Aging Management Guideline For Commercial Nuclear Power Plant

Aging Management Guideline for
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants—

Electrical and Mechanical Penetrations
Effective December 6, 2006, this report has been made publicly available in
accordance with Section 734.3(b)(3) and published in accordance with
Section 734.7 of the U.S. Export Administration Regulations. As a result of
this publication, this report is subject to only copyright protection and does
not require any license agreement from EPRI. This notice supersedes the
SED
N WARNING: export control restrictions and any proprietary licensed material notices
A L
LICE
Please read the License Agreement

embedded in the document prior to publication.
on the back cover before removing
R I
M AT E
the Wrapping Material.
Technical Report
Aging Management Guideline for
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants—
Electrical and Mechanical
Penetrations
1003456
Final Report, April 2002
Cosponsor
U.S. Department of Energy
19901 Germantown Road
Germantown, Maryland 20874
Project Manager
G. Morris
EPRI Project Manager

J. Carey
EPRI • 3412 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304 • PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303 • USA
800.313.3774 • 650.855.2121 • askepri@epri.com • www.epri.com
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES
THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW AS AN
ACCOUNT OF WORK SPONSORED OR COSPONSORED BY THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI). NEITHER EPRI, ANY MEMBER OF EPRI, ANY COSPONSOR, THE
ORGANIZATION(S) BELOW, NOR ANY PERSON ACTING ON BEHALF OF ANY OF THEM:
(A) MAKES ANY WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, (I)

WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS, OR
SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS DOCUMENT, INCLUDING MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR (II) THAT SUCH USE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON OR
INTERFERE WITH PRIVATELY OWNED RIGHTS, INCLUDING ANY PARTY'S INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, OR (III) THAT THIS DOCUMENT IS SUITABLE TO ANY PARTICULAR USER'S
CIRCUMSTANCE; OR
(B) ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY WHATSOEVER

(INCLUDING ANY CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF EPRI OR ANY EPRI REPRESENTATIVE
HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES) RESULTING FROM YOUR
SELECTION OR USE OF THIS DOCUMENT OR ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD,
PROCESS, OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS DOCUMENT.
ORGANIZATION(S) THAT PREPARED THIS DOCUMENT
Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc.
ORDERING INFORMATION
Requests for copies of this report should be directed to EPRI Orders and Conferences, 1355 Willow
Way, Suite 278, Concord, CA 94520, (800) 313-3774, press 2 or internally x5379, (925) 609-9169,
(925) 609-1310 (fax).
Electric Power Research Institute and EPRI are registered service marks of the Electric Power
Research Institute, Inc. EPRI. ELECTRIFY THE WORLD is a service mark of the Electric Power
Research Institute, Inc.
Copyright © 2002 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
CITATIONS
This report was prepared by
Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc.

1777 Sentry Parkway West
Abington Hall, Suite 300
Blue Bell, PA 19422
Principal Investigators
W. Denny
R. Butwin
D. Katz
F. Gregor
V. Miselis
This report describes research sponsored by EPRI and the U.S. Department of Energy.
The report is a corporate document that should be cited in the literature in the following manner:
Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants—Electrical and

Mechanical Penetrations, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2002. 1003456.
NOTE: This report is one of several Aging Management Guidelines funded by the
U.S. Department of Energy and developed with the cooperation of EPRI and the EPRI Life
Cycle Management Committee. Due to termination of the DOE program, EPRI carried this
report to completion and publication at the request of the LCM Committee.
iii
REPORT SUMMARY
As part of the application process for license renewal, nuclear utilities must perform an
evaluation to confirm that they have appropriately considered aging effects on plant components
within the scope of the License Renewal Rule. This report provides guidelines for managing
relevant degradation mechanisms applicable to electrical and mechanical penetrations in nuclear
power plants. Use of these guidelines will provide utilities with a basis for verifying that
effective methods for managing age-related degradation of penetration systems have been
established.
Background
This report is one of several Aging Management Guidelines (AMGs) developed by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) with the cooperation of EPRI and the Life Cycle Management
advisory committee. In general, the AMGs provide guidance on managing aging effects in
various power plant systems. This AMG supports the documentation of aging effects
management programs required under the License Renewal Rule (10 CFR 54) and may assist
utilities in Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) activities. Effective aging management activities
will ensure that plant systems—in this case, electrical and mechanical penetrations—will
continue to perform their functions during both the current and license renewal terms.
Objectives
• To provide an analysis of the potential aging mechanisms and effects for electrical and
mechanical penetrations.
• To consolidate historical maintenance and industry operating information into one source and
develop guidelines for managing significant aging mechanisms.
Approach
The scope of this AMG includes the following components: electrical penetrations, piping
penetrations, equipment hatches and doors, personnel airlocks, drywell heads, and fuel transfer
tubes. The AMG evaluates the main subsystems within both electrical and mechanical
penetrations. In specific, the AMG examines the stressors acting on penetration components,
industry data on aging and failure of these components, and maintenance activities performed on
penetration systems. Principal aging mechanisms and effects resulting from environmental and
operating stressors on these systems are identified, evaluated, and correlated with actual plant
experience to determine if the mechanisms are actually being experienced. The AMG next
evaluates maintenance programs to determine if the effects of aging mechanisms are being
detected and managed. Other potentially useful testing and condition monitoring techniques are
also identified. Finally, for components where an aging mechanism may not be fully managed by
existing programs, the AMG recommends additional plant-specific activities. This AMG is
v
organized so as to allow maintenance and inspection personnel to compare their plant-specific
aging effects and aging management program activities to the more generic results and
recommendations in the guideline.
Results
This AMG concludes that electrical and mechanical penetrations are highly reliable and, for the
most part, can be expected to function reliably through the current operating term as well as
during the license renewal period. While significant aging effects exist, most are effectively
managed by existing plant programs. For the very few cases where existing programs may not
adequately manage aging effects, the AMG recommends supplemental plant activities.
EPRI Perspective
Use of the AMG can greatly simplify the process for determining the aging effects applicable to
electrical and mechanical penetrations and for managing these effects into the license renewal
period. With its comprehensive approach, the AMG has the potential for reducing a portion of
the effort required in developing and submitting a license renewal application. In addition, the
AMG provides useful data on aging effects and failure rates that can be used in life cycle
management evaluations of penetrations. Finally, the AMG characterizes initiation and
progression of equipment aging for use in training maintenance and inspection personnel. To
date, nine AMGs have been published by Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. DOE on the
following topics: 1) battery chargers, inverters and uninterruptible power supplies, 2) stationary
batteries, 3) heat exchangers, 4) motor control centers, 5) pumps, 6) switchgear, electrical, 7)
transformers, power and distribution, 8) tanks and pools, and 9) electrical cables and
terminations.
Keywords
Penetrations
Aging (materials)
License renewal
Aging management review
LWR
vi
EPRI Licensed Material
ABSTRACT
This Aging Management Guideline (AMG) describes recommended methods for effective
detection and mitigation of aging mechanisms in both mechanical and electrical commercial
nuclear power plant containment penetrations. The intent of this AMG is to assist plant
maintenance and operations personnel in maximizing the safe, useful life of these components. It
also supports the documentation of aging effects management programs required under the
License Renewal Rule 10 CFR 54 and may assist utilities in Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65)
activities. This AMG is presented in a manner that allows personnel responsible for performance
analysis and maintenance to compare their plant-specific aging effects (expected or already
experienced) and aging management program activities to the more generic results and
recommendations presented herein.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This Aging Management Guideline was prepared by Ogden Environmental and Energy Services
Co., Inc., with funding provided by the U.S. Department of Energy. Baltimore Gas & Electric
Company acted as “host” utility to provide plant-specific data to help to benchmark this report.
Its assistance is gratefully acknowledged. Review and comments were provided by members of
EPRI’s Life Cycle Management Subcommittee and other utility personnel; their assistance is
also gratefully acknowledged. We also acknowledge survey respondents who provided
additional data that assisted in the development of this report. A special acknowledgement is
made to Paul Colaianni of Duke Power and William Denny of AMEC Earth and Environmental,
Inc. for their assistance in performing a final review of the report.
ix
CONTENTS
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 1-1

1.1 Purpose and Objective .............................................................................................. 1-1
1.2 Scope........................................................................................................................ 1-1
1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 1-2
1.4 Conclusions of This Study......................................................................................... 1-2
1.4.1 Historical Performance ..................................................................................... 1-2
Electrical ................................................................................................................... 1-2
Mechanical................................................................................................................ 1-3
1.4.2 Significant Component/Aging Mechanism Combinations Not Always
Managed by Existing Programs ..................................................................................... 1-4
1.4.3 Recommendations Regarding Aging Management of Electrical and
Mechanical Penetrations................................................................................................ 1-4
1.5 References................................................................................................................ 1-5
2 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 2-1

2.1 Background............................................................................................................... 2-1
2.2 Purpose and Objectives ............................................................................................ 2-2
2.3 Contents of Aging Management Guideline ................................................................ 2-4
2.4 Generic License Renewal Requirements .................................................................. 2-5
2.5 Method Used to Define the Scope of Components to be Evaluated Under the
License Renewal Rule (LRR) and the Maintenance Rule (MR) .......................................... 2-6
2.6 Method Used to Define Aging Mechanisms Assessed in This Study ......................... 2-6
2.7 References................................................................................................................ 2-8
3 EQUIPMENT EVALUATED ................................................................................................. 3-1

3.1 General ..................................................................................................................... 3-1
Safety-Related Penetrations .......................................................................................... 3-1
Environmentally Qualified (EQ) Penetrations ............................................................ 3-4
Voltage Category (EPAs)............................................................................................... 3-4
xi
Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Electrical Penetration Assemblies.......................... 3-5

3.2 Results of Methodology Used to Select Components Within the Scope of
License Renewal ................................................................................................................ 3-6
3.3 Description and Listing of Components Evaluated .................................................... 3-6
3.3.1 Electrical Penetration Assemblies..................................................................... 3-6
3.3.2 Mechanical Penetration Assemblies ................................................................. 3-7
Piping Penetration Subcomponents .......................................................................... 3-7
Equipment Hatch Subcomponents ............................................................................ 3-7
Personnel Airlock Subcomponents............................................................................ 3-8
Fuel Transfer Tube Subcomponents ......................................................................... 3-8
Drywell Heads........................................................................................................... 3-8
3.4 Component Boundaries............................................................................................. 3-9
Electrical ........................................................................................................................ 3-9
Mechanical .................................................................................................................... 3-9
3.5 Analysis of EPRI NUS Database for Environmentally Qualified Electrical
Penetration Assemblies.....................................................................................................3-10
3.5.1 Manufacturer Sort............................................................................................3-11
3.5.2 Plant Sort ........................................................................................................3-12
3.5.3 Model/Information Sort ....................................................................................3-13
3.5.4 Conclusions Regarding EPRI NUS Database..................................................3-13
3.6 Operating and Service History..................................................................................3-13
3.6.1 Industry-wide Operating Experience with Components: NRC
Documentation .............................................................................................................3-14
3.6.1.1 Electrical Penetration Assemblies..............................................................3-14
IEN 93-25, “Bunker Ramo Electrical Penetration Assembly Degradation”
[3.8] .....................................................................................................................3-14
IEN 88-89, “Degradation of Kapton Electrical Insulation” [3.9] .............................3-14
IEN 88-29, “Deficiencies in Primary Containment Low-Voltage Electrical
Penetration Assemblies” [3.10] ............................................................................3-15
IEN 86-104, “Unqualified Butt Splice Connectors Identified in Qualified
Penetrations” [3.11] .............................................................................................3-15
IEN 82-40, “Deficiencies in Primary Containment Electrical Penetration
Assemblies” [3.12] ...............................................................................................3-16
IEB 82-04, “Deficiencies in Primary Containment Electrical Penetration
Assemblies” [3.13] ...............................................................................................3-16
IEN 81-20, “Test Failures of Electrical Penetration Assemblies” [3.14] ................3-16
xii
IEB 77-06, “Potential Problems with Containment Electrical Penetration

Assemblies” [3.15] ...............................................................................................3-17
3.6.1.2 Mechanical Penetrations ...........................................................................3-17
IEN 93-59, “Unexpected Opening of Both Doors in an Airlock” [3.17] ..................3-17
IEN 92-20, “Inadequate Local Leak Rate Testing” [3.18] .....................................3-17
IEN 89-79, “Degraded Coatings and Corrosion of Steel Containment
Vessels” [3.19].....................................................................................................3-17
3.6.2 Industry Publications .......................................................................................3-18
3.6.2.1 Common (Electrical and Mechanical) ........................................................3-18
NUREG/CR-1730, “Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Primary
Containment Penetrations at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants” [3.3]........3-18
NUREG/CR-5461, SAND89-2369, “Aging of Cables, Connections, and
Electrical Penetration Assemblies Used in Nuclear Power Plants” [3.21].............3-21
EPRI NP-7189, “Review of Polyimide Insulated Wire in Nuclear Power
Plants” [3.22] .......................................................................................................3-22
NUREG/CR-3855 (SAND-7139), “Characterization of Nuclear Reactor
Containment Penetrations” [3.23] ........................................................................3-24
NUREG/CR-4064, “Structural Response of Large Penetrations for
Containment Vessels Subjected to Loadings Beyond Design Basis” [3.24] .........3-25
NUREG/CR-4944, “Containment Penetration Elastomer Seal Leak Rate
Tests” [3.25] ........................................................................................................3-25
NUREG/CR-5096, “Evaluation of Seals for Mechanical Penetrations of
Containment Buildings” [3.26]..............................................................................3-25
NUREG/CR-5561, “Analysis of Bellows Expansion Joints in the Sequoyah
Containment” [3.27] .............................................................................................3-25
3.6.3 Evaluation of NPRDS Data..............................................................................3-26
3.6.3.1.1 EPA Subcomponent Review ..............................................................3-29
3.6.3.1.1.1 Module Seals ...............................................................................3-29
3.6.3.1.1.2 Penetration Leads ........................................................................3-29
3.6.3.1.1.3 Flange/Nozzle Seals/O-Rings ......................................................3-29
3.6.3.1.1.4 Tubing/Tube Shell/Canister Hardware..........................................3-29
3.6.3.1.1.5 Terminations ................................................................................3-30
3.6.3.1.1.6 Pressure Monitoring/Regulating Devices......................................3-30
3.6.3.1.1.7 Auxiliary Components ..................................................................3-30
3.6.3.1.1.8 Other............................................................................................3-30
xiii
3.6.3.1.1.9 Unknown ......................................................................................3-30

3.6.3.1.1.10 Failure of Two or More Penetration Subcomponents....................3-30
3.6.3.2 Mechanical Penetration Assemblies ..........................................................3-31
3.6.4 Evaluation of LER Data ...................................................................................3-31
3.6.4.1.1 Module Seals .....................................................................................3-32
3.6.4.1.2 Penetration Leads..............................................................................3-33
3.6.4.1.3 Pressure Monitoring/Regulating Devices ...........................................3-34
3.6.4.1.4 Auxiliary Components ........................................................................3-34
3.6.4.1.5 Penetration Gland ..............................................................................3-34
3.6.4.1.6 Other..................................................................................................3-34
3.6.4.1.7 Failures of Two or More Subcomponents...........................................3-34
3.6.4.1.8 Conclusions from LER Review - EPAs...............................................3-34
3.7 Host Utility Operating Experience.............................................................................3-35
Electrical Penetration Assemblies.................................................................................3-35
Mechanical Penetrations...............................................................................................3-36
3.7.1 Plant Surveys ..................................................................................................3-36
3.8 Overall Conclusions Regarding Equipment Historical Performance .........................3-40
Electrical .......................................................................................................................3-41
Mechanical ...................................................................................................................3-41
3.9 References...............................................................................................................3-42
4 STRESSORS, AGING MECHANISMS, AND EFFECTS...................................................... 4-1

4.1 Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Aging Effects Acting on Penetration
Components....................................................................................................................... 4-1
Thermal ......................................................................................................................... 4-2
Mechanical .................................................................................................................... 4-2
Electrical ........................................................................................................................ 4-2
Radiation ....................................................................................................................... 4-2
Chemical/Electrochemical.............................................................................................. 4-2
Oxygen .......................................................................................................................... 4-3
“Significant” Aging Mechanisms..................................................................................... 4-3
xiv
4.2 Thermal Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects ................................................. 4-3

4.2.1 General ............................................................................................................ 4-3
4.2.1.1 Thermal Degradation of Organic Materials ................................................. 4-9
Short-Term Thermal Degradation ......................................................................... 4-9
Long-Term Thermal Degradation.........................................................................4-11
4.2.1.2 Sources of Thermal Stress ........................................................................4-16
Ambient Effects ...................................................................................................4-16
Localized Heating ................................................................................................4-17
Seasonal Temperature Effects ............................................................................4-17
4.2.2 Thermal Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Electrical
Penetration Assemblies ................................................................................................4-19
Ohmic Heating.....................................................................................................4-20
Circulating Currents.............................................................................................4-20
4.2.2.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Thermal Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and
Effects - EPAs..........................................................................................................4-20
Long-Term Thermal Degradation.........................................................................4-21
Ohmic Heating.....................................................................................................4-21
Localized or Hotspot Temperatures.....................................................................4-22
4.2.3 Thermal Stressors and Aging Mechanisms - Mechanical Penetrations............4-23
Piping Penetrations .............................................................................................4-23
Equipment Hatch .................................................................................................4-23
Drywell Head .......................................................................................................4-23
Personnel Airlock.................................................................................................4-23
Fuel Transfer Tube ..............................................................................................4-24
Effects - Mechanical Penetrations ............................................................................4-24
4.3 Mechanical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects............................................4-25
4.3.1 General ...........................................................................................................4-25
Stressors..................................................................................................................4-25
Compression of Organic Materials.......................................................................4-25
Volumetric Changes ............................................................................................4-26
Vibration ..............................................................................................................4-27
Stress Relaxation ................................................................................................4-27
Work Hardening ..................................................................................................4-27
Degradation Related to Installation, Maintenance, or Operation ..........................4-28
xv
Wear....................................................................................................................4-29
4.3.2 Mechanical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Electrical
Penetrations .................................................................................................................4-29
Electrical Fault-Induced Mechanical and Thermal Stress .........................................4-29
Ohmically Induced Thermal Cycling.....................................................................4-30
4.3.2.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Mechanical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and
Effects - Electrical Penetrations................................................................................4-30
Compression Set .................................................................................................4-31
Incidental Damage...............................................................................................4-31
Wear of Fasteners ...............................................................................................4-31
Thermal Cycling ..................................................................................................4-31
Work Hardening ..................................................................................................4-32
4.3.3 Mechanical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Mechanical
Penetrations .................................................................................................................4-32
Static Loads.........................................................................................................4-32
Cyclic Loads ........................................................................................................4-33
Fatigue ................................................................................................................4-33
Wear....................................................................................................................4-34
Settlement ...........................................................................................................4-35
Wear....................................................................................................................4-35
Cyclic Loads/Fatigue ...........................................................................................4-35
Settlement ...........................................................................................................4-36
4.4 Electrical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects ...............................................4-36
4.4.1 Energization at Normal Voltage Levels ............................................................4-36
4.4.2 Overvoltage/Transient Conditions....................................................................4-37
4.4.3 Partial Discharge .............................................................................................4-39
4.4.4 Effects of Moisture and Contaminants .............................................................4-40
Water Treeing ..........................................................................................................4-41
4.4.5 Effects of Aging ...............................................................................................4-41
4.4.6 “If-Then” Criteria for Electrical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects
of Aging - Electrical Penetrations ..................................................................................4-41
Energization at Normal Voltages ..............................................................................4-41
Partial Discharge......................................................................................................4-42
Moisture and Contaminants .....................................................................................4-42
xvi
Overvoltage Transients ............................................................................................4-42

4.5 Radiation Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects ..............................................4-42
4.5.1 General ...........................................................................................................4-42
Alpha (α) ..................................................................................................................4-43
Beta (β) ....................................................................................................................4-43
Gamma (γ) ...............................................................................................................4-43
Bremsstrahlung........................................................................................................4-43
Ultraviolet .................................................................................................................4-44
Neutron ....................................................................................................................4-44
Effects of Radiation Exposure ..................................................................................4-45
4.5.1.1 Radiation Dose-Rate and Aging Sequence Effects....................................4-48
Dose-Rate Effects ...............................................................................................4-48
Sequence Effects ................................................................................................4-49
Conclusions Regarding Dose-Rate and Sequence Effects ..................................4-51
Dose-Rate Effects ...............................................................................................4-51
Sequence Effects ................................................................................................4-51
4.5.2 Radiation Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Electrical
Penetrations .................................................................................................................4-52
4.5.3 Radiation Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Mechanical
Penetrations .................................................................................................................4-52
4.5.3.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Radiation Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and
4.6 Chemical/Electrochemical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects.....................4-54
4.6.1 General ...........................................................................................................4-54
4.6.1.1 Chemical Attack of Organics .....................................................................4-54
4.6.1.2 Electrochemical Attack of Metals ...............................................................4-55
4.6.1.2.1 Affected Components ........................................................................4-57
EPAs ...................................................................................................................4-57
Mechanical Penetrations .....................................................................................4-57
4.6.1.3 Contaminants ............................................................................................4-58
4.6.1.4 Chemical Decomposition of Penetration Organic Materials .......................4-58
4.6.2 Chemical/Electrochemical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects -
Electrical Penetrations ..................................................................................................4-59
4.6.2.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Chemical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and
Effects - Electrical Penetrations................................................................................4-60
Metallic Components ...........................................................................................4-60
xvii
Nonmetallic Components.....................................................................................4-60
Mechanical Penetrations...............................................................................................4-60
Stress Corrosion Cracking .......................................................................................4-60
4.6.3.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Chemical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and
Corrosion of Metals .............................................................................................4-61
Stress Corrosion Cracking...................................................................................4-61
Chemical/Contamination......................................................................................4-62
4.7 Effects of Oxygen.....................................................................................................4-62
4.8 Effects of Ozone ......................................................................................................4-62
4.9 Combined Aging Environments ................................................................................4-63
4.9.1 Synergisms......................................................................................................4-63
4.9.2 Sandia Research on Combined Thermal-Radiation Aging Environments ........4-63
4.10 Discussion of Material Similarity ..........................................................................4-66
4.11 References ..........................................................................................................4-67
5 EVALUATION OF AGING MECHANISMS AND EFFECTS ................................................ 5-1

5.1 Aging Management Review ...................................................................................... 5-1
5.2 Maintenance, Surveillance, and Condition Monitoring Techniques for Evaluation
of Electrical and Mechanical Penetrations .......................................................................... 5-1
Preventive Maintenance Programs ................................................................................ 5-2
Maintenance Rule.......................................................................................................... 5-3
5.2.1 Generic Activities.............................................................................................. 5-4
5.2.1.1 Physical Properties by Inspection ............................................................... 5-4
5.2.1.2 Cleaning ..................................................................................................... 5-5
5.2.1.3 Temperature and Radiation Monitoring......................................................5-10
Infrared Thermography ........................................................................................5-10
Environmental Monitoring ....................................................................................5-11
5.2.1.4 Repair and Replacement ...........................................................................5-12
5.2.1.5 Plant Walkdowns .......................................................................................5-13
5.2.1.6 Protective Coating Maintenance Program .................................................5-14
5.2.2 Activities Specific to Electrical Penetration Assemblies....................................5-14
5.2.2.1 Physical Properties by Inspection ..............................................................5-14
5.2.2.2 Measurement of Component or Circuit Properties .....................................5-15
5.2.2.2.1 Insulation Resistance (IR)/Polarization Index (PI) ..............................5-16
xviii
Insulation Resistance ..........................................................................................5-16

Polarization Index (PI) .........................................................................................5-17
5.2.2.2.2 Insulation Power Factor .....................................................................5-18
5.2.2.2.3 High Potential ....................................................................................5-20
5.2.2.2.4 Capacitance.......................................................................................5-21
5.2.2.2.5 Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) ....................................................5-21
5.2.2.2.6 Integrated Measurement Techniques (ECAD and CHAR)..................5-22
5.2.2.2.7 Compressive Modulus .......................................................................5-22
5.2.2.3 Use of Environmental Qualification Test and Aging Data...........................5-24
5.2.2.4 Post-Installation Testing ............................................................................5-25
5.2.3 Activities Specific to Mechanical Penetrations .................................................5-25
5.2.3.1 Physical Properties by Inspection ..............................................................5-25
5.2.3.1.1 Surveillance Programs .......................................................................5-25
ASME B&PV Code Section XI Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program,
Subsection IWE...................................................................................................5-26
5.2.3.2 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Leakage Testing ...................................................5-30
Local Leak Rate Test Leakage Root Cause Analysis ..........................................5-30
Local Leak Rate Test Leakage Trending .............................................................5-31
5.2.3.3 Special Testing Programs for Penetration Weld Integrity ...........................5-31
5.2.3.4 Special Testing Programs for Cooling Channel Flow Rate.........................5-31
5.2.3.5 Settlement Trending Program....................................................................5-32
5.2.3.6 Detailed Fatigue Analysis Using Current Condition....................................5-32
5.2.3.7 Special Considerations for Stainless Steel Bellows ...................................5-32
5.3 Commonly Used Maintenance, Surveillance, and Condition Monitoring
Techniques........................................................................................................................5-33
5.4 Evaluation of Current Practices ................................................................................5-33
5.4.1 Electrical Penetrations .....................................................................................5-34
5.4.2 Mechanical Penetrations .................................................................................5-42
Piping Penetrations ..................................................................................................5-42
Equipment Hatch......................................................................................................5-42
Fuel Transfer Tube...................................................................................................5-43
5.4.3 Potentially Significant Component/Aging Mechanism Combinations Not
Addressed By Current Programs ..................................................................................5-43
5.5 References...............................................................................................................5-44
xix
6 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL AGING MANAGEMENT

CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................................................... 6-1
6.1 Summary .................................................................................................................. 6-1
6.1.1 Electrical Penetrations ...................................................................................... 6-1
6.1.2 Mechanical Penetrations .................................................................................. 6-2
6.2 Conclusions Regarding Electrical and Mechanical Penetration Aging ....................... 6-3
6.3 Additional Aging Management Considerations .......................................................... 6-4
6.4 References................................................................................................................ 6-7
A DEFINITIONS...................................................................................................................... A-1
B ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................. B-1
C EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION.............................................................................................. C-1

C.1 Electrical Penetration Assemblies......................................................................... C-1
Terminations.................................................................................................................. C-3
Junction Boxes .............................................................................................................. C-4
Radiation Shields........................................................................................................... C-5
EPA Manufacturers and Design Evolution................................................................. C-5
C.1.1 Amphenol SAMS/Bunker Ramo Electrical Penetration Assemblies .................. C-6
Single Header Plate....................................................................................................... C-6
Double Header Plate ..................................................................................................... C-7
Canister EPA ................................................................................................................. C-7
Mated Double Header Assembly ................................................................................... C-9
Unitized Header Assembly............................................................................................. C-9
C.1.2 Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) Electrical Penetration Assemblies ................ C-11
C.1.3 Conax Buffalo Corporation (Conax) Electrical Penetration Assemblies........... C-13
C.1.4 Crouse-Hinds Electrical Penetration Assemblies ............................................ C-16
C.1.5 D. G. O’Brien Electrical Penetration Assemblies............................................. C-17
C.1.6 General Electric Electrical Penetration Assemblies......................................... C-20
238X600NMG1 ....................................................................................................... C-20
100 Series............................................................................................................... C-21
Type F-01 ............................................................................................................... C-22
C.1.7 Physical Sciences Penetration Assemblies..................................................... C-22
C.1.8 Viking Electrical Penetration Assemblies ........................................................ C-23
C.1.9 Westinghouse (Imaging and Sensing Technologies) Electrical Penetration
Assemblies .................................................................................................................. C-24
xx
Modular................................................................................................................... C-25
Canister .................................................................................................................. C-26
C.2 Mechanical Penetrations (Including Piping Penetrations, Access, and
Equipment Hatches) ......................................................................................................... C-27
C.2.1 Piping Penetrations ........................................................................................ C-30
C.2.2 Equipment Hatches ........................................................................................ C-33
C.2.3 Personnel Airlocks.......................................................................................... C-37
C.2.4 Drywell Head .................................................................................................. C-40
C.2.5 Fuel Transfer Tube ......................................................................................... C-41
C.3 References ......................................................................................................... C-42
D DESIGN REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING CODES, STANDARDS AND

REGULATIONS...................................................................................................................... D-1
D.1 Design Requirements: Codes, Standards and Regulations .................................. D-1
Electrical Penetration Assemblies.................................................................................. D-1
D.1.1 Environmental Qualification .............................................................................. D-1
Division of Operating Reactor (DOR) Guidelines ........................................................... D-2
NUREG-0588 ................................................................................................................ D-2
10 CFR 50.49 ................................................................................................................ D-3
Regulatory Guide 1.89 ................................................................................................... D-3
Regulatory Guide 1.97 ................................................................................................... D-3
IEEE Standard 323-1971 ............................................................................................... D-4
IEEE Standard 323-1974 ............................................................................................... D-4
D.1.2 Compliance with Applicable Elements of Standard Review Plan,
NUREG-0800 ................................................................................................................ D-5
ANSI Stds................................................................................................................. D-5
ASME Codes............................................................................................................ D-5
IEEE Stds. ................................................................................................................ D-5
IPCEA Stds. ............................................................................................................. D-6
Other ........................................................................................................................ D-7
D.2 References ........................................................................................................... D-7
E DISCUSSION OF NPRDS DATA ........................................................................................ E-1

E.1 Categorization of Reports.......................................................................................... E-1
E.2 Method of Detection .................................................................................................. E-2
E.3 Cable Insulation Materials ......................................................................................... E-2
F SAMPLE PLANT SURVEY ................................................................................................. F-1
xxi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4-1 Extrapolated Time to Retention of 50% Elongation for Various Common
Organic Materials ...........................................................................................................4-15
Figure 4-2 Seasonal Temperature Variations Within Primary Containment Of Typical
U.S. Nuclear Plant [4.24] ................................................................................................4-18
Figure 4-3 Seasonal Temperature Variations for Single Elevation of Reactor Building of
Typical U.S. Nuclear Plant [4.24] ....................................................................................4-18
Figure 4-4 Operational Temperature Variations for Single Elevation of Reactor Building
of Typical U.S. Nuclear Plant [4.24] ................................................................................4-19
Figure 4-5 Relative Radiation Resistance of Inorganic Insulating Materials Based Upon
Changes in Physical Properties......................................................................................4-48
Figure 4-6 Time to Equivalent Damage (TED) versus Radiation Dose for Anaconda EPR
(FR-EP) Insulation Material ............................................................................................4-64
Figure 5-1 Simplified Schematic of Insulation Power Factor Test Circuit (Courtesy of
Doble Engineering Co.) ..................................................................................................5-19
Figure 5-2 Relationship Between Compressive Modulus and Aging.......................................5-23
Figure C-1 Amphenol Single Header Plate Design.................................................................. C-6
Figure C-2 Amphenol Double Header Plate Design ................................................................ C-7
Figure C-3 Amphenol Canister EPA Design............................................................................ C-8
Figure C-4 Amphenol Mated Double Header Design............................................................... C-9
Figure C-5 Amphenol Unitized Header Plate Design............................................................. C-10
Figure C-6 Amphenol Epoxy Hermetic Module (Unitized Design).......................................... C-11
Figure C-7 Cross Section of CB&I EPA................................................................................. C-12
Figure C-8 Cutaway View of Conax Buffalo EPA .................................................................. C-14
Figure C-9 Detail of Conax Feedthrough Module .................................................................. C-14
Figure C-10 Conax Adapter Modules .................................................................................... C-16
Figure C-11 Typical Crouse-Hinds EPA Used in Safety-Related Applications ....................... C-17
Figure C-12 Outboard Electrical Connector, D. G. O’Brien EPA Module ............................... C-19
Figure C-13 Inboard Electrical Connector, D. G. O’Brien EPA Module.................................. C-19
Figure C-14 Physical Sciences EPA Drawing (TVA) ............................................................. C-23
Figure C-15 Viking Canister EPA .......................................................................................... C-24
Figure C-16 Viking Modular EPA .......................................................................................... C-24
Figure C-17 Westinghouse Modular Type EPA ..................................................................... C-25
Figure C-18 Individual Module for Westinghouse Modular EPA ............................................ C-26
xxiii
Figure C-19 Westinghouse Canister Type EPA..................................................................... C-27

Figure C-20 Typical Hot Piping Penetration .......................................................................... C-31
Figure C-21 Typical Hot Piping Penetration - Concrete Containment .................................... C-32
Figure C-22 Typical Hot Piping Penetration - Steel Containment .......................................... C-32
Figure C-23 Typical Equipment Hatch - Concrete Containment ............................................ C-34
Figure C-24 Typical Equipment Hatch - Steel Containment .................................................. C-35
Figure C-25 Typical Gasket Arrangements - Equipment Hatch ............................................. C-35
Figure C-26 CRD Removal Hatch for Mark I Containment .................................................... C-36
Figure C-27 Suppression Pool Access Hatch for Mark I Containment................................... C-36
Figure C-28 Personnel Airlock - Concrete Containment ........................................................ C-37
Figure C-29 Personnel Airlock - Steel Containment .............................................................. C-39
Figure C-30 Personnel Airlock - Door and Interlock Mechanism ........................................... C-40
Figure C-31 Typical Drywell Head Cover .............................................................................. C-41
Figure C-32 Typical Fuel Transfer Tube (PWR) .................................................................... C-42
xxiv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1 License Renewal Rule and Maintenance Rule Scope Screening Requirements...... 2-7
Table 3-1 Primary Containment Penetrations Covered in This AMG ....................................... 3-1
Table 3-2 Electrical and Mechanical Penetration Manufacturers ............................................. 3-2
Table 3-3 EPA Manufacturer Listing.......................................................................................3-12
Table 3-4 Penetration Failure Summary - NUREG/CR-1730 [3.3] ..........................................3-20
Table 3-5 Number of Failures for Years 1972 to 1978 per NUREG/CR-1730 [3.3] .................3-20
Table 3-6 Summary of NPRDS EPA Failure Data (by Subcomponent) ..................................3-27
Table 3-7 Summary of EPA Subcomponent Failures by Manufacturer...................................3-28
Table 3-8 Summary of LER Failure Data by Subcomponent - EPAs ......................................3-33
Table 3-9 Results of Plant Surveys - EPAs ............................................................................3-38
Table 3-10 Summary of Plant-Specific Aging Information (Survey) - EPAs ............................3-39
Table 4-1 Summary of Stressors, Significant Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Electrical
Penetration Assemblies................................................................................................... 4-4
Table 4-2 Summary of Stressors, Significant Aging Mechanisms, and Effects -
Mechanical Penetrations ................................................................................................. 4-6
Table 4-3 Thermal Ratings of Materials Used in Typical EPA [4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7] ....................4-11
Table 4-4 Percent Compression Set of Viton at Various Temperatures [4.3]..........................4-26
Table 4-5 Effects of Radiation on Compression Set of Various Seal Materials [4.21] .............4-27
Table 4-6 Radiation Dose Thresholds for Common Penetration and Termination Organic
Materials [4.48, 4.49] ......................................................................................................4-47
Table 4-7 Chemical Compatibility of Common Penetration Organic Materials [4.2, 4.3,
4.8, 4.21, 4.47, 4.52] ......................................................................................................4-56
Table 4-8 Sandia Combined Environments Methodology Research Cable Insulation and
Jacket Materials .............................................................................................................4-65
Table 4-9 Chemical Formulation of Typical “EPR” Insulation [4.58]........................................4-66
Table 5-1 Inspection Techniques Applicable to Various Degradation Mechanisms -
Electrical and Mechanical Penetrations ........................................................................... 5-6
Table 5-2 Aging Management Activities of Units Represented in Surveys (19 Units Total)
- EPAs............................................................................................................................5-35
Table 5-3 Aging Management Programs - Mechanical Penetration Components...................5-37
Table C-1 Physical Sciences EPA Materials ......................................................................... C-22
Table C-2 BWR Containment List ......................................................................................... C-28
Table C-3 PWR Containment List ......................................................................................... C-29
xxv
Table C-4 Typical Mechanical Penetration Materials............................................................. C-30

Table C-5 BWR Hot Piping Penetrations............................................................................... C-33
Table C-6 PWR Hot Piping Penetrations............................................................................... C-33
Table F-1 Types of Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) Installed .................................. F-2
Table F-2 Aging Management Activities.................................................................................. F-4
Table F-3 Description of Significant Observed Aging Mechanisms and Effects....................... F-5
xxvi
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 Purpose and Objective
Continued operation of nuclear power plants for periods that extend beyond the original 40-year
license period may be a desirable option for many U.S. nuclear plant operators. To allow
operation of the plant to continue beyond the original licensing period, utilities must show that
the aging of components within the scope of license renewal is managed such that these
components will not degrade to the extent that they are incapable of performing their design
function(s). Therefore, to allow operation during a license renewal period, operators of nuclear
power plants must manage the aging of components such that proper function is assured.
The purpose of this Aging Management Guideline (AMG) is to provide guidance for the
effective management of aging electrical and mechanical containment penetrations used in
nuclear power plants. Effective aging management activities will ensure that these systems will
continue to perform their functions during both the current and license renewal term.
The objective of this AMG is to provide an analysis of the potential aging mechanisms and
effects for electrical and mechanical penetrations, and acceptable guidelines for managing
significant aging mechanisms. Use of these guidelines will provide utilities with a basis for
verifying that effective means for managing age-related degradation of penetration systems have
been established.
1.2 Scope
Specific nuclear plant primary containment penetrations covered in this AMG include:
· Electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs)
· Piping penetrations
· Equipment hatches and doors
· Personnel airlocks
· Drywell heads (BWR, Mark I and II only)
· Fuel transfer tubes (PWR, BWR Mark III)
Each of these penetrations has individual components associated with its normal operation, and
these components are also included in scope.
1-1
Executive Summary
The group of components described in 10 CFR 54 as being within the scope of license renewal is
as follows:
1. Safety-related
2. Non-safety-related whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of a

safety-related function
3. Those relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that

demonstrates compliance with the NRC regulations for:
· Fire protection (10 CFR 50.48)
· Environmental qualification (10 CFR 50.49)
· Pressurized thermal shock (10 CFR 50.61)
· Anticipated transients without scram (10 CFR 50.62)
· Station blackout (10 CFR 50.63)
1.3 Methodology
This AMG evaluates the stressors acting on penetration components, industry data on aging and
failure of these components, and the maintenance activities performed on penetration systems.
The AMG evaluates the main subsystems within both electrical and mechanical penetrations.
The principal aging mechanisms and effects resulting from environmental and operating
stressors on these systems are identified, evaluated, and correlated with actual plant experience
to determine if they are actually being experienced. Then, the maintenance procedures and
condition monitoring/testing methodologies used by plant operators are evaluated to determine if
the effects of these aging mechanisms are being detected and managed. Other potentially useful
testing and condition monitoring techniques are also identified. Where an aging mechanism is
not fully managed or not considered, additional plant-specific activities to manage the aging
mechanism are identified and recommended.
1.4 Conclusions of This Study
1.4.1 Historical Performance
The following overall conclusions regarding penetration historical performance were made:
Electrical
1. Electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) are, in general, highly reliable components. The
number of electrical penetration failures that have occurred throughout the industry is very
low in proportion to the size of the population. However, the data that supports this
conclusion is limited in two ways: (1) there is little or no data to quantify performance under
1-2
Executive Summary
accident conditions, and (2) only a few plants have operated for more than 20 years, which is
only about one-third of the total expected period of operation for these systems (that is, 60
years).
2. Electrical penetrations can, in general, be expected to perform their safety function

throughout the current and license renewal periods.
3. Shorting of the penetration insulation/leads and leakage of the penetration modules or

assembly (failure to seal) appear to be the two most likely failure modes for EPAs.
Predominant failure causes include thermal exposure and mechanical damage.
4. Detection of EPA failures appears to occur mostly through leak rate testing and monitoring
of pressure instrumentation. Electrical shorts of leads/conductors appear to be detected
primarily during operation, through monitoring of plant instruments, and electrical system
operation.
5. Roughly one-fourth of all penetration-related failures noted were attributable to improper

design, maintenance, or testing (i.e., “maintenance induced”).
6. No evidence of widespread Kapton® lead degradation was noted. Instances of degradation

appear occasionally and no more frequent than for other types of penetration lead insulation.
However, care must be exercised in the maintenance and handling of Kapton based on its
susceptibility to incidental mechanical damage and moisture.
Mechanical
1. The number of mechanical and access penetration failures that have occurred throughout the
industry is low in proportion to the size of the population.
2. Mechanical penetrations can, in general, be expected to perform their safety function

throughout the current and license renewal periods.
3. Degradation of mechanical penetrations has been identified primarily through leak rate tests
and visual inspections.
4. For piping penetrations, few incidents of aging have been observed over the first 15 to 20
years of service. However, age-related degradation incidents for stainless steel expansion
joint bellows (hot piping penetrations) have been increasing for 1970s vintage units.
5. For access penetrations, most of the instances of aging-related degradation are related to the
degradation of gaskets and seals. In most cases, these components were refurbished or
replaced. Normal aging of materials and mechanical damage have been the primary causes of
degradation.
1-3
Executive Summary
1.4.2 Significant Component/Aging Mechanism Combinations Not Always

Managed by Existing Programs
Evaluation of the components of the penetration systems, the stressors acting upon the
components, and the operational history data determined that although several “significant”1
aging mechanisms exist, few actual subcomponent failures result. Evaluation of the general and
specific failure histories for penetration systems (as reflected in the NPRDS and LER databases,
available literature, and information provided from host utility plants and surveys) shows that
both electrical and mechanical penetrations are, in general, highly reliable and experience a
generally low failure rate.
Section 4 of this report describes all significant aging mechanisms and effects for electrical and
mechanical penetrations included in the scope of this AMG. Comparison of this set of aging
mechanisms with common maintenance, surveillance, and condition monitoring techniques
currently employed by operating plants indicates that nearly all significant aging and degradation
mechanisms are addressed through current practices. A very limited number of mechanisms may
not be fully controlled by current practices, due in some cases to the lack of any reliable means
for their detection. These latter mechanisms include:
· Thermal, radiolytic, or mechanical degradation of exposed penetration leads and sealing
materials
· Thermal degradation of low- and medium-voltage power leads (insulation) and terminations
for circuits subject to continuous or near-continuous loading at high currents
· Cracking of conductor insulating materials
· Oxidation and/or corrosion of connector internal and external contact surfaces associated
with low-current and impedance-sensitive circuits
· Degradation of stainless steel expansion joint bellows (hot piping penetrations)
· Degradation of Kapton-insulated leads due to mechanical damage and/or moisture
1.4.3 Recommendations Regarding Aging Management of Electrical and

Mechanical Penetrations
The following recommendations regarding aging management of electrical and mechanical

penetrations are offered:
1. Aging management activities for EPAs should focus on those components and applications
most likely to experience degradation (including organic components exposed to
comparatively high temperatures, radiation doses, or mechanical damage). Penetration seals
and leads (including associated terminations) appear most susceptible based on historical
1
For the purposes of this AMG, a “significant” aging mechanism was defined as one which could potentially affect
the functionality of the equipment if left unmitigated.
1-4
Executive Summary
failure data. Visual/physical inspection of leads and exposed seals and monitoring/trending of
EPA leakage rates are likely to be most effective.
2. An effective program for monitoring and control of age-related degradation of Kapton

insulation should include activities that detect incidental mechanical damage (nicking,
cutting, etc.) and limit exposure to moisture. Periodic visual/physical inspection is probably
most useful for this purpose.
3. Accurate characterization of plant environments (especially those in the more severe areas) is
important to effectively manage the aging of certain organic components used in both
electrical and mechanical penetrations. Such characterization should be conducted to help
identify components that may undergo accelerated aging with respect to the rest of the
penetration assembly.
4. Based on the similarity between many Environmentally Qualified (EQ) and non-EQ
penetrations, existing information and analyses related to the aging of EQ components can be
effectively applied to many non-EQ components.
5. Information from ongoing qualification and natural aging research programs should be
incorporated where appropriate.
6. Certain mechanical penetrations that use stainless steel bellows may be susceptible to
degradation via fatigue and stress corrosion cracking. Early detection of cracks and surface
damage is crucial to the continued longevity of these components. Due to the importance of
these bellows for maintaining primary containment integrity, and the relative difficulty and
cost associated with their replacement, effective repair and refurbishment techniques should
be implemented/developed where possible.
1.5 References
None.
1-5
2
INTRODUCTION
2.1 Background
The DOE-sponsored Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR) Program, in cooperation with
EPRI’s Life Cycle Management (LCM) Subcommittee, is establishing and demonstrating a
predictable license renewal (LR) process for existing light water reactors (LWRs) in the United
States. An important element of this program was the development of the License Renewal
Industry Reports (IRs) by the Nuclear Management and Resource Council (NUMARC; now the
Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI), which cover critical classes of long-lived passive components
such as reactor pressure vessels, reactor coolant pressure boundary piping, containment
structures and penetrations, and cables. To support continued demonstration of LR and LCM
concepts, there is a need for further industry development of guidelines that describe and
evaluate acceptable aging management approaches for groupings of equipment not evaluated in
the IRs. The DOE-sponsored Aging Management Guidelines (AMGs) support that need. To date,
nine AMGs have been published. Topics are:
1. Battery Chargers, Inverters and Uninterruptible Power Supplies [2.1]
2. Batteries, Stationary [2.2]
3. Heat Exchangers [2.3]
4. Motor Control Centers [2.4]
5. Pumps [2.5]
6. Switchgear, Electrical [2.6]
7. Transformers, Power and Distribution [2.7]
8. Tanks and Pools [2.8]
9. Electrical Cables and Terminations [2.9].
This AMG evaluates electrical and mechanical containment penetrations determined to be within
the scope of both the License Renewal Rule (LRR), 10 CFR 54.21 [2.10], and the Maintenance
Rule (MR), 10 CFR 50.65 [2.11].
2-1
Introduction
Continued operation of nuclear power plants for periods that extend beyond the original 40-year
license period may be desirable for many U.S. nuclear plant operators. To obtain a renewed
license and to operate a plant during a license renewal period, utilities must show that the
detrimental effects of aging of components within the scope of license renewal have been
managed such that these components will not degrade to the extent that they are incapable of
supporting intended function(s). Therefore, operators of nuclear power plants must manage
detrimental effects of aging of components so that the intended function(s) is assured. Electrical
and mechanical containment penetrations are specifically identified in 10 CFR 54 [2.10] as
requiring an aging management review.
Aging management activities such as preventive maintenance and refurbishment may be

necessary during the current license period even though some of these activities may not be
necessary to guarantee function during the current license period. These activities may be
necessary to assure that there is no loss of intended function(s), no unacceptable reduction in
safety margins, and that higher rates of challenge to plant safety systems do not occur during the
license renewal period.
2.2 Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this AMG is to provide information on cost-effective, practical methods to plant
systems engineers and maintenance personnel for the effective management of aging of electrical
and mechanical penetrations used in commercial nuclear power plants. Many of the same
methods can be used to provide effective aging management of similar equipment in fossil fuel
power plants. An effective aging management program will ensure that each penetration within
scope will continue to perform its intended function(s) or will not prevent performance of
intended function(s) during the current license period and the license renewal term.
The objectives of this AMG are (a) to provide an analysis of the potential degradation modes,
including the effects of aging, for penetrations, and (b) to present acceptable guidelines for
developing effective aging management programs that will yield a reasonable assurance that
intended function(s) will be preserved.
This AMG is intended for nuclear plant personnel performing aging management evaluations,
and provides information and guidance that will be valuable in the formulation of the plant’s
aging management programs. This AMG also provides additional value to nuclear plant
operators as follows:
1. The AMG is a well-researched technical document that can be used by maintenance and
system engineering personnel for the identification, characterization, and management of
age-related degradation in electrical and mechanical penetrations. It can also be used as a
resource document for plants developing a license renewal application and/or compliance
with the MR.
2. The information presented is based on an extensive literature search. Therefore, nuclear plant
personnel can use this AMG as a substantive reference for relevant information about
penetrations. Some of the references used include:
2-2
Introduction
· EPRI and other Industry Reports

· NRC Bulletins, Information Notices, Circulars, Generic Letters, and Reports
· Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and Federal Register
· Vendor Manuals
· Industry Codes and Standards (e.g., ANSI, NEMA, ICEA, AEIC, IEEE)
· Miscellaneous References and Technical Papers
3. This AMG consolidates historical maintenance and industry operating information into one
source. The plant maintenance/system engineer will find this useful for both the
identification of age-related degradation (including root causes) and the verification of
appropriate corrective action. Issues discussed include:
· Operating and maintenance history from the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) and NRC Licensee Event Report (LER)
databases
· Additional operating and maintenance history input from host utilities
· Results of relevant plant surveys
· Equipment design differences relevant to aging considerations
· Equipment obsolescence as it affects aging management
· Service environments
4. Aging phenomena are described in detail. This will be useful for maintenance interval and
reliability evaluations of penetrations. The following topics are discussed:
· Stressors acting on penetrations
· Aging mechanism identification
· Significance of aging stressors using “if/then” criteria
· Age-related degradation and potential failure modes
· Maintenance-induced aging or failures
· Effects of aging
5. The AMG can be an effective tool for aging management and personnel training because it:
· Identifies the need for aging management and can be used as input for MR performance
measures and corrective action requirements
· Discusses both conventional and nonconventional maintenance techniques, and considers
how these practices can be used to effectively manage equipment aging
· Characterizes initiation and progression of equipment aging for use in training personnel
responsible for maintenance and inspection activities
2-3
Introduction
· Identifies concepts, principles, and methods that may be used to evaluate penetrations not in
the scope of this AMG
2.3 Contents of Aging Management Guideline
This AMG evaluates electrical and mechanical containment penetrations determined to be within
the scope of both the License Renewal Rule (LRR), 10 CFR 54.21 [2.10], and the Maintenance
Rule (MR), 10 CFR 50.65 [2.11]. Sources of information used to make this determination
included previous BWR and PWR Lead Plant License Renewal studies, electrical and piping and
instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), NUMARC 93-02 Maintenance Rule verification and
validation results [2.12], draft NUREG-1299 [2.13], and Appendix B of Draft Regulatory Guide
DG-1009 [2.14]. Maintenance Rule verification and validation efforts and BWR/PWR Lead
Plant License Renewal studies relied on a screening process to identify and select specific system
penetrations that need to be evaluated. The screening process used a systematic approach to
identify penetrations with important-to-safety functions as well as those that are environmentally
qualified.
Section 3 provides the results of the screening and lists the electrical and mechanical penetrations
evaluated and component boundaries. Section 3 also includes a detailed study of the operating
history of the penetrations evaluated from LER and NPRDS data, and from other sources. Note
that from Section 3 through the end of the document, separate topical discussions (specific to
either mechanical or electrical penetrations) are included where appropriate to provide better
clarity and permit more rapid location of relevant material.
Section 4 discusses stressors, aging mechanisms, age-related degradation, failure modes, and the
effects of aging acting on penetrations. Stressors produce aging mechanisms that can cause
component degradation. An aging mechanism is significant when, if allowed to continue without
detection or mitigation measures, it will cause the component to lose its ability to perform its
intended function(s). Significant and nonsignificant aging mechanisms relevant to electrical and
mechanical penetrations are identified and evaluated. Operational demands, environmental
conditions, failure data, and industry operations and maintenance history are considered, and the
significance of the aging mechanisms is determined. The entire set of aging mechanisms
evaluated in this AMG is provided in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses aging management techniques that can be used to mitigate aging mechanisms
determined to be significant in Section 4. Maintenance, inspection, testing, and surveillance
techniques and programs are described. The effectiveness of these techniques or programs to
manage significant aging mechanisms is described wherever supported by historical operating
data. Variations in plant aging management programs or techniques are discussed. Requirements
for an effective technique or program are presented in the form of “if/then” criteria whenever
possible.
Section 6 discusses management options to address action items identified in Section 5.

