Social Networks and Macrosocial Change: Annual Review of Sociology

SO43CH11-Erikson ARI 20 July 2017 13:12
Annual Review of Sociology
Social Networks and

Macrosocial Change
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Emily Erikson and Nicholas Occhiuto

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2017.43:229-248. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Department of Sociology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06511;

email: emily.erikson@yale.edu, nicholas.occhiuto@yale.edu
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2017. 43:229–48 Keywords

First published as a Review in Advance on May 17, social network theory, comparative historical sociology, collective action,
2017
state formation, economic development, policy diffusion
The Annual Review of Sociology is online at
soc.annualreviews.org Abstract
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-060116- Social networks are heavily implicated in large-scale social transformations.
053633
They are both transformed and transformative. We review the ways in which
Copyright c 2017 by Annual Reviews. social networks act as agents of change in macrohistorical processes, stress-
All rights reserved
ing two distinct theoretical approaches. Formalism analyzes the structure of
networks. Relationalism evaluates the linking properties of networks. Using
these two approaches to organize the literature, we present the current state
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229
INTRODUCTION
Patterns of relationships are essential components of macrosocial transformation. From the ear-
liest days of sociological inquiry, sociologists have identified changes in relational patterns as a
central mechanism in the transition to modernity. For Ferdinand Tönnies (1887), the shift from
natural to rational will was of crucial importance because it pushed patterns of interactions away
from closed, densely connected groups and toward large populations of disconnected and shifting
individuals. The change in relational patterns transformed community into society while simulta-
neously stimulating the emergence of science and the state. Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, and
Karl Marx all put a similar emphasis on the central importance of patterns of relations in the social
transformations taking place in industrializing European countries. Contemporary comparative
historical sociology continues to embrace a view of society shaped by network structure, as for
example in the work of Mann (1986).
The importance of changes in the structure of relationships between individuals is so great
that it can be difficult to separate it out from change itself. Networks are so intimately bound
up with society that many have argued that social structure should be understood as the sum
total of relationships and relational patterns that guide and constrain individual behavior and
produce the interactional sites and routines that we experience as institutions and organizations.
Such a perspective implies that a thorough description of meaningful macrosocial change requires
charting the patterns of networks as they unfold over time.
Although compelling, this approach to social structure can obscure the role of networks as
agents of change in and of themselves—and little ambiguity remains as to the existence of network
effects. Decades of research have made it clear that relationships between actors, and not just
the actors linked by those relations, have an independent effect on many crucial social processes,
which makes it important to distinguish social networks from social structure to evaluate the role of
networks in stimulating and channeling large-scale social, economic, and political transformations.
We consider the effects of social networks and their structure on four outcomes of interest
in studies of macrosocial change: civil uprising, state formation, policy formation and diffusion,
and economic development and inequality. Social network research is a diverse field in terms of
theoretical and methodological approaches. We map out two major styles of research that stake
out different theoretical and conceptual claims about how networks should be applied within each
category. In conclusion, we identify areas of theoretical and methodological innovation in the
application of social network research to historical change: the study of institutional emergence
and computational models of network dynamics.
DEFINING SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CHANGE

Let us first emphatically state that social networks hold a unique potential for both instigating
and explaining globally significant, macrosocial transitions. Social networks are interstitial co-
ordinating mechanisms. They have a unique capacity to exist outside, within, and across formal
organizations, groups, and hierarchies. Because of this quality, they can coordinate the actions
of individuals excluded from institutionalized bases of collective power—and therefore facilitate
cooperation between those who may be interested in transforming or, even, razing existing struc-
tures. Some sociologists have argued that all social movements are social networks (Gerlach & Hine
1970, Curtis & Zurcher 1973, Diani & McAdam 2003, Diani 2015), as social movements must span
different organizations and groups if they are to be successful. In this sense, networks can be under-
stood as proto-organizations that act as both sources and templates for change (White 1992, 2008).
For networks to be agents of social change, however, they must be empirical phenomena, not
merely observational tools, which is not how the term is always used. The term social network is
230 Erikson · Occhiuto

often used to refer to a methodology, rather than a social agent or object. Here we refer to the
methods unique to social network research as social network analysis. The term social network
we reserve for a set of actors and relations. Within this set, there may be one type of relation or
many. Relations may be present or absent. And actors may be directly linked, indirectly linked, or
disconnected from each other. As we use it, the term can refer to three unrelated actors (a null triad)
(Figure 1a), an informal network of communication between employees of a firm (Figure 1b),
or the structure of corporate partnership in late-imperial Russia (Figure 1c).
Null triad Informal network

a b
Network of corporate partnership
Figure 1
(a) Null triad, (b) informal network, and (c) network of corporate partnership. Panel b adapted with permission from Erikson & Samila
(2016). Panel c adapted with permission from Hillmann & Aven (2011).
www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 231

