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Contents oCtober 2019
VOLUME 27 / ISSUE 6

06

Royal Australian Navy Collins Class

Submarines HMAS Collins, HMAS Farncomb,
HMAS Dechaineux and HMAS Sheean in
formation while transiting through Cockburn
Sound, Western Australia in February UNDERWATER
2019. The submarines were in the area to
participate in several activities, including ARMS RACE
Exercise Lungfish 2019 and Exercise Ocean Tim Fish finds out why owning submarines has
Explorer 2019. suddenly become a priority for the region’s navies.

10 26 30 34

ASIA-PACIFIC NAVAL
DIRECTORY 2019
Dr Alix Valenti presents a three part
look at Indo-Pacific naval strategy,
and interviews Rear Admiral David
Proctor, Chief of the Royal New
Zealand Navy (RNZN).
ASIAN SOF LOOKS FOR
PROTECTED MOBILITY
Andrew White reviews transport
options for SOF on the move.
SCANNING FOR TROUBLE
Dr. Thomas Withington analyses
the capabilities and utility of ground
scanning radars.
LIGHT GUNS KEEP
HEADS DOWN
Light artillery, from mortars to guns,
can make a huge difference to the
welfare of the PBI (Poor Bl**dy
Infanty), as Steven W Miller reports.

38 42 46 50

ANTI-SHIP MISSILE PREPARING FOR THE TAIWAN’S DEFENCE ANALYSTS COLUMN

EVOLUTION UNTHINKABLE INNOVATION ON SHOW Ben Ho examines South Korea’s plan
Anti-ship missiles are now big JR Ng takes a regional look at Andrew Drwiega reports from the to add a large-deck STOVL capable,
enough to be ‘carrier killers’. Jon Lake national capabilities to tackle biennial Taiwanese TADTE defence amphibious-warfare ship to its navy.
examines how such missiles evolved. CBRN contamination. expo.

| october 2019 | 03
 Index of Advertisers

ASELSAN 11
COLLINS AEROSPACE 15
CST 27
DIMDEX 29
DSA 37
DUBAI AIRSHOW COVER 3
EUROSATORY 41

Editorial
EXCALIBUR 25
GENERAL ATOMICS COVER 4
GULF DEFENsE 49
FLIR COVER 2
IAI 5

INTELLIGENCE
INDO DEFENCE 35
MAN 21
MTU 13

TAKES A BACK SEAT

NEXTER 23
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SINGAPORE AIRSHOW 45

T
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he spiral downwards in relations between the Republic of Korea (RoK) and Japan is worrying from
a regional security viewpoint, especially the decision in August made by the Korean government to
stop sharing intelligence with Japan.
With America’s eye distracted by the impeachment investigation against President Trump, and
indeed Trump’s lack of strategy regarding North Korean leader Kim Jong-un following his initial meetings
and handshakes, South Korea’s decision not to share intelligence through the General Security of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA) must be very pleasing to both Kim Jong-un and China’s President Xi
Jinping.
Any wedge between countries that adhere to the ‘under threat’ rules-based international order benefits those
countries who seek to dismantle it and replace it with their own predominance, exactly what China (and
Russia) are seeking to do.
The bad blood between Koreans in general and Japan goes back to the very serious humanitarian issues
resulting from the Second World War and Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula. While this is not
going to be resolved any time soon, the security threats posed by Chinese expansionist ambitions regionally
and increasingly further afield, North Korea’s belligerence by continuing missile testing following Kim’s
meetings with Trump, would suggest that stopping intelligence sharing will benefit neither side.
Having both signed up to the GSOMIA agreement in November 2016, then renewed again in November
2017, South Korea’s move to withdraw intelligence sharing could be read as sending a not so subliminal
message to Washington to re-engage in a more committed way to the problem of its northern neighbour and
to act as moderator on an equal basis over its dispute with Japan.
The interception earlier this year by Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) F-15 and F-16 fighters of
Russian and Chinese aircraft, at least one of which had entered the air defence identification zone near the
disputed Dokdo islands (also known as the Liancourt Rocks and Takeshima to Japan) in the Sea of Japan,
should be more than enough evidence that countries in that region need to be working closer together, rather
than pushing each other away. The fact that the ROKAF aircraft fired around 360 shots and released flares
around the Russian Beriev A-50 (NATO - Mainstay) airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft
was exploited by Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga who called the action ‘totally unacceptable
and extremely regrettable’.
Not sharing intelligence is a step too far in a region that is edging closer to a serious military engagement if
cooler heads do not prevail.
Andrew Drwiega, Editor-in-Chief

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04 | Asian Military Review |

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 sea
power

UNDERWATER
ARMS RACE
The number of navies that can now invest in submarine technology is
increasing, although operational capability will still vary widely.

by Tim Fish

Japan is expanding its submarine fleet and is still taking delivery of Soryu-class (16SS) boats.

06 | Asian Military Review |


T
he submarine arms race in the
Indo-Pacific region that has been
underway for almost 10 years is
continuing apace as more navies
are expanding their fleets and are
bringing new boats into service
A combination of relatively strong
economic growth in the region and
the gradual realisation by political
leaders that the maritime domain is of
importance to their country’s finances
and security mean that naval capabilities
have received some attention. There
is also a heightened appreciation of
maritime security issues in the different
sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific and the
desire to possess submarines as reputed
weapons for sea control.
Dr Collin Koh Swee Lean, from
the Institute of Defence and Strategic
Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies in Singapore told
AMR that while the increase in the size
and sophistication of China’s People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) “does
play a significant role spurring the
equivalent build-ups by at least some
regional countries, such as Japan, there
are a few other drivers.”
This includes the ‘me too’ need to
copy what other countries are doing,
growth in regional uncertainties that
require improvement in defence, and
a modernisation trend towards a more
capable and balanced fleet. In terms of
status, “for some countries, acquiring a
submarine equates to being in the ‘club’ –
one that brings prestige because operating
and maintaining a submarine capability
becomes testament to the country’s
financial and technical prowess,” Collin
said.
China wants the status of developing
capabilities on a par with the US Navy
(USN) and the PLAN is moving on to
building the next generation of nuclear-
powered ballistic missile (SSBN), nuclear-
powered attack (SSN) and conventional
diesel-electric powered (SSK) submarines.
The PLAN is developing a new Type
096 SSBN boat called the Tang-class. It is
expected to be larger and more capable
than the current Type 094 Jin-class that
have provided the PLAN with its first
continuous-at-sea-deterrent nuclear
posture with at least four boats in-service
offering a round-the-clock nuclear launch
capacity.
The PLAN’s six Type 093 Shang-class
SSNs are set to be joined by a new class
of five Type 095 Sui-class SSNs. Media
reports state that the first of-of-class will
enter service in 2020 although it is not
clear what stage of production these have
reached.
“The Type 095 is supposed to be
more capable than the Type 093 SSN
with a stronger standoff offensive
strike capability – speculated by some
to incorporate a robust VLS [vertical
launch system] capability to house
SLCMs [submarine-launched cruise
missiles],” Collins said. “In terms of
overall strike capabilities the Type-095
could possibly get close to the US Navy,
but less so perhaps in the area of sonar,
combat management systems and most
importantly, quieting,” he added making
it comparable to the later variants of the
USN’s Los Angeles-class.
The SSK fleet has been receiving new
Type 039A/041 Yuan-class boats, which
are a step up in noise reduction over the
earlier Type 039 Song-class and Type 035
Ming-class before that. The Yuans have
air-independent propulsion but how
advanced they are is unclear. Collin said
that using insights from imported Kilo-
class SSKs from Russia and access to
dual-use technology it means that each
SSK model has got progressively more
capable.
“The Yuan class has evolved into newer
variants, most current being the Type-
039B/C, which bears an appearance closer
to contemporary Western and Japanese
designs, especially the Japanese Oyashio
for instance. It’s plausible to surmise
Daewoo
The Korean Navy’s first Jangbogo-III Batch-I submarine was launched in September 2018.
| october 2019 |
sea
power
that these new SSK models have enjoyed
improved quieting, hydrodynamic
performances, and combat capabilities,”
Collin said.
Japan Counters PLAN
Meanwhile Japan’s Maritime Self-
Defense Force (JMSDF) is trying to
counter PLAN submarine expansion by
increasing its fleet of SSKs from 16-18 up
to 22. It is achieving this by keeping more
of its older Oyashio-class boats in service
to supplement the Soryu-class (16SS) that
are still entering service. The Soryu-class
is built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industry
and Kawasaki Heavy Industry shipyards.
Production started in 2005 and boat 10,
Shoryu (SS 510) was the most recent to
be commissioned in March 2019. Up to
14 are expected and the remaining boats
(SS 511-514) will be equipped with Li-ion
batteries instead of lead acid ones. Whilst
the JMSDF can’t match the PLAN for
numbers it hopes to retain a qualitative
edge over its rival in terms of quieting,
acoustic sensor capability and reliability.
Neighbouring South Korea has been
gradually developing its own submarine
production capacity across three variants
of its KSS submarine programme. The
first KSS-I Chang Bogo-class SSKs used
the Type 209/1400 design from German
shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp Marine
Systems (TKMS), the second KSS-II Son
Won-Il-class variant was based on the
Type 214 design. The final boat of this
07
 sea
power

class will be commissioned this year.

But the new KSS-III Jangbogo-class
SSKs uses a Korean design from local
shipbuilder Daewoo Shipbuilding and
Marine Engineering (DSME). The KSS-
IIIs will replace the Chang Bogo-class and
construction of a first batch of three boats
is underway. The first-of-class, Dosan Anh
Chang-ho was launched in September
2018 and will be commissioned in 2020-21
with the second due to launch in 2020 and
commission in 2022. Work on the third
started at Hyundai Heavy Industries in
2017. A second batch of three is expected
to start construcution this year that could
be larger and with more vertical launch
tubes.

RAN SEA 1000

At the opposite end of the region, the
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has
committed itself to procuring, manning
and maintaining 12 new SSKs under its
SEA 1000 Attack-class future submarine
programme worth about $36 billion (A$50
billion). In 2016 the Shortfin Barracuda
1A design from French naval shipbuilder
Naval Group was selected and a Strategic
Partnership Agreement was eventually
signed in February 2019.
This will manage the relationship
between the Australian Commonwealth
and the company for 50 years and cover
the design, construction and delivery of
the boats out to 2054. There is considerable
risk in the programme as the design will
be heavily modified from its initial SSN
layout to become an SSK and it will use a
different propulsion, weapon system and
combat management system.
But SEA 1000 will also provide
Australia with a new state-of-the-art
submarine construction facility in South
Australia. A submarine design contract
was signed in March 2019 that has
initiated next steps of the programme.
According to the Naval Group the
design contract takes in preparations for
Attack class construction at the Osborne
North naval shipyard on the outskirts of
Adelaide. This includes ongoing support
to Commonwealth-owned Australian
Naval Infrastructure for the design
and build of the dedicated submarine
construction yard and the information
and communications technologies
systems to be employed there.
The only other major submarine
builder and operator in the Indo-Pacific
is India, which is trying to build its
own SSBNs, SSNs and SSKs. The Indian
Navy (IN) saw its first SSBN, INS Arihant,
An Indian Navy Scorpene-class submarine, INS Kalvari (S50).
Only two out of six have so far been delivered.
built by the Navy Shipbuilding Centre
in Visakhapatnam, commissioned in
2016 after a very long procurement
programme that started in the 1990s. A
second boat, Arighat was launched in 2017
but it is not clear when it will be delivered
or commissioned. Two more boats are
expected to follow. Visakhapatnam will
be used for the future production of a new
class of six new Indian-built SSNs.
Meanwhile the IN has a requirement
for 24 new SSKs but it is struggling to take
delivery of six new boats built at Mazagon
Docks Ltd (MDL) to the Scorpene design
from Naval Group under the Kalvari-class
(Project 75) programme. A Naval Group
spokesperson told AMR: “Four Scorpene
submarines out of six being built by MDL
have been already launched, the first
one INS Kalvari has been commissioned
and has been in service since 2017. The
second one is close to completion of trials
and delivery.” Kalvari was due to have
been commissioned in 2012. When the
second boat is commissioned the rest
are supposed to follow on an annual
drumbeat out to 2022.
India is already embarking on a follow-
on project for six more SSKs dubbed
Project 75(I). According to the company it
has been in contact with IN to propose and
adapted technically advanced submarine
suiting their expected operational needs.
This new design from Naval Group will
be a next generation follow-on to the
Scorpene class. The company is preparing
its response to the Expression Of Interest
recently issued by IN.
Recapitalisation
Neighbouring Pakistan is responding
to the IN build-up with its own SSK re-
capitalisation programme. It has decided
to buy the S26 – an export variant of the
PLAN’s Type 039B – from China. The
Pakistan Navy (PN) needs to replace its
ageing pair of Hashmat-class Agosta 70A
and three Agosta 90B SSKs built in France
and has a requirement for up to eight
boats.
“The Chinese boats are most likely
going to carry a robust offensive strike
capability in the form of SLCMs for land
attack. The existing fleet of French builds
is ageing and no longer economical to
maintain in service, so the Chinese boats
are meant to block-replace all these
eventually,” Collin said. Meanwhile the
PN is upgrading the Agosta 90Bs built in
France under a $350 million contract with
Turkish shipbuilder STM.
China is also supporting Bangladesh,