Appendix A provides a list of definitions for aging terminology used in this AMG based on
Reference [2.15]. Appendix B provides a listing of acronyms and abbreviations. Appendix C
provides a description of the components evaluated, including manufacturers’ design differences.
2-4
Introduction
Appendix D includes a discussion of the design requirements that apply to penetrations,

including applicable Codes, Standards, and Regulations. Appendix E provides additional
information regarding use of NPRDS data.
2.4 Generic License Renewal Requirements
10 CFR 54.21 [2.10] describes the current requirements for the content of technical information
in a license renewal application.1 Section 54.21 states that an application for license renewal
must contain the following:
1. An Integrated Plant Assessment (IPA),
2. A list of current licensing basis (CLB) changes during NRC application review,
3. An evaluation of time-limited aging analyses (TLAA),
4. A Final Safety Analysis Report supplement.
An IPA must:
1. For those systems, structures, and components within the scope, as delineated in Section
54.4, identify and list those structures and components subject to aging management review,
2. Describe and justify the methods used in item 1 (scope determination) of the IPA, and
3. For each structure and component identified in item 1 of the IPA, demonstrate that the effects
of aging will be managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained for the period of
extended operation.
An aging management review is intended to demonstrate that plant “programs and procedures
will provide reasonable assurance that the functionality of systems, structures and components
requiring review will be maintained during the period of extended operation.” [2.10] The LRR
focuses on the effects of aging rather than a detailed review of aging mechanisms. The LRR
states there must be a “reasonable assurance” that intended function(s) of SSCs will be
maintained.
This AMG evaluates all potentially significant aging mechanisms and aging management
practices that can be used to demonstrate that the effects of aging will be managed so that the
intended function(s) will be maintained, even though the LRR data do not require such an
evaluation.
1
NEI 95-10, “Industry Guideline for Implementing the License Renewal Rule, 10 CFR Part 54,” February 1995
[2.16], is another source of information regarding implementation of the proposed License Renewal Rule.
2-5
Introduction
Exemptions and requests for relief (pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12 and 10 CFR 50.55a, respectively)
were not considered under this AMG in that these issues are plant-specific in nature and,
therefore, must be considered on a plant-by-plant basis.
2.5 Method Used to Define the Scope of Components to be Evaluated

Under the License Renewal Rule (LRR) and the Maintenance Rule
(MR)
To determine the electrical and mechanical penetrations covered by LRR and MR requirements,
the definitions of SSCs within the scope of the LRR and MR must be evaluated. Table 2-1
describes the current definitions. Note that the scope of electrical and mechanical penetrations
covered under the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65 [2.11], is almost the same as that covered by
the License Renewal Rule, 10 CFR 54.21 [2.10].
2.6 Method Used to Define Aging Mechanisms Assessed in This Study
As indicated above, the LRR does not require explicit evaluation of aging mechanisms, but does
require the reasonable assurance of preserving intended function(s) that may be degraded due to
the effects of aging. Because the users of this AMG consist of systems engineers and plant
maintenance personnel, detailed descriptions of stressors, aging mechanisms, and failure modes,
as well as the effects of aging, were included. This approach was supported by feedback from
users of previously published AMGs.
To define aging mechanisms assessed in this study, a two-part evaluation was performed. First,
the effects of stressors (e.g., mechanical, chemical, electrical, and environmental) on equipment
operation were determined. Then, aging mechanisms associated with those stressors were
defined. Finally, age-related degradation mechanisms and failure modes (effects of aging) caused
by aging mechanisms were described. This evaluation is contained in Section 4.
Second, industry-wide operating experience (particularly that reported in NRC LERs,

Information Notices, Bulletins, and Circulars, and INPO NPRDS data) was examined in Section
3.6. A review of the NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Circulars was conducted to
identify age-related failures. Events described in the NPRDS data and LERs were then analyzed
for age-related degradation and to identify the numbers of particular types of failures. The aging
mechanisms associated with these failures were then determined. The review of host-utility
operating experience is contained in Section 3.7.
This multi-source analysis (i.e., using data from NPRDS and NRC documentation and utility
data) provides a comprehensive characterization of equipment aging by using actual plant and
vendor data to substantiate and refine those aging mechanisms postulated to occur due to
stressors.
After a list of all possible aging mechanisms was developed (see Section 4), the significance of
each aging mechanism was determined. Those aging mechanisms that would result in a failure
2-6
Introduction
having an impact on equipment operation or functionality were designated as significant.

Significant aging mechanisms are discussed in Section 4.1.
Table 2-1
License Renewal Rule and Maintenance Rule Scope Screening Requirements
License Renewal Rule Maintenance Rule

Safety-related SSCs Safety-related SSCs
1. Safety-related SSCs, which are those relied upon 1. Same as for LRR.
to remain functional during and following design
basis events to ensure:
i. The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure a. Same as for LRR.
boundary,
ii. The capability to shut down the reactor and b. Same as for LRR.
maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or
iii. The capability to prevent or mitigate the c. Same as for LRR.
consequences of accidents that could result
in potential off-site exposure comparable to
the 10 CFR 100 guidelines.
Non-safety-related SSCs Non-safety-related SSCs
2. All non-safety-related SSCs whose failure could d. Whose failure could prevent safety-related
directly prevent satisfactory accomplishment of structures, systems, and components from
any of the intended function(s) identified in fulfilling their safety-related function,
paragraphs (1) (i), (ii), or (iii) of this definition.
e. That are relied upon to mitigate accidents or
transients or are used in plant emergency
operating procedures (EOPs),
f. Whose failure could cause a reactor scram or
actuation of a safety-related system.
Required by Regulation Required by Regulation
3. All SSCs relied on in safety analyses or plant
evaluations to demonstrate compliance with the
Commission’s regulations for:
- Fire Protection (10 CFR 50.48)
- Environmental Qualification
(10 CFR 50.49)
- Pressurized Thermal Shock
(10 CFR 50.61)
- Anticipated Transients without Scram
(10 CFR 50.62)
- Station Blackout (10 CFR 50.63)
Maintenance, inspection, testing, and surveillance techniques or programs used to manage aging
of electrical and mechanical penetrations are discussed in Section 5.2. A discussion of commonly
used activities and techniques is provided in Section 5.3. Potentially significant component/aging
mechanism combinations not addressed by current programs are discussed in Section 5.4.
2-7
Introduction
2.7 References
2.1 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Battery
Chargers, Inverters and Uninterruptible Power Supplies,” Sandia National Laboratories
Report SAND93-7046, February 1994.
2.2 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Stationary
Batteries,” Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND93-7071, March 1994.
2.3 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Heat
Exchangers,” Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND93-7070, June 1994.
2.4 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Motor Control
Centers,” Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND93-7069, February 1994.
2.5 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Pumps,” Sandia
National Laboratories Report SAND93-7045, March 1994.
2.6 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Switchgear,
Electrical,” Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND93-7027, July 1993.
2.7 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Transformers,
Power and Distribution,” Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND93-7068, May
1994.
2.8 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Tanks and
Pools,” Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND96-0343, March 1996.
2.9 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Electrical Cables
and Terminations,” Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND96-0344, September
1996.
2.10 Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Part 54.21, “Requirements for
Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants,” May 8, 1995.
2.11 Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, “Requirements for Monitoring the
Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” 10 CFR Part 50.65, July 10,
1991.
2.12 NUMARC 93-02, “A Report on the Verification and Validation of NUMARC 93-01,
Draft Revision 2A, ‘Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance
at Nuclear Power Plants,’” May 1993.
2.13 Draft NUREG-1299, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of License Renewal
Applications for Nuclear Power Plants,” November 1990.
2-8
Introduction
2.14 Draft Regulatory Guide, DG-1009, “Standard Format and Content of Technical
Information for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses,”
December 1990.
2.15 “Nuclear Power Plant Common Aging Terminology,” EPRI Report TR-100844,
November 1992.
2.16 NEI 95-10, “Industry Guideline for Implementing the License Renewal Rule, 10 CFR
Part 54,” February 1995.
2-9
3
EQUIPMENT EVALUATED
3.1 General
Primary containment penetrations used in nuclear power plants can be divided into two general
categories based on function: electrical and mechanical. Electrical penetrations (commonly
known as electrical penetration assemblies, or EPAs) consist generically of one or more
electrical conductors sealed to a canister or header plate such that a pressure boundary between
the inboard and outboard sides of the penetration is created while maintaining electrical
continuity through the device. Mechanical penetrations can be functionally divided into two
types; piping penetrations and access penetrations. Piping penetrations consist of one or more
fluid carrying pipes within a metal containment sleeve. Many of these piping penetrations require
provisions to accommodate the thermal movement of piping and/or the differential movement
between the steel containment shell and concrete shield wall. Access penetrations are openings
within the primary containment necessary for the movement of personnel and material. They are
generally classified as equipment hatches, drywell heads, or personnel airlocks. PWRs and BWR
Mark III’s also contain access penetrations termed fuel transfer tubes. The common
characteristic of all three of these types of penetrations (i.e., electrical, piping, and access) is their
requirement to maintain the primary containment pressure boundary.
Specific nuclear plant primary containment penetrations covered in this AMG are listed in
Table 3-1. Each of these penetrations has individual components associated with its normal
operation, and these are also included in scope. The scope of equipment (component boundaries)
included with each penetration type is discussed in Section 3.4. Torus or suppression pool
downcomers/vacuum breakers are not included within the scope of this AMG.
Table 3-1
Primary Containment Penetrations Covered in This AMG
Description BWR PWR

Electrical Penetration Assemblies Yes Yes
Piping Penetrations Yes Yes
Equipment Hatches and Doors Yes Yes
Personnel Airlocks Yes Yes
1
Drywell Heads Yes No
2
Fuel Transfer Tubes No Yes
Notes: 1. For Mark I and Mark II containments.
2. Mark III containments.
3-1
Equipment Evaluated
For the purposes of this document, electrical and mechanical containment penetrations will be
treated as two separate groups of components. This approach is used for a number of reasons,
including the significant differences in function and design, as well as differences in applicable
stressors and aging mechanisms. As previously indicated, several subcategories of “mechanical”
penetration are defined in this AMG: (1) piping penetration, (2) access penetration, (3) drywell
head, and (4) fuel transfer tube. Piping penetrations include those primary containment
penetrations associated solely with plant mechanical systems or process lines. Access
penetrations include airlocks and other personnel or equipment access hatches and doors.
The typical nuclear plant primary containment has several hundred individual penetrations
[3.1, 3.2, 3.3]. The majority of these are mechanical piping penetrations, with lesser numbers
(roughly 20 to 60) being attributed to electrical and access penetrations collectively.1
Numerous different types of both electrical and mechanical penetrations are installed in U.S.
commercial nuclear plants. Penetration manufacturers identified during the preparation of this
report are listed in Table 3-2. Other manufacturer’s equipment or configurations may also be
installed in nuclear plant applications; however, such populations are considered to be very small
relative to that represented in the table. Aging mechanisms and aging management techniques
identified in this AMG may be applicable to this other equipment because of the similarities in
penetration component design, construction, and materials.
Table 3-2
Electrical and Mechanical Penetration Manufacturers
Electrical Mechanical
· Amphenol SAMS (including Bunker Ramo) · Brown and Root

· Chicago Bridge and Iron · Chicago Bridge and Iron
· Conax Buffalo · Ohio Brass
· Crouse-Hinds · Pittsburgh Des Moines
· D. G. O’Brien · Stone and Webster Engineering
· General Electric · Tru-Seal
· Physical Sciences · Tube Turns
· Viking · Wooley
· Westinghouse (including Imaging and
Sensing Technology)
Many of the manufacturers listed in Table 3-2 may no longer exist or produce penetrations. For
example, as of this writing, only two manufacturers continue to supply EPAs to the industry:
Conax Buffalo and Imaging and Sensing Technology (formerly the Westinghouse EPA line).
Several manufacturers of mechanical penetrations have not maintained their nuclear plant
manufacturing certifications. Additionally, many product lines may have been discontinued or
1
See, for example, NUREG/CR-1730 [3.3], which indicates that the population of electrical, piping, and access
penetrations for one BWR is 60, 181, and 4, respectively, based on its FSAR.
3-2
Equipment Evaluated
substantially modified; varying configurations of the same general product are common. In many
cases, penetrations are “one-of-a-kind” or “few-of-a-kind” installations. Due to the large number
of different configurations installed, this AMG attempts to analyze only the more common
manufacturer’s product lines.2 However, much of this analysis is directly applicable to the less
common types because of substantial commonality of design.
When considering the aging management of penetrations installed at commercial nuclear power
plants, the following classifications (as defined in Section 2) can be used:
Safety-Related Penetrations
Some electrical penetrations may be used in circuits designated as “safety-related.” Safety-

related equipment is defined in 10 CFR 50.49 as those items designed to remain functional
during and following design basis events to ensure: (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant
pressure boundary, or (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe
shutdown condition, or (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents
that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to regulatory guidelines (per 10 CFR
50.49 Section (b)(1)). Furthermore, EPAs are classified as safety-related due to their pressure
boundary function. Safety-related equipment may also require environmental qualification,
depending on its location and function.
Similarly, piping and access penetrations are safety-related by virtue of their primary
containment pressure boundary function. For the purposes of this AMG, mechanical penetrations
are treated somewhat differently than EPAs in that a plant system served or supported by a
mechanical penetration is often not considered to be in scope (e.g., a process pipe running
through a mechanical penetration or a containment isolation valve is considered part of the
system and not the penetration); hence, analysis of the safety classification or significance of the
system is not relevant. For access penetrations, the only germane consideration is the pressure
boundary, which is indirectly related to the function of the access. EPAs, on the other hand, are
indivisible from the circuit they support (the penetration assembly also functions implicitly as
part of the circuit); therefore, the safety significance of the penetration to circuit functionality is
considered along with pressure boundary integrity.
All penetrations are attached to the primary containment steel shell for metal containments, or to
the primary containment steel liner for concrete containments. In the case of EPAs and piping
penetrations, a penetration sleeve or nozzle is generally the subcomponent attached to the steel
shell or liner. In the case of access penetrations, the outer wall of the penetration is generally the
subcomponent attached to the primary containment steel shell or liner. For concrete
containments, the penetration sleeves or the outer wall of the penetration generally contain steel
2
The list of EPA types examined in this study was determined based on analysis of the number of plants at which
each type of penetration is installed (from the EPRI NUS database, survey responses, and other industry reports) as
well as the availability of design and descriptive information. Other EPAs identified during the preparation of this
AMG include those manufactured by Combustion Engineering, G&W Electric, Des Moines Steel, Ebasco,
Cargoaire Engineering, Ceramsel, Gulf General Atomics, O'Conner, Pratt, ProgFab, and Rundel. Attempts to obtain
descriptive and design information on these types of EPAs were unsuccessful as of this writing.
3-3
Equipment Evaluated
bars or plates that are embedded in the adjacent concrete. The penetration sleeve and the outer
wall of the penetration and the attachments to the primary containment steel shell or liner are
included in the scope of this report. In most cases, these components and their attachments to the
steel shell or liner have been included in the BWR and PWR Containment Industry Reports
[3.28, 3.29]. However, they are included because leak tightness of these attachments could
impact the results of periodic primary containment leak rate tests (integrated, Type A or local,
Type B; see Section 5) performed in accordance with the plant Technical Specifications. The
steel embedments into concrete for concrete containments are excluded from the scope of this
report. Steel embedments associated with primary containment penetrations and other portions of
concrete containments are appropriately covered in the Containment Industry Reports and other
concrete containment aging evaluations (see Reference [3.30]).
Environmentally Qualified (EQ) Penetrations
A significant number of electrical penetration assemblies may require environmental

qualification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49. EQ equipment must be able to perform its
required safety function when subjected to harsh environmental conditions resulting from a
postulated design basis event (DBE). The EPA may be installed in either safety-related, non-
safety-related (that could affect plant safety), and/or certain post-accident monitoring circuits. No
mechanical penetrations fall under the 10 CFR 50.49 requirements for environmental
qualification.
Voltage Category (EPAs)
Electrical penetrations contained within the classification of penetrations important to license

renewal may also be categorized by the following voltage ranges:
• Low-voltage (0 to 1000 Vac, 125 and 250 Vdc)
• Medium-voltage (2 kVac through 15 kVac)
No high-voltage circuits (e.g., >15 kVac) supply loads inside primary containment. Furthermore,
most, if not all, medium-voltage loads inside the typical plant containment (such as reactor
coolant pump motors) are not safety-related.
It should be noted that these voltage ranges reflect cable voltage ratings and not normal operating
voltages. The rated voltage of a circuit component represents the maximum voltage at which that
component can be continuously operated. Generally speaking, the voltage rating of a nuclear
power plant component is much greater than the operating voltage. For example:
Voltage Rating Normal Operating Voltage

300-V ≤48 Vdc
600-V ≤120 Vac, ≤125 Vdc
600-V and 1000-V 480 to 600 Vac
5-kV and 8-kV 4160 Vac
15-kV 13.8 kVac
3-4
Equipment Evaluated
Circuits falling within a voltage range can be further classified by their function as power,
control, instrumentation, specialty, lighting, telephone, or security cable; see Section 3.3 for
additional information on these classifications.
Specialty applications (such as coaxial- or triaxial-type cables used in nuclear instruments) may
use varying voltages, depending on their function. These systems typically operate below 2 kV
and will therefore be discussed with the low-voltage systems.
Transient phenomena (such as electrical switching transients or lightning-induced surges) or

circuit component testing may produce voltages substantially higher than normal operating
voltage for short periods. However, these short duration events are not considered representative
of the voltage stress normally applied to plant circuits.
Common nuclear plant operating voltages are 120 Vac, 480 Vac, 4160 Vac, and 13.8 kVac; and
24 Vdc, 48 Vdc, 125 Vdc, and 250 Vdc. These common voltage values will be used in this
guideline; however, it should be recognized that other operating voltages (such as 525 Vac) may
be used at some plants.
Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Electrical Penetration Assemblies
Long-term aging has been evaluated for those EPAs that have been environmentally qualified
(EQ). This special category of equipment has been analyzed for material composition, ambient
environmental conditions, and operating parameters so that a “qualified life”3 could be
established. For most of the installed EPAs that are EQ, the qualified life is equal to or greater
than the 40-year design life of the plant. That was not a regulatory requirement, however, and the
actual requirements varied depending on whether the equipment had to be qualified to the
requirements of the DOR Guidelines [3.4], NUREG-0588 [3.5], or 10 CFR 50.49 [3.6]. The
specific requirements of these regulations regarding EQ and aging are described in detail in
Appendix D of this AMG.
Because the overall requirements for EQ were different in the three regulations, the specifics
regarding aging and aging management also varied. The discussions about them (and several
related industry standards and Regulatory Guides) in Appendix D are summarized as follows:
· Electrical penetrations qualified to the DOR Guidelines [3.4] had to demonstrate a qualified
life only if the plant was already constructed and operating and had used material(s) that had
been identified already as being susceptible to significant degradation due to thermal and
radiation aging. Maintenance or replacement schedules were to include consideration of the
specific aging characteristics of the material(s), and ongoing programs were to be established
to review surveillance and maintenance records to assure that equipment that was exhibiting
3
Defined in IEEE Standard 323-1974 [3.32] as “the period of time for which satisfactory performance can be
demonstrated for a specific set of conditions.” The definition was changed in the 1983 revision of IEEE Standard
323 to be “the period of time, prior to the start of a design basis event, for which equipment was demonstrated to
meet the design requirement for the specified service conditions.” The 1983 revision has never been endorsed by the
NRC, and the change in definition occurred after most qualifications were established for operating plants.
3-5
Equipment Evaluated
age-related degradation was identified and replaced as necessary. Thus, some DOR plants
may have already established an aging management program, and records should be
available for evaluation as part of the 10 CFR 54 Aging Management Review.
· EPAs qualified to the requirements of NUREG-0588 (Category II only) had to address aging
only to the extent that equipment that is composed, in part, of material susceptible to aging
effects should be identified and a schedule for periodically replacing the equipment and/or
materials should be established. Thus, an aging management program may have already been
established for penetrations in Category II plants, and records may be available for evaluation
as part of the 10 CFR 54 Aging Management Review.
· The qualification aging requirements for Category I NUREG-0588 and 10 CFR 50.49 plants
were much more stringent, and they should not be expected to have an aging management
program in place or to have the historical replacement schedules as could be expected at
plants qualified to the DOR Guidelines or Category II of NUREG-0588.
3.2 Results of Methodology Used to Select Components Within the

Scope of License Renewal
For each plant preparing a license renewal application, an assessment must be performed to
identify those penetrations that are within the scope of license renewal. Primary containment
penetrations, whether electrical or mechanical, are safety-related in that they are required to
prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures
comparable to regulatory guidelines (see definition of “safety-related” above).4 Therefore, the
safety classification of the circuit or piping system supported by the penetration is of no real
practical significance; all primary containment penetrations are considered to be within the scope
of license renewal.
3.3 Description and Listing of Components Evaluated
3.3.1 Electrical Penetration Assemblies
The following major subcomponents may be used in constructing electrical penetration

assemblies:
· Header Plate(s)
· Header Plate Seals or Gaskets
· Feedthrough Modules and Seals (including epoxy or other organic module sealants)
· Penetration Leads (cables or wires) or Conductors
· Terminations
4
The possible exception is very small diameter penetrations associated with instrument lines, the failure of which
would not result in offsite exposures in excess of those specified by 10 CFR 100.
3-6
Equipment Evaluated
· Canister Shell
· Internal Conductor Support
· Pressure Monitoring Equipment
· Junction Boxes
· Radiation Shields
Not all components listed above are necessarily used in each penetration. Other minor
components (such as assembly hardware, rubber grommets, etc.) may also be included. The
relationship between the penetration components listed above is discussed in the following
paragraphs. Appendix C provides additional discussion regarding EPA design and construction,
especially with regard to individual manufacturer’s models.
3.3.2 Mechanical Penetration Assemblies
The subcomponents of the four types of mechanical penetration assemblies evaluated in this
guideline (piping penetrations, equipment hatches, personnel airlocks, fuel transfer tubes,
drywell heads) are listed below. Additional information is contained in Appendix C.
Piping Penetration Subcomponents

· Sleeve (not concrete embedded; NCE)
· Sleeve (concrete embedded; CE)
· End Plate
· Expansion Joint (steel)
· Expansion Joint (elastomer)
· Guard Pipe
Equipment Hatch Subcomponents

· Sleeve (NCE)
· Sleeve (CE)
· Cover Ring
· Fasteners
· Gasket
· Hatch Cover
· Sleeve Ring
3-7
Equipment Evaluated
Personnel Airlock Subcomponents

· Sleeve (NCE)
· Sleeve (CE)
· Sleeve Ring
· Door Hinges
· Fasteners
· Expansion Joint (Elastomer)
· Circular Door
– Cover Ring
– Gasket
· Rectangular Door
– End Plate
– Door Seal
· Mechanical Systems
· Electrical Systems
Fuel Transfer Tube Subcomponents

· Sleeve (CE)
· Tube
· Flange
· Fasteners
· Gasket
· Expansion Joint (steel)
Drywell Heads
· Cover
· Cover Flange
· Shell Flange
· Circumferential Stiffeners
· Fasteners
· Gasket
· Gusset Plates
3-8
Equipment Evaluated
Where practical, similar subcomponents for each penetration type have been given the same
name. This allows a more convenient presentation of the aging mechanisms affecting these
subcomponents for one or more penetration types (see Section 4). The complex mechanical and
electrical systems necessary for the personnel airlock door interlocks have not been further
divided into subcomponents. They are generally described in Appendix C; a more complete
description is not useful for performing the aging evaluation.
3.4 Component Boundaries
Electrical
The component boundaries for the EPAs covered in this AMG include all components of the
penetration (including leads), with the exception of terminations for the leads.5 Pressure
monitoring equipment is included within scope. (Due to variations in design and voltage
classification, the boundaries applicable to each penetration may vary somewhat.) The
containment sleeve/nozzle assembly is not specifically included within scope of the discussion of
EPAs, except as where it may interact with EPA components (such as at the nozzle/seal/header
plate interface). However, degradation and aging management of containment nozzles and their
attachment to the containment liner/wall are covered under the discussion of mechanical
penetrations.
Mechanical
The component boundaries for the mechanical penetrations are shown on Figures C-20 through
C-32 of Appendix C with the clarifications discussed below.
The boundaries in the axial direction are the ends of the penetration sleeves on both the primary
containment end and the non-containment end of the penetration. The lateral boundaries are
more complex. Starting from the primary containment end the boundaries are:
1. The sleeve and the weld to the primary containment steel shell
2. The removable cover for the expansion joint (steel)
3. The sleeve embedded in the biological shield wall
4. The removable cover for the expansion joint (elastomer)
The following components are excluded from the scope of mechanical penetrations:
a. The primary containment steel shell or liner, including any reinforcement of the shell or liner
due to penetration opening, and the concrete biological shield wall, including any metal
embedments for the sleeve. These components are included with primary containment aging
evaluations.
5
Terminations are included within the scope of SAND96-0344, “Aging Management Guideline for Electrical Cable
and Terminations” [3.31].
3-9
Equipment Evaluated
b. The process pipe and the multiple flued head. These components are generally included with
piping aging evaluations.
The equipment hatch penetration boundaries in the axial direction are from the hatch cover to the
end of the sleeve. The lateral boundary is the sleeve and sleeve ring, including the weld from the
sleeve ring to the steel liner reinforcing plate. The containment liner plate and reinforcing
members, and the concrete containment wall, including metal embedments for the sleeve, are
excluded from scope. These components are generally included with primary containment aging
evaluations.
The personnel airlock penetration boundaries in the axial direction are the inner door and the
outer door. The lateral boundary is the sleeve, including the expansion joint, and the sleeve ring,
including the weld to the containment metal shell. The containment metal shell and the
biological shield wall, including metal embedments for the sleeve, are excluded from scope.
These components are generally included with primary containment aging evaluations.
The fuel transfer tube penetration boundaries in the axial direction are the blind flange in the
primary containment transfer canal and the face of the weld neck flange in the spent fuel pit. The
lateral boundaries are the penetration sleeve in the center portion of the penetration and the
expansion joints, tube, and flange at the ends of the penetration. The weld from the sleeve to the
containment liner plate is included in scope. The welds from the expansion joints to the transfer
canal and spent fuel pit lines are also included in scope. The following components are excluded
from the scope:
a. The transfer canal and spent fuel pool liner and the extensions of these liners to the expansion
joints
b. The containment steel liner
c. The concrete containment wall, including metal embedments for the sleeve
d. The concrete structures for the transfer canal and spent fuel pit.
All of these excluded components are generally included with primary containment or seismic
Class I structure aging evaluations.
3.5 Analysis of EPRI NUS Database for Environmentally Qualified

Electrical Penetration Assemblies
The EPRI NUS Penetration Database (August 1995 revision) is a computer-based listing of EQ
penetrations installed in U.S. nuclear power plants. This database included information provided
by 49 utilities comprising 68 plants and 100 units6 derived from both EPRI and non-EPRI
members. The accuracy of the database is largely dependent upon periodic updating of
6
Two penetration listings from French units were also recorded; however, these listings were excluded from
subsequent analysis.
3-10
Equipment Evaluated
penetration-related information provided by utilities. Substantial variances in the types and

quantities of information provided to EPRI from contributors were noted during analysis of the
database. Despite these variances, the database as a whole provides a fairly good representation
of the types and relative quantities of EPAs in use in the industry. No corollary database for
mechanical containment penetrations was identified during preparation of this AMG.
Categories of information within the database include the penetration manufacturer,

manufacturer’s model number, plant/unit designations, and environmental qualification-related
information (including pertinent standards, thermal aging and type testing data, and applicable
references). The database was imported into a spreadsheet utility and sorted based on these
categories. Identical entries were retitled as necessary to ensure common titling for sorting
purposes. The scheduled commercial date of operation and the type of reactor plant (boiling
water or pressurized water) were also added from the World List of Nuclear Power Plants
contained in Reference [3.7]. The information was added to identify the earliest time frame when
particular types of penetrations were purchased or installed, and to identify any trends based on
plant type and age.
The database consisted of 563 electrical penetration listings from 68 plants (100 units). These
listings composed of EPAs manufactured by a total of 13 vendors. Some penetration vendors,
such as Amphenol and Bunker Ramo, have either merged, sold their product lines, or ceased
manufacturing altogether during the period under consideration.
The following paragraphs describe the results of the sorts performed on the EPRI NUS database.
3.5.1 Manufacturer Sort
Electrical penetration data were sorted by manufacturer, model/type, plant, and the first reference
listed for each entry. The results were tabulated (Table 3-3) and identified the number of
penetration listings in service or purchased from each manufacturer, the number of units where
each penetration entry was installed, and a ranking of the five most commonly used
manufacturers (based on the number of penetration entries listed).
Most of the listings are for Conax EPAs (271), followed by Westinghouse Electric Corp. (82)
and General Electric (54). Conax penetration entries were listed for 54 units, which is
approximately half of the total population. General Electric and Westinghouse penetration
listings were present for 23 and 17 units, respectively. Therefore, most units appear to have
acquired their EPAs from only a limited number of vendors (i.e., there is little relative diversity
in the EPA population at a given plant). Three manufacturers (Conax, GE, and Westinghouse)
account for nearly three-fourths of the penetration listings in the database.
3-11
Equipment Evaluated
Table 3-3
EPA Manufacturer Listing
No. of Units
No. of EPA Listings/
Where EPAs
Rank Manufacturer Percent of Total
Installed
1 Conax Corp. 271/48.3 54
2 Westinghouse Electric Corp. 82/14.6 17
3 General Electric Co. 54/9.6 23
4 D. G. O’Brien, Inc. 46/8.2 10
5 Amphenol 41/7.3 14
6 Viking Industries 23/4.1 5
7 Crouse Hinds 19/3.4 7
8 Bunker Ramo Corp. 10/1.8 2
9 Physical Sciences Corp. 8/1.4 5
10 Chicago Bridge & Iron 2/<1 2
11 Combustion Engineering, Inc. 2/<1 2
12 Rundel Electric 2/<1 1
13 Gulf General Atomic, Inc. 1/<1 2
Total No. of Manufacturers: 13
Total No. of Penetration Listings: 561
3.5.2 Plant Sort
A second sort was performed according to reporting plant (unit). Between 1 and 29 EPA listings
(not including nonseparated or combinational entries) were present in this sort, thereby
indicating a significant diversity in reporting format from unit to unit. The type of plant (BWR or
PWR) was also included as previously described. Overall, the database was comprised of entries
from 42 PWR plants with 72 units and 25 BWR plants with 34 units. There were 149 entries
from BWR plants and 399 entries attributed to PWR plants, which, in ratio to the total number of
U.S. penetration listings (561), is roughly comparable to the overall fraction of BWR and PWR
plants in this country, per Reference [3.7].
3-12
Equipment Evaluated
3.5.3 Model/Information Sort
The EPRI NUS database was also sorted according to the EPA manufacturer’s model number
column, which includes information on model numbers, plant IDs, and the type of EPA. Due to
the broad array of information contained in this data field, and limited similarity between any
appreciable number of entries, no meaningful conclusions could be drawn. Additionally, the
overall number of EQ penetrations per individual unit could not be determined without first
determining the number of penetrations per database entry; this information was not available in
the database and not otherwise readily available.
When one penetration listing referred to two units, for tabulation purposes, one penetration and
two units were counted. For example, Gulf General Atomic was listed for both St. Lucie Units 1
and 2. Table 3-3 also does not include two entries related to French nuclear plants.
3.5.4 Conclusions Regarding EPRI NUS Database
A relatively small number (13) of manufacturers have supplied the electrical penetration
assemblies for U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. An even smaller number currently provide
such assemblies. Conax EPAs account for nearly half of those listed in the database, whereas GE
and Westinghouse collectively account for about one-fourth; this result is considered generally
applicable to the EPA population as a whole, due to the relatively high proportion of U.S. plants
reporting to the database. Since Conax EPAs are modular in design (see Appendix C), it can be
inferred that about half of the EPAs currently in use are of this design. Sufficient information
was not present in the database to evaluate the most prevalent models or types of EPA designs
within a given manufacturer.
3.6 Operating and Service History
A review of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Information Notices, Circulars, Generic

Letters, and Bulletins was conducted to determine the industry-wide operating experience with
penetrations. Each applicable Notice, Circular, Letter, and Bulletin is discussed in Section 3.6.1.
Some documents that pertained to penetrations were considered to be not applicable to this report
(for example, failures resulting from improper design).
Industry studies and literature were searched for applicable documents relating to penetration
operating history and failures. Materials identified during this search are discussed in
Section 3.6.2.
Penetration data derived from the Institute for Nuclear Power Operation (INPO) Nuclear Plant
Reliability Data System (NPRDS) and NRC Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were also reviewed.
Component failures described in these sources were analyzed to identify significant penetration
failure mechanisms and their relative likelihood of occurrence. These analyses are discussed in
Sections 3.6.3 and 3.6.4, respectively.
3-13
Equipment Evaluated
3.6.1 Industry-wide Operating Experience with Components: NRC

Documentation
The following subsections discuss various NRC documents applicable to the failure or aging of
electrical and mechanical penetrations. Several other NRC documents relating to penetrations
were located; however, these were not considered relevant to component aging and therefore are
not discussed further.
3.6.1.1 Electrical Penetration Assemblies
IEN 93-25, “Bunker Ramo Electrical Penetration Assembly Degradation” [3.8]
The Notice concerns the pressure seals on Bunker Ramo EPAs used at the Trojan plant. In the
originally installed Bunker Ramo penetrations, two seals are used to seal the header plate of the
penetration; the first seal acts as a containment boundary, and the second is used to determine the
integrity of the first seal. The seals used (composed of Parker polyester urethane, or
“Parkerthane”) were determined to be inadequate for this application due to their short expected
life (as low as 2 to 5 years in some conditions), incompatibility with water or high temperature,
and significant compression set.
In terms of seal lubricants, several incompatible lubricants were identified. Three seal failures
occurred in 1987 as a result of the use of silicone grease, which is incompatible with the seal
material. Investigation of additional seal failures in 1991 indicated that a castor oil-based
lubricant (Celvacene) was responsible for deterioration of the seals (butyric acid is produced
when the lubricant is exposed to moisture, resulting in hydrolysis of the seal).
IEN 88-89, “Degradation of Kapton Electrical Insulation” [3.9]
The Notice advised utilities of the various problems that have been observed regarding Kapton
insulation (in electrical penetrations as well as other components), and focused particular
attention on the vulnerability of Kapton to mechanical damage from handling in combination
with exposure to moisture and to prolonged contact with caustic solutions. The primary use of
Kapton in nuclear plants is associated with Conax products (including EPAs and adapter module
assemblies). The Notice concludes that pre-accident mechanical damage, exposure to caustic
solutions, and exposure to high temperature, moisture, and strain may each lead to failure of
Kapton insulation during or after an accident.
The Notice cites the failure of several Kapton penetration leads at San Onofre Unit 1 during
testing (low insulation resistance); these failures were attributed primarily to mechanical damage
to the insulation resulting from personnel and equipment contact during penetration installation,
maintenance, and other activities. Degradation of the insulation resistance was facilitated by the
condensation of marine (salt) air on the leads located outside containment.
The Notice also cites other instances of Kapton failures related to penetrations. These include:
3-14
Equipment Evaluated
1. Shorting of Kapton leads in Conax EPAs during construction of River Bend Unit 1 as a result
of nicked or otherwise damaged insulation, aggravated by the presence of water.
2. Anomalies during qualification testing of Kapton wires on various Conax products due to
stresses occurring during shipment and handling (not typical of plant installations).
Discussed in the Notice is guidance provided by Du Pont de Nemours (the manufacturer of

Kapton and Teflon) indicating that when Kapton is used in nuclear plant applications, it should
be protected from direct exposure to loss of coolant accident spray due to its tendency to degrade
under high temperature caustic environments. Furthermore, results of work by the Naval
Research Labs indicate that Kapton is subject to damage by (1) mechanical nicking or gouging,
(2) direct chemical attack by caustic solutions, and (3) complex hydrolytic degradation related to
moisture, strain, and temperature. See Section 4.1 of this AMG for additional information on
Kapton aging and degradation mechanisms.
IEN 88-29, “Deficiencies in Primary Containment Low-Voltage Electrical Penetration

Assemblies” [3.10]
The Notice discusses inadequate environmental qualification testing methodology employed to

qualify Bunker Ramo instrumentation penetrations. During simulated LOCA conditions,
measurement of the insulation resistance of the penetration assembly leads was not conducted
with sufficient frequency to ensure the performance of the equipment during all portions of the
simulated accident testing. In the specific instances cited, the first insulation resistance
measurement of one penetration was taken between 8 and 20 hours after the initiation of test, and
the testing of another was not in accordance with IEEE Standard 323-1974.
The Notice cited the significance of the penetrations affected by the qualification; they were used
to support up to 75 independent instrumentation and protection circuits that characteristically
operate in the milliampere region (and are thereby highly sensitive to changes in insulation
resistance and impedance).
IEN 86-104, “Unqualified Butt Splice Connectors Identified in Qualified Penetrations” [3.11]
The Notice discusses failures experienced during qualification testing of electrical butt splice
connectors used in environmentally qualified F-01 EPAs supplied by General Electric. These
splices were supplied by three vendors (Thomas and Betts, Hollinsworth, and AMP), and are
made of Zytel or Celanese nylon tubing. Four such splices were removed from Commonwealth
Edison plants and subjected to accident testing. Under LOCA testing, three of the four splices
tested failed (short circuited) before completion of the test. Based on this result, similar splices
installed at various plants were reworked by wrapping the splices in previously qualified splice
insulating tape.
3-15
Equipment Evaluated
IEN 82-40, “Deficiencies in Primary Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies” [3.12]
The Notice documents several instances of design and manufacturing defects associated with
installed Bunker Ramo electrical penetration assemblies. These deficiencies included:
1. Improper lug crimping
2. Incorrect lug types and/or sizes
3. Loose terminal block connections
4. Improperly identified penetration leads
5. Cracked or missing wire insulation where the wires exit from the epoxy block
Two potentially aging-related causes for these deficiencies were cited. These were chemical
interaction between the conductor insulation and the hard epoxy block, and mechanical stress on
the conductors where they exit the block. Non-age-related causes included improper design,
inadequate quality control during manufacturing, and improper crimping pressure (use of the
same size lug for various size conductors required variation in the applied crimping force). One
facility also identified deficiencies with crated spare penetration assemblies; these deficiencies
were attributed to the lack of any specific handling instructions.
IEB 82-04, “Deficiencies in Primary Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies” [3.13]
The Bulletin relates to deficiencies noted in Bunker Ramo EPAs as indicated in IEN 82-40
above. These deficiencies have been identified on Bunker Ramo EPAs using a hard epoxy
module design. Another deficiency is that spurious alarms are caused by intermittent voltage
drops within the EPAs. Actions to be taken for plants under construction and currently operating
were listed. Actions included inspections of EPAs, justifications for continued operation for
plants with defective Bunker Ramo EPAs, and written reports discussing actions taken.
IEN 81-20, “Test Failures of Electrical Penetration Assemblies” [3.14]
The Notice describes deficiencies related to the design and qualification testing of D. G. O’Brien
Model K EPAs. Specifically, the connector portion of the EPA uses a silicone grommet that is
mechanically confined by a metallic spacer plug. Under conditions of thermal/radiation aging
followed by simulated accident exposure, the silicone grommet (Dow Corning Silgard 170 RTV)
substantially expands, extruding out of the spacer plug around the adjacent conductors. This
extrusion has shown under testing a tendency to strip away the insulation of the conductors,
thereby potentially resulting in shorting of the conductors within the connector.
The Notice indicates that this penetration design was used at only four plant sites, one of which
had already identified the problem and corrected it through redesign of the spacer plug and
subsequent retesting.
3-16
Equipment Evaluated
IEB 77-06, “Potential Problems with Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies” [3.15]
The Bulletin described deficiencies related to General Electric Series 100 electrical penetration
assemblies. These deficiencies related to reduced insulation resistance and shorting of the
conductors used in this type of penetration due to moisture buildup within the assembly. Small
fissures in the epoxy seals surrounding the conductors in a connector module were noted, which
allowed the moisture to penetrate between the conductors and eventually provide a shorting path.
The importance of maintaining adequate nitrogen pressure within the assembly to preclude such
intrusion is also identified. (See also IE Bulletin 77-07, “Containment Electrical Penetration
Assemblies at Nuclear Power Plants Under Construction” [3.16].)
3.6.1.2 Mechanical Penetrations
IEN 93-59, “Unexpected Opening of Both Doors in an Airlock” [3.17]
The Notice identified degradation of the personnel airlock door interlocking system at River
Bend and other nuclear units, which resulted in the simultaneous opening of the inner and outer
airlock doors. Degradation of the mechanical and electrical systems may be due to wear or
mechanical abuse. These door interlocking systems can operate in the automatic or manual
mode. At River Bend, the automatic mode was not reliable and had not been used for several
years.
IEN 92-20, “Inadequate Local Leak Rate Testing” [3.18]
The Notice documented the inadequacy of performing local leak rate testing for piping
penetrations by pressurizing between the plies in two-ply expansion joint bellows. Tests at Quad
Cities, Dresden, Perry, and Clinton indicated that these between-the-plies tests could
underestimate the leakage across the bellows by a factor of more than 20. The conclusion was
that these two-ply bellows were manufactured using a method that inhibited the free flow of air
between the bellows plies. The tests being performed in this manner were Type B local leak rate
tests (LLRTs) in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. The NRC provided exemptions to
plants with this type of two-ply bellows. The exemptions specify that an alternate means for
testing these bellows is required and test frequencies must be increased until the existing bellows
are replaced with testable bellows. The alternate testing includes testing bellows where any level
of leakage has been detected with helium (sniffer testing).
IEN 89-79, “Degraded Coatings and Corrosion of Steel Containment Vessels” [3.19]
The Notice identified coating damage and base metal corrosion on the inner and outer surfaces of
steel containments at the McGuire and Catawba nuclear units. After several previous reports, the
Notice confirmed that steel containment surfaces and the carbon steel surfaces that are part of
mechanical penetrations can be degraded by corrosion.
3-17
Equipment Evaluated
3.6.2 Industry Publications
3.6.2.1 Common (Electrical and Mechanical)
NUREG/CR-1730, “Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Primary Containment

Penetrations at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants” [3.3]
The report analyzed licensee event reports (LERs) of various primary containment penetration
events submitted to the NRC between January 1, 1972 and December 31, 1978. The report
addresses LERs for all relevant primary containment penetration categories (electrical,
piping/mechanical, and access). Penetration components were defined as the penetration
assembly and all hardware associated with the normal operation of the penetration.
Manufacturer, failure mode, failure mechanism, type, and date of event were recorded.
Penetration populations by NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) vendor were estimated. Four
NSSS vendors were considered (Babcock and Wilcox, Combustion Engineering, General
Electric, and Westinghouse) for plants considered in the study. These penetrations were listed as
follows:
Penetration Type NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) Vendor
B&W CE GE Westinghouse
Electrical 554 410 1,053 2,032

Piping 794 439 3,389 1,908
Access 28 23 123 98
Total 1,376 872 4,565 4,038
This information was subsequently used with the failure information described above to generate
an estimate of failure rate for the following categories:
· each licensed operating plant
· each NSSS vendor
· pressurized and boiling water reactors
· the aggregate of all licensed operating plants included in the study
The study identified 431 potentially applicable LERs. Of these 431 reports, 236 were ultimately
considered relevant. The remainder were excluded for a variety of reasons, including occurrence
prior to criticality, occurrence at so-called atypical plants (HTGRs, one-of-a-kind NSSS vendors,
etc.), and actual failure of some component other than the penetration. Of these 236 reports, 148
were considered failures, and the remaining 88 were considered non-failures.
Table 3-4 provides a summary of failure mechanisms by type of penetration. The data are
relevant to the time period of 1972 through 1978.
3-18
Equipment Evaluated
The following specific results were also noted:
1. There were 90 instances of failures of the penetration to seal in the database. These 90
failures accounted for 61% of the 148 total failures. Of these 90 failures, 48 (53%) were
access penetration failures, 22 (24%) were piping penetration failures, and 20 (22%) were
associated with electrical penetrations. The time period January 1, 1976 through December
31, 1978 accounted for 66 (73%) of these 90 failures.
2. Twenty-five plants reported access penetration failures related to sealing functions. The
largest number of failures reported by one plant was six; these failures were attributed to
out-of-adjustment latch mechanisms and worn sealing surfaces.
3. Nine plants reported 10 “Failed-to-Close” events. This failure mode applies only to access
penetrations. There were no multiple failures associated with this category and no common
cause failures. Only two “Failed-to-Open” events were reported.
4. Twenty-two plants reported 35 “Simultaneous-Opening” access failures. There were 16

simultaneous openings due to personnel error, 11 due to mechanical parts being out of
adjustment, 5 simultaneous openings due to design error (specifically in the interlock
mechanism), 2 simultaneous openings attributed to procedural discrepancies, and one
unknown cause of failure. All 35 failures of this nature were classified as
frequency-of-use-related.
5. Eight plants reported 11 “Failed to Operate Properly” failures associated with accesses. (This
failure mode does not encompass the previous access failure modes; it includes those LERs
that did not state how the access failed or whose failure modes did not fit into the other
failure mode categories).
3-19
Equipment Evaluated
Table 3-4
Penetration Failure Summary - NUREG/CR-1730 [3.3]
Failure Access Electrical Piping Total

Mechanism Failures Failures Failures Failures
Unknown 1 0 4 5
Personnel
21 0 1 22
(operation)
Personnel
1 5 1 7
(maintenance)
Personnel (testing) 2 0 0 2
Design Error 6 0 0 6
Fabrication/
0 9 4 13
Construction/QC
Procedural 3 0 0 3
Normal Wear 2 0 0 2
Excessive Wear 1 0 0 1
Corrosion 0 0 0 0
Foreign Material
7 0 0 7
Contamination
Excessive Vibration 0 0 2 2
Mechanical Parts;
Failed or out of 30 0 0 30
adjustment
Seal/Gasket Failure 21 3 0 24
Packing/Sealant
9 1 0 10
Failure
Bellows/Boot
0 1 10 11
Failure
Bearing Failure 1 0 0 1
Weld Failure 1 1 0 2
Total 106 20 22 148
The report also cited the number of failures for each of the years considered (Table 3-5).
Table 3-5
Number of Failures for Years 1972 to 1978 per NUREG/CR-1730 [3.3]
Year Number of Number of Failures/

Failures Operating Plants Operating Plant
1972 1 23 0.04
1973 10 34 0.29
1974 17 47 0.36
1975 24 51 0.47
1976 26 58 0.45
1977 33 61 0.54
1978 37 66 0.56
3-20
Equipment Evaluated
It can be seen from Table 3-5 that the number of failures per operating plant almost doubled
from 1973 to 1978 (0.29 to 0.56).
NUREG/CR-5461, SAND89-2369, “Aging of Cables, Connections, and Electrical Penetration