The null triad in this example is not a set of three separate individuals but three disconnected
actors in which the absence of relations produces a structural effect. The social network research
that we cover here identifies or assesses the effects of (a) the relations between actors or (b) the
pattern of relations between actors. The different types of effects are associated with two well-
conceived theoretical traditions within social network analysis. One of the reasons the study of
social networks is such a promising field is that we do not perceive social networks directly. This
means the study of networks can produce entirely new and often counterintuitive insights into
social processes. It also means that we need theoretical tools to conceptualize social networks.
Two distinct and largely successful approaches to theorizing social networks have evolved over
time, which we refer to as formalism and relationalism (Erikson 2013).
Formalism is concerned with structural patterns, or the configuration of social networks, and
the effects these patterns have on society or social actors. Georg Simmel is the forefather of this
theoretical framework. His work on, for example, the triad, exemplifies many of the strengths
of the approach. The triad, for Simmel, is a form that exists outside the ideal and material world
in the realm of the social. The pattern of ties within the triad has a generalizable capacity to alter
the content of relations and the subjective states of the individuals engaged within them (Simmel
1950). For example, triads introduce the possibility of strategic action and coalition formation—
impossible in dyadic interactions. The formalist tradition is concerned with identifying different
network configurations and structural patterns and understanding their impact on social processes.
Simmel’s approach is grounded theoretically in a Kantian interpretation of social forms as fixed,
a priori objects that make social life possible. Formalist researchers have had great success in
demonstrating that the structure of networks has a significant impact on numerous social processes
through the way in which different structural patterns amplify, restrict, or regulate access to
information, influence, emotions, resources, and currency.
In contrast, relationalism focuses on the linking function of the relationships that make up social
networks. Relationalists reject the idea of fixed and discrete entities (Emirbayer 1997). Instead,
they posit that social actors are fluid and dynamic entities produced by the interconnections
between actors. Thus, there is a tension between the two approaches. Relationalists have achieved
great success in demonstrating that social actors are constructed and defined by their relationships,
which shift and change over time. They tend to avoid consideration of the formal effects of network
structure—such as centralization, density, or path length—which have a static, a priori character
that is often applied across contexts by formalists.
We break down the literature into these two categories because the underlying conceptualiza-
tions of networks are quite different. Relationalists are interested in social networks but less so in
their structural patterns. Formalists focus on those patterns but care less about the different types
of groups or actors linked via those networks. These very significant differences in what is being
evaluated as the agent of change lead to different types of findings.
We also restrict ourselves to the impact of social networks on instances of macrosocial change,
which we use to refer to discontinuities or transitions that have global significance. Thus, for
example, we do not review a large literature on social networks and social movements that is
focused on the determinants of social movements rather than their consequences. We do not
include spatial or neighborhood models or other work that can be interpreted through the
lens of networks but does not employ network analysis explicitly. Despite these exclusions, our
object of interest remains broad, including both informal and formal relations; bounded and
linked social groups; the pattern of social relations that hold together communities and soci-
eties; and, because these actors, relations, communities, and societies evolve over time, relational
dynamics.

REVOLUTIONS AND CIVIL WAR

A relationalist perspective is particularly strong in the social movements literature. Its strength is
evident in the way prominent and influential practitioners including Diani, Goodwin, McAdam,
Mische, and Tilly have both embraced and championed it (Tilly 1978, 2004, 2005; Emirbayer &
Goodwin 1994; Diani & McAdam 2003; Mische 2011).
A central contribution of the relationalist approach in social movements has been the identifica-
tion and assessment of the role of social networks in recruitment. This contribution is quintessen-
tially relationalist owing to its emphasis on the substance of the links between individuals as prior
to and productive of social movements themselves. The relations are constitutive of the actors—a
central tenet of relationalism. The importance of social networks to recruitment has been shown
to hold for revolutionary contexts. Preexisting networks channeled women’s recruitment into the
Salvadoran guerrilla army (Viterna 2006), university ties spread participation in the Protestant Ref-
ormation (Kim & Pfaff 2012), neighborhood and National Guard recruitment networks mobilized
workers in the Paris Commune (Gould 1991, 1993), and personal ties increased the likelihood of
joining the civil rights movement (McAdam 1986, 1988; Fernandez & McAdam 1988) as well as
protesting in the East German Revolution (Opp & Gern 1993). In recent uprisings of the Arab
Spring, online networks of communication have had an impact on revolutionary participation
(Brym et al. 2014).
The relational emphasis on the importance of combining network analysis with cultural context
is evident in the work on revolutions. Tilly (1978), Viterna (2006), and Pfaff (1996) have emphasized
that the influence of these networks varies depending on the extent to which they touch on or
activate recognizable group identities. For example, building on Gould’s work, Viterna (2006)
found that women in El Salvador developed participation identities through their involvement
in political organizations. These identities led them to follow recruiters into the Salvadorian
revolutionary guerrilla army. Pfaff (1996) showed that informal social groups were an important
source of group identity spurring revolutionary action in the East German protests of 1989.
Group identity plays an essential role in explanations based on the impact of cross-cutting net-
works. In these cases, the linking function of the network, which connects various disparate groups
into effective and active cross-national coalitions, is emphasized over the structural characteris-
tics of the network. This emphasis on linking over structure fits a relational rather than formal
framework. Cross-cutting social networks played a crucial role in the success of revolutionary
uprisings in Iran, Nicaragua, and France and in the recent Arab revolts. Foran & Goodwin (1993)
found that a broad, multiclass coalition linking clerics, intellectuals, striking workers, merchants,
artisans, students, officer workers, professionals, and shantytown residents formed the backbone
of the Iranian Revolution. A similarly broad coalition emerged in Nicaragua, including peasants,
agricultural workers, and a substantial fraction of the national bourgeoisie in addition to the groups
above. Barkey (1991) found that large-scale, sustained peasant rebellions in France were the result
of strong peasant-noble alliances against the absolutist state. More recently, Goldstone (2011)
found a series of cross-class coalitions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya fostered mobilization. The
mesh of cross-national alliances across all these instances made revolutionary action possible.
A formalist tradition that emphasizes the generalizable importance of structural patterns for
revolutionary outcomes also exists. As Goldstone (2003) has noted, researchers have long found
that community cohesion both enables and sustains community mobilization. Barkey & Van
Rossem (1997) found that cohesive villages with strong internal solidarity were most likely to
engage in contention in the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire. The resistance of internally
cohesive communities to state penetration has been identified as an independent effect fostering
revolutionary activity in the Iranian Revolution (Skocpol 1982). The creation of spaces temporarily