08 | Asian Military Review |

 sea
power

a requirement for three boats, showing shipyard is likely to be getting significant

they are serious about a submarine
capability. Collin said that cost is the
driving factor in the selection: “With the
basket of cash on hand, Thailand could
only get one submarine if they insist on
Western or even South Korean design,
and this may not even come with the
full training, armaments and after-sales
support package they need. And you end
up with a token fleet. But with the S26T,
the Thais argue that they could get three
boats with the full package, which allows
them to have a working fleet.”
The Philippines wants to buy
submarines under its Horizon 2
programme but it is expected to have
modest requirements and a limited
budget. A Request for Information (RfI)
has been released and Collin believes
that Russia has made an offer but it
unlikely any foreign shipyard would be
interested. Collin believes the Philippine
Navy needs to get experience with its
TKMS
levels of assistance and advice from
DSME.
Malaysia already brought its two
French-built Scorpene submarines into
service in 2009 and has plans to double
the size of its fleet to four boats. However,
Collin said the budget is a problem
and the increased costs and effort of
sustaining the existing fleet are of concern
in the short term.
Singapore will get four new Invincible-
class (Type 218SG) SSK from TKMS to
replace the existing two 1960s vintage
Challenger-class boats that are still in-
service with the Republic of Singapore
Navy (RSN). The Invincible-class will
be the first new SSKs that the RSN has
purchased as the Challengers and the two
Archer-class that entered service in 2011
and 2013 were formerly Royal Swedish
Navy submarines. TKMS launched the
first-of-class, Invincible in February and it
is expected to enter service in 2021 with

anti-submarine warfare frigates and a second boat, Impeccable, due to follow

which purchased two old PLAN Type
35B Ming-class SSKs in 2016. Whilst the
submarines are not much of a threat the
relationship between the two countries
will be of concern to India.
China also has influence in South East
Asia where Thailand has also decided to
buy S26T SSKs. The Royal Thai Navy has
The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) received the first of four new
Invincible-class (Type 218SG) submarines from TKMS in February.
helicopters first before embarking on
submarine acquisition.
Indonesia is set to expand its SSK fleet
from the existing pair of Type 209 Cakra-
class SSKs to six boats. It has received
two new Type 209/1400 SSK from DSME
called the Nagapasa-class and Indonesia
is planning to build a third locally at PT
Pal. A contract for a second batch of three
boats has been signed that would see
more boats built at PT Pal although the
“I surmise Taiwan might have concluded,
in 2022. Work on boats three and four
(Illustrious and Inimitable) has started with
a commissioning date expected in 2024.
Vietnam has recently purchased six
Kilo-class (Type 636.1) SSKs from Russia
in three batches of two that entered
service in 2014, 2015 and 2017. Collins
said that this show the Vietnamese Navy
was serious about having a workable fleet.
Not only does it get a robustly-sized fleet
of one of the most capable and quiet boats
on the market “but it went to the extent of
investing in its supporting infrastructure,
including a comprehensive on-shore
training facility, and even thought about
acquiring a submarine rescue capability,”
he said.
Taiwan has instead decided to
build eight submarines under its
Indigenously Defense Submarine (IDS)
programme. Taiwan has built a yard for
the construction of the boats but even
with substantial US and Japanese help
there are significant risks. Collin believes
that Taiwan does not have much choice:
rightly, that the project risks of going
alone with the programme (with foreign
aid) is way lower than the risks of finding
no suppliers or unreliable suppliers who
are susceptible to Chinese pressure.”
Eight boats is a significant increase on the
existing two Chien Lung-class SSKs but
something that is necessary for Taiwan
considering Chinese military expansion.
AMR

| october 2019 | 09
 Regional
naval directory

US Navy
A Chinese naval Z-9 helicopter prepares to land aboard the
People’s Liberation Army (Navy) frigate CNS Huangshan (FFG-570)
as the ship conducts a series of maneuvers and exchanges with the
Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Sterett (DDG 104)
in the South China Sea during exercises in June 2017.

ASIA-PACIFIC NAVAL
DIRECTORY 2019
The potential for maritime conflict in the region - and increasingly
beyond - continues to increase with the growth of the Chinese Navy
and the unpredictability of North Korea.
by Dr. Alix Valenti

T
here has been no shortage
of news regarding security
concerns in the Asia Pacific
region as of late. In June, regional
and international media reported
that North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un,
inspected a newly built submarine for the
North Korean Navy. Late July and early
August, North Korea resumed missile
testing, firing three short-range missiles
that landed in waters between North
Korea and Japan. Tensions between foes
and allies in the region are also on the rise,
with South Korea and Japan resuming an
old feud while China and the US continue
their trade war and India and Pakistan
argue over Kashmir.
The simmering tensions in the Asia
Pacific have been concerning analysts
the world over for some time, especially
concerning North Korea’s nuclear and
ballistic missile programmes as well
as Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOP) in contested waters such as
the South China Sea. Coupled with non-
traditional security threats such as piracy,
illegal fishing and smuggling (whether
drugs or people), these traditional threats
have triggered a capability modernisation
and procurement race in the region for
the past few years. From patrol boats
to high-end frigates, submarines and
aircraft carriers, countries in the region
are preparing their navies to tackle a wide
variety of maritime threats. And today,
this also includes cyber and space.

10 | Asian Military Review |

 Regional
naval directory
This photo supplied by North Korea allegedly shows leader Kim Jong-un visiting a
new submarine under construction - a date has not been verified.
Loose Canons
A ‘loose canon’ is defined as: “An
unpredictable person or thing, liable
to cause damage if not kept in check
by others.” Opinions generally vary,
amongst analysts, as to whether there
is a chance that a conflict, very likely
maritime in nature, may erupt in the
coming decades in the Asia Pacific region;
where it would break out is even more
uncertain. What is clear, however, is that
an analysis of the maritime strategies
in the region reveals growing tensions
that have the potential to become ‘loose
canons’ should misunderstandings ensue
or diplomacy fail.
The first of these is the ongoing tension
around the Korean peninsula. Following a
period free of missile testing, in the wake of
Kim Jong-un and United States President
Trump’s Singapore meeting in June 2018,
on 30 July Pyongyang proceeded with
two new short-range missile tests. One
flew 267 miles (430km) and the other 430
miles (692km), landing in waters between
North Korea and Japan and proving that
12
Seoul was well within range. Two more
missile tests took place on 1 and 6 August.
According to statements released by Kim
Jong-un, these tests were meant to warn
the US and South Korea that if they held
their joint military exercise as planned
during the course of August, exercises
that Pyongyang has strongly criticised
and which Trump had agreed to halt
while meeting in Singapore, North Korea
would retaliate.
There is no shortage of speculations
as to whether Kim Jong-un would really
follow through on his threats or whether
he is merely testing the two allies’
resolve. But the real concern actually
lies elsewhere. The missiles that were
launched appear to be similar to Russia’s
Iskander short-range ballistic missiles,
which Pyongyang said would be harder
to intercept because they were guided
and could be manoeuvred during flight.
These could pose a significant threat to the
missile defence system being built by the
US and South Korea; they also bring back
to the fore concerns regarding submarine-
| Asian Military Review |
Korea Central News Agency
launched ballistic missiles. Indeed, on
22 June photos were released showing
Kim Jong-un inspecting a newly- built
submarine, which could potentially be
firing ballistic missiles thus considerably
extending the range and reach of North
Korea’s weapons.
China Seeks SSBN Bases
China’s infrastructure developments on a
number of contested groups of islands in
the East China Sea (ECS) and South China
Sea (SCS) has also been significant cause
for concern in the region. Some of the most
common explanations advanced for these
developments include the nationalist
sentiment, the need to assert sovereignty
over natural resources particularly
within the 9-dash-line, and shifting the
balance of power. However, the article
co-authored by Sarah Kirchberger and
Patrick O’Keeffe, ‘Military-Strategic
Aspects of the South China Sea Issue’, and
published in 2017 in the book Traversing
the Challenges: Political, Economic, and
Environmental Dimensions of Maritime and
 Regional
naval directory
CIA open source
A map of South China Sea showing the nine-dash line (in green).
Regional Security, debunks these theories
and advances two new ones.
Based on a wide variety of Chinese
sources, the article argues that: “China’s
uncontested territorial waters and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are for the
most part continental shelf and fall under
the category of ‘confined and shallow
waters’ that pose peculiar challenges
for naval operations. Only the contested
waters of the SCS south of Hainan offer
China ready access to deeper Pacific
waters, a crucial factor for China’s nuclear
submarine patrol missions.” Using the
territories it is claiming in the SCS would
allow the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) to create a bastion for its nuclear
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet,
thus facilitating passage through the
exit points of the First Island Chain and
14
at the rim of the SCS by avoiding enemy
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets
thanks to a link chain of sensors. “The
infrastructure already built on the Spratly
Islands appears to substantiate this
theory,” Patrick O’Keeffe, Non-Resident
Fellow at the Centre for Asia-Pacific
Strategy and Security in Kiel, told AMR;
part of the systems placed on the island
would allow China to get a clear three
dimensional (3D) picture of the threats to
its SSBNs. This, in turn, would allow it to
become a much more credible maritime
threat to the US Navy (USN) in the Pacific
region.
Strategically, the ECS has a different
character for China than the SCS,"
according to Mr. O’Keeffe; it has been
using activities on the ECS to attract
media attention and deflect from more
| Asian Military Review |
crucial developments in the SCS, Taiwan
or elsewhere. More important is Taiwan,
located between the two: its East coast
offers immediate access to deep-water
patrol areas for SSBNs. If China were to
regain control over Taiwan and build a
SSBN base there, it would significantly
increase, once more, the level of threat to
the USN and its allies in the Pacific region.
Mutual suspicion
But the ECS and SCS are not the only
places where Chinese activity has been
raising questions as to the rising power’s
maritime strategy. For the past few years,
there has been an increasing number
of Chinese submarines operating in
the Indian Ocean (IO). One of the most
commonly accepted explanations for
this development is China’s increasing
reliance on maritime trade routes, in order
to both access export markets and meet
key resource needs. As such, the increased
presence of submarines indicates a desire
to protect Sea Lines Of Communication
(SLOC). This, however, has contributed
to increasing tensions between China
on one side and India and the US on the
other. As indicated in a report published
in 2010 by The Hague Centre for Strategic
Studies, ‘The Maritime Future of the Indian
Ocean - Putting the G Back in to Great
Politics’: “Historically embedded mistrust
between China and India is encouraging
mutual suspicion regarding each other’s
maritime intentions, particularly given
the tendency of both countries to think
in terms of rights and responsibilities
within their own naval backyard.” The
IO has always been India’s ‘backyard’
for carrier strike group training, “as
such, the growing presence of Chinese
submarines in the area is troublesome for
India,” added Mr O’Keeffe; especially as
tensions with Pakistan continue to grow
over Kashmir and China’s Gwadar port
in Pakistan guarantees it increased access
to the IO via the Strait of Hormuz.
Gwadar is only a small part of China’s
port-building strategy in the Asia Pacific
region. On the Western side of the IO, the
Djibouti base opened in 2017, effectively
introducing China to the restricted clan of
countries with bases in the strategic choke
point of the Gulf of Aden. Additionally,
through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
China is securing a string of logistics ports
that, while not necessarily benefitting
immediately the PLAN, are part of a
wider strategic context of seeking new
allies in a region where it currently counts
few. AMR
 Regional
naval directory

Indian Navy
INS Khanderi, the second of the Kalvari Class diesel electric
attack submarines of the Indian Navy, was launched in 2017
and commissioned on 28 September 2019.

SUBMARINES
TO SPACE; THE
CHALLENGE OF
MARITIME SECURITY
While submarines have become ‘flavour of the moment’, increased
spending on defence has meant that a small number of nations are
improving their 3D maritime posture.

“T
he proliferation of much
more capable submarines in
the region has necessitated
that several countries
improve their ASW
capability,” Tom Waldwyn, Research
Associate for Defence and Military
Analysis at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), told Asian Military
Review. However, only a limited number
of countries in the Asia Pacific region can
by Alix Valenti
afford to have a truly three dimensional
(3D) ASW capability for their navy - that
is, sub-surface, surface and air.
India, perhaps the country most
concerned with what it perceives as a
Chinese threat in its neighbouring waters,
is one of the few regional countries
capable of such capability. Spearheaded
by an economic growth that has seen the
country’s annual real economic growth
grow at an average of 7.2 percent over the
past ten years, according to the document
published by the Australian Department
of Defence ‘2017 Defence Economic
Trends in the Asia-Pacific’, India has been
focusing on the acquisition of submarines,
destroyers, frigates, corvettes and
Maritime Patrol Aircrafts (MPA).
In order to supplement its ‘Kolkata’
class guided missile destroyers, the
Indian Navy (IN) contracted Magazine
Dock Limited (MDL) in 2011 for the

16 | Asian Military Review |

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 Regional
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The Indian Government’s Project 15B is supplementing the Kolkata-class destroyers with a new
Visakhapatnam-class, the first of which INS Visakhapatnam was launched on 20 Apr 2015 at
Mazagaon Dock Limited (MDL), Mumbai.
construction of the next generation
destroyers, Project 15B. The first of class,
INS Visakhapatnam, was launched in
April 2015, while the second ship, INS
Mormugao, was launched in September
2016 and the third, INS Imphal, was
launched in April 2019. The fourth ship,
INS Porbandar, is scheduled for launching
next year. Displacing 7,300 tones and
with a range of 4,000nm (7,408km) the
new guided-missile destroyers will be
fitted with indigenously developed
533mm torpedo launchers and RBU-6000
anti-submarine rocket launchers. In terms
of frigates, the IN concluded negotiations
with Russia in February 2019 for the
procurement of another four ‘Krivak
III’ class frigates to complement the six
frigates already operational. The 3,300
tonne frigates will features two twin
torpedo launchers. Additionally, seven
new stealth frigates (Project 17A) will join
the IN in the 2020s: four will be built by
MDL and the remaining three by Garden
Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers
(GRSE). GRSE was also selected in April
2019 to build the eight new ASW Shallow
Water Craft (ASWSWC). According to
a company statement, the ASWSWC
will be capable of “full scale sub surface
surveillance of coastal waters, SAU
and Coordinated ASW operations with
aircraft. In addition, the vessels shall have
the capability to interdict/destroy sub
18
Indian Navy
surface targets in coastal waters.” Finally,
under the surface the IN is currently in
the process of receiving a total of six
‘Kalvari’ class diesel-electric attack (SSK)
submarines, built by MDL and based on
Naval Group’s Scorpene submarines. In
June 2019, India also issued an Expression
of Interest (EoI) for six Project 75i
submarines.
In order to address the ASW air
capability gap currently facing the IN
- the majority of its 11 Kamov-28 and
17 Sea King ASW helicopters are not
operational - in August 2017 the Indian
MoD issued a Request for Information
(RfI) for 123 naval multi-role helicopters
with ASW capabilities, as well as 111
armed light Naval Utility Helicopters
(NUH). So far, only the procurement
of the NUH has been approved and in
February 2019 the MoD issued a EoI for
shortlisting of potential Indian strategic
partners and foreign Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEM). Moreover, in
November 2015 the first squadron of
Boeing P-8I Poseidon MPAs was officially
inducted, and in 2016 India placed an
order for an additional four P-8Is, which
delivery is scheduled to begin in 2020.
These MPAs are bringing significant new
capabilities to the IN, including MK-54
lightweight torpedoes and Mark 82 depth
charges.
Australia is also seeking to reinforce
| Asian Military Review |
its ASW capabilities in order to be able
to secure the Indian Ocean region and
protect its interests therein. In a speech
given during the Into-Pacific Conference
hosted in Perth in August, Australia
Defence Minister Linda Reynolds noted
that Australia’s “equities in the Indian
Ocean are clear”: the country’s Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) extends deep into
the IO, the IO is home to five of Australia’s
top 15 trading partners, and the country’s
LNG sector is booming largely thanks
to project located on the North Western
Shelf.
Key to the maritime strategic goal of
securing the IO is the replacement of the
‘Collins’ class SSK submarines with the
SEA 1000 ‘Attack’ class submarines. Based
on Naval Group’s ‘Barracuda’ design for
the French Navy, which was selected in
April 2016 as the successful bidder, the
12 ‘Shortfin Barracuda’ (or ‘Attack’ class)
submarines will significantly enhance
Australia’s capabilities. Although, as the
programme continues to face significant
delays, there are now questions as to
whether it might be necessary to further
extend the life of the ‘Collins’ class: it is
now expected that the first ‘Attack’ class
will not be commissioned before the
mid-2030s, whereas the ‘Collins’ class,
commissioned between the mid-90s and
early 2000s, were originally expected
to start retiring by 2026. Moving to the
surface, in June 2018 the Australian
government announced that BAE
Systems’ ‘Type 26’ frigate design had won
the competition for the replacement of
the ‘Anzac’ class frigates. The latter have
been in service since the mid-90s and the
‘Hunter’ class will start replacing them in
the late 2020s. Built in Australia by ASC
Shipbuilding, the 8,800 tonne ships based
on BAE’s Type 26 Global Combat Ship will
accommodate Australian-specific systems
such as the Aegis combat system, CEA’s
CEAFAR2 active phased array radar and
one Sikorsky MH-60R helicopter. It will
be armed with MU90 torpedoes for ASW
as well as fitted with BAE’s Nulka decoy
launch system. Finally, Australia has also
acquired twelve P-8A MPA: the first one
arrived in Canberra in November 2016
and the remaining 11 are scheduled for
delivery by March 2023.
Submarines in the Strait
Singapore and Indonesia also have
significant stakes in the region: their
unique position around the Strait of
Malacca means that they are particularly
worried about the increasing passage of
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Moscow, Russian Federation Rosoboronexport accounts for over 85% of Russia's
annual arms sales and maintains military-technical
Phone: +7 (495) 534 61 83 cooperation with over 100 countries worldwide.
Fax: +7 (495) 534 61 53
E-mail: roe@roe.ru
www.roe.ru
 Regional
naval directory