Assemblies Used in Nuclear Power Plants” [3.21]
The report examined the aging of containment electrical penetration assemblies; specifically, the
equipment design and materials were characterized, the aging mechanisms and stressors were
identified, and current industry maintenance and testing practices were described. The study also
analyzed LERs from mid-1980 through 1988, and NPE (Nuclear Power Experiences) from 1972
through 1980, related to the aging or accident survivability of EPAs. The number of reports
identified for EPAs as part of this study was very small considering the number of plants and the
number of containment electrical penetrations in the typical plant.
The following information regarding electrical penetration population was included in the report
(arranged in order of number installed):
Manufacturer/Supplier Number of EPAs
Installed/% of Total
Chicago Bridge and Iron 744/27.7%
Viking 404/15.0%
Amphenol 360/13.4%
General Electric 301/11.2%
D. G. O’Brien 268/10.0%
Conax 213/7.9%
Westinghouse 178/6.6%
Crouse-Hinds 104/3.9%
Physical Sciences 64/2.4%
Ebasco 50/1.9%
These numbers represent an estimate of the total population of EPAs installed as of

approximately 1982. Because many manufacturers/suppliers have since discontinued
supplying these components, and many plants have likely replaced some EPAs with others,7
these numbers can be considered only a very rough approximation and may not be representative
of the current status of the industry (see, for example, results of the EPRI NUS database analysis
in Section 3.5, which indicates a different distribution; however, that database is for EQ EPAs).
7
The only two remaining suppliers of EPAs as of the date of this writing are Conax Buffalo and Imaging and
Sensing Technology (formerly the Westinghouse line).
3-21
Equipment Evaluated
The LER search located a total of 39 reports applicable to EPAs. These tallies are assumed to
include penetrations from all voltage ranges. Forty-one (41) percent of the reports involved
pressure leakage, 26% were related to electrical failure (shorting or grounding), 21% to design
deficiencies, and 13% to “other” causes. Failures deemed to be the result of personnel errors
were not included in the total. The study indicates that emphasis should be placed on aging
effects that have the potential for common mode failure under abnormal or accident conditions.
Overall, the results compare fairly well with those obtained in the LER search performed as part
of this AMG (see Section 3.6.4); both indicate a very low rate of failure relative to the number of
EPAs in operation during the period(s) of coverage.8
The following conclusions were ultimately drawn:
1. EPAs are highly reliable devices under normal plant operating conditions, with no apparent
indications of significant failure rate increase as a function of aging. However, the data that
supports this conclusion is limited in two ways: (1) there is little or no data to quantify
performance under accident conditions, and (2) only a few plants have operated for more
than 20 years, which is only about one-third of the total expected period of operation for
these systems (that is, 60 years).
2. EPAs typically receive little or no preventive maintenance.
3. Many of the causes of failures of EPAs under accident conditions would not be detected
during normal operations due to the lack of severe temperature and humidity. The most
significant failure mode for EPAs is expected to be electrical shorting as a result of several
possible causes, including insulation degradation.
4. The LER database existing at the time of preparation of the report was limited in its
usefulness with respect to identification of possible accelerated degradation mechanisms for
EPAs.
5. Due to the significant number of different EPA configurations and manufacturers, generic
assessment of aging effects is difficult.
EPRI NP-7189, “Review of Polyimide Insulated Wire in Nuclear Power Plants” [3.22]
The report examines the use and aging of polyimide (Kapton) film, used in a variety of electrical
components including electrical penetration assemblies (primarily those manufactured by
Conax). Its objective was to evaluate the appropriateness of Kapton insulated wire applications
in nuclear plants. It describes manufacturing processes and physical characteristics of Kapton
insulated wire, its applications in nuclear and non-nuclear industries, and circumstances that
should be avoided to maximize reliable performance.
8
Assumed to be approximately 4000 for the purposes of this study.
3-22
Equipment Evaluated
In the past, concerns have arisen related to the adequacy of Kapton insulation under nuclear plant
aging and accident conditions, based largely on problems with Naval aircraft in which wire
insulation failures were caused by handling abuse and degradation from washing of the aircraft
with highly caustic solutions to remove salt deposits. Some failures resulted in “arc tracking” and
arc propagation thereby charring the insulation in a wire bundle. Data from the Naval Research
Laboratory indicated that, in addition to being sensitive to high pH liquids, Kapton insulations
would deteriorate more rapidly if exposed to high humidity and elevated temperature while
tightly bent.
The polyimide and Teflon in the Kapton insulation system can deteriorate under certain nuclear
power plant environmental conditions, each from different stressors. Research in non-nuclear
industries indicates that “Kapton,” when subjected to strain and elevated temperature in the
presence of water, steam, or caustic spray will degrade significantly. Under hot and moist
conditions, Kapton is susceptible to the chemical reaction known as hydrolysis (a chemical
process of decomposition involving splitting of a bond and addition of the elements of water).
Deterioration of the Kapton film may result in cracking, leading to shorting or low insulation
resistance in the presence of water or condensation.
Teflon has a well-known lower-than-average resistance to irradiation (it loses half of its original
elongation at break when irradiated to 0.35 Mrd [megarad]). Failure of the adhesive may allow
unraveling and separation of the film layers. If full unraveling does not occur (i.e., the film stays
in place mechanically due to the spiral wraps), shorting or low insulation resistance may occur if
the insulated wire is wet.
Review of the existing test results for conditions relevant to in-containment nuclear power plant
applications has shown that the failure mechanism of arc tracking followed by propagating
electrical arcing is not a significant concern. (No such failure has occurred in the roughly 1000
plant-years of nuclear plant operating experience.)
The report also indicates the following precautions for nuclear power plant applications of
Kapton used inside primary containment:
· Kapton insulated wire should not remain flexed beyond the minimum bend radius specified
in manufacturers’ instructions. This is especially important where high-temperature, moist
environments could be encountered.9
· Kapton insulation should be handled with care to avoid inflicting inadvertent damage.
Because it is a wrapped insulation and because it has a thin wall, it is somewhat more
susceptible to damage than most heavier walled thermoplastic and rubber insulations.
9
In response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Information Notice No. 88-89 [3.9], Conax issued a
service bulletin to its customers advising the straightening of polyimide wires if a bend radius of less than
approximately 6.1 to 10.2 times the diameter of the wire exists with 100% relative humidity and temperatures of
60°C [140°F] or greater. These bend radii represent strains ranging from 7.7 to 4.7%. (Note: Job-specific Conax
Installation and Maintenance Manuals should be consulted as necessary for Conax's bend radius limitations for
specific wire sizes.)
3-23
Equipment Evaluated
· Following irradiation beyond tens of megarads, Kapton insulations generally should not be
exposed to direct spray impingement under accident environments. They should be housed
within termination boxes equipped with drain holes or protected by heat-shrinkable tubing to
prevent spray impingement.
· Credit should not be taken for annealing of the insulation caused by normal service
conditions because many circuits are not normally energized and in most, the currents are
low in comparison to the ampacity of the cables.
· Handling of Kapton insulated wire after it has been irradiated to beyond 1 Mrd should be
kept to a minimum due to the potential for mechanical failure of the Teflon adhesive.
Subsequent wetting could lead to insulation breakdown when the circuit is energized.
· Under accident conditions, Kapton insulations should be protected from wetting caused by
flooding of termination boxes. This concern relates to wires for which Teflon adhesive
failure from irradiation would allow moisture to penetrate between layers of the polyimide
film.
· Kapton insulation that is not exposed to moisture, steam, or spray will function properly in
high temperature, high radiation conditions, provided unraveling does not occur. In
applications where radiation may cause deterioration of the Teflon “glue,” unraveling can be
prevented by mechanical restraint, such as heat-shrinkable tubing at the ends of the wire
insulation.
· To preclude chemical damage to the polyimide film, Kapton insulation should be isolated
from caustic spray.
· Variations in Kapton insulated wire exist from one manufacturer to another, even when wire
is manufactured to the same specification. Therefore, qualification of one brand of Kapton
insulated wire does not necessarily qualify other brands.
The report indicates that continued use of Kapton insulations in nuclear plants is generally
acceptable. However, the special nature of the insulation system must be accounted for in design,
installation, and maintenance. See Section 4.1 for additional information on the aging
mechanisms of Kapton leads.
NUREG/CR-3855 (SAND-7139), “Characterization of Nuclear Reactor Containment

Penetrations” [3.23]
The document presents design data and detailed drawings of piping and access penetrations for
26 nuclear units. The primary reason for gathering the data was to further develop methodologies
for analyzing and testing penetration responses under severe accident conditions. Relative
stiffness ratios for large access penetrations were developed. These stiffness ratios were used to
select those penetration models for which detailed analysis and testing should be performed.
3-24
Equipment Evaluated
NUREG/CR-4064, “Structural Response of Large Penetrations for Containment Vessels

Subjected to Loadings Beyond Design Basis” [3.24]
The document provides analysis and test results of large penetrations, such as equipment hatches
and BWR drywell heads, and large hot piping penetrations to pressures and temperatures beyond
their design specification. Tests were performed on these components in the new or undegraded
condition. These high pressures and temperatures will cause deformation and leakage at the
penetration seal prior to structural failure. Significant seal leakage does not occur until pressures
are 3 to 4 times greater than design and temperatures are more than 93°C [200°F] greater than
design temperature. The analysis also evaluated the fatigue resistance of piping penetration
expansion joints. The stainless steel bellows in these hot piping penetrations should be able to
withstand more than 150 major compression cycles.
NUREG/CR-4944, “Containment Penetration Elastomer Seal Leak Rate Tests” [3.25]
Tests were conducted on silicone rubber, neoprene, and ethylene propylene (EPDM) gasket
materials used for equipment hatches. The effect of gasket configuration (double tongue and
groove, gum drop, and O-ring) was also evaluated. A containment pressure increase up to three
times the design pressure did not affect seal integrity. The failure temperature of all gasket
materials was well above the design temperature for the containment. The neoprene material
failed at the lowest temperature 237.7°C to 260°C [460°F to 500°F]. Under these high loadings
the O-ring design appeared to have less margin for overload than the other configurations.
NUREG/CR-5096, “Evaluation of Seals for Mechanical Penetrations of Containment Buildings”

[3.26]
Tests were conducted on new and artificially aged silicone rubber and ethylene propylene gasket
materials used in mechanical access penetrations. Four gasket configurations were used (O-ring,
gum drop, dog ear, tongue and groove). The materials were artificially aged for temperature and
radiation exposure. The results indicated that the artificial aging had little effect on the
temperature at which joints using these materials began to leak. The joints were usually sealed by
metal-to-metal contact even when gasket properties were affected by temperatures. For design
configurations with gaps, onset leakage temperatures were 252.2°C [486°F] for silicone rubber
and 330°C [626°F] for ethylene propylene. The geometry of the gasket (O-ring, dog ear, etc.) did
not have a major effect on the leakage initiation temperature.
NUREG/CR-5561, “Analysis of Bellows Expansion Joints in the Sequoyah Containment” [3.27]
The document involves the nondestructive examination of full penetration welds in the guard
pipe and sleeve of hot piping penetrations. The volumetric examination of these welds using
ultrasonic techniques to identify flaws, previously approved by the NRC and the ASME, were
found to be inadequate with regard to flaw detection. Subsequent radiographic examination of
these welds identified flaws that exceeded allowable levels. These welds were made from one
side with backing rings. It is apparent that this weld configuration does not allow appropriate
interpretation of ultrasonic examination results. Licensees were requested to ensure that similar
welds in hot piping penetrations are nondestructively examined using radiographic techniques.
3-25
Equipment Evaluated
3.6.3 Evaluation of NPRDS Data

To substantiate the postulated stressors and aging mechanisms for penetrations, plant component
failure data were reviewed. One of the primary sources of this type of failure data is the INPO
Nuclear Power Reliability Data System (NPRDS). Query reports contained in NPRDS include
such information as the voltage rating, type of equipment, date of discovery, cause category, and
a brief narrative describing the event. NPRDS data are not focused directly on component aging,
as NPRDS does not necessarily address the root cause or mechanism of component degradation.
Additionally, not all degradations observed during maintenance activities are identified in the
database. Not all plants have provided NPRDS data, and those that have may not have reported
for their entire period of operation. As a result of these limitations, the database cannot be used
to provide probabilistic information about the reliability of a specific population of components
with respect to age-related degradation. However, the data can be used to identify those
penetration components that have a high incidence of degradation or failure relative to other
components, as well as types of applications and environments that are conducive to degradation
or failure.
The NPRDS database was searched based on component category (i.e., containment
penetrations). Subcategories of penetrations included “Instrument Line,” “Process Piping,” “Fuel
Handling,” and “Electrical.” This search generated 92 potentially applicable reports for EPAs,
whose event dates ranged from September 1974 through February 1992. The reports were then
individually evaluated to determine their applicability to aging and aging mechanisms.
Those NPRDS reports resulting from prior equipment installation, maintenance, modification, or
surveillance testing (as differentiated from events detected during these activities) were classified
as “maintenance-induced.” Other events considered non-age-related included penetrations with
components missing, manufacturing defects, and unqualified penetrations. Maintenance-induced
events, although not an aging mechanism, do constitute a mechanism for penetration component
degradation over time. Failures resulting from maintenance-induced causes are identified in each
of the discussions presented below, and treated as a separate category of failure.
Other considerations related to the analysis of the NPRDS data are discussed further in Appendix
E of this AMG.

Table 3-6 presents a summary of the NPRDS failure data, and shows the distribution of failure
reports for each penetration subcomponent. Table 3-7 shows the distribution of failure reports
according to manufacturer.
Many of the reports reviewed in this analysis required a substantial degree of interpretation;
incomplete and even contradictory descriptions of the circumstances surrounding the failure
were sometimes noted. Such reports were estimated to comprise roughly 20% of the total
number. In cases where the ambiguity could not be resolved with any degree of certainty, the
report in question was not used. Due to the uncertainty inherent in some of the data, the relative
proportions of various types of failures may differ somewhat from the “actual” values; this
potential error was assumed to be evenly distributed (that is, reports erroneously attributed were
assumed not to affect one component, failure mode, or failure cause grouping disproportionately
in relation to another).
3-26
Equipment Evaluated
Table 3-6
Summary of NPRDS EPA Failure Data (by Subcomponent)
Failed No. of Significant Failure Significant Method of Detection

Subcomponent Failures/ Modes Failure Causes
%
Module Seals 11/16.2 Leakage (100%) Heat (91%); Leak Rate Testing
Wear and Aging (9%) (82%); Unidentified
Surveillance (9%);
Operations (9%)
11/16.2
Penetration Leads Shorts to Grounds Unknown (64%); Operations (91%);
(82%); Loose Fittings Wear and Aging (36%) Maintenance (9%)
(9%); Unknown (9%)
9/13.2
Flange/Nozzle Leakage (100%) Wear and Aging (44%); Leak Rate Testing
Seals/ O-Rings Corrosion (22%); (33%); Unknown (56%);
Unknown (22%); Unidentified
Heat (11%) Surveillance (11%)
10/14.7
Tubing/Tube Leakage (90%); Unknown (80%); Unidentified
Shell/ Canister/ Short to Ground (10%) Moisture (10%); Surveillance (70%);
Hardware Vibration (10%) Leak Rate Testing
(10%); Operations
(20%)
Terminations 8/11.7 Loose Fittings (63%); Unknown (88%); Operations (88%);

Open Circuit (37%) Wear and Aging (12%) Maintenance (12%)
Pressure 8/11.7 Leakage (100%) Unknown (75%); Leak Rate Testing

Monitoring/ Wear and Aging (25%) (75%); Unidentified
Regulating Surveillance (12%);
Devices Operations (12%)
Auxiliary 2/2.9 Unknown (50%); Unknown (50%); Unknown (100%)

Components Short to Ground (50%) Moisture (50%)
Unknown 5/7.4 Leakage (100%) Unknown (100%) Leak Rate Testing

(40%); Operations
(40%); Maintenance
(20%)
Failures of Two or 3/4.4 Leakage (67%); Corrosion (33%); Unknown (33%);

More Short to Ground (33%) Physical Contaminants Operations (67%)
Subcomponents (33%); Wear and Aging
(33%)
Other 1/1.5 Leakage (100%) Unknown (100%) Operations (100%)

Notes:
1. Number of failures does not include those attributed to maintenance, manufacturing, or other
personnel error.
2. Level of significance for table equals 10%.
3. Percentages shown are rounded to nearest one-tenth of one percent.
3-27
Equipment Evaluated
Table 3-7
Summary of EPA Subcomponent Failures by Manufacturer
Subcomponent Failure
Failure
Flange/ Tubing/ Pressure
of Two
Manufacturer Module Module Penetration Nozzle Tube Shell/ Monitoring/ Auxiliary
Total Unknown Terminations Other or
Seals Comp. Leads Seals/ Canister/ Regulating Comp.
More
O-Rings Hardware Devices
Comp.
Conax
19 1 0 0 1 0 6 2 8 0 1 0
Westinghouse
6 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1
GE
11 0 1 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Amphenol
15 1 10 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1
Viking
12 0 0 0 1 8 0 3 0 0 0 0
Crouse Hinds
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Henry Pratt
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Chicago Bridge
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
& Iron
3-28
Equipment Evaluated
3.6.3.1.1 EPA Subcomponent Review
3.6.3.1.1.1 Module Seals
Twelve failure reports were applicable to the module seals; one was maintenance-induced and
therefore excluded from further analysis.
The primary failure mode was leakage for all (100%) failures. Ten of the failures were caused by
heat, and the other failure was caused by wear and aging. Nine failures were identified during
leak rate testing, one was identified during unspecified surveillance testing, and one was
identified during operations with no effect on the functionality of the penetration.
3.6.3.1.1.2 Penetration Leads
Sixteen failure reports were applicable to EPA wires and cables; five were maintenance-induced
and therefore excluded from further analysis. The primary failure mode was shorting to ground
(nine failures, or 82%). Seven failures were caused by unknown factors and four failures were
caused by “normal” wear and aging. Ten failures were detected during operations, and affected
the functionality of the penetrations; one failure was identified during maintenance.
3.6.3.1.1.3 Flange/Nozzle Seals/O-Rings
Fifteen failure reports were applicable to flange and nozzle seals or, more specifically, O-rings;
six were maintenance-induced and therefore excluded from further analysis. The failure mode of
all nine failures (100%) was leakage. Four failures were caused by “normal” wear and aging, two
failures were caused by corrosion, two failures were caused by an unknown failure cause, and
one failure was caused by heat. Five failures were detected by unidentified methods, three
failures were detected during failure leak rate tests, and one failure was detected during
unspecified surveillance testing.
3.6.3.1.1.4 Tubing/Tube Shell/Canister Hardware
Thirteen failure reports were applicable to tubing, the tube shell, canister, or other body
hardware; three were maintenance-induced and therefore excluded from further analysis. The
primary mode of failure was leakage for nine (90%) failures and a short to ground for one (10%)
failure. Eight failures were the result of unidentified causes, one failure was caused by moisture
and contaminants, and one failure was caused by vibration. Seven failures were detected during
unspecified surveillance testing, one failure was detected during leak rate testing, and two
failures were detected during operations with one affecting penetration functionality and one not
affecting functionality.
3-29
Equipment Evaluated
3.6.3.1.1.5 Terminations
Fourteen failure reports were applicable to terminations; six were maintenance-induced and
therefore excluded from further analysis. The primary mode of failure was loose
fittings/connections for five (42%) failures and high resistance and open circuits for three (25%)
failures. Seven failures were caused by unknown circumstances and one failure was caused by
wear and aging. Seven failures were detected during normal operations, and one failure was
detected during maintenance and walkdowns.
3.6.3.1.1.6 Pressure Monitoring/Regulating Devices
Nine failure reports were applicable to pressure monitoring and regulating devices; one was
maintenance-induced and therefore excluded from further analysis. The primary failure mode of
all eight failures (100%) was leakage. Six failures were the result of unidentified causes, and two
failures were caused by wear and aging. Six failures were detected during leak rate testing, one
failure was detected during unspecified surveillance testing, and one failure was detected during
operations with no effect on the functionality of the equipment.
3.6.3.1.1.7 Auxiliary Components
Three failure reports were applicable to auxiliary devices (squirrel cage, junction box); one was
maintenance-induced and therefore excluded from further analysis. The primary mode of failure
was short to ground for one failure. One report had an unidentified failure mode. One failure was
the result of unknown causes, and one failure was caused by moisture and contaminants. The
method of detection for the two failures was not identified.
3.6.3.1.1.8 Other
One failure report was applicable to “connections and cap.” The primary failure mode was
leakage from an unknown cause. The failure was detected during operations.
3.6.3.1.1.9 Unknown
Six failure reports were applicable to unknown or unidentified subcomponents; one was
maintenance-induced and therefore excluded from further analysis. The primary mode of failure
for all (100%) the subcomponents was leakage with an unknown cause of failure. Two failures
were identified by leak rate testing, two failures were detected during operations, and one failure
was identified by maintenance.
3.6.3.1.1.10 Failure of Two or More Penetration Subcomponents
Several failure reports were applicable to combinations of penetration subcomponents. One event
discussed the failure of the entire module. The primary failure mode described in this report was
leakage, which was caused by corrosion, and was identified during a pull test of the leads.
3-30
Equipment Evaluated
Another event discussed the failure of the module seals, the module, and the O-rings. The
primary mode of failure was leakage, which was caused by wear and aging, and detected during
a leak rate test. A third event included the failure of a penetration lead and also an auxiliary
component. The primary failure mode was a short to ground caused by contaminants, and
identified by an unknown method of detection.
3.6.3.2 Mechanical Penetration Assemblies
This review was separated into three categories: piping penetrations; equipment hatches, drywell
heads, and airlocks; and fuel transfer tubes.
Very little degradation and failure data were available in NPRDS for piping penetrations. Thirty-
five piping penetration incidents were identified. Twenty of these incident reports were unrelated
to the primary containment piping penetrations. There were 12 reports of leaking stainless steel
expansion joint bellows and 3 reports of test valve leaks. Degradation was attributed to
corrosion, vibration, and maintenance error.
A significant amount of data was available for the equipment hatches, drywell covers, and
airlocks. A total of 824 degradation and failure incident reports were reviewed. About one third
of these incidents were associated with design inadequacy, installation errors, maintenance errors
and procedural errors (primarily related to procedures for opening/closing the airlock). Of the
remaining 550 incidents, about 75% were associated with the airlock. The airlock components
involved were primarily door seals, shaft seals, and other wearing parts associated with the
mechanical interlock system (gears, cams, bearings, bushings, clutches, etc.). The root causes for
degradation were normal wear or degraded material (unknown root cause). The remaining
incidents involved the equipment hatches and the main subcomponent was a degraded gasket.
There were only three incident reports that involved aging for the fuel transfer tube penetration.
These were all reports of flange leakage due to gasket degradation. The root cause was not
identified.
The impact of these penetration component degradation incidents on the plant was generally a
minor inconvenience; the degraded component was generally refurbished or replaced.
In most cases, the degradation was identified through leakage tests (10 CFR 50 Appendix J),
operational indications (for airlock) or inspections.
3.6.4 Evaluation of LER Data
NRC Licensee Event Reports (LERs) are another source of penetration failure and degradation
data. LERs are issued by nuclear plant operators when equipment failures and plant operating
events meet the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73. As with NPRDS data, LERs
do not directly record data related to component aging. In addition, the criteria for issuance of an
LER do not encompass all component failures (especially those of little or no consequence to
plant safety). Hence, evaluation of LER data provides only a partial picture of failure
3-31
Equipment Evaluated
information; accordingly, the data may or may not be representative of general equipment failure
behavior. LER data can be used, however, as support for the findings derived from other data
sources (such as NPRDS and industry studies), as well as for verification of postulated aging
mechanisms.
The LERs used in the EPA analysis covered the period from 1980 through 1993. The abstracts of
433 LERs were identified via keyword search of the LER database maintained by Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. Each of the reports generated by this search was individually reviewed; in
cases where the applicability of a given report to a topic could not be reliably determined, the
report was discarded. The search was based on failures of four different types of penetrations:
· electrical or instrument line penetrations
· personnel or equipment access penetrations
· process piping penetrations
· fuel handling and miscellaneous penetrations
Of the 433 reports reviewed, 27 (6.2%) were ultimately retained as being applicable to EPAs; the
remaining reports were applicable to mechanical penetrations. The EPA-applicable reports were
analyzed in a method to be consistent with the NPRDS data; therefore, the plant, year of failure,
manufacturer, subcomponent, failure mode, failure cause, and method of detection were used in
the analysis.
Those LER reports resulting from prior equipment installation, maintenance, modification, or
surveillance testing (as differentiated from events detected during these activities) were classified
as “maintenance-induced.” Maintenance-induced events, although not an aging mechanism, do
constitute a mechanism for penetration component degradation over time. Failures resulting from
maintenance-induced causes are identified in each of the discussions presented below, and
treated as a separate category of failure. Ten of the total EPA-applicable LERs were considered
maintenance-induced and therefore removed from consideration, leaving 17 applicable EPA
LERs. Table 3-8 shows a summary of these LER failures by EPA subcomponent.
Little information regarding manufacturer was available in the reports; accordingly, no

distribution of failure by manufacturer could be determined.
3.6.4.1.1 Module Seals
Six failure reports were applicable to the module seals; three were maintenance-induced and
therefore excluded. The primary failure mode was leakage for all (100%) failures. Two failures
were caused by unknown circumstances and one was caused by wear and aging. All three
failures were identified by leak rate testing.
3-32
Equipment Evaluated
Table 3-8
Summary of LER Failure Data by Subcomponent - EPAs
Subcomponent Number of Percentage

Failures of Total
Module Seals 3 17.6
Module Components 0 0.0
Penetration Leads 6 35.3
Flange/Nozzle Seals/O-Rings 0 0.0
Tubing/Tube Shell/Canister 0 0.0

Hardware
Terminations 0 0.0
Pressure Monitoring/Regulating 1 5.9

Devices
Auxiliary Components 1 5.9
Penetration Gland 3 17.6
Other 2 11.7
Failure of Two or More 1 5.9

Subcomponents
Unknown 0 0.0
Total 17 100
Notes: 1. Percentages shown are rounded to nearest tenth of one percent.

2. Maintenance induced and manufacturing defects excluded.
3.6.4.1.2 Penetration Leads
Eight failure reports were applicable to penetration leads; two were maintenance-induced and
therefore excluded. The primary failure mode was shorts to grounds for five (83%) failures and
low insulation resistance for one (17%) failure. Five failures were caused by unknown
circumstances and one failure was caused by moisture and contaminants. Five failures were
detected during operations affecting the functionality and one failure was detected by unknown
circumstances.
3-33
Equipment Evaluated
3.6.4.1.3 Pressure Monitoring/Regulating Devices
One failure report was applicable to a pressure monitoring and regulating device. The primary
failure mode for this device was leakage, which was caused by miscellaneous mechanical
problems. The failure was identified during operations and affected functionality.
3.6.4.1.4 Auxiliary Components
One failure report was applicable to an auxiliary component (valves and flanges). The primary
failure mode for this failure was leakage, which was caused by unknown circumstances. The
method of detection for the auxiliary component failure was leak rate testing.
3.6.4.1.5 Penetration Gland
Three failure reports were applicable to the penetration gland. The primary failure mode for all
(100%) failures was leakage. The exact failure cause for all three failures was unknown. All
failures were detected by leak rate testing.
3.6.4.1.6 Other
Two failure reports were applicable to bushings. The primary failure mode for both (100%)
failures was leakage and both were caused by unknown circumstances. Both failures were
detected during operations affecting the functionality of the penetrations.
3.6.4.1.7 Failures of Two or More Subcomponents
One failure report discussed the failure of the module, which includes the module seal and other
components. The primary failure mode was a “faulty signal” from a “conditioning module.” The
cause of failure was moisture. The failure was detected during operations affecting the
functionality of the penetrations.
3.6.4.1.8 Conclusions from LER Review - EPAs
General observations regarding penetration failures as described by the LER database are
summarized below. The LER data, in comparison to the NPRDS data, had less information
regarding failed subcomponents, failure modes, and causes. Very high percentages of each
category were listed as “unknown,” thereby making meaningful observations or inferences
difficult. Also, the total number of LERs makes it difficult to draw any broad-based conclusions.
The largest number of LER subcomponent failures were for module seals, and leads/cables,
which appears consistent with the NPRDS data. The primary failure mode for module seals was
pressure leakage, which also correlates with the NPRDS data. The primary failure mode of
leads/cables was shorting to ground. Penetration glands, which are a type of seal, appear to fail
primarily via pressure leakage.
3-34
Equipment Evaluated
This review was separated into two categories: (1) piping penetrations and (2) equipment hatches
and airlocks. No pertinent information was identified for the fuel transfer tube.
Overall, very little degradation and failure data were available for piping penetrations. Twenty-
two piping penetration incidents were identified. Ten of these incidents were unrelated to aging
of components. The 12 remaining incidents were associated with a failure to seal identified
through leakage testing. Ten of these 12 incidents were expansion joint bellows leaks. Causes
were not clearly stated, but potential concerns were corrosion and vibration.
3.7 Host Utility Operating Experience
To complement the other information sources used in this study to characterize mechanical and
electrical penetration aging, information relating to penetrations was obtained from one “host”
utility through interviews with plant maintenance and supervisory personnel and review of plant
documents and records. One host plant, a mid-1970s PWR, was used for both the electrical and
mechanical portions of this study. Some of the more notable findings related to penetration
degradation and maintenance practices at this host facility are discussed in the following
paragraphs. The discussion is not intended to comprehensively recount all failures occurring at
the host plant; to the contrary, no effort was made to determine the total numbers of failures of
each type. Rather, the intent was to validate observations noted in the analysis of the NPRDS and
LER data,10 as well as the aging mechanisms and effects discussed in Section 4 and common
maintenance techniques in Section 5.
EQ and non-EQ penetrations have different maintenance requirements driven primarily by the
establishment of a qualified life for various EQ penetration organic components. However, the
same preventive maintenance activities are generally applied to all penetrations manufactured by
the same vendor. The qualification of EQ EPAs covers only environmental stressors potentially
affecting the electrical functionality of the EPA (such as temperature, radiation, and humidity);
maintenance and functionality of the pressure boundary is addressed separately. Most
penetrations in the plant are physically located in the same vicinity (in two or three locations),
and hence are exposed to similar aging environments and stressors. There is no specific cooling
of penetrations anywhere.
EPAs at the host plant have been historically very reliable, with few instances of failure or
degradation noted. Some mild surface corrosion has been identified (EPAs are not typically
painted at this facility), as have a limited number of instances of EPA leakage (normally detected
during leak rate testing or routine monitoring). Walkdowns of EPAs are performed periodically.
10
Very few of the NPRDS reports or LERs discussed the mode and cause of a given failure with sufficient
specificity to validate the existence of some of the aging mechanisms hypothesized in Section 4. For example, no
instances of UV radiation degradation (see Section 4.2.1) of penetration components were found in the data.
3-35
Equipment Evaluated
Installation is not considered an aging mechanism by the plant, but penetrations had deficiencies
caused by improper installation on occasion. No instances of significant corrosion or moisture
buildup were identified. Some instances of Kapton lead degradation (primarily nicking due to
incidental contact) have been identified and preventive measures subsequently employed.
The hot piping penetrations were designed without the need for expansion joints. The concrete
primary containment structure and the pipe routing, both within and outside containment,
allowed the hot piping to be anchored at the point where it penetrated the containment concrete
wall. The penetration sleeves are embedded in the concrete wall and welded to the containment
steel liner. The penetration end plates are welded to the sleeves and hot piping. The anchor loads
are transmitted from the piping into the concrete wall. Several of the hot penetrations have
cooling channels between the pipe insulation and sleeve. The cooling water flowing through
these channels ensures that concrete temperatures are kept below their design level. Except for
higher thermal loading, the hot and cold piping penetrations have similar configurations. Most
carbon steel material surfaces of these penetrations are coated with approximately 16-mil-thick
paint. The surface coatings are maintained through an overall plant paint preservation program.
Visual inspections of the penetrations prior to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J leakage tests have noted
very little degradation. Local leak rate tests of the mechanical penetrations have always had
acceptable results, and measured leakage has been well below allowable values. The 10 CFR 50
Appendix J leak tests are performed on approximately 2-year intervals. The mechanical and
electrical systems for the personnel airlock are maintained during each refueling in accordance
with the supplier’s instructions. Some refurbishment and replacement has been necessary for
normally wearing parts of the airlock. Door seals have been replaced periodically. The moving
airlock parts are lubricated periodically.
3.7.1 Plant Surveys
Surveys were sent to more than 50 operating nuclear plants in an attempt to obtain information
related to EPA aging and performance. These surveys were sent (or ultimately forwarded) to
personnel considered familiar with the design, maintenance, and environmental qualification of
electrical penetrations. The survey requested information on the types and quantities of EPAs
installed, common maintenance and surveillance techniques, and specific instances of aging and
failures noted (and any relevant circumstances related to EPA aging). A sample survey is shown
in Appendix F. Nine utilities, representing 20 units, responded to the survey. The total number of
units responding represents slightly less than 20% of all operating U.S. nuclear power plants;
therefore, conclusions drawn from the survey responses can be considered substantially
representative of the industry as a whole.
Table 3-9 shows the overall results of the survey. In general, these results are consistent with the
information obtained from NPRDS, LERs, EPRI NUS database, and the host utility. Conax
3-36
Equipment Evaluated
appears to be the most commonly used EPA. The number of EPAs in each unit ranged from a
low of 17 to a high of about 100. This wide disparity is attributed to differences in plants, and the
counting of all penetrations, both electrical and mechanical, by some utilities. Taking the total
number of penetrations listed by the utilities and dividing by the number of utilities results in
approximately 63 EPAs per unit. The number of electrical penetrations per type of nuclear plant
(BWR or PWR) was also calculated. Six BWR units responded to the survey and averaged
approximately 39 electrical penetrations per unit. Fourteen PWR units responded to the survey
and averaged 73 electrical penetrations per unit.
The surveys also asked respondents to provide descriptions of significant observed aging
mechanisms and effects. Table 3-10 is a summary of the plant survey results of aging
mechanisms; results from several plants have been combined into single entries for common
aging management techniques.
Section 5 describes maintenance, surveillance, and condition monitoring practices currently in

use by plant operators. These techniques were identified as part of the plant survey described
above.
Questionnaires regarding mechanical penetration performance were sent to 43 utilities. Six

utilities representing 19 nuclear units responded to the survey. The questions related to aging
incidents and general concerns, and aging management programs used. Thirteen of the units
reported no significant aging incidents for mechanical penetrations. The aging incidents at the
other six units were consistent with the information identified from the NPRDS and LER
databases. The aging concerns for most units were corrosion in general and fatigue for the hot
piping penetration expansion joints. One plant reported a concern for overloading due to
settlement.
The most effective programs for aging management cited by these units were 10 CFR 50
Appendix J leak testing, painting and coating maintenance programs, periodic walkdowns, and
preventive maintenance, primarily for airlock mechanical systems. A few units identified cooling
flow testing, fatigue analysis, and refurbishment/replacement.
3-37
Equipment Evaluated
Table 3-9
Results of Plant Surveys - EPAs
Type No. of
Plant- General Gamma
1 of EPAs Amphenol Conax Viking Westinghouse
Unit 2 Electric Metrics
Plant Installed
A-1 PWR 64.5 48.5 16
A-2 PWR 64.5 48.5 16
B BWR 19 19
C BWR 48 48
D PWR 55 55
E BWR 17 17
F-1 PWR 99 2 97
F-2 PWR 81 79 2
G-1 BWR 100.6 47.4 42 11.2
G-2 PWR 100.6 47.4 42 11.2
G-3 PWR 100.6 47.4 42 11.2
H PWR 100.6 47.4 42 11.2
I PWR 100.6 47.4 42 11.2
J-1 BWR 24 24
J-2 BWR 24 24
K PWR 52 52
L-1 PWR 59 59
L-2 PWR 60 49 11
M-1 PWR 42 5 37
M-2 PWR 42 5 37
Total
no. of
1254/100 146/11.6 451/36.0 423/33.7 97/7.7 135/10.8 2/<1
Survey
/%
Notes: 1. The identity of survey respondents has been maintained confidential.

2. Fractional values for the number of EPAs listed resulted from some survey respondents listing
all penetrations for a utility, which may encompass several plants or units. Without further
information, the number of EPAs were divided equally among the number of applicable units.
3-38
Equipment Evaluated
Table 3-10
Summary of Plant-Specific Aging Information (Survey) - EPAs
CM or
Percentage (%) of
Significant Aging Knowledge and Effective Aging Maintenance
Installed EPAs to
Concerns or Resulting Rate of Understanding of Mitigation Management Techniques
Which Aging Remarks
Problems for Degradation Degradation Possible? Program in Used to
Concern Potentially
EPAs? Mechanism Place? Address
Applicable
Concerns
EPA monitoring,
Leakage 76-100 Varies Fair Yes Yes
trending, testing
Mechanical: Kapton
Insulation failure Mechanical: 0-25 Mechanical: Yes easily nicked or cut
Mechanical: Low Mechanical: Good Mechanical: Yes IR, Continuity
(mechanical, Electrical: 0-25; 51- Electrical: Electrical: Possibly
Electrical: Varies Electrical: Fair Electrical: Possibly testing, visual
electrical, or 75 Possibly due to moisture
Thermal and Thermal and Thermal and inspection,
thermal and Thermal and Thermal and intrusion; move
Radiative: Low Radiative: Good Radiative: No cleaning, repair
radiative) Radiative: 76-100 Radiative: Yes loads to spare
loads
Noneffective:
Seals (Fissures in
Continuity, verify
Seal Potting
integrity Potting material
Material, U-Cup Potting: 0-25 Potting: Varies Potting: Fair Potting: No Potting: No Effective: cracks cause
Module Seal U-Cup: 76-100 U-Cup: Medium U-Cup: Good U-Cup: Yes U-Cup: Yes Pressure current leakage
Failure, Thermal
Organics: 76-100 Organics: Low Organics: Good Organics: No Organics: Yes monitoring, path between
and Radiative
repair, cleaning, splices
Aging of Seal
refurbishment,
Organics)
replacement
Visual inspection,
Peeling/degraded IR, continuity
0-25 Low Good Yes Yes
interior paint testing, repairs,
cleaning
EQ Program
determines
Thermal and
qualified life;
radiation aging of Pressure
76-100 Low Good No Yes penetration
EQ penetration monitoring
components
components
replaced prior to
end of qualified life
Notes: 1. Percentage values allowed in response were 0-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, and 76-100%.
3-39
Equipment Evaluated
The incidents related to personnel airlock and specifically documented by one unit are
summarized below. These are representative of operating history and degradation for personnel
airlocks.
7/76 - Defective cam on airlock positioner. Initial installation error. Replaced cam.
12/76 - Improper parts installed on airlock swing rod assembly. Replaced parts.
4/77 - Airlock door linkage deformed by mechanical abuse (slamming door). Replaced
linkage.
4/77 - Airlock door out of alignment resulting in high stress and broken door bolts.
Realigned door and replaced bolts.
10/87 - Airlock pressurization ball valve leaked. Valve was rebuilt.
10/87 - Airlock door gasket was worn and leaked. Gasket was replaced.
2/88 - Airlock door seal was worn. Replaced seal.
6/88 - Airlock handwheel would not turn due to bent tie rod. Cause was mechanical
abuse. Tie rod was replaced.
6/89 - Airlock door seal pulled away from normal position. Replaced seal.
9/93 - Airlock door seal and drive chain were damaged. Root cause was defective
check and relief valves in pressurization system. Valves, seal, and drive chain
replaced. Unit entered in LCO but problems were found and corrected without
effect on plant operation.
9/93 - Airlock door and door seal damaged from being hit by equipment being
transported. Resultant leakage was below technical specification requirements.
Realigned door and replaced seals.
9/93 - Outer door of airlock could not be opened. Door handwheel was turning free at
shaft penetration through door. Worn gears, spacers, and shaft seals were found
to be the problem. Worn parts were replaced.
3.8 Overall Conclusions Regarding Equipment Historical Performance
Six primary sources of information were used in this AMG to characterize penetration historical
performance, namely,
· NRC Notices, Bulletins, Circulars, and Generic Letters
· NPRDS data
· LER data
· Industry information provided by previous analyses and reports relating to penetrations
· Information obtained from operating nuclear plants acting as host utility
· Plant surveys.
These sources each provide a somewhat different perspective on penetration component aging.
Several limitations are inherent in any comparison of these results, stemming primarily from the
variations in equipment types within the population, differing scope of equipment included,
classification of failures, and criteria used in the analysis. Accordingly, no statistical inferences
3-40
Equipment Evaluated
(such as mean-time-between-failure) can readily be drawn concerning component failure

probability or rate. Despite these limitations, several generic observations can be made:
Electrical
1. Electrical penetration assemblies are, in general, highly reliable components. The number of
electrical penetration failures that have occurred throughout the industry is very low in
proportion to the size of the population. It is unknown, however, whether this observed low
failure rate will increase, decrease, or remain constant with continued aging during normal
operation.
2. Shorting of the penetration insulation/leads, and leakage of the penetration modules or

assembly (failure to seal) appear to be the two most likely failure modes for EPAs.
Predominant failure causes include thermal exposure and mechanical damage.
3. Detection of EPA failures appears to occur mostly through leak rate testing and monitoring
of pressure instrumentation. Electrical shorts of leads/conductors appear to be detected
primarily during operation, through monitoring of plant instruments, and electrical system
operation.
4. Roughly one-fourth of all penetration-related failures noted were attributable to improper

design, maintenance, or testing (i.e., “maintenance induced”).
5. No evidence of widespread Kapton lead degradation was noted. Instances of degradation

appear occasional and no more frequent than for other types of penetration lead insulation.
However, care must be exercised in the maintenance and handling of Kapton based on its
susceptibility to incidental mechanical damage and moisture.
Mechanical
1. The number of mechanical and access penetration failures that have occurred throughout the
industry is extremely low in proportion to the size of the population.
2. Degradation of mechanical penetrations has been identified primarily through leak rate tests
and visual inspections.
3. For piping penetrations, few incidents of aging have been observed over the first 15 to 20
years of service. However, age-related degradation incidents for stainless steel expansion
joint bellows (hot piping penetrations) have been increasing for 1970s vintage units.
4. For access penetrations, most of the instances of aging-related degradation are related to the
degradation of gaskets and seals. In most cases, these components were refurbished or
replaced. Normal aging of materials and mechanical damage have been the primary causes of
degradation.
3-41
Equipment Evaluated
3.9 References
3.1 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), mid-1980s General Electric BWR.
3.2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), mid-1970s Westinghouse PWR.
3.3 NUREG/CR-1730, “Data Summaries of Licensee Event Reports of Primary Containment
Penetrations at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,” September 1980. Prepared by
EG and G Idaho, Inc.
3.4 IE Bulletin 79-01B, “Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class IE
Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors,” Enclosure 4 to “Environmental
Qualification of Class IE Equipment,” Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 14, 1980.
3.5 NUREG-0588, “Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related
Equipment Including Staff Responses of Public Comments, Resolution of Generic
Technical Activity A-24,” Rev. 1, July 1981.
3.6 “Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear
Power Plants,” Federal Register, Vol. 48 No. 15, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
January 21, 1983.
3.7 “1995 World List of Nuclear Power Plants,” Nuclear News, March 1995.
3.8 IE Notice 93-25, “Bunker Ramo Electrical Penetration Assembly Degradation,” U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 1, 1993.
3.9 IE Notice 88-89, “Degradation of Kapton Electrical Insulation,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, November 21, 1988.
3.10 IE Notice 88-29, “Deficiencies in Primary Containment Low-Voltage Electrical
Penetration Assemblies,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 24, 1988.
3.11 IE Notice 86-104, “Unqualified Butt Splice Connectors Identified in Qualified
Penetrations,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 16, 1986.
3.12 IE Notice 82-40, “Deficiencies in Primary Containment Electrical Penetration
Assemblies,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 22, 1982.
3.13 IE Bulletin 82-04, “Deficiencies in Primary Containment Electrical Penetration
Assemblies,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 3, 1982.
3.14 IE Notice 81-20, “Test Failures of Electrical Penetration Assemblies,” U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, July 13, 1981.
3.15 IE Bulletin 77-06, “Potential Problems with Containment Electrical Penetration
Assemblies,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 22, 1977.
3.16 IE Bulletin 77-07, “Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies at Nuclear Power
Plants Under Construction,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 19, 1977.
3-42
Equipment Evaluated
3.17 IE Notice 93-59, “Unexpected Opening of Both Doors in an Airlock,” U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, July 26, 1993.
3.18 IE Notice 92-20, “Inadequate Local Leak Rate Testing,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 3, 1992.
3.19 IE Notice 89-79, “Degraded Coatings and Corrosion of Steel Containment Vessels,” U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1, 1989.
3.20 IE Bulletin 80-08, “Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds,” U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, April 7, 1980.
3.21 NUREG/CR-5461, SAND89-2369, “Aging of Cables, Connections, and Electrical
Penetration Assemblies Used in Nuclear Power Plants,” July 1990.
3.22 “Review of Polyimide Insulated Wire in Nuclear Power Plants,” EPRI NP-7189,
February 1991.
3.23 NUREG/CR-3855, SAND-7139, “Characterization of Nuclear Reactor Containment
Penetrations,” January 1985.
3.24 NUREG/CR-4064, “Structural Response of Large Penetrations for Containment Vessels
Subjected to Loadings Beyond Design Basis,” February 1985.
3.25 NUREG/CR-4944, “Containment Penetration Elastomer Seal Leak Rate Tests,” July
1987.
3.26 NUREG/CR-5096, “Evaluation of Seals for Mechanical Penetrations of Containment
Buildings,” August 1988.
3.27 NUREG/CR-5561, “Analysis of Bellows Expansion Joints in the Sequoyah
Containment,” December 1991.
3.28 “PWR Containment Structures License Renewal Industry Report; Revision 1,”
EPRI TR-103835s, July 1994.
3.29 “BWR Containment License Renewal Industry Report; Revision 1,” EPRI TR-103840s,
July 1994.
3.30 Shah, Vikram N. and Macdonald, Philip E., “Aging and Life Extension of Major Light
Water Reactor Components,” Elsevier Science Publishers, 1993.
3.31 SAND96-0344, “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants -
Electrical Cable and Terminations,” 1996.
3.32 IEEE Standard 323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 1974.
3-43
4
STRESSORS, AGING MECHANISMS, AND EFFECTS
This section describes applicable stressors, aging mechanisms and effects, and assesses the
potential significance of these mechanisms for electrical and mechanical penetrations. These
stressors and aging mechanisms were identified by considering the design, applications, and
operating experience of penetrations, along with relevant industry research, information, and
reports. Guidelines or criteria are also developed to aid plant personnel in evaluating the
severity of a given stressor or aging mechanism and its effects on penetration aging. If the
relevant criteria are met (or, in the case of a quantitative threshold, exceeded), then the effects
of the associated aging mechanism may be significant for that component; these are referred
to as “if-then” criteria. The development of these criteria is separate from the determination
of the significance of a given aging mechanism; “if-then” criteria merely assist a plant operator
in determining whether the environmental and operational stressors present at his/her respective
plant are of a sufficient type and/or magnitude to result in aging effects on the plant’s penetration
systems. As discussed in Section 4.1, the significance of an aging mechanism (for the purposes
of this document) centers more around whether loss of component functionality may result.
4.1 Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Aging Effects Acting on Penetration

Components
A stressor is an “agent or stimulus that stems from pre-service and service conditions and can
produce immediate or aging degradation of a system, structure, or component.” Stressors result
in aging mechanisms, which are specific processes that gradually change the characteristics of a
system or component with time or use. Net changes in the characteristics of a system, structure,
or component (SSC) with time or use resulting from aging mechanisms are known as aging
effects [4.1]. Stressors caused by normal operation and environmental conditions have a direct
impact on the existence and progression of aging mechanisms and effects. It is therefore
important to understand the behavior of materials when subject to these various stressors, in
order to design and operate the component satisfactorily, and to develop methods for detecting
and mitigating component degradation.
The stressors that are relevant to penetrations generally include the following:
· Thermal
· Electrical
· Mechanical
· Radiation
· Chemical/Electrochemical
· Oxygen/Ozone
· Moisture/Humidity
· Dirt, Dust, and Other Contaminants
4-1
Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects
Although not directly producing stress, oxygen, ozone, humidity, dust, dirt, and other types of
contamination may aggravate the effects of other stressors acting on penetration systems and
related components and may result in more rapid deterioration.
Certain types of degradation may result only from the combination of two or more stressors.
For example, voltage stress and moisture may combine to produce degradation of dielectric
materials that would otherwise not occur in the presence of one stressor alone. Similarly,
some stressors act to accelerate the degradation that would otherwise be experienced from
another stressor; the effect of oxygen on thermal- or radiation-induced degradation is such a
case. Hence, both individual stressors and their potential interactions with other stressors must be
considered when evaluating the degradation potential of penetration system components.
Potential aging mechanisms associated with the stressors listed above include the following:
Thermal
· Thermal degradation of organic materials (short- and long-term)
Mechanical
· Compression/volumetric changes of organics (thermal and/or radiation induced)
· Stress relaxation of metallic components
· Work hardening of metals
· Physical damage (during installation, maintenance, or operation)
· Wear
· Cyclic loading/fatigue
· Settlement
Electrical
· Moisture-induced degradation
· Loss of surface insulating properties (including surface tracking)
· Voltage-induced degradation
Radiation
· Radiolysis of organics
· Photolysis of organics (UV)
Chemical/Electrochemical
· Direct chemical attack of organics
· Chemical decomposition of organic materials
· Electrochemical attack of metals (including oxidation and corrosion)
4-2
Oxygen
· Thermoxidative degradation
· Radiation-induced oxidation
“Significant” Aging Mechanisms
An aging mechanism is considered to be significant when it may result in effects that produce a
loss of functionality of a component or structure during the current or license renewal period if
allowed to continue without mitigation. Loss of penetration functionality resulting from an aging
mechanism is determined through examination of the design function of each subcomponent and
the potential effect of the aging mechanism on that function. In the following text, aging
mechanisms have been substantiated where possible through evaluation of operating history.
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 summarize stressors and significant aging mechanisms for electrical and
mechanical penetrations, respectively. The following sections provide additional information on
these aging mechanisms, as well as “if-then” criteria for determination of the severity of each
mechanism.
The following sections provide a discussion of the stressors, aging mechanisms, and aging
effects listed above for both electrical and mechanical penetration designs. Substantial
commonality between stressors, mechanisms, and effects exists for the two categories (for
example, thermal and radiation degradation of organics affects components of both electrical and
mechanical penetrations). Accordingly, each section below presents a general discussion of the
stressors and aging mechanisms common to both types of penetrations as well as providing
information specific to each type.
4.2 Thermal Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects
4.2.1 General
Thermal stress results from exposure of penetration system components to normal and abnormal
environments. Environmental influences that may induce thermal stress on a penetration
component may result from general area ambient temperatures, localized high temperatures (hot
spots), or heating from electrical conductors or process piping running through the penetration.
Elevated temperature produces some degree of aging in all organic materials. Indications of
thermally induced degradation of organics may include embrittlement, cracking or crazing,
discoloration, melting, and a change in the mechanical or electrical properties of the material(s)
that are essential for the penetration to perform its design function.
4-3
Table 4-1
Summary of Stressors, Significant Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Electrical Penetration Assemblies
Applicable Potential Failure

Component Aging Mechanisms Effects of Aging Remarks
Stressors Modes
Electrical Leads
(including
conductor, Thermal/thermoxidative
insulation, degradation of organics Embrittlement, cracking, Reduced IR; electrical
Heat, oxygen
jacketing, (environmental and melting, discoloration failure
shielding and ohmic/induced currents)
related
components)
Radiolysis and photolysis Photolysis applicable only
Radiation, Embrittlement, cracking, Reduced IR;
of organics; radiation- to exposed UV sensitive
oxygen discoloration, swelling electrical failure
initiated oxidation materials
Voltage-induced Generally of little or no
Microphysical changes in Reduced IR; electrical
Voltage degradation/electrical concern for low-voltage
insulation properties failure
treeing circuits
Bending Hardening/embrittlement Occurs only in leads that
Work hardening of Conductor breakage;
stress, of conductors; are frequently manipulated
conductors, fatigue increased resistance
vibration discoloration, cracking and/or bent sharply
Tracking paths; presence
Voltage,
of moisture/contaminants Insulation failure; Generally of little concern
moisture, Surface tracking
on insulation surface; electrical fault for low-voltage systems
contaminants
blackening/discoloration
Kapton exhibits greatly
Moisture-related
Dissociation of Kapton Reduced IR; electrical reduced longevity in high
degradation of polyimide
film from conductor failure humidity/moisture
(Kapton)/Teflon
environments
4-4
Table 4-1
Summary of Stressors, Significant Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Electrical Penetration Assemblies (Continued)
Applicable
Component Aging Mechanisms Effects of Aging Potential Failure Modes Remarks
Stressors
Assembly/disassembly
during maintenance, work in
External
Abrasion, cutting, or nicking Damage to exposed area; personnel traffic; poor
mechanical Reduced IR; electrical failure
of components portions of components support practices. Kapton
influences
leads particularly sensitive to
nicking/cutting.
Organic insulating/ Heat/radiation, Difficult to correlate % set to
Reduced/altered
sealing oxygen, Compression set and leakage propensity. Set
thickness of gasket or Seal/gasket leakage
components and compressive volumetric changes combined with shrinkage is
seal after installation
compounds stress most severe.
Thermal/thermoxidative
degradation of organics Embrittlement, cracking, Leakage, loss of mechanical
Heat, oxygen
(environmental and melting, discoloration integrity
ohmic/induced currents)
Radiolysis and photolysis of Photolysis applicable only to
Radiation, Embrittlement, cracking, Leakage, loss of mechanical
organics; radiation-initiated exposed UV sensitive
oxygen discoloration, swelling integrity
oxidation materials
Damage to sealing
External Incidental damage during
Abrasion, cutting, cracking or surfaces, cracking of
mechanical Leakage maintenance, operations,
nicking of sealing surfaces insulating/potting
influences etc.
compounds
Swelling, discoloration, Leakage; loss of physical
Chemical Chemical degradation of
softening; changes in integrity; extrusion under
contaminants physical properties
mechanical properties pressure
Usually many
assemblies/disassemblies
Assembly/ Binding, friction, and/or required for wear to be
Leakage; loss of physical
Fasteners disassembly Wear wear byproducts; significant; galling, cross-
integrity
(friction) looseness threading, or overtorquing
can result in premature
wear/failure.
Metallic structural
Moisture,
components Stainless steel highly
oxygen, Surface oxidation; Loss of physical integrity
(including header resistant to oxidation
susceptible Corrosion (including discoloration, pitting; (severe cases); potential
plate, nozzle, corrosion; low-alloy carbon
materials, oxidation and galvanic) reduced thickness in leakage (if occurring on
casing, modules, steels highly susceptible if
dissimilar severe cases sealing surfaces)
junction boxes, not coated.
metals
etc.)
4-5
Table 4-2
Summary of Stressors, Significant Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Mechanical Penetrations
Degradation Mechanisms
Degradation of Nonmetallic
Components
Components
Thermal Radiation Chemical
Wear Corrosion SCC Fatigue Settlement
Stressors Stressors Stressors
Pipe Penetrations
Sleeve (NCE) N N N N Y N N N
Sleeve (CE) N N N N Y N Y N
Exp Joint (Steel) N N N N N Y Y N
Exp Joint (Elastomer) Y Y Y N N N N N
Guard Pipe N N N N Y N N N
End Plate N N N N Y N N N
Equipment Hatch
Cover Ring N N N N Y N Y N
Fasteners N N N Y Y N N N
Gasket N N Y N N N N N
Hatch Cover N N N N Y N Y N
Sleeve Ring N N N N Y N Y N
4-6
Table 4-2
Summary of Stressors, Significant Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Mechanical Penetrations (Continued)
Components
Components
Fuel Transfer Tube
Sleeve (CE) N N N N Y N Y Y
Tube (Stainless) N N N N N Y Y Y
Flange (Stainless) N N N N N Y N N
Fasteners (Stainless) N N N Y Y Y N N
Gasket N Y Y N N N N N
Exp Joint (Steel) N N N N N Y Y Y
Personnel Airlock
Sleeve Ring N N N N Y N Y N
Exp Joint (Elastomer) N N Y N N N N N
Door Hinges N N N Y Y N N N
Circular Door N N N N Y N Y N
Cover Ring N N N N Y N Y N
Gasket N N Y N N N N N
Rectangular Door N N N N Y N Y N
End Plate N N N N Y N Y N
Door Seal N N Y N N N N N
Mechanical System N N Y Y Y N Y N
Electrical Systems N N Y N Y N Y N
4-7
Table 4-2
Summary of Stressors, Significant Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Mechanical Penetrations (Continued)
Components
Components
Drywell Head
Cover N N N N Y N Y N
Cover Flange N N N N Y N Y N
Shell Flange N N N N Y N Y N
Circumferential Stiffeners N N N N Y N Y N
Gusset Plates N N N N Y N Y N
Gaskets N N Y N N N N N
Notes: 1. N = Not potentially significant.