disconnected from state actors can foment revolution, as occurred in religious festivals that fed
into the Indian Rebellion of 1857 (Rao & Dutta 2012) and within the protective architecture that
fostered student uprisings in the Beijing protests of 1989 (Zhao 1998).
The impact of cohesion in these studies, however, must be weighed against indications that
cohesion may also have a dampening effect. Too much internal cohesion has damaged the integrity
of resistance movements over time (Goodwin 1997). Communities comprised entirely of dense,
kin-based clusters have historically shown little capacity to engage in effective collective action
(Banfield 1958, Granovetter 1973, Safford 2009, Small 2009), let alone successful revolutionary
activity. Brokers that build connections across groups through diverse ties build coalitions capable
of sustained state resistance. Cross-coalition brokers, for example, were central to the construction
of parliamentary opposition to Charles I and, through this, the onset of the English Civil War
(Hillmann 2008b). Brokerage can be understood as a portable formalization of the relationalist
emphasis on cross-cutting ties. Both sit awkwardly with the finding that increasing community
cohesion facilitates revolutionary activity or civil uprising. Cross-cutting ties and group-boundary
spanning brokerage ties do not increase in-group cohesion but are instead likely to decrease in-
group cohesion by directing relational energy outside the group.
These contradictory findings may be resolved within a formal approach. For example, cohesion
may have a curvilinear effect, dampening mobilization and revolutionary prospects at the extremes
but providing an ideal environment for uprising when cohesion is still high but enough bridg-
ing ties are present. Increased network connectivity in these cases could translate into increased
coordinative capacity. Although plausible, this possibility ultimately needs empirical testing.
The effects of cross-cutting networks, cohesion, and brokerage may also all depend on the
larger network structure of the society in which they are activated. Such an approach requires
preserving the relationalist emphasis on cross-cutting networks but embedding it within a larger,
formal description of the network structure of society. Mapping the social relational structure of a
society is a daunting and data-intensive task and has generally been undertaken only in the context
of dedicated monographs. In perhaps the first major comparative historical work to take a networks
approach, Bearman (1993) accomplished this combination in his explanation of the determinants
of the English Civil War. He showed that the structure of relations between gentry in seventeenth-
century England shifted away from a kin-based pattern into a patronage system that articulated its
claims for legitimacy and authority within abstract religious terms ambiguous enough to transcend
local political factions, thereby setting the stage for the English Civil War. The work preserves a
relational emphasis on the importance of cross-cutting relations and formally analyzes the struc-
tural pattern through which those ties reshape the connections between existing sections of society.
Gould (1995) achieved something similar in Insurgent Identities, which documents the existence of
multiple types of social networks (e.g., kinship, religion, neighborhood, credit) and considers the
structure of the overlap between groups in bringing about the 1871 Paris Commune. Although
these studies provide persuasive accounts of the larger social structural shifts that engendered civil
uprising, the number of studies conducted at this scale and level of detail as of now limits the
possibility of generalizing findings about the social structural preconditions of mass uprising.
STATES
Social networks have also proved to be significant elements in processes of state formation, which
are not entirely distinct from the causes and consequences of civil uprising. As with the literature
on revolutions and social movements, relationalists emphasize the linking function of cross-group
social networks. A robust finding is that associational networks—which wend in and out of classes,
ethnicities, and regions—have played an important role in the emergence of the nation-state across

diverse contexts. In Switzerland, a network of ties between civic associations created the frame-
work for the emergence of its distinctive multiethnic structure (Wimmer 2011). In Japan, links
between arts groups—aesthetic networks—provided a foundation for the emerging Meiji Empire
(Ikegami 2005). Associational membership ties spanning the British Empire fostered connections
and aligned interests between the American colonies and the London metropole, facilitating the
emergence of the imperial state (Olson 1992). Multivariate analysis further corroborates the im-
portance of ties between civic associations across a variety of emerging nations (Wimmer 2015).
In an innovative step, Kroneberg & Wimmer (2012) used a formal model to explore various pa-
rameters of state formation and found that cross-cutting networks of civic associations produced
nation-states in centralized regimes. When civic networks were absent, populism and ethnic clo-
sure (rather than nation-states) arose. It is important to note here that this work considers links
between civic associations, not the existence of civic associations. Thus, for example, the finding
is not inconsistent with the documented relationship between the presence of civic associations
and fascist support within regions of Italy (Riley 2005). It does suggest, however, that these Italian
associations had weak or exclusively local interorganizational networks. Cross-cutting interorga-

nizational ties also appear to have played a role in the consolidation of state power in the United
States. Carpenter (2001) demonstrated that the rise of bureaucratic autonomy within the US
government depended on the construction of networks of alliances that freed agencies from the
demands of any one party or interest group.
At a higher level of generality, Tilly (2004, 2005) combined the literature on networked forms of
trust and state formation to argue that effective states rely on social networks for the resources they
create through their unique ability to produce interpersonal trust, cooperation, and commitment.
Tilly persuasively maintained that successful states require socially generated resources that only
trust networks can provide.
Elite networks appear to be a particularly important subset of trust networks. McLean (2004,
2011) found that in Poland, the parallel development of elite expansion and superelite consolida-
tion set the stage for the modernizing national political reform of 1791. Elite coalitions, in the
form of protection pacts, have served as the basis of durable authoritarian regimes in Southeast
Asia (Slater 2010). And patron-broker-client networks have played a central role in early modern
state formation processes. As shown by Kettering (1986), Cardinal Richelieu built up a ministerial
network of clients through which he funneled royal patronage in return for loyalty and support at
the provincial level. The French state continued to exert control through this system of patrons,
brokers, and clients throughout the seventeenth century. The network both extended state power
into the provinces and circumvented the aristocratic networks of patron-client relations that had
the potential to block state expansion and centralization. McLean (2007) demonstrated the im-
portance of Florentine patronage networks to local processes of Italian city-state formation, and
in a later period, Blok (1974) made a powerful argument that the Sicilian mafia—and the network
of violence and patronage it represented—was used by nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century
Italian elites to centralize state power through the imposition of strong vertical control.
Blok and McLean’s examples also demonstrate the limits of these patron-client relations, as
the critical brokerage positions that embedded mafiosi into national power structures and local
communities also allowed them to undermine state reforms as the twentieth century progressed
and elite networks in Florence ultimately undermined state expansion. Indeed, patron-client and
patrimonial networks have been deeply implicated in the failure of many states to transition into
modern, centralized systems of governance. Dutch patrimonial networks, for example, first pro-
pelled the expansion of state capacity for the newly united Dutch Republic, but—stretched to
their capacity by the eighteenth century—ultimately constrained further development, delaying
the onset of the industrial revolution in the Netherlands (Adams 1994, 2005). Similarly, after the

