to see cybernetics as a metadiscipline, 40
41 for its own worldview, this research should Jacques Ellul (1964: 324) termed “the law which is ideal, but how does one achieve a 41
42 be viewed tentatively­ – not being as rich as of technique.” The deep integration of tech- meta-narrative with groups of people who 42
43 initially thought. Scott (§7) mentions criti- nology into the day-to-day living of people have not yet understood even the early cy- 43
44 cal psychology and the attempt to review has resulted in major shifts in how people bernetic principles? This is indeed a dilem- 44
45 the assumptions of mainstream psychology, communicate and achieve their daily goals. ma. Second, there is a high degree of unpre- 45
46 which is important; however, there is still a This technological efficiency may adjust our dictability in state-determined systems that 46
47 barrier in that Western thought idolises the worldview, and should not be thought of as require continuous updates for participant 47
48 individual and one’s ability to control and something neutral (Heidegger 1977: 4). It is observers, as Scott (§16) describes, citing 48
49 manipulate one’s environment. Linear cau- not surprising that one of the most influen- Maturana, Gordon Pask, and Heinz von 49
50 sality is central to the Western mind and the Foerster. This may not be a well-liked posi- 50
51 dominance of positivism, prizing mechani- 6 |  See also the “chain-free initiative,” http:// tion for researchers to subscribe to. As Scott 51
52 sation and the objectification of measure- www.emro.who.int/mental-health/chain-free- states (§17) “cyberneticians had the reflexive 52
53 ments, which are often the goals of funding initiative, accessed 30 December 2013. awareness that in studying self-organising 53
54 models. In terms of psychotherapy, efficacy 7 |  http: //www.inteco.cl/articulos/metade- systems, they were studying themselves.” 54
55 that relies on standardisation has found its sign.htm The associated ethics and responsibilities 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°3

 Second-Order Cybernetics
The Social and the Psychological Eva Buchinger

column A column B column C

1 that arise out of second-order cybernetics The Social and the He further gives a clear illustration of how 1
may be overwhelming. This is an unsettling Pask’s P-individuals are conceptualized as
2
3 no-man’s land for many scholars and stu-
Psychological: Conceptual psycho-social unities (§§25, 37) that are
2
3
4 dents, who in turn opt out of this challeng- Cybernetic Unification hosted by either one M-individual (human 4
ing reflexive epistemological domain. being, biomechanical unity) or by several
5
6
vs Disciplinary Analysis? M-individuals. Of special interest is the
5
6
7 Conclusion Eva Buchinger latter idea, which indicates that – comple- 7
8 « 9 »  Scott (§7) notes that if the field of mentary to an inner dialog – an outer dia- 8
Austrian Institute of Technology,
9 psychology is looked at as a historical whole, log exists (outer conversation that unifies a 9
10 there has not yet been any single paradigm Austria collective) that is also a P-individual, but of 10
11 that stands as a dominant victor, rather eva.buchinger/at/ait.ac.at another nature. The same holds for Pask’s 11
12 competing paradigms are at play in different definition of conversation as “concept shar- 12
13 areas. This means there is still scope for cy- > Upshot • Psychology and sociology are ing” along a certain togetherness and there- 13
14 bernetics to “re-enter” and take a seat at the distinct academic disciplines but never- by distinguished from communication as 14
15 table of dominant approaches in psychology, theless closely interrelated. What are the “signal transfer which may, or may not, be 15
16 gaining its position as the metadiscipline benefits of conceptual integration using conversational” (Pask 1980: 999). The ex- 16
17 while also not excluding other knowledge a cybernetic approach and what are the pression “certain togetherness” makes sense 17
18 systems. However, there are boundaries that strengths of progressing within the dis- because 18
19 need to be addressed in order for the step to ciplinary paths? a there must be enough togetherness sup- 19
20 embracing cybernetics to take place. ported by institutions (e.g., a dining 20
21 « 1 »  It was Aristotle who said that “it table, café, market, organization), but 21
22 Philip Baron currently works at the University of is a characteristic of man that he alone has b too much togetherness gives rise to indi- 22
23 Johannesburg and teaches post-graduate studies any sense of good and evil, of just and un- vidual or social malaise. 23
24 in electrical engineering. His main interests are in just” and that “the individual, when isolated, The second point is the result of digitaliza- 24
25 interdisciplinary works, having qualified in the fields is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like tion – the growth of data storage and com- 25
26 of psychology, engineering, philosophy, and religious a part in relation to the whole” (Aristotle putation, in Pask’s wording (Pask 1980: 26
27 studies. The University of Johannesburg presented 1920: 29). One could argue that this is a per- 1000) – which rapidly creates an informa- 27
28 him with its highest award for teaching and learning fect and still up-to-date expression of the tion environment. Pask concluded that 28
29 excellence in 2015 (Vice-Chancellor’s Distinguished inseparability of the social and the psycho- communication that only resembles con- 29
30 Awards: Teaching Excellence). He currently serves logical dimension of human beings. versation will be amplified in this signal- 30
31 as an associate editor for Kybernetes journal « 2 »  Psychology and sociology never- overloaded information environment and 31
32 theless have been developed as distinct aca- will therefore “appear as major hazards 32
33 Received: 8 June 2016 demic disciplines with an established link in the future” (Pask 1980: 1001). All these 33
34 Accepted: 13 June 2016 in the form of social-psychology (Goethals considerations are based on a second-order 34
35 2007; Ross, Lepper & Ward 2010). What are, cybernetic understanding8 that refers to the 35
36 therefore, the benefits of another approach work of Ross Ashby, Norbert Wiener and 36
37 to interrelating these two disciplines? In Heinz von Foerster,9 among others, which 37 519
38 the section “Unifying individual and social are astonishingly up-to-date concerning the 38
39 psychologies” of his target article, Bernard recent debates about the digital revolution. 39
40 Scott argues that the benefits can be found Scott’s proposition of a unifying conceptual 40
41 in better supporting the understanding of 41
42 the dynamics of interpersonal perception 8 First-order cybernetics is understood
42
43 and human communication (§39). He ar- as the exclusion of the observer within an obser-
43
44 gues further that a concept of social systems vation and second-order cybernetics as the inclu- 44
45 based on the conversation theory of the cy- sion of the observer in what is observed. Second- 45
46 bernetician and psychologist Gordon Pask order therefore means that the observer is “inside 46
47 could provide an alternative to the theory of the box” (Brand, Bateson & Mead 1976: 38), re- 47
48 social systems developed by the sociologist spectively “a person who considers oneself to be 48
49 Niklas Luhmann (§40). a participant actor” (Foerster 2003: 289), and is 49