2. Y = Potentially significant
4-8
4.2.1.1 Thermal Degradation of Organic Materials
Thermal energy absorbed by polymers initiates various types of chemical reactions. Bonds that
hold the material together can be damaged by these chemical reactions. In solid polymers, other
chemical reactions occur due to the initial chemical reactions, the predominant types being
crosslinking and chain scission. Crosslinking refers to that process where long chain molecules
typically present in polymers are bonded together; chain scission is the breaking of these chains
into smaller pieces. In fact, both scission and crosslinking usually occur during polymer
degradation.
Each of these processes will result in some sort of effect on the macroscopic properties of the
material depending on the degree of reaction. Crosslinking will generally result in increased
tensile strength and hardening of the material, with some loss of flexibility and eventual decrease
in elongation-at-break (and increased compression set). Crosslinking may be induced during the
manufacturing process (chemically or via irradiation) to produce desired properties in certain
materials. Scission generally reduces tensile strength; however, elongation may increase,
decrease, or remain essentially constant depending on the type of polymer and the level of
degradation.
Other reactions that may occur in polymers include crystallization and chain depolymerization,
where molecules “unzip” in sequence. Crystallization is often the result of exposure to high
temperature or rapid heating/cooling of a material and, therefore, is generally not considered an
aging phenomenon. Chain depolymerization is a subset of the chain scission process that occurs
during normal aging to varying degrees based on the material type and aging influences.
In general, thermal degradation effects on penetration materials can be divided into two
categories based on the longevity of exposure and the dominant physical processes: short-term
and long-term. Short-term effects will typically result from relative extremes of temperature, and
can occur over a very brief period of exposure. Long-term effects occur over a more protracted
period and are commonly associated with the concept of component “aging.” Each of these types
of degradation are discussed in the following sections.
Short-Term Thermal Degradation
Exposures of organic materials to comparatively high temperatures (e.g., those well in excess of
normal ambient aging temperatures) may produce other types of physical or chemical processes
and degradations not normally associated with low-temperature aging. For example, exposure of
thermoplastics to high temperature can result in reduced viscosity or melting, thereby allowing
material deformation (flow) under mechanical stress. This situation can ultimately affect the
mechanical and electrical properties of the material (including reduced thickness, electrical
4-9
resistance, etc.), and produce shorts, leakage, or other undesirable effects.1 For other materials
(such as elastomers), crystallization resulting from thermal exposure can produce substantial and
irreversible changes in physical properties such as tensile strength, compression set, elongation,
and viscosity as well as electrical performance [4.2]. Additionally, differential thermal expansion
of materials at low temperature can create substantial mechanical stress and result in cracking of
certain components. At high temperature, thermal expansion of organic components can place
significant stress on nearby components.2
The susceptibility of each organic component or material to such short-term effects may depend
on several factors including the type of material, the peak temperature to which it is exposed, the
duration of exposure, ambient environmental conditions (humidity, oxygen concentration, etc.),
and the rate of heat input/component temperature change. A precise temperature or other
criterion that differentiates long-term aging from short-term degradation may be impractical or
impossible to determine for many materials. Rather, knowledge of the differences in effects of
such exposures (if any) can be useful in identifying short- versus long-term degradation
mechanisms. Furthermore, modeling of short-term thermal degradation by use of the Arrhenius
equation (described below) is generally not valid, because the fundamental chemical and
physical processes induced by the high temperatures may be significantly different than those
that occur under more typical low-temperature thermal aging. Hence, it is often difficult or
impossible to assess how much of a material’s lifetime has been “lost” as a result of a brief
exposure to high temperature.
In most cases, organic materials are tested for short-term as well as long-term temperature
durability. For example, some EPA organics (such as GE RTV 112 and Benelex No. 401, which
are used as sealing compounds) are rated at temperatures on the order of 204°C [400°F] for short
durations. Viton can sustain operation at 204°C [400°F] almost indefinitely [4.3]. These ratings
are generally a byproduct of direct testing at or near the rated temperature, as opposed to an
Arrhenius-type extrapolation from aging data obtained at lower temperatures. Table 4-3 presents
thermal rating data for organic materials used in the construction of a typical electrical
penetration assembly. The data are presented to illustrate the relative thermal capabilities of the
materials with respect to one another, as well as in situ aging temperatures, and may vary
substantially from generically similar materials based on differences in formulation. The types of
materials used in other manufacturer’s EPAs may also vary.
1
Overcurrent testing observed by the authors on small-gauge ETFE (Tefzel) insulated wire caused the insulation to
melt and dissociate from its conductor due to the sustained high conductor temperatures during the test.
2
An example of such stress is indicated by the inboard electrical connector associated with D. G. O’Brien electrical
penetration assemblies; in this case, thermal expansion of a polymer grommet constrained inside the connector
assembly was found to cause damage to nearby components, thereby necessitating redesign. The thermal expansion
was attributed to the comparatively large temperature swings experienced by the containment-side connector due to
changes in primary containment temperature.
4-10
Table 4-3
Thermal Ratings of Materials Used in Typical EPA [4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7]
Approximate Continuous
Material Type Typical Application
Temperature Rating
Alumina Ceramic Sealing material 65.5°C [150°F]
Conductor/thermocouple lead
PVC 44.4°C [112°F]
insulation
Raychem RNF-100 Heat shrink environmental seal 0.5% shrink at 121°C [250°F]
Bishop Bi-Seal Self-Bonding
Sealing tape -55°C to 95°C [-67°F to 203°F]
Tape
Neoprene with Clay Filler Gasket 176.7°C [350°F]
Dow Corning Sylgard (186) Sealing material 250°C [482°F]
GE RTV Sealing material 204.4°C [400°F]
Benelex No. 401 Sealing material 204.4°C [400°F]
Conductor insulation/jacketing;
CSPE (Hypalon) 90°C [194°F]
conformal coating
EPDM/EPR Conductor insulation; seals 90°C [194°F]
ETFE Conductor insulation 120°C - 150°C [248°F - 302°F]
Conductor jacketing; seal
Neoprene 90°C [194°F]
material
Kapton (polyimide/Teflon) Conductor insulation 90°C [194°F]
Conductor insulation, seal
Silicone 90°C - 150°C [194°F - 302°F]
material
Viton A Seal material 204°C [399.2°F]
Conductor insulation;
XLPO/XLPE 90°C [194°F]
terminations seals
Notes:
1. Definition of “continuous” is not specific; generally connotes “long-term” endurance without further
description. Temperature service limits for listed materials increase as required operating time is
reduced. For example, Viton A can sustain temperatures of 315°C [600°F] for approximately 48
hours, or 232°C [450°F] for greater than 3000 hours [Viton handbook].
2. Service limits listed are based on use of material as electrical conductor insulation.
3 The longevity of polyimide-insulated wire varies greatly with temperature and prevailing humidity.
Data from Figure 4-6 of Reference [4.8] would indicate a maximum 60-year equivalent
temperature of greater than 100°C [212°F] for cable applications (0% RH). However, for 100%
RH and 140°F and severe bend conditions, Kapton-insulated wire will fail well before 60 years.
Long-Term Thermal Degradation
Long-term thermal degradation of penetration organic materials is controlled by the mechanisms

described above. Multiple models describing organic material long-term thermal degradation
have been developed, such as the Arrhenius, Eyring, and inverse power models, which are
described in detail in EPRI NP-1558 [4.9]. The Arrhenius model, which provides a relationship
between material lifetime and thermal stress (that is, temperature), is by far the most commonly
used and recognized, and is described below.
4-11
Arrhenius Model
The Arrhenius model relates the rate of degradation (reaction) to temperature through the
following exponential function [4.9]:
R = A exp(-f/kT)
were:
R = Rate at which the degradation reaction proceeds

A = Frequency factor (constant for the material under evaluation)
f = Activation energy (eV)
k = Boltzmann’s constant (8.617 x 10-5 eV/K)
T = Absolute temperature (K)
The activation energy, f, is a measure of the energy required to produce a given type of
endothermic reaction within the material. This parameter can be correlated to the rate of
degradation; that is, materials with higher activation energies will thermally degrade at a slower
rate than those with lower activation energies.
A common form of the Arrhenius equation relates the degradation time for a material at one
temperature to that at another temperature as follows:
t1 = t2 exp(f/k(1/T1 - 1/T2))
where:
t1 = time at temperature T1
t2 = time at temperature T2
According to this form of the equation, exposure of a material of activation energy f to
temperature T2 for a period of t2 produces equivalent degradation to exposure at T1 for period t1.
Implicit in this relationship is the idea that exposure of a material at higher temperature for
shorter duration will result in degradation equivalent to that resulting from longer exposure at
lower temperature.
This relationship is useful in that:
· the longevity of a given material at a different temperature may be estimated;
· long-term, low temperature aging (similar to that which generally occurs in nuclear power
plant environments) can be approximated through the application of higher temperatures for
shorter durations (i.e., accelerated aging);
· the model can be used for comparing basic properties of one material to those of another
during the development of a new product.
The Arrhenius model does have several theoretical and practical limitations, of which the
following are examples: (1) the aging of specimens at high temperature may result in reactions
4-12
and aging mechanisms different than those produced during normal service for the component
being tested (thereby effectively resulting in multiple activation energies as a function of aging
temperature); (2) the potential for extrapolation through a significant property change or material
phase transition region (e.g., crystalline melting point region); (3) use of regressed statistical
data, which may generate varying results for activation energy based on the endpoint criterion
selected; and (4) unavailability in some instances of empirical activation energy information for
specific material formulations (i.e., generally, activation energies are available for a given class
of material) [4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13]. These limitations stem largely from the relatively
simplistic kinetic model used as the basis for the relationship, and the use of empirical data for
the determination of activation energy. Additionally, highly accelerated aging may produce
heterogeneous aging effects within the material, due largely to the limited opportunity for
oxygen diffusion into all but the surface layers of the material [4.14, 4.15]. Thus, the artificial
aging may produce effects on the material (such as changes in macroscopic physical properties)
that are largely an artifact of the accelerated aging process. The Arrhenius relationship should be
used with caution. Although it may be used to provide a generalized description of the
correlation between thermal exposure and degradation, it may produce results that are not
representative of the actual behavior of the material under actual long-term aging conditions.
References [4.9], [4.10], [4.11], [4.12], and [4.13] discuss the Arrhenius model, its uses, and
limitations in greater detail.
Practical Implications of Arrhenius Model
Arrhenius calculations are commonly used as a part of the basis for the environmental
qualification of equipment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.49. The general approach is to use this
relationship, knowledge of the physical properties of the material under consideration (such as
their activation energies), and enveloping assumptions regarding the equipment’s operating
environment to determine a theoretical or “qualified” life. This qualified life is the allowable
time in-service for the material given the assumption that the component must be able to function
under accident environments, even at the end of its qualified life. For nonenvironmentally
qualified equipment, the relationship may be similarly used to estimate the effects of
environments on material longevity.
As a result of the exponential relationship described above, a small change in the aging
temperature to which the material is exposed produces a somewhat disproportionate change in its
longevity. A reduction of 10°C [18°F] in the aging temperature at this level increases the
estimated longevity of the material by roughly a factor of two to three for most materials.3 The
practical outgrowth of this relationship is that lowering the temperature to which a given
penetration organic component is exposed during its installed lifetime even a small amount can
result in significant gains in longevity under the Arrhenius model (discounting other potentially
life-limiting influences).
Figure 4-1 illustrates the general relationship between aging temperature and longevity for some
common organic materials used in penetration construction. This graph is derived from
3
The precise relationship between temperature and time to reach a given endpoint under the Arrhenius relationship
is determined by the activation energy (and intercept) of the specific material under consideration.
4-13
experimental aging data obtained from several sources, including manufacturer’s aging studies
and qualification testing [4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19] for various compounds; note that
these data may not be applicable to specific plant applications. The data are linearly regressed
(accounting for the logarithmic relationship)4 to develop a “best fit” curve for the data. Such
aging tests are often conducted at elevated temperatures (121°C [250°F], 136°C [277°F], 150°C
[302°F]) to permit more rapid completion of the tests; hence, the resulting curves must be
extrapolated to lower temperatures, which may or may not be representative of the actual
behavior of the material in the lower temperature region. A common aging endpoint was
specified for all of the data5 (50% retention of elongation); hence, the results are comparable to
one another in this regard. The curve shown for each material is specific to one manufacturer’s
formulation; thus, the results obtained for a specimen of the same generic class of material yet
produced by a different manufacturer may vary substantially. The results shown in the figure
may be considered representative of the relative thermal aging characteristics of the generic
classes of material only.
As shown in the figure, the most thermally superior material considered is silicone rubber, which
displays an extrapolated time to 50% elongation in excess of 104 years at 90°C [194°F].
Silicone rubber is typically used in a number of different components on EPAs (such as electrical
lead insulation and O-rings), as well as in some mechanical penetrations (such as for
containment access door seals). However, silicone’s resistance to mechanical degradation
(including tearing, cutting, and abrasion) is generally poor in comparison to other elastomers
such as EPR. Viton (a common seal material) also shows exceptional thermal capability. On the
other end of the spectrum, neoprene (a common cable jacket material also occasionally used in
sealing applications) shows an extrapolated life of less than one year for the same endpoint and
aging temperature.6 The thermal lifetime of polyimide (Kapton, a common EPA lead insulation)
is estimated to be nearly 104 years at 90°C [194°F] and 0% relative humidity; however, its
estimated lifetime at 100% humidity (or submerged in water) is only in the hundreds of hours if
the temperature is also 140°F and the wire is severely bent [4.41].
4
Many Arrhenius plots are constructed using 1/T (K) as the abscissa of the graph, because this will provide a linear
aging curve. Such plots can be readily converted to a direct temperature scale (i.e., °C or K) after regression of the
aging data. The resulting curve is slightly nonlinear (on a logarithmic plot), yet is considered to be more easily
interpreted (see Figure 4-1).
5
With the exception of the PVC data, for which hours to electrical failure was used as the endpoint.
6
The data for the neoprene curve were obtained from Figure 1 of Reference [4.22]. As shown on Figure 4-1, the
data indicate a very short time to reach 50% elongation for neoprene (roughly 10 years at 40°C [104°F]). In
comparison, the data obtained from Reference [4.5] indicate a much longer time to reach the same elongation (more
than 100 years at 40°C [104°F]). The Sandia data were obtained from a specimen of unaged commercial Class 1E
cable, whereas the Du Pont data were taken on a sample of pure (or nearly pure) neoprene rubber. Furthermore, it is
not clear that the endpoint identified in Reference [4.5] is expressed in terms of relative (as opposed to absolute)
elongation. Accordingly, the Sandia data may more closely model the actual performance of installed neoprene
jackets.
4-14
Figure 4-1
Extrapolated Time to Retention of 50% Elongation for Various Common Organic Materials
4-15
Consideration must also be given to the critical physical properties of the component being
evaluated and the acceptable level of degradation for these properties. For example, an electrical
penetration lead may be periodically manipulated or bent during the course of its lifetime; hence,
a physical property such as elongation-at-break would be applicable to the insulation/jacket to
help identify the level of aging at which replacement should be considered (or bending
restricted). The arbitrary residual elongation of 50% relative chosen above is highly conservative
[4.20], and would assure prevention of embrittlement and cracking of the lead (which may result
in electrical failure). Conversely, for a static silicone rubber flange seal, compression set (see
Section 4.3.1) is the most relevant property to seal leakage [4.21]. An endpoint of 75%, 50%, or
even 25% compression set may be appropriate to help avoid seal leakage. Ideally, therefore, each
component would have an associated criterion and endpoint that ensured replacement or
reevaluation prior to failure via the most likely failure mode(s). For many of the nonmetallic
components used in both electrical and mechanical penetrations, either elongation-at-break or
compression set is most relevant to continued component functionality.7 For some materials
(such as more rigid epoxies), flexural strength or hardness may be more appropriate.
Accordingly, comprehensive material test and aging data are required to properly evaluate the
aging of each individual organic component.
As a general rule, elastomers and thermoplastics (such as neoprene, EPR, PVC, and
XLPO/XLPE) experience much more rapid degradation of physical properties than do ceramics
and glasses. Epoxies vary widely in their thermal capability based on specific formulation.
Hence, elastomeric, thermoplastic, and epoxy EPA components are most likely to degrade as a
result of thermal exposure, and should generally be considered first when evaluating the thermal
longevity of the penetration as a whole.
4.2.1.2 Sources of Thermal Stress
For most plant areas outside of primary containment, normal (i.e., nonaccident) general area
temperatures result in slow degradation of penetration organic components. Components
exposed to environments inside of primary containment, however, may age more rapidly due to
potential exposure to elevated temperatures (and radiation doses).
Ambient Effects
Normal general area temperatures within plant spaces result from the interaction of various
influences, such as the types and number of heat-producing equipment in operation in that space,
the number/lineup of HVAC systems in operation, the thermal conductivity of the bounding
surfaces such as walls and floors, external (outdoor) temperature, and the temperature of adjacent
spaces. These general area temperatures are controlled within technical specification or other
established design limits for that space. Normal general area aging temperatures can be estimated
through (1) examination of the plant’s environmental study, which estimates a maximum value
for each plant zone, or (2) use of installed temperature monitoring equipment. The maximum
7
Other potentially useful parameters include flexural strength, dielectric strength, hardness, modulus, tensile
strength, tear resistance, and abrasion resistance.
4-16
temperature values obtained from the plant environmental study are considered conservative
(i.e., bounding) with regard to actual general area temperatures. Temperature monitoring
equipment (if installed) provides direct data for the representative general area temperature of a
given space, assuming the detectors are installed in representative locations that are free from
localized effects such as a direct heat source or ventilation air flow.
By virtue of penetrating the primary containment wall, components within electrical and
mechanical penetrations may be exposed to more than one environment. Because the
temperature, radiation dose/dose rate, humidity, and oxygen concentration within primary
containment may vary substantially from that outside containment, the aging of similar
components may also vary based on their location within the penetration. One example of this
effect is penetration leads (cable); the portion of the lead near the inboard (containment) side
may be exposed to higher radiation doses and ambient temperatures, thereby accelerating the
aging of its insulation with respect to the outboard end.
Also of interest to containment penetration aging is the variation of temperature with elevation
inside primary containment. This temperature gradient may be substantial (on the order of 38°C
[100°F] for some plants during operation)8 and may result in differential rates of aging for
similar components installed at different elevations. Accordingly, any analysis of aging rates of
penetration components must consider plant-specific variations in ambient temperature as a
function of elevation (both during operational and shutdown periods). As a general rule,
penetrations at lower elevations will experience lesser rates of thermal aging than those installed
at higher elevations (excluding the effects of any ohmic or localized heating).
Localized Heating
Short-term degradation effects (such as melting and flowing, crystallization, and thermally-
induced mechanical stresses) may result from severe localized heating. Due to their location,
little or no localized heating of EPA components other than that induced by ohmic effects is
expected (unless either end of the EPA is in immediate proximity to a significant heat source);
however, significant “localized” heating may result for certain process piping penetrations that
carry high temperature fluids. Normally, process temperatures are considered in the design and
fabrication of the penetration to preclude thermal degradation or formation of damaging
mechanical stresses and to ensure compliance with containment wall/liner design criteria.
Seasonal Temperature Effects
Another factor that can affect penetration system thermal aging is the variation in ambient
temperature due to daily, seasonal, or operational effects. Throughout the course of a given day,
outside air (and water) temperature may vary significantly; additionally, solar radiant heat
transfer may account for additional temperature rise in exposed components during daylight
hours. Much larger ambient temperature variations may occur over the course of a given year;
differences in air temperature of more than 50°C [90°F] are not uncommon for some portions of
the country [4.23]. Operational temperature effects stem from significant changes in plant
operating status, such as maintenance or refueling outages.
8
Based on a review of historical containment data and environmental studies for one BWR.
4-17
Minimum and maximum allowable temperatures are usually specified for most major plant
spaces (including primary containment), and HVAC systems are operated so as to maintain these
temperatures. However, in some cases, these temperature bands are not or cannot always be
maintained. Hence, seasonal or daily variations in temperature within these spaces may be fairly
large. Figure 4-2 illustrates seasonal temperature variations for various elevations with the
primary containment of a typical U.S. nuclear plant. The magnitude of the change from summer
to winter for the plant shown is on the order of 14°C to 17°C [25°F to 30°F]. Figure 4-3 shows
the variations for one elevation in a plant reactor building; similar yet smaller changes are
evident.
Figure 4-2
Seasonal Temperature Variations Within Primary Containment Of Typical U.S. Nuclear
Plant [4.24]
Figure 4-3
Seasonal Temperature Variations for Single Elevation of Reactor Building of Typical U.S.
Nuclear Plant [4.24]
4-18
As previously indicated, changes in the ambient temperature in plant spaces are also largely a
function of the operational status of the plant. Figure 4-4 shows variations in one plant’s reactor
building temperature as a function of time (and outages). Looking at the figure, a significant
fraction of the lifetime of a given component installed at this location will be spent at
temperatures below 38°C [100°F]; the thermal aging occurring during these periods will be
minimal, and the longevity of the component extended accordingly.
Figure 4-4
Operational Temperature Variations for Single Elevation of Reactor Building of Typical
U.S. Nuclear Plant [4.24]
4.2.2 Thermal Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Electrical Penetration

Assemblies
Thermal stressors are primarily the result of primary containment ambient temperature and
localized hotspots, and affect nonmetallic components of electrical penetration assemblies
including:
· Penetration lead insulation, shielding, or other organic components
· Lead termination components9
· Lead sealing compounds, tapes, and module seals
· Flange seals, gaskets, O-rings, and grommets
9
Note that terminations are not considered within the scope of this guideline; see Reference [4.20] for additional
information on termination aging management.
4-19
In addition, the following sources of thermal stress are potentially applicable to components of
electrical penetration assemblies (see Table 4-1 for a summary of aging mechanisms, indications
of degradation, and aging effects):
Ohmic Heating
For EPAs, ohmic heating may be induced via the conductors passing through the penetration.
Ohmic heating is generally significant only for power circuits because they operate at much
higher fractions of their rated ampacity. In addition to the loaded circuit(s), other circuits in the
same module or even the same penetration assembly may also be affected by the ohmic heating
of the loaded circuit. This effect results from heating of the nonloaded circuit insulation and
other components through conductive, convective, and radiant heating. Therefore, the thermal
aging of all conductors (loaded or unloaded) in the same penetration assembly must also be
considered. Appendix C and References [4.25 through 4.27] provide additional information and
guidance regarding ohmic heating in EPAs.
In addition to the conductor, ohmic heating of other conductor and termination components may
occur due to a variety of phenomena. Corrosion, oxidation, insufficient contact pressure, and
improper swaging or crimping may result in poor electrical contact (high resistance
connections/joints) between the conductor(s) or between individual components within a
termination conducting path. Organic components in the vicinity of this high resistance (such as
penetration lead insulation) will undergo accelerated thermal aging as compared to the rest of the
circuit. If the rate of heating or resulting temperature is extreme, more severe damage to the
component(s) may occur. Accordingly, ohmic heating will be significant for a limited number of
power circuit penetrations. See Reference [4.20].
Circulating Currents
Circulating currents may be induced in metallic components by virtue of varying magnetic fields
in their vicinity. Magnetic fields are created by current flowing through a conductor; alternating
current circuits will accordingly produce alternating magnetic fields. As the magnetic flux
permeating the component varies, an electromotive force (EMF) is established, which creates
circulating current flow within the component. This circulating current may generate heat
through ohmic losses [4.23]. For example, the outer penetration casing may carry significant
circulating currents and, therefore, be subject to appreciable heat generation. Penetration
components are generally designed with materials that minimize losses due to circulating
currents, and conductor ampacities in the assembly set considering these effects.

Effects - EPAs
Listed below are “if-then” criteria applicable to thermal stressors, aging mechanisms and effects
for EPAs. Similar criteria are presented for other stressors/aging mechanisms/effects described in
subsequent sections of this AMG. In some instances, no specific quantitative guidelines can
reasonably be formulated; therefore, qualitative criteria are included. Generally, any quantitative
4-20
criteria are set with sufficient conservatism to ensure that the functionality of the component will
not be impacted (based on an assumed 60-year period) if the criteria are not exceeded.
It should be emphasized that the thermal data of Table 4-3 and Figure 4-1 are meant only as a
general guideline, and are not a replacement for more substantive evaluation based on the
underlying stressors applicable to a given plant location and the specific types of materials in
use. This AMG does not explicitly consider the effects of radiation, long-term oxygen diffusion,
or combined aging environments.10Therefore, caution must be exercised in their application.
Accordingly, adjustment of these criteria should be considered for higher dose-rate environments
(greater than about 0.02 Gy/hr [2 rad/hr], or roughly 1 x 104 Gy [1 x 106 rad] over 60 years)
where radiation aging begins to become more significant 11[4.22].
Note also that the thermal criteria below and similar criteria that follow, where applicable,
identify other coincident stressors or environmental conditions that may either be necessary for
certain types of degradations to occur, or accelerate their effects. In this manner, significant
combinations of stressors may be identified.
Long-Term Thermal Degradation
Organic materials exposed to ambient or localized heat sources in oxygen or inert environments
will experience thermal degradation to varying degrees. The level of thermal aging degradation
is related to (1) type of material (including activation energy), (2) aging temperature, (3) relative
concentration of oxygen in ambient environment, and (4) and the material/physical property of
concern. See Figure 4-1. In general, if the ambient temperature is less than about 35°C [95°F],
then thermal aging resulting therefrom can be considered nonsignificant over the 60-year period
of interest.12 For most organic penetration materials, a much higher “threshold” temperature
exists. However, other heat sources (such as localized heating via hotspots or ohmic heating)
must be factored into the analysis if such stressors are present.
Ohmic Heating
If one or more power circuits are served by a particular penetration assembly, then ohmic heat
generation may be significant. Ohmic heating may be evaluated using the methodology of
References [4.20] and [4.25 through 4.27], and the operating history of the circuit (i.e., percent of
time energized at that load level) can be estimated from examination of plant logs, historical
10
Section 4.9 provides additional information on combined thermal and radiation aging environments.
11
As discussed in Section 4.5.3, the radiation damage threshold for most penetration/termination materials is on the
order of 1 x 104 Gy [1 x 106 rad]. Furthermore, the analyses described in Section 4.9 predict that the time to reach
elongation endpoint (TED) is relatively invariant at this dose rate for most materials [4.22].
12
The threshold temperature of 35°C [95°F] is based on the most conservative materials identified (such as neoprene
rubber) which may be used for various EPA components. As evidenced by Figure 4-1, the 60-year threshold
temperature for most materials is well in excess of this value.
4-21
information, and procedures. Additionally, temperature monitoring of various penetration

components may provide a more accurate assessment of the aging temperature and, therefore,
component longevity. In general, unless the circuit under evaluation is operated at a significant
fraction of its rated ampacity (greater than about 30 to 40%) and also operated for a substantial
fraction of its installed lifetime, aging resulting from ohmic heating will not be significant. As a
practical matter, an extremely limited number of plant circuits serving primary containment are
likely to meet this criterion.
Localized or Hotspot Temperatures
1. If contact temperature on EPA organic components of concern is roughly 20°C [36°F] or

more above general area temperature, the component(s) should be considered for further
evaluation and/or periodic monitoring because they can be expected to age much more
rapidly than those exposed to ambient only. For example, portions of a penetration lead
routed near a hot process pipe may exhibit accelerated aging in that region as compared to
the rest of the lead.
2. If high temperatures (i.e., those approaching or exceeding the short-term thermal rating of the
materials of concern) are present, short-term degradation or damage may be significant and
more frequent component evaluation/replacement may be required. See Table 4-3.
As an example of the application of the criteria described above, consider a silicone rubber-
insulated EPA conductor located in a 60°C [140°F] ambient environment (inboard end). Per
Figure 4-1 (or its equivalent for the specific material of concern), 60°C [140°F] would be much
less than the 60-year/50% elongation temperature of about 130°C to 140°C [266°F to 284°F];
hence, it would be expected that the conductor insulation would retain in excess of 50% relative
elongation at the expiration of 60 years (assuming no other aging sources). Per the same figure,
however, a PVC-insulated conductor exposed to the same aging temperature would reach 50%
retained elongation well before expiration of 60 years. (Recall that the curves in Figure 4-1 are
generic classes of material and specific materials may behave quite differently.)
If the conductor was a power circuit, and the circuit was operated regularly and at a sufficient
fraction of its rated ampacity (e.g., greater than 40%), it will produce an additional temperature
rise over ambient, thereby accelerating the aging of the insulation. This temperature rise can be
evaluated through analysis or actual temperature monitoring data.
With respect to the localized heating guidelines above, the criterion of the 60-year material
temperature13plus 20°C [36°F] is based on providing plant operators with a sufficient interval to
detect and address the effects of localized thermal degradation. Using the “10°C” [18°F] rule-of-
thumb (i.e., an increase of 10°C [18°F] in aging temperature will result in a reduction in lifetime
of roughly one-half for many common penetration organic materials), the severity of localized
thermal sources can be rapidly evaluated for effects on longevity. For example, per Figure 4-1, a
13
For power penetration applications, the maximum recommended ambient temperature should be used to account
for any effects due to ohmic heating.
4-22
neoprene seal that has been installed for 20 years and has been aged at an average temperature of
about 47°C [117°F] would be expected to have roughly 40 years of life remaining before it
reached the chosen endpoint criterion of 50% retained elongation [4.5]. A portion of that same
penetration exposed to a contact temperature of 67°C [153°F] since plant startup would reach the
same endpoint (50% retention of elongation) in roughly one-fourth the time, or 10 years. This
criterion is also sufficient to ensure that localized heating applied late in a component’s installed
life will not result in a reduction of the critical property (i.e., elongation, compression set, or
other as applicable) below the minimum value set. For example, the same penetration seal
described above aged at 47°C [117°F] for 50 years would have an estimated remaining lifetime
of 10 years. Localized aging at 67°C [153°F] (47°C [117°F] plus 20°C [36°F]) beginning at year
50 would cause the penetration to reach its endpoint elongation in roughly 2.5 years, more than
one refueling cycle for the typical plant. Application of the localized temperature guideline must
be based on material(s) and physical properties of concern (for example), and does not consider
the effects of radiation, oxygen diffusion, or combined aging.
4.2.3 Thermal Stressors and Aging Mechanisms - Mechanical Penetrations
Thermal stressors for the mechanical penetrations are due to primary containment ambient
temperature during operating periods. Localized high ambient temperatures may exist as well.
Thermal stressors at piping penetrations may also be caused by abnormally high process fluid
temperature or degradation of the thermal insulation on the exterior surface of the piping. The
mechanical penetration components that can be degraded over time by these thermal stressors are
primarily the nonmetallic components and subcomponents. These are listed below by type of
penetration:
Piping Penetrations
Equipment Hatch
· Gasket
Drywell Head
· Gasket
Personnel Airlock
· Gasket
· Door Seals
· Mechanical Systems (nonmetallic components)
· Electrical Systems (nonmetallic components)
4-23
Fuel Transfer Tube

· Gasket
Thermal degradation of the nonmetallic components listed above is unlikely if normal

temperatures are below 52°C [125°F] and short-term temperature excursions do not exceed
~80°C [175°F]. The equipment hatch and personnel airlock are essentially exposed to the
containment gaseous environment on air side and the auxiliary building or annular region
(between containment steel wall and biological shield) gaseous environment on the other side.
Under normal conditions, temperatures will not exceed the values noted above. Therefore,
thermal degradation of the equipment hatch gasket, and the personnel airlock nonmetallic
components mentioned above is not significant. This conclusion does not account for the design
temperature of the primary containment atmosphere, which is based on accident conditions and
is much greater than ~80°C [175°F]. The accident condition is not relevant to this aging
evaluation because containment high temperature excursions regardless of the cause would
require a specific inspection on nonmetallic materials for potential degradation.
The fuel transfer tube gasket is exposed to containment atmosphere during power operation and a
water environment during refuelings when spent fuel assemblies are transported through the
tube.14 The water temperature is not greater than containment gaseous temperature during
refuelings. Radiation heating has little impact on the bulk water temperature as the fuel assembly
moves through the tube or on other penetration components even under conditions where a spent
fuel assembly remained stationary within the tube for an extended period of time. Water
temperatures would not significantly increase because natural circulation would replace the
warm water with cooler water from the refueling canal. Therefore, thermal degradation of the
fuel transfer tube gasket is not significant.
The outer end of some hot penetrations include elastomer expansion joints. Hot penetrations may
contain fluids in the 260°C to 315°C [500°F to 600°F] range. Although the hot process lines are
insulated and in some cases cooling channels are used to ensure that surrounding concrete is not
overheated, normal temperatures may exceed the 52°C [125°F] level. Therefore, thermal
degradation of elastomer expansion joints on hot piping penetrations is significant. See Table 4-2
for a list of aging mechanisms, indications of degradation, and aging effects.
4.2.3.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Thermal Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects -
Thermal degradation of nonmetallic components is significant if normal ambient temperature
exceeds 52°C [125°F] and if short-term ambient temperature excursions exceed ~80°C [175°F].
Temperature limits may be higher for specific materials. Manufacturers’ data and qualification
test conditions should be considered in determining potential for degradation at higher
temperature.
14
If the gasket is removed prior to filling the refueling canal then replaced with a new gasket prior to reinstallation,
it is not exposed to radiation or borated water. Therefore, the gasket could be considered to be outside of the scope
of license renewal.
4-24
4.3 Mechanical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects
4.3.1 General
Mechanical stressors and aging mechanisms can be caused by a variety of conditions that occur
during operation. These stressors include vibration, static loading, wear (relative motion of
components in contact) fatigue and cyclic stress, residual stresses, settlement, thermal stresses
resulting from component expansion/contraction, as well as external mechanical influences (such
as incidental impact or abrasion during maintenance or normal equipment operation).
In general, cyclic stresses are not applicable to electrical penetration assemblies because they are
static in nature with few if any moving parts.15 One potential exception relates to cyclic stresses
related to periodic variations in containment pressure. Wear may occur for fasteners if they are
frequently assembled or disassembled. Settlement is potentially applicable to the nozzle
assembly for EPAs; this topic is discussed in Section 4.3.3.
Stressors
Compression of Organic Materials
Organic materials placed in compression for extended periods may exhibit an effect known as
compression set; this is defined as the amount that a material fails to return to its original
dimension or shape after compressive load is removed16 [4.21]. Compression set, measured using
the technique of ASTM D395 [4.28] or a similar standard, is probably the most common cause of
seal failure [4.21]. This quantity is of primary interest for O-rings, seals, gaskets, and grommets
(such as those used in sealed electrical connectors), because it can be related to the ability of the
O-ring/seal to perform its design function, especially under situations where the device is
disassembled and subsequently reassembled using the same part. Exposure to heat, radiation,
chemicals, oxygen, ozone, compressive forces (such as overtightening), etc. can produce
significant changes in the compression set of a given material [4.21]. For most elastomers,
compression set increases (indicating a loss of resiliency) with increased thermal and radiation
exposure. However, most plants replace such components periodically or each time maintenance
or testing is performed, thereby obviating the need for further aging management considerations.
Also, the temperature range at which most penetration organic components normally operate is
comparatively low. Specific information regarding the compression set of a particular material
can be obtained from the component manufacturer; compression set properties for a typical seal
material (Viton) as a function of temperature exposure are shown in Table 4-4 [4.3]. Table 4-5
shows the effects of gamma radiation on the compression set of various materials [4.21].
15
Some EPAs have moving parts associated with pressurization or regulation equipment; however, this is generally
operated infrequently enough to be considered static.
16
Compression set is defined in ASTM Test D 395 as the residual decrease in thickness of a test specimen that is
observed after 30 minutes of testing following the removal of a specified compressive load applied under established
time and temperature conditions.
4-25
Table 4-4
Percent Compression Set of Viton at Various Temperatures [4.3]
At Room At 149°C At 200°C

Time (hours)
Temperature [300°F] [392°F]
1000 -- 12 50
2000 -- 16 65
4000 21 22 79
8000 21 32 98
It is unclear what level of compression set is required to initiate seal leakage under given
circumstances. For example, a seal can remain sealed at 100% compression set (no outward force
being exerted by the seal on the sealing surfaces) so long as system pressure and temperature
remain constant such that the seal contact is not broken. Additionally, swell of seals upon
exposure to certain gases or chemicals can act to offset the effects of compression set [4.21].
Accordingly, development of a universally applicable compression set “endpoint” is not
practical.
Volumetric Changes
In addition to the compression set phenomenon discussed above, volumetric changes in organic
materials may occur. These are of particular interest for seals and gaskets, because volumetric
changes directly affect the sealing force exerted by the organic against the adjacent sealing
surfaces. Swelling (usually brought on by contact with chemicals or solvents) tends to aid sealing
through volumetric expansion, yet may affect other properties (such as tear and abrasion
resistance and extrusion potential). Shrinkage, on the other hand, may reduce the sealing force,
and make leakage more likely (all else remaining constant). Shrinkage may occur as a result of
exposure to chemicals or solvents, as well as thermal and radiation exposure. Hence, for
materials that tend to set and shrink when exposed to elevated temperatures, the propensity for
leakage will increase substantially. The shrink/swell characteristics of each material must be
considered separately; however, for most penetrations, contact with chemicals or solvents can be
eliminated such that thermal and radiation effects are of most concern [4.21]. Generally, seal
materials are chosen to minimize the effects of thermal or radiation-induced shrinkage or
swelling.
4-26
Table 4-5
Effects of Radiation on Compression Set of Various Seal Materials [4.21]
Seal Material Compression Set (percent) After Exposure

7 1
to 10 rad Gamma at Room Temperature
Silicone 20.0
Nitrile 24.3
EPR 28.6
Polyurethane 55.2
Polyacrylate 61.5
Fluorocarbon 66.7
Fluorosilicone 67.6
Note: 1. According to Reference [4.21], the effects on these materials
6
at 10 rad were minor.
Vibration
Vibration may result in component cyclic fatigue (discussed in Section 4.3.3) as well as cutting,
wear, and abrasion if left unabated. Vibration is generally induced by external equipment
operation. For example, operation of an airlock access door can induce vibration throughout the
entire airlock assembly. Vibration may also result from flow resonance or movement of pumps
or valves in fluid systems. Vibration is generally not a significant concern for electrical
penetrations in that no moving parts or fluidic systems are physically connected or in contact
with the penetration assembly. For some mechanical penetrations, however, vibration from these
sources may be significant, and result in fatigue of components exposed to these stresses.
Aging Mechanisms
Stress Relaxation
Under some circumstances high temperature conditions can cause stress relaxation in metallic
fasteners that are torqued to high loads. Some fasteners used in both mechanical and electrical
penetrations may meet this criteria. Stress relaxation is also a function of operating temperature
and has not been observed at temperatures below 204.4°C [400°F]. None of the penetration
fasteners operate at temperatures as high as 204.4°C [400°F], and therefore thermal stressors will
not cause stress relaxation.
Work Hardening
In extreme cases, work hardening of the penetration lead conductor may occur due to
manipulation and bending, thereby resulting in embrittlement and possible breakage. Work
hardening (or cold working) occurs in metals that are worked at low temperature. As the yield
strength of the metal is exceeded, progressively higher amounts of stress are required to continue
plastic deformation (strain) of the material. This increase in stress correlates to an increase in
hardness and a corresponding loss in ductility. This process is illustrated through the bending of
a new conductor; the first bend occurs with relative ease, whereas subsequent bends at the same
4-27
location require more and more stress until finally embrittlement and breakage occur. Work
hardening may occur in components that are frequently moved or manipulated (such as a lead
that is routinely bent or moved out of the way during maintenance [4.29, 4.30]. The severity of
the work hardening effect depends primarily on the frequency of manipulation, the range of
motion/stress applied, and the type of material being stressed. In most power plant applications,
the frequency of manipulation is sufficiently low such that work hardening is of minimal
concern.
Degradation Related to Installation, Maintenance, or Operation
Degradation during penetration assembly or component installation is not an aging mechanism

per se, but it can adversely affect the longevity of the penetration. Installation degradation is
normally controlled or prevented through use of approved procedures, controls, and standards
during installation or maintenance. Equipment damage usually occurs as a result of failure to use
or improperly implement procedures, or in a limited number of cases from improper equipment
design. Examples of such degradation include:
· Accidental scratching or denting expansion joint surfaces, damaging thermal insulation or
chipping paint off surfaces with tools when performing maintenance, testing, or inspection
activities
· Nicking or cutting EPA lead insulation during maintenance or through incidental contact
· Slamming doors or hatch covers for airlocks and equipment hatches
· Subjecting relatively weak or susceptible components (small tubing, guard pipes) to high
loads by using them for supports during maintenance or inspection activities
· Striking the sleeve, hatch cover or seal area when carrying large components through the
equipment hatch
Penetration seals are particularly susceptible to installation-related damage because they are
often exposed, more frequently replaced than most other penetration components, and are
generally fabricated from relatively soft organic materials (such as silicone or EP rubber).
Damage to seals may result from a number of causes including improper alignment, twisting,
pinching, overtightening of flange bolts or seal engagement nuts, improper seal chamber design,
metallic burrs or sharp edges, improper lubrication (for those with relative motion), or inclusion
of dirt or contaminants in the seal area [4.21].
The potential for incidental damage to many penetration components is very high for the
following reasons:
a. Due to functional requirements, many penetration components cannot be designed with extra
stiffness and large safety factors or protected with covers or guards
b. The periodic testing, inspection and maintenance activities necessary for penetrations
c. Large numbers of personnel use the equipment hatches and personnel airlocks
4-28
Incidental mechanical degradation can, by itself, cause an immediate functional failure of a

component. The reason for considering mechanical damage as a stressor that can cause aging is
that it is relatively likely to occur for various types of penetrations (especially those frequently
used, such as airlocks), and in many instances may not be detected and reported. The effects of
mechanical degradation will then act together with other stressors to accelerate aging. Examples
would be corrosion on carbon steel surfaces where the surface coating was previously damaged,
or premature failure of an electrical lead whose insulation had previously been physically
damaged.
Wear
The only penetration components that have contacting surfaces that are in relative motion are the
fasteners (bolts, studs, nuts, washers, screws, etc.) used for flanges and other miscellaneous
components, and some of the moving parts in the personnel airlock mechanical systems.
Depending on the usage frequency, applied loads and adequacy of lubrication, the relative
motion will cause these components to wear over an extended time period. The determination of
whether or not wear is significant for fasteners is primarily determined by the frequency of
assembling and disassembling for each set of fasteners.
For electrical penetrations, wear of fasteners is generally not significant because they are not
frequently disassembled. Possible exceptions may include the nozzle flange bolts (if any), and
individual module fasteners, bushings, or locking rings. Also, terminations associated with
penetration conductors may experience wear (see Reference [4.20] for additional information).
Wear of mechanical penetration components is addressed in greater detail in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Mechanical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Electrical

Penetrations
See Table 4-1 for descriptions of aging mechanisms, indications of degradation, and aging
effects.
Electrical Fault-Induced Mechanical and Thermal Stress
Faults occurring in power circuits may induce significant forces and mechanical stresses on
penetration components.17 However, in most plants, (1) the total number of faults occurring on
an annual basis in relation to the number of power circuits in the plant is extremely small, (2) the
number of faults occurring on any one circuit during its lifetime (if any) is also extremely small,
(3) the fault clearing time is extremely short such that significant forces are experienced by the
penetration for only a brief period, (4) penetration leads are constrained such that damaging
forces on other components due to acceleration of the lead cannot be developed, and (5)
electrical protective devices are selected and set to prevent insulation damage during electrical
17
Faults do not include electrical overload conditions for the purposes of this discussion.
4-29
faults. Thermal stresses resulting from these events, although potentially large in magnitude,
usually last only for very short durations and occur so infrequently as to be an insignificant
contributor to the thermal aging degradation of organic penetration and termination
components.18
Ohmically Induced Thermal Cycling
Circuits exposed to appreciable ohmic or ambient heating during operation may experience
effects related to the repeated cycling of connected loads or of the ambient temperature
environment. Differing materials used in various penetration system components can produce
situations where stresses existing between these components changes with repeated thermal
cycling. For example, under loaded conditions, appreciable ohmic heating may raise the
temperature of a compression termination and conductor well above ambient, thereby causing
thermal expansion of both components. Differing thermal expansions coefficients may alter
mechanical stresses between the components such that the termination may tighten on the
conductor. When the load or current is reduced, the affected components cool and contract.
Repeated cycling in this fashion can produce loosening of the termination under ambient
conditions, and may lead to high electrical resistance joints or eventual separation of the
termination from the conductor. This effect is not necessarily limited to compression-type
terminations; threaded connectors, splices, and terminal blocks may experience loosening if
subjected to significant thermally induced stress and cycling. Similarly, nonelectrical
components such as seals, grommets, and penetration hardware can display these effects.
Because many plant environments do not routinely experience the magnitude of temperature
changes necessary to induce these effects, heavily loaded power circuits (i.e., those that are
loaded to a sufficient fraction of their rated ampacity such that significant ohmic heating is
produced) that are routinely cycled are the most likely to experience them. Primary containment
ambient temperature does experience considerable variation between period of shutdown and full
power operation (especially at the higher elevations). Despite consideration of such stresses
during component design and selection/installation, instances of termination loosening have been
identified in the historical failure data for EPAs and associated field cable/terminations.
4.3.2.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Mechanical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects
- Electrical Penetrations
The following “if-then” criteria are applicable to mechanical stressors on electrical penetration
components:
18
Note, however, that thermal degradation (such as insulation melting) may occur under extreme conditions of
conductor temperature.
4-30
Compression Set
If gaskets, seals, or other organic materials are present and exposed to “elevated” temperatures
and/or radiation doses, then compression set of the material may be significant. The
determination of elevated temperatures or radiation doses is made based upon analysis of the
aging properties of each specific material being considered over the interval of interest (i.e., 40
or 60 years). For most common EPA gasket or seal materials, radiation dose will not
significantly impact compression set based on the typically low doses (in relation to their
threshold) incident on EPAs at their installed locations, and the effects of shielding by other
penetration assembly components. Thermal degradation, however, may be significant for all such
components. For the more thermally capable materials (including silicone and Viton), little set is
expected for EPA applications. For other materials (such as neoprene or EPDM/EPR), more
significant set may occur. The level of set that can be sustained without affecting assembly
functionality (typically pressure leakage of the seal) will vary from application to application
based on other factors such as the presence of shrink/swell or the pressure (and pressure changes)
to which the seal is exposed.
Incidental Damage
If the penetration assembly is subjected to periodic maintenance or disassembly/reassembly, then

the potential for incidental damage to penetration organic components exists. This is particularly
important for (1) polyimide (Kapton) lead wires, the performance of which has been shown to be
susceptible to nicking, cutting, and other similar mechanical damage, and (2) silicone rubber
seals/gaskets, which have generally low tear, cut, and abrasion resistance.
Wear of Fasteners
Frequent disassembly/assembly of the EPA (i.e., more than about 20 or so times during its
installed life) or its subcomponents may produce significant wear of fasteners in extreme cases.
This number is somewhat arbitrary, and actual wear will depend on other factors including the
presence of lubrication, the type of material from which the fasteners are fabricated, applied
torque, etc.
Thermal Cycling
If the EPA serves power circuits whose loads are frequently cycled from high19 to low current
levels, then ohmically induced thermal cycling of components may be significant. Generally,
components directly in the circuit path (such as terminations or internal splices) are most
susceptible. Other components not in the circuit path, however (such as seals and grommets) may
also be affected by this phenomenon if sufficient ohmic heating of these components occurs.
19
No single current value or fraction of rated ampacity was identified as constituting a threshold for this effect.
Based on analysis of NPRDS and LER failure contained in Section 3 and Reference [4.20], it appears to occur most
frequently in circuits which cycle on and off frequently and which are under heavy load when operating.
4-31
Work Hardening
If the conductors of the EPA are determinated/reterminated or otherwise frequently manipulated,

work hardening of the metal may occur. The effect is largely dependent upon the severity of the
bend radius as well as the number of bending cycles, but will generally only become problematic
(i.e., the conductor will fatigue and break) after many such cycles.
4.3.3 Mechanical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Mechanical