consolidation of Medici power in Florence, patron-client relations in that city—once an engine

of state centralization—became a hindrance over time, significantly slowing the transition to the
modern state in Italy (McLean 2005). Thus, it is generally accepted that these types of patronage
networks are effective only for early stages in the development of state power, after which bu-
reaucratic organization and informal institutions are necessary to manage large populations. This
should not, however, be taken to mean that patrimonial patronage networks have disappeared
from the modern world, as there is ample evidence of their persistence and perhaps resurgence
(Adams & Charrad 2011).
A microlevel approach, which might be termed strong-program formalism, appears in John
Levi Martin’s book Social Structures (2009), in which he formally defined patronage networks,
the armed forces, and political parties by describing them as specific patterns of relations between
actors. He argued that antitransitive patronage networks form the rudiments of more sophisticated
command structures that evolve into armed forces with the introduction of relational transitivity.
This process transforms patronage networks from structures in which clients answer only to
their immediate patron to hierarchical trees in which commands may be issued and obeyed along
all vertical sets of relations. Martin then traces the formation of political parties to the structural
merger of horizontally linked blocs and vertically linked patronage networks. Ultimately, he argues
that these two structures, armed forces and parties, form the core of the modern nation-state, thus
providing an explanation for the nation-state that revolves around the concatenation of different
microlevel relational patterns.
In work that emphasizes the importance of distinguishing different formal structures of broker-
age, Hillmann (2008a) demonstrated that brokerage ties within local elite factions allowed for the
preservation of local concerns in the face of a nationalizing political arena in eighteenth-century
revolutionary Vermont. The vertical ties of Kettering (1986), McLean (2007), and Blok (1974), in
contrast, contributed to the effacement of local identities. Hillmann’s work, however, is consistent
with the claim that early stages of state formation rely on linking the central government to local
communities via patronage networks.
Padgett & Ansell’s classic article “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400–1434” (1993)
bridges relational and formal approaches in a deeply contextualized account of state formation in
Renaissance Florence. Patterns of economic and marital ties in fifteenth-century Florentine society
created a context in which a central actor, Cosimo de Medici, was able to consolidate power—
thereby acting as an agent of state centralization. Theorists of empire have also emphasized a
version of culturally and institutionally embedded network centralization. Empires by definition
gather up and unite formerly disparate social and political units into new territories of rule; thus,
one might expect that social networks that cross the boundaries of imperial subunits necessarily
serve to integrate the larger whole. Barkey (2008) demonstrated persuasively that the hub-and-
spoke structure of Ottoman rule, in combination with organizational institutions of dominance
and a culture of tolerance, was an essential formal component of the empire. In a very different
context, and with different institutional mechanisms underpinning the formal impact of changes
in network structure, Adams (1996) showed how changes in the network of overseas trade linkages
between Europe and Asia, particularly the creation of new linkages that decreased the centrality
of the Dutch East India Company, threatened Dutch control over its overseas territories in the
eighteenth century by virtue of the way in which the flow of monies impacted principal agent
relations within the firm.
GLOBAL AND NATIONAL POLICY OUTCOMES

Elite networks also play a special role in the literature on policy outcomes. Networks of corpo-
rate board interlock, advocacy groups, and business roundtables all predict unified advocacy for

neoliberal trade policies (Dreiling & Darves 2011). More generally, board interlocks serve as a
coordinating mechanism for corporate actors, amplifying their ability to affect national legisla-
tion (Mizruchi 1992, Vogus & Davis 2005) and finance political candidates (Burris 2005). The
power of these networks to affect policy lies in their ability to integrate the elite communities they
served—thus, the linking function of the networks is emphasized.
The diffusion of policy at both national and global levels appears to be impacted strongly by
the existence of elite networks. In pioneering work, Gray (1973) showed that connections be-
tween interacting state officials within the United States increased the likelihood of implementing
new laws at the state level. The network of Chicago economists appears to have contributed to
the diffusion of privatization policies across the globe (Kogut & Macpherson 2008). And affili-
ations and comembership ties between international organizations have facilitated the creation
and diffusion of new global political norms. Evidence suggests that democratic tendencies diffused
across intergovernmental organization (IGO) ties from 1800 to 2000 (Wejnert 2005, Torfason &
Ingram 2010), the strength of national educational systems is positively affected by international
nongovernmental organization (INGO) membership (Schofer & Meyer 2005), and support for
women’s rights is increased through links to human rights INGOs (Wotipka & Ramirez 2008).
Other work puts a stronger emphasis on the structure of relations between nations in global
policy diffusion. Privatization policies are more likely to diffuse across structurally similar peer
nations (Meseguer 2004, Brooks 2005). Embeddedness in trade networks explains degrees of
central bank independence (Polillo & Guillén 2005), adoption of neoliberal policy (Henisz et al.
2005), and changes in the size of the public sector (Lee & Strang 2006). These network effects
all contribute to larger global trends toward democratization, liberalism, and neoliberal economic
policy. Because the focus in this literature has been on the positive effects of network ties, the
picture that has emerged is one in which diffusion of positive norms appears somewhat inevitable—
although it is difficult to be so optimistic as to believe this is actually the case. Disconnected,
weakly integrated elite networks reduce the ability of elites to institute change, with outcomes of
varying benefit to society. Fragmented merchant networks in eighteenth-century England led to
ineffective resistance to the abolition movement, contributing ultimately to the demise of British
slave trading (Böhm & Hillmann 2015). Disintegration of cohesive elite corporate networks in
late-twentieth-century US society, however, has contributed to national political gridlock and
polarization in the form of splintering extremist conservatism (Mizruchi 2013).
In an approach that combines rich contextualization with formal explanatory elements, Somers
(1993) demonstrated the importance of the network of links between national and local institu-
tions in the emergence of modern citizenship. She shows that popular citizenship emerged in
pastoral communities of eighteenth-century England because of the pattern of ties between the
state, justices of the peace, village constables, local merchants and businessmen, and the larger
community. The involvement of the merchants and businessmen in local governance, which was
absent in primarily arable areas, created an additional pathway of influence linking county and
village officials to the concerns of the local community. Thus, the pattern of structural connec-
tions between groups created a context in which even a villager could exercise his or her political
prerogative; by doing so, they created one of the earlier models of active citizenship.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY

An increasing pool of research demonstrates that social networks serve as conduits for the expan-
sion of global markets. Many of the researchers who work on global trade and emerging markets
are operating from well outside a relationalist framework and put a stronger emphasis on the link-
ing function of informal ties in this work than on the structural characteristics of the networks.
Immigrant ties have repeatedly been shown to increase overseas trade (Gould 1994, Rauch 2001,

Rauch & Trindade 2002, Wagner et al. 2002, Combes et al. 2005). Although the exact mechanisms
through which immigrant ties promote global trade links are not identified in these works, which
employ statistical analysis using nations as the unit of analysis, they advance a persuasive argu-
ment that immigrant ties increase information flow between potential trade partners and serve as
informal substitutes for formal governance systems, both of which are valuable functions in the
uncertain and complicated jurisdictional world of international commerce.
Similar mechanisms appear to underpin firms’ extensive use of networks in transitional periods
of economic growth. In her study of the role of guanxi in China (loosely translated as social con-
nections or social networks), Keister (2001, 2002) found that social relations influenced decision
making for firms in China’s largest business groups in the early stages of economic transition.
Drawing on interviews and panel data on China’s 40 largest business groups, she found that man-
agers relied on preexisting social ties to reduce the uncertainty that characterized China’s economy
in the early stages of reform. In related work, Wank’s (2002) findings suggest that although guanxi
remained crucial to firms entering the market, those relations diminished in importance for firms
that had established themselves. Informal networks have also been shown to provide a collective
foundation for instigating change in formal institutional structures to pave the way for continued
economic expansion in contemporary Chinese markets (Nee & Opper 2012, 2015).
Indeed, business groups and deliberative associations, which combine legally distinct firms
into functional units through combinations of informal and formal ties, appear to compensate for
the weak institutional environments endemic to transitional economies, thus allowing for growth
by fostering relational governance, promoting the circulation of information, increasing trust,
reducing uncertainty, and insulating firms from economic shocks (Gerlach 1992, Stark & Bruszt
1998, Stark & Vedres 2006).
In their work on Japan’s network economy, Lincoln et al. (1992) argued that belonging to the
keiretsu (a term referring to clusters of interlinked firms in Japan) reduced a firm’s costs and risk,
facilitated communication, promoted trust and reliability, and provided insulation from outside
competition.1 Nevertheless, in their examination of how profitability was affected by firm inte-
gration, Lincoln et al. (1996) found that whereas some Japanese firms derived substantial benefits
from their keiretsu affiliations, others were penalized. The keiretsu equalized their members by
smoothing inequality in financial returns across participating firms. In recent work that under-
scores the relationship between networks groups and the development phase of economic growth,
Lincoln & Gerlach (2004) suggest that Japan may be shedding its networked character. They
contend that with the bursting of the asset-price bubble in Japan in 1991 and a corresponding
decrease in cross shareholding, the prevalence and importance of keiretsu affiliations has declined.
Whereas these works focus on the effect of the existence of ties, there is a stronger emphasis on
the formal pattern of ties in works that address the relationship between international trade and
policy networks and contemporary rates of national economic development. Integration into the
global trade network is associated with national economic growth (Clark 2008). Although this effect
may perhaps be explained through industry spillover, a similar result holds for integration into
the network of INGOs, which also has a positive impact on economic growth (Clark 2010). This
second finding indicates that a normative or social process is at work. Higher levels of integration
into IGOs have also been shown to positively impact bilateral trade as well as foreign direct
investment (Ingram et al. 2005, Zhou 2010, Alcacer & Ingram 2013). In total, these findings suggest
1
Similar business groups have also been shown to exist in Korea. However, unlike the guanxi in China or the keiretsu in Japan,
the chaebŏl of Korea appear to be the result of state action (Maman 2002, Kong 2012).

that both trade and organizational ties may positively impact overseas commerce by encouraging
the transmission of social and cultural traits that facilitate cooperation and trust between nations.
Research on market development in premodern or developing contexts has also emphasized the
positive impact of network density on exchange. Numerous researchers have argued that mech-
anisms of relational governance and network exchange, which are facilitated by dense, cohesive
groups of actors, contribute significantly to sustained commercial exchange and market develop-
ment in precapitalist settings. In these cases, networks are often understood to substitute for ab-
sent or weak legal regimes that support contract enforcement and encourage the generalized trust
presumed necessary for market operations. Greif (1993) advanced the argument that merchant
coalitions—comprised in his case of small, dense, and stable groups of Maghribi traders—provided
a solution to the principal-agent problem that plagued overseas trade prior to strong legal institu-
tions. A growing literature is documenting the existence of relational governance systems, which
depend on reciprocity and the enforcement capacity of small groups, in developing economies
(Landa 1981, Nee & Opper 2012, Khanna & Palepu 2013).
As with patron-client networks, it is uncontroversial to assume that small-group structures