Chinese submarines in the area. Moreover,

Boeing
their proximity to the SCS brings with
it concerns in relation to disputes over
island sovereignty.
As such, Singapore has a strong
submarine fleet that will soon be
complemented by an additional two
Type 218SG attack submarines from
Thyssenkrup Marine Systems for a total
of four such ships. The ‘Invincible’ class
submarines should start entering the
Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) by
2021, with the first one launched in
February. The RSN also boasts eight
‘Formidable’ class frigates, built by
Naval Group and Singapore Marine
Technologies, equipped with EDO Model
980 ALOFTS active low-frequency towed
sonar and armed with the Eurotrop A244S
torpedo. As far as air assets are concerned,
the Republic of Singapore Air Force
operates eight Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk
naval helicopter for the RSN, and the
government is currently deciding if it will
replace its ageing Fokker 50 MPAs with
the P-8, Saab’s Swordfish or IAI’s G550.
Intrinsically linked to China for its
economy, yet concerned with maritime
developments in the region, Indonesia’s
defence budget has been representing
a small yet stable share of the GDP
(between 0.6-0.8 percent of GDP) over
the past ten years. Part of this spending
has been allocated to the development
of its submarine fleet, which currently
includes the construction and delivery,
by Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine
Engineering (DSME), of three Type
209 ‘Nagapasa’ class SSKs. The first one
was delivered in 2017 and the last one
is scheduled for delivery by 2021. The
Indonesian Navy (Tentara National
Indonesia - Angkatan Last - TNI-AL) is
now considering different options for the
next batch of submarines, including the
Russian ‘Kilo’ class and Naval Group’s
‘Scorpene’. In the past few years, the TNI-
AL has also received two ‘Martadinata’
class guided missile frigates, built by PT-
PAL in collaboration with Dutch Damen
Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS) and
armed with two triple torpedo launchers.
In terms of air assets, in January 2019 the
TNI-AL received another CN-235-220
MPA as part of an order of five such third
generation aircraft to complete the naval
aviation fleet of the Navy. At the same
By 2023 New Zealand will join Australia and
India as operators of Boeing’s P-8A Poseidon
time, it also received five more AS565
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance MBe Panther ASW helicopters from PT
aircraft over the maritime. Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI) - this is
part of an order of 11 helicopters in total,
which was placed in 2014.

20 | Asian Military Review |

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 Regional
naval directory
HMAS Farncomb berthing at its home port of Fleet Base West, Western
Australia. The Collins-class may require a life extension programme
due to delays in the commissioning of the Attack-class submarines
expected in the 2030s.
The Philippines is another country
that has been emerging as of late in terms
of military spending. Long confined to 0.7-
0.8 percent of the GDP, under president
Rodrigo Duterte defence spending has
been growing steadily to reach 1.2 percent
in 2016, and the proposed budget for 2020
- announced in August - has seen a three
percent increase over the allocation in
2019 (reaching $3.6 billion) and represents
nearly five percent of total government
expenditure. Although half of the budget
will be allocated to the Philippine Army,
as the country continues to grapple
with terrorism, some is expected to
continue to cover recent acquisitions for
the Philippine Navy. Indeed, embroiled
with China in the overlapping claims
over the Spratly and Paracel islands, the
Philippines is increasingly concerned
with China’s activity in the region and is
seeking to significantly increase its ASW
capabilities. These include the acquisition
of a corvette vessel dedicated to ASW,
two AW159 Wildcat helicopters, and
two frigates built by Hyundai Heavy
Industries and based on the design of
the Incheon frigates (FFX-I) built for the
South Korean navy.
Non-Traditional Threats
It would however be misguided to
interpret Asia Pacific countries’ naval
modernisation and expansion solely
22
through the prism of ASW to address
the resurgence of great power politics in
the region. As noted by Waldwyn, “each
country has different threat perceptions
and requirements,” which range from
traditional to non-traditional threats
such as illegal, unregulated, unreported
fishing, piracy, illegal smuggling and,
increasingly, the devastating effects of
climate change that “have required a
swift response from navies as well as
disaster relief agencies.” The economic
dependency of many of these countries
on maritime trade routes is also a key
driver in increasing capabilities in order
to be able to secure key maritime trade
channels.
As such, countries like New Zealand,
that had seen its defence spending
plateauing over the past decade, are
making new, more significant financial
commitments to their security forces. In
the 2019-20 budget, the Vote Defence
Force received 18 percent more funds
than in 2018-19 reaching $2.6 billion
(NZ$4.29 billion), of which $303 million
(NZ$493 million) was allocated to the
Navy. Part of this budget will serve to pay
for the procurement of the four new P-8A
MPAs, a contract awarded in July 2018
that will spread over fiscal years until
2026. In the coming years the Royal New
Zealand Navy (RNZN) also plans for
ongoing upgrades to the ‘Anzac’ frigates
| Asian Military Review |
RAN
to maintain their offensive and defensive
capabilities, including replacing the
embarked Seasprite SH-2G(I) by 2027,
as well as procuring an additional
sealift vessel equipped with a docking
well, hospital facilities, planning spaces
and self-defence capabilities. Finally, a
Southern Ocean Patrol vessel is scheduled
for acquisition in the mid-2020s for
dedicated patrol capabilities within New
Zealand’s EEZ and the Southern Ocean.
It is interesting to see that countries
such as Japan and Taiwan have also been
modernising their air, surface and sub-
surface fleet, although their focus remains
primarily on the development of the
indigenous shipbuilding industry. Others,
such as Malaysia and Vietnam, have been
attempting to modernise and procure
capabilities, however their plans have
been significantly hampered by a lack of
financial backing from the government.
Generally speaking, “although varying in
terms of size, capability and quantity, Asia
Pacific nation navies and coast guards
are primarily investing in frigates, patrol
vessels and diesel-electric submarines,”
according to Walwyn.
But perhaps even more interesting is
the slow yet steadily increasing attention
some regional countries are paying to
space assets. At first glance the link
between space and maritime strategy
may appear tenuous, however the race to
 China People’s Daily
Regional
naval directory

space,” noted O’Keeffe, and for China

the Spratly and the Paracel islands are a
significant asset on its chessboard.
Other countries are slowly becoming
aware of the new race to space assets
that is shaping up; an article about
Australia on the Defence Connect website,
‘Vulnerability of Space-Based Systems
could Expose the ADF’, and the inclusion
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) newest space of maritime satellite surveillance and
tracking ship is the Yuan Wang 7, seen here in August 2018. Its
missions include satellite and ballistic missile tracking. cyber security in the RNZN’ Capability
Plan are two examples of this. However,
according to O’Keeffe the link between
space and maritime capabilities and
strategies is still too tenuous in military
increase satellites that will be able to give eight minutes of a satellite launch its planners’ mind, which is giving China a
an accurate picture for maritime domain trajectory can still be influenced by the significant strategic advantage. “China is
awareness is on. Nowhere is this more Earth atmosphere and it may be necessary not necessarily building a PLAN ready
visible than in China’s infrastructure to re-adjust it accordingly; there is also for the next maritime war,” he noted;
development strategy in the SCS and its the possibility that once into space, the “rather, it is interested in expanding in
increased presence in the IO. O’Keeffe satellite may need to be reignited, so areas where other countries’ presence
explains: “If you want to go into space, again it is necessary to position assets in is weak, making it difficult for them to
you need to be at sea: the ships you will order to maintain that connection. In the access these regions and establishing its
be positioning along the trajectory of SCS, on Hainan island, China has built a own power.” It will be interesting to see
the satellite system will ensure that you space station, which its naval assets are how this will contribute to shaping naval
always maintain a connection.” This is contributing to protecting; “proximity to procurement in the near future. AMR
primarily due to the fact that in the first the equator is key in launching assets into

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 Regional
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NEW
ZEALAND’S
MARITIME
PERSPECTIVE
Interview with Rear
Admiral David Proctor,
Chief of Navy for the
Royal New Zealand
Navy (RNZN)
by Alix Valenti
R
ear Admiral (RAdm) David
Proctor assumed the role
of Chief of Navy on 29
November 2018 following
numerous senior positions
within the New Zealand Defence Force,
including Deputy Commander Joint
Forces New Zealand and Acting Vice
Chief of Defence Force from July to
September 2018.
RAdm Proctor has held a number
of senior logistics posts during his
career, including operational logistics
appointments at sea and overseas.
His operational service includes a
deployment to the Solomon Islands and
being appointed Chief of Logistics, United
Nations Mission and the New Zealand
Senior National Officer in Support of East
Timor.
What do you perceive as the current
main threats and challenges in the
Asia Pacific region?
New Zealand is navigating an increasingly
complex and dynamic international
24
security environment. While there may
be noteworthy effects on New Zealand’s
interests from singular developments,
New Zealand’s security outlook is being
shaped by increasing pressure on the
international rules-based order from the
dynamic intersections of three forces:
- The increasing importance of spheres
of influence, with some states pursuing
greater influence in ways that, at times,
challenge international norms.
- Challenges to open societies and
Western liberalism threaten to reduce
the willingness of open liberal states to
champion the rules-based order.
- A collection of complex disruptors,
including the impacts of climate change,
new technologies changing the nature
of conflict, extremist ideologies, and
transnational organised crime. These
disrupters are forces for disorder
disproportionately affecting open
societies and weak states.
The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly
shaped by strategic competition, historic
and newly emerging inter-state tensions,
and nationalism. While the regional
order has accommodated regional states’
preference to pursue a diverse set of
economic and security relationships,
intensifying competition may challenge
the framework in the future. In this
context, states may be compelled to make
choices, small and large, in ways they had
previously avoided. Economic tension
associated with strategic competition
could impact the multilateral trading
system.
As these forces pressure the
international rules-based order, New
Zealand, and its partners are confronted
by shifts in the foundations of security
requiring a span of high-level statecraft,
all-of-government strategies, and
community development.
Furthermore, when the effects of
climate change intersect with a complex
array of environmental and social issues,
they can be significant contributors to
both low-level and more violent conflict,
and generate security implications, which
can be further magnified in younger
nations. In coming decades, the impacts
of climate change will continue to test the
security and resilience of the South Pacific
region and the world. Understanding
and accounting for the security impacts
of climate change will be a critical
component of operational planning in the
years to come.
Closer to home, the impacts of climate
change will necessitate more High
| Asian Military Review |
Availability Disaster Recovery (HADR)
and stability operations in our region,
and greater need to plan for and respond
to domestic civil defence emergencies
resulting from severe weather at
home. New Zealand may be faced with
concurrent operational commitments,
which could stretch resources.
What are the challenges specific to
New Zealand?
New Zealand is a large maritime nation,
with significant resources, which
remain unexploited because much of
our productive capacity lies below the
low water mark. Our greatest challenge
is geographic remoteness, which gives
some security, but also creates exposure,
and isolation from markets. Our Area of
Responsibility covers 11 percent of the
globe creating significant responsibilities
for search and rescue, and national
defence, including territorial integrity, all
of which require a significant degree of
awareness.
New Zealand’s trade links to the rest of
the world provide the goods and services
that underpin its way of life. Free and
unfettered access to the global maritime
commons will continue to be integral
to New Zealand’s development and
economic prosperity, making the safety
and security of sea lines of communication
worldwide a vital national interest. New
Zealand’s trade with some 240 nations
and territories accounts for 60 percent
of its total economic activity, so any
disruption to shipping will have serious
consequences to the national economy.
Any degradation of the security or
commercial viability of New Zealand’s
SLOCs, or those of its partners, will
have significant implications for New
Zealand’s economic prosperity. The Asia-
Pacific and Indian Ocean region contain
the busiest highways in the world for the
exchange of data, commodities capital,
manufactures, and services. It is crucial
to New Zealand’s national interests, and
those of our regional friends and partners,
that we meaningfully contribute to
maintaining access to these trade routes
and sea and data lines of communications,
and the security of our maritime resources.
What is the role of the RNZN in
addressing those threats?
New Zealand takes an ‘all hazards’
approach to national security, bringing
Government agencies together to
respond to all risks to national security,
whether internal or external, human-