50 « 3 »  Scott’s excellent analysis of the role contrary to “the first order of classical black boxes 50
51 of cybernetics in psychology and his inspir- and negative feedback” (Pask 1996: 355). 51
52 ing thoughts concerning the unification of 9 See Pask (1970; 1996). For sources 52
53 process and person approaches indeed sup- see, for example, Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow 53
54 port the better understanding of the inter- (1943), Wiener (1948); Shannon & Weaver (1949) 54
55 linking of the social and the psychological. and Ashby (1952). 55
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 column A column B column C
1 framework on the basis of conversation Modern societies neither have one center Second Thoughts 1
theory is therefore quite promising. (one top) nor one rationality integrating the
2
3 « 4 »  But one should be aware of the particular rationalities of the different soci-
on Cybernetic Unifications 2
3
4 complexity of the world society, which is the etal systems. “It is a society without an apex Tilia Stingl de Vasconcelos 4
focus of Luhmann’s social theory and which
5 or center” (Luhmann 1990a: 31) Therefore,
Guedes 5
6 is not covered by conversation theory. From modern society is characterized by an enor- 6
7 a sociological point of view, this can be seen mous degree of complexity and it is the ex- European Society for Education and 7
8 as an expression of strengths of progressing planation of this (complex, functionally dif- Communication, Austria 8
9 within the disciplinary path. While elabo- ferentiated) world society that is Luhmann’s comunic/at/tiliastingl.com 9
10 rating the societal micro-macro link as part objective (Luhmann 1982b, 2012: xiii). 10
11 of his social systems theory, Luhmann em- « 5 »  An integration of Pask’s conversa- > Upshot • While Scott’s perspective is 11
12 phasized the difference between interaction tion and Luhmann’s interaction approach an inspiring attempt to unify psychology, 12
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics

13 and society by focussing on the latter (Luh- could benefit from Pask’s rich account of much more impact from second-order 13
14 mann 1977, 1982a, 1982b): learning as the evolution of concepts within cybernetics would be needed to build an 14
15 a Interaction forms the basic type of so- a conversation as well as from Luhmann’s appropriate and comprehensive cyber- 15
16 cial system, which emerges whenever advanced elaborations on the complex dy- netic framework to unify an actor-based 16
17 present individuals perceive one an- namics of modern society (Buchinger & field such as psychology. In particular, I 17
18 other (face-to-face interaction). They Scott 2010: 118). Such integration could identify three aspects that need to be ad- 18
19 communicate verbally and/or non-ver- be based on already-established concep- dressed: the problem of levels, the prob- 19
20 bally with those that are present (with tual links, since Luhmann himself was very lem of multiple-level dynamics, and the 20
21 the option to speak about those that are much influenced by cybernetic consider- problem of being sufficiently different. 21
22 absent). ations. For example, his notion of resonance 22
23 b Society represents the comprehensive was inspired by von Foerster (as discussed « 1 »  The problem of conceptual unifica- 23
24 system of all communicative interac- in Buchinger 2012: 23), his notion of self- tion is usually considered critical for a mature 24
25 tions. reproduction by Ashby, Humberto Matura- academic discipline. The main point in Ber- 25
26 Very simplified, it can be said that after na and Francisco Varela (Luhmann 1990b, nard Scott’s target article is to demonstrate 26
27 a first evolutionary transformation from 1995: 34, 369), and his notion of mutual- the possibility of using concepts of second- 27
28 segmentation to stratification, another istic-dialogical unities by Pask (Luhmann order cybernetics to provide a foundation 28
29 evolutionary transformation from strati- 1995: 38). and a unifying conceptual framework for 29
30 fication to functional differentiation led « 6 »  The progress in each discipline psychology. In fact, he argues that cybernetic 30
31 to the world society in which we live now. thereby provides the ground for the inte- concepts have influenced psychology since 31
32 Functional systems (which are societal sub- gration. For overall scientific advancement, the 1950s. He also claims that the origins of 32
33 systems) co-evolved with symbolically gen- both are needed, disciplinary specialization psychological concepts based on cybernetic 33
34 eralized communication media. Here are on the one hand and conceptual integration ideas were lost and the interest of cyberneti- 34
35 some examples: (or spill-over between disciplines, or inter-/ cians in working on transdisciplinary unity 35
36 ƒƒ Money is the communication media transdisciplinary fields) on the other. did not last (§1). Scott’s article is an attempt 36
520 37 of the societal system economy, which to offer means and ideas for this unity. Ac- 37
38 operates on the basis of the binary code Eva Buchinger specializes in systems theory and cording to Scott, one can build conceptual 38
39 pay/not pay. innovation policy. Her tasks include research, bridges between psychology and sociology – 39
40 ƒƒ Truth is the media of the scientific sys- teaching, research management and policy by merging individual and social psychology. 40
41 tem, with the code true/false. consulting. She is, among other roles, board member Scott’s motivation comes from his personal 41
42 ƒƒ Power belongs to the political system of the Research Committee on Sociocybernetics experiences as a practicing psychologist, in 42
43 and the code is government/opposition. (RC51) of the International Sociological Association which he understands cybernetics as a pro- 43
44 Thus, an economy is a self-referential sys- (ISA) and consultant for the Austrian government vider of useful tools for modeling specific 44
45 tem based on all the communication ele- and EU institutions (ERAC, Commission). situations. 45
46 ments that fall into the scheme of pay/not « 2 »  In this commentary, I want to 46
47 pay; all communication belonging to the Received: 12 June 2016 demonstrate that the journey to unification 47
48 code (scientifically) true/false constitutes Accepted: 16 June 2016 in an actor-based discipline such as psychol- 48
49 the functional system of science; and all ogy has not ended with Scott’s article but has 49
50 communication-elements belonging to only just started. In my view, three important 50
51 power and government/opposition gener- yet missing aspects must be addressed in or- 51
52 ate the political system. As a consequence, der to reach the stage of unification, i.e., the 52
53 operational closure results in particular sys- problem of levels, the problem of multiple- 53
54 tem rationalities: scientific rationality, eco- level dynamics, and the problem of being 54
55 nomic rationality, political rationality, etc. sufficiently different. 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°3

 Second-Order Cybernetics
column A
1 The problem of levels
2 « 3 »  Fields such as psychology, sociol-
3 ogy or ethnography deal with individuals
4 and societies, both in static and in dynamic
5 aspects. Scott recommends that these in-
6 dividuals should be described in a dual
7 manner, namely by a differentiation of me-
8 chanical individuals, or M-individuals, and
9 psychological individuals, or P-individuals.