encourage market growth in early stages and later inhibit further development, when one-shot
and arm’s-length transactions promote competition within the market. It is generally assumed that
weak or bridging ties require the formal backing of strong institutional environments that protect
contract and property rights so that individuals may move out of small circles of trusted individuals.
However, the link between judicial enforcement and small-group exchange does not hold in the
negative, as there are many instances of relational governance and small-group exchange within
societies that offer strong legal institutions. Bernstein (1992) and Richman (2006), for example,
have both provided extensive evidence of relational governance in the US diamond industry,
which operates in an environment of strong legal protections. As Richman emphasizes, the ethnic
homogeneity and reputational mechanisms characteristic of many systems of relational governance
nevertheless provide a subpopulation of diamond merchants with an efficiency advantage over
merchants relying on the judicial system alone. Indeed, Greif ’s (1993) conclusions have also been
challenged on this front. Goldberg (2005) has contended that Greif overstates the cohesiveness of
the merchant group and its exclusive reliance on small-group enforcement processes. Similarly,
Edwards & Ogilvie (2012) argue that although Maghribi traders used informal sanctions, they
also resorted to legal enforcement.
Other recent research expands the formal side of this largely relational vein of work by suggest-
ing that other types of network connections play crucial roles in development processes. In the
transitioning economy of prerevolutionary Russia, Hillmann & Aven (2011) found that companies
linked by founders into a diverse pattern of exchange—not the small, exclusive groups of relational
governance—were the active locus of market expansion and vitality. Erikson (2014) found that the
increased macroconnectivity of the English East India Company’s trade network encouraged by
employee autonomy amplified the flow of valuable trade information in an uncertain, dynamic,
and information-poor market environment, thereby contributing to global market expansion. Us-
ing the same data, Erikson & Samila (2016) further established that the pattern of information
exchange about ports within the firm was not bound by small groups but was instead character-
ized by transient, weak-tie interactions. Other evidence of one-shot heterogeneous exchange has
been found in other early modern sites experiencing significant growth in weak institutional en-
vironments (Van Doosselaere 2009, Trapido 2013), indicating that further work on the structural
conditions for weak-tie or one-shot exchange in developing contexts may prove informative.
It is particularly worth exploring the impact of networks distinct from the small groups of rela-
tional governance, given that closed network structures have the potential to generate inequality
through the hoarding of knowledge, resources, and opportunities. Social networks have certainly

been identified as agents of inequality as well as agents of growth. DiMaggio & Garip (2012)
have already provided a thorough review of the formal mechanisms through which homophilous
processes of tie formation can increase inequality in complex societies.
Their call for additional research on the relationship between social networks and inequality
has been answered, although perhaps not yet in the quantity desired. Kim et al. (2015) presented a
more relational take that interestingly highlights the importance of cross-cutting networks in the
production of inequality; they demonstrated that abnormally high rates of compensation for CEOs
have diffused across homophilous executive networks and that these networks have contributed
significantly to the increasingly skewed income distribution in the United States. Patterns of
information diffusion across social networks in early modern trade also increased inequality across
ports in terms of the rate of overseas traffic. Merchants were more likely to hear about prospects
for trade at heavily traveled ports via social networks and therefore travel to them as part of an
attempt to mitigate uncertainty (Erikson & Samila 2015). Such trends can build into long-term
developmental impacts, such as those identified in world-systems research.
At a more formal extreme, Thomas & Mark (2013) built on earlier work linking structural en-
dogamy (families relinking via marriage over generations) to persistent inequality by constructing
a theoretical model that shows that the intergenerational reproduction of structural position via
kin networks may be responsible for the emergence of intergenerational inequality in prehistorical
settings. And at a different level of observation, world-systems researchers have long emphasized
the importance of the purely structural properties of global economic and political networks in
channeling the development prospects of different nations (Wallerstein 1974, Snyder & Kick
1979, Nemeth & Smith 1985, Mahutga 2006).
PATHS FORWARD
Networks and Institutional Emergence

The above review includes works that are explicitly relational, some that are explicitly formal, some
that are agnostic, and some that draw on both perspectives. Our review has led us to conclude
that work investigating both the linking function and the formal patterns of social networks would
help advance these four substantive areas of inquiry. For example, if microstructural components
of networks are doing the heavy lifting in producing moments of change, establishing this will
require empirically and comparatively assessing the alternative hypothesis (i.e., that contextual
factors instead play a crucial role). In the ideal case, social networks can be situated within the
social structure of their time to piece out whether the increased connectivity provided by the
linking function of the network, the structure of the network, or some new transformative mapping
between existing structures of society produces the change. This representation of the problem
space suggests that relational and formal approaches should be combined. Although this can be
and has been achieved practically, the two perspectives have underlying inconsistencies that make
either theoretical framework insufficient for supporting this kind of hybrid work. On the one
hand, lack of a larger theoretical framework may be inconsequential to empirically grounded
research. On the other hand, theory can both motivate researchers and coordinate research efforts
to increase conceptual and methodological rigor and rapidly expand the field of knowledge. It is
because of this latter possibility that we highlight potentially encompassing theoretical frameworks
in social network research.
White’s two versions of Identity and Control (1992, 2008) continue to provide a major theoretical
resource for network researchers, but one that many people find difficult to parse. By changing the
subtitle of this work from the first to second edition, from A Structural Theory of Social Action to How
Social Formations Emerge, White signaled a shift of focus from actors to institutional emergence.

Mohr &White (2008) presented a significantly more accessible theory of institutional development
in their essay “How to Model an Institution.” In it, they argue that institutions are instances
in which cultural and relational networks lock onto each other in mutually reinforcing social
formations. In this telling, institutional emergence occurs when new populations with different
cultural patterns interact and transform existing institutions. In typically diverse examples, the
authors describe how this process explains the emergence of Catholicism and the birth of rock
and roll.
In The Emergence of Organizations and Markets, Padgett & Powell (2012) lay out the case that
truly new social forms (including the social, political, and economic) emerge from interactions and
spillover between multiple layers of networks representing different types of relational contents.
For example, in the late twentieth century, geographic propinquity in the California Bay Area;
Cambridge, Massachusetts; and northern San Diego promoted multiple types of interactions be-
tween a diverse set of science-based firms. Public research universities, dedicated biotechnology
firms, and venture capitalists in these areas were all linked through multiple channels of research
and development alliances, financial support, licensing agreements, and commercial partnerships.
These multiple ties facilitated the transfer of practices across a diverse set of organizations, trigger-
ing innovative practices and ultimately laying the foundation for a new and durable institutional
form: the high-tech cluster (Powell et al. 2012). The book presents many other examples of
institutions that emerged from networks, including corporate merchant-banks, commercial part-
nerships, joint-stock banks, the German state, postcommunist economic reform, and the Russian
telecommunications market.
Both of these theoretical visions emphasize the importance of multiplexity to the process of
institutional innovation and transformation. Multiplexity is the state in which multiple networks
of different types coexist in the same setting. Clearly, most empirical settings are characterized
by multiplexity, as commercial, familial, and friendship ties are nearly ubiquitous. Analyses of
multiplexity consider both linkages across groups and the structural pattern of those linkages. Thus,
relationalist and formalist elements are combined in the analytical strategy in promising ways.
Mathematical and Computational Models