driven or naturally occurring. To this end,
New Zealand maintains armed forces
to defend New Zealand and protect its
interests; to contribute forces to collective
security, coalition, or UN-mandated
operations; and to provide assistance to
the civil power or for any other public
service. These forces, including New
Zealand’s naval forces are trained and
equipped to fight and prevail in a wide
variety of operational settings. They are
also trained and equipped to conduct
HADR operations, peace enforcement,
peace keeping and peace building
operations, border protection operations
and capability building.
The Government has set out ten
principle roles for the NZDF, one of
which is to make a credible contribution
to support peace and security in the Asia-
Pacific region, including regional security
arrangements. The Defence contribution
to New Zealand’s support for Asia-Pacific
regional arrangements will become
increasingly important in the future.
The RNZN is a blue water,
expeditionary warfighting service
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providing any one of the following
options to the New Zealand Government
if required:
- Combat operations at sea – patrol,
ISR, maritime strike and interdiction,
barrier operations, protection of shipping,
maritime trade operations.
- Combat operations from the
sea – sealift amphibious operations,
mine countermeasures, and rapid
environmental assessment.
Constabulary operations – resource
and border protection, sanctions
enforcement, sovereignty patrols, and
peace support or monitoring operations.
- Safety and assistance operations;
stability operations, HADR, search and
rescue and environmental protection.
- Naval diplomacy.
In addition to our Five Eyes
relationship with the US, UK, Canada
and Australia, New Zealand maintains
bilateral defence relationships with
countries across Asia, including
Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, Brunei
Darussalam, Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan
and the Philippines. New Zealand also
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Regional
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maintains its commitment to Singapore
and Malaysia through the Five Power
Defence Arrangements with Australia
and the United Kingdom. Cooperation
with WPNS (Western Pacific Naval
Symposium) nations has grown over
recent years, supported by a range of
visits, exchanges, and development
projects.
How is the RNZN cooperating with
regional and non-regional navies
to address the regional threats
and challenges?
As previously noted, NZDF and the
RNZN have a long history of engagement
with regional maritime forces including
navies and maritime police (RIMPAC,
WPNS, FPDA, ASEAN, ADMM+,
IFC). New Zealand’s approach is one
of partnership focussed on quality of
engagement exemplified by our initiation
of the Southwest Pacific Heads of
Maritime Forces Symposium bringing
together the heads of regional maritime
forces to discuss common problems and
their resolution. AMR
www.excaliburarmy.cz
4.3.2019 15:36:55
 land
warfare
Afghan special operations commandos
of the 6th Cobra Strike Kandak were the
first of seven planned CSK units to get a
new level of mobility and firepower during
2018. The units use heavily armoured and
mine-resistant MSFVs.
ASIAN SOF LOOKS FOR
PROTECTED MOBILITY
SOF vehicles can be light and quick, but for some operators there is
also a proved need for greater protection for the operators.
I
n April, senior Special Operations
Forces (SOF) delegations from
across the Asia-Pacific (ASPAC)
region met in Honolulu, Hawaii
to share lessons learned from the
contemporary operating environment
(COE).
Organised by the US Special
Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC),
the Pacific Area Special Operations
Conference (PASOC) provided SOF
leadership from across the region with
the opportunity to discuss a range of
concepts of operation, tactics, techniques
and procedures relating to counter-
insurgency, counter-terrorism and
maritime security missions in particular.
Speaking at the event, delegates
(who must remain anonymous due to
operational security concerns) discussed
26
by Andrew White
requirement for event greater ‘Rapid
Reaction’ capabilities, particularly during
operations across the austere topography
of extensive waterways and island chains.
Critical to supporting such rapid
reaction missions is Special Operations
Vehicle (SOV) technology which, as
delegates explained at the PASOC, must
be capable of conducting a wide range
of ground, airborne and amphibious
operations.
Addressing delegates at the event,
senior special operations officers from
Armed Forces of the Philippines Special
Operations Command described how
SOF components had innovatively used
non-traditional SOVs such as the M111
armoured personnel carrier to fulfil a
number of more specialised roles beyond
protected troop transport during the
| Asian Military Review |
DVIDS
Battle of Marawi in 2017.
According to officials, M111s were
driven up ramps to the first and second
floors of shelled-out buildings to provide
overwatch across the battlefield with the
vehicle’s ISTAR mission suite. Additional
uses saw the same vehicles forward-
mounted close to enemy lines, fitted with
loud hailers to ‘negotiate’ with insurgent
forces.
Despite such innovation, SOF
commanders across ASPAC continue to
demand a mix of protected mobility and
lighter weight, lesser protected and more
agile SOVs to support the full spectrum of
special operations across the region.
Interoperability
Speaking to Asian Military Review, vice
president at Polaris Government and

Defense, Jed Leonard, described how
the “expeditionary nature of special
operations forces and their missions are
well supported by the transportability,
mobility and overall capability” of SOV
technology, including the company’s
own inventory of DAGOR, MRZR and
MV 850 tactical ground vehicles, many of
which are already operational with SOF
customers across ASPAC.
“As their missions expand, special
operations vehicles flex to integrate
different payload packages, integrated
communications and weapon systems,”
he explained.
Referring to increased levels in
cooperation between one of Polaris’s main
government customers, the US Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), and
Polaris-equipped SOF partner forces
across Asia-Pacific including Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand, Leonard went
onto describe: “The vehicle trends are
similar to those in the US because so many
military efforts are joint and coalition-
based between the US and its allies.
“The same thing goes for training
and exercises. We see that when our
vehicles are demonstrated or trialled,
their capabilities speak for themselves;
operators quickly see how a mission can
move from 3mph to 60mph. And the
increased amount of tactical options the
vehicles afford to a team. The need for
special operations vehicles is increasing
and we’re ready to continue supporting
special operators.
Protected Mobility
In terms of protected mobility, particularly
relevant to counter-terrorism (CT) and
counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in
urban environments, multiple state actors
across ASPAC are driving requirements
for SOV technology similar to Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicles in capability.
Examples include the Afghan
National Army Special Operations
Corps (ANASOC) which in October
2018, announced a total of five Cobra
Strike Kandaks or battalions were now
operational across the whole of the South-
Central Asian country.
The news followed a $333 million
contract award to Textron Systems a year
earlier, to provide up to 255 Mobile Strike
Force Vehicles (MSFV) to the ANASOC
to support CT and COIN operations
including direct action missions.
Based on Textron’s Commando
Select vehicle, the MSFV is available in
l and
warfare
multiple configurations with options
C S T
for the integration of the Objective
Gunner’s Protective Kit featuring 40mm
automatic grenade launcher; or 12.7mm
heavy machine gun to provide an organic
fire support capability to ground force Local situaonel
elements as well as protected mobility
for insertion and extraction across urban
awareness
areas.
Delivery of the total inventory of
MSFVs to ANASOC is due to run through
to 2024, a company spokesperson for
Textron confirmed to AMR. The 4x4
Commando Select has a top speed of
62mph (100km/h) at maximum ranges
out to 400 miles (644km), it was added.
Similar CONOPs are being explored
in Indonesia with Thales and PT Pindad’s
design of the Sanca MRAP. As defence
sources explained to AMR, a total of 30
vehicles could eventually support the
Indonesian Armed Forces’ (TNI) army
special operations command, KOPASSUS.
Thales and PT Pindad first unveiled
a technology demonstrator of the 4x4
Sanca at the Indo-Defence Exhibition in
Jakarta in 2016. However, as AMR went
to press, no contract award had yet been
announced by the TNI for the Sanca
which is based on the design of the Thales
Australia Bushmaster MRAP (already
in service with NATO and Non NATO
Entity SOF customers in Europe and Asia
Pacific).
Similarly, SOF components from
Japan’s Ground Self Defence Force
(JGSDF) are already benefiting from the
procurement of Thales Australia’s 4x4
Bushmaster MRAP following multiple
contract awards over the course of 2018.
According to Japan’s 2017 Defence
Plan, JGSDF must be capable of countering
attacks by enemy guerrilla forces as well
as SOF units, with Bushmaster vehicles
providing a protected mobility solution
for the JGSDF’s Special Operations Group
(SOG) which can be tasked with internal
security missions as well as limited
special operations abroad.
Light Mobility
Despite ongoing demand for protected
Copenhagen Sensor Technology A/S | info@copst.com
mobility platforms to support fire support
and insertion and extraction of small unit
teams in densely populated areas of Asia-
www.copst.com
Pacific, SOF units around the region also
seek lighter weight platforms to support
requirements for enhanced mobility and
agility across and over the battlefield.
As an example, Japanese SOF remain
regular operators of Polaris MRZR-4 Scan the QR code to see Company website
SOVs, which are owned and shared by US
| october 2019 |
 land
warfare
A Thales Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle from the 8th/12th Regiment, Royal Australian
Artillery during Exercise Koolendong in 2019. Indonesia’s PT Pindad has been working with
Thales on its 4x4 Sanca version which might be supplied to the TNI.
SOF components in Okinawa to support
‘fly and drive’ operations as an internally
transportable vehicle in the cargo holds of
CH-47 helicopters and V-22 Osprey tilt-
rotors, defence sources informed AMR.
Although not directly owned by Japan,
the SOG regularly trains with US SOF
partners including the US Air Force’s
320th Special Tactics Squadron at Kadena
Air Base in Japan. This provides access to
some unique capabilities of US SOF and
provides an interoperable capability for
the SOG with the Japanese government
currently in the process of procuring its
own inventory of V-22B Block C variants
from Bell-Boeing.
In Malaysia, the Ministry of Defence
remains in the process of selecting an
SOV to support army SOF components
including Grup Gerak Khas (GGK).
In August 2018, the MoD launched a
competition to consider a variety of
tactical ground vehicles with an initial
evaluation programme understood to
have been completed at the start of 2019,
industry sources indicated to AMR.
Competition participants are
understood to include Cendana Auto’s
Rapid Intervention Deployment Vehicle;
Kembara Suci’s SOV; Weststar’s GK-
M1 SOV; and Nimr Automotive’s Rapid
Intervention Vehicle (RIV) in association
with DefTech. The MoD is seeking a
4x4 SOV capable of supporting the full
spectrum of ground and airborne special
operations.
Selected vehicles will replace and
augmented a variety of SOVs currently in
28
Australian DoD
operation with Malaysian SOF including
Mercedes G-Wagens and “Lipan Bara”
4x4 high-mobility armoured vehicles
(HMAVs).
Kembara Suci’s SOV totals 3,200kg
(7,054lb)in gross vehicle weight (GVW),
providing a five-strong small unit
team with a total of 1,500kg (3,306lb)
payload. Cendana’s Rapid Intervention
Deployment Vehicle measures just
1,900kg (4,188lb) although it retains the
capacity to carry a six-strong crew; while
Weststar’s GK-M1 SOV has a 3,300kg
(7275lb) GVW and total payload capacity
of 760kg (1675lb) for a crew of four.
Nimr’s RIV has a GVW of 4,000kg
(8818lb) and maximum payload of
1,500kg (3306lb), with the ability to
project a maximum crew of four out to
a maximum cruising range of 1,000km
at 74mph (120km/h), a company
spokesperson confirmed to AMR.
In Indonesia, KOPASSUS is operating
P6 ATAV (All Terrain Assault Vehicles)
following delivery to force components
over the course of 2017 and 2018 by SSE
Defence.
First displayed at the Indo-Defence
Exhibition in November 2016, P6 ATAVs
are being used to support internal
security operations targeting violent
extremist organisations including Jemaah
Ansharut Daulah (JAD). SOVs, which
have a 142hp turbo diesel engine, is used
for the rapid insertion and extraction of
small unit teams as well as organic fire
support capability with the addition of
light or medium machine guns.
| Asian Military Review |
Finally in New Zealand, the
government is seeking to purchase a
series of ‘utility light’ vehicles as part
of an effort to support the “improved
mobility, safety and versatility to rapidly
deployable mobile forces”, according to a
statement by defence minister Ron Mark
on 3rd July.
A total of $11.7 million (NZ$18.6
million) has been set aside to procure
utility light vehicles which could include
an undisclosed number of MRZR
variants from Polaris Government and
Defense. However, Mark was unable to
confirm how many SOVs would be made
available to New Zealand Defence Force
SOF components.
Polaris’s 4x4 MRZR-4, now available
in a diesel variant (MRZR-D4), can carry
a total of up to six operators with a
maximum curb weight of 879kg (1,732lb)
and payload capacity of 680kg (1,500lb).
Smaller MRZR-2/MRZR-D2 variants
have a curb weight of 737kg (1,625lb)
and payload capacity of 453kg (960lb),
company literature explained.
The news follows the acceptance
into service of Supacat’s Special
Operations Vehicle-Mobility Heavy
(SOV-MH) vehicle in January 2018, which
provides operators with the flexibility
to reconfigure the vehicle from a 4x4
platform into a 6x6 variant with extended
wheelbase.
The SOV-MH, which is a variant of
the HMT Extenda, has a GVW of 7,600kg
(16,755lb) and 10,500kg (23,148lb) in 4x4
and 6x6 configurations with payload
capacities measuring 2,100kg (4,630lb)
and 3,900kg (8,600lb) respectively.
Platforms have been designed to carry
a variety of support weapons including
automatic grenade launchers, heavy
machine guns and remote weapon
stations, as well as C4ISTAR mission
suites.
Conclusion
According to Polaris’s Leonard, demand
for SOVs will continue to drive designs
and development in the short to medium
term as SOF units seeking flexible
and modular solutions to support an
increasing range of mission sets across
arduous terrain.
As he explained to AMR: “We’re
developing future platforms right now
and it’s critical for us to maintain the
simplicity and flexibility of the base
platforms so they can be maximised in
the field. AMR
 land
warfare

Thales
Thales’ Squire radar is an X-band GSR can be man
backpacked over terrain and into position.