Penetrations
See Table 4-2 for descriptions of aging mechanisms, indications of degradation, and aging
effects.
Mechanical stressors applicable to mechanical penetration components include:

· Static Loads
· Cyclic Loads
· Relative Motion Between Contacting Surfaces (Wear)
· Settlement
Static Loads
Many penetration components are designed to withstand specific types of static loads. These
include the following:
a. Pressure loads due to pressurization of the primary containment

b. Forces due to thermal movement of piping during system heatup and cooldown (only for hot
piping penetrations)
c. Forces due to differential thermal movement of structures through which the penetration
extends
d. Forces due to supporting the weight of penetration components or other adjacent components
Provided that these static loads are within those specified for design of the penetration, they
should not cause component degradation. However, there are two situations where static loads
can increase significantly. One is inservice differential settlement of the multiple structures that
are in contact with the penetration (only for fuel transfer tube). The second is axial misalignment
of the entire penetration or the penetration expansion joint (particularly piping and fuel transfer
tube penetrations) during initial installation or subsequent maintenance activity.
The static loads described above can be applied periodically and are, therefore, also cyclic loads
with the exception of the forces due to weight. This can affect many components in all types of
penetrations.
4-32
Cyclic Loads
Dynamic cyclic loads also occur in the personnel airlock mechanical systems, such as periodic
operation of hydraulic cylinders and the periodic movement of various solenoid or switch
operated level arms and cylinders. Dynamic, cyclic loads are also applied to the personnel
airlock rectangular door seal when the doors are closed. Depending on the specific airlock door
design the magnitude of these door closure loads can be controlled by personnel. The typical
result of cyclic loads on metal components is fatigue cracking and failure, however the cyclic
loads may also cause deformation that results in functional failure.
Some of the components exposed to cyclic loads were designed for these cyclic loads. Generally,
the design basis would keep the stresses resulting from cyclic loads low enough that the expected
number of cycles was well below the number required to cause component degradation or
failure. However, this may not be the case where the component has been degraded inservice by
other stressors.
Fatigue
Fatigue of metal mechanical penetration components is primarily associated with the cyclic
load stress as described above. The cyclic loadings are due to the periodic application of
pressure loads and forces due to thermal movement of piping transmitted through penetrations
and structures to which the penetrations are connected. The effects of aging (crack initiation
and growth) are associated with the number and magnitude of the cyclic loads and the stress
levels resulting from these loads. In general, the initiation of cracks due to fatigue will occur
on the surface of the components at the location of a geometric discontinuity that locally
increases stresses.
The periodic application of pressure loads is due to pressure testing of the entire containment
(integrated leak rate test) and local leak rate tests for individual penetrations. Periodic piping
thermal loads are applied to hot piping penetrations when the piping systems are heated up and
cooled down and when significant changes in fluid temperature occur within the piping during
operation. Periodic structure thermal loads are generally associated with steel containments
where there is differential movement between the steel shell and the biological shield wall during
heatup and cooldown of the primary containment environment, which generally coincides with
plant heatup and cooldown.
Penetration components susceptible to fatigue must have a configuration that includes geometric
discontinuities with high stress intensification factors. The only components that satisfy this
requirement are the stainless steel expansion joints, sleeves welded to metal primary containment
shells and liners; the cover ring, sleeve ring and hatch cover for the equipment hatch; the sleeve
ring, cover ring, end plate and doors for the airlock; and the tube for the fuel transfer tube. These
components have been designed for cyclic loads and, therefore, should not be subject to fatigue
cracks unless the number and/or magnitude of the loads exceeded those specified for design.
However, additional factors must be considered. Other stressors and degradation mechanisms
acting on the component may reduce its resistance to fatigue. Examples would be loss of material
due to corrosion that increases average stresses or mechanical abuse that results in a surface
4-33
crack in an area where stress concentrations are already high. Degradation of other components
over time may increase thermal movement and loads and, therefore, increase the magnitude of
cyclic loads.
The airlock mechanical and electrical systems may also contain components that have
configurations that include geometric discontinuities and, due to normal usage of the airlock
doors, expect hundreds of load cycles.
Fatigue failures of expansion joint bellows and airlock mechanical/electrical system components
have occurred at nuclear power plants.
Therefore, fatigue for the following mechanical penetration components is potentially

significant:
a. Steel expansion joints
b. Hatch cover, cover ring and sleeve ring of equipment hatches
c. Fuel transfer tube penetration tube and sleeve
d. Sleeve ring, cover ring, end plate and doors of personnel airlocks
e. Drywell head cover, cover and head flange, circumferential stiffeners and gusset plates
f. Selected components in the airlock mechanical/electrical systems
Wear
The significance of wear for fasteners is largely determined by the frequency of

assembly/disassembly. In comparing fastener activities for the airlock, fuel transfer tube, drywell
head, and equipment hatch it can be assumed that the equipment hatch and fuel transfer tube
fasteners are assembled/disassembled at least once during each refueling. The airlock fasteners
are assembled/disassembled more frequently. Based on a minimum threshold of 30
assembly/disassembly activities, significant wear of these fasteners may occur.
The airlock hinges and the moving parts within the airlock mechanical systems (including
handwheel shift sleeves, bearings, bushings, gears, pistons/cylinders, etc.) are subjected to
intermittent movement cycles, and the number of cycles determines whether significant wear
degradation will occur. Use of the airlock during reactor operation is infrequent for PWRs and
essentially zero for BWRs. However, during planned outages for refueling and/or maintenance,
the airlock may be used many times per day and one hundred or more times during a single
outage period. The number of cycles for usage of these components is more than enough to cause
significant wear.
Therefore, wear that the mechanical penetration fasteners and the airlock door hinges and
mechanical system components experience due to relative motion is potentially significant.
4-34
Settlement
Settlement of the structures to which the mechanical penetrations are attached should be
reviewed to determine if they increase the static and cyclic load stressors previously described. If
all structures to which the penetrations are attached settle or moved downward at the same time,
the relative positions of the penetration and the associated opening in the structure would not
change. This is obviously the situation for the concrete containment. For piping penetrations,
settlement may increase loadings on independent pipe support structures near the penetration but
would not have any significant effect on loads in the penetration. The piping, equipment hatch
and personnel airlock penetrations in steel containments pass through both the containment metal
shell and the biological shield wall. However, due to the containment foundation design, the
shell and shield wall must settle at the same rate [4.31, 4.32]. Therefore, the conclusions with
regard to effects on the penetrations are the same as for the concrete containment.
The fuel transfer tube penetration passes through the primary containment structure and the spent
fuel pit structure. Unlike the situation discussed above, these structures are not necessarily
supported by a common foundation. Differential settlement of these structures can change the
relative position of the penetration and the opening in the structure through which it passes.
Although the design includes some provisions to accommodate differential settlement, the static
loads would be increased and the expansion joints would be misaligned. Additional loads would
be imposed on the sleeve, tube and expansion joints.
Therefore, settlement for the fuel transfer tube penetration sleeve, tube and expansion joint is
potentially significant. Settlement could also be a factor for other penetrations with piping that is
supported in an adjacent building, depending on the design of the plant.

Effects - Mechanical Penetrations
Wear
The if-then criteria for wear of penetration fasteners, air lock hinges and air lock mechanical and
electrical systems moving parts are as follows:
a. For fasteners, wear is significant if actual or expected number of assembly and disassembly
cycles is greater than 30.
b. Wear is potentially significant for all subcomponents or parts associated with the airlocks
that are in contact with each other and experience relative motion during a cycle of entry or
exit through the airlock.
Cyclic Loads/Fatigue
a. Fatigue is potentially significant for stainless steel expansion joints.
4-35
b. Fatigue is potentially significant for metal penetration components that are highly stressed
during fastener assembly (such as equipment hatch covers, cover rings, sleeve rings) or
highly stressed during LLRTs and ILRTs and contain geometric discontinuities and
experience at least 100 load cycles (combination of fastener assembly/disassembly cycles
and LLRT and ILRT cycles).
c. Fatigue is potentially significant for airlock mechanical and electrical system metal
components that are highly loaded during airlock operational cycles.
Settlement
a. Settlement (or differential settlement) is not significant for penetration components unless the
component is supported by structures that are themselves supported by independent concrete
foundations or piles.
4.4 Electrical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects
Stressors associated with the electrical functions of a penetration may also lead to age-related
degradation. Electrical stresses on penetration components are caused by extreme voltage
gradients from over-voltage transients, spikes, and fault interruption, and continuous
energization at normal voltage and current levels. Per Section 3.4, any electrical components of
mechanical penetrations (such as interlock circuits, lighting, etc.) are not explicitly considered as
part of this AMG; hence, electrical stressors and aging mechanisms are pertinent only to
electrical penetration assemblies.
Those EPA components potentially affected by electrical aging influences include the
penetration leads/conductors (and any associated electrical insulation material) and the
terminations. Electrical aging of terminations is discussed in more detail in Reference [4.20].
4.4.1 Energization at Normal Voltage Levels

Energization at normal design voltage levels can electrically stress cable insulation over the long
term; the amount and severity of this stress is determined primarily by the dielectric strength and
thickness of the insulating material used, and the operating voltage and frequency.20 In general,
an inverse relationship between the time to failure (breakdown) of an insulating system and the
voltage (stress) has been observed. Two mathematical models commonly used to express this
relationship are the exponential model, and the inverse power model [4.33, 4.34].
The exponential model is described by an equation such as the following:
L = C exp [-(V - Vt)], V > Vt
where C and Vt are constants. A threshold voltage (Vt) is used such that breakdown may occur
only when the applied voltage is greater than the threshold.
20
Cables are designed to specific voltage ratings that always exceed the cable operating voltage (e.g., cables used in
4160-V systems are rated at 5 or 8 kV).
4-36
The inverse power model is described by an equation of the following form:

L = kV-N
where L is the time to breakdown at constant voltage V, and N and k are constants. A threshold
voltage may also be incorporated in the inverse power model.
As with the Arrhenius thermal aging model described above, several limitations are inherent in
the application of the exponential and inverse power models. Constants used in each model are
experimentally determined and material specific, and extrapolation beyond the experimental
conditions may produce nonrepresentative results (e.g., such as if a discontinuity in the
relationship exits due to the effects of another physical process). Furthermore, the time to
breakdown at a specific voltage stress level may vary significantly for several seemingly
identical samples; this relationship often may be represented by a probability distribution (such
as Gaussian or Weibull). Hence, caution must be exercised in attempting to estimate the
longevity of a given application based solely on voltage stress. References [4.33] and [4.34]
provide additional information on accelerated testing and the evaluation of electrical aging
effects on various insulation systems. Additionally, data contained in Reference [4.34] would
tend to indicate that insulation breakdown due to energization at normal operating voltages is of
much less concern for low-voltage circuits, based on the comparatively low applied voltage
stress.21
Another electrical aging consideration relates to the presence of impurities in the insulation. For
a given potential gradient, the voltage drop across each of the materials interposed between that
gradient will vary inversely with the material’s dielectric constant; the highest fraction of voltage
drop will occur across the material of lowest dielectric constant. Thus, materials with lower
dielectric constants will usually be limiting in terms of the overall effective dielectric strength of
the insulation system. The dielectric constant of gas or other impurities entrained in the
insulation may be low in relation to the surrounding insulation; hence, a larger voltage drop
occurs across the impurity causing a large stress. This can cause localized ionization and
breakdown at the inclusion site, which may rapidly degrade the insulating material [4.23, 4.35,
4.36]. This effect is generally of significance only to medium-voltage insulation due to the higher
voltage stress present at normal operating voltages.
4.4.2 Overvoltage/Transient Conditions
Voltage and current surges are characterized by rapid magnetic field generation and collapse and
the production of large potentials in the insulation, which can place substantial stress on the
dielectrics of the penetration conductors. Inductive surges and other electrical transients resulting
in high potentials can cause stressors that contribute to breakdown of insulation and other
dielectric materials. When an electrical pulse or surge is applied to a conductor, the voltage does
not distribute uniformly throughout the length of the conductor instantaneously; therefore, some
portions of the insulation may be stressed more severely than others. These stressors can
21
For example, Figure B3 of Reference [4.34] shows an estimated voltage endurance in excess of 100 years at a
voltage stress of approximately 5 kV/mm (roughly 127 V/mil), which is well in excess of typical operating voltage
stress levels for low-voltage cable.
4-37
ultimately result in localized degradation or breakdown of the insulation causing shorts or

flashover to ground [4.23].
Voltage or inductive surges may affect both low- and medium-voltage systems. Loads such as dc
motors and large solenoids can produce significant inductive voltages on low-voltage systems. If
pre-existing degradation or defects in the insulation are present, these defects may be
significantly exacerbated by exposure to large voltage spikes or surges, such that failure of the
conductor insulation occurs much earlier than would otherwise be the case [4.37, 4.38]. This is
particularly true of medium-voltage systems, which are exposed to a higher normal operating
voltage level.
Voltage and current surges occurring in electrical circuits and their connected loads may be
produced through a variety of mechanisms, including electrical switching (bus transfers), fault
interruption, blowing of current limiting fuses, or lightning [4.27]. In such cases, higher
dielectric stress is imposed on insulating materials, and greater ohmic heating of the conductor,
surrounding insulation, and associated terminations can result. Bus transfers may be either
manual or automatic; automatic bus transfers are fast or slow. Manual or operator-induced bus
transfers occur on a regular basis for various circuits. This switching is usually conducted in a
controlled manner; loads (current) are minimized and phases synchronized such that the severity
of the resulting electrical transient is minimized. Similarly, slow automatic bus transfers do not
generally create large voltage surges. Fast automatic bus transfers, however, can create
significant voltages because the bus and source voltage may be out of phase. Bus transfers are
normally accomplished via medium-voltage circuits and switchgear, thereby “insulating” low-
voltage systems from the surge. Additionally, transients experienced in low-voltage systems
(such as those resulting from load starting/stopping, etc.) are less severe and small in comparison
to the rating of the penetration lead and associated termination. However, medium-voltage
systems may be directly exposed to comparatively high voltages created by bus transfer or other
voltage transients. Furthermore, some medium-voltage switchgear (such as vacuum breakers)
have the potential to produce significant transient voltages.
Transient voltages are also influenced by the grounding scheme (if any) on a particular
distribution system. Systems that are ungrounded or grounded via high-impedance pathways
can experience higher transient voltages.
Electrical faults may produce extremely high currents in both low- and medium-voltage
systems. These transients are considered in the design and selection of electrical system
components (such as electrical cable, penetrations, and switchgear); nonetheless, conductor
insulation aging through voltage stress occurs22 [4.23]. Voltage stress results from the near-
instantaneous interruption of current flow through the conductor upon termination or clearance
of the fault, and can peak at levels well in excess of normal operating voltages. Thermal stress is
placed on the bulk of the affected circuit insulation through exposure to these extremely high
currents. Although most penetration leads are thermally rated for short circuit exposure (typically
about 250°C [482°F]), such stress produces degradation of the insulation. Hence, repeated
22
No significant thermal aging caused by ohmic heating is generally experienced due to the extremely short clearing
times for most faults.
4-38
exposure to fault current or electrical surges may reduce the longevity of the insulation (as well
as other components).
Lightning strikes may create severe overvoltage conditions; voltages in excess of 500,000 volts
and currents greater than 200,000 amperes are possible. In addition, the current may build up at
rates as high as 10,000 amperes per microsecond [4.27]. Lightning-induced surges have steep
wave fronts that travel along the conductors away from the strike location in both directions.
Lightning or surge arresters are typically installed to mitigate the effects of the voltage/current
surge (see, for example, ANSI/IEEE Standard 142-1982 [4.39]). Penetrations are not directly
susceptible to lightning by virtue of their physical location and placement in the plant electrical
distribution system; however, most penetration leads and conductors are designed with sufficient
basic impulse insulation level (BIL) capability so as to withstand the voltage stress resulting
from most of these events. This capability is typically expressed in terms of voltage withstand
capability (i.e., 110-kV BIL for a 15-kV power cable) and is somewhat higher for cable than that
of other electrical distribution equipment. Terminations are generally matched to the
performance of the cable system (see, for example, IEEE Standard 48-1975 [4.40]).
4.4.3 Partial Discharge
Another phenomenon that can degrade electrical insulation is internal partial discharge. Also
known as corona, this effect results from large potential gradients between materials separated by
air or similar media. A high voltage gradient results in ionization of the air between the
materials, which permits the air to act as an electrical conductor. If the gradient is sufficiently
large and the separation sufficiently small, complete dielectric breakdown may occur. Partial
discharge can occur between conducting components internal to the penetration structure or
between insulators separated by a gaseous medium (including air or inert gas). Partial discharges
are usually extinguished when the large voltage difference inducing its formation is reduced;
however, the dielectric quality of organic materials may be reduced during each subsequent
discharge. As a result, subsequent discharges will occur at progressively lower voltage levels.
This process can continue until the discharge extinction voltage level is less than the normal
operating level, in which case the discharge will not extinguish and faulting will ultimately
occur. If a conductive inclusion is in the insulation wall, the wall thickness will effectively be
reduced and the localized stress increased, causing higher voltages across the remaining
insulation. This phenomenon will cause increased noise (crackling) due to ionization of the air
(medium voltage only).
Partial discharge effect is generally of little concern to low-voltage electrical systems because the
requisite voltage gradient necessary to ionize the interposing medium is not present. However, in
medium-voltage applications, it may result in insulation degradation due to the higher voltage
gradient [4.23, 4.36, 4.41, 4.42]. Evaluation of medium-voltage cable insulation that has been
removed from service and that has inclusions and voids often identifies indications of long-term
partial discharge breakdown. The damage patterns identified in the insulation look like trees,
thus the term “electrical treeing.”
4-39
4.4.4 Effects of Moisture and Contaminants
In some applications, the combination of voltage and moisture can affect insulation that is dirty
or deteriorated, resulting in surface tracking paths between conductor and ground, or conductor
to conductor. Moisture allows leakage currents to flow across the insulation surface when a
potential gradient exists. The leakage current flow will cause the moisture in the tracking path to
evaporate; the leakage current will tend to remain constant such that the current density in the
tracking path increases as moisture evaporates. This can result in localized burning of the
insulation and carbonization at the ends of the tracking paths and ultimately in insulation failure.
Water penetration into electrical insulation may also result in decreased dielectric strength. As
water23 permeates the insulation, the conductivity of the dielectric is increased due to the
increased ion mobility and concentration. Increased conductivity results in an increased leakage
current flowing either through or on the surface of the insulation; this current flow eventually
produces insulation with a permanently degraded dielectric strength. Some insulation and jacket
materials have extremely limited water absorption and permeation, and are therefore relatively
unaffected. PVC is an example of a jacketing material commonly used in high moisture
applications to help prevent radial ingress of moisture to the underlying insulation. Similarly,
Tefzel (ETFE), Hypalon, and some other forms of polyethylene are highly resistant to moisture.
However, water may penetrate leads in a longitudinal fashion (such as at terminations) and
propagate along the conductor, thereby rendering the moisture resistance of the outer jacket or
insulation materials of little consequence.
Moisture may also result in corrosion or oxidation of penetration components. The effect of
moisture on metallic components is analyzed in the discussion of chemical stressors below.
Contamination of the conductor insulation may also occur during the manufacturing process.
This is particularly critical to cable insulation, especially that used on medium-voltage power
cable, due to the comparatively high voltage stress that this insulation experiences. Inclusions or
voids within the insulation tend to increase the dielectric stress across the void/inclusion, such
that the insulation immediately surrounding the problem area is more rapidly degraded via the
effects of partial discharge. Failures of medium-voltage cable have occurred at some utilities,
and have been traced to manufacturing defects/insulation contamination exacerbated by moisture
intrusion [4.43, 4.44, 4.45, 4.46].
In general, leads and other insulated conductors installed in EPAs are not subjected to
appreciable moisture. This observation stems from the fact that the penetrations are usually of
enclosed design, not subjected to any significant moisture sources (such as system leakage, rain,
spray, standing water, etc.), and often internally purged with inert gas. EPAs are also in general
periodically inspected by plant personnel (see Section 5) such that any moisture accumulation
via condensation would be readily identified and corrected. Hence, electrical aging effects
resulting from moisture exposure are not considered significant. The formation of tracking paths
is possible, because the buildup of contaminants (such as dirt) over time coupled with relatively
little moisture or humidity can result in this phenomenon.
23
Pure water is a good insulator. However, most water sources contain sufficient impurities to be conductive.
4-40
Water Treeing
Water treeing is a degradation and long-term failure phenomenon that has been documented for
medium-voltage electrical cable with certain extruded polyethylene insulations and EPR. Water
trees occur in hydrophobic polymers used as insulating materials when exposed to electrical
stress and moisture; these trees eventually result in breakdown of the dielectric and ultimate
failure. Water trees are a different aging mechanism than electrical treeing, which requires no
water to proceed (see partial discharge discussion above). As previously indicated, the
accumulation of significant amounts of moisture on penetration leads or conductors is considered
very unlikely, hence, water treeing is not considered to be a viable degradation mechanism for
electrical penetration leads of any voltage range.
4.4.5 Effects of Aging
Effects of aging due to the stressor/aging mechanism combinations described above may include
one or more of the following [4.47]:
· Tracking on surfaces near terminations
· Noise (ionization of air due to partial discharge; medium-voltage only)
· Thermal damage to insulation or other organic components in the vicinity of conductors or
terminations
· Corroded, tarnished, or discolored inorganic (metallic) components such as conductors or
terminations.
4.4.6 “If-Then” Criteria for Electrical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects
of Aging - Electrical Penetrations
The following if-then criteria are applicable to electrical stressors and aging mechanisms for
penetration lead and conductor components:
Energization at Normal Voltages
For penetration conductors, energization at normal voltage stress may be significant over the 60-
year period of interest under the following circumstances:
- the conductor is operated at a high voltage level relative to the insulation thickness
(i.e., greater than about 80 volts per mil);
- the conductor has been exposed to transient voltages significantly higher than those
associated with normal energization;
- the conductor insulation contains impurities, voids, or inclusions that increase the
likelihood of partial discharge/ionization and eventual insulation breakdown.
However, due to the substantial variations that may occur in insulation longevity between two
seemingly identical conductors under identical conditions, these criteria should be used only as a
4-41
general guideline. In general, it is very difficult to predict with any confidence the electrical
longevity of an insulated conductor (see Reference [4.20]).
Partial Discharge
See “Energization at Normal Voltages” above.
Moisture and Contaminants
If medium-voltage conductor insulation is exposed to appreciable quantities of moisture (such as

by standing water inside of an EPA, constant condensation of humidity on the conductors, or
leakage of nearby fluid systems), then moisture intrusion may be significant and the longevity of
that insulation reduced. Generally, insufficient exposure to moisture exists to create any
detrimental effects on medium-voltage insulation. Moisture is generally of no concern to
low-voltage insulation longevity due to reduced voltage stress.
[Note: See Section 4.5 for a discussion of the effects of moisture and contaminants on metallic
components of electrical penetration assemblies.]
Overvoltage Transients
If the penetration conductor (or terminations) are exposed to repeated overvoltage transients at
voltage levels well in excess of their nominal rating, then the longevity of the insulation may be
reduced. The severity of this effect appears to be related to both the duration of exposure
(including the number of transients) as well as the peak voltage. Most components have
sufficient insulation to sustain periodic transients at or below the BIL; however, repeated
exposure or exposure to voltages in excess of the BIL are likely to substantially reduce the
lifetime of the insulator (as measured by time to electrical breakdown). Medium-voltage
conductors are most at risk based on their typically higher normal operating voltage stress
(volts per mil of insulation).
4.5 Radiation Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects
4.5.1 General
Types of radiation that may be expected in nuclear power plants may be classified as either a
particle or electromagnetic wave. Four primary types of radiation exist: alpha, beta, gamma, and
neutron [4.48, 4.49]. Although all four types of radiation are present in the typical nuclear power
plant, the significance of each varies greatly with respect to penetration aging. Other types of
radiation to be considered include Bremsstrahlung (a byproduct of beta radiation interaction),
and ultraviolet radiation (electromagnetic radiation of energy or frequency lower than that of
gamma or X-rays).
4-42
In most plant areas, normal radiation dose rates (all sources) are roughly commensurate with
natural background levels (i.e., 1 x 10-2 mGy/hr [<1 mrad/hr]). In some spaces, however, the
dose rate during normal operation is significantly higher; this is especially true of the primary
reactor containment, in which normal radiation doses may range from about 10-4 to 1 Gy/hr [0.01
to 100 rad/hr], depending on plant type [4.50]. Because mechanical and electrical penetrations
are exposed to these higher dose spaces, the aging of these devices resulting from exposure to
radiation must be considered.
Alpha (α)
Alpha radiation is an ionized helium atom (nucleus), which is highly damaging to some organic
materials; however, due to its high mass and charge relative to other particles, alpha is easily
shielded. Alpha emitters have short half-lives, and the range of alpha particles in free air is
extremely limited [4.48, 4.49, 4.69]. No appreciable alpha dose is anticipated for any penetration
in the plant under normal conditions. Alpha radiation is not considered further in this AMG.
Beta (b)
Beta radiation is a charged subatomic particle of low mass (the fundamental equivalent of an
electron); it can be produced from a number of sources and varies in its energy level (expressed
in million electron volts, or MeV). Beta penetration is proportional to the density of the
absorbing material, and is more penetrating than the alpha particles [4.48, 4.69]. Under certain
accident scenarios, significant beta radiation may be produced from sources liberated during the
accident (i.e., leaking reactor coolant/steam). This dose must be considered in the environmental
qualification of penetrations; however, under normal conditions, beta-emitting sources are not
present in the ambient environment.
Gamma (g)
Gamma radiation is electromagnetic in nature, and is emitted from a broad variety of nuclear
species. Gamma energy varies in relation to its frequency/wavelength, such that higher frequency
radiation is more energetic [4.48, 4.69]. Gamma sources exist in the reactor core and are created
as a result of the fission process. Gamma radiation is highly penetrating in comparison to alpha
and beta radiation. Gamma dose rate attributable to natural sources is extremely low (1 x 10-2
mGy/hr [<<1 mrad/hr]) and, for the most part, is invariant with time. Gamma dose rate
attributable to reactor plant operation varies widely as a function of location within the plant and
reactor power level, and may range from 0.01 to 1 Gy/hr [1 to 100 rad/hr] inside primary
containment. Therefore, gamma dose must be considered in the aging of penetration materials.
Bremsstrahlung
A related form of radiation known as Bremsstrahlung (braking radiation) results from the
interaction of a beta particle with an inorganic material. This photon (gamma or X-ray) radiation
is produced from the deceleration of an incident beta particle upon striking the absorber.
4-43
Accordingly, the dose rate arising from Bremsstrahlung interaction is related to the incident beta
dose rate. As a general rule, the Bremsstrahlung dose is conservatively estimated at about 3 to
5% of the incident beta dose [4.48, 4.69]. Because Bremsstrahlung is electromagnetic radiation,
its effect on organic penetration materials is comparable to that of gamma. Bremsstrahlung
radiation of an intensity sufficient to result in significant degradation of penetration organic
materials is created only during accident conditions (i.e., when high concentrations of beta-
producing nuclides are released to the atmosphere); accordingly, Bremsstrahlung radiation is not
significant with respect to penetration aging, but rather is considered only in the context of
equipment qualification during accident conditions.
Ultraviolet
Ultraviolet (UV) radiation is a form of electromagnetic energy with a lower frequency than that
of gamma or X-rays [4.69]. Due to its reduced energy, ultraviolet radiation is far less penetrating;
however, certain organic materials may be affected through an interactive process known as
photolysis.24 Photolysis operates through the excitation of electrons within specific molecular
functional groups in a polymer. Some polymers including polyester, PVC, and polyurethane
contain these functional groups as part of their basic molecular structure. Hydrocarbon polymers
(such as polyethylene/polyolefin, polypropylene, and EPR), although ideally not containing the
functional groups necessary for photolysis, may exhibit some degree of photolytic behavior. This
behavior is due to the inclusion of other materials (fillers or impurities containing ketones or
hydroperoxide groups) in the polymer formulation [4.51].
UV radiation sources at nuclear plants include solar radiation and ultraviolet or fluorescent lamps
[4.23]. UV radiation is readily shielded by even a thin layer of opaque material; hence, only
materials directly exposed to these sources may potentially be degraded. Penetrations may be
exposed to UV radiation only from fluorescent lamps installed in proximity to the penetration.
However, due to the fact that (1) most organic components within the penetration are enclosed
(either within the penetration itself or other ancillary equipment, such as junction boxes), (2)
fluorescent lighting is not typically in sufficient proximity to provide a substantial UV dose, and
(3) most modern organic materials are UV stabilized, UV degradation of penetration components
is not considered significant. For additional information on UV degradation of organics, see
Section 4 of Reference [4.20].
Neutron
Neutron radiation emanates from the reactor core during operation (and to a greatly reduced
degree during shutdown). Neutrons are relatively massive subatomic particles that vary in energy
level (fast/thermal). Energetic neutrons may be destructive to both inorganic and organic
materials [4.48]; however, the neutron reflectors, moderators, and radial shielding installed
around the reactor core and vessel ensure that the net neutron flux (and thus dose rate) out of the
vessel shielding is extremely low in comparison to that of gamma radiation. Therefore, neutron
radiation is a nonsignificant source.
24
UV radiation may also interact with free oxygen to produce ozone; see Section 4.8.
4-44
Effects of Radiation Exposure
Radiation interacts with matter in two principal ways: ionization/excitation of atoms in the
material (radiolysis), and displacement of atoms or subatomic particles, thereby altering the
molecular structure of the material. Both processes are applicable to radiation-induced
degradation; however, displacement effects are usually not significant for organics due to their
less rigid structure and covalent bonding. Similarly, ionization effects are of little significance to
inorganic materials due to their ionic bonding and rigid structure. In general, radiation effects on
organic materials are much more severe than on inorganic materials [4.48, 4.49].
Ionization and excitation within organic materials result in accelerated chemical reactions; the
type of reaction is determined by the material. The magnitude or extent of these chemical
reactions is determined by the total energy deposited into the material. In most cases, the effects
of radiation type and energy spectrum on the total energy deposited are minimal; thus, equal
doses of various types of radiation will produce roughly equal damage in an organic material.
This relationship does not generally hold for inorganic materials. Accordingly, the specific type
of radiation dose applied to an inorganic must be carefully considered as well as the type of
material irradiated. Of the types of radiation produced by a nuclear reactor, neutron is clearly of
most concern to inorganics and metals for the reasons stated above [4.52].
Radiation incident on penetration organic components produces aging/degradation through

scission, oxidation, or crosslinking of polymer chains; this process is generally known as
radiolysis [4.51]. (Note that radiation-induced oxidation is considered separately in Section 4.7
of this AMG.) As with thermal exposure, the tolerance of an individual material to various types
of radiation will vary based on the general type of material (i.e., elastomer, fluoropolymer, etc.)
and its individual chemical structure and formulation. Organic materials commonly used in
nuclear plant penetration applications vary widely in their susceptibility to radiation. Changes in
the material’s overall mechanical properties (such as compression set or hardness) and electrical
properties (such as dielectric strength and conductivity) may result from exposure to radiation.
As a general rule, penetration organic materials exposed to total gamma doses less than about 1 x
103 Gy [1 x 105 rad] (corresponding to a dose rate of 2 x 10-3 Gy/hr [~0.2 rad/hr] over 60 years)
will experience little or no aging effect due to radiation exposure [4.48]. Above this level,
however, progressive changes in physical properties begin to occur as dose is increased. The
threshold is 25unique for each material, and can be affected somewhat by environmental
conditions such as temperature [4.53]. Radiation-induced damage to penetration polymers in
oxygen environments also may depend largely on the dose rate of the exposure for the same
given dose 26[4.16, 4.22, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.58, 4.59]. Table 4-6 lists approximate radiation
threshold values for generic penetration materials. For many of the polymers used in fabricating
penetrations, the radiation threshold is roughly 1 x 104 Gy [1 x 106 rad]. References [4.48] and
[4.49] provide additional information on the degradation of specific materials with radiation and
25
Defined by EPRI NP-2129 [4.48] as "...the first detectable change in a property of a material due to the effect of
radiation."
26
ASTM E 1027-1984 gives generalized procedures for preparing and exposing test samples to ionizing radiation
and how to report test results.
4-45
other environmental influences. Section 4.6 discusses the effects of radiation exposure on the
loss of fire retardants within penetration materials.
Macroscopic effects of radiation-induced degradation of organics may include embrittlement,

cracking or crazing, swelling, discoloration, and melting, as well as a change in the mechanical
or electrical properties of the affected material. Additionally, swelling (due to increased moisture
absorption) may be induced for certain materials by severe radiation exposure [4.70]. This effect
generally occurs at high radiation levels where corresponding mechanical properties of the
material are significantly degraded [4.48]. Organic penetration components (such as O-rings or
seals) may potentially swell, thereby resulting in increased tension or pressure on other
components in direct proximity.
For inorganic materials, a rough estimate of the threshold level of concern can be made. Figure
C-6 of Reference [4.9] (reproduced here as Figure 4-5) shows approximate levels of radiation
damage for various inorganic insulating materials based upon changes in their physical
properties. A neutron fluence of roughly 1 x 1018 n/cm2 (equivalent to a gamma dose of about 3 x
107 Gy [3 x 109 rad] results in no significant damage or change in material properties for the
materials listed (with the exception of glass). Metals generally have comparable or higher
damage thresholds, on the order of 1 x 1019 n/cm2 (approximately 2.5 x 108 Gy [2.5 x 1010 rad])
[4.52]. The predominant effects on metals are increased hardness and reduced creep rate. Fatigue
properties and electrical resistance are among the least affected [4.52]. Accordingly, a
conservative threshold dose of 1 x 1017 n/cm2, or 3 x 106 Gy [3 x 108 rad] gamma, can be set for
metals used in penetration components. This correlates to about 5.71 Gy/hr [571 rad/hr] gamma
over 60 years. Below this dose, little or no aging effects should be noted in such materials.
Because the total integrated dose (TID) for all penetration locations is much lower than this
threshold, radiation aging of inorganics is considered to be of no significance for these
applications.
4-46
Table 4-6
Radiation Dose Thresholds for Common Penetration and Termination Organic Materials
[4.48, 4.49]
Lowest Reported Estimated

Threshold or Applicable
Material Applicable Threshold Threshold Range;
2 1
Category Material Name Range (Rad Gamma) Neutron (n/cm ) Property Measured
6 14
Elastomers EPR/EPDM 10 4 x 10 Compression Set
6 14
Neoprene 10 4 x 10 Compression Set
5 14
CSPE 5 x 10 2 x 10 Elongation
6 14
Nitrile (Buna N) 10 4 x 10 Compression Set
5 14
Butyl 7 x 10 2.8 x 10 Tensile Strength
5 13
Viton 10 4 x 10 Elongation
6 14
Silicone 10 4 x 10 Tensile Strength,
Compression Set
6 14
Thermo- XLPE/XLPO 10 4 x 10 Elongation, Tensile
plastics Strength
5 13
PVC 10 4 x 10 Unstated
5 14
Polyethylene 3.8 x 10 1.5 x 10 Elongation
ETFE (Tefzel) Note 2 Note 2 -
8 16
Thermosets Epoxy Resins 2 x 10 8 x 10 Varies
7 15
Polyimide (Kapton) 10 4 x 10 Tensile Strength,
Elongation
5 8 14
Phenolic Resins 3 x 10 to 3.9 x 10 1.2 x 10 to 1.6 x Elongation
17
10
8 17
Furanic Resins 3 x 10 1.2 x 10 Tensile Strength,
Elongation
5 7 13 16
Polyester Resins 10 to 7.9 x 10 4 x 10 to 3.2 x 10 Elongation
6 15
Melamine 6.7 x 10 2.7 x 10 Impact Strength
Formaldehyde
8 2
Notes: 1. Based on approximated conversion factor of 4 x 10 n/cm = 1 rad per Reference [4.9].
2. No radiation threshold data were located for ETFE; however, based on manufacturer’s data
and elongation data at 75% and 50% retention of elongation in Reference [4.48], the radiation
6
threshold may be conservatively estimated at 10 rad.
4-47
Figure 4-5
Relative Radiation Resistance of Inorganic Insulating Materials Based Upon Changes in
Physical Properties
4.5.1.1 Radiation Dose-Rate and Aging Sequence Effects
Dose-Rate Effects
In nuclear plant applications, a variety of polymeric materials receive radiation exposure at

relatively low dose rates for long periods of time. To estimate the long-term degradation that
occurs, accelerated aging studies are performed by raising the radiation dose rate based on the
assumption that the amount of degradation will depend only on the integrated radiation dose.
However, evidence exists to indicate that, in air environments, certain polymeric materials can
show significant dose-rate effects. A dose-rate effect may be defined as an effect on a material
that is different in magnitude or type (for the same total dose), depending on the irradiation rate
[4.48]. These effects may be transient or permanent. Dose-rate effects are a very common
occurrence for radiation aging of polymeric materials, and can range from very large to
insignificant, depending upon such factors as polymer type, aging conditions, sample geometry,
and degradation parameter being monitored [4.15].
Dose-rate effects typically involve oxidation mechanisms. When aged at high radiation dose
rates, a large fraction of polymeric materials is found to have physical dose-rate effects caused
by oxygen diffusion-limited degradation. A much smaller fraction has chemical dose-rate effects.
4-48
No evidence exists for dose-rate effects in a nitrogen environment [4.15]. Most materials found
to have dose-rate effects usually tended to indicate more mechanical degradation for a given dose
as the dose rate is lowered [4.15]. Dose-rate effects for polyethylene (PE) and polyvinyl chloride
(PVC) were determined at low dose rates of 8.7 x 101 and 4.4 x 101 Gy/hr [8.7 x 103 and 4.4 x
103 rad/hr], respectively. A difference in mechanical properties of these materials irradiated at
low dose rates could be identified only after a total dose of greater than ~2 x 104 Gy [~2 x 106
rad] had been absorbed, and the difference did not become significant (i.e., >10%) until the total
dose exceeded ~1 x 105 Gy [~1 x 107 rad] [4.15]. For other common penetration component
materials (such as silicone rubber, EPR, XLPE, etc.) synergistic effects were either not noted, or
occurred at dose rates above those for PE and/or PVC. No evidence of dose-rate effects
occurring at exposure rates less than those indicated above was identified in the literature.
Dose-rate effects may be considered from both an aging management and environmental
qualification perspective. From an aging perspective, test and laboratory data concerning the
response of various materials to radiation obtained under high dose rate testing may
underestimate the degradation of a material for a given dose. Similarly, in the environmental
qualification context, the simulation of aging during qualification testing through exposure at
accelerated rates may arguably underestimate the pre-LOCA degradation occurring under natural
aging conditions. Additionally, the degradation resulting from exposure at a comparatively low
qualification dose rate and that resulting from the higher postulated accident dose rate may
differ.
Environmental qualification testing does not typically include a segment that addresses the actual
radiation dose rate during the component’s design life. To do so would require a test program
that lasted 40 years or more. As stated above, the highest anticipated dose rate during normal
operating conditions is on the order of 2 Gy/hr [200 rad/hr] inside primary containment. That rate
would have to be increased several thousand percent in order to be in the range where dose-rate
effects have been observed for certain materials, and would require an exposure on the order of
one year in duration. The test dose rate would not be representative of the actual rate at the
installed location, and the results may not be representative of the effects that would actually
occur.
A typical qualification test also does not address the actual radiation rate during accident
conditions. The maximum accident dose rate for a plant may exceed 105 Gy/hr [107 rad/hr]
[4.15], whereas the maximum dose rate used during qualification testing is 1 x 104 Gy/hr [1 x 106
rad/hr] and usually is only 40% to 80% of that value. The rate used for qualification testing is far
in excess of the dose rate where dose-rate effects have been observed. Based on such
considerations, exposure at a maximum dose rate of 104 Gy/hr [106 rad/hr] has been accepted by
the USNRC to establish qualification.
Sequence Effects
The chemical composition of a polymer determines its possible reaction mechanisms.

Environmental conditions generally determine which of these possible reactions will occur and at
what rates. This implies that changes in a material subjected simultaneously to radiation and
4-49
another environmental stress could be different from the changes that would occur in the material
if subjected to the stresses separately and sequentially. A “synergistic” effect could occur [4.48].
If some type of reaction occurs in a material because of two environmental stressors, the best
approach would be the use of appropriate combined-environment accelerated simulation. On the
other hand, if synergistic effects were not important, sequential exposure to the two
environments might adequately simulate the ambient aging conditions. The possibility also exists
that sequential exposure to the two environments might adequately simulate cases where
synergistic effects are important, thereby eliminating the necessity for more complex and
expensive exposure to combined environments [4.15].
Important synergisms of low-temperature radiation and elevated thermal environments and

important ordering effects in sequential aging experiments can occur and these are related by
mechanics to radiation dose-rate effects. NUREG-0237 concluded that significant evidence
existed for the possible presence of important synergistic effects in combined radiation-thermal
environments. If a material was determined to have important synergistic effects in combined
radiation-thermal environments, it was probable that sequential aging simulations would give
different material degradation results. Therefore, the normal sequential exposure of thermal
aging followed by ambient-temperature radiation-aging can underestimate material damage
when strong synergistic effects related to radiation and temperature exist for a material [4.15].
The aging response of many materials to sequential exposure (radiation followed by thermal or
thermal followed by radiation) is similar to their response to a combined radiation plus thermal
exposure. In the materials for which significant differences do occur, the radiation followed by
thermal sequence is usually more severe than the thermal followed by radiation sequence, and
the radiation followed by thermal sequence more closely matches simultaneous exposure
conditions. This indicates that the most conservative approach to sequential aging simulations
should use the radiation followed by thermal sequence. Significant sequential ordering effects
usually occur in materials that also have large synergisms related to radiation and temperature
and large radiation dose-rate effects [4.15]. In sequential aging experiments, the thermal
exposure can bring about rapid degradation of certain polymeric materials that have been pre-
sensitized by previous radiation exposure [4.55].
NUREG/CR-3629 [4.56], which examined the effects of aging sequence, concluded the
following:
· For several materials, tensile properties at completion of aging were only slightly affected by
both the temperature during irradiation and the order of the sequential aging environmental
exposures.
· In general, the choice of temperature during irradiation was secondary to the choice of aging
sequence in its effect on polymer properties.
· If sequential ordering of irradiation and thermal exposure was important to the aging
degradation of tensile properties, usually irradiation followed by thermal exposure was most
severe [4.66].
4-50
In terms of environmental qualification testing, Section 6.3.2 of IEEE Standard 323-1974 [4.57]
provides a recommended sequence of phases in a test program, namely, thermal aging, radiation
aging, accident radiation and steam/chemical-spray exposure (LOCA). However, it does modify
the sequence by stating “the sequence used shall be justified as the most severe for the item
being tested.”
Conclusions Regarding Dose-Rate and Sequence Effects
Dose-Rate Effects
To determine the significance of a potential dose-rate synergism on the qualification of a device,

a review of the analysis or test report used to establish qualification may be performed to
compare the dose rate and total dose used in the test to those actually occurring at the installed
location. If the dose rate and total dose at the installed location are not in the same range as those
values for which synergistic effects are known to exist for the specific material or component in
question, then the test/analysis dose rate and total dose may be considered acceptable to establish
qualification. Components that contain no Teflon and are subjected to a total dose of less than
103 Gy [105 rad] may be excluded from further analysis for dose-rate synergisms. At these levels,
there is no significant degradation of mechanical or permanent electrical properties, and no
indications were found of significant synergistic effects of radiation combined with either
environmental stresses or subsequently imposed stresses [4.48].
For equipment located inside primary containment, the lowest dose rates discussed in the
literature for any material at which dose-rate effects have been observed (more than 10 Gy/hr
[103 rad/hr] greatly exceed those for the typical plant under normal operating conditions.
Although the maximum 60-year total dose inside a typical primary containment is anticipated to
be on the order of 10 x 104 to 10 x 106 Gy [10 to 100 megarad], most of the areas should receive
a lower total dose [4.50]. Therefore, dose-rate effects are of no real aging or qualification
significance for any penetration components.
Dose-rate effects are also generally of little potential significance for components qualified
for accident doses, because the fraction of the total dose applied that is potentially subject to
dose-rate effects (i.e., the aging dose) is comparatively small.27
Sequence Effects
Various tests performed during the past 20 years have determined that certain properties of some
materials vary significantly depending on the sequence of performing radiation aging and
thermal aging. More damage can occur in some materials if the radiation aging is performed
before the thermal aging. However, test results do not demonstrate that this is always the case,
even for the same generic material (that is, different compounds of EPR can give different or
contradictory results). Although test data are limited, the results seem to be somewhat dependent
27
A typical qualification radiation exposure might include 50 x 104 Gy [50 megarad] to simulate the pre-LOCA
aging dose, and 150 x 104 Gy [150 megarad] to simulate the accident dose.
4-51
on the elevated temperature used for thermal aging. Many of the research reports cited in the
literature used an elevated temperature that was much lower than the typical range of 121°C to
150°C [250°F to 302°F] used in qualification test programs. When the elevated temperature was
closer to those typically used in qualification tests, the results concerning sequence were not
conclusive. Consequently, caution must be used when attempting to relate the results of the
research tests with those of qualification tests and with actual plant environments.
For those materials that demonstrate sequence effects where thermal aging followed by
irradiation is more severe, the sequence recommended by IEEE 323-1974 will be representative.
For those materials where irradiation followed by thermal aging or simultaneous aging is more
severe, the recommended thermal/radiation sequence may not produce the most degradation.
However, for this latter group of materials, sequential irradiation followed by thermal aging is
not representative of actual plant environments. Rather, the typical plant environment may be
accurately modeled as simultaneous low dose-rate irradiation coupled with thermal aging.
Therefore, the aging sequence that produces the most severe degradation of these materials (i.e.,
irradiation to the full aging/accident dose followed by thermal aging) would never occur in an
actual plant. Hence, the use of sequential thermal-then-radiation aging regimen adequately
simulates in-plant aging.
4.5.2 Radiation Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Electrical

Penetrations
No radiation stressors or aging mechanisms unique to electrical penetration assemblies were

identified. This stems largely from the fact that electrical penetrations carry no radioactive
materials or fluids as do some mechanical penetrations, and all aging radiation dose received by
EPA components is the result of external sources. In general, these sources are of insufficient
magnitude (as discussed previously for inside containment) to result in significant degradation of
properties for organic components over the 60-year period of interest.
In some cases, electrical penetrations are outfitted with radiation shielding and/or junction boxes
on the inboard end that may act to reduce the radiation dose to various penetration components
(as well as to adjacent plant spaces outside containment). Furthermore, shielding may result from
inorganic components of the penetration assembly (such as the header plate and nozzle flange
shielding the flange seals). This shielding effect may be incorporated into environmental
qualification or component longevity analyses where appropriate.
4.5.3 Radiation Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects - Mechanical

Penetrations
Radiation stressors for mechanical penetrations are due to general area dose and radiation fields
generated by the fluid contained within the process piping at piping penetrations as well as
general area doses. The general area doses are the same as those for electrical penetrations, and
are not significant for most materials. Process radiation doses would be significant (in terms of
component aging) where the fluid is within a system in contact with the reactor or primary
system. This would be most likely for piping penetrations associated with the following systems:
4-52
· Main Steam (BWR Only)

· Residual Heat Removal
· Reactor Water Clean Up (BWR Only) (RWCU)
· Chemical and Volume Control (PWR Only) (C&VC)
· Primary Water Charging (PWR Only)
Therefore, radiation stressors are significant only for a selected group of piping penetrations. The
other type of mechanical penetration that may be exposed to high radiation doses is the fuel
transfer tube penetration for PWRs.
Mechanical penetration components that can be degraded over time are only those nonmetallic
components and subcomponents that are part of selected piping penetrations listed above and the
fuel transfer tube penetration. These components include:
· Expansion Joints (elastomer)
· Gaskets (elastomer)
· Protective Surface Coatings (coated components)
The maximum levels of normal radiation dose are, in all cases, below the threshold level that
would affect metallic components within the penetration (see Section 4.2.3).
For most nonmetallic components in mechanical penetrations, the cumulative radiation dose
threshold level necessary to initiate radiation degradation could not be attained in 40 or 60 years
of plant operation. There are two situations where the potential for radiation levels approaching
the threshold level exists. The fuel transfer tube penetration gasket can be exposed to high
radiation levels from spent fuel assemblies passing through the tube and occasionally becoming
stationary in the tube for some period of time. Although the spent fuel movement operations
occur infrequently, the instantaneous radiation flux levels are quite high. High radiation levels
also exist in some process fluids that go through piping penetrations. Typically, piping carrying
fluids that have direct contact with the core contain moderate or high radiation levels (PWR
charging and C&VC systems, BWR RWCU and steam systems). Therefore, radiation
degradation of fuel transfer tube gaskets and selected high radiation fluid piping penetration
elastomer expansion joints is considered potentially significant.
4.5.3.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Radiation Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects -
Radiation degradation of nonmetallic components in mechanical penetrations is potentially

significant if the 60-year TID to which these components are exposed exceeds the levels
specified in Table 4-6. For piping penetrations, this will generally be limited to those associated
with the reactor coolant, main steam, charging and volume control, RWCU, and RHR systems.
Additionally, the fuel transfer tube components may be exposed to doses approaching the
applicable damage threshold(s).
4-53
4.6 Chemical/Electrochemical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects
Chemical/electrochemical stressors take several forms that can degrade penetration components.
Chemical stressors result from the exposure of penetration components to moisture, solvents,
fuel oils, lubricants, or other substances. Chemical stressors can affect the structure and
properties of both organic and inorganic materials. In general, chemical stressors are highly
localized in nature and typically affect only very small portions of the plant penetration
population. The degradation of inorganic (metallic) penetration materials is generally
electrochemical in nature, as compared to the purely chemical processes primarily associated
with organic material degradation. Each of these degradation mechanisms is described in the
following sections.
4.6.1 General
4.6.1.1 Chemical Attack of Organics