Methodologically, computational analysis offers exciting new tools for dealing with the complex-
ities of social dynamics. Although often abstracted from context in a way that many historical
researchers find troubling, two literatures in mathematical and computational modeling directly
address the problem of sudden, large-scale collective social shifts. This research provides useful
findings that extend our understanding of the formal impact of network structure on collective out-
comes and presents a valuable tool for extending existing research into historical transformations
and social change.
At a baseline level, computational models of collective action have supplied abundant evidence
that networks mediate mobilization rates and therefore revolutionary outcomes (Marwell et al.
1988, Macy 1991, Gould 1993, Kim & Bearman 1997, Chwe 1999, Chiang 2007, Centola 2013).
These models explore the direct effects of network structures as well as interactions between
network structures and individual attributes. Particularly important individual characteristics are
the propensity to participate in revolutionary activity, the factors that influence that propensity,
and the decision rule used to calculate that likelihood of participation. Model outcomes have
varied dramatically depending on whether individual propensities are sensitive to the absolute
number or to the proportion of other activated revolutionaries, making a substantive comparison
of network effects across papers a potentially problematic exercise. This does not, however, limit
their applicability to specific circumstances or the potential for increased comparability as standards
evolve over time.

Network science contains a large body of work that explicitly considers the structural conditions
that encourage or inhibit large-scale changes in beliefs and behaviors. These models are abstract
enough to encompass the adoption of new norms, the spread of innovations, financial volatility,
cultural change, social movement success, or revolutionary outcomes. They provide a means
through which to estimate the likelihood of large-scale transformations given different network
structures, thus providing an understanding of the network mechanisms that produce more or less
dynamic systems. This broad literature spans many disciplines and cannot be covered fully here.
Within sociology, island cascade models (Boorman & Levitt 1980), global cascade models (Watts
2002), and complex contagion models (Centola & Macy 2007) have all made major advances
in illuminating how network structure underpins large-scale social transformations. They do,
however, suffer from a problem plaguing much computational modeling, which is a significant
distance from specific empirical circumstances. Indeed, many comparative historical scholars may
find the usefulness of these models a stretch. However, computational modeling is increasingly
including more precise model calibration that integrates specific contextual factors into the models
to shed light on specific circumstances, places, and moments in time (see, for example, Hedström
et al. 2000, Bruch 2014, Grow & Van Bavel 2015). This direction promises to help forge a tighter
link between the messy and unavoidable details of social change and the deep structural insights
provided by computational research.
CONCLUSION
We have restricted our review to areas of inquiry that can be defined as large-scale social trans-
formations caused in part or in whole by social networks or some feature of their structure.
There is also a vibrant and growing stream of research in history that uses networks descriptively
or addresses smaller-scale historical transitions. Historians have explored the network structure
of early modern communities (Shepard & Withington 2000) and have charted the networks of
sixteenth-century prisons (Ahnert 2013), early modern religious refugees (Terpstra 2015), and
eighteenth-century London informants (Warner & Ivis 2001). Additionally, networks appear to
mediate many crucial processes that can cumulate up to large-scale change, such as health out-
comes, migration patterns, and community violence. Thus, the impact of social networks is not
limited to revolution, states, policy outcomes, or economic development.
As a whole, the literature on networks and social change is diverse, but it contains points of
convergence. The generative tension in the literature on revolution and civil uprising regarding
the importance of group cohesion for mobilization deserves further research. Ample evidence
indicates that patronage networks and associational networks serve important functions at different
stages of the emergence of the modern nation-state. Considering the relationship between the two
and comparing their characteristics and position within the larger social structure may produce
further insights into these transformations and may assist in the identification of which features
of networks are crucial to state-building. Similarly, the literature on networks and economic
development places a strong emphasis on dense, closed groups in building out markets but agrees
that they eventually limit continued expansion. Where this turn occurs, why it occurs, and whether
it is a formal limit or a reaction to other contextual variables has yet to be determined, and the
question of how relational governance and business groups may affect trajectories of inequality is
an important issue. Finally, in this day and age, the diffusion of negative policy outcomes in global
and national contexts is an increasingly pressing issue.
There is also work to be done in improving the network methods used in historical research.
Network science is a large, interdisciplinary field that advances rapidly. This situation is a boon
to researchers who want to understand social processes. It also, however, means that updating is