SCANNING FOR TROUBLE

Ground Surveillance Radars (GSRs) help safeguard border lines,
military and civilian installations and infrastructure. With local security
challenges in mind, several GSR vendors are looking closely at the
Asia-Pacific.

by Dr. Thomas Withington

I
n Asia-Pacific, as elsewhere, ground
threats to national borders pose a
serious problem, particularly at
times when insurgency is high. To
combat this, Ground Surveillance
Radars (GSRs) play an instrumental
role in helping to protect sensitive
areas. Increasingly, these radars are also
called upon to help detect Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Although not
a replacement for optronics, radar is
attractive as a tool to support ground
surveillance. It may not be adversely
affected by low visibility, fog or haze in
the same way as optronics. Secondly, it
is immune to camouflage; a person will
still show up on a radar regardless of how
good their camouflage is.
Mark Radford, co-founder and
chief executive officer of Blighter
Surveillance Systems says that a number
of considerations must be factored into
the design of GSRs intended for the
Asia-Pacific: “For GSRs to be effective
in this region, they need to be robust
and low maintenance to cope with the
environmental extremes of -30 degrees
Celsius (-22 degrees Fahrenheit) in winter
and a humid +40ºC (104ºF) in summer.” A
written statement from Collins Aerospace,
which builds the PSR-500 GSR (see below),
emphasised the drivers for the GSR
market in the Asia-Pacific including “the
growing need for the protection of secure
sites, critical infrastructure, military bases,
camps and assets against current and
emerging threats.”
Radford adds that “political
instability in many parts of this region
serves to intensify the need for an
effective surveillance solution.” For
Steen Trier, Terma’s director of sales

30 | Asian Military Review |

 l and
warfare

for the company’s surveillance and
mission systems, demand for GSRs in
the defence domain still outstrips that of
the civilian domain, although demand
in the latter is increasing: “The needs (of
the) defence sector usually outnumbers
the rest, due to the need for military
perimeter and border protection. We also
see an increasing interest from end-users
involved in ensuring security in the energy,
transportation and communications
sectors.”
Counter UAV
Traditionally, GSRs are used to detect
people and vehicles. They are increasingly
being employed to detect low-flying
UAVs and drones. Such targets may fly
relatively close to the ground, typically
at altitudes of up to 500 feet (152 metres).
This can place such flying objects squarely
within the elevation FOV of some GSRs.
Moreover, a UAV or drone’s size can make
its detection by conventional ground-
based air surveillance radars difficult.
These aircraft can present a threat as they
can be used to gather reconnaissance and,
in nefarious cases, carry explosives. This
March is was reported that the YPG/PKK
Kurdish separatist group had made up to
twelve attempts to target Turkish military
bases in the southeast of the country with
explosive-laden drones. The attacks are

Blighter
believed to have originated from Kurdish-
controlled areas in Syria. Fortunately on
this occasion the attacks were foiled.
Thales has taken these threats into
account with the realisation of the
company’s Squire Mk.2 GSR. The Squire
Mk.2, like its predecessors, is an X-band
(8.5 gigahertz/GHz to 10.68GHz) GSR
with an instrumented range of up to 45
kilometres/km (28 miles). X-band is an
attractive waveband for GSRs. The short
wavelengths of X-band transmissions lets
such radars detect targets in fine detail.
This is an important consideration when
it is necessary to depict targets such as
people crawling and moving vehicles,
and to discriminate them from animals.
X-band radars achieve such a performance
using comparatively small-sized antennas,
allowing them to be moved with relative
ease; a Squire radar can be carried by
two people in backpacks. The trade-off is
that X-band radars have a comparatively
short range compared to lower frequency
radars transmitting in S-band (2.3GHz to
2.5GHz/2.7GHz to 3.7GHz) and L-band
(1.215GHz to 1.4GHz). Nevertheless, this
is an acceptable compromise. A GSR
will typically be required to look several
kilometres out from a base to provide
early warning of approaching potentially
hostile troops or vehicles. Such ranges
may also be sufficient to protect a border
from people attempting to cross it illegally.
All radars are, to an extent, restricted to
a line-of-sight range. Therefore one may
as well use a radar providing a detailed
depiction of targets within its line-of-
sight.
Thales’ Squire Mk.2 includes a new
processor and an embedded, uncooled
infrared camera. Its detection range for
a person has been increased to 13km
(eight miles), compared to the 10km (six
miles) of the previous version. Regarding
counter-drone performance, Thales
officials told the author that the radar can
Dual Blighter B422-HP Ground Surveillance Radars on Tower - the field of view can be
augmented by increasing the number of antennas used by individual systems.
detect a drone at 2.7 nautical miles/nm
(five kilometres) and classify that drone

| october 2019 | 31
 land
warfare
Collins Aerospace’ PSR-500 ground surveillance radar can be equipped with an optronics system
to enhance surveillance capabilities yet further.
at 2.2nm (4km) range. The radar can
also measure the altitude of such targets.
Thales added that existing Squire radars
can be upgraded to the Squire Mk.2
specification. This is already being done
for the Koninklijke Landmacht (Royal
Dutch Army) which is upgrading 70 of
its radars to Squire Mk.2 status. The first
upgraded radars will be delivered to the
force by the final quarter of 2019. The
Canadian Army has, meanwhile, received
new Squire Mk.2 radars.
FMCW
Collins Aerospace has been energetically
promoting its PSR-500 C-band Frequency
Modulated/Continuous Wave (FMCW)
perimeter protection radar. The company
states that this product “combines all
functionalities for ground intrusion
detection, such as the efficient detection of
moving targets, night and day whatever
the weather conditions.” Its statement
goes on to say that the PSR-500 “is a low
power, lightweight and easily-deployable
system, well adapted for the surveillance
of various types of sites.” The radar can
32
Collins Aerospace
detect a person at a range of 500m (1,640ft)
and a vehicle at 900m (2,952ft). Many
radars employ Pulse Doppler techniques
to determine the speed of a target relative
to the radar. The radar transmits a pulse
of Radio Frequency (RF) energy which
travels at the speed of light, 161,825 knots-
per-second (299,700 kilometres-per-hour).
By halving the time it takes for the radar
to transmit a pulse, and then receive that
pulse’s echo as it is reflected by the target,
one can ascertain the target’s distance
from the radar. Exploiting the Doppler
Effect enables the measurement of the
target’s velocity. An oft quoted example
of the Doppler Effect is the seemingly
rising tone of a police car’s siren when
approaching a stationary observer, and
the seemingly declining tone that it
makes as it drives away. This is because
the sound waves take a progressively
shorter time to reach the observer as the
police car approaches and progressively
longer as it drives away. Pulse Doppler
radars exploit this change in frequency of
the echoes to determine a target’s speed.
FMCW work in a different way.
| Asian Military Review |
Whereas Pulse Doppler radars transmit
a pulse of RF energy an FMCW radar
transmits a continuous signal. The signal’s
frequency will change over a set time
pattern as the signal is swept across a set
bandwidth. The radar will record which
frequency was transmitted at which
particular time, and record the frequency
of the echo when the signal hits a target.
These two signals (original signal and
the echoed signal) will be mixed together
thus creating a new signal. It is this latter
signal that will be processed to determine
the target’s distance and velocity. FMCW
are less complex to construct than their
pulse Doppler counterparts, and hence
can be less expensive. Such radars can
also have a small physical size making
them easy to transport and install, and
use comparatively less power making
them not only less expensive to operate,
but potentially harder to detect by
electronic support measures. FMCW
radar is particularly attractive for
applications where the user may need to
procure several GSRs, such as to position
along a border, or to protect the perimeter
of a base.
Border Regions
Blighter’s GSRs employ a mix of FMCW
and Doppler processing. The company
has enjoyed success with its B-400 series
Ku-band (13.4GHz to 14GHz/15.7GHz
to 17.7GHz) systems which have an
instrumented range of up to 25km (15.5
miles) for a large vehicle, and 4.6km (2.9
miles) for a crawling person. They can
detect a target moving as slow as 0.37
kilometres-per-hour (0.23 miles-per-
hour). The FOV of the B-400 series is
dependent on the number of antennas
used therein. The baseline B-402 has a
90 degree horizontal FOV using a single
antenna. This can be increased to 360
degrees for the B-442 which employs
four antennas. As Radford notes these
azimuths allow “hills, mountains, plains,
riverine territories and marshes to be
scanned simultaneously, without the
need to tilt the radar.” Meanwhile, the 20
degree elevation beam width “provides
detection of low flying manned aircraft,
UAVs and drones, which is a growing
concern in most border or coastal security
applications.” In 2010 Blighter began
supplying B-400 series radars to equip the
DMZ (Demilitarised Zone); the de facto
border between the Republic of Korea
and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. The firm supplied 120 examples
of these radars to this end, Radford notes.