10 Both are considered as self-organized and
11 organizationally closed systems. This dis-
12 tinction between M-individuals or M-uni-
13 ties (§25) as processors for the procedures
14 of P-individuals or P-unities may have its
15 unifying merits, but they are, in my view,
16 insufficient and under-critical as unifiers.
17 « 4 »  In recent decades, we can observe
18 that there has been an enormous literature
19 in the cognitive neurosciences, which have
20 made spectacular advances in promoting
21 the level of neurons and neural network
22 interactions as the basis for studying psy-
23 chological phenomena such as percep-
24 tion, emotions, memory, etc. Can we still
25 use Scott’s M and P differentiations at the
26 neural level as well? Can we use M- and
27 P-unities at the level of neurons and their
28 interactions? In other words, can we use
29 the split between M- and P-unities across
30 different levels, starting with the neural
31 level and single neurons as acting unities to
32 higher neural levels up to the micro-level
33 of individuals? If the answer turns out to
34 be negative, then the proposed cybernetic
35 framework would be inadequate to reach
36 its unification goal.
37 « 5 »  The same argument can be ap-
38 plied upwards towards higher levels of
39 aggregation such as groups, organizations
40 or even regions or states. Using a similar
41 distinction from sociology or economics,
42 micro-psychology can be understood as an
43 actor-based configuration whereas macro-
44 psychology deals with unities as compos-
45 ites of individuals. Can we also use Scott’s
46 M and P-separation for these macro-unities
47 or are we bound to the individual or micro-
48 level alone? Again, a negative answer would
49 demonstrate the basic restrictions of Scott’s
50 approach.
51 « 6 »  Finally, the question arises of
52 whether Scott’s approach is able to deal
53 with problems of the subconscious as well,
54 which, at first sight, the framework of M
55 and P unities does not seem to address.
column A
Second Thoughts on Cybernetic Unifications Tilia Stingl
column B column C
« 7 »  But even a positive answer that the The problem of being sufficiently 1
distinction between M- and P-unities can be different 2
used across all levels from the basic neural « 11 »  Finally, a third aspect of Scott’s 3
level up to the level of macro-psychology, program for the cybernetic unification of 4
including the level of the subconscious, psychology needs to be urgently addressed: 5
would result in a very serious new challenge, the status of previous and current unifica- 6
which can be classified as the problem of the tion attempts in psychology. For example, 7
dynamics in multiple-level configurations, sociology has seen many unifying ap- 8
as discussed in the next section. proaches, starting from the days of Max 9
Weber at the beginning of the 20th century, 10
The problem of multiple-level culminating with Talcott Parsons for a short 11
dynamics period in the 1950s, and ending in its cur- 12
« 8 »  As my second critical comment rent configuration with a multiplicity of dif- 13
to Scott, I would like to address the issue of ferent unification approaches by, to name a 14
the analysis of multiple-level configurations, few, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, An- 15
which also is a general problem in many dis- thony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, Niklas 16
ciplines outside the social sciences. Luhmann and Richard Münch. Two impor- 17
« 9 »  After 1945, we can observe the tant phenomena can be observed. First, due 18
appearance of a large number of new ac- to their inherent differences, these unifica- 19
tors operating beyond the traditional local, tion approaches further fragment sociology 20
regional or national level. Transnational en- rather than unify it. Second, the multiplicity 21
terprises, transnational public and private of different foundations has not affected the 22
organizations and very large-scale trans- methodology of empirical social research, 23
national systems such as the financial mar- which continues in its normal operations of 24
kets emerged. This lead to a highly complex quantitative and qualitative analyses. Thus, 25
multiple-level configuration where relevant in sociology, any new unification attempt 26
actions occur at all different levels simul- increases the number of available alterna- 27
taneously. Rogers Hollingsworth and Karl tives and leaves the empirical work of so- 28
Müller (2008) remind us that the dynamics ciologists largely unaffected. From this, one 29
across a multiplicity of levels is still an un- can conclude that each new attempt moves 30
solved analytical challenge. the unification of sociology a step further 31
« 10 »  The governance of the contempo- away. 32
rary world and the interconnections among « 12 »  Will the same happen to psychol- 33
governance, democracy and knowledge are ogy? Given the failed attempts in sociology, 34
far more complex than most observers rec- what can Scott’s new cybernetic approach 35
ognize. No single level is decisive in shaping offer that makes it different from previous 36
the world in which we live. Moreover, the unification attempts, and how can his sec- 37 521
levels are nested and linked with each other. ond-order cybernetics framework also affect 38
So one of the great remaining challenges is the empirical work of psychologists in order 39
to comprehend the nature of this nested- to make a difference with regard to the nor- 40
ness, to understand how governance, de- mal practices of psychologists? 41
mocracy and knowledge are linked together « 13 »  The work on a unifying founda- 42
not only at each of these levels but also how tion for a discipline such as psychology 43
these processes are linked together across based on second-order cybernetics liter- 44
different levels. As societal institutions are ally begs for a high degree of self-reflection 45
increasingly nested in a multi-level world, and considerations of the impact that this 46
we are all faced with the perplexing problem kind of unification could generate for the 47
of how to govern ourselves (Hollingsworth community of psychologists. Perhaps in 48
& Müller 2008: 417). Unfortunately, in his academic disciplines such as sociology, eco- 49
article, Scott has provided no clue as to nomics and psychology, one can only start 50
how to deal with the issue of multiple-level a discussion about the relative advantages 51
dynamics, which, as stated above, forms a or disadvantages of various unification ap- 52
problem for his approach if he offers a posi- proaches without being able to reduce them 53
tive answer to the differentiation of M- and to a dominant paradigm in the sense of 54
P-unities across different levels. Thomas Kuhn. 55
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 column A column B column C