in order from time to time. For example, an important literature on estimating network effects
has sprung up in the time since many of the works reviewed here were written that suggests that
past research may contain upwardly biased estimates resulting from endogenous processes not
adequately accounted for in their analytical strategies. Researchers should consider incorporating
the techniques proposed in this literature and reassess knowledge where necessary. One hurdle to
this process, which has always hindered all forms of social network analysis, lies in the availability
of data. Understanding how an associational network fits into the larger network structure of a
given society requires measuring that larger structure. Systematically identifying and gathering
data that reveal the relevant network of interpersonal influence and information flow for any given
society continues to be an extremely difficult problem even for contemporary communities, despite
the influx of new data available from online interactions and transactions. Most macrohistorical
transitions exist in the past, and the data collection problem is correspondingly more difficult.
This problem is almost certainly part of the reason why much of the historical work reviewed
above focuses on identifying the existence of linked subpopulations, rather than offering more
precise descriptions of their network structure. Even when available, gathering precise data on
historical networks has been a painstaking and laborious process subject to the hours and condition
of various archives. Happily, this situation is changing.
The ease with which electronic images can be stored and transferred has already immeasurably
improved archival research for individuals. It has also led major libraries to make the contents
of their archives available online. This shift has tremendous consequences for research on social
change as hundreds of hours spent transcribing information by hand to create usable data structures
can be replaced with a few hours of coding. Even the catalogues of many libraries can provide
extensive and valuable data. As of now, however, the online face of many libraries and archives are
set up for individuals interested in one item—rather than systematic analysis of the contents of the
archive. Thus, researchers need to scrape data from online sources, a process that is often time-
consuming and tedious. The data are there but they are frustratingly more difficult for researchers
to access than they should be. One solution is to build strong institutional links supporting the
transfer of data between libraries and universities. Another solution would be the widespread
adoption of application program interfaces that facilitate the organized transfer of larger chunks
of information. Both would do wonders to improve access to data and stimulate research on the
role of networks in social change, thereby illuminating the large-scale social and institutional
transformations society continues to undergo.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that
might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Peter Bearman, Scott Boorman, Damon Centola, Henning
Hillmann, Isaac Reed, and Philip Withington for their helpful comments.
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SO43-FrontMatter ARI 5 July 2017 14:1
Annual Review
of Sociology
Contents Volume 43, 2017
Prefatory Article
A Life in Sociology
Robert M. Hauser p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
Theory and Methods

Data ex Machina: Introduction to Big Data
David Lazer and Jason Radford p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p19
Field Experiments Across the Social Sciences
Delia Baldassarri and Maria Abascal p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p41
Genealogical Microdata and Their Significance for Social Science
Xi Song and Cameron D. Campbell p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p75
Network Sampling: From Snowball and Multiplicity to
Respondent-Driven Sampling
Douglas D. Heckathorn and Christopher J. Cameron p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 101
New Developments in Survey Data Collection
Mick P. Couper p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 121
Replication in Social Science
Jeremy Freese and David Peterson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 147
Studying the Digital: Directions and Challenges for Digital Methods
Keith N. Hampton p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 167
Theorizing in Sociological Research: A New Perspective, a New
Departure?
Richard Swedberg p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 189
Social Processes
Decision-Making Processes in Social Contexts
Elizabeth Bruch and Fred Feinberg p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 207
Social Networks and Macrosocial Change
Emily Erikson and Nicholas Occhiuto p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 229
Toward a Sociology of Privacy
Denise Anthony, Celeste Campos-Castillo, and Christine Horne p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 249
v
Formal Organizations
The Social Bases of Philanthropy
Emily Barman p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 271
Political and Economic Sociology
The Demand Side of Hiring: Employers in the Labor Market
David B. Bills, Valentina Di Stasio, and Klarita Gërxhani p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 291
Differentiation and Stratification
Categorical Inequality: Schools as Sorting Machines

Thurston Domina, Andrew Penner, and Emily Penner p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 311
Gender Quotas for Legislatures and Corporate Boards
Melanie M. Hughes, Pamela Paxton, and Mona Lena Krook p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 331

Graduate Education and Social Stratification
Julie R. Posselt and Eric Grodsky p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 353
Wealth Inequality and Accumulation
Alexandra Killewald, Fabian T. Pfeffer, and Jared N. Schachner p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 379
Individual and Society
Skin Color and Colorism: Global Research, Concepts, and
Measurement
Angela R. Dixon and Edward E. Telles p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 405
The Development of Transgender Studies in Sociology
Kristen Schilt and Danya Lagos p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 425
Demography
Social Structure, Adversity, Toxic Stress, and Intergenerational
Poverty: An Early Childhood Model
Craig A. McEwen and Bruce S. McEwen p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 445
The Second Demographic Transition Theory: A Review and Appraisal
Batool Zaidi and S. Philip Morgan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 473
Urban and Rural Community Sociology
Ethnographies of Race, Crime, and Justice: Toward a Sociological
Double-Consciousness
Victor M. Rios, Nikita Carney, and Jasmine Kelekay p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 493
Explicating Divided Approaches to Gentrification and Growing
Income Inequality
Japonica Brown-Saracino p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 515
vi Contents
Policy
The Social Safety Net After Welfare Reform: Recent Developments
and Consequences for Household Dynamics
Laura Tach and Kathryn Edin p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 541
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 34–43 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 563

Cumulative Index of Article Titles, Volumes 34–43 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 567
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Sociology articles may be found at

http://www.annualreviews.org/errata/soc
Contents vii

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SO43CH11-Erikson ARI 20 July 2017 13:12

Annual Review of Sociology

Social Networks and

Emily Erikson and Nicholas Occhiuto

Department of Sociology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06511;

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2017. 43:229–48 Keywords

DEFINING SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CHANGE

230 Erikson · Occhiuto

Null triad Informal network

Network of corporate partnership

www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 231

232 Erikson · Occhiuto

REVOLUTIONS AND CIVIL WAR

www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 233

234 Erikson · Occhiuto

associations had weak or exclusively local interorganizational networks. Cross-cutting interorga-

www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 235

consolidation of Medici power in Florence, patron-client relations in that city—once an engine

GLOBAL AND NATIONAL POLICY OUTCOMES

236 Erikson · Occhiuto

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY

www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 237

238 Erikson · Occhiuto

As with patron-client networks, it is uncontroversial to assume that small-group structures

www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 239

Networks and Institutional Emergence

240 Erikson · Occhiuto

Mathematical and Computational Models

www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 241

242 Erikson · Occhiuto

www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 243

Ottoman empire. Am. Sociol. Rev. 56:699–715

century Ottoman empire. Am. J. Sociol. 102:1345–82

244 Erikson · Occhiuto

recruitment to Mississippi freedom summer. Sociol. Forum 3:441–60

www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 245

246 Erikson · Occhiuto

www.annualreviews.org • Social Networks and Macrosocial Change 247

248 Erikson · Occhiuto

Contents Volume 43, 2017

Theory and Methods

Categorical Inequality: Schools as Sorting Machines

Melanie M. Hughes, Pamela Paxton, and Mona Lena Krook p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 331

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 34–43 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 563

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Sociology articles may be found at

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