As well as being used to help safeguard critical infrastructure and border regions, GSRs have a
valuable role to play in helping to protect ports and coastlines.
Procurements of the B-400 have also been
made by India. These radars equip the
Indian government’s Comprehensive
Integrated Border Management System
(CIBMS). The CIBMS introduces several
technologies, including radar, to improve
the surveillance of India’s borders with
Bangladesh and Pakistan.
The Danish radar specialists are
looking closely at the Asia-Pacific as a
market for its SCANTER-1002 ground
surveillance radar. Transmitting in Ku-
band, this radar has an instrumented
range of up to twelve kilometres (7.4
Thales’ Squire Mk.2 radar can detect a UAV at 2.7 nautical miles/nm (five kilometres) and classify it at 2.2nm (4km) range.
Terma
miles), detecting a person at 3.7km
(2.2 miles) and performing continuous
scanning across a 360 degree radius.
Trier says that this radar is currently
“deployed and operational in a number of
Critical Infrastructure Protection systems
in the Middle East and in the USA where
it is used to provide enhanced situational
awareness to protect sensitive sites and
strategic assets.” He says that the “Asia-
Pacific market holds a large number of
interesting opportunities.” Trier continues
that the company has “identified several
projects within the military, paramilitary
| october 2019 |
l and
warfare
and civilian areas (in the Asia-Pacific) for
which high resolution area surveillance is
very important.”
The Market
Collins Aerospace expects the need
for GSRs to grow in the Asia-Pacific:
“Demand for the protection of secure
sites and critical infrastructure will
increase. Leveraging current and future
technologies such as drones and artificial
intelligence to detect, identify and contain
threats will increase the need for GSR in
the Asia-Pacific,” the firm’s statement
argues. Radford agrees saying that the
potential threat emanating from drones
and UAVs is driving the market: “The
ability to simultaneously detect drones
and ground targets is key to enhancing
security when drones are commonly
used for surveillance as a precursor to
the physical (action) by the transgressors
themselves.” The drive to protect key sites
and military deployments against drones
has been noted by Terma with Trier
stating that “the detection and tracking
of drones represent a real threat since
their incursion not only disrupts civilian
infrastructure (such as airports) but (can
also) be a threat to lives and valuable
assets.” Radford expects a plethora of
security challenges to continue driving
the demand for GSRs in the Asia-Pacific:
“We are receiving increased enquiries for
our ground and coastline security radars
to help secure borders and coastlines
against a multitude of threats including
smuggling, terrorism, people-trafficking
and illegal immigration.” Security
challenges show no signs of abating in
the Asia-Pacific. Fortunately, ground
surveillance radars can play an important
role in helping to keep such challenges in
check. AMR
Thales
33
 land
warfare
Soldiers fire a 105mm round with an M119 light-tow
howitzer from their base at Combat Outpost Monti in
Kunar province of Afghanistan, December, 2009.
LIGHT GUNS KEEP
HEADS DOWN
The strength of light artillery lies in its
responsiveness and reliability in support of
ground forces. Its firepower can make the
difference between winning or losing in an
engagement.
by Stephen W. Miller
I
n defence light artillery excels at
disrupting attacks and preventing
rapid reinforcement. In attack,
it can keep the enemy under
cover and preventing them from
effectively engaging the attackers.
The availability of indirect fires is
particularly critical to light forces. Light
infantry, airborne, and helicopter inserted
forces have limited organic firepower
making them especially reliant on outside
support to neutralise threats.
Much attention is currently being
given to extended range and deep strike
missions that are the purview of heavy
artillery systems. Yet, for the individual
soldier, those supporting fires that are
rapidly available and delivered directly
in his battle space remain vital. The
availability of these often falls to either
mortars that are part of the ground unit
or light artillery which are assigned to
34
US ARMY
provide direct support responding to the
calls for fire of units in contact.
Mortars
According to the US Army manual:
“Mortars allow the manoeuvre
commander to quickly place killing
indirect fires on the enemy, independent of
whether he has been allocated supporting
artillery.” Unlike tube artillery and air
support mortars are directly responsive
to the ground manoeuvre commander.
The rapid, high-angle, plunging fires
they offer are invaluable against dug-
in enemy troops and targets in defilade.
These attributes also allow mortars to
place its rounds close to friendly troops.
This makes it ideally suited in the final
defence where the enemy assault is
trying to overrun ones positions. It is
often referred to as a “Commander’s hip-
pocket artillery”.
| Asian Military Review |
The 81mm and 120mm are the most
prevalent mortars at company and
battalion level and those for which
significant capability improvements have
been made. These calibers have allowed
for the introduction of precision guided
projectiles that can place a round within a
few metres of a target. General Dynamics
Ordnance and Tactical Systems and BAE
Systems successfully demonstrated that
their 81mm Roll Control Guided Mortar
(RCGM) could impact within seven metres
of the target at any range. Raytheon
developed its PERM (Precision Extended
Range Munitions), a 120mm GPS-guided
mortar round that also extends the range
from seven to 16 kilometres. The US
Army Armament Research Development
and Engineering Centre (ARDEC) fielded
similar 120mm GPS guided Accelerated
Precision Mortar Initiative cartridges
(APMI) to Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams in Afghanistan. Peter Burke, PEO
Ammunition’s deputy product manager,
Guided Precision Munitions and Mortar
Systems suggested that: “ Coupled with
a Lightweight Hand-held Mortar Ballistic
Computer and the Dismounted 120mm
Mortar Fire Control System, the infantry
commander has a precision-strike
capability and responsiveness he has
never had before.”
The Russian news agency TASS
reported earlier in 2019 that its army had
begun to receive a new ‘silent’ 82mm
mortar model 2B25. Initial deliveries
were made to special forces. The system,
manufactured by CRI Burevestnik, is
reported to be quieter than traditional
mortars, which are not especially loud
themselves, and have more limited
muzzle blast when fired. Its rate of fire
is 15 rounds per minute (rpm) using
high explosive. Reports suggest the
range is over a kilometre which, if true,
is significantly shorter than 3km of the
82-PM-41 conventional mortar in service.
However, the 2B25 at 13kg (28lb) is much
lighter than the 50kg (123lb) of the PM-41.
Russia also fields the 2B9 Vasilek
Cornflower automatic 82mm mortar. It
uses a wheeled chassis and has a recoil
system as well as an automatic loader
that uses clips of four rounds. A clip can
be fired off in less than two seconds. It
can also fire single rounds either breech
loaded or dropped down the muzzle.
It has an indirect fire range of 4.25km
or direct fire range of 1km. At 632kg
(1,393lb) it can be towed but in practice
is more commonly carried in the bed
of a 4x4 truck. In service with Russian
 land
warfare
The 120mm mortar has been the principle battalion organic indirect fire assets for NATO, Russian
and many other armies.  With maximum ranges of 7000 to 9500 meters plus the ability to fire
precision guided projectiles these can be disassembled and man-packed or carried in or towed
by light tactical vehicles.  Here a US mortar team executes a fire mission.
Airborne units it has also been seen in
Syria. China’s Norinco manufactured its
own copy of the Vasilek designated the
W99.
The Hungarian company
DIGÉP (Diósgyöri Gépgyár) began
manufacturing the 2B9M with some
modifications in 1982 delivering over
2500. Continuing its improvements
it produced the DE-82 which, with
conversion to 81mm, was pursued in
collaboration with the US Army ARDEC
for mounting the HMMWV tactical truck.
The system was tested extensively.
Another light truck mobile mortar
system being offered is the Thales
Scorpion which has been displayed
mounted on the 4x4 Toyota Land Cruiser
but which, a spokesperson suggested,
can be fitted onto similar vehicles. The
system uses a shock absorbing platform
in the vehicle bed that can accept an 81, 82
or 120mm tubes, has onboard fire control,
and allows automatic laying of the mortar.
The ability to fit commercial 4x4 open bed
light trucks makes the system particularly
attractive to militaries in Africa and
the Middle East which have shown a
preference for such fleets (technicals).
The US Army announced in October 2018
that is was looking for a replacement
for its current M120A1 mortar. The new
Extended Range Mortar or ERM must
have at least 9km range and is therefore
allowed to be heavier but not over 181kg
(400lb). The goal would be to field the
ERM in 2026. They are also looking for an
36
US ARMY
automated remote loading/firing system
that can be adapted to both 81 and 120mm
and fire 20 to 30 rounds per minute.
Light Howitzers
While today’s artillery is predominantly
155mm or 152mm calibre there is also
a need to have guns that can be easily
lifted by medium helicopter and moved
on the ground by light vehicles. This
has seen the 105mm in western supplied
armies and 122mm in Russian and
Chinese supported forces. These guns
sacrifice range to active light weight and
transportability. In the later case the goal
is to be able to utilise more numerous
medium lift helicopters and to parachute
drop these guns and accompanying light
tactical prime movers to accompany
these forces.
The British L118 and its US sister the
M119A3 are both widely fielded, being
used by 39 armies including UK, New
Zealand and Thailand. An L19 gun
on the L17 carriage weights 1,858kg
(4,096  b) and has a range with standard
ammunition of 17.2km and 20.6km with
base bleed. Accuracy and responsiveness
was improved with the 2013 introduction
of LINAPS artillery pointing system, a
digital fire-control system and GPS-
aided inertial navigation unit. This self-
contained system uses ring laser gyros to
calculate azimuth, elevation and trunnion
tilt, as well as, position and self-survey
using a global positioning system. It has
also been fit with a telescope and night
| Asian Military Review |
vision device for direct fire. The gun is
towed by the Land Rover, Pinzgauer,
HMMWV or other light tactical vehicle.
Barrages fired by L118 batteries were
credited with contributing greatly to the
British Falkland ground operations.
Another popular light howitzer is
the LG1 towed piece developed by GIAT
(now Nexter) in France. It at 1520kg the
lowest weight gun yet has a maximum
range of 18.5km, exceptional accuracy
and a firing rate of over long distances.
The gun was specifically designed for
light and expeditionary forces and
although first fielded in 1992 it remains in
service with Thailand, Indonesia, Canada,
Colombia and Belgium. Singapore retired
its LG1s in 2005 replacing them with the
ST Kinetics Pegasus 155mm light-weight
howitzer. Malaysia has ordered 18 LG1
MkIIIs for its 10th Airborne Brigade
with first deliveries in November 2019.
Sixteen of these guns will be assembled
in country.
This latest improvement in the
MarkIII provides the gun with inertial
positioning and north seeking system, a
ballistic computer and a muzzle velocity
measuring system. These reduce the in-
action time, increase accuracy and permit
a gun crew of as low as three to service
the piece. The Canadian Forces further
improved their LG-1 guns with a new
muzzle brake, a new spade design for
better stability and larger tires.
Light Truck Mounted Artillery
Light guns have proved to be ideal
candidates for mounting on tactical
trucks. Although this will increase the
lift load when slung under a helicopter it
actually allows the gun system - meaning
the howitzer and its mobility component
- to be carried in a single lift. With towed
guns the prime mover would need a
separate helicopter. Vehicle mounted
guns have the advantages of being able to
set-up more quickly and to displace just
as rapidly. This is a critical capability as
recent near-peer combat experience has
shown that artillery can be quickly located
and targeted once they fire. The surest
means to survive is to move immediately
after concluding a fire mission. A vehicle
mounted weapon can do this much more
rapidly that a towed gun. The question is:
at what point does the size and weight of
a truck mounted gun move from it being
considered light to medium?
This divide could reasonably be
whether it can still be lifted by the same
transport helicopter as the towed gun that
 Nexter
The French LG1 is the lightest 105mm
howitzer offered.  It has been improved with
inertial positioning and digital fire controls.
No longer in active service with the French
army it is still popular and recently fielded by
Malaysia’s airborne brigade.
it is indented to replace. This criterion
narrows the range of candidates. One
that meets the mark is the Hawkeye that
was debuted by AM General several years
ago at the AUSA Expo in Washington
DC. It uses a ‘soft-recoil’ mount for
the M20 105mm howitzer mounted on
the M1152A1 HMMWV 4x4. Nguyen
Trinh, director International Business
Integration explained: “Hawkeye going
into firing position is fully automated and
powered while its navigation and digital
fire control provide a ready to fire solution
within under two minutes of halting. It is
manually loaded achieving a maximum
rate of fire of eight rounds per minute for
three minutes and then a sustained rate of
three rounds per minute.” A drawback
is that Hawkeye requires a Boeing CH-47
Chinook to lift it where as the M119A1
(although gun alone) can be sling lifted
by the Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk. The
system recently was subject to field trials
by the US Army National Guard in which
multiple guns were put through the paces
conducting fire missions. These include
“shoot-and-scoot” exercises where the
gun move, take up positions, fire and
then immediately move again.
Light Gun Trends
Several trends are evident in the direction
of light guns and mortars. First are efforts
that enhance their responsiveness. This is
| october 2019 |
l and
warfare
typified by the integration of positioning
and fire controls directly on the system.
Next is providing greater tactical
mobility to the systems. The introduction
of ‘soft’ and recoil absorbing features
are permitting the mounting of both
howitzers and mortars on lighter vehicles
to provide this ability to fire and move.
Finally there is increased automation of
the entire gun servicing process. This not
only reduces gun set-up but allows for
a reduced gun crew size. An evolution
of automation is the quest for automatic
loading and rapid fire capability. A
principle driver for auto-loading is the
significantly higher target effect that it
can provide. Placing a number of rounds
on a target simultaneous or in rapid
succession has the greatest destructive
and physiological impact. Being able to
do this with a single gun provides major
advantages.
Although research and development
efforts continue to find a way to apply the
155mm calibre to light artillery as of today
this category remains dominated by the
105mm. AMR
37
 sea
power

Lockheed Martin
Lockheed Martin's Long Range Anti-Ship Missile
during testing in May 2018.

ANTI-SHIP MISSILE
EVOLUTION
The anti-ship missile has come a long way since the crude guided
weapons first witnessed during the Second World War.
by Jon Lake

T
here are a bewildering array of
weapons systems optimised for
the destruction of surface vessels.
At the height of the Cold War,
the RAF’s Blackburn Buccaneer
aircraft had an arsenal that included
TV- and radar-guided Matra Martel
missiles, longer-range BAe (now MBDA)
Sea Eagle anti-ship missiles, Texas
Instruments (now Raytheon) Paveway
laser-guided bombs and tactical nuclear
weapons, while during the Falklands
War, the courageous and highly skilled
Argentinian pilots wreaked havoc on
Britain’s naval task force - largely using
unguided ‘iron bombs’. The Royal
Navy (RN) was saved from disaster
largely because some of these weapons
had not fused by the time they hit their
targets. During an engagement between
the US Navy and Iranian forces in 1988
(Operation Praying Mantis), US aircraft
attacked enemy vessels using AGM-84
Harpoon missiles, AGM-123 Skipper
rocket-propelled bombs, Walleye TV-
guided bombs, and unguided 1,000lb
(453kg) bombs.
But with the increasing sophistication
and lethality of today’s anti-aircraft
defences, anti-ship attacks are better
carried out without having to overfly
the target, and ideally from significantly
greater stand-off range, and to do this
requires the use of (ideally guided) anti-
ship missiles (AShMs).
These range from small weapons
intended for use against fast and agile
small boats to ballistic missiles that are
designed to take out a capital ship. There
are systems that can be fired from other
ships, or from land-based platforms, or
from helicopters or fixed wing aircraft,
while some missiles have variants for
each of these classes of firing platform.
These various anti-ship weapons employ
different types of guidance, use different
warhead types and sizes, and follow a
wide variety of flight profiles.
During the Second World War, allied
anti-shipping aircraft used cannon,
unguided rockets, bombs and homing

38 | Asian Military Review |


torpedoes against enemy ships, but
Germany did develop the first operational
anti-ship missiles, which used radio
command guidance. Weapons like the
Henschel Hs 293 and the unpowered,
armour-piercing Fritz X gained some
success, especially in the Mediterranean
Theatre, from 1943–44, sinking or heavily
damaging at least 38 ships including
the Italian battleship Roma and the
cruiser USS Savannah. The wire-guided
Hs 293B and the television-guided Hs
293D variants were developed to counter
allied radio jamming, but neither reached
operational service.
On the Allied side, the US Navy
deployed the ASM-N-2 Bat radar-guided
glide bomb, which was claimed to be
the world’s first autonomously-guided,
radar-homing anti-ship weapon, and
used it operationally against the Japanese
in April 1945. The powered McDonnell
LBD-1 Gargoyle saw no operational use.
During the Cold War, Western Navies
were more concerned with tackling
airborne and underwater threats than
with engaging enemy warships, since the
Russian Navy’s ‘blue water’ capabilities
were relatively limited, while the anti-
ship mission tended to fall to submarines,
using torpedoes, and to airborne platforms
– particularly fast jets – using much the
same weapons as they employed against
ground targets. For many years, missile
technology was insufficiently advanced
to allow the development of effective anti-
ship missiles, though some larger aircraft
(like the Soviet Tu-16 ‘Badger’ and Tu-
95 ‘Bear’) did carry large cruise missiles
(usually nuclear-armed) intended for use
against large naval targets like US aircraft
carriers.
Modern anti-ship missiles came to
prominence following the sinking of the
Israeli destroyer Eilat (the former HMS
Zealous) by Egyptian missile boats in 1967,
while air launched anti-ship missiles
were used in the 1982 Falklands War.
Five Exocet missiles had been delivered
to Argentina before the war, and these
were used to sink the British Type 42
destroyer HMS Sheffield on 4 May 1982.
The official Royal Navy Board of Inquiry
Report stated that evidence indicated
that the warhead had not detonated –
demonstrating the lethality of modern
AShMs. A single Exocet which failed to
explode left a destroyer dead in the water,
and which sank four days later. Two
Exocets were then used to sink the 15,000-
ton container ship Atlantic Conveyor on 25
May.
During the long Iran–Iraq War in the
1980s, Iran and Iraq targeted one another’s
merchant shipping and especially oil
tankers in what became known as the
Tanker War. The Iraqi Air Force used
MiG-23s, Mirage F1s and Super Frelon
helicopters armed with Exocet anti-ship
cruise missiles during the first phase of
this campaign, before France supplied
Dassault Super Etendards in 1984,
allowing Iraq to increase the range of its
anti-shipping Exocet strikes. A Liberian
tanker,  Neptunia, was hit by an Iraqi
Exocet in February 1985, becoming the
first tanker to sink as a result of a missile
strike. In 1987, a US Navy guided-missile
frigate, USS Stark, was hit by an Exocet
anti-ship missile fired by an Iraqi Mirage
F1.
Most early air-launched anti-ship
missiles were derivatives of weapons
originally developed for ship-against-
ship combat, including the US AGM-84
Harpoon, the Chinese YJ-83, the French
AM39 Exocet, the Italian Marte, the
Norwegian Penguin, Russia’s Zvezda
Kh-35 and the Swedish RBS-15, although
some dedicated air-launched missiles
were also developed and deployed,
including the Anglo-French Martel and
its active radar-homing, turbojet-powered
Sea Eagle derivative.
While early anti-ship missiles used
radio command guidance, most modern
missiles are ‘fire and forget’ and use
infrared or active radar homing, often in
conjunction with inertial guidance.
Sea-skimming
Most anti-ship missiles follow a flat sea
skimming trajectory, often with a final
highly supersonic ‘dash’ to the target,
though some ballistic missiles have been
re-purposed or designed for an anti-
ship role, especially by China’s People’s
Liberation Army Navy. Anti-ship ballistic
missiles would approach their targets at
enormous speed, with sufficient kinetic
energy to cripple or destroy a large
naval ship (including the largest aircraft
carriers) with a single hit, even with a
conventional warhead, as well as being
very difficult to intercept.
Because a direct hit is required to be
effective, they would need a precise and
high-performance terminal guidance
system. Such weapons can be air launched.
Russia’s Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, for example,
was developed to hit ballistic missile
defence ships and can be carried by Tu-
22M3 bombers or MiG-31K interceptors.
Whether ballistic or sea-skimming,
| october 2019 |
sea
power
modern anti-ship missiles are hard to
evade, outrun or out-turn once a target
has been acquired. To counter the threat,
the modern surface ship has to avoid
being detected, or has to decoy or destroy
all of the incoming missiles or their missile
launch platforms – ideally destroying the
latter before missiles have even been fired.
An incoming missile does not have
things ‘all its own way’, however, and will
have to overcome multi-layered defences,
perhaps beginning with patrolling carrier-
or land-based fighter aircraft carrying
long-range missiles. Its target will
probably be equipped with integrated
computer fire-control systems for agile
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) guided
by powerful and agile radar systems,
and may be able to simultaneously track,
engage, and destroy several incoming
anti-ship missiles or hostile aircraft.
The missile will also have to cope with
electronic countermeasures, chaff, and
decoys, and an ‘inner layer’ of missile
defences, using short-range missiles like
the Raytheon Sea Sparrow or the Rolling
Airframe Missile (RAM). Even the target
ship’s own main gun armament may be
used defensively, as well as dedicated
close-in weapons systems (CIWS), using
rapid firing guns.
The development of new air-launched
anti-ship missiles slowed following
the end of the Cold War, as navies
increasingly operated in the littoral zone,
and as the need to prepare for peer-on-
peer engagements gave way to a need to
engage small, manoeuvrable boats and
other asymmetric threats – even including
suicide bombers using jet skis. This did,
however, lead to the development of a
whole new class of cheap, lightweight
missiles for use against this class of
target. The chance of peer or near-peer
engagements (increasingly entailing ship-
against-ship maritime warfare) seemed to
grow with increasing tensions between
the USA and its allies on one side, and
China and Russia on the other, and this
led to some renewed emphasis on the
development and procurement of bigger
anti-ship missiles.
Most of the new generation of AShMs
are stealthy, highly supersonic and
autonomous, and many of them carry
large warheads – sufficient to inflict a
manoeuvre kill on even the largest targets,
and able to saw smaller vessels in half.
They come screaming in at sea-skimming
heights, giving defences little time to
react and presenting a difficult target for
defensive systems.
39
 sea
power
A Mig 31K interceptor of the Russian Air Force carries a Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air
launched ballistic missile on a flypast during the 2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade.
The joint Russian-Indian PJ-10
BrahMos has a 660lb (300kg) warhead, and
is claimed to be the fastest low-altitude
missile in the world, while also enjoying
a 500km range. Brahmos is powered by
a two stage power-plant, with a solid-
fuel rocket providing the first stage,
accelerating the missile to supersonic
speeds and with a liquid-fuelled ramjet as
the second stage, accelerating it to Mach
2.8 at wavetop height. The BrahMos-II,
now under development, is a hypersonic
version with a speed of Mach 7-8. It is due
to begin testing by 2020.
China’s CASIC YJ-12 is similar to
BrahMos, with a 550lb (250kg) warhead
and an integrated liquid fuel ramjet
engine and a solid rocket booster
conferring a cruise speed of Mach 2.5-
3.5 and a range of 150-400km. In service
with the PLA Navy’s Xian H-6J and H-6L
‘Badger’ bombers the YJ-12 will also be
carried by the Shenyang J-16 (a derivative
of the Su-30MKK) and is being offered to
export customers as the CM-302.
Japan’s new ASM-3 has completed
testing, and is expected to enter service
imminently, initially equipping the
JASDF’s Mitsubishi F-2 fighters, and
perhaps later the F-35A and Kawasaki P-1.
The XASM-3 is a stealthy sea-skimming
missile with hypersonic performance, its
40
solid-fuelled rocket and integrated ramjet
powering it to speeds of up to Mach
5. Range is being boasted to 400km, but
exact warhead weight remains classified.
Less speed; more stealth
But not all new AShMs are hypersonic
or even highly supersonic. Norway’s
Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (claimed
to be the world’s first 5th generation anti-
ship missile) relies on stealth rather than
speed, and is claimed to be ‘fully passive,’
not using active sensors to track targets
and not emitting infrared or radar that
could be detected by enemy ships. The
missile is powered by a small turbofan
(after an initial rocket boost) and has a
range of 185km. It carries a 275lb (125kg)
warhead. A derivative, the developmental
Joint Strike Missile, is designed to be
capable of both air to ground and anti-
ship missions. The JSM will fit the internal
weapons bay of the Lockheed Martin F-35
Joint Strike Fighter.
Another relatively slow mover is the
American Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
(LRASM), intended as a successor to
and replacement for the ageing AGM-
84 Harpoon. LRASM is a derivative of
the JASSM-ER cruise missile used by US
Air Force bombers, and is stealthy and
jam-resistant, producing no trackable
| Asian Military Review |
Kremlin
radar return and no real IR signature.
LRASM will use this low observability
and its autonomous capabilities to detect
and attack targets while evading their
defences. LRASM has a range of more
than 500 miles, compared to 67 miles for
Harpoon. It can deliver a 1,000lb (453kg)
penetrating warhead, hitting targets with
an accuracy of within three metres.
For the US and its allies, LRASM
promises to be a useful means of
addressing the growing threat posed
by Chinese naval forces in the Western
Pacific, protecting international shipping
routes and preventing China from
turning the area between its coast and the
island chain stretching from the Japanese
archipelago to the Philippines into a no-
go area for allied ships and a sanctuary
for its own.
At the other end of the scale, the
development and refinement of weapons
like the MBDA Brimstone and Sea Venom
has produced a new generation of short-
range missiles for use against maritime
targets, replacing lighter weight AShMs
like the Aerospatiale AS 15 TT and the
MBDA Sea Skua. The Sea Venom is a
lightweight Anglo-French anti-ship
missile (formerly known as the Future
Anti-Surface Guided Weapon (Heavy))
that was designed to equip Royal Navy
Wildcat helicopters and French Navy
Panther and NH90 helicopters. The
weapon is expected to enter service with
the Royal Navy in late 2021. AMR
 LAND AND AIRLAND DEFENCE AND SECURITY EXHIBITION

