Article 28.

Discrimination on grounds of religion, etc- (1) The

State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
(2) Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the
State and of public life.
(3) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex
or place of birth be subjected to any disability, liability,
restriction or condition with regard to access to any place of
public entertainment or resort, or admission to any educational
institution.
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making
special provision in favour of women or children or for the
advancement of any backward section of citizens.

The principle of equality laid down in Article 27 is spelt out for certain
situations in greater detail in Article 28. Article 28, clauses (1) and (2) are
both limited to discrimination on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex or
place of birth or any of them. Clause (3) speaks of non-restriction of access
in any public entertainment or resort, or admission to any educational
institution on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Clause (4)
of this article permits the State to make special provision for women,
children and for the advancement of any backward section of citizens. As a
matter of fact, this article projects the citizen against discrimination. The
State cannot discriminate only on the grounds as mentioned in Article 28,
but with some other rational factor, the discrimination would be valid. The
crucial word in this Article is discrimination which means making an
adverse distinction with regard to or distinguishing unfavorably from
others.

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Art.27 enunciates the general principle of equality and forbids a
classification on arbitrary or unreasonable grounds. Art.28 (1) relates to a
particular application of the principle of equality. Under art.28 (1)
classification of citizens on grounds of only religion, race, caste, sex or birth
place is per se discriminatory and no question of reasonableness of the
classification arises. Unless differential treatment is meted out only on one
of those grounds, this article is not attracted. In one case the High Court
Division found the failure of a nationalised company to give benefit of an
agreement to some of its employees violative of art. 28, the judgment does
not show that discrimination has been made on one of those grounds.
(Carew and Company v. Labour Court, 50 DLR 396).

Art. 28(2) provides that women shall have equal rights with men in all
spheres of the State and of public life, while art. 28(3) provides that no citizen
shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth be
subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to
access to any place of public entertainment or resort, or admission to any
educational institution. The use of the word 'only' makes it clear that what is
forbidden is discrimination purely and solely on account of any of the
specified grounds.

Gender discrimination–The SRO published in the Bangladesh Gazette on

February 5th 1984 which provides that the retirement of Flight Steward
(male) 45 years and Flight Stewardess (female) 35 years are violative of
Articles 28 of the Constitution.
Rabia Bashri Irene and another v Bangladesh Biman Corporation and
another 52 DLR 308

In view of the provisions of art.28 of the Constitution, no differential

treatment can be made only on the ground of race, caste, religion, sex or
place of birth s except that the State is not prevented from making special

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provisions in favour of women or children or for the advancement of any
backward section of the citizens. (Rabia Bashri Irene v. Banglaesh Biman,
52 DLR 308 (Fixing retirement age of flight stewardess below the age of
retirement of flight steward constitutes gender discrimination); Dalia
Parveen v. Bangladesh, 48 DLR 132)

A distinction made amongst the tax-payers, for an annuity deposit scheme,

between those belonging to upper income groups and those belonging to
lower income groups and requiring only the former to pay annuity deposits
is a reasonable classification. (Hari Krisna v. India, AIR 1966 SC 619).

Indirect election for reserved seats whether destroyed the principle of

democracy–A system of indirect election cannot be called undemocratic. It
is provided in the Constitution itself. Clause 4 in Article 28 provides that
nothing in that Article shall prevent the State, which expression includes
Parliament, from making special provision in favour of women as done by
Act No. 38 of 1990. (Dr. Ahmed Hussain vs Bangladesh 44 DLR (AD) 109).

Article 29. Equality of opportunity in public employment- (1)

There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in respect
of employment or office in the service of the Republic.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex
or place of birth, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in
respect of, any employment or office in the service of the
Republic.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from –
(a) making special provision in favour of any backward section
of citizens for the purpose of securing their adequate
representation in the service of the Republic;

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(b) giving effect to any law which makes provision for reserving
appointments relating to any religious or denominational
institution to persons of that religion or denomination;
(c) reserving for members of one sex any class of employment or
office on the ground that it is considered by its nature to be
unsuited to members of the opposite sex.