1 « 14 »  In any case, even without Scott’s Cybernetics and Synergetics special and rehabilitation pedagogy) have 1
contribution, psychology has already be- repeatedly expressed confusion with the
2
3 gun to use cybernetic concepts to provide
as Foundations for variety of (often contradictory) research
2
3
4 solution-focused, fast, effective ways to deal Complex Approach Towards findings, theories, concepts, work models, 4
with daily issues – many of these methods methods, or skills in their use, best prac-
5
6 are based also on cybernetic ideas, with
Complexities of Life tice examples, etc. Students have usually
5
6
7 ongoing research considering concepts of Lea Šugman Bohinc found it relieving, informing, and empow- 7
8 second-order cybernetics, especially in the ering to make sense of the distinctions and 8
University of Ljubljana and Sigmund
9 field of systemic therapy (see, for example, similarities between different approaches 9
10 Schlötter 2005; Varga & Sparrer 2016; Vor- Freud University in Ljubljana, when interpreting them through the lens of 10
11 hemus 2015). Even though the systemic Slovenia, lea.sugmanbohinc/at/fsd. first- and second-order cybernetics. Defin- 11
12 work represents a specific sector of psychol- uni-lj.si ing those premises always demands negoti- 12
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics

13 ogy, its explanations are based on cybernetic ating the meaning of the concepts used by 13
14 thoughts being accepted as the foundation > Upshot • Based on my personal and the students. This eventually leads them to 14
15 of systemic methods. How do these highly professional experiences as a university arrive at new understandings, such as new 15
16 practical methods fit Scott’s call for unifica- teacher of social work, systemic psycho- individual interpretations and new agree- 16
17 tion? therapy, and education, I suggest the ments, including the agreement to disagree 17
18 « 15 »  In this respect, Scott’s article may concepts of third-order cybernetics and (Pask 1987: 18f). These understandings 18
19 be considered only one of several starting synergetics as a support to creating a arise among two or more “locally synchro- 19
20 points for a long journey towards unifica- more unified and integrated framework nised” participants (Pask 1980: 999) while 20
21 tion, rather than its finishing line. of psychology to better understand and maintaining or increasing their (interper- 21
22 deal with complex, self-organizing sys- sonal or polyvocal interpretative) distinc- 22
23 Tilia Stingl de Vasconcelos Guedes is an tems. tions (Pask 1987: 23). 23
24 autonomous systemic and business consultant « 3 »  In what follows, I will introduce 24
25 and member of the European Society for Education Introduction two of the connecting patterns that have 25
26 and Communication. She has a bachelor’s degree « 1 »  With a background in psychol- proved useful for me and that I believe to be 26
27 and a master’s degree in computer science and ogy and psychotherapy, working as a uni- useful for Scott’s intention to unify psychol- 27
28 business administration from the Vienna University versity teacher in three (inter)disciplinary ogy. 28
29 of Technology, a post-graduate qualification in fields, i.e., social work, psychotherapy, and 29
30 magazine journalism and has earned her PhD in education, and teaching a variety of courses “Third-order” cybernetics 30
31 communication science from the University of Vienna. in bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral pro- « 4 »  For me, the epistemology of sec- 31
32 Her research interests are in the field of organizational grammes, I have been rewarded with ex- ond-order cybernetics is more than just a 32
33 communication and systemic approaches. perience of learning about a field through constructivist theory of knowledge, a philo- 33
34 learning about the history of its ideas more sophical world view, a viewpoint, or even a 34
35 Received: 7 June 2016 than once. That is why I have been excited science. I interpret it as a set of assumptions 35
36 Accepted: 14 June 2016 to read Bernard Scott’s target article and to at the basis of individual and collective pat- 36
522 37 learn about “his” story of cybernetics, which terns of cognitive acts (Maturana & Varela 37
38 fulfils two promises: 1992: 173f), in which “every act of know- 38
39 ƒƒ it shows how second-order cybernetics ing brings forth a world” (Maturana & Va- 39
40 can provide a much-needed foundation rela 1992: 26). As such, cognitive acts are 40
41 for constructing a new meaning or or- processes leading to certain products (e.g., 41
42 der in the conceptually messed-up dis- thinking processes lead to certain thoughts 42
43 cipline of psychology; and acts or decision making processes re- 43
44 ƒƒ it brings together the so-far more-or- sult in a decision or act) that then serve as 44
45 less divided branches of individual and a starting point for a new process (of think- 45
46 social psychology by unifying person ing, decision making). These processes are 46
47 and process aspects. recursive and the relation between process- 47
48 « 2 »  I have always been interested in es and products is complementary. Bringing 48
49 constructing patterns that connect (rather high sensitivity to the influences of struc- 49
50 than disconnect or divide) the social and tural societal factors, such as power imbal- 50
51 natural sciences and the theories devel- ance relations, into the reflection on how 51
52 oped within their disciplines. During more people construct their worlds, I have joined 52
53 than twenty years of teaching, my students authors such as Rudi Dallos, Ros Draper, 53
54 of social work, psychotherapy, and educa- and Amy Urry (Dallos & Draper 2010; Dal- 54
55 tion (e.g., teaching, social education, and los & Urry 1999). These authors comple- 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°3

 Second-Order Cybernetics
column A
1 mented the notion of second-order cyber-
2 netics with a “third-order” one – not as a
3 different epistemology but as an additional
4 recursion or a variation of the constructivist
5 paradigm, with important implications for
6 the life quality of human population and so-
7 cial justice. It is what Scott, in §39, refers to
8 as “social constructionism.” In my opinion,
9 the role of dominant public discourses per-
10 formed by social elites and unconsciously
11 internalised (i.e., ingrained in their inner
12 dialogues, which progressively become sat-
13 urated with those dominant narratives) and
14 lived out by the public, as reflected in the
15 work of Michel Foucault (1980) and other
16 critical theory authors, has to be explicitly
17 articulated and emphasised when we talk
18 about the epistemology of second-order
19 cybernetics. Foucault, in a personal com-
20 munication with Hubert Dreyfus and Paul
21 Rabinow (1983: 187), asked: “We know
22 what we think; we think we know what we
23 do; but do we know what what we do does?”