08-12 JUNE 2020 / PARIS

THE UNMISSABLE
WORLDWIDE
EXHIBITION

1,802
exhibitors +14,7%
from 63 countries
65,9% of international
65 startups at Eurosatory LAB

98,721
Total attendance
(exhibitors, visitors,
press, organisers)

227
Official delegations
from 94 countries
and 4 organisations
(representing 760 delegates)

696
journalists
from 44 countries

75 Conferences
2 102 Business meetings made

2018 key figures

 land
warfare
PREPARING FOR THE
UNTHINKABLE
Tackling any type of CBRN attack demands the proper equipment.
Some Asian-Pacific countries have the capability to react if the worst
T
he threat of biological and
chemical warfare in the Asia
Pacific remains low with a firm
commitment by the 10 member
countries of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) –
comprising Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam –
along with other regional countries and
stakeholders: Australia, China, India,
Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand,
Russia, and the United States, who have
all principally committed to the non-
proliferation and use of these deadly
weapons.
“We recognise the need to address
ongoing chemical weapons challenges, to
speak with one voice against the use of
chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone,
and under any circumstances,” the
leaders of these countries asserted in their
joint statement on chemical weapons
during the 12th East Asia Summit (EAS)
in Manila in November 2017 .
Despite this assurance, the risk of
a biological or chemical attack is not
42
should happen.
by JR Ng
non-existent. The Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North
Korea) continues to pursue weapons
of mass destruction and is believed to
maintain a stockpile of between 2,500 and
5,000 tonnes of mustard, phosgene, sarin,
and V-series nerve agents.
The threat has also been broadened
with the rising tide of transnational
terrorism in the region, largely stemming
from returning Daesh foreign fighters
from Iraq and Syria. In the latter half of
2015 and early 2016, these fighters were
recorded employing in multiple instances
deploying mustard gas and chlorine via
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and
mortar bombs, mainly in Iraq.
In its latest worldwide Threat
Assessment Report released in January
2019, the US intelligence community
warned that the overall threat from
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
will continue to grow during the year,
noting “the most significant and sustained
use” of such weapons in decades.
“This trend erodes international
norms against chemical warfare
| Asian Military Review |
programmes and shifts the cost-benefit
analysis such that more actors might
consider developing or using chemical
weapons,” the report stated.
In April 2019, chairman of the National
Authority of Malaysia, Ambassador Dato
Ilankovan Kolandavelu specifically noted
the threats posed by non-state actors at
the opening of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), warning that the
risk of terrorists acquiring and misusing
toxic chemicals constitutes to be a serious
threat to peace and security in the region.
“[The] thriving chemical industry in Asia,
along with the influx of chemical imports
entering and moving within the region,
requires vigilance against potential
misuse of these goods, especially by
various terrorist groups,” Ambassador
Kolandavelu noted.
Although most Asia Pacific countries
are well aware of the dangers, chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear
(CBRN) defence capabilities and
preparedness remain uneven across the
region, largely due to limited budgets and
other competing defence requirements.

Nevertheless, several countries appear to
have invested considerable resources.
Australia
The Australian Defence Force (ADF)
provides specialist CBRN advice and
resources for detection, decontamination,
rendering safe and recovery in hazmat
(hazardous materials) emergencies
including analysis of CBRN material,
personnel and civilians, and areas affected
by CBRN materials. Its International
Deployment Group utilises the Specialist
Response Group for particular medium-
and high-risk planned operations or
emergency incidents in addition to force
protection.
The service also maintains the elite
Special Operations Engineer Regiment
(SOER), which provides Special
Operations Command with ‘leading-
edge’ mobility, survivability and
specialist counter-CBRN and explosive
capabilities. SOER combat engineers are
specially trained and equipped to work
alongside other special forces on a range
of contingencies, both domestically and
in support of forces deployed overseas in
high-threat environments.
As part of the Department of Defence
(DoD)’s Project LAND 2110 Phase 1B, the
ADF is receiving equipment worth $201
million (A$300 million) to acquire new
equipment and facilities that will enhance
its ability to address CBRN threats. In
July 2017, the DoD announced that new
detectors, suits, masks, protection tents,
decontamination systems, containers
for contaminated equipment, warning
and reporting software and simulation
systems, will be procured under this
effort.
“The new equipment enhances the
Australian Defence Force’s ability to
detect, identify, monitor and warn others
of CBRN hazards, protect personnel from
exposure and decontaminate affected
personnel and equipment safely,” said
then-defence minister Marise Payne,
who also noted that the investment will
provide an integrated and layered CBRN
defence capability and replace ageing
equipment reaching the end of service life.
The DoD awarded Leidos Australian a
$160 million (A$243 million) contract in
September 2018 to “deliver and sustain
capabilities in detection, identification
and monitoring, warning and reporting,
physical protection, hazard management
and medical support”, although the
company did not disclose specifics.
In June 2019 local firm Oil Pollution
and Environmental Control (OPEC)
Systems announced that it had won a
$16 million (A$23 million) contract with
Leidos Australia to provide a range of
equipment including newly developed
protective gear called the Kestrel medium
protective CBRN ensemble.
South Korea
The Republic of Korea (RoK, or South
Korea) is among the few countries in the
world today to face active CBRN threats,
and is therefore on constant alert against
an attack from the belligerent DPRK.
The Worldwide Threat Assessment
Report, again warned of a continued
danger posed by Pyongyang, having the
distinction of being one of two countries
that have “used chemical weapons on the
battlefield or in assassination operations
during the past two years”.
The DPRK also continues to defy
international pressure to denuclearise,
and is also pursuing increasingly
sophisticated missile systems that could
reliably deliver nuclear payloads beyond
the Asia Pacific, placing all regional
countries well within range of its wrath.
Moreover, the Korean People’s Army
(KPA) has deployed thousands of
chemical-capable artillery pieces and
multiple rocket launchers within range
of South Korea’s capital city of Seoul. It
is conceivable that a major conflict on
the Korean peninsula could entail the
use of chemical or biological weapons,
potentially devastating much of the
RoK’s urban population.
It is unsurprising, then, that the RoK
Army (RoKA) expends considerable
resources to equip, train, and sustain
numerous counter-CBRN units. These
include the 1st Chemical Company based
in Wonju, the 8th Chemical Company in
Yangyang, the 13th Chemical Battalion in
Inje, the 21st Chemical Battalion in Seoul,
as well as a dedicated CBRN Command
and Chemical Defence Training School.
The RoK Air Force and Navy also maintain
organic CBRN defence capabilities.
The RoKA has fielded the tracked
CBRN Recon Vehicle II manufactured by
Hanwha Land Systems, a protected CBRN
reconnaissance platform specifically
configured to rapidly detect and identify
nuclear and chemical warfare agents
to provide early warning of dangers to
friendly units.
The CBRN Recon Vehicle II is an
updated and networked version of the
earlier K216 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle
(NBCRV) and is based on the improved
| october 2019 |
l and
warfare
K200A1 Korean Infantry Fighting Vehicle
(KIFV) chassis. The 13-tonne vehicle is
operated by a four-person crew within
a reinforced hull that offers protection
against small arms fire, explosive blasts,
and localised NBC agents.
The vehicle is expected to operate close
to the forward edge of the battlespace
behind the RoKA’s main battle tank and
armoured fighting vehicle units, so it is
armed with a M60 7.62mm machine gun
and a K6 12.7mm heavy machine gun for
self-defence.
Its key feature is an extensive NBC
detection suite comprising equipment
such a soil and air sampling system,
chemical sampling tools, contamination
marking set, mass spectrometer,
radiological detection system, warfare
agent indication system, and weather
observation system. This package enables
the vehicle to detect chemical agents at
distances of up to 5km, while the integral
battlefield management system (BMS)
facilitates information sharing via a
secure network.
Hanwha Land Systems has also
developed the 7-tonne 4x4 CBRN Recon
Vehicle I derived from the long wheelbase
version of the Kia Motors Light Tactical
Vehicle (LTV) chassis. In contrast to the
tracked CBRN Recon Vehicle II, this
platform is operated by a three-person
crew and can attain a higher road speed
of 100km/h.
It is also equipped with a comparable
NBC reconnaissance suite, although being
a soft-skinned truck the Type I is aimed at
providing support to rear-echelon units.
Deliveries of both vehicles are ongoing to
replace the service’s ageing legacy CBRN
fleet, and are expected to be completed by
around 2021.
Japan
Staunchly pacifist following the Second
World War, Japan has nevertheless
suffered one of the most deadly CBRN
attacks in the world, when the doomsday
cult Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth)
unleashed a near-weapons grade Sarin
nerve agent on the Tokyo subway in
March 1995.
The country also experienced yet
another nuclear disaster when the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant was severely damaged by a 9.0
magnitude earthquake and the resultant
15 metre tsunami on 11 March 2011.
Although resistant to the seismic shock
of the earthquake the flood of seawater
disabled the power supply and cooling
43
 land
warfare
The Japan Ground Self Defense Force operates a variety of CBRN response
vehicles, such as the NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle
systems of the crippled plant’s three
reactors, causing their cores to overheat
and melt.
Spurred by the performance of
the Japan Ground Self Defense Force
(JGSDF)’s Central NBC Weapon Defense
Unit in the evacuation and recovery
operations in Fukushima, the Ministry
of Defense (MoD) has authorised the
acquisition of various decontamination
capabilities to strengthen the service’s
ability to respond to large-scale NBC
attacks and to minimise the potential
damage.
The MoD allocated $60 million (¥6.5
billion) in the following year to boost the
service’s CBRN capabilities, acquiring
a broad range of equipment such as
decontamination devices and vehicles,
personal protection, and to fund related
research.
It also awarded a $19.3 million (¥2.1
billion) contract to Lockheed Martin and
its local partner Itochu for the delivery of
the AbleSentry system, which is designed
to fuse data from multiple sensor nodes
over a wide area to provide tactical early
warning of a possible attack with chemical,
biological, or radiological agents.
The AbleSentry is an evolution of the
company’s Biological Aerosol Warning
System (BAWS) and Enhanced Biological
Aerosol Warning System (EBAWS) which
have been in JGSDF service since 2005.
The new system adds chemical and
radiological detection capabilities to the
earlier systems, which could only provide
44
JR Ng
warning of biological agents.
More recently in May 2018, the JGSDF
unveiled a new 6x6 medium truck-based
NBC decontamination system at Camp
Omiya in Saitama Prefecture, where its
Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit is
based. The system comprises the Type I
and Type II decontamination equipment
and replaces the service’s ageing Type 94
decontamination set mounted on the 4x4
Mitsubishi Type 73 light truck.
According to the MoD’s Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA),
development and initial trials of the new
decontamination system commenced
between fiscal year 2008 and 2010,
followed by operational testing from
fiscal year 2013 to 2014. Each Type I
system is understood to cost around just
under $1 million (¥100 million),
Singapore
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)
deploys the Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Explosives Defence
Group (CBRE DG) for CBRN
interventions and other related
contingencies. The group comprises the
36th and 39th Battalions of the Singapore
Combat Engineers – which specialise in
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and
CBRN respectively – and leverages on
the capabilities of the SAF Medical Corps’
elite Medical Response Force (MRF).
The CBRE DG operates the Trinity
CBRE Robotic Suite, which is a CBRN-
optimised UGV developed jointly
| Asian Military Review |
developed by the SAF, DSO National
Laboratories, and the Defence Science
and Technology Agency (DSTA).
The 72lb (33kg) UGV measures 0.68m
and is designed to be highly mobile
and can travel at a maximum speed of
1.97metres/second. Like Japan’s Type I
KAI, the vehicle is equipped with a set of
flippers, which extends its length to 0.87m
and boosts its urban manoeuvrability
when deployed.
According to the Ministry of Defence
(MINDEF), the Trinity CBRE Robotic
Suite can be fitted with a range of
mission-specific payloads. These include
a detection package comprising chemical,
radiological, explosives trace detectors,
as well as an oxygen detector; a sampling
package that includes a manipulator arm
to allow the UGV to collect samples, and
a mitigation package featuring a compact
decontamination system, to reduce the
severity of a chemical or radiological
threat. The vehicle can also carry a radio
to facilitate communication between the
operator and a victim.
More recently, the Trinity CBRE
Robotic Suite has been fitted with a
waterjet disruptor, which is designed to
remotely trigger suspicious objects and
improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
from a safe distance. The disruptor is
powered by an electrically initiated
power cartridge and generates a high-
velocity water project to separate the key
components of an IED.
In contrast, MRF personnel don the
Mission Oriented Protective Posture Suit
(MOPP), a protective kit which comprises
several components: a protective gas
mask, overgarments, gloves, and
overboots.
The mask contains a filter that protects
its wearer against harmful chemical
agents. Different canisters can be attached
to the mask to address the anticipated
type of chemical agent, with each MRF
trooper equipped with two types of gas
canisters. These cover the spectrum of
typical chemical agents and can also
provide extended protection inorganic
agents.
MRF personnel are also issued auto-
injectors and filtered bag valve masks
(BVMs), with the former enabling them
to administer the appropriate antidote
to counteract nerve agent damage, while
the latter aids patients who are unable to
support their own breathing. BVMs can
be fitted with similar gas canisters for
protection against active agents. AMR
 Regional
M i l i t a r i e s