The main object of this article is to create a Constitutional right to equality of

opportunity and employment in public offices. It is confined to employment
or appointment to an office under the Republic. Clauses (1) & (2) of this
Article speak of certain positive rights and clauses 3(a), (b) and (c) are certain
exceptions in respect of which the State can make laws for reservation of any
backward sections of citizens if not adequately represented in the Service of
the Republic, and prescription of professing a particular religion or
belonging to a particular denomination, if the office is in connection with the
affairs of any religious or denominational institution. Law can be made
reserving any class or employment or office for one sex on the ground that
the nature of employment is unsuited to the members of the opposite sex. In
reality, clause (3) of Article 29 gives a permissible basis. Broadly, equality of
opportunity in public employment is provided in general terms, but Article
29(2) prohibits discrimination against a citizen on the ground of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth.

Giving benefit to some and denying the same to others under the same
agreement and service condition is not only illegal but also the same offends
the respondents' fundamental rights.
Carew and Company (Bangladesh) Limited vs Chairman Labour Court and
others 50 DLR 396.

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For obvious reasons the equality before law and equality of opportunity are
both governed by the principle that the equality should be qualified by the
qualification of the citizen.
The opportunity offered to the citizen must be subject to the qualifications
of the citizen. For example, in the posts of Muharrars all citizens of
Bangladesh cannot make a prayer for appointment. Only such citizen as has
the requisite qualification may be offered an opportunity for employment in
the post of Muharrars. So we have to consider whether there was
discrimination among the citizens with equal qualification and equal claim.
(Nurul Islam vs Bangladesh 46 DLR 46).

Equal opportunity– Reduction of chance of promotion does not amount to

deprivation of the right to equal opportunity for employment. No grievance
could be made of new rules if they are made bonafide to meet exigencies of
service. (Bangladesh vs Md Azizur Rahman 46 DLR (AD) 19).

The framers of the Constitution attached immense importance to the service

of the Republic and guaranteed equal opportunity under Article 29. The
words "in respect of employment" is so wide, that it includes all matters in
relation to employment, both prior and subsequent to initial appointment,
subject to reasonable rules framed by the Government. (Gazi Jashimuddin
vs Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dhaka & others 50
DLR 31).

Classification of those who failed in the examination for the first time like
the petitioner and those who did not appear at all in such examination or
failed to appear in such examination into two categories has a reasonable
basis and an intelligible differentia. Subsequently passing of one who failed
earlier in such examination though securing highest position like the
petitioner is immaterial as the stigma of failure sticks to him. The

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classification of the two categories of officers is not discriminatory. (A B
Mohiuddin Ahmed, Executive Engineer vs Bangladesh and others 49 DLR
353).

Article 30. Prohibition of foreign titles, etc- No citizen shall,

without the prior approval of the President, accept any title,
honour, award or decoration from any foreign state.

Article 31. Right to protection of law- To enjoy the protection of

the law, and to be treated in accordance with law, and only in
accordance with law, is the inalienable right of every citizen,
wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being
within Bangladesh, and in particular no action detrimental to the
life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be
taken except in accordance with law.

This article clear] that every citizen and every person in Bangladesh have an
inalienable right to be treated in accordance with law. Further, no action
detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any citizen or
inhabitant of Bangladesh shall be taken except in accordance with law. The
term in accordance with law is akin to American concept of 'due process'.
No person's life, liberty, reputation or property shall be taken except in
accordance with law means maintaining fairness and avoiding arbitrariness.
This is in essence the concept of rule of law.

It will be a highly doubtful proposition to say that in the absence of a due

process guarantee in the constitution conferment of uncontrolled and
unfettered discretionary power on the executive can pass the test of the
equality clause. Warris Meah answers the question in the negative. At any

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rate, the Constitution having incorporated the American 'due process'
concept in art.3 1 there can be no doubt that conferment of unfettered and
uncontrolled discretionary power will not only be hit by art.27, but will also
be inconsistent with the provision of art. 31.

In the case of ETV Ltd. Vs. Dr. Chowdliury Mahmood Hasan, 54 DLR (AD)
130, K.M. Hasan, J. while interpreting Articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution
held in paragraph 80 as under:
"It is a simple case of investment, and like every investment the investment
in ETV has its own risk. The third party rights exist and fall with the Ekushey
Television, since their interests are merged with that of ETV. The substantive
legal principle in this regard is that every person is subject to the ordinary
law within the jurisdiction. Therefore, all persons within the jurisdiction of
Bangladesh are within Bangladesh rule of law. The foreign investors in ETV
are no exception to this principle."

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