1.TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court
is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
Griño-Aquino, J.

FACTS:

As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino house maids employed in
Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No.16, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers
going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such
Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37,
Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circularsand to
prohibit their implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;t hat the assailed
DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive;
and that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative
Register were not complied with.

HELD:

The second and first grounds are unmeritorious. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor
Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. It reads: “The
Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement
activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title[Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.” On the other hand, the scope of the
regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the
functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the
overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for
among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was
the power and duty to establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate
private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas; it
assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty to recruit
and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to
government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate; and from the National
Seamen Board, the POEA took over to regulate and supervise the activities of agents or
representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure
the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance
therewith. Said administrative issuances merely restricted the scope or area of PASEI’s business
operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong
till after the establishment of the “mechanisms” that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic
helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic
helpers for Hong Kong, PASEI may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hong Kong
and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries. Said administrative
issuances, are intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive
collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by
private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hong Kong. They are
reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the
recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and
filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register. As announced in Tañada vs. Tuvera ,“All
statutes , including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance
of their duties.”

G.R. No. L-46158 November 28, 1986

TAYUG RURAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant.

Bengzon, Bengzon, Villaroman & De Vera Law Office for plaintiff-appellee.

Evangelista, Bautista & Valdehuesa Law Office for defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Tayug Rural is a bank in Pangasinan which took out 13 loans from Central Bank in 1962 and1963,
all covered by promissory notes, amounting to 813k. In late 1964, Central Bank released a circular;
Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 thru the Director of Loans and Credit. This circular all informed all
rural banks that an additional 10% per annum penalty interest would be assessed on all past due
loans beginning 1965. This was enforced beginning July 1965.In 1969, the outstanding balance of
Tayug was at 444k. Tayug Rural filed a case in CFI Manila to recover the 10% penalty it paid up to
1968, amounting to about 16k, and to restrain Central bank from further imposing the penalty.
Central Bank filed a counterclaim for the outstanding balance includingthe10% penalty, stating that it
was legally imposed under the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the
Monetary Board on 1958, under RA 720.Tayug’s defense was that the counterclaim should be
dismissed since the unpaid obligation of Tayug was due to Central Bank’s flexible and double
standard policy of its rediscounting privileges to Tayug Rural and its subsequent arbitrary and illegal
imposition of the 10% penalty. Tayug Rural contends that no such 10% penalty starting from 1965
was included in the promissory notes covering the loans. A judgment was rendered by CFI Manila in
favor of Central Bank ordering Tayug Rural Bank to pay10% penalty in the amount of around 19k
pesos for loans up to July 1969, and to pay nothing for the next remaining loans. Tayug’s claim in
the case was however successful, and so Tayug was also ordered to pay 444k, with interest to the
Central Bank for the overdue accounts with respect to the promissory notes. Central Bank appealed
to the CA, but also lost on the ground that only a legal question had been raised in the pleadings.
The case was then raised to the SC, with each party arguing in the following manner:

CFI rules that the circular’s retroactive effect on past due loans impairs the obligation of contracts
and deprives Tayug Rural of property without due process of law.

Central Bank reasons that Tayug Rural, despite the loans, should have known that rules and
regulations authorize the Central Bank to impose additional reasonable penalties.

ISSUE: WON The Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty via Memorandum Circular No.
DLC-8

HELD: NO. A reading of the circular and pertinent provisions, including that of RA 720, shows that
nowhere therein is the authority given to the Monetary Board to mete out additional penalties to the
rural banks on past due accounts with the Central Bank. As said by the CFI, while the Monetary
Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition of
administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure SUPERVISORY in character. Administrative
rules have the force and effect of law. There are, however, limitations in the rulemaking power of
administrative agencies.All that is required of administrative rules and regulations is to implement
given legislation by not contradicting it and conform to the standards prescribed by law. Rules and
regulations cannot go beyond the basic law. Since compliance therewith can be enforced by a penal
sanction, an administrative agency cannot implement a penalty not provided in the law authorizing it,
much less one that is applied retroactively. The new clause imposing an additional penalty was not
part of the promissory notes when Tayug took out its loans. The law cannot be given retroactive
effect. More to the point, the Monetary Board revoked the additional penalty later in 1970, which
clearly shows an admission that it had no power to impose the same. The Central bank hoped to
rectify the defect by revising the DLC Form later. However, Tayug Rural must pay theadditional 10%
in case of suit, since in the promissory notes, 10% should be paid in attorney’s fees and costs of suit
and collection. Judgment AFFIRMED with modification

G.R. No. 70479 February 27, 1987

FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
CARLOS LARIOSA and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS:
n this petition for certiorari, petitioner Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines
[Firestone for brevity] assails the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission which ordered the reinstatement without backwages of Carlos Lariosa, a dismissed tire
builder of petitioner, as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
WON under Article 283 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for "serious
misconduct" or for "fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or representative."

HELD:
If there is sufficient evidence that an employee has been guilty of a breach of trust or that his
employer has ample reasons to distrust him, the labor tribunal cannot justly deny to the employer the
authority to dismiss such an employee.

As a tire builder, Lariosa was entrusted with certain materials for use in his job. On the day in
question, he was given two bundles of wool flannel swabs [ten pieces per bundle] for cleaning disks.
He used four swabs from one pack and kept the rest [sixteen pieces] in his "blue travelling bag." 10
Why he placed the swabs in his personal bag, which is not the usual receptacle for company
property, has not been satisfactorily explained.

If Lariosa, by his own wrong-doing, could no longer be trusted, it would be an act of oppression to
compel the company to retain him, fully aware that such an employee could, in the long run,
endanger its very viability.

The employer's obligation to give his workers just compensation and treatment carries with it the
corollary right to expect from the workers adequate work, diligence and good conduct. 11

In view of the foregoing, We rule that Firestone had valid grounds to dispense with the services of
Lariosa and that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering his reinstatement.
However, considering that Lariosa had worked with the company for eleven years with no known
previous bad record, the ends of social and compassionate justice would be served if he is paid full
separation pay but not reinstatement without backages as decreed by the NLRC

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated December 28, 1984 is reversed and set aside. Petitioner Firestone Tire and Rubber Company
of the Philippines is directed to pay its dismissed worker Carlos Lariosa the separation pay to which
he may be entitled under the law, or any collective bargaining agreement or company rules or
practice, whichever is higher.

SO ORDERED.