24 Tracking down the effects of our cognitive
25 acts for other people’s lives, Michael White
26 (2011: xxviii) could identify one of their
27 origins: the expert knowledge twisted to-
28 gether with the new forms of power thus
29 creating the “politics” (in the general sense
30 of relating to other people and directing
31 their behaviour by using our power) of
32 widely accepted and unquestioned “expert
33 power” in any field of expertise. The reflec-
34 tion on the consequences of the structural
35 factors for how we, as humans, socially con-
36 struct our realties needs to be complement-
37 ed with a reflexiveness on how our expert
38 knowledge, along with our gender-, class-,
39 culture-based identities, enters and effects
40 our conversation with others in whatever
41 interactional context.
42 « 5 »  So, rather than a worldview, I pre-
43 fer to understand the epistemology of sec-
44 ond- and third-order cybernetics as an atti-
45 tude towards oneself, the others, and life or
46 world as one constructs them, reflected in
47 one’s continuous endeavour to make his or
48 her thoughts, decisions, feelings, values, etc.
49 congruent with actions and vice versa. That
50 is how, according to Gordon Pask (in Scott
51 2001c), we construct conceptual (“know-
52 ing why”) and procedural (“knowing how”)
53 knowledge (Scott 2001c) in different con-
54 texts of dialogical practice. That is how we
55 make it our experiential knowledge about
column A
Cybernetics and Synergetics Lea Šugman Bohinc
column B column C
the world, constructed and lived through linear interactions among the system’s ele- 1
as our “lived experience” (White & Epston ments, which can themselves be complex 2
1990: 9). Again, it is our conversation part- systems. Understanding the circumstances 3
ners (students or clients or service users, that can potentially stimulate a complex 4
to use the traditional linear terminology, system to adapt to those very circumstances 5
as well as our colleagues, family, and com- by reorganizing its operational patterns 6
munity co-members etc.) who feed their can increase the chances of creating an 7
understanding of our related congruence encouraging environment for processes of 8
or incongruence back to us. It is they who (desired, needed, agreed upon) change. In 9
teach us about the consequences of our acts other words, it is useful to understand the 10
in interaction with them. The precondition changes in the environment that, when in- 11
for that to happen is an established relation- terpreted in a certain way, serve as stimula- 12
ship context, mutually perceived as safe and tion for the complex system to reorganize 13
trustworthy. To acknowledge the meaning its operational patterns and thus adapt to 14
of lived experience is to acknowledge the the new circumstances. Synergetics has 15
complexity of any conversation participant been used and proved meaningful and suc- 16
(i.e., one or more of his or her constructed cessful in many disciplines, such as psycho- 17
selves or voices or “psycho-social individu- therapy (e.g., Schiepek et al. 2005a, 2005b; 18
als,” as Scott refers to Pask in §§24f, 36–38, Schiepek, Tominschek & Heinzel 2014) 19
and 40) in both their individual (autono- and social work (Sommerfeld et al. 2005), 20
mous) and social (relational) self (Flaskas as well as in psychology, education, organi- 21
2002: 91). zational sciences, economy, linguistics, etc. 22
and, of course, in different fields of biology 23
Synergetics (e.g., in ecology), physics etc. 24
« 6 »  Generally speaking, conversation « 8 »  Personally, I have used synergetics 25
participants can be interpreted as self-orga- in the last two research projects on which 26
nizing systems in which nonlinear interac- I have collaborated. One deals with the 27
tions (at the microscopic level) might result change processes in teaching and learning 28
in emergent new patterns (at the macro- as well as giving support and help to chil- 29
scopic level), such that an observer can dren in a school setting, the other deals with 30
interpret them as a (new) self-organizing multi-challenged families in their commu- 31
system in itself (§§13, 37). In the history nities. Furthermore, I teach synergetic the- 32
of ideas, cybernetics as a transdisciplinary ory of complexity to my students of social 33
science of patterns and complex systems is work, systemic psychotherapy, and educa- 34
referred to as one of the main origins for tion. The more experienced they are in their 35
another transdisciplinary science of self- profession, the more they find this concep- 36
organizing processes, i.e., synergetics (see, tual and procedural framework meaningful 37 523
e.g., Haken 1983, 2006, 2009). and useful. The bachelor’s students usually 38
« 7 »  Since 2005, I have been using interpret it as very abstract and difficult to 39
synergetics as an experimentally support- grasp; the master’s students, who already 40
ed theory for describing and dealing with have work experience, report that their in- 41
complex living and non-living systems tellectual and practical knowledge finally 42
through a perspective of interpretive (mac- becomes integrated, and holistically as well 43
roscopic) common principles. The “generic as critically reflected. The doctoral students 44
principles of synergetics” (see Schiepek et make use of synergetics in their research de- 45
al. 2005a, 2005b) make it possible to over- sign and interpretive synthesis of analysed 46
come the traditional split between natural data whenever they are dealing with pro- 47
and social science by integrating them into cesses of change in the functioning of com- 48
one unified conceptual and methodological plex systems. 49
framework (Šugman Bohinc in press). The 50
main focus of synergetics is the explora- Conclusion 51
tion of the conditions in which a complex « 9 »  Understanding the interconnect- 52
system spontaneously, i.e., in a self-orga- edness and embeddedness of biopsycho- 53
nizing and qualitative manner, changes the social complex systems in other complex 54
pattern of its operation as a result of non- systems, e.g., cells within organs within a 55
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 column A column B column C
1 brain/body within a family within a com- Author’s Response to make sense of this mess and inspired me 1
munity within state administrative systems to become an enthusiastic scholar. It is thus
2
3 as well as socially constructed norms, roles,
On Becoming and Being no surprise that Vincent Kenny’s impassioned
2
3
4 identities, etc., enables us to bridge the di- a Cybernetician account of the sorry state of psychology 4
5 chotomies that have been developed in resonates with me. I see a properly-founded 5
6 the last century, such as micro and macro Bernard Scott and articulated cybernetic psychology as the 6
7 context, individual and social, theory and “psychological psychology” he seeks. I am 7
8 practice, evidence-based and practice-based > Upshot • I discuss further why my pro- certainly not advocating any kind of “glue” 8
