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CHAPTER 13 AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION There are many secondary aids that can help in the statutes. These may be classified as either intrinsic or extrinsic aids.’ Intrinsic aids are derived from the statute that is being ese include the title, the preamble (which sets out the headings, and punctuation. Extrinsic aids refer to w itself. Judges have looked at dictionaries, earlier interpretation of interpreted. Th purposes of the law), sources outside the la statutes, or the records and journals of Congress.* INTRINSIC AIDS PARTS OF A STATUTE Laws have to be correctly interpreted to determine whether they apply to the case at hand. The meaning of a statute and its application can be derived from an examination of the text of the parts of the statute. These parts can shed light on the manner and conditions attending the enactment of the law and can help determine whether they were meant to apply to a case pending before a court. ‘Administrative regulations, for example, do not apply '0 criminal cases. This is illustrated by the case of Ebarle ». Sucaldito! In that case, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. filed before the City Fiscal of Pagadian City several complaints for violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as that of the Revised Penal ' Gany Stapren & Davin KeLty, THE ENCLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 202 (7% edition, 2004). Id. at 202-205. ‘GR. No. L-33628, December 29, 1987. 336 | LeGat METHOD ESSENTIALS 3.0 Code against the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga, Ebarle complaints stemmed from alleged irregularities in the conduct Of public bidding for the supply of gravel and sand to the province, aPPointmeny of relatives to government positions, and falsification of Public documents. Ebarle attempted to have the complaints dismissed, claiming that the City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, which Outlined the Procedure by which complainants may charge government Officials ang employees with commission of irregularities. The Court held that the text of the Executive Order showed that it applied exclusively to administrative, not criminal complaints, The Court noted that (1) the very title spoke of “commission of inregularities.”; and (2) there was no express or implied mention of criminal “offenses” or “crimes”. While “crimes” “Srregularities”, the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto, the Court explained, Finally, the Court found it Significant that the Executive Order made spec ific reference to “erring officials or employees... removed or otherwise vindicated” and did sot employ Such technical terms in criminal prosecutions as “accused,” “convicted,” or “acquitted.” amount to The title of a statute as an aid in interpretation is an unsafe criterion, and is not entitled to much weight The wiser course of action ‘would seem to be to examine other parts of the statute. Where there is ambiguity in a statute, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and to ascertain the purpose and intent of the statutes An explanatory note usually accompanies a bill It presents the issue that the bill seeks to address and Proposes the steps to address that issue. In many cases, the ex) ‘planatory note can shed light on what the authors intended to accomplish with the proposed measure. oo spemmissioner of Customs v. Relunta, GR. No. L-11860, May 29, 1959. 7, 2008. ‘nicipality of Nueva Era v Municipality of Marcos, GR. No. 169435, February 27; ‘Atos To ConstrUCTiON | 337 Following is an example of an explanatory note: This measure | was filed in the Republic of the Philippines House of | HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Representatives. Quezon City A parallel | version 1s | usually filedin | FIFTEENTH CONGRESS Ce First Regular Session eae _— | House bills | a receive a | HOUSE BILL No. 4631 | number when Introduced by Reps. TEDDY A. CASINO, NERI they are | JAVIER COLMENARES, LUZVIMINDA C. rl ILAGAN, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, RAYMOND V. PALATINO, ANTONIO L. TINIO and EMMI A. These are the | DE JESUS authors of | the bill. | EXPLANATORY NOTE For most people, the importance of communication is usually taken for granted. for individuals constrained by hearing or faced with audiological impairment, the insufficiency of communication systems and the lack of support can cause great injustice and disparity. For instance, data from the Philippine Deaf Resource Center (PDRC) show that one out of three deaf women is a victim of rape while 65 to 70% of deaf children are molested. Of the 82 cases they monitored, 67% of deaf complainants lodged rape complaints while 32% of deaf respondents were accused of theft. The note explains =| the prevailing situation and why there is a need to | enact the proposed measure. | 998 | LEGAL METHOD ESSENTIALS 3.0 With the high incidence of criminal cases involving deaf persons, there is an unquestionable need for interpreters during investigative and judicial proceedings. Unfortunately, the current system does not have a clear procedure for such, Oftentimes, the deaf individual is left to find and pay a suitable interpreter. Without a proper ee system, finding an interpreter may also delay The note Proceedings. specifies the | solution to the The proposed bill addresses all of these problems. problem that the Itis the responsibility of the State to provide for bill proposes interpreters during any government Proceeding, _ be it for police investigations, court or public hearings. Hired interpreters are also entitled to sufficient payment and rest, In view of the fore; going, immediate approval thereof is highly recor mmended. In People v. Purisima,* several defendants were charged with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. The lower courts issued orders quashing or dismissing the informations on the ground that they did not allege facts that constituted the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9. Allo the informations failed to state one element of the crime: that the defendants carried a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon outside aa residence in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or rt ‘© subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessnes Public disorder. The Government, in trying to prevent the dismso!® the cases, argued that the law did not require that the prohibited 2°5 related to subversive activities and that the act proscribed “Sentally a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of pubic po! — ‘GR.Nos, L-42050-66, November 20, 1978, AIDS T0 ConstRUCTION | 339 Guided by the principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the gate, the Supreme Court ruled that the simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree was not a criminal offense initself, and what made the act criminal or punishable under the decree was the motivation behind it. The Court explained that in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule js to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. The Court then noted that certain aids were available in ascertaining the intent for Presidential Decree No. 9, namely: $h€ presence of events that led to or precipitated the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 9 as clearly spelled out in the preamble or the “whereas” clauses of the decree. It reasoned that while the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult to interpret, be used to determine the intent of the law, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist.” Additionally, the Court stated that the result or effects of the Presidential Decree must be within its reason or intent. In this case, it considered that it was only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the aforementioned desired result of Proclamation No. 1081 that was within the intent of Presidential Decree No.9, and nothing else. The resolution of a case sometimes turns on the analyses of several provisions of the same law, as illustrated in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc.’ where the Court tuled that courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from the four corners of the statute. In order to discover the intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular Provision thereof, should be considered. Every section, provision, or a In another case, the Supreme Court explained that a preamble is really not an integral part of law and that a t it is merely an introduction to show its intent. It cannot be the origin of Enis and obligations. If the meaning of a statute is clear, the preamble cannot expand or festrict its oper im ation, or prevail over its text. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. reall January 19, 1999, -R. No, 83736, January 15, 1992.

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