Chemical attack of organic materials used in penetrations may occur due to exposure of these
materials to water, salts, cleaners, solvents, lubricants (oil and grease), fuel oil, plant additives,
and acids. These agents may reach the material through a number of different mechanisms such
as accidental or intentional application, airborne transport (atomization), splash or spray, or
leaching. Chemical attack of polymers may result in dissolution, swelling, or breaking of
chemical bonds within the polymer, ultimately affecting its mechanical and/or electrical
properties [4.2].
Significant differences in the chemical resistance of substances exist between categories of
polymers (thermoplastics and thermosets) and between individual families within those
categories. Furthermore, individual formulations of a particular polymer can have significantly
different chemical resistance based on the ratios and types of constituents included in the
formulation. The chemical properties of common penetration materials are discussed in the
following paragraphs; these properties are only generalizations and may not be representative of
a material’s performance upon exposure to specific chemical compounds. Additionally, other
environmental influences (such as heat, humidity, and radiation) may substantially alter the
effect of any chemical interaction such that it is more or less severe. The following discussions
(and table) are meant only as a general guide; manufacturer’s literature or other comparable
sources should be used to determine the resistance of a particular material to a specific chemical
agent under prevailing environmental conditions. See also Section 5.2 for additional information
regarding specific substances used for cleaning penetration assemblies.
Changes in the appearance of chemically affected organics will vary with the specific material
and chemical to which it has been exposed. For example, changes in color may indicate contact
with a strong solvent (often producing a bright or vivid color) or oxidizer (lightened or white
color). Changes in the texture of the material (such as surface roughness, cracking, or oily
residue) may also result. Additionally, changes in the mechanical properties of the compound,
such as swelling or softness, may occur [4.47]. Table 4-7 shows some common organic materials
used in electrical penetration construction and their relative susceptibility to certain chemicals.
4-54
4.6.1.2 Electrochemical Attack of Metals
Corrosion is a destructive process that is characterized by either chemical or electrochemical

attack on metals. Direct chemical corrosion occurs in instances of highly corrosive environments,
high temperatures, or both. More common is electrochemical corrosion, which accounts for most
degradation experienced by metals exposed to moisture or atmosphere. Electrochemical
corrosion can result in cases of two dissimilar metals (galvanic reaction) or one homogeneous
metal. Corrosion of one homogeneous metal occurs due to variations in electrostatic potential
between various regions of the metal (caused by anodic and cathodic areas, inclusions, residual
stress, etc.); this potential results in electron flow from the anodic to cathodic areas, eventually
producing pitting and wastage.
Numerous different types of corrosion may occur, depending on the types of metal involved and
the environment (e.g., galvanic corrosion, general corrosion, erosion/corrosion, and
microbiologically influenced corrosion). A discussion of each type of metal and its applicable
corrosion(s) is beyond the scope of this AMG; however, several common factors can be
identified. These include the presence of an electrolyte (such as water), soluble ions in the
electrolyte (such as chlorides), elevated temperature, and high oxygen concentration. In addition,
some corrosions depend upon the presence of other factors (such as tensile stress and susceptible
materials; see discussion of stress corrosion cracking below). The occurrence and rate of
corrosion is affected by a number of factors, including the types of metal, the type and properties
of fluid (electrolyte) in contact with the metal, the presence of other influences, and the
concentration of oxygen and ions present. Corrosion of penetration components may be
enhanced by the presence of stray dc currents resulting from open ground circuits or strong
fields.
Oxidation corrosion of metal penetration components in the containment environment may occur
at slow rates. Stainless steel has excellent corrosion resistance and oxidation corrosion rates are
extremely small for components made from stainless steel. Carbon steel will corrode at slow
rates in the gaseous containment environment. Carbon steel surfaces are generally covered with
corrosion protection coatings that mitigate oxidation corrosion. However, these coating are
imperfect with regard to surface coverage (pin holes), may be thin and permeable in local areas,
and may crack or peel in service due to other stressors. Even though coatings are maintained by
normal plant housekeeping practices, some surfaces may remain uncoated for extended time
periods and some of the coated penetration component surfaces are difficult to inspect and to
maintain corrosion protection coatings because of poor access. As noted in the description of
stressors, water may accumulate on some penetration component surfaces and some surfaces
may be exposed to more aggressive chemical substances. This could cause significant loss of
material over small areas or localized pitting of the surface (i.e., crevice/pitting corrosion). This
aging mechanism is more severe in the suppression pool area of BWRs where some mechanical
penetrations are located below the water level or in areas that experience alternating wet and dry
conditions. There is also some potential for water exposure at containment penetrations in
normally gaseous environments due to leakage, condensation or inadequate cleanup from
maintenance and testing activities.
4-55
Table 4-7
Chemical Compatibility of Common Penetration Organic Materials [4.2, 4.3, 4.8, 4.21, 4.47, 4.52]
Chemical
Elastomers Thermo-plastics Thermosets
Compatibility
Chemical Agent EPR/ Neoprene CSPE Nitrile Butyl Viton Silicone PVC Poly- XLPE/ ETFE Epoxy Resins Polyimide Phenolic Furanic
EPDM ethylene XLPO (Tefzel) (Kapton) Resins Resins
5 1 1
Acids (inorganic) Poor Poor Good Poor Fair Good Poor Good Good Good Good Poor Fair Fair Poor
2
Acids (organic) Fair Poor Fair Fair Fair Poor Good Good Poor Poor Good Good Fair Good Good
Alcohols Fair Good Good Fair Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good
Alkalines Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Poor Good Good
Esters Fair Poor Poor Poor Fair Poor Fair Poor Fair Fair Good Fair Good Good Good
Ketones Good Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Good Fair Good Good Good
(acetone)
Mineral Oils Poor Fair Fair Good Good Good Good Good Poor Poor Good Good Good Good Good
Petroleum-based Poor Fair Fair Good Poor Good Poor Fair Fair Fair Good Good Good Good Good
Oils and Fuels
Silicone Oils Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Poor Poor Good Good Good Good Good
Oxidizers Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Good Poor Good Fair Fair Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor
Chlorinated Poor Poor Poor Fair Poor Good Poor Poor Poor Poor Good Fair Good Good Good
Solvents
3
Inorganic Salts Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Fair Good Good
Hydrocarbon Poor Fair Poor Good Poor Good Poor Poor Poor Poor Good Fair Good Good Good
Solvents
4
Water (including Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Poor Good Good
steam)
Good = No significant effect Fair = Mild effect or limited use Poor = Strong effect or prohibited use
Notes: 1. Good in weak acids, poor in strong acids.
2. With exception of acetic and formic acids.
3. Poor for alkaline salts.
4. May be swollen by exposure to steam.
5. With exception of chlorosulfonic and chloroacetic acids.
4-56
In the case of oxidation of metallic components, dissolved oxygen combines with the metal at the
surface of the component to form an insoluble metal oxide (such as ferric oxide). These oxide
layers may have significantly different electrical and physical properties than the underlying
parent metal. For example, metallic electrical contacts that oxidize with a less conductive species
may experience higher electrical resistance and therefore result in overheating of electrical
junctions or interference with circuit operation. In some cases (such as for passivated metals
including Inconel), the formation of an oxide layer can actually protect the metal and
subsequently reduce the rate of certain types of corrosion.
Corrosion of metallic components is important because the electrical and mechanical properties
of the component may be affected. Corrosion can attack the surface of conductive components
such as electrical contacts, thereby increasing their resistance and reducing their electrical
conductivity. Additionally, corrosion may, if left unimpeded, result in loss of the mechanical
integrity of a component; this property loss may be significant if the component is under
mechanical stress (either during normal or transient conditions) such that mechanical failure
occurs.
4.6.1.2.1 Affected Components
EPAs
Many electrical penetrations are fabricated in part or completely from stainless steel, which has
excellent resistance to many types of corrosion. However, some of the earlier types of EPAs are
made of more corrosion-susceptible materials such as low-alloy carbon steel. Most EPAs are not
subjected to appreciable moisture, chloride ions, or elevated temperature; therefore, the
likelihood of significant corrosion (even for the more susceptible materials) is low.
The carbon steel components in piping and access penetrations within the BWR suppression
pool, which is partially filled with water, and the water-filled PWR fuel transfer tube penetration
are particularly susceptible to oxidation corrosion. The piping and fuel transfer tube penetrations
contain material combinations that are susceptible to galvanic corrosion under appropriate
environmental conditions. The primary concern are carbon steel/stainless steel combinations that
have surfaces inadvertently wetted or wetted under normal operation (piping penetrations located
in suppression pool, fuel transfer tube). In these situations, the carbon steel surface could be
subjected to galvanic corrosion that can cause significant amounts of material loss over small
areas. Therefore, corrosion of all carbon steel materials in the mechanical penetrations is
potentially significant. Aluminum or copper components (primarily in airlock mechanical
systems) can also suffer from galvanic corrosion when adjacent to stainless steel material in a
moist or wetted environment.
4-57
4.6.1.3 Contaminants
Another chemical/electrochemical stressor is the presence of contaminants in the atmosphere or

deposited on component surfaces. These containments include chlorides, fluorides, peroxides
and sulfur compounds. There are several sources of these contaminants at the penetrations:
· Inadequate cleaning after completion of the initial penetration installation
· Inservice penetration inspection, testing and maintenance activities without adequate care or
clean-up
· Cleaning compounds used in other areas of the primary containment being inadvertently
spread into the penetration area and not removed from penetration components
· Residual material from welding processes (smoke and other particulates) associated with
penetration components during initial installation or inservice maintenance remain on or
within penetration components. The most specific welding activity of concern is associated
with the installation and repair of stainless steel expansion joints for mechanical piping
penetrations.
· Decomposition of nonmetallic components such as thermal insulation or surface coatings
4.6.1.4 Chemical Decomposition of Penetration Organic Materials
In addition to exposure from foreign or external chemical substances, penetration components

may be exposed to chemical by-products of the thermal or radiolytic decomposition of cable
jacketing, insulation, seals, conformal or fire-resistant coatings, or other organic components.
Many materials commonly used in penetration component construction either contain or are
manufactured using potentially corrosive chemicals such as chlorides, peroxides, or sulfurous
compounds. Chemical by-products originating from decomposition of these components may
result in several degradation mechanisms, including corrosion of metallic components (cable
conductor, shield, drain wire, or terminations), and softening, swelling, or decomposition of
other organics within the penetration assembly. Plasticizer migration (PVC) can also result in
swelling of adjacent elastomers.
For example, neoprene rubber (chloroprene), PVC (polyvinyl chloride), CSPE (chlorosulfonated
polyethylene), and CPE (chloropolyethylene) all may produce chlorine ions (and hydrochloric
acid) upon decomposition. Additionally, elastomers including EPR/EPDM are cured using
peroxide or sulfur compounds that may be leached from the material as it ages or is subjected to
certain environmental conditions (such as heat or wetting). Copolymers such as ethylene vinyl
acetate (semiconducting shield material) may also decompose to produce by-products such as
weak acids [4.47].
Degradation resulting from copper-catalyzed oxidation reactions may occur in certain polymers
[4.5, 4.60]. A catalyst is defined as a substance that affects the rate or the direction of a chemical
reaction, but is not appreciably consumed in the process [4.61]. Because of its proximity to the
insulation, ions from copper-based lead conductors may act as catalysts for oxidation reactions
within the insulation, thereby accelerating its degradation [4.62]. This will occur primarily in
4-58
areas where the insulation is in direct contact with the conductor. Often little (if any) degradation
of the conductor will occur as a result of this catalysis. Furthermore, most copper conductors are
tinned, which prevents this type of reaction.
By-products are also generated from chemically crosslinked XLPE as a result of the high
temperature/pressure curing process. By-products such as acetophenone, cumene, and alpha
methyl styrene are produced as the chemical crosslinking agent (dicumyl peroxide) decomposes.
Results of testing aimed at defining the effect of these chemicals on electrical cable aging (ac and
impulse breakdown strength) indicate that some effect does exist;28 however, this effect is
complex in nature, relatively small in magnitude, and depends not only on the concentration of
the by-products but also on their mixture. Hence, no clear-cut rule can be formulated regarding
the effects of these chemicals on XLPE insulation aging [4.63].
Another potential aging mechanism is hydrolytic29 degradation of mylar (polyethylene

terephthalate) shield film under exposure to high temperature and moisture. Under this
mechanism, water increasingly reacts with the mylar polymer as temperature is increased30
[4.64]. Normally, the mylar shield in an electrical cable is contained completely within an overall
jacket; however, moisture may ingress to the shield through the ends of the cable (which may be
loosely wrapped, such as in twisted shielded pair configurations) or through cuts or other damage
to the jacket.
In general, the effects of the chemical decomposition processes on the penetration population
appear to be negligible because the number of components producing such by-products is small
and the severity of the effects of these by-products when produced is limited.
Degradation of thermal insulation (such as piping lagging) may also result in the production of
harmful chemical byproducts. For example, chloride ions present in some types of lagging may
be leached from the insulation during exposure to moisture or wetting; this can produce various
types of corrosion, including chloride stress corrosion cracking in susceptible materials such as
austenitic stainless steel.

Electrical Penetrations
No chemical stressors or aging mechanisms unique to electrical penetration assemblies were

identified. As discussed in the preceding paragraph, decomposition of certain cured organic
materials is specific to EPAs (such as those produced by thermal or radiolytic decomposition of
28
AC breakdown strength of compression molded XLPE is increased, whereas the impulse breakdown strength is
reduced.
29
Hydrolysis refers to the reaction of the ester group linking the polymer chain with water.
30
Figure 3 of Reference [4.64] indicates less than 100 hours average life at 100 RH at 110°C [230°F], approximately
one year at 70°C [158°F], and roughly 20 years at 50°C [122°F].
4-59
penetration lead insulation). Additionally, corrosion of certain metallic components may occur
due to exposure to moisture, oxygen, and other influences.
4.6.2.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Chemical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects -
Electrical Penetrations
Metallic Components
If moisture is present on metallic EPA components, then general (oxidation) corrosion may be
significant. Stainless steel components are generally exempt from the effects of oxidation
corrosion; however, other types of metals (including low-alloy carbon steel) are susceptible.
Usually, sufficient oxygen is present to permit oxidation corrosion; exceptions may include those
components contained completely within inert environments (such as the interiors of purged
canister EPAs). Stress corrosion cracking is usually not of significance for EPAs because the
requisite tensile stress and other required factors (such as ionic species) are absent.
Nonmetallic Components
Degradation of nonmetallic components due to chemical stressors in the form of contamination

is potentially significant if:
i. Penetration inspection, maintenance, testing and refurbishment activities are not controlled in
a manner which ensures that the surfaces of nonmetallic penetration components are not
exposed to contaminants.
ii. Nonmetallic penetration component surfaces are not protected from contamination during
operational and maintenance activities, including cleaning, of other nearby components.
iii. Nonmetallic penetration component surfaces are not protected from contamination due to the
degradation of other penetration components such as thermal insulation.
iv. Nonmetallic penetration component surfaces are not thoroughly inspected for contaminants
and any contaminants identified are removed prior to plant restart from the refueling/outage
mode.

Stress Corrosion Cracking
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is an aging mechanism that is primarily associated with
austenitic stainless steel materials. The three conditions necessary for SCC are a sensitized
material (due to the manufacturing and/or installation process) a high tensile stress (residual or
applied) and a suitably aggressive environment. Higher temperature encourages SCC, which will
4-60
generally not occur below 121°C [250°F] unless aggressive contaminants (such as chloride) are
present. The penetration components made from austenitic stainless steel include the piping
penetration expansion joints, the fuel transfer penetration tube, flange, fasteners, and expansion
joint, and some of the airlock mechanical system components.
The tube, flange, and fasteners that are part of the fuel transfer tube penetration may be exposed
to high tensile stress levels (residual or applied) and, therefore, are susceptible to SCC. Some of
the stainless steel airlock components are subjected to high tensile stress but only for short
periods of time when the airlock is being operated. The stainless steel expansion joints may be
subjected to high tensile stress (particularly in the bellows area where geometry causes high local
stresses) at all times. These expansion joints may be subject to water environments part of the
time as well as be contaminated with materials (fluids, chlorides, sulfides, etc.) that encourage
the initiation of SCC and crack growth. Several instances of transgranular stress corrosion
cracking of piping penetration expansion joint bellows have occurred at nuclear plants in the last
5 years. Therefore, stress corrosion cracking for the piping and fuel transfer tube stainless steel
expansion joints and the fuel transfer tube penetration tube, flange, and fasteners is potentially
significant.
4.6.3.1 “If-Then” Criteria for Chemical Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects -
Corrosion of Metals
The if-then criteria for corrosion of penetration components is as follows:
a. Oxidation corrosion is not significant for stainless steel materials.
b. Oxidation corrosion is not significant for coated, accessible, carbon steel surfaces provided
that (a) the initially specified and installed protective surface coating was at least 50 mils
thick, did not contain any cracks, pinholes and/or porous areas, and was qualified for
exposure to accident conditions, and (b) the coating is inspected and repaired, as required,
during each refueling. Microbiologically influenced corrosion could be a concern for BWR
piping penetrations under suppression pool water, unless the suppression pool water is
treated.
c. Oxidation corrosion is significant for uncoated carbon steel components.
d. Galvanic corrosion of carbon steel, aluminum and copper surfaces is significant if they are
within a wetted or high humidity environment and are adjacent to other metals at the cathodic
end of the galvanic scale with significant surface areas.
Stress Corrosion Cracking
The if-then criteria for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of penetration components is as follows:
4-61
Stress corrosion cracking is significant only for stainless steel penetration components under
high tensile stress (residual or applied) in a moist or wetted environment or in an environment
contaminated with small amounts of chloride, fluoride or sulfates.
Chemical/Contamination
See Section 4.6.2.1.
4.7 Effects of Oxygen
Another consideration in organic material aging and degradation relates to the concentration of
oxygen in local atmosphere. The thermal and radiation-induced degradation described above
may proceed without the presence of oxygen; however, oxygen-related degradation processes
stimulated by heat or radiation (thermoxidative or radiation-induced oxidation) within polymers
are often dominant over these mechanisms. Accordingly, although a few polymers actually age
slower in oxygen (as opposed to nitrogen or other inert gases), the presence of oxygen increases
the aging rate of most common penetration polymers [4.48, 4.69, 4.51]. Higher concentrations of
oxygen often result in greater oxidation reaction rate and, hence, more rapid degradation of the
physical properties of the material. The aging may also affect the material in nonuniform
fashion; if oxygen diffusion occurs slowly with respect to the rate of reaction, sections of the
polymer unexposed to oxygen will experience less deterioration [4.48, 4.55, 4.65]. However, that
the mechanical properties of the outer surface of the penetration polymer will sometimes dictate
those of the polymer as a whole.
For most polymers, environments with reduced oxygen concentration will produce reduced rates
of aging. Accordingly, organic penetration components located inside nitrogen-purged primary
containments may experience a somewhat lower aging rate (as compared to an oxygen
environment). Although the rate of degradation is also coupled to several other factors, including
temperature, ohmic heating, radiation dose/dose rate, and penetration configuration/construction,
the presence of oxygen is often a very significant determinant of the aging rate for these
materials. It should also be recognized that some electrical penetration designs use inert gas
(such as nitrogen or argon) to purge the interior of the penetration assembly to aid in controlling
the formation of condensation and corrosion (as well as leak detection). Accordingly, organic
components such as seals and O-rings exposed to this environment could be expected to age
more slowly than similar components exposed to a normal atmosphere under the same
conditions.
4.8 Effects of Ozone

In addition to the effects of oxygen described above, the degradation of certain organic
penetration materials may be affected by the presence of ozone (O3) in the surrounding media.
Ozone is generated in air as a result of the interaction of ionizing radiation with oxygen.
Reference [4.14] documents an investigation performed into the effects of ozone on SBR and
Buna-N rubbers under gamma irradiation.
4-62
Conclusions of this study indicate that the heterogeneous degradation of these materials due to
irradiation is the result of two processes: (1) radiation-induced oxidation coupled with oxygen
diffusion effects, and (2) ozone effects in the surface regions of the sample. The study also
suggests that the presence of ozone and ionizing radiation may be synergistic in their effect on
these materials.
References [4.66] and [4.67] indicate that the presence of tensile stress on elastomers in the
presence of ionizing radiation tends to increase the likelihood of ozone-induced damage in the
form of macroscopic surface cracks that propagate progressively through the thickness of the
material. The testing described in Reference [4.14] subjected SBR specimens to irradiation under
tension (15% elongation), resulting in the formation of substantial cracks at a dose of 3 x 105 Gy
[3 x 107 rad].
The applicability of these observations to other commonly used penetration organic materials
was not determined. Buna-N and SBR are not common penetration materials. It can be
postulated that the effects of ozone are implicitly considered in the material-specific radiation
threshold and degradation data referenced in Section 4.5, because a good number of these studies
were conducted in oxygenated environments. However, many studies were conducted in inert
environments (nitrogen, argon, or vacuum), and some studies performed in air were conducted
with limited volumes of oxygen that may have been largely consumed during testing [4.15, p.
2.6-1]. It is uncertain if all radiation threshold values set forth in Section 4.5 necessarily include
the effects of ozone degradation. Furthermore, the application of compressive stress (as opposed
to tensile stress) may produce varying results.
4.9 Combined Aging Environments
4.9.1 Synergisms
Combinations of stressors acting on a given penetration component may produce synergistic

degradation effects. A synergistic effect is defined as an effect on a material of two or more
stresses applied simultaneously, which is different in magnitude or type than the summed effects
of the same stresses applied separately [4.48]. Two commonly acknowledged synergisms
applicable to components covered under 10 CFR 50.49, namely dose-rate effects and sequence
effects, are discussed in Section 4.5.1. Other potential synergistic stressor combinations that may
affect penetration aging include: (1) voltage stress in the presence of moisture; (2) bending stress
(tensile elongation) or compression of thermal aged and/or irradiated organic penetration
materials; (3) thermal aging/irradiation of organic materials in oxygenated environment; and (4)
exposure of susceptible metallic penetration components to oxygen, tensile stress, moisture, and
ionic species.
4.9.2 Sandia Research on Combined Thermal-Radiation Aging Environments
Investigation performed by Sandia National Laboratories into combined thermal and radiation
aging environments is documented in References [4.58], [4.59], and [4.68]. As previously
discussed, aging of most materials under a sequential aging regimen is comparable to that of a
combined (simultaneous) environment. However, for some materials under certain conditions,
4-63
this may not be the case. The properties of several common cable insulation and jacket materials
under combined thermal/radiation environments were studied in an attempt to better understand
the behavior of these materials under “normal” plant aging conditions. The data are potentially
useful when considering penetration aging management from two perspectives: (1) electrical
cable is often used in electrical penetrations, and (2) many of the same or similar materials
studied by Sandia are used to fabricate other penetration components (such as seals).
The approach used in the Sandia investigation was to expand upon existing time-temperature
superposition methodology (commonly embodied by the Arrhenius relationship) through
development of functional relationships between isothermal dose versus dose-rate curves for
various materials. These relationships were then extrapolated to predict the time to equivalent
damage (TED) as a function of dose rate for various aging temperatures. In this manner, the time
to achieve a given damage (in this case, degradation of material tensile elongation to a
predetermined value) can be predicted for a given aging temperature, thereby providing an
estimate of material longevity under combined thermal and radiation environments. Figure 4-6
shows a plot of time to equivalent damage (TED) versus radiation dose rate for an EPR material,
as predicted by the time-temperature-dose rate superposition model.
Figure 4-6
Time to Equivalent Damage (TED) versus Radiation Dose for Anaconda EPR (FR-EP)
Insulation Material
Results of the Sandia model predictions for very low dose rates to those of the standard time-
temperature (Arrhenius) model show generally good consistency. For example, as shown in
Figure 4-6, the curve for the 65°C [149°F] aging temperature indicates a time to reach 100%
absolute elongation of greater than 100 years for a dose rate of 0.1 Gy/hr [10 rad/hr], or 5.3
megarad over 60 years). Therefore, at dose rates much lower than 0.1 Gy/hr [10 rad/hr], the
predicted life (time to equivalent damage = TED) is far in excess of 100 years. The Arrhenius
model (Figure 4-1) predicts a time to reach 50% relative elongation of several hundred years
at 65°C [149°C]; hence, the results of both models are seemingly consistent. Other materials
show similarly consistent results at low dose rates. One significant inconsistency is evidenced
by the data for silicone rubber; the Sandia model indicates a lifetime at 65°C [149°F] and low
dose (<0.01 Gy/hr [<1 rad/hr]) between 10 and 100 years, whereas the Arrhenius projection of
Figure 4-1 shows a lifetime in excess of 106 years at the same temperature. Closer examination
4-64
of the activation energies used, however, shows a great disparity between the Sandia value
(21 kcal/mole, or 0.91 eV) and the value derived from a manufacturer’s qualification report
(1.81 eV);31 this disparity explains the large difference in results, and underscores the sensitivity
of the Arrhenius method to choice of activation energy.
As part of the Sandia studies, the concept of “approximate life” is used. Approximate life is
defined as the time required for the elongation of a material to decrease to 100% absolute under
“normal” plant conditions of 45°C [113°F] and 0.1 Gy/hr [10 rad/hr]. This concept is completely
arbitrary (i.e., a different endpoint, such as 20% compression set, could have been chosen) and
also distinct from that of qualified life previously described. Approximate life simply provides an
estimate of the longevity of a material under the assumed plant conditions, based on the time-
temperature-dose rate superposition model. Table 4-8 lists some of the approximate life values
predicted by the Sandia model for various materials in combined thermal-radiation aging
environments.
Table 4-8
Sandia Combined Environments Methodology Research Cable Insulation and Jacket
Materials
1
Material Application Approximate Life
(Years)
CSPE (Hypalon) Insulation >100
CSPE (Hypalon) Jacket ~90
EPR Insulation >100
ETFE (Tefzel) Insulation ~100
LDPE Insulation ~10
Neoprene Rubber Jacket ~5
PVC Jacket ~60
Silicone Rubber Insulation ~50
XLPE (including XLPO) Insulation >100
Note: 1. Derived from SAND90-2009 [4.16] and SAND91-0822 [4.58].
Part of the basis for the approximate life values listed in Table 4-8 was a radiation dose rate of
0.1 Gy/hr [10 rad/hr], which equates to a total dose of approximately 5.3 x 104 Gy [5.3 x 106 rad]
over 60 years. As previously stated, this is roughly the same order of magnitude as the damage
threshold radiation value for many penetration component polymers, and equates to doses found
only in locations within primary containment. A value of 0.1 Gy/hr [10 rad/hr] is substantially
above the dose rate for most areas outside primary containment; hence, the lifetimes predicted
for these areas under the Sandia model would necessarily be longer, and would approximate
thermal-only (e.g., time-temperature superposition) aging as the dose rate approaches zero. Thus,
the approximate life values listed above would seem to be primarily applicable to penetration
components located inside of primary containment or otherwise exposed to more significant
radiation doses.
31
Note that the manufacturer of the silicone penetration used by Sandia (Rockbestos) was the same as that for the
penetration from which the thermal aging data were obtained.
4-65
Because there is little correlation between a given reduction in elongation and compression set
(or other potentially relevant properties), the Sandia data are of somewhat limited specific
applicability to many penetration organic components (such as seals). However, the general
observation stated above (i.e., that in low-dose environments, the predicted behavior is generally
consistent with that predicted by the purely thermal kinetic models such as Arrhenius, and that at
higher doses, greater divergence occurs) is seemingly applicable. Therefore, it could be expected
that organic penetration components installed in higher TID environments (such as inside
containment) would tend to show greater reduction in their physical properties as compared to
those aged in purely thermal or low TID environments.
4.10 Discussion of Material Similarity

Although it is common to describe organic components using the name of the base polymer
(such as silicone, EPR or XLPE), the constituents used to make these components includes
materials other than the base polymer in order to obtain specific performance characteristics that
cannot be obtained from the base polymer alone. For example, an actual electrical cable
insulation may contain the following: base polymer, clay, fire retardants, anti-oxidants, coloring
agents, and anti-radiation compounds. Table 4-9 shows the chemical composition of a typical
EPR formulation for nuclear plant cable [4.58].
In general, the larger the fraction of non-base polymer additives, the more widely the physical
characteristics and performance of the compound may vary from those of the base. Additives
often constitute in excess of half of the formulation. Because the additives are proportioned on a
weight basis and usually have higher densities than the base polymer, the base polymer still may
account for a large percentage of the volume of the insulation. Manufacturers have their own
proprietary formulations for each type of application of an insulation identified by the base
polymer. Some manufacturers often do not even identify the base polymer, choosing to maintain
this information proprietary. In some cases, the components must meet common requirements
(for example, the ICEA standards for electrical cable), and the basic characteristics of an
insulation are the same irrespective of the manufacturer.
Table 4-9
Chemical Formulation of Typical “EPR” Insulation [4.58]
Parts per
Constituent
Hundred (pph)
EPDM 90
Low density polyethylene 20
Zinc oxide 5
90% Red lead dispersion 5
Paraffin wax 5
Zinc salt of mercaptobenzimidazole 2
Low temperature reaction product
of acetone and diphenylamine 1
Treated calcined clay 60
Vinylsilane 1
SRF black 2
Diadduct of hexachlorocyclopentadiene
and cyclooctadiene 33
Antimony oxide 12
Dicumyl peroxide 3
4-66
When evaluating the longevity or performance of a particular organic material with respect to
thermal, radiation, or other aging influences, the specific composition of the material may play
an important role. Thermal or radiation aging evaluations such as those previously discussed
ideally should be based on material aging data pertinent to the specific formulation in use at the
plant as opposed to data for a generically similar material. This is particularly true of
environmentally qualified components, because the demonstration of post-accident functionality
is dependent on the properties of the specific materials used during qualification testing. For non-
EQ components or those qualified by analysis, use of generic aging data may be the only viable
alternative for the reasons stated below. Examination of laboratory test data for various
penetration system materials during preparation of this AMG [4.16, 4.22, 4.48, 4.49, 4.52, 4.58]
has indicated that the performance of two ostensibly similar materials (e.g., belonging to the
same generic class) may vary widely based on differences in chemical formulation.
At present, the exact chemical compounding of many organic materials cannot be readily
determined because (1) manufacturers will often maintain the formula of their material
proprietary, (2) variations in the product may occur within a given production period in the
manufacturing facility, (3) the manufacturer may not keep records of adequate specificity for the
required historical time period, and (4) many manufacturers of components installed in nuclear
plants are no longer in business, or the product lines have been sold and marketed under different
trade names and formulations. Furthermore, the manufacturer’s source for the base polymer or
other constituents of a given material may have changed over the course of time. 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B quality assurance requirements are applicable only to safety-related components;
hence, manufacturer traceability for chemical formulation is more likely to exist for such
components. For non-safety-related components (especially those manufactured many years
ago), information as to precise formulation may be lost altogether.
With regard to EQ components, 10 CFR 50.49, paragraph (f) indicates that electrical equipment
important to safety may be qualified through testing or analysis of identical or “similar” items.
No additional regulatory guidance as to what constitutes an adequate demonstration of material
similarity was located during the preparation of this AMG. IEEE 323-1983 discusses material
similarity and indicates that the materials of construction of the item to be qualified should be
either the same or equivalent as those tested; any differences identified should be shown not to
affect safety function.
A certificate of conformance (C of C) is typically issued from the component manufacturer

indicating that a particular component is certified to a particular qualification test report; the
basis for this certification is the identical nature of the materials and configuration of the tested
component to that of the component in question.
4.11 References
4.1 “Nuclear Power Plant Common Aging Terminology,” prepared by MPR Associates, Inc.
for the Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI TR-100844, November 1992.
4.2 Harper, C. A., Handbook of Plastics and Elastomers, McGraw-Hill, 1975.
4-67
4.3 Du Pont E-46315, “The Engineering Properties of Viton Fluoroelastomer,” E. I. Du Pont

de Nemours, Inc. (undated).
4.4 Physical Sciences Corporation, “Environmental Capabilities of Electrical Penetration

Assemblies,” Revision 2, January 21, 1971.
4.5 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. Elastomer Chemicals Department Report SD-157,
“Comparative Heat Resistance of Hypalon and Neoprene,” K. H. Whitlock, February 8,
1982.
4.6 Rockbestos Report QR-7802, “Qualification of Firewall SR Class 1E Electric Cables,”

March 2, 1978.
4.7 Rome Technical Report, “Long-Time Aging Data,” Rome (Cyprus) Cable Corporation
(undated).
4.8 “Review of Polyimide Insulated Wire in Nuclear Power Plants,” EPRI NP-7189,
February 1991.
4.9 “A Review of Equipment Aging Theory and Technology,” prepared by Franklin

Research Center, EPRI NP-1558, September 1980.
4.10 “Equipment Qualification Reference Manual,” EPRI TR-100516, 1992.
4.11 Gillen, K. T., R. L. Clough, and N. J. Dhooge, “Density Profiling of Polymers,” Polymer,
Vol. 27, p. 225, 1986.
4.12 Gillen, K. T. and R. L. Clough, “Occurrence and Implications of Radiation Dose-Rate

Effects for Material Aging Studies,” Radiat. Phys. Chem., Vol. 18, p. 679, 1981.
4.13 Clough, R. L. and K. T. Gillen, “Investigation of Cable Deterioration Inside Reactor

Containment,” Nuclear Technology, Vol. 59, p. 344, 1982.
4.14 Clough, R. L. and K. T. Gillen, “Polymer Degradation Under Ionizing Radiation: The
Role of Ozone,” J. Polym. Sci., P. C. Ed., Vol. 27, p. 2313, 1989.
4.15 NUREG/CR-4301 (SAND85-1309), “Status Report on Equipment Qualification Issues

Research and Resolution,” November 1986.
4.16 SAND90-2009, “Predictive Aging Results for Cable Materials in Nuclear Power Plants,”
Sandia National Laboratories Report, November 1990.
4.17 NTS Report No. 558-1088, “LOCA Nuclear Qualification of FR EPDM, X-Linked
Polyolefin & EPDM/Hypalon for Eaton Cables,” October 9, 1981.
4.18 FRC/FIRL Report F-C4350-4, “Anaconda EPR Insulated CPE Jacketed Cables Subjected
to Thermal Aging, Gamma Radiation and a LOCA Simulation,” July 1976.
4-68
4.19 Elliot, D. K., “A Standardized Procedure for Evaluating the Relative Thermal Life and
Temperature Rating of Thin-Wall Airframe Insulation,” IEEE Transactions on Electrical
Insulation, Vol. EI-7, No. 1, March 1972.
4.20 SAND96-0344, “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants -
Electrical Cable and Terminations,” September 1996.
4.21 Parker O-Ring Handbook, Publication No. ORD-5700, Parker Seal Group, 1982.
4.22 SAND88-0754, “Time-Temperature-Dose Rate Superposition: A Methodology for

Predicting Cable Degradation Under Nuclear Power Plant Aging Conditions,” prepared
by K. T. Gillen and R. L. Clough, Sandia National Laboratories Report, August 1988.
4.23 “Standard Handbook for Electrical Engineers,” Twelfth Edition, McGraw-Hill, 1987.
4.24 “Guide for Monitoring Equipment Environments During Nuclear Plant Operation,”
EPRI NP-7399, June 1991.
4.25 IPCEA Publication No. 53-426 (NEMA WC 50-1976), “Ampacities, Including Effect
of Shield Losses for Single-Conductor Solid-Dielectric Power Cable 15 kV through
69 kV,” 1993.
4.26 IEEE Standard S-135, IPCEA P-46-426, Power Cable Ampacities: Copper and
Aluminum, 1962.
4.27 ANSI/IEEE Standard 141-1986, “IEEE Recommended Practice for Electric Power
Distribution for Industrial Plants.”
4.28 ASTM D395-82, “Standard Test Methods for Rubber Property - Compression Set.”
4.29 Avallone, E. and T. Baumeister III, “Marks Standard Handbook for Mechanical
Engineers,” Ninth Edition, McGraw-Hill, 1987.
4.30 Van Vlack, L., “Materials for Engineering,” Addison Wesley, 1982, p. 73.
4.31 “PWR Containment Structures License Renewal Industry Report,” EPRI TR-103835s,
Revision 1, July 1994.
4.32 “BWR Containment Structures License Renewal Industry Report,” EPRI TR-103840s,
Revision 1, July 1994.
4.33 IEC Report 727-1, “Evaluation of Electrical Endurance of Electrical Insulation Systems -
Part 1,” International Electrotechnical Commission, First edition, 1982.
4.34 IEC Report 727-1, “Evaluation of Electrical Endurance of Electrical Insulation Systems -
Part 2,” International Electrotechnical Commission, First edition, 1993.
4.35 Power Plant Electrical Reference Series, Vol. 4, “Wire and Cable,” EPRI EL-5036, 1987.
4-69
4.36 “Power Plant Practices to Ensure Cable Operability,” Nuclear Maintenance Applications
Center, EPRI NP-7485, July 1992.
4.37 Srinivas, N. N., B. S. Bernstein, and R. A. Decker, “Effects of DC Testing on AC

Breakdown Strength of XLPE Insulated Cables Subjected to Laboratory Accelerated
Aging,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 5, No. 4, October 1990.
4.38 “Effect of DC Testing on Extruded Cross-Linked Polyethylene Insulated Cables,”

EPRI TR-101245, January 1993.
4.39 ANSI/IEEE Standard 142-1982, Grounding of Industrial and Commercial Power

Systems.
4.40 IEEE Standard 48-1975, IEEE Test Procedures and Requirements for High-Voltage AC
Cable Terminations.
4.41 “Low-Voltage Environmentally-Qualified Cable License Renewal Industry Report,

Revision 1,” prepared by Sandia National Laboratories, EPRI TR-103841, July 1994.
4.42 Mashikian, M. S., et al., “Evaluation of Field Aged Crosslinked Polyethylene Cables by
Partial Discharge Location,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 9, No. 2,
April 1994.
4.43 “Effects of Moisture on the Life of Power Plant Cables,” EPRI TR-103834-P1-2,
August 1994.
4.44 Bahder, G., C. Katz, G. S. Eager, et al., “Life Expectancy of Crosslinked Polyethylene
Insulated Cables Rated 15 to 35 kV,” IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and
Systems, Vol. PAS-100, No. 4, April 1981.
4.45 Kaneko, T., et al., “Long-term Characteristics of XLPE Insulated Cable Installed in
Water,” IEEE International Symposium on Electrical Insulation, Pittsburgh, PA, June
1994.
4.46 Scarpa, P., et al., “Electrical Aging of XLPE Power Distribution Cables in Humid
Environment,” IEEE International Symposium on Electrical Insulation, Pittsburgh, PA,
June 1994.
4.47 Proprietary Plant Field Manual for Condition Assessment of Low-voltage

instrumentation and Control Cables and Medium-voltage Power Cables.
4.48 “Radiation Effects on Organic Materials in Nuclear Plants,” prepared by Georgia Institute
of Technology, EPRI NP-2129, November 1981.
4.49 “Radiation Data for Design and Qualification of Nuclear Plant Equipment,” prepared by
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (C.I.T.), EPRI NP-4172M, August 1985.
4-70
4.50 “Natural Versus Artificial Aging of Nuclear Power Plant Components,” prepared by
University of Connecticut, EPRI NP-4997, December 1986.
4.51 ASTM Special Technical Publication 926, “Engineering Dielectrics, Volume IIB,”
American Society for Testing and Materials, 1987.
4.52 NASA SP-3051, Space Materials Handbook, Third Edition, 1969.
4.53 Compilation of Radiation Damage Test Data Halogen-free Cable Insulating Materials,
CERN 89-12, December 31, 1989.
4.54 “Proceedings: Multi Factor Aging Mechanisms and Models, 1992 Workshop,”
EPRI TR-103172, June 1994.
4.55 NUREG/CR-2763, SAND82-1071, “Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Simulation Tests

on Polymers: The Importance of Including Oxygen,” Sandia National Laboratories, July
1982.
4.56 NUREG/CR-3629, “The Effect of Thermal and Irradiation Aging Simulation Procedures
on Polymer Properties,” April 1984.
4.57 IEEE Standard 323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 1974.
4.58 SAND91-0822, “Aging Predictions in Nuclear Power Plants - Crosslinked Polyolefin and
EPR Cable Insulation Materials,” Sandia National Laboratories Report, June 1991.
4.59 Gillen, K. T. and R. L. Clough, “Inhomogeneous Radiation Degradation in Polymers

Studied with a Density Gradient Column,” Radiat. Phys. Chem., Vol. 22, p. 537, 1983 (or
Gillen, K. T. and R. L Clough, Polym. Degrad. and Stabil., Vol. 24, p. 137, 1989).
4.60 NUREG/CR-2157 (SAND80-1796), “Occurrence and Implications of Radiation Dose-

Rate Effects for Material Aging Studies,” June 1981.
4.61 Gill, C. H., “Chemical Engineering Kinetics and Reactor Design,” Wiley, 1977.
4.62 Sax, N. and R. Lewis, “Hawley’s Condensed Chemical Dictionary,” Eleventh Ed., Van
Nostrand Reinhold, 1987.
4.63 “Effect of the Volatile By-Products of the Cross-Linking Reaction on the Dielectric
Strength of Cross-Linked Polyethylene Cables,” EPRI TR-103908, July 1994.
4.64 Dakin, T. W., “Electrical Insulation Deterioration,” Electro-Technology, December 1960.
4.65 NUREG/CR-3643, SAND83-2493, “Heterogeneous Oxidative Degradation in Irradiated

Polymers,” Sandia National Laboratories, April 1984 (See also Clough, R. L., et al., J.
Polym. Sci., P. C. Ed. Vol. 23, p. 359, 1985).
4-71
4.66 Erickson, E. R., R. A. Bernsten, E. L. Hill, and P. Kusy, “A Study of the Reaction of
Ozone with Polybutadiene Rubbers,” from Symposium on Effect of Ozone on Rubber,
ASTM Special Technical Publication No. 229, ASTM, 1958.
4.67 Tucker, H., “The Reaction of Ozone with Rubber,” from Symposium on Effect of Ozone
on Rubber, ASTM Special Technical Publication No. 229, ASTM, 1958.
4.68 Regulatory Guide 1.99, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials, Revision 2,
May 1988.
4.69 Tipler, P., “Modern Physics,” Worth, 1979.
4.70 “Selection Guide for Organic Materials for Nuclear Engineering,” CERN 72-7 (1972).
4-72
5
EVALUATION OF AGING MECHANISMS AND EFFECTS
5.1 Aging Management Review
The revised version of 10 CFR 54 [5.1] discusses the concept of an “aging management review”;
specifically, the Integrated Plant Assessment (IPA) described in Section 2.4 of this AMG must
list those structures and components subject to an aging management review, and must
demonstrate that the effects of aging on the functionality of such structures and components will
be managed to maintain the current licensing basis such that there is an acceptable level of safety
during the period of extended operation. Furthermore, the time-limited aging analyses required
by §54.21 for some SSCs,1 which form the basis of a plant operator’s conclusion regarding the
capability of those SSCs, must consider the effects of aging and be based on explicit assumptions
defined by the current operating term of the plant. The specific methods to be used by the plant
operator in meeting these requirements are not mandated; each operator can select the method(s)
or technique(s) most appropriate for their individual aging management review.
Section 5.2 of this AMG discusses maintenance, surveillance, and condition monitoring
techniques potentially useful in managing the aging of electrical and mechanical penetration
components. Section 5.3 identifies those practices and programs currently being used by plant
operators to maintain their penetrations. Section 5.4 evaluates the effectiveness of these practices
and programs at mitigating the significant aging mechanisms and effects identified in Section 4.
5.2 Maintenance, Surveillance, and Condition Monitoring Techniques for

Evaluation of Electrical and Mechanical Penetrations
Maintenance, surveillance, and condition monitoring are performed to ensure that the
characteristics or attributes of components that are essential for operation are maintained. The
activities performed during the operation, maintenance, testing, and condition monitoring of
electrical and mechanical penetrations may be generally classified as follows:
· Visual or physical inspection
· Measurement of component, circuit, or system properties
· Leak rate testing
1
A time-limited aging analysis (TLAA) would be generically applicable to electrical penetrations in the context of
10 CFR 50.49 (environmental qualification) [5.2]. 10 CFR 54.21(c) requires such analyses to remain valid for the
license renewal term [5.3]; the analysis must be updated or the effects of aging otherwise demonstrated to be
adequately managed during the extended operating period.
5-1
Evaluation of Aging Mechanisms and Effects
· Cleaning
· Component repair or replacement
· Monitoring of temperature or other environmental conditions
· Arrhenius analysis and use of accelerated aging data.
Not all of these activities are applicable to each type of penetration. Generic maintenance,
testing, and condition monitoring activities are discussed in Section 5.2.1. Specific and
programmatic activities applicable to both EPAs (Section 5.2.2) and mechanical penetrations
(Section 5.2.3) are also discussed.
In addition to individual maintenance, surveillance, and condition monitoring techniques,

programs that have the result of managing aging effects on penetration components were
considered. For example, maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 [5.2] can be considered an
aging management program for qualified penetration2 because the net effect is to maintain
adequate post-accident component functionality through establishment of a qualified life. All
plants have existing environmental qualification programs that include some portion of the total
penetration population within their scope. Similarly, a structured penetration inspection program
based on plant-specific operating experience and coupled with root cause analysis and
appropriate corrective action could be considered an aging management program. Many of the
plants contacted as part of this study have similar programs in place. It is also important to note
that some existing plant activities not specifically focused on penetration aging management may
be credited with addressing aging effects.
Preventive Maintenance Programs
The term “preventive maintenance program” encompasses a large number of activities designed
to ensure that nuclear plant components will operate reliably and in accordance with their design
requirements and will need little corrective maintenance. Preventive maintenance program
activities may be applied to the following mechanical and electrical penetration components.
Mechanical
· Fasteners
· Personnel Airlock Mechanical and Electrical Systems
· Steel Expansion Joints
2
Note that the techniques used in determining qualified life (such as Arrhenius and environmental analysis) are
often directly applicable to non-EQ penetrations; see Section 4 for additional information on application of these
techniques.
5-2
Electrical
· Fasteners
· Seals and O-rings
· EPA leads and terminations
· EPA pressure monitoring equipment
The preventive maintenance requirements for fasteners are associated with the visual inspection
of the condition of fasteners (studs, nuts, bolts, washers, etc) when they are disassembled.
Inspection of the surfaces of the fasteners and associated flanges are performed to identify any
surface defects and signs of wear and corrosion. Any abnormalities are investigated and
corrective actions are taken as appropriate. In addition, the reassembly procedures ensure that the
applied torque is within the specified range.
A significant number of preventive maintenance activities are periodically performed for the
personnel airlock mechanical and electrical systems components. Many of these procedures
follow the recommendations of the airlock manufacturer. They include periodic lubrication and
the refurbishment and replacement of high-wear parts such as seals, bearings, gears, lever arms,
swivel joints and hinges. Components are inspected periodically for cracks, wear, or other
degradation.
Although periodic inspection of expansion joint bellows is performed under the Surveillance
Program (Section 5.2.3), some periodic cleaning and refurbishment or replacement of these
bellows may be performed under the preventive maintenance program.
For EPAs, seals and O-rings are inspected and/or replaced upon each disassembly or prior to
expiration of their qualified life (if environmentally qualified). Penetration leads and
terminations are inspected for degradation (including evidence of embrittlement or electrical
tracking). Pressure monitoring instrumentation is normally monitored and trended to detect
leakage in the penetration assembly or individual modules.
Maintenance Rule
Nuclear power plant owners must implement the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) [5.4] at their
plants by July 1996. Due to their safety-related function, the containment mechanical and
electrical penetrations are included within the scope of the Maintenance Rule. The Maintenance
Rule is a performance-oriented rule where reliability goals are established for both systems and
individual components. Two aspects of the program for implementing the Maintenance Rule will
support aging management for containment penetrations. The first is associated with the
investigation of maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFF). An MPFF for a penetration
may be a structural failure of a penetration subcomponent that results in compromising the
pressure integrity of the primary containment or causes the deformation of adjacent components,
or the inability to meet the leakage acceptance criteria during a local leak rate test due to a small
hole or crack or a worn seal. The program requires that MPFFs be monitored, that the root cause
5-3
of the failure be investigated, and that a corrective action plan be developed and implemented.
The second aspect is associated with the actual monitoring of penetration performance. To meet
program performance goals and reduce the potential for MPFF occurrences, the results of the 10
CFR 50 Appendix J [5.5] LLRTs for selected mechanical penetrations are trended over time. The
leakage data, along with other performance, maintenance, refurbishment, and modification
history information, can help develop future maintenance activities to ensure meeting reliability
goals. The investigation of MPFFs is considered an aging management activity that can support
the detection and mitigation of any type of degradation for all penetration components. The
trending of leakage test results can identify degradation for the penetration components directly
contributing to primary containment pressure integrity.
5.2.1 Generic Activities
5.2.1.1 Physical Properties by Inspection
One of the best techniques for evaluating penetration component aging is periodic visual and
physical inspection, because the effects of many degradation stressors (including heat, chemicals,
radiation, mechanical stress, moisture, and contaminants) are readily detectable in this fashion.
By simply observing physical changes in penetration components, their relative condition can
often be determined. However, the effectiveness of this technique at detecting degradation may
be limited under some circumstances; depending on the type of degradation mechanisms at work,
a component that exhibits no outward indications of degradation may nonetheless be degrading
at a significant rate, depending on its application.3
General physical properties to consider when performing physical inspections of components

include:
· Flexibility
· Cracking
· Texture (including crazing)
· Color
· Size (swelling or shrinkage)
· Physical integrity (tight or loose)
· Deformation/compression set
· Friction
· Flow or leakage
3
This limitation is also true of many other techniques, as discussed below.
5-4
Additionally, the presence of one or more of the following may be indicative of degradation:
· Dirt, dust, contamination
· Moisture/humidity
· Chemicals
· Corrosion products
· Wear products
Degradation affecting internal penetration components (such as O-rings, module seals, epoxies,
etc.) can often only be visually assessed through disassembly of the penetration; hence,
maintenance activities that involve such disassembly provide a good opportunity to perform
these inspections. Some components can be inspected during nonmaintenance periods or without
disassembly. For example, terminal blocks in junction boxes connected to penetrations can be
visually inspected during operation for signs of surface tracking, insulator cracking, or other
degradation. Similarly, corrosion of metallic components or cracking of a weld joint can often be
directly observed.
Table 5-1 correlates various penetration aging mechanisms to their applicable inspection
techniques and indications. These techniques are meant only as a guide, and may not be a
suitable substitute for a more detailed evaluation (such as that specified in Section 5.2.3) and/or
root cause analysis.
5.2.1.2 Cleaning
Cleaning of penetration components is performed in some fashion by a significant percentage of

plants. Cleaning is generally performed coincident with periodic inspections of components or
during related maintenance.
For EPAs, dust and contaminants are removed from potential creep paths and all dielectric
surfaces such as terminal blocks or between conductors (when deenergized). Cleaning of header
plates and blowing dry with nitrogen is also recommended by some manufacturers. Also,
electrical connectors (terminations) in some low-impedance circuits may be susceptible to
oxidation, which may be removed through periodic cleaning of the connector contact surfaces
with an appropriate solvent.
Preventive cleaning of certain mechanical penetration components may be performed as well;

such components could include expansion joint bellows and access sealing surfaces.
Additionally, periodic housekeeping cleaning of components is performed.
5-5
Table 5-1
Inspection Techniques Applicable to Various Degradation Mechanisms - Electrical and Mechanical Penetrations
Indications/Effects of
Stressor Aging Aging Detectable Applicable Inspection Accelerating
Category Mechanism Through Inspection Potential Causes Techniques Factors/Remarks
Thermal Thermal/ Hardening, Ambient or - Visual inspection Oxygen, radiation may
Thermoxidative embrittlement, cracking, localized thermal - Flexibility determination accelerate
discoloration, surface exposure; process - Evaluation of hardness
crazing, shrink-back, or ohmic heating - Evaluation of
melting (in extreme compression set
cases for
thermoplastics),
compression set
Radiation Radiolysis, Hardening, Ambient or - Visual inspection Oxygen, thermal aging may
oxidation embrittlement, cracking, localized radiation - Flexibility determination accelerate
discoloration, surface exposure - Evaluation of hardness
crazing, swelling (with - Evaluation of
moisture), compression compression set
set
Photolysis Crazing, surface UV exposure - Visual inspection of Comparatively few organics
cracking, or (indoor or outdoor) surface are UV sensitive; few if any
discoloration of UV - Flexibility determination penetration components
sensitive materials - Identification of UV exposed to UV sources
source
Displacement Embrittlement, Neutron exposure - Visual inspection Requires very high neutron
discoloration, or - Evaluation of dose; no detectable effects
hardening of metals hardness/flexibility anticipated for penetration
components
Mechanical Bending/ Cracking of embrittled Bending or - Visual inspection Frequently handled

Manipulation organics handling during - Flexibility determination components most
maintenance or - Evaluation of hardness susceptible
inspection
5-6
Table 5-1
Inspection Techniques Applicable to Various Degradation Mechanisms - Electrical and Mechanical Penetrations (Continued)
Wear Friction; wear products Assembly/ - Visual inspection Frequently maintained

(fasteners, disassembly; - Feel during components most
terminations inadequate assembly/disassembly susceptible
and other lubrication
hardware)
Work Hardening, Bending or - Visual inspection Work hardening of leads

Hardening discoloration, and handling during - Evaluation of considered unlikely due to
ultimate failure of metals maintenance hardness/flexibility minimal handling
Compression Permanent deformation Compressive - Visual inspection for

Set of seals, gaskets, stress coupled deformation
O-rings with exposure - Measurement of
to heat, radiation, dimensions
chemicals, and/or
oxygen
Damage from External cuts, tears, Personnel traffic; - Visual inspection High maintenance or traffic
External chips, or abrasions equipment areas, restricted spaces,
Influences vibration; incidental exposed sharp corners or
contact; poor edges
maintenance or
installation
practices
5-7
Table 5-1
Inspection Techniques Applicable to Various Degradation Mechanisms - Electrical and Mechanical Penetrations (Continued)
Moisture Visible moisture, Condensation/ - Visual inspection Many EPAs fabricated from
Intrusion discoloration, corroded wetting of stainless steel and purged
metallic components susceptible with inert gas to counter
nearby, damaged material effects of condensation
penetration leads
(conductors/terminations)
Chemical Chemical Discoloration, softening, Spill, spray, or - Visual inspection See Table 4-7 for
Reaction with swelling, odors other contact with - Evaluation of material compatibility of materials with
Organics chemical agent; hardness various substances
decomposition of
jacket/insulator
Electro- Oxidation of Discoloration; formation of Oxidation of - Visual inspection Accelerated by oxygen and
Chemical metals surface layer nonprotected susceptible material
metals
Corrosion of Discoloration; formation of Exposure of - Visual inspection

metals corrosion byproducts such susceptible metals - NDT evaluation
as iron oxides or cuprous to combination of (ultrasound, etc)
chloride; pitting; wastage; moisture, ionic
cracking species, oxygen,
and/or tensile
stress
5-8
The following substances have been found generally acceptable by various manufacturers for
cleaning of penetration components:
· “Freon” TF (Trichlorotrifluoroethane)
· “Freon” TWD 602 (“Freon” TF with water and detergent)
· Mild detergents and soaps
· Denatured alcohol (“Isopropyl”)
The following substances are generally not recommended for use on penetrations:4
· 1, 1, 2, 2 - Tetrachloroethane
· 1, 1, 1 - Trichloroethane (e.g., “Vythene”)
· Acetone
· Alcohols (except as noted above)
· Benzene (benzol)
· Carbon tetrachloride
· Cellosolve solvent
· Chlorobenzene
· Chloroform
· Cyclohexanone
· Esters (e.g., ethylacetate)
· “Freon 22”
· “Freon” TA (“Freon” TF + acetone)
· “Freon” TE (“Freon” TF + ethanol)
· Heptane
· Kerosene
· Methylene chloride
· Methyl ethyl ketone
· Mineral spirits (e.g., “Varson”)
· Most regular gasolines
· Naphtha
4
One utility procedure examined recommends cleaning the penetration header plate facing with methyl ethyl ketone
(MEK) applied on a lintfree towel [5.6].
5-9
· Tetrachloroethylene (“Perclene”)
· Toluene
· Trichloroethylene (a degreasing solvent)
· Turpentine
· Xylene (xylol)
In all cases, the manufacturer’s guidance should be consulted before using any substance for
cleaning penetration components [5.7, 5.8].
5.2.1.3 Temperature and Radiation Monitoring
Infrared Thermography
Infrared thermography is a nondestructive maintenance and surveillance technique used to detect

and evaluate component heating. Thermography is not a condition monitoring technique itself;
rather, it can be used to identify and describe thermal aging influences on cable systems.
All materials radiate infrared energy. The hotter the component, the more energy radiated.
Infrared detectors can sense infrared radiant energy and produce electrical signals proportional to
the temperature of the targeted component. The instruments use optics to gather and focus
energy from the targets onto infrared detectors. Infrared detectors are available in two basic
types, namely, spot measuring and scanning, and have sensitivities on the order of ±0.1°C
[±0.18°F] with rapid response times. Reference [5.9] provides a detailed description of the
systems. Scanning systems with recording capability are preferred over spot measuring systems
in that exposed penetration components with elevated temperature (such as leads and
terminations) can be readily compared to surrounding components. If thermographic scans had
been performed, then comparisons could be made and variations in thermal images could be
evaluated to determine if these hotter areas are developing or changing.
Infrared thermography is primarily useful for electrical penetrations in identifying comparatively

high temperature power leads (conductors) or terminations associated with a given EPA. Such
high temperatures may be the result of operation of power circuits at ampacity levels near the
ampacity limit of the conductor, exposure to external heat sources (such as nearby process
piping), or as a result of ohmic heating of high resistance lead terminations. Typically,
instrumentation and control circuits will not operate at sufficient current levels to generate any
substantial ohmic heating (for either the conductor or terminations); however, EPAs carrying
these circuits may be exposed to external heat sources. Exposure to high temperatures could
degrade the surrounding organic materials, and cause eventual electrical or pressure sealing
failure. Identifying such high temperature components could allow correction of the condition
before significant degradation occurred. At a minimum, more frequent observation of the suspect
component could be performed to determine if the condition is stable or worsening.
5-10
Operational and environmental factors must also be considered when taking thermographic
readings. For example, equipment connected to the cable should be in a normal operational
mode, and the plant operating at normal power levels when data are taken. Additionally, other
circuits served by the EPA(s) under evaluation should be in a normal operating state because
they may contribute heat to the EPA as a whole and affect the peak temperature obtained for
various components. Likewise, fluctuations in the ambient environment (both inside and outside
of containment) can affect these temperatures.
The techniques described above for infrared monitoring of EPAs can also be applied to many
types of mechanical penetrations where heat generation and/or degradation of organic
components is of concern.
Environmental Monitoring
Environmental monitoring is a general term for methods by which plant operators may more
accurately characterize the environment(s) in which their penetrations operate. The aging of
penetration components is related to the thermal, radiation, mechanical, electrical, and chemical
environments to which they are exposed. Although the operating environments for many
penetrations cannot be significantly altered to reduce thermal or radiolytic degradation, more
complete understanding of these environments may be useful for extending the lives of both
environmentally qualified and nonqualified penetrations. In the environmental qualification
context, assumptions made regarding the service environment of penetrations may be overly
conservative or not representative of actual thermal or radiation exposure. By more accurately
characterizing the exposure of penetrations in plant areas where heat or radiation exposure
currently limit the qualified life of these components, increases in qualified life may be realized.5
This technique may also have applicability to nonqualified applications, in that estimates of
penetration longevity based on thermal or integrated radiation dose analyses may vary
significantly with use of actual versus estimated temperature or radiation exposure data.
Current methods used in monitoring plant environments include realtime data collection, use of
passive monitoring devices and data loggers, and extrapolation of known environments to other
plant locations. Realtime systems involve use of portable or installed instrumentation that
directly indicate the parameter being measured (such as a thermocouple or area radiation
monitor). Passive devices, such as film dosimeters and lifetime monitors, are installed in various
areas of the plant for a predetermined period to estimate the integrated exposure at that location.
Data or bit loggers are similar; however, these devices generally record information historically
(e.g., as a function of time), and are periodically removed and their information downloaded for
analysis. Extrapolation involves the modeling of environments in areas that are not well
characterized or instrumented based on data from other plant areas and factors such as equipment
heat loading, HVAC, heat flux through walls and floors, and meteorological conditions. These
methods may be employed in parallel to provide a more comprehensive description of plant
environmental conditions than is possible with one method alone. Reference [5.10] discusses
5
This is perhaps the greatest benefit associated with environmental monitoring for EPAs, based on the high cost of
component or assembly replacement upon expiration of qualified life. See Reference [5.12] for additional
information on cost savings associated with extending the longevity of environmentally qualified EPA components.
5-11
environmental monitoring in detail, including programs employed by various utilities. IEEE Std
1205-1993, Annex B [5.11] provides additional guidance on this topic. According to the utility
survey results discussed in a following section, a significant percentage of respondent plants
indicated that they used continuous temperature monitoring of their electrical penetration
assemblies.
In terms of mechanical penetrations, temperature monitoring is used for hot piping penetrations
to monitor the maximum temperature in the vicinity of the penetration. The bulk temperature of
the containment is continuously monitored by a series of temperature sensors located within the
primary containment in accordance with the surveillance program. These sensors will not,
however, determine locally high temperatures in the vicinity of specific hot piping penetrations.
The sensors used for these hot piping penetrations may have instrument wiring such that the
temperature can be periodically monitored or may be fixed independent sensors that record, and
hold within memory, the highest temperature attained. Data are obtained only occasionally,
generally during outages.
Similarly, radiation levels are monitored in the vicinity of certain mechanical penetrations
including selected piping penetrations and the fuel transfer tube penetration. Radiation sensors
are placed in the area where these particular penetrations are located; data are generally obtained
from the sensor only during outages. Usually two sensors are used: one for maximum continuous
radiation levels and one for cumulative radiation dose.
5.2.1.4 Repair and Replacement
Generally, little “repair” of penetration components is possible. In certain cases (such as a

leaking seal or module), adjustment or torquing of components can be effective. However,
failures such as conductor insulation shorting to ground or wear of an airlock mechanism cam
are generally addressed through direct replacement of the degraded component. Repair of
conformal coatings is both possible and desirable, especially in light of the enhanced potential
for corrosion in areas where the coating is damaged (see discussion of protective coating
program below).
Because the great majority of penetration components are not subject to significant aging
degradation (many are metallic or ceramic), typically only the degradable organic components
are replaced. In general, little preventive replacement of penetration components occurs with the
exception of environmentally qualified organic components in EPAs that are approaching the
end of their qualified lives. Replacement of such components is typically scheduled for a time
prior to expiration of the applicable qualified life, and coincident with plant maintenance or
outage periods. Various levels of disassembly of the EPA are required to replace these
components.
Another significant factor weighing in the replacement decision is cost. Penetration assemblies
are generally quite costly (both in terms of material and labor); hence, substantial savings can be
realized through servicing of existing components as opposed to complete replacement. See, for
example, Reference [5.12], which discusses the cost efficiency of preserving the qualification of
5-12
selected EQ components (including penetrations) compared to replacement or refurbishment for

one nuclear plant.
In modular type EPAs, individual modules may be replaced without removal or disassembly of
the rest of the penetration. In older plate and canister designs, however, individual modules are
welded to the header plate such that the weld must be severed to remove the module/conductor.
This generally requires removal of the entire penetration assembly from the containment nozzle.
Some EPA manufacturers (most notably Conax) produce feedthrough modules that adapt to
other manufacturers’ EPAs that are already installed. In this fashion, the design attributes and
benefits associated with the replacement module may be realized without replacement of the
entire penetration assembly. See Appendix C for additional details on feedthrough assembly
design.
Components that are replaced at a periodicity of less than 40 years are exempt from the aging
management review requirements of 10 CFR 54. Similarly, components that are routinely
replaced through periodic or planned maintenance may be eliminated from an aging assessment
(as described in IEEE Std 1205 [5.11]) so long as the replacement interval is short enough to
ensure no loss of functionality due to aging.
5.2.1.5 Plant Walkdowns
Periodic walkdown inspections of plant areas are performed daily and prior to plant restart. The
areas included in plant walkdowns are those where both mechanical and electrical penetrations
are located and, therefore, can be effective for identifying penetration degradation.
Routine daily plant walkdowns are conducted in all plant areas except those within primary
containment. Therefore, the accessible portions of penetrations outside of primary containment
will be observed during these walkdowns. The purpose of these routine walkdowns is to notice
any abnormal physical conditions (such as rust, dents, cracks, deformation, discoloration,
insulation damage, vibration, leaks, and spills) and any unusual noises.
Plant walkdowns are also performed after refuelings and other planned plant shutdowns and just
prior to or during plant restart. The purpose for these walkdowns is the same as that for the daily
walkdowns; however, during pre-start walkdowns, personnel pay particular attention to areas or
components that were modified, refurbished, or replaced during the outage and to general
housekeeping conditions. These pre-start plant walkdowns are performed within the primary
containment as well as other plant areas. Therefore, all reasonably accessible portions of the
penetrations are observed during these walkdowns.
All abnormal conditions identified during these walkdowns are documented and investigated and
corrective action is taken as necessary. The periodic plant walkdowns are particularly useful for
identifying corrosion and deformation of the mechanical penetration components.
5-13
5.2.1.6 Protective Coating Maintenance Program
The protective coating maintenance program is a plant-wide activity designed to identify areas of
defective paint or coatings on the surfaces of plant components and structures. The program
consists of walkdowns of plant areas at least once every 4 or 5 years for the purposes of
inspecting the condition of corrosion protection coatings on surfaces. These walkdowns are
performed within primary containment and all other plant areas. These walkdowns include the
recording of the coating condition on prepared forms and checks of areas where local
refurbishment of coatings had been performed recently. With regard to mechanical penetrations,
there is some similarity between these coating inspections and the pre-leak rate test inspections
performed as part of surveillance program activities. However, the protective coating inspections
have a single purpose and are performed by personnel trained to identify coating degradation.
Coating degradation identified during these walkdowns is investigated and coating repairs are
planned and scheduled. The investigations may include the measurement of remaining coating
thickness and a review of any corrosion or other damage to the surfaces below the coating. These
walkdowns are effective for checking the condition of coating on all mechanical penetration
components that are coated, such as sleeves, rings, flanges, doors, and end plates. Such coatings
are often not applied to EPA components due largely to their stainless steel construction.
5.2.2 Activities Specific to Electrical Penetration Assemblies
Despite the relative quantity of industry standards applicable to electrical penetrations, little
specific guidance is available for in-situ tests to evaluate the component condition or remaining
qualified life. The great majority of these standards do not address anticipated modes of failure.
One notable exception for electrical penetrations is IEEE 1205-1993 [5.11], which provides
useful information on identifying, assessing, and mitigating the effects of aging degradation in
Class 1E equipment. Although not specifically oriented towards penetrations, much of the
guidance is generically applicable to these devices. The following activities are considered
specific to the aging management of EPAs.
No inspection requirements for EPA electrical components were identified during preparation of
this AMG. However, based on the empirical data presented in Section 3, many of the instances
of EPA component degradation relate to either the electrical leads or sealing components;
accordingly, periodic inspection of these components (including leads and terminations, module
and flange seals, pressure gauges, regulators, and inert gas supplies) may be beneficial in
identifying instances of degradation. Gas leakage through a penetration seal often occurs at a low
enough rate where its detection by sound or feel is unlikely if not impossible; hence, examination
of secondary evidence of leakage (such as reduced or fluctuating seal pressure or rapid use of the
purge gas supply) may be more effective. Arcing, burning, and discoloration around high power
insulators is indicative of electrical tracking, which may result in flashover if not addressed.
Physical manipulation of leads to verify seal integrity (sometimes called “pull testing”) is also
useful if carefully performed.
5-14
5.2.2.2 Measurement of Component or Circuit Properties
Electrical containment penetrations generally require little in the way of periodic maintenance.
Furthermore, many types of degradation identified in Section 4 are not readily detectable through
condition monitoring or other measurement of component properties. Therefore, the list of
condition monitoring and measurement techniques directly applicable to electrical penetrations is
comparatively small. This section describes those techniques and programs that may be useful in
evaluating the condition of various penetration components.
In general, techniques for measuring component properties may be classified as either

destructive or nondestructive.6 Because minimization of component damage and replacement is
desired, nondestructive techniques are almost exclusively used (except, for example, where the
component has already been removed or destroyed, and a destructive measurement technique
would afford additional information on the type of degradation or its root cause). Also, because
the level of reliability is high and the accessibility poor for most components, little is currently
done in the way of condition monitoring.
Because an EPA has two primary functions (i.e., electrical continuity and maintenance of the
containment pressure boundary), existing maintenance/condition monitoring techniques are
focused primarily on these two issues.
For the EPA, electrical circuit continuity exists via conductors that pass through the penetration
assembly to terminations on either end. These conductors are similar in both materials and
configuration to bulk cable installed throughout the plant (often, such bulk cable is used directly
in fabricating the penetration leads). Accordingly, many of the techniques applicable to cable
aging management may in some cases be applied to penetration leads (and associated
terminations). Reference [5.13] describes condition monitoring and measurement techniques
applicable to electrical cable (and their associated terminations) in additional detail.
EPA conductors, by virtue of being electrically interposed between the end device and power
supply/load center for a given circuit, are often subject to testing when the rest of the circuit is
tested. For example, periodic dc hipot testing of reactor coolant pump motor windings via the
load center (as discussed below) necessarily exposes the applicable EPA conductor to the test
voltage.
The following paragraphs present a general description of the applicable technique, a discussion
of its relative advantages and disadvantages, and information regarding its implementation.
6
Some techniques, such as oxidation induction time (OIT) testing, require very small samples of the material being
evaluated for laboratory analysis. Generally, the quantity of material required does not affect the electrical or
mechanical integrity of the insulation; hence, these techniques may be considered essentially nondestructive. See
Reference [5.13] for additional information.
5-15
5.2.2.2.1 Insulation Resistance (IR)/Polarization Index (PI)
Insulation Resistance
Insulation resistance (IR) testing typically uses a direct current to measure the electrical
resistance of a dielectric such as penetration lead insulation to provide an indication of its overall
dielectric capability. The measured resistance of insulation material depends on several factors,
including the geometry of the system being measured and the dielectric resistivity of the
material. Due to the arrangement of the conductor in a typical lead or conductor with respect to
the insulation, the section of the insulation with the lowest dielectric resistivity will generally
determine the characteristics of the entire penetration (parallel resistor concept). The resistance
of dielectrics is usually both time and frequency dependent; this behavior results from the
polarization or charge displacement within the material. Accordingly, current flowing through
the dielectric can be broken down into conductive, capacitive, and absorptive components.
Charge displacement within the material generally occurs within various time frames, ranging
from a few nanoseconds to several seconds or even minutes, depending on the atomic and
molecular processes being considered. Accordingly, one or more time constants7 based on
exponential decline of the polarization current (i.e., transient capacitive and absorptive
components) can be empirically determined for each material. Insulation resistance is typically
measured using commercially available equipment (ohmmeters) with differing dc voltage levels
to measure resistance [5.14]. Voltages of 500 V, 1000 V, and 2500 V are common, although
higher voltages may be used.
IR readings may detect long-term changes due to deterioration of the bulk of the insulation,
which is typical of thermal and chemical aging effects. Localized damage is not readily detected
unless very severe. IR measurements may provide advance warning of some but not all types of
insulation deterioration. Direct current IR measurements are suitable for indication or
identification of gross problems, but are less suited to long-term diagnostics.
The dc insulation resistance of unshielded penetration leads (i.e., those with no metallic shield in
proximity to the outer surface of the insulation) tends to be somewhat erratic due to the absence
of a well-defined ground path; IR, therefore, depends primarily on the surface conditions of the
insulation. Because variations in the surface condition at different locations on the same
penetrations may exist, it is very difficult to formulate any conclusions regarding aging trends
based on the IR obtained from these types of leads. IR can be useful for detecting shorts in
insulation that has been wetted or exposed to steam (even in localized areas) due to the increase
in ion mobility [5.15, 5.16, 5.17]. Surface IR may also be measured on terminal blocks and
similar components as an indication of the presence of degradation or tracking paths.
Alternating current IR measurements are best for locating faults to ground, and are not suitable
for diagnostic measurements [5.18]. Use of alternating current IR is comparatively rare in
general, and no instances of its use on EPAs were noted in this study.
7
Multiple time constants result from the use of more than one material in the chemical formulation.
5-16
IR is generally considered of little use in predicting the aging of a penetration lead [5.19] or other
insulation. IR properties of dielectrics may change little until severe degradation of mechanical
properties occurs. These measurements display some gradual changes with aging, but are
generally nowhere near as sensitive to aging as techniques based on mechanical properties (such
as elongation or compressive modulus) [5.15, 5.18, 5.20, 5.21]. Conversely, even gross
insulation damage may not be evidenced by changes in IR; for example, an insulation cut,
though surrounded by dry air, may not significantly impact IR readings. Acceptance criteria are
difficult to determine due to the many factors that affect IR, including temperature along the
penetrations, humidity, and the condition of the terminations. Testing is usually conducted
pass/fail, but values may not be recorded. Data from one utility indicate some variation in IR as a
function of voltage on low-voltage cable [5.22].
IR is insensitive to thermally induced degradation for SBR, PVC, BR, PE, and EPR [5.23].
Therefore, this technique may be insensitive to advanced thermal degradation before the onset of
significant cracking. Once cracking of the insulator occurs, other techniques (such as partial
discharge) may be effective at detecting these defects [5.23]. The use of computerized IR testing
with multiple sampling over time may allow further refinement of this method.
Electrical components may be tested for IR per IEEE Stds 422-1986 [5.24], 690-1984 [5.25], and
43-1974 [5.26]. IEEE Std 422 testing is performed to determine whether any damage has
occurred to the penetration components during storage or installation. The standard explicitly
states that these tests may not detect damage that may eventually result in penetration (lead)
failure. IR is measured between any possible combination of conductors in the same penetration
lead, and between any conductor and station ground (with all other conductors grounded). In
acceptance testing, IR is used to detect gross installation problems prior to energization.
Detection of such problems can prevent catastrophic damage at first energization. See also the
general guidance contained in IEEE Std 141 [5.27] and ASTM D 257 [5.28] concerning the
measurement of insulation resistance in materials.
Polarization Index (PI)
Insulation resistance varies as a function of time proportional to the polarization current through
the dielectric as described above. The polarization index (PI) is the ratio of the polarization
current at two different times. PI is traditionally measured using the polarization currents at times
of 1 minute and 10 minutes after application; however, because the rate of change of the
polarization current may vary with temperature, different materials, or equipment configurations,
these times may be varied as required to obtain a meaningful result for a specific application.
The basic theory of this test is to compare the initial capacitive, conductive, and absorptive
currents in the dielectric material to the resistive current at a later time. The ratio is indicative of
the state of the dielectric; the higher the ratio, the better the condition of the insulation. A low
polarization index where conductive currents dominate capacitive and absorptive currents may
be indicative of an electrically degraded insulation [5.14]. A value of less than one can indicate
high volumetric leakage [5.29]. The conduction current through the insulation is generally
related to ion mobility; polymers generally have high dielectric resistivity because their ion
mobility is low. The introduction of water into the material can be especially effective at
reducing dielectric resistivity, as water facilitates ion mobility within the material and also
5-17
generally contains ions of its own. Resistivity generally decreases with increasing temperature.
Also, resistivity increases with increasing electrical frequency due to the inability of the
polarizing charges to react to the rapid changes in electric field induced by the test signal
[5.14, 5.21].
PI measurements are subject to many of the same limitations as IR, based on use of common
measurements (e.g., IR). Caution must be exercised in interpretation of PI test results, because
trending of the ratio over time may provide more insight into insulation condition than the results
of one individual test (but does not appear to be sensitive to aging effects).
5.2.2.2.2 Insulation Power Factor
Insulation power factor testing (or Doble testing) is a means by which the condition of cable
insulation may be assessed. The basic premise of this testing is the detection of changes in the
dielectric properties of the insulation, which can be associated with the effects of thermal,
radiation-induced, voltage (partial discharge), or mechanical damage or wetting. The power
factor of an insulation is defined as the cosine of the charging current and voltage vectors [5.30].
In simple terms, insulation power factor is a measure of the stored energy component of the
charging current.
When a dc potential is initially applied to insulation, charging current will vary as a function of
time; a finite period of time is required for the insulation to “charge,” after which the charging
current will stabilize. This effect stems from the energy required to realign dipoles within the
insulation, commonly known as the dielectric absorption loss. However, when an alternating
current is applied to the same insulation, the dielectric field (and therefore alignment of the
dipoles) is never fully accomplished due to the alternating fields; hence, the charging current
remains relatively high, and the dielectric losses roughly constant with time.
Insulation power factor test apparatus (see Figure 5-1) measures the charging current and
dielectric loss from which the power factor, capacitance, and ac resistance may be determined.
As the amount of insulation being tested increases, the charging current and dielectric loss
(in watts) at a given voltage also increases; however, the ratio of these two quantities remains
constant. Therefore, common “normal” insulation values may be established for cables of
varying length.
5-18
Figure 5-1
Simplified Schematic of Insulation Power Factor Test Circuit (Courtesy of Doble
Engineering Co.)
Insulation power factor tests are generally applicable only to shielded medium-voltage cable, and
are made with the circuit out of service [5.22, 5.30, 5.31]. Normal test voltages used for power
factor testing are on the order of 1 to 10 kV. Typical power factor values for cables having
metallic armor or grounded shield are 3 to 5% at 20°C [68°F]; power factors for ungrounded or
unshielded cables may be higher. Increases in power factor with temperature are relatively small
for most modern cable insulation materials [5.31].
Insulation power factor testing is generally more effective at locating insulation defects or
deterioration than dc tests such as IR. It provides a measure of the overall condition of the
insulation, which is independent of the amount of insulation being tested; however, the greater
the amount of insulation tested, the less any defects can be localized [5.31]. Therefore, isolation
of suspect cable runs or components during testing is beneficial. Because the technique uses an
ac signal, it more accurately simulates operating conditions for ac systems (the majority of cable
systems in the typical plant). In addition, because dielectric absorption losses in insulation are
related to the moisture content and the presence of other impurities, small changes in the
moisture content of insulation may result in significant changes in the dielectric losses and
therefore, the required charging current. These changes may be readily detected through
measurement of the charging current and comparison with previous values.
The physical limitations of the test set (in terms of producing the required charging current) may
limit the length of cable that may be tested at one time. Maximum testable cable lengths are
typically on the order of 152 to 304 m (500 to 1000 feet).
5-19
NEMA WC-54 1990 (ICEA T-26-465) [5.32], ASTM D 150 [5.33], and References [5.30] and
[5.31] provide information and guidance on power factor testing of electrical cables and
materials.
5.2.2.2.3 High Potential
Two primary types of high potential (hipot) testing may be used: breakdown and withstand.
Hipot breakdown testing involves the application of either ac or dc signal to an insulator to
determine the voltage at which breakdown of the dielectric occurs (breakdown voltage). Hipot
withstand testing is used to demonstrate that insulation can withstand a given over-voltage
condition, and to detect weak spots in the insulation that could later result in in-service failures.
Hipot breakdown testing may be considered destructive, whereas withstand testing is not.
Accordingly, hipot breakdown is generally not applied to in-situ equipment. Additionally, the
use of alternating current during over-voltage testing may be more damaging to insulation
integrity; therefore, dc is preferred for post-factory testing [5.27, p. 125]. However, some
operators consider ac hipot testing to be more sensitive to locating minute flaws or damage; see
Reference [5.34] for a discussion of ac hipot and partial discharge testing.
Factory hipot tests of cable are generally performed at comparatively high voltage levels
(typically 300 Vdc/mil or 125 Vac/mil) or to customer’s specifications. In addition, cables are
acceptance tested immediately after installation to detect gross damage, usually at voltage levels
on the order of 80% of the factory tests [5.22].
Post-acceptance hipot withstand testing is normally performed only on shielded medium-voltage
power cable,8 using one of two methods: go/no-go, or stepped or incremented voltage
application. In the first method, the voltage applied to the cable is raised rapidly, in one step to
the desired value; if breakdown of the dielectric occurs (as indicated by increasing or stable test
current), the test is failed. In the second method, a voltage is applied and raised in increments
(five or more are recommended). At each increment, exponential decay of the current is expected
(based on polarization of the dipoles in the material, and dissipation of the capacitive and
absorptive currents). If the current continues to increase after a new voltage step, the dielectric is
approaching breakdown and the test is halted. Caution must be used to ensure breakdown is not
reached and the insulation potentially damaged. So long as the instability falls sufficiently above
the normal operating voltage of the circuit, the cable may be returned to service for subsequent
evaluation or replacement [5.35]. Maximum withstand voltages used in post-acceptance testing
may vary significantly based on the industry standard and manufacturer of the cable.
Post-acceptance hipot testing is not performed directly on the conductors of installed electrical
penetrations. However, many plants will perform high-voltage testing of loads or end devices
through the connected power cable and penetration. For example, testing of motor winding
insulation is commonly performed via the load center or switchgear. However, the voltage levels
associated with such testing are typically far below those that would be imposed upon dc hipot
testing of the cable or conductor itself.
8
Although commonly used as production acceptance tests, hipot testing is not normally performed on low-voltage
cable after installation.
5-20
5.2.2.2.4 Capacitance
Capacitance measurements are used to detect the presence of moisture intrusion into insulation.
Moisture present in the insulation (or jacketing, if any) may substantially increase the measured
capacitance of EPA leads. In shielded leads, the capacitance measured will reflect that of only
the interposing dielectric (in this case, the insulation). In unshielded leads applications, the
capacitance measurement will reflect the capacitance of both the lead and the space surrounding
it. Therefore, moisture located either in the jacket/insulation or immediately surrounding the lead
will affect the capacitance.
Because the capacitance of a penetration lead or associated termination may or may not be
affected by age-related degradation of dielectric materials, its use as an aging measurement tool
is limited. Wet insulation may reflect a change in capacitance; however, this change cannot be
coupled to the condition of the insulation. Because the presence of (or changes in) the ground
plane may affect the capacitance reading taken on an unshielded leads, comparison of
capacitance readings to detect moisture intrusion may be better suited to shielded applications.
The capacitance of dry insulation is generally affected little by increases in temperature;
however, the capacitance of wetted insulation may increase significantly [5.22, 5.30, 5.36].
Capacitance measurements may be made through a variety of commercially available equipment,
such as a capacitance bridge or one of the integrated electrical measuring systems described
below. See also Section 6 of the applicable ICEA standard (EM-60 testing) and ASTM D 150
[5.33], D 470 [5.37], and D 4566 [5.38]. Manufacturer’s guidance should also be consulted.
5.2.2.2.5 Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR)
Time domain reflectometry (TDR) testing is used to characterize the impedance of an electrical
circuit [5.19, 5.39, 5.40]. TDR is an electrical technique that applies an electrical radio-frequency
pulse (square wave) into an out-of-service circuit to determine the impedance characteristics of
that circuit. (See also the following discussion of integrated test suites.) Reflectance of the pulse
occurs at those points in the circuit where the electrical impedance changes. The electrical
impedance of a circuit is determined by both real (resistive) and complex (inductive or
capacitive) components within the circuit. When the pulse encounters a change in impedance, a
portion of the signal is reflected from the interface back toward the point of origin. The
magnitude of this reflection is a function of the relationship between the impedance of the
interface and the characteristic impedance of the circuit. Small changes or discontinuities in
impedance result in accordingly small reflections, whereas large variations in impedance produce
large changes. TDR equipment generally plots the reflection coefficient as a function of time
(which can be directly related to distance through knowledge of the signal propagation speed) to
identify and locate changes in circuit impedance. If a baseline plot of the circuit has been
previously obtained, direct comparison of the two TDR signatures can be made to identify
changes in characteristics. Generally, these identifiable changes are from gross variations in
condition such as wetting of a once dry circuit, or increased resistance at a connector interface.
The primary function of TDR testing is diagnosis or troubleshooting, and TDR has been
demonstrated to be effective at detecting and locating degraded components. However, its
application as a predictive aging measurement or condition monitoring tool is questionable in
that very precise baseline signatures of each circuit would be required to distinguish the small
5-21
changes in physical properties induced by aging. This is especially true for penetration lead
insulation degradation, because changes in circuit impedance resulting from changes in
capacitance due to aging are generally negligible with respect to test method capabilities. For
other circuit components such as connectors, splices, and terminations, more readily apparent
changes in the TDR signature due to corrosion or loose connections may be noted [5.19, 5.39,
5.41]. Some data indicate that TDR is capable of detecting small changes in voltage stress in
both shielded and unshielded cables [5.22]. However, the data also indicate that isolation from
external effects may be required to detect such changes in unshielded cables.
5.2.2.2.6 Integrated Measurement Techniques (ECAD and CHAR)
The ECADÔ and CHARÔ systems may be used for condition monitoring and troubleshooting
of deenergized plant circuits, including components such as penetrations, terminal boards, and
splices. Development of these systems began after the need for in-containment testing of circuits
was identified at Three Mile Island. The system applies dc, low frequency ac, and radio
frequency (RF) test signals to the tested circuit to monitor its electrical characteristics. The low-
voltage dc and ac measurements provide lumped values of circuit loop resistance, inductance,
insulation resistance, capacitance, and dissipation factor.
Measurements of these parameters can provide information relating to circuit component
degradation such as insulation deterioration, moisture intrusion (wetting), or corrosion, as well as
other circuit problems (opens, faults, improper grounding, noise, and development of shunt
ground paths). Both system calibration and testing are computer-driven, thereby enhancing
accuracy and test repeatability. Data obtained during testing are automatically stored to facilitate
rapid testing and subsequent retrieval.
The ECAD and CHAR systems are effective primarily for troubleshooting; although they do
provide trendable data, no definitive correlation between measurement of such electrical
parameters and penetration component longevity has been established. Also, temperature and
humidity measurements are required to allow compensation of some readings (such as insulation
resistance) [5.40, 5.42, 5.43]. ECAD/CHAR testing is performed in accordance with
manufacturer’s guidance and applicable plant procedures (see, for example, Reference [5.40]).
5.2.2.2.7 Compressive Modulus
Compressive modulus, a mechanical property of insulation and jacket materials, may be used to
monitor the aging of electrical cables (penetration leads) and other polymer applications such as
seals and gaskets.9 The concept behind compressive modulus testing is simple; an anvil, moving
at a fixed velocity, is pressed into the sidewall of a cable while the force is monitored. A load
cell or similar force-measuring device connected to the anvil monitors the force applied. Once
the anvil touches the material, its total travel is on the order of a fraction of a millimeter (a few
hundredths of an inch). The compressive modulus is calculated by dividing the change in force
by the change in position during inward travel.
9
The term “modulus” typically refers to the modulus of elasticity, or the ratio of unit stress to unit deformation
(expressed in lb/in2) [5.44]. However, the term has been used in relation to the Indenter system for describing the
ratio of the change in applied force to material deformation (lb/in).
5-22
Figure 5-2 depicts the relationship between compressive modulus, elongation, and aging for a
specific cable type.
Compressive modulus is an effective technique for insulation or jacket material that exhibits an
orderly change in properties as it ages.10 Certain rubber and rubber-like materials, such as some
types of EPR, silicone rubber, neoprene, PVC, and CSPE, can be monitored in this manner. The
effectiveness of this technique for measuring the aging of crosslinked polyethylene is currently
under investigation; early results of one testing program indicate that XLPE which has been
considerably aged may exhibit trendable changes in compressive modulus, particularly at
advanced levels of aging [5.45]. See also Reference [5.46], which indicates that degradation of
XLPE can be tracked using compressive modulus. Other programs have indicated no correlation
between modulus and aging for XLPO/XLPE. Additionally, if neoprene or CSPE jackets have
been used on cables/leads with crosslinked polyethylene insulation, the jackets may potentially
be used as indirect aging indicators for the insulation.
Figure 5-2
Relationship Between Compressive Modulus and Aging
10
Note that direct measurement of the compressive modulus of the insulation is not possible for jacketed specimens,
unless portions of the underlying insulation are exposed. However, the condition of the insulation in such cases may
be correlated to the changes observed in the outer jacket modulus through knowledge of the aging characteristics of
both materials.
5-23
Comparison of elongation with compressive modulus by Sandia National Laboratories showed a

good degree of correlation; elongation was found to be a more sensitive aging indicator at lower
doses, whereas compressive modulus was the more sensitive aging indicator at higher doses
[5.47]. Data from one cable aging research program currently underway indicate that for certain
materials, the sensitivity of the compressive modulus technique (i.e., the change in modulus for a
given change in elongation) is relatively low until jacket/insulation elongation has declined
significantly. Accordingly, the technique may not be wholly effective at detecting early changes
in elongation for these materials. Other limitations associated with the use of compressive
modulus include the requirement to develop a correlation between outer jacket and insulation
aging for jacketed cables, and physical configuration effects (e.g., larger variations in modulus)
for certain types of cable.
The Indenter is an example of a currently available test device using the compressive modulus
concept. The system is self-contained and portable, and may be used for both in-situ and
laboratory evaluation [5.48, 5.49]. Laboratory and field test programs have evaluated the efficacy
of the Indenter system at monitoring component polymer aging. Results of these programs
indicate compressive modulus and elongation both showed good correlation with aging for jacket
materials, except for XLPO and other polyethylenes [5.47, 5.50]. In addition to the test
programs, actual field use of the system for cable aging evaluation has also indicated good
correlation between thermal aging and modulus, and the system has been proven effective at
evaluating and profiling cable damage resulting from localized heat and radiation sources (i.e.,
hotspots) [5.48, 5.51]. An EPRI report detailing initial laboratory and in-plant trials with the
Indenter system is currently being published [5.52].
One method of estimating the aging of environmentally qualified cable is through comparison of
the compressive modulus measured for cable samples of the same type artificially aged to the
thermal and radiation levels applied in the original environmental qualification program(s) to
those measured on the in-situ cables. Modulus readings less than those obtained from the
artificially aged specimens would be indicative of comparatively less aging. From this method,
the inference may also be made that so long as the modulus of the in-situ cable remains less than
that of the 40-year equivalent artificially aged specimen, post-accident performance will be
maintained. However, most qualification test specimens were thermally aged and irradiated to
comparatively low elongation values; therefore, use of the qualified condition as the aging
endpoint may not be practical or desirable for cable that is required to maintain significant
elongation (e.g., that which is routinely bent or manipulated). Furthermore, potential effects of
natural (i.e., low-temperature, low-dose rate) aging are not accounted for using this model.
Several utility test programs are currently underway to correlate compressive modulus and
elongation under both accelerated and natural aging conditions.
5.2.2.3 Use of Environmental Qualification Test and Aging Data
In addition to the activities previously described, test and aging data derived from environmental
qualification programs and manufacturer’s testing may be used as an aging management tool.
This information has obvious importance for EQ penetrations in terms of qualified life
determination, and it may be just as readily applied to nonqualified equipment to assist in the
evaluation of their lifetime. Use of EQ aging and test data is particularly useful because many of
5-24
the penetrations used in non-EQ applications are similar or identical to those used in EQ
applications. In those instances where identical materials are not used in both types of
applications, knowledge of the aging behavior of a similar material can be used (with appropriate
caution) to infer the behavior of the generic class of material. Although the ultimate endpoint or
lifetime criteria may be different for the two classifications of equipment, the data are
nonetheless relevant.
Section 4.1 of this AMG presents background information on use of thermal aging data and the
Arrhenius relationship for such evaluations. Furthermore, discussions of radiation threshold and
combined aging environments are presented to assist the reader in evaluating materials used in
non-EQ electrical penetrations for longevity.
5.2.2.4 Post-Installation Testing
IEEE Std 317-1983, “IEEE Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment
Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations” [5.53], states that installation procedures shall
include adequate measures to prevent damage to the electric penetration assembly. A gas leak
rate test shall be performed and also the following electrical tests: continuity, insulation
resistance, and dielectric strength. Continuity through the cable conductors is checked at
specified currents based on cable system. The dielectric strength between all conductors and also
for all conductors to ground is checked at a potential specified for each application [5.54].
5.2.3 Activities Specific to Mechanical Penetrations
5.2.3.1.1 Surveillance Programs
Surveillance programs provide for the visual inspection of primary containment accessible
surfaces, including the mechanical penetrations, once each operating cycle satisfies Technical
Specification requirements. The surfaces are inspected for discoloration, blisters, scratches,
flaking, rust, and any other abnormal appearance. The condition of corrosion protection coatings
is also identified during these inspections. For BWR suppression pool surfaces below the normal
water line, this type of surface inspection is performed at least every 5 years rather than every
outage. Some BWR piping penetrations are located below the suppression pool normal water
level. MIC could be a concern if the water is not treated. The results of these inspections are
recorded and corrective action is taken as necessary.
The surveillance program includes the visual inspection of elastomer seals on piping penetrations
and airlocks as part of the inspection of all secondary containment seals. These seals are
inspected for shrinkage, embrittlement or other abnormal conditions.
The surveillance program also includes additional activities for the personnel airlock. These are
inspections of the airlock door latching mechanisms, gaskets, and seals for wear, fatigue, or other
damage, and functional tests of door operation. Leakage tests of the airlock doors are also
5-25
performed periodically during outages to assure that the specified leakage limits are not
exceeded.
ASME B&PV Code Section XI Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program, Subsection IWE
Many of the nuclear power plants commissioned after 1980 have primary containment vessels
and mechanical penetrations designed in accordance with Section III, Class MC and Class CC of
the ASME B&PV Code. In 1986, the ASME amended Section XI of the B&PV Code (added
Subsection IWE) to include inservice inspections requirements for containment vessels,
including mechanical penetrations. Although it was generally expected that Subsection IWE
would be a formalization of the Surveillance Programs (described above) already being
performed by operating nuclear power plants, the inspection requirements, which included
surface nondestructive examinations for selected welds and nondestructive wall thickness
examinations for portions of steel containments and more specific requirements for visual
inspections, were significantly more rigorous. The NRC has never formally required that current
nuclear power plant inservice inspection (ISI) programs adopt the requirements of Subsection
IWE of Section XI. The NRC is currently considering the official adoption of Subsection IWE as
published in the 1992 Edition of Section III [5.55]. This proposal includes a 5-year
implementation schedule that would not require compliance with Subsection IWE until at least
year 2000. This still remains a somewhat controversial issue and the appropriate ASME
committees are currently considering modifications to subsection IWE that would make the
requirements more compatible with current primary containment inspection practices. The
modifications, if approved by the ASME, would be formalized during 1996 through inclusion in
the periodic Code Addenda publications. The final resolution of this issue is not known at this
time and although it may have a substantial impact on future inspection requirements for the
primary containment steel shell and liner, it will probably have little or no effect on the current
inspection requirements for the mechanical penetrations.
The inspection requirements related to mechanical penetrations in the current version of Section
XI, Subsection IWE include the following eight items:
I. Accessibility for Examination
1. Accessible Surface Areas

a. As a minimum, the following portions of Class MC containment vessels,
parts, and appurtenances and Class CC metallic shell and penetration
liners shall remain accessible for either direct or remote visual
examination, from at least one side of the containment vessel, for the life
of the plant:
(1) openings and penetrations
(2) structural discontinuities
(3) single-welded butt joints from the weld side
(4) 80% of the remaining surface area
2. Inaccessible Surface Areas
5-26
a. Portions of Class MC containment vessels, parts, and appurtenances that

are embedded in concrete or otherwise made inaccessible during
construction of the vessel or as a result of vessel repair, modification, or
replacement are exempted from examination, provided:
(1) no openings or penetrations are embedded in the concrete;
(2) all welded joints that are inaccessible for examination are double butt
welded and are fully radiographed and, prior to being covered, are
tested for leak tightness using a gas medium test, such as Halide Leak
Detector Test;
(3) all welded joints that are not double butt welded remain accessible for
examination from the weld side and the vessel is leak rate tested after
completion of construction, repair, or replacement.
b. Portions of Class CC metallic shell and penetration liners that are
embedded in concrete or otherwise made inaccessible during construction
or as a result of repair or replacement are exempted from examination,
provided:
(1) all welded joints that are inaccessible for examination are examined
prior to being covered or otherwise obstructed by adjacent structures,
components, parts, or appurtenances, are tested for leak tightness and
the containment is leak rate tested after completion of construction,
repair, or replacement.
II. Surface Areas Requiring Augmented Examination
Surface areas likely to experience accelerated degradation and aging require augmented
examinations as follows:
Interior and exterior containment surface areas that are subject to accelerated corrosion
with no or minimal corrosion allowance or areas where the absence or repeated loss of
protective coatings has resulted in substantial corrosion and pitting. Typical locations of
such areas are those exposed to standing water, repeated wetting and drying, persistent
leakage, and those with geometries that permit water accumulation, condensation, and
microbiological attack. Such areas may include penetration sleeves, surfaces wetted
during refueling, concrete-to-steel shell or liner interfaces, embedment zones, leak chase
channels, drain areas, or sump liners.
Interior and exterior containment surface areas that are subject to excessive wear from
abrasion or erosion that causes a loss of protective coatings, deformation, or material loss.
Typical locations of such areas are those subject to substantial traffic, sliding pads or
supports, pins or clevises, shear lugs, seismic restraints, surfaces exposed to water jets
from testing operations or safety relief valve discharges, and areas that experience wear
from frequent vibrations.
5-27
III. Standards for Examination Category E-A, Containment Surfaces
1. Visual Examinations - General

(a) The General Visual Examination shall be performed by, or under the
direction of, a Registered Professional Engineer or other individual,
knowledgeable in the requirements for design, inservice inspection, and
testing of Class MC and metallic liners of Class CC components. The
examination shall be performed either directly or remotely, by an
examiner with visual acuity sufficient to detect evidence of degradation
that may affect either the containment structural integrity or leak tightness.
(b) Prior to proceeding with a Type A test, conditions that may affect
containment structural integrity or leak tightness shall be accepted by
engineering evaluation or corrected by repair or replacement.
2. Visual Examinations on Coated Areas
The inspection area, when painted or coated, shall be examined for evidence of
flaking, blistering, peeling, discoloration, and other signs of distress. Areas that
are suspect shall be accepted by engineering evaluation or corrected by repair or
replacement. Supplemental examinations shall be performed when specified as a
result of the engineering evaluation.
3. Visual Examinations on Noncoated Areas
The inspected area shall be examined for evidence of cracking, discoloration,
wear, pitting, excessive corrosion, arc strikes, gouges, surface discontinuities,
dents, and other signs of surface irregularities. Areas that are suspect shall be
accepted by engineering evaluation or corrected by repair or replacement.
Supplemental examinations shall be performed when specified as a result of the
engineering evaluation.
IV. Standards for Examination Category E-B, Pressure Retaining Welds
1. The Visual Examinations on Coated Areas

The inspected area, when painted or coated, shall be examined for evidence of
2. Visual Examinations on Noncoated Areas
5-28

V. Standards for Examination Category E-C, Containment Surfaces Requiring

Augmented Examination
1. Visual Examinations on Coated Areas

The inspected area, when painted or coated, shall be examined for evidence of
2. Visual Examination of Noncoated Areas
3. Ultrasonic Examination
Containment vessel examinations that reveal material loss exceeding 10% of the
nominal containment wall thickness, or material loss that is projected to exceed
10% of the nominal containment wall thickness prior to the next examination,
shall be documented. Such areas shall be accepted by engineering evaluation or
corrected by repair or replacement. Supplemental examinations shall be
performed when specified as a result of the engineering evaluation.
VI. Standards for Examination Category E-D, Seals, Gaskets, and Moisture Barriers
Visual Examinations
Seals, gaskets, and moisture barriers shall be examined for wear, damage, erosion, tear,
surface cracks, or other defects that may violate the leak-tight integrity. Defective items
shall be repaired or replaced.
VII. Standards for Examination Category E-F, Pressure Retaining Dissimilar Metal
Welds
Surface Examinations
The acceptance standards of dissimilar metal welds for Class 1 components are
applicable.
VIII. Standards for Examination Category E-G, Pressure Retaining Bolting
Visual Examinations
5-29
Bolting materials shall be examined in accordance with the material specification for
defects which may cause the bolted connection to violate either the leak-tight or
structural integrity. Defective items shall be replaced.
Bolt Torque or Bolt Tension
Either bolt torque or bolt tension shall be within the limits specified for the original
design. If no limits have been specified, acceptable bolt torque or bolt tension limits shall
be determined.
5.2.3.2 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Leakage Testing
The primary containment as a whole and many of the mechanical penetration individually are
periodically leak tested in accordance with Technical Specification requirements and the
regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J [5.5]. Although this leak testing is also part of
the surveillance program discussed in Section 5.2.3.1, it is considered to be a separate program.
The testing frequency can generally be stated as three times during a 10-year period for the
integrated leak rate test (ILRT) for the entire primary containment and every refueling outage for
local leak rate tests (LLRTs) of individual mechanical penetrations. The LLRTs for most
penetrations only pressurize and test the internal piping and valves, while the ILRT checks the
penetration as a whole. The ILRT and LLRT have specific maximum allowable leakage rates
that are specified in 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, the Technical Specifications and the test procedures.
When leakage exceeds the allowable rates, an investigation of the leakage cause is performed
and corrective action is taken as necessary. Usually an immediate retest is performed to ensure
that corrective action was appropriate. Local leak rate tests are performed on all mechanical
penetrations except for the drywell head. Recent modifications have been issued to 10 CFR 50
Appendix J by the NRC, which provides optional requirements for performing these leakage
tests. In general, this option would allow the frequencies of the ILRTs and LLRTs to be reduced
based on the successful experiences with prior testing and the establishment of leakage test
performance goals. Although the option to reduce test frequency is to some extent a result of
generally good performance with regard to the results of ILRTs and LLRTs over the past 20
years, it also reflects a concern for the aging effect on the primary containment and mechanical
penetrations caused by frequent testing.
The LLRTs associated with mechanical penetrations that contain stainless steel expansion joints
made with two ply bellows typically have included interply leakage tests for these bellows. It is
now clear that due to the bellows manufacturing methods this type of test is invalid and can
provide unconservative leakage rate results [5.5]. The NRC notified licensees of this concern in
Information Notice 92-20 [5.56]. Complete resolution of this issue is plant specific in nature
because only some plants have this type of two-ply bellows. This issue is further discussed in
Section 5.4.
Local Leak Rate Test Leakage Root Cause Analysis
Local leak rate tests (LLRTs) are performed on many of the mechanical penetrations (one of
several exceptions is the drywell head). This program is designed to specifically evaluate the
results of these LLRTs for each penetration, regardless of whether or not the measured leakage
exceeds the acceptance level. Evaluations are seldom performed unless measured leakage
5-30
exceeds 10% of the acceptance level. The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the root
cause or causes for leakage so that appropriate action can be taken. This would include actions
(maintenance, refurbishment/replacement, administrative controls, etc.) to limit or reduce
leakage for the specific penetration under evaluation. The root cause investigation would also
uncover generic leakage causes that could affect the performance of other mechanical
penetrations and then appropriate action would be taken to address the generic issues. Root cause
evaluations of LLRT leakage can significantly reduce the potential for identifying performance
deficiencies during LLRTs. Penetration leakage levels exceeding the criteria in the Technical
Specifications have the potential for extending planned outage periods due to the time required
for troubleshooting and any necessary refurbishment activities. The root cause evaluation for
LLRT leakage may be considered to be part of other larger scope programs at nuclear plants.
These would include the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Section XVI (Corrective
Action) and the implementation plan associated with compliance with the Maintenance Rule.
Local Leak Rate Test Leakage Trending
This program for trending the leakage results from LLRTs for mechanical penetrations is a
companion of the root cause analysis program for leakage described above. The trending of the
historical data on leakage represents important input to the engineering evaluation and the ability
to estimate the priority and timing for corrective action to reduce leakage.
The leakage trending program should consider the specific circumstances identified in the LLRT
test reports as well as the numerical value for leakage. The trending program would generally
include some type of algorithms that would estimate when leakage would exceed LLRT
allowable levels if no action to mitigate were taken. As with the leakage root cause analysis
program, the trending program may also be incorporated into other corrective action (10 CFR 50
Appendix B) or preventive maintenance programs (10 CFR 50.65).
5.2.3.3 Special Testing Programs for Penetration Weld Integrity
Several piping penetration designs and the fuel transfer tube penetration (see Appendix C) were
initially fabricated or modified in service such that welds and other components such as sleeves,
end plates, and double gasket flanges could be air tested in place for leakage. These tests were
performed to support LLRTs and are performed on the same frequency as the LLRTs. The basis
for the test is generally the capability of maintaining a specified internal pressure for a specified
period of time. The test acceptance criteria are clearly identified in the test procedure. If the
acceptance criteria are not met, an investigation is performed, corrective action is taken as
necessary, and a retest is performed.
5.2.3.4 Special Testing Programs for Cooling Channel Flow Rate
Hot piping penetrations are often designed with cooling channels to ensure that adjacent concrete
material or nonmetallic components do not exceed a specified temperature during operation.
These tests are generally performed during each refueling outage. These tests verify that the
cooling channel is not plugged and that the cooling channel does not leak. The test acceptance
5-31
criteria is clearly identified in the test procedure. If the acceptance criteria is not met, an
investigation is performed, corrective action is taken as necessary, and a retest is performed.
5.2.3.5 Settlement Trending Program
The settlement monitoring and trending program is identical to the programs described in the
Containment Industry Reports [5.57, 5.58] to verify primary containment settlement. A similar
program is used for the spent fuel pit foundation. The purpose is to check for differential
settlement, which could increase loads on the fuel transfer tube penetration components.
5.2.3.6 Detailed Fatigue Analysis Using Current Condition
Fatigue is a potentially significant degradation mechanism for some components in each type of
mechanical penetration. Fatigue analysis has been performed for many of these components
using an undegraded component basis. This program requires an updated fatigue analysis when
significant degradation is found for any of the components. The ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section XI, Inservice Inspection includes an Appendix to address fatigue when the
analysis includes the calculation of cumulative fatigue usage factor. This Appendix provides
guidance for usage factors that approach the limiting value of 1.0 or other fatigue concerns.
5.2.3.7 Special Considerations for Stainless Steel Bellows
The hot piping penetrations for steel containments and the fuel transfer tube penetration contain
metallic expansion joints that are pressure boundary components for the primary containment.
These stainless steel expansion joints contain single or double bellows that provide for thermal
growth at the penetrations. These bellows are either single-ply or double-ply with four to eight
convolutions. The thickness of a single ply is 0.076 to 0.152 cm [0.030 to 0.060 in]. The double-
ply bellows generally have a tight stainless mesh to separate the plies. The two current issues
associated with these stainless steel bellows are the potential for degradation due to fatigue and
stress corrosion cracking [5.59, 5.60] and the inability to leak test the double-ply bellows with air
pressure between the plies [5.56, 5.60].
Degradation of these bellows elements and the inability to effectively repair these components
has caused the entire expansion joint to be replaced for feedwater and mainstream piping
penetrations at two nuclear plants. These replacements are difficult and costly due to poor access
around these large diameter piping penetrations. These replacements have longitudinal closure
welds (through the expansion joint spacer and bellows areas). Without employing these
expansion joint closure welds, it would have been necessary to remove an entire section of
process pipe and all other penetration components to replace the expansion joint. This is clearly
impractical for most physical configurations. The detection and mitigation of bellows surface
defects and cracks due to SCC and fatigue is important for long-term reliability of these type of
penetrations. The development of improved repair and refurbishment methods for these bellows
elements should also be undertaken.
5-32
The problems with interply leak testing of two-ply stainless steel bellows were identified by the
NRC in Information Notice 92-20 [5.56]. This issue has been explored in greater detail in
References [5.59] and [5.60].
The interply pressurization method for leak testing two-ply bellows provides invalid and
unconservative results because the air path between the bellows from one end to the other and
around the circumference is essentially blocked by the stainless steel mesh between the plies.
The function of the mesh was to hold the spacing between the two plies; however, it also acts as
a gas seal, at least for an extended period of time. To perform a valid leakage test across the
expansion joint bellows, a pressure must be applied to the exterior or interior surface and the
level of pressure decay over a period of 1 to 2 hours time measured. This can be accomplished
with a permanent modification. A second bellows expansion joint is placed outside the existing
joint and the leakage test is performed by pressurizing the area between the primary and
secondary (or outer) expansion joint. Localized permanent test enclosures around bellows can be
designed and used for leak testing as described in Reference [5.60].
Valid LLRTs for these two-ply bellows expansion joint penetrations, as well as other types of
mechanical penetrations, can be accomplished with a temporary test fixture. This fixture, applied
to and sealed on the containment side of the penetration, would result in testing all pressure-
retaining penetration components, including the expansion joint, simultaneously. Although it is
obviously possible to build such fixtures for testing as noted in Reference [5.56], it is very time
consuming and expensive, especially at plants with 30 to 50 penetrations of this type. A localized
temporary and reusable test assembly that can be installed and removed rapidly would be
preferred for periodic penetration LLRTs. Where space does not allow the use of local bellows
test assemblies, the replacement of two-ply with single-ply bellows is one of the few alternatives
remaining to satisfy the LLRT requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
5.3 Commonly Used Maintenance, Surveillance, and Condition

Monitoring Techniques
Vendor and utility maintenance procedures were reviewed to identify those maintenance and
surveillance techniques discussed in the preceding section that are commonly used to maintain
electrical and mechanical penetrations. Personnel from appropriate maintenance organizations at
several nuclear plants were contacted for further insight on maintenance practices employed for
each class of equipment. Industry sources and reports were also reviewed for applicable data and
information. Activities performed by plants (including those identified by survey respondents)
are listed in Tables 5-2 and 5-3 for electrical and mechanical penetrations, respectively.
5.4 Evaluation of Current Practices
10 CFR 54 [5.1] requires that the Integrated Plant Assessment (IPA) list those structures and
components subject to an aging management review (AMR), and demonstrate that the effects of
aging on the functionality of such structures and components will be managed to maintain the
current licensing basis such that there is an acceptable level of safety during the period of
extended operation. Furthermore, the time-limited aging analyses required by §54.21, which
5-33
form the basis of a licensee’s conclusion regarding the capability of SSCs, must consider the
effects of aging and be based on explicit assumptions defined by the current operating term of
the plant.
The methods by which the licensee meets these requirements may vary; each licensee can select
the method(s) or technique(s) most appropriate for their individual AMR. The methodology
employed by this AMG for determining the effects of aging on penetration components was (1)
to identify maintenance or surveillance practices currently in use (Section 5.3) and (2) to
compare them to the potentially significant aging mechanisms and effects identified in Section
4.1 to determine those mechanisms and effects that are not currently addressed.
The industry operating experience with penetrations, as presented in Section 3.6.1, demonstrates
that the number of failures is small. Even though the failure rate almost doubled between 1973
and 1978, as shown in Table 3-5, the total number of failures is so small that a doubling of the
rate is not significant. The low number of failures shows that the plant programs, as described
and tabulated in Section 5.3, are effective.
5.4.1 Electrical Penetrations
As previously described, environmentally qualified components within the penetration assembly

are also periodically replaced prior to expiration of their qualified lives. Because the
determination of the qualified life of each component necessarily must consider the relevant
degradation mechanisms, these mechanisms can be said to be addressed merely by virtue of the
qualification (and eventual replacement) of the component. For non-EQ components subject to
similar degradation mechanisms, the aging management practices applied to the qualified
EPAs/components can be uniformly extended, or other aging management practices can be
demonstrated to address the relevant aging mechanisms.
5-34
Table 5-2
Aging Management Activities of Units Represented in Surveys (19 Units Total) - EPAs
When Activity is Planned

Potentially
Significant Aging Trouble-
Aging Management Affected Mechanisms Initial Every shooting/
No. Activity Components Addressed Installation RFO Repair Other Frequency of Activity
1 Containment ILRT Seals, O-rings, Thermal/radiation 15 3 3 15 Every 10 years; per ASME III; 3 per 10
testing modules degradation of organic years; Every 2nd RFO; Every 40 months
sealing materials
2 Monitoring/trending Pressure Thermal/radiation 6 10 Daily; Biweekly; Monthly; Quarterly
of EPA internal monitoring degradation of organic
pressure (where equipment; sealing materials
applicable) internal seals
3 Visual inspection of All Various (including 5 6 1 7 Random; monthly; 3 per 10 years
penetration corrosion,
components and/or thermal/radiation
nozzle degradation of
organics, mechanical
damage, electrical
tracking, etc.)
4 Inspection of junction Junction box Thermal/radiation 7 2 4 2 Random
box (gaskets, drain degradation of
holes) organics, corrosion
5 Torquing of Flange seals, Thermal/radiation 5 7
header plate bolts fasteners, degradation of
(if installed) header plates organics (compression
set); cyclic thermal
stresses on fasteners
6 Insulation resistance Leads, Thermal/radiation 3 4 5 1 Maintenance
testing of penetration terminations, degradation of
leads (including PI) insulating materials,
electrical tracking,
moisture intrusion
7 Continuity testing of Leads, Work 4 2 4 3 Maintenance;<2 years
penetration leads terminations hardening/breakage of
conductors, oxidation
of terminations
5-35
Table 5-2
Aging Management Activities of Units Represented in Surveys (19 Units Total) – EPAs (Continued)
8 Other electrical Leads, Thermal/radiation 2

testing (including terminations degradation of
capacitance, TDR, insulating materials,
ECAD, etc.) electrical tracking,
moisture intrusion;
oxidation of
terminations
9 Refurbishment of Various Various 3
EPA assembly
10 Periodic component Various Various 1 8 After failure or end-of-life

replacement
(including EQ)
11 Repair of damaged Various Various 7 4 When failure occurs
components
12 Temperature/radiatio Organic Thermal/radiation 6 Continuous

n monitoring of components degradation of organic
penetration or local components
environment
13 Cleaning Various Chemical attack of 6 1 3 Random; Every 3 Years
organics, corrosion,
electrical tracking
14 Painting/coating of Various Oxidation, corrosion, 2 3 2 When necessary
components chemical attack
15 Epoxy Seals Seals Thermal/radiation 1 Every 2nd RFO

degradation of
organics
16 Local Leak Rate Seals, O-rings, Thermal/radiation 8 7 5 5 Every 24 months
Testing modules degradation of organic
sealing materials
17 Gas Purging Seals, O-rings, Thermal/radiation 1
internal degradation of
components organics (oxidative
processes)
18 Drywell inerted with Various Oxidative degradation 1 Continuous
nitrogen of organics; corrosion
19 Field Welds Canister, header N/A 1

plate, nozzle
5-36
Table 5-3
Aging Management Programs - Mechanical Penetration Components
Abbreviations:
SV Surveillance Program MR Penetration Area Radiation Monitoring
AJ 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Leak Rate Testing ST Settlement Trending Program
IW ASME B&PV Code Section XI Inservice Inspection Program, Paragraph IWE FA Detailed Fatigue Analysis Using Current Condition
PM Preventive Maintenance Program LR Local Leak Rate Test Leakage Root Cause Analysis
PW Special Testing Programs for Penetration Weld Integrity LT Local Leak Rate Test Leakage Trending
CF Special Testing Programs for Cooling Channel Flow Rate WK Periodic Plant Walkdowns
MT Penetration Area Temperature Monitoring PC Protective Coating Maintenance Program
Notes: Yes = this program is used. No = this program is not used.
Potentially Significant Aging Common Programs Less Common Programs

Components Mechanisms SV AJ IW PM PW CF WK PC MT ST MR FA LR LT
Pipe Penetration
Sleeve Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Expansion Joint (Steel) Fatigue, SCC Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes No No
Expansion Joint (Elastomer) Temp/Rad/Chemical Degradation Yes No No No No No No No Yes No Yes No No No
Guard Pipe Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes
End Plate Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Equipment Hatch
Sleeve Fatigue, Corrosion Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No
Cover Ring Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Fasteners Wear, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
Gasket Chemical Degradation Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Hatch Cover Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sleeve Ring Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
5-37
Table 5-3
Aging Management Programs - Mechanical Penetration Components (Continued)

Fuel Transfer Tube
Sleeve Fatigue, Corrosion, Settlement Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Tube Fatigue, SCC, Settlement Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Flange SCC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
Fasteners Corrosion, Wear, SCC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
Gasket Rad/Chemical Degradation Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Expansion Joint (Steel) Fatigue, SCC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Expansion Joint (Elastomer) Rad/Chemical Degradation Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes
5-38
Table 5-3

Personnel Airlock
Sleeve Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sleeve Ring Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Expansion Joint (Elastomer) Chemical Degradation Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Fasteners Wear, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
Door Hinges Wear, Corrosion Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No No No No No No
Circular Door Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Cover Ring Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Gasket Chemical Degradation Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Rectangular Door Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
End Plate Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Door Seal Chemical Degradation Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
Mechanical Systems Chemical Degradation, Wear, Corrosion, Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No
Fatigue
Electrical Systems Chemical Degradation, Fatigue, Corrosion Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes No No
5-39
Table 5-3

Drywell Head
Cover Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No
Cover Flange Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No
Shell Flange Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No
Circumferential Stiffeners Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No
Gasket Plates Fatigue, Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No
Fasteners Corrosion, Wear Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No No No
Gaskets Chemical Degradation Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
5-40
The most potentially significant aging mechanisms associated with EPAs relate to their organic
sealing and insulating components (including flange O-rings, module seals, epoxy and potting
compounds, and electrical conductor insulation, shielding, and jacketing). Specifically, thermal,
chemical, and radiation-induced degradation of these components represents the greatest threat to
continued functionality.
The condition of seals or sealing components is not directly monitored (i.e., seals are generally
not accessible such that their compression set, hardness, or other properties can be readily
measured), yet degradation would be detected potentially by leak rate testing, monitoring of
internal leak detection or pressurization instrumentation, or through periodic walkdowns and
visual/physical inspection. In a limited number of cases, periodic torquing of fasteners associated
with some types of seals (such as O-rings) can help ensure continued sealing even with
appreciable compression set.
Few post-installation electrical tests are performed on penetration leads, terminations, or other
insulating components; hence, aging-related degradation of the electrical performance of these
components cannot be considered to be directly monitored. However, degradation of the
mechanical properties of these materials (including embrittlement, discoloration, etc.) would be
detected through periodic visual/physical inspection, as well as through continued circuit
performance. In addition, techniques that are potentially useful in monitoring the mechanical
condition of the insulation (including compressive modulus or OIT) may be employed. For low-
voltage systems, the electrical properties of the insulation are largely coupled to the mechanical
properties; hence, electrical performance can be inferred from the mechanical properties. For
medium-voltage systems, however, this correlation is often not reliable, and a seemingly sound
lead/conductor may nonetheless fail electrically. Accordingly, electrical degradation of medium-
voltage insulation may go undetected until failure.
With regard to Kapton (polyimide/Teflon) insulation, the primary determinants of longevity are
mechanical damage (nicking, cutting, etc.), moisture, and certain ionic species (such as chloride
ions). Therefore, so long as these factors are mitigated, no premature degradation of the electrical
performance or mechanical integrity of Kapton EPA leads should be experienced. Periodic visual
inspection, walkdowns, control of moisture, and care during maintenance should ensure these
conditions are maintained.
Corrosion of any external EPA components would be detected through periodic visual/physical
inspection and walkdowns. Fastener wear would be detected during disassembly/assembly or
through leakage rate testing. Corrosion of components located in inaccessible areas of the
penetration assembly (such as the interior cavity) would be addressed through periodic visual
inspection during disassembly (if any). However, (1) many internal EPA components are
fabricated from stainless steel, and (2) many EPAs are internally purged with inert gas, such that
oxidation corrosion of metallic components would be minimized.
Oxidation/corrosion of circuit-path metallic components (such as terminations) would be
addressed through periodic TDR, hipot, or continuity testing (if performed), and potentially
through continued functionality of the circuit during normal operations (i.e., high resistance
connections may be reflected as anomalous readings on installed electrical plant
instrumentation).
5-41
5.4.2 Mechanical Penetrations
Piping Penetrations
The significant aging mechanisms include corrosion and fatigue, stress corrosion cracking for
stainless steel expansion joints, and thermal/radiation/chemical environment degradation for
elastomer expansion joints.
Corrosion of the carbon steel materials (sleeve, guard pipe, end plate) is addressed by many of
the common programs (Surveillance, Appendix J Testing, Weld Leak Tests, Cooling Chemical
Tests, Walkdowns, and Coating Maintenance) and the less common LLRT leakage trending and
root cause analysis program. Corrosion would be observed through surveillance inspections,
walkdowns, and coating inspection. Corrosion that is severe enough to cause leakage would be
identified through the results of testing programs. The leakage trending and root cause analysis
could also identify corrosion in a less direct manner. Cracking due to fatigue for the sleeve and
steel expansion joint and stress corrosion cracking of the steel expansion joint would be observed
through the surveillance inspections provided that the surfaces are accessible for inspection.
Fatigue cracking or stress corrosion cracking severe enough to cause leakage would be identified
through the results of testing programs. Special fatigue analysis may be performed for these
components, particularly for the expansion joint, when degradation is found that is difficult to
repair. The degradation (embrittlement, deformation) of the elastomer expansion joint due to
high temperature, radiation, and aggressive chemical environments would be observed through
the surveillance program inspection. The monitoring of temperature and radiation levels in the
vicinity of susceptible piping penetrations would also identify situations where these nonmetallic
components may be degraded and specific inspections would be performed.
Equipment Hatch
The significant aging mechanisms include corrosion for all metallic components, fatigue for all
metallic components except fasteners, wear for the fastener, and aggressive chemical degradation
for the nonmetallic gasket.
Corrosion of the sleeve is addressed by the surveillance, walkdown, and coating maintenance
programs because degradation of the sleeve would not directly affect primary containment
integrity. Corrosion of the cover, cover ring, sleeve ring, and fasteners is addressed by these
three programs plus the Appendix J Testing Program. As noted in Section 5.3.1, corrosion is
observed by inspection programs, and severe corrosion that causes weakness or openings in
pressure boundaries is detected by leakage test results.
Cracking due to fatigue would be observed through surveillance inspections, provided that
surfaces were accessible. More severe fatigue cracking could be identified through the results of
testing programs. Special fatigue analysis can be used to evaluate the need for repair or
replacement if fatigue damage is observed. Fastener wear, particularly in threaded areas, would
be detected primarily through preventive maintenance inspections during outage periods when
the equipment hatch is removed.
5-42
Fuel Transfer Tube
The significant aging mechanisms include corrosion of the sleeve and fasteners, fatigue of the
sleeve, tube and steel expansion joint, stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel components,
radiation and aggressive chemical degradation of the gaskets and elastomer expansion joints, and
differential settlement for the tube and sleeve.
Corrosion of the sleeve and fasteners is addressed by many of the common programs
(Surveillance Program, Appendix J Leak Rate Testing, Penetration Weld Integrity, Walkdowns)
and the less common LLRT leakage trending and root cause analysis programs. The observation
of corrosion for fasteners is also addressed by the PM program. Corrosion for the inaccessible
portions of the sleeve is addressed only by leakage testing, but not inspections. Stress corrosion
working is addressed by the same programs as corrosion. However, for the unaccessible portion
of the tube and stainless steel expansion joint, leakage testing rather than inspection is the
primary detection mechanism.
Fatigue is also addressed by the same programs as corrosion; however, for the inaccessible
portions of the sleeve, tube, and stainless steel expansion, leakage testing is again the primary
detection mechanism. Wear of the fasteners would be detected by preventive maintenance
inspections. The degradation (embrittlement, deformation) of the gasket and elastomer expansion
joint due to radiation and aggressive chemical environments would be observed through the
surveillance program inspections. A special air pressure test between the double gasket
configuration on the containment end of the fuel transfer tube is also performed as part of the
preventive maintenance program. This test would identify degradation of the gasket. Differential
settlement that could significantly increase loads on the sleeve and tube would be identified by
the settlement monitoring program. This program would determine if there was any structural
settlement and whether the containment foundation and spent fuel pit foundation are settling at
significantly different rates.
5.4.3 Potentially Significant Component/Aging Mechanism Combinations Not

Addressed By Current Programs
Comparison of the currently employed maintenance and surveillance techniques and the
principal aging mechanisms and effects demonstrates the following:
1. Nearly all of the aging effects resulting from significant aging mechanisms are being
detected by practices currently employed by plant operators and adequately managed by
existing programs.
2. Those few aging mechanisms not currently detected or addressed by current practices are not
fully detectable via existing techniques.
In effect, the foregoing conclusions indicate that the aging of penetration components is almost
completely detected and addressed through current practices. In a very limited number of cases
(such as electrical aging of EPA leads), aging is left essentially unmitigated until some sort of
degradation or failure is detected. In general, the reliability of both electrical and mechanical
5-43
penetrations to date is such that additional surveillance or condition monitoring activities would
likely not be warranted unless an appreciable increase in the rate of failure is subsequently
experienced. This is supported by the comparatively low failure rate for both electrical and
mechanical penetrations indicated by the available literature, NRC documentation, Licensee
Event Reports, NPRDS data, surveys, and discussions with host utility personnel. These sources
tend to indicate that penetrations in general have experienced a low rate of failure in the field,
based on a maximum installed age of about 28 years.11
No significant increase in the failure rate of penetrations considered as part of this AMG is
anticipated as the end of either the current or the license renewal period is approached. This
conclusion is based on the following:
· No aging mechanisms other than those identified in this AMG are known or expected to
occur during this period (i.e., no mechanisms unique to the license renewal period have been
identified).
· No change in the character of existing aging mechanisms or rate of degradation induced by
these mechanisms is anticipated.
· Significant conservatism (via design, qualification, and other analyses) often exists with
respect to component longevity.
Aging mechanisms and effects potentially warranting additional consideration include:

· Thermal, radiolytic, or mechanical degradation of exposed penetration leads and sealing
materials
· Thermal degradation of low- and medium-voltage power leads (insulation) and terminations
for circuits subject to continuous or near-continuous loading at high currents
· Electrical aging of conductor insulating materials exposed to normal and/or transient voltages
· Oxidation and/or corrosion of connector contact surfaces associated with low-
current/impedance-sensitive circuits
· Degradation of stainless steel expansion joint bellows (hot piping penetrations)
5.5 References
5.1 Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Part 54, “Requirements for Renewal
of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants,” May 8, 1995.
5.2 “Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear

Power Plants,” Federal Register Vol. 48 No. 15, USNRC, January 21, 1983.
11
Certain types of mechanical penetrations that are more frequently operated (such as access penetrations) may
experience more component failures per given time period; however, the maintenance and inspection periodicity for
such penetrations is generally increased accordingly.
5-44
5.3 Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Part 54, Section 21, “Contents of
Application - Technical Information,” May 8, 1995.
5.4 Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, “Requirements for Monitoring the
Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” 10 CFR Part 50.65, July 10,
1991.
5.5 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, “Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-
Cooled Power Reactors,” January 1, 1995.
5.6 Instruction Manual 123-2121 for Electrical Penetration Assemblies for ANO, Unit 2,
Rev. A, June 1974.
5.7 Conax Buffalo Corporation Proprietary Report IPS-981, Rev. B, March 1987.
5.8 Conax Buffalo Corporation Proprietary Report IPS-725, Rev. H, July 1987.
5.9 “Infrared Thermography Guide,” Electric Power Research Nuclear Maintenance

Applications Center, EPRI Report NP-6973, 1990.
5.10 “Guide for Monitoring Equipment Environments During Nuclear Plant Operation,”
EPRI NP-7399, June 1991.
5.11 IEEE Std 1205-1993, “Guide for Assessing, Monitoring, and Mitigating Aging Effects on
Class 1E Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations.”
5.12 “Evaluation of Environmental Qualification Options and Costs for Electrical Equipment
for a License Renewal Period for CCNPP,” Electric Power Research Institute,
EPRI TR-104063, October 1994.
5.13 Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND96-0344, “Aging Management Guideline

for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Electrical Cable and Terminations,”
September 1996.
5.14 “Standard Handbook for Electrical Engineers,” Twelfth Edition, McGraw-Hill, 1987.
5.15 Toman, G. J., “Aging, Deterioration and Failure Modes of Electrical Cables,” prepared
for Workshop on Power Plant Cable Condition Monitoring, EPRI EL/NP/CS-5914-SR,
July 1988.
5.16 Stone, G., et al., “Electrical Testing of Generator Station Cables,” prepared for Workshop
on Power Plant Cable Condition Monitoring, EPRI EL/NP/CS-5914-SR, July 1988.
5.17 “Power Plant Practices to Ensure Cable Operability,” Nuclear Maintenance Applications
Center, EPRI NP-7485, July 1992.
5-45
5.18 Reynolds, P. H., “Conventional Cable Testing Methods: Strengths, Weaknesses and
Possibilities,” prepared for Workshop on Power Plant Cable Condition Monitoring,
Electric Power Research, July 1988, Report EL/NP/CS-5914-SR.
5.19 NUREG/CR-5461, “Aging of Cables, Connections, and Electrical Penetration

Assemblies Used in Nuclear Power Plants,” July 1990.
5.20 Anandakumaran, K., J. M. Braun, R. Morra, et al., “Characterization of Aged Station

Cable Insulations: Comparison of Electrical and Physical Tests,” Proceedings: 1993
EPRI Workshop on Power Plant Cable Condition Monitoring, Electric Power Research
Institute, June 1993.
5.21 Petty, K. A., “Application, Construction, and Testing of Generating Station Cables,”
prepared for Workshop on Power Plant Cable Condition Monitoring, EPRI EL/NP/CS-
5914-SR, July 1988.
5.22 “Effects of Moisture on the Life of Power Plant Cables,” EPRI TR-103834-P1-2,
August 1994.
5.23 Anandakumaran, K., and D. J. Stonkus, “Assessing Techniques to Evaluate Cable

Insulation,” Report No. 89-172K, Ontario Hydro Research, August 1989.
5.24 IEEE Std 422-1986, “IEEE Guide for the Design and Installation of Cable Systems in
Power Generating Stations.”
5.25 IEEE Std 690-1984, “IEEE Standard for the Design and Installation of Cable Systems for
Class 1E Circuits in Nuclear Power Generating Stations.”
5.26 IEEE Std 43-1974 (Reaff 1991), “IEEE Recommended Practice for Testing Insulation
Resistance of Rotating Machinery” (ANSI).
5.27 ANSI/IEEE Standard 141-1986, “IEEE Recommended Practice for Electric Power
Distribution for Industrial Plants.”
5.28 ASTM Standard D257-93, “Test Methods for D-C Resistance or Conductance of
Insulating Materials.”
5.29 Jacobus, M. J., G. L. Zigler, and L. Bustard, “Cable Condition Monitoring Research
Activities at Sandia National Laboratories,” prepared for Workshop on Power Plant
Cable Condition Monitoring, EPRI EL/NP/CS-5914-SR, July 1988.
5.30 “Notes on Doble Test Equipment and Service,” prepared by the Doble Engineering
Company, Watertown, Mass. (various dates).
5.31 Doble Engineering Company, UOD-068, “Use of Doble Power Factor Insulation Tests
for Maintenance Testing of Electrical Apparatus.”
5-46
5.32 NEMA WC 54-1990 ICEA T-26-465), “Guide for Frequency of Sampling Extruded
Dielectric Power, Control, and Instrumentation, and Portable Cables for Test.”
5.33 ASTM Standard D150-93, “Test Methods for A-C Loss Characteristics and Permittivity
(Dielectric Constant) of Solid Electrical Insulating Materials.”
5.34 Gillespie, M. T. G., et al., “Experience with AC Hipot and Partial Discharge Tests for
Commissioning Generating Station Cables and Switchgear,” IEEE WPM, 1989.
5.35 DeDad, J. A., “Field Proof Testing of MV Cables,” EC&M, pp. 49-52, June 1993.
5.36 Meininger, R. D., “Evaluation of Insulation Quality of Power Cables,” EPRI Condition
Monitoring Workshop, February 1993.
5.37 ASTM Standard D470-93, “Test Methods for Crosslinked Insulations and Jackets for
Wire and Cable.”
5.38 ASTM Standard D4566-90, “Test Methods for Electrical Performance Properties of
Insulations and Jackets for Telecommunications Wire and Cable.”
5.39 Sharma, V., “Effectiveness of Surveillance Methods for Class 1E Power and Reactor
Protection Systems,” prepared for Aging Research Information Conference, Rockville,
MD, March 1992.
5.40 Wagner, T., et al., “Electrical Monitoring and Analysis Program at the Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station,” 1993 EPRI Workshop on Power Plant Cable Condition
Monitoring, June 1993.
5.41 Braun, J. M., G. L. Ford, J. P. Levine, et al., “Partial Discharge Assessment of Shielded
and Unshielded Cables,” Proceedings: 1993 EPRI Workshop on Power Plant Cable
Condition Monitoring, Electric Power Research Institute, June 1993, Project 2895.
5.42 ECAD Trends, The Newsletter for Predictive Maintenance of Electrical Systems and
Components, July 1991.
5.43 Hover, C. R., J. L. Edison, and R. D. Meininger, “In Situ Testing of San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station Unit Electrical Circuits Using ECAD System,” Proceedings for
Operability of Nuclear Power Systems in Normal and Adverse Environments,
September/October 1986.
5.44 Avallone, E. and T. Baumeister III, “Mark’s Standard Handbook for Mechanical
Engineers,” Ninth Edition, McGraw-Hill, 1987.
5.45 Telecon between G. Toman (Ogden) and E. Lehockey (Ontario Hydro Research),
Subject: Indenter Testing of Cable Specimens, February 9, 1995.
5.46 Spång, K., “Methodology for Artificial Aging of Electrical Components in Nuclear
Power Plants,” SKI Technical Report 93:39, December 1993.
5-47
5.47 NUREG/CR-5772, “Aging, Condition Monitoring, and Loss-of Coolant Accident

(LOCA) Tests of Class 1E Electrical Cables,” (in three volumes: Volume 1, “Crosslinked
Polyolefin Cables”; Volume 2, “Ethylene Propylene Rubber Cables”; Volume 3,
“Miscellaneous Cable Types)”; prepared by Sandia National Laboratories, August 1992,
November 1992, and November 1992.
5.48 Toman, G., et al., “In-Plant Indenter Use at Commonwealth Edison Plants,” Proceedings:
1993 EPRI Workshop on Power Plant Cable Condition Monitoring, Electric Power
Research Institute, June 1993.
5.49 NUREG/CP-0135, BNL-NUREG-52409, “Results of Indenter Testing of In-Plant and

Artificially Aged Cable Specimens, Workshop on Environmental Qualification of
Electric Equipment,” prepared by Toman, G. J. and R. F. Gazdzinski for Brookhaven
National Laboratory, November 1993.
5.50 Toman, G. and J. B. Gardner, “Development of a Non-Destructive Cable-Insulation

Test,” prepared for the International Topical Meeting on Operability of Nuclear Power
Systems in Normal and Adverse Environments, Albuquerque, NM, Sept.- Oct. 1986.
5.51 Cable aging assessments of three BWRs and one PWR; conducted by Ogden
Environmental and Energy Services for the Electric Power Research Institute (Indenter
evaluation program), and for various utility clients.
5.52 Toman, G. and R. F. Gazdzinski, “Evaluation of Cable Polymer Aging Through

Indenter Testing of In-Plant and Laboratory Aged Specimens,” EPRI Report TR-104075,
August 1996.
5.53 IEEE Std 317-1983, “IEEE Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment
Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.”
5.54 Physical Sciences Instruction Manual for Electrical Penetrations, BFN-VTD-P215-0020.
5.55 Federal Register, January 7, 1995, 59FR979, “Proposed Changes to 10 CFR 50.00a.”
5.56 NRC Information Notice 92-20, “Inadequate Local Leak Rate Testing,” March 3, 1992.
5.57 “PWR Containment Structures License Renewal Industry Report; Revision 1,”
EPRI TR-103835s, July 1994.
5.58 “BWR Containment License Renewal Industry Report; Revision 1,” EPRI TR-103840s,
July 1994.
5.59 Brown, J. A. and Tice, G. A., “Containment Penetrations - Flexible Metallic

Bellows Testing, Safety, Life Extension Issues,” American Power Conference, 1993,
pages 825-830.
5.60 Berg, P. and Brown, J. A., “Testability of Containment Flexible Metallic Expansion
Joints,” Nuclear Plant Journal, September-October 1995, pages 46-50.
5-48
[Note: The following uncited references were also used during preparation of this guideline.]
5.61 Shah, Vikram N. and Macdonald, Philip E., “Aging and Life Extension of Major Light
Water Reactor Components,” Elsevier Science Publishers, 1993.
5.62 Inside NRC, October 2, 1995, Page 1, “New Leakage Testing Rule Could Save Industry
$600 Million Over 20 Years.”
5.63 ASME Section XI Working Group or Metal Containment, Proposed Revisions to

Subsection IWE for Discussion, July 21, 1995.
5.64 LER 009, Revision 0, September 23, 19909, Docket 237, Dresden 2.
5.65 NUREG/CR-6154, Volume 1, “Experimental Results from Containment Piping Bellows

Subjected to Severe Accident Conditions,” September 1994.
5.66 NUREG/CR-4944, “Containment Penetration Elastomer Seal Leak Rate Tests,” July
1987.
5.67 NUREG/CR-5096, “Evaluation of Seals for Mechanical Penetrations of Containment

Buildings,” August 1988.
5.68 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, 1995.
5.69 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, 1995, Subsection IWE,
“Requirements for Class MC and Metallic Lines of Class CC Components of Light-
Water Cooled Plants.”
5.70 NUREG/CR-4064, “Structural Response of Large Penetrations and Closures for

Containment Vessels Subjected to Loadings Beyond Design Basis,” February 1985.
5.71 NUREG/CR-3855, “Characterization of Nuclear Reactor Containment Penetrations Final

Report,” February 1985.
5.72 NUREG/CR-1730, “Data Summaries of License Event Reports of Primary Containment

Penetrations at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,” September 1980.
5.73 ANSI/ANS-56-8, “Containment System Leakage Test Requirements,” 1987.
5.74 NRC IE Bulletin 80-08, “Examination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds,”

April 7, 1980.
5.75 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.147, “Inservice Inspection Code Case Acceptability - ASME
Section XI, Division 1,” July 1993.
5.76 NRC LER Database Search, Containment Leakage Plus Seal, Gasket and Bolt
Degradation, August 1995.
5-49
5.77 Bump, T. R., Seidensticker, R. W., and Shackelford, M. H., “ANL Survey of LWR
Containment Penetrations: A Progress Report,” Nuclear Engineering and Design 90
(1985) pages 167-179, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
5.78 NUREG/CR-5561, “Analysis of Bellows Expansion Joints in the Sequoyah

Containment,” December 1991.
5.79 Standards of the Expansion Joints Manufacturers Association, 5th Edition (1985
Addenda), EJMA, 25 North Broadway, Tarrytown, NY.
5.80 NRC Information Notice 93-59, “Unexpected Opening of Both Doors in an Airlock,”
July 26, 1993.
5.81 LER 006, Revision 0, Docket 225, Palisades, October 5, 1983.
5.82 DOE/EPRI Seminar on Nuclear Power Plant Life Extension, Section 11.3.2 “Interim
Project Report for Containment Penetrations, Surry Unit 1,” August 25-27, 1966.
5.83 NRC Information Notice 89-79, Supplement 1, “Degraded Coating and Corrosion of
Steel Containment Vessels,” July 29, 1990.
5.84 ASME B&PV Code Case N-315, Repair of Bellows, Section III, Division 1, February 14,
1983.
5-50
6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL AGING
MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
This AMG has presented a comprehensive examination of currently available information

regarding electrical and mechanical containment penetration construction and materials, the
stressors that cause aging, applicable aging mechanisms and aging effects, and the currently
available methods that can be used to monitor and control aging. Section 6.1 summarizes the
findings concerning electrical and mechanical penetrations. Section 6.2 presents both general and
specific conclusions relating to the aging of penetrations drawn from an analysis of the
information presented in preceding sections. Section 6.3 presents several additional
considerations regarding penetration aging management, based on the conclusions of Section 6.2.
6.1 Summary
6.1.1 Electrical Penetrations
1. Some of the possible failure modes of EPA subcomponents may not be detected during
normal operation due to the relatively benign aging environments (as compared to accident
conditions).
2. Many of the instances of EPA component degradation relate to electrical leads and sealing
components; accordingly, periodic inspection of these components (including leads, seals,
pressure gauges, regulators, and inert gas supplies) may be beneficial in identifying instances
of degradation.
3. Electrical circuit continuity exists via conductors that pass through the penetration assembly
to terminations on either end. These conductors are similar in both materials and
configuration to bulk cable installed throughout the plant (often, such bulk cable is used
directly in fabricating the penetration leads). Accordingly, many of the techniques applicable
to cable aging management1 may in some cases be applied to penetration leads (and
associated terminations).
4. Existing environmental qualification practices (such as qualification conservatisms) coupled

with design/application conservatisms provide assurance that aging mechanisms and effects
will not preclude electrical penetrations designated as “EQ” from performing their required
function(s) during their qualified life. Because some non-EQ penetrations are identical or
1
A comprehensive discussion of cable aging and cable aging management is presented in Reference [6.1].
6-1
Summary, Conclusions and Additional Aging Management Considerations
similar to their EQ counterparts, conclusions and information related to the EQ components

are applicable to the non-EQ equipment.
5. Substantial progress has been made in the last few years to develop methods for evaluating
the aging of low-voltage cable used in electrical penetrations. Of these, tests that measure
physical properties of the cable insulation/jacket appear most promising at present. For
example, the oxidation induction time (OIT) and compressive modulus methodologies appear
to have significant potential within certain constraints. Time domain reflectometry (TDR) is
also useful in identifying degraded (i.e., high impedance) terminations or connectors in
certain instances [6.1].
6. Some methods may be effective at detecting severe electrical degradation or monitoring

certain types of degradation; however, correlation of electrical measurements with the
expended or remaining life of the cables in penetrations has not been demonstrated to date.
6.1.2 Mechanical Penetrations
1. The aging of mechanical penetrations is routinely assessed and monitored through a

combination of the following on-going programs at each plant: leak rate testing; surveillance
program; plant walkdowns; protective coating maintenance program; penetration area
temperature monitoring (hot piping only); and penetration area radiation monitoring
programs.
2. Interior and exterior containment surface areas that are subject to accelerated corrosion are
those exposed to standing water, repeated wetting and drying, persistent leakage, and those
with geometries that permit water accumulation, condensation, and microbiological attack.
Such areas may include penetration sleeves, surfaces wetted during refueling, concrete-to-
steel shell or liner interfaces, embedment zones, leak chase channels, drain areas, or sump
liners.
3. Interior and exterior containment surface areas that are subject to excessive wear from
abrasion or erosion that causes a loss of protective coatings, deformation, or material loss are
those subject to substantial traffic, sliding pads or supports, pins or clevises, shear lugs,
seismic restraints, surfaces exposed to water jets from testing operations or safety relief valve
discharges, and areas that experience frequent vibrations.
4. The primary containment as a whole and many of the mechanical penetrations individually
are periodically2 leak tested in accordance with Technical Specification requirements and the
regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix J [6.2]. When leakage exceeds the
allowable rates, an investigation of the leakage cause is performed and corrective action is
taken as necessary. Usually an immediate retest is performed to ensure that corrective action
2
Recent modifications have been issued to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, which allows the frequencies of the ILRTs and
LLRTs to be reduced. It reflects a concern for the aging effect on the primary containment and mechanical
penetrations caused by frequent testing.
6-2
was appropriate. Leakage tests of the airlock doors are also performed periodically during
outages to assure that the specified leakage limits are not exceeded.
5. The LLRTs associated with mechanical penetrations that contain stainless steel expansion
joints made with two-ply bellows typically have included interply leakage tests for these
bellows. It is now clear that this type of test is invalid and can provide nonconservative
leakage rate results.
6. Trending of the historical data on leakage represents important input to the engineering
evaluation and the ability to estimate the priority and timing for corrective action to reduce
leakage.
7. Preventive maintenance program activities are applied to the following mechanical

penetration components: fasteners; personnel airlock mechanical and electrical systems; and
steel expansion joints. The preventive maintenance requirements for fasteners are associated
with the visual inspection of their condition when they are disassembled. Inspection of the
surfaces of the fasteners and associated flanges is performed to identify surface defects and
signs of wear and corrosion.
8. The surveillance program provides for the visual inspection of mechanical penetrations for
discoloration, blisters, scratches, flaking, rust, and any other abnormal appearance. The
condition of corrosion protection coatings is also identified during these inspections. The
surveillance program includes the visual inspection of elastomer seals on piping penetrations
and air locks for evidence of shrinkage, embrittlement, or other abnormal conditions. The
program also includes inspections of the personnel airlock door latching mechanisms, gaskets
and seals for wear, fatigue, or other damage, and functional tests of door operation.
9. Routine daily plant walkdowns are conducted in all plant areas (except within primary
containment) to detect any abnormal physical conditions (such as rust, dents, cracks,
deformation, discoloration, insulation damage, vibration, leaks, spills, and any unusual
noises). The accessible portions of mechanical penetrations outside of primary containment
are observed during these walkdowns.
10. Plant walkdowns of all areas are performed after refueling and other planned plant
shutdowns and just prior to plant restart (in this case, personnel pay particular attention to
areas or components that were modified, refurbished, or replaced during the outage). All
reasonably accessible portions of the penetrations are observed during these walkdowns. All
abnormal conditions identified during these walkdowns are documented and investigated and
corrective action is taken as necessary.
6.2 Conclusions Regarding Electrical and Mechanical Penetration Aging
The following general conclusions are applicable to electrical or mechanical penetrations:
1. Penetration assemblies and their components that are included within the scope of this AMG
have historically been highly reliable. They are expected to perform their safety function and
meet all regulatory requirements during the current licensing term.
6-3
2. Penetrations currently installed in operating plants can, in general, be expected to continue to

perform their safety function and meet all regulatory requirements during an extended period
of operation after the expiration of the current licensing period.
3. Based on analysis of historical failure data, the number of penetration failures that have
occurred throughout the industry is very low in proportion to the overall population.
4. No significant increase in the failure rate of penetrations considered as part of this AMG is
anticipated as the end of either the original or the license renewal period is approached. This
conclusion is based on the following:
· No aging mechanisms other than those identified in this AMG are known or expected to
occur during this period (i.e., no mechanisms unique to the license renewal period have
been identified).
· No change in the character of existing aging mechanisms or rate of degradation induced
by these mechanisms is anticipated.
· Significant conservatism (via design, qualification, and other analyses) often exists with
respect to component longevity.
5. The stressors and aging mechanisms affecting penetration components are generally well
understood and characterized; however, knowledge of some areas (including combined and
natural aging environments) is more limited.
6. Penetration component aging can be evaluated on an on-going basis, using periodic

inspections, theoretical techniques, and measurement of physical properties.
7. The majority of techniques used to assess aging in penetrations are preventive or surveillance
activities. Preventive actions include physical inspection, component replacement, cleaning,
and painting. Surveillance activities include integrated and local leak rate testing.
8. In general, both electrical and mechanical containment penetrations require little in the way
of periodic maintenance. Furthermore, some types of degradation identified in Section 4 are
not readily detectable through condition monitoring or other measurement of component
properties. Therefore, the list of condition monitoring and measurement techniques directly
applicable to mechanical and electrical penetrations is comparatively small.
9. Most penetration components are not subject to significant aging degradation (many are
metallic or ceramic). Typically, only the degradable organic components are replaced,
particularly those environmentally qualified organic components that are approaching the end
of their qualified lives.
6.3 Additional Aging Management Considerations
Penetrations of the types considered in this AMG are generally very reliable; additional aging
management activities appear warranted for only a very small fraction of the total penetration
population. Existing programs appear effective at managing most of the significant aging effects
6-4
for these components, as demonstrated by the low historical failure rates observed in the
empirical data to date. However, improvements to existing practices can be made; such
improvements may include better focus of present programs on areas/applications potentially
subject to more rapid degradation, and identifying and managing those aging effects not
completely addressed. Accordingly, the following recommendations regarding penetration aging
management are presented:
1. Additional aging management will be required only for a relatively small fraction of the total
plant penetration population. Specifically, certain penetrations may warrant more careful
consideration if they are:
· located near local sources of high heat and/or radiation,
· subject to continuous or near-continuous loading at a significant percentage of their
ampacity limits (power electrical penetrations only),
· exposed to submergence/wetting or adverse chemical environments, or
· subject to repeated or continuous damaging mechanical stress (access hatches).
2. Accurate characterization of plant environments (especially those of the more severe areas
such as primary containment) is important to manage effectively the aging of certain
penetrations. Such characterization should be conducted to assist in establishing
representative qualified lives for environmentally qualified components, and to help identify
components that may undergo accelerated aging with respect to the rest of the population
(and potentially warrant additional aging management activities).
3. Based on the similarity between many EQ and non-EQ electrical penetrations, existing
information and analyses related to the aging of EQ components should be considered for use
with non-EQ components where applicable to assist in management of their aging.
4. In cases where condition monitoring is deemed appropriate (such as where aging effects
cannot otherwise be adequately managed by existing practices), a program to determine
baseline aging condition of affected components using a nondestructive test or evaluation
method should be considered.
5. Information derived from natural or low-acceleration factor aging programs currently

underway may yield a better understanding of degradation resulting from combined
environments and natural aging conditions, and should be used to supplement present
knowledge regarding the aging of organic penetration materials. Additionally, input from
ongoing qualification activities (such as follow-on analyses, testing, condition monitoring,
and maintenance) should be incorporated into existing programs as appropriate.
6. One of the best techniques for evaluating penetration component aging is periodic visual and
mechanical inspection, because the effects of many degradation stressors (including heat,
chemicals, radiation, mechanical stress, moisture, and contaminants) are readily detectable in
this fashion. By simply observing physical changes in penetration components, their relative
condition can often be determined. The summary of inspection techniques for both electrical
6-5
and mechanical penetrations presented in Table 5-1 demonstrates the importance of visual
inspections in identifying various aging mechanisms.
7. In specific cases where known or identified problem areas exist, increased preventive
maintenance and/or monitoring may be employed, or the degraded component may simply be
replaced as required.
8. A structured penetration inspection program based on plant-specific operating experience and

coupled with root cause analysis and appropriate corrective action could be considered an
aging management program. Many of the plants contacted as part of this study have similar
programs in place. Note: Many existing plant activities not specifically focused on
penetration aging management may often be credited with addressing aging effects.
9. Plants must implement the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) [6.3] by July 1996, and
containment mechanical penetrations are included within the scope of the Maintenance Rule.
Two