9 research, etc. emerging in psychology, as posals may not be taken up by all and say (§1). I see my proposed foundations and 9
10 Scott claims in many sections throughout more about their usefulness, my under- conceptual framework not only as unify- 10
11 his article. Our understanding that interac- standing of what it is to be a cyberneti- ing but also as filters that sift out and reject 11
12 tions (e.g., conversations) of complex, self- cian and the underlying coherent form dross. 12
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics

13 organizing biopsychosocial systems, such as that I see amongst different “versions” « 2 »  I was inspired, eventually, to re- 13
14 human beings, produce emergent complex, of cybernetics. I also elaborate on what is gard myself as being a cybernetician. Heinz 14
15 self-organizing systems of a different order social about psychosocial unities (P-indi- von Foerster stated that 15
16 can serve as a bridge over the conceptual viduals) and elaborate their relevance for 16
17
18
distinctions and divisions brought forth in
the development of psychology and other
studies of social systems. “  we need a theory of the observer. Since it is
only living organisms which would qualify as be-
17
18
19 social and natural sciences along with the « 1 »  I am happy that my commentators ing observers, it appears that this task falls to the 19
20 very split between those two categories of are generally supportive of my proposal that biologist. But he himself is a living being, which 20
21 scientific research. The notion of construc- cybernetics can provide a unifying frame- means that in his theory he has not only to ac- 21
22 tivist (social constructionist) epistemology work and foundations for psychology. (As a count for himself, but also for his writing this 22
23
24
and the common principles offered by the
transdisciplinary sciences of complexity,
point of clarification, when I refer to “cyber-
netics,” I mean the complementary union
”
theory. (Foerster 2003: 247) 23
24
25 such as cybernetics and synergetics, have of both first- and second-order cybernet- Thus the aim of second-order cybernetics 25
26 laid the foundations for a more unified and ics.) However, I quite understand that, as is to explain the observer to herself. He also 26
27 integrated approach to the complexities of pointed out by several commentators, this stated that “Life cannot be studied in vitro, 27
28 life. It can be a self-reflective and self-re- proposal will not be acceptable to everyone. one has to explore it in vivo” (ibid: 248). I 28
29 flexive, socially critical and responsible ap- Many domain specialists in any discipline took these ideas to heart. As a transdisci- 29
30 proach to participating in conversations that lack an interest in the more holistic issues pline, cybernetics empowered me to cross 30
31 would lead to creating complex answers to of foundations and conceptual unification. disciplinary boundaries. This was exhilarat- 31
32 the complex challenges of our time. They have other priorities. Many have cog- ing. I also understood other transdisciplines 32
33 nitive styles (by habit or heritage) that are (systems theory, general semantics, syner- 33
34 Lea Šugman Bohinc is an assistant professor at not conducive to this sort of contempla- getics) to be quite cognate with cybernetics 34
35 the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Work tion (for more about individual differences and, at a high enough level of abstraction, 35
36 and Faculty of Education, and at the Sigmund Freud in cognition and learning, see Scott 1993). despite differences in terminology, to have 36
524 37 University in Ljubljana, Faculty of Psychotherapy 1
But I do believe that many can benefit if my conceptual structures homomorphic or iso- 37
38 Science. Her research interests include the epistemology proposal is adopted. As noted in my article, morphic with those of cybernetics.3 38
39 of help, postmodern collaborative approaches to my early exposure to cybernetics certainly « 3 »  In response to Arnold-Cathalifaud 39
40 help, common factors in successful psychotherapy helped me. As an undergraduate student of & Thumala-Dockendorff (§5), I should like to 40
41 and social work, and transdisciplinary sciences of psychology, I was an indifferent and poorly- point out that I see all “versions” of cyber- 41
42 complexity, such as cybernetics and synergetics. motivated student in the midst of what I netics as having a core commonality. It is 42
43 saw as a mess of a discipline, in which my obvious that every scholar or practitioner 43
44 Received: 12 June 2016 teachers, espousing different paradigms, will have her own narrative and ways of do- 44
45 Accepted: 15 June 2016 were incapable of constructive conversation 45
46 with one another.2 Cybernetics enabled me and economics are more internally consistent 46
47 than psychology. Of course, this depends on how 47
48 1 |  We also continue to have wide gaps be- one defines these fields. I certainly see competing 48
49 tween the two cultures of the sciences and the paradigms, especially if one adds the psychologi- 49
50 humanities. Many in the latter camp are quite “il- cal and sociological dimensions, without which 50
51 literate” when it comes to science, mathematics, the disciplines are very limited to the point of ir- 51
52 logic and technology. Arguably, popular writings relevance and sterility. 52
53 on these topics are helping to bridge the gaps. 3 | On the application of homomorphism 53
54 2 |  Marcelo Arnold-Cathalifaud and Daniela and isomorphism to conceptual structures, see 54
55 Thumala-Dockendorff (§3) assert that linguistics Pask, Kallikourdis & Scott (1975). 55
column A column B column C

Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°3


column A
1 ing things and that these may be undergoing
2 changes with experience and further study
3 and reflection. What I detect with cybernet-
4 ics is a commonality that evolved amongst a
5 community of scholars, where differences in
6 emphasis, terminology and areas of interest
7 and practice mask underlying agreements
8 and similarities of form. To emphasise what
9 I say in my article, I count amongst this
10 community certain central figures: Norbert
11 Wiener, Warren McCulloch, Ross Ashby,
12 Gregory Bateson, Stafford Beer, Gordon
13 Pask and Humberto Maturana. There are,
14 of course, precursors, not least Jean Piaget,
15 who embraced cybernetics when he en-
16 countered it. I thank Robert Martin for high-
17 lighting the significance of Piaget’s contribu-
18 tions (§§18f), which I did not stress in my
19 target article but which I perhaps should
20 have. Certainly, his work has been a central
21 influence in the development of conversa-
22 tion theory (see also below). I also thank
23 Martin for his more general endorsement of
24 my proposals and for his additional elabo-
25 rations of the significance of the concept of
26 circular causality.
27 « 4 »  I agree with Philip Baron (§§2–8)
28 that there are challenges to trying to take my
29 proposal forward. I have already noted that
30 not all students take to holistic thinking and,
31 of course, there are many institutional bar-
32 riers. Discussions about how best to place
33 cybernetics within educational curricula
34 have been going on since shortly after its
35 inception. The (now defunct) Department
36 of Cybernetics at Brunel University, where
37 I studied for my PhD, had postgraduate stu-
38 dents only, arguing that one needed to have
39 a strong disciplinary base before embarking
40 on transdisciplinary studies. I myself am a
41 supporter of Jerome Bruner’s concept of the
42 “spiral curriculum”:
43
44
“ 
A curriculum as it develops should revisit the
45 basic ideas repeatedly, building upon them until
46 the student has grasped the full formal apparatus
48
”
47 that goes with them (Bruner 1960: 13)
49
“ We begin with the hypothesis that any subject
50 can be taught effectively in some intellectually
51 honest form to any child at any stage of develop-
52 ment.
53
” (ibid: 33)
54 As a teacher at primary school level, I intro-
55 duced my pupils to the concept of circular
column A
Second-Order Cybernetics
Author’s Response Bernard Scott
column B column C
processes as part of encouraging them to netics.wordpress.com. I thank Eva Buchinger 1
gain some understanding of the ecosystem. for her discussion of Luhmann’s cybernetic 2
« 5 »  I also agree with Baron (§3) that macrotheory of functional social systems. It 3
a “dummy’s guide to cybernetics” could is beyond the scope of my article to com- 4
be useful.4 In 2010, with excellent tech- ment much further here, except to note 5
nical support, I produced a multimedia that the P-individual concept can be readily 6
“Dummy’s Guide to Learning Design” for extended to include the recursive nesting 7
the British Armed Forces (sadly, not avail- and the dynamics of interaction of social 8
able to the wider public), in which I em- actors at different levels.5 I also note that, as 9
bedded cybernetic concepts. Courses on Buchinger emphasises, sociology, as a disci- 10
learning to teach and learning to learn can pline, departs from psychology and social 11
readily include explicit reference to cyber- psychology when sociologists choose (as 12
netics. Diana Laurillard’s influential book, do Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann) 13
Rethinking University Teaching: A Conver- to study social systems that, by definition, 14
sational Framework for the Effective Use of have an autonomous existence beyond the 15
Learning Technologies (Laurillard 2002), level of individual human beings. One can, 16
although it does not explicitly mention cy- of course, draw on cybernetics in mak- 17
bernetics, uses Pask’s conversation theory as ing these studies (as do both Parsons and 18
the source if its core model for teaching and Luhmann). In contrast to the social systems 19
learning. Nigel Ford’s Web-Based Learn- of sociologists, P-individuals at the social 20
ing Through Educational Informatics (Ford system level have their existence in the 21
2008) makes even more extensive use of conversations (both internal and external) 22
the theories and research findings of Pask of particular human beings, not least those 23
and his research team. Ford states that his who hold ultimate responsibility and are ac- 24
disciplinary background is in “information countable for the form those social systems 25
science,” which of course can be considered take (kings, presidents, ministers of state, 26
as a part of the broader field of cybernetics. heads of institutions, leaders of professions 27
« 6 »  Not everyone who studies cyber- and so on). 28
netics becomes a cybernetician who studies « 7 »  It is also worth noting that Luh- 29
“the cybernetics of cybernetics.” There are mann follows Parsons in basing his concept 30
many scholars of cybernetics who look on of a psychic system on the controversial the- 31
only from their main area of practice and ories of Sigmund Freud and his followers.6 I 32
position themselves in the first instance as find Freud’s concept of “the unconscious”7 33
being historians, philosophers, architects, as a repository of repressed desires, hopes 34
biologists, sociologists, psychologists and and fears particularly troublesome. Stud- 35
so on. In doing so, I believe they miss the ies of brain dynamics and the processes 36
point, the sense of what it is to be a cyber- 37 525
netician and a member of the cybernetics 38
5 |  I refer the reader to the collection of my
community. Some of the commentators 39
papers Explorations in Second-Order Cybernetics
invite me to comment on issues and disci- 40
(Scott 2011), in which I discuss aspects of the cy-
plines, such as sociology, that are beyond my 41
bernetics of social systems in several chapters (5,
immediate concern with psychology. I agree 10, 15, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35 and 36).
42
that these topics are of interest and that cy- See also Scott (in press).
43
bernetics has a role to play in conceptual
clarification and unification. It is relevant to
6 |  Psychoanalysis was not included in the 44
45
undergraduate psychology syllabus that I studied,
note that there is a very active community as it was considered not to be open to refutation 46
of international scholars concerned with
“sociocybernetics,” see https://sociocyber-
and thus not scientific. See Popper (1963) for 47
48
a very influential critique of psychoanalysis. In
general, psychoanalysis plays only a small part in 49
50
4 |  In the 1970s, Frank George, Professor of mainstream psychology. In contrast, it frequently
Cybernetics at Brunel University, wrote Cyber- plays a major role in literary criticism. 51
netics (George 1976) as part of a “Teach Your- 7 | The term has entered popular culture, 52
53
self ” book series that was similar in intent to the along with other Freudian concepts (“ego,” “id,”
“Dummy’s Guide” books. Of its time, it does not “superego” and so on). Stingl (§6) seems to use 54
include reference to second-order cybernetics. the term uncritically. 55
column B column C
http://constructivist.info/11/3/601.scott
 column A
1 of learning and skill acquisition show that
2 many cognitive processes occur without
3 conscious awareness. This is discussed in
4 detail in Scott & Bansal (2014), which pres-
5 ents a cybernetic theory of consciousness
6 and “the unconscious,” understood as an
7 ongoing evolutionary process of conceptu-
8 alisation and internal and external conver-
9 sation.
10 « 8 »  In answer to a question from
11 Tilia Stingl (§4), the P-individual concept
12 cannot be applied at the neuronal level.8
Psychological Concepts in Second-Order Cybernetics
column B column C
on complex systems, nor do they reflexively have limited uptake amongst students and 1
acknowledge that their own academic en- practitioners of psychology. However, for 2
deavours are a part of an evolving, complex, those who do take the proposals on board I 3
self-organising system of academic activity see great benefits, not least the insights and 4
and that, as participant observers, they are understandings provided by second-order 5
engaged in bringing about changes in scien- cybernetics concerning the human condi- 6
tific discourse of the same kind as they claim tion, which I believe should be promulgated 7
are happening. I am reasonably sure that widely. I am further persuaded that I should 8
this circularity is virtuous. This can be use- broaden the scope of my proposals to in- 9
fully contrasted with the Cibercultura y De- clude the social sciences more widely. Ac- 10
sarrollo de Comunidades de Conocimiento cordingly, I am now considering writing an 11
research programme of El Centro de Inves- introductory text with the provisional title 12

13 P-individuals are psychosocial unities that tigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Ciencias y An Introduction to Cybernetics for the Social 13
14 emerge within human communities. I dis- Humanidades (CEIICH) at La Universidad Sciences, in which I will bear in mind that… 14
15 cuss the ontogeny and ontological status of Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), 15
16
17
P-individuals in some detail in Scott (2007)
and Scott & Shurville (2011). The works of
http://www.ceiich.unam.mx/0/20Ciberc.
php, in which the self and other observation
“  social cybernetics must be a second-order cy-
bernetics – a cybernetics of cybernetics – in order
16
17
18 Piaget, Lev Vygotsky and George Herbert of the observers of observers of observed that the observer who enters the system shall be 18
19 Mead play central roles in these accounts, systems plays a central role. allowed to stipulate his own purpose […] [I]f we 19
20 alongside references to the ideas of Pask, « 11 »  Stingl also asks for comment on fail to do so, we shall provide the excuses for those 20
21 von Foerster and Maturana. recent work in psychotherapy that is in- who want to transfer the responsibility for their 21
22
23
« 9 »  In her question concerning levels
and interactions of different systems, Stingl
formed by cybernetic concepts (§14). As
described in Scott (1987) and as evident 286)
”
own actions to somebody else. (Foerster 2003: 22
23
24 (§9) refers approvingly to an article by Rog- in the commentary by Lea Šugman Bohinc, 24
25 ers Hollingsworth and Karl Müller (2008). there is a long tradition of the use of cyber- Acknowledgements 25
26 Interesting though this article is, by their netic concepts in psychotherapy. I see this I thank the editors for their hard work 26
27 own declaration, the “new paradigm” they as an excellent justification for taking my in putting this special issue together and I 27
28 promote (“Science II”) is monistic. They proposals seriously. thank the authors of the open peer com- 28
29 contrast with the the ontological Cartesian « 12 »  In her very informative com- mentaries for taking on the task of reading 29
30 dualism found in “Science I” (ibid: Tables 1 mentary, Šugman Bohinc refers to a third- and commenting on my article. 30
31 and 6). The complex systems and networks order cybernetics. In the literature, there 31
32 they refer to, whatever their origins in par- are several attempts to invoke higher levels Received: 30 June 2016 32
33 ticular disciplines, are just that: complex of cybernetics. One can certainly do this. Accepted: 4 July 2016 33
34 systems and networks. For them, it is a vir- However, it is important to recognise that, 34
35 tue that the “natural” and the “social” can be as Šugman Bohinc does, higher levels, whilst 35
36 studied with similar models and methods having explanatory usefulness, do not add 36
526 37 and that, because of this, the distinctions anything new epistemologically. This point 37
38 between disciplines can be voided. This is was made by von Foerster (2003: 301). The 38
39 in contrast to the P-/M-individual distinc- key step is the transcendence to a new do- 39
40 tion, which is a theoretical, analytic way of main, the second-order domain in which 40
41 distinguishing the “social” and “symbolic” reflexivity is introduced. Šugman Bohinc re- 41
42 from the “natural” and the “mechanical.”9 fers to her interest in power relations as re- 42
43 « 10 »  In cybernetic terms, the different vealed in discourse and social interaction. I 43
44 disciplinary studies Hollingsworth & Müller see this concern as one that is central in sec- 44
45 refer to are all first-order: they are studies of ond-order cybernetics and I thank her for 45
46 observed systems. Interestingly, cybernetics raising this topic, which features as a major 46
47 (first- or second-order) is not mentioned by theme at conferences on sociocybernetics. 47
48 name in their account of the history of work Some of my own thoughts about this can be 48
49 found in Scott (2006). 49
50 8 |  Incidentally, whilst Stingl repeatedly attri- « 13 »  Having read the commentaries, I 50
51 butes the P-/M-individual to me, it is, of course, as am even more persuaded that my proposals 51
52 I hope is clear in my article, originally due to Pask. concerning cybernetic foundations and a 52
53 9 |  Pask (1979) is a forceful critique of the unifying conceptual framework for psychol- 53
54 limitations and dangers of what he refers to as ogy have merit. I acknowledge that the pro- 54
55 “systemic monism.” posals face institutional barriers and may 55
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Constructivist Foundations vol. 11, N°3

 Second-Order Cybernetics
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