Andrew Drwiega
The NCSIST developed Teng Yun (Cloud Rider) MALE UAV.

TAIWAN’S DEFENCE
INNOVATION ON SHOW
This year Taiwan’s biennial defence show, the Taipei Aerospace
& Defence Technology Exhibition (TADTE), was staged from 15-
17 August in Taipei. Taiwan’s External Trade Development Council
(TAITRA) invited to review what was on show.
by Andrew Drwiega

T
wo of the most striking exhibits
at TADTE 2019, both of which
took pride of place within the
Ministry of National Defence
(MND) Pavilion were the Taiwan
National Chung-Shan Institute of Science
& Technology (NCSIST) loitering anti-
radiation munition and a beta version of
a medium-altitude long-range (MALE)
unmanned aerial vehicle.
The Jian Hsiang anti-radiation
loitering munition was displayed on
its own and as part of a truck mounted
battery which can carry up to 12 of
the munitions in individual bays - one
solution to keep them mobile and
avoiding counter-attacks by hostile forces.
Jian Hsiang has a range of around 186
miles (300km) and can be fired from fixed
launchers, the mobile battery or loaded
onboard ships belonging to the Republic
of China Navy (RoCN). Defence observers
have noted a strong resemblance of the
system to the Harpy loitering munition
produced by Israel Aerospace Industries
(IAI), although this was claimed to be
coincidental.
NCSIST is Taiwan’s main research
and development agency responsible for
developing technology and creating a
national independent defence capability.
It also develops critical technology and
systems that can be integrated into future
weapons development and production.
The MALE UAV on show was a beta
updated version of the Teng Yun (Cloud
Rider) UAV, the development of which
was started by NCSIST in 2015. The
current timeline will see the Teng Yun
begin testing in January 2020 and will
progress to full operational trials by
2021. The new version has an improved
and enhanced flight control system
and is capable of automatic take-off
and landing using a turboprop engine,
allowing it to carry a larger payload.
During development, NCSIST’s aim was
to enable the Teng Yun to have a 24 hour
endurance capability with a range of
over 621 miles (1,000km) which would
allow it to engage in long patrol missions,
particularly in the maritime environment.
It will carry a range of sensors that
will include providing real-time video

46 | Asian Military Review |

 Regional
M i l i t a r i e s

transmission.

Andrew Drwiega
In total the MND exhibited 81
different weapons systems and military
hardware. including a prototype of the
Cloud Leopard M armoured vehicle
complete with 81mm mortar mounting.

Taiwan’s Defence Sector Grows

During the opening ceremony, James
Huang, chairman, Taiwan External Trade
Development Council (TAITRA), drew
attention to the achievements of NCSIST
and Aerospace Industrial Development
Corporation (ADIC), highlighting
“their latest instructional jet [for the
military], which will help train even
more top fighter jet pilots.” He added
the achievement Taiwan’s National
Space Organisation which, in June this
year, “saw the successful launch of the
Formosat-7 constellation, the biggest
US-Taiwan scientific collaboration in 10
years.”
He also gave thanks to the
participation in TATDE of international
companies including Lockheed Martin,
General Dynamics, BAE Systems, GE
Aviation, and Thales. Other international
Top view of the the Ministry of National Defence (MND) Pavilion at TADTE defence companies did participate,
with Cloud Leopard vehicles sporting a new 30mm gun turret and mortar
carrying versions.
usually on shared stands and keeping a
low profile.
Andrew Drwiega

The Jian Hsiang anti-radiation loitering

munition with 12 pod transporter,
again designed by NCSIST.

| october 2019 | 47
 Regional
M i l i t a r i e s
Andrew Drwiega
Lockheed Martin’s F-16C/D cockpit
demonstrator.
Jennifer Chuang, director, AIDC
stated that her organisation supported
both military and civilian aviation
development. Within this, ADIC had
supported the development of numerous
programmes including the Xiong Ying
(Taiwan Eagle), the Ching-Kuo (IDF)
fighter, AT-3 and F5E/F.
The development of Taiwan’s
Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) is being
conducted by the Aeronautical Systems
Research Division within the NCSIST. The
aim is to produce a subsonic jet trainer
that will improve on legacy aircraft to
better prepare pilots for the F-16 that they
will ultimately fly. The AJT’s airframe
has been redesigned to deliver a higher
lift-to-drag ratio.
The big news that broke just
after TADTE had closed was the
announcement by the US State Defence
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
that approval had been granted for an
$8 billion Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of
66 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 70
aircraft to Taiwan, something that the
Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF)
48
President Tsai Ing-wen gets to experience the F-16 cockpit demonstrator
for herself.
Andrew Drwiega
Geosat’s Maritime Aerial Reconnaissance System GRH-1 is being targeted
for naval maritime and coastguard missions.
had sought for over a decade. The F-16
Block 70 represents the latest baseline
model that combines Lockheed Martin’s
Mid-Life Update (MLU) and Common
Configuration Improvement Programme
(CCIP) which will allow the F-16 fleet to
be upgraded with technology insertion
well into the future.
The complete package included 75
Block 70 F110 General Electric engines
(one for each aircraft and nine spares);
together with the same number of Link-
16 Systems; Improved Programmable
Display Generators (iPDG); APG-83
Active Electronically Scanned Array
(AESA) Radars; Modular Mission
Computers 7000AH; LN-260 Embedded
GPS/INS; M61 Vulcan 20mm guns; as
well as a wide variety of kinetic ordnance.
During the show Lockheed Martin had
| Asian Military Review |
TAITRA
been discreetly demonstrating its F-16V
cockpit simulator to invited guests,
including President Tsai Ing-wen.
Running at the same time as TADTE,
the Taiwan International Drone Show
(Drone Taiwan) attracted over 20
exhibiting companies, although most of
the more serious models were aimed at the
government emergency response market.
One outstanding UAV was the three
bladed Maritime Aerial Reconnaissance
System (MARS) GRH-1 from Geosat.
According to chairman and CEO, Dr
Cheng-Fang Lo, the heavy fuel oil 100cc
engine, fed by three fuel tanks, could
allow the GRH-1 to fly at a cruise speed of
up to 108km/h for over three hours with
an EO/IR camera and optional laser sight.
Likely customers would be the Taiwan
Navy and Coastguard. AMR
 Analyst
C o l u m n
SOUTH KOREA
JOINS ASIA’S
CARRIER
RACE
T
he Republic of Korea (ROK)
recently announced that it plans
to launch by 2030 a large-deck
amphibious-warfare ship that
could handle Short Take Off and
Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft. With
a displacement of 30,000 tons, the new
Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) is
over twice the size of its predecessors,
the 14,500-ton Dokdo-class vessels, and
is expected to have significantly more
capabilities. For instance, its aviation
complement could number 20 STOVL
jets (likely to be the Lockheed Martin
F-35B Lightning) on top of other air
assets, and this is a step-change from
the Dokdos with their dozen helicopters.
This development is part of an ambitious
five-year naval build-up unveiled in mid-
August that includes ballistic missile
defence-capable Arleigh Burke type
Aegis destroyers and submarines armed
for land attack. LPX-II, the official name
for the ROK’s new capital ship, marks the
first time the republic is pursuing a true
aircraft carrier-type platform. What then
are the main drivers behind this keystone
acquisition?
South Korea’s Ministry of National
Defence stated in no uncertain terms
that the naval build-up has North Korea
in mind. Indeed, its northern neighbour
has been an existential threat for much of
its history. Should a second Korean War
break out, ROK airfields could be prime
targets for the much-feared artillery,
tactical ballistic missiles, and special
operations forces of the Korea’s People
Army (KPA). Having a carrier force
would mitigate this threat. Should its
land bases be knocked out, South Korea
could turn to sea-based airpower for one
of its ‘second-strike’ options. it could be
argued that the relatively small air wing
50
By Ben Ho
of an LPX-II militates against it shaping
the battlespace to any significant degree.
However, this line of reasoning ignores
the fact that the flat-top could bring
about disproportionate strategic effects.
A carrier force could use its mobility
and speed to complicate the enemy’s
calculus, and trying to locate one (or two)
of them roaming off the North Korean
coasts in the Japan and Yellow Seas is
essentially trying to find a needle in the
haystack. Matters are not helped by the
KPA’s anaemic naval and air-defence
capabilities.
Another driver behind the LPX-II
acquisition would be the increasing
uncertainty clouding the north-east
Asian geo-strategic environment. China
is becoming increasingly assertive in its
environs and the People’s Liberation
Army-Navy (PLAN) is growing from
strength to strength. In addition, South
Korea’s ties with Japan are at its lowest
ebb in recent times. In August, the ROK
ended a military intelligence-sharing deal
with Japan in a tit-for-tat move against
trade sanctions imposed by Tokyo a month
earlier. Soon after the termination of the
deal, the South Korean military launched
an exercise aimed at demonstrating
control over the Dokdos that Japan also
claims. Even though these islets are
within range of South Korean land-based
aircraft, the highly maritime nature of
this spat means that there would be a
premium placed on sea-based airpower
during any crisis. For instance, the latter
offers various tactical advantages over its
shore-based counterpart, such as longer
loiter time in the area of operations. It
also bears consideration that the LPX-II
was revealed after Japan said its Izumo-
class “helicopter destroyers” could be
converted to carriers. And just over a
| Asian Military Review |
week after the LPX-II’s unveiling, Tokyo
officially announced that it will buy the
F-35B from the United States. Are these
developments too much of a coincidence
perhaps?
All in all, continual inter-state tensions
are probably the main factor driving
South Korea’s aircraft carrier ambitions.
Moreover, with the ROK gazing
increasingly towards the ‘blue waters’
and concomitantly out-of-area operations,
having a carrier would stand South Korea
in good stead should it partake in a major
humanitarian-assistance/disaster-relief
mission given that the vessel could then
be a key node in such an operation. In
summery, the utility of a carrier-like
platform invariably expands a nation’s
military toolbox, and it makes for a good
hedge against the uncertainties of the
regional security environment. There is
arguably a prestige element to the LPX-
II acquisition as well. Flat-tops are the
‘Queen of the Waves’, and owning (and
being able to operate) them invariably
adds to a country’s standing amongst
the league of nations. Indeed, possessing
an aircraft carrier seems to be par the
course for medium powers these days,
with the likes of Australia, India and
Japan already having or working towards
such a capability. While South Korea’s
current Dokdo-class vessels are certainly
aviation-capable, they are too small in
size and too limited in capability to be
categorised even as ‘quasi-carriers’. The
LPX-II, however, would change that state
of affairs.
Note: Ben Ho is an associate research fellow with
the military studies programme at Singapore’s
Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
E-mail: iswbh@ntu.edu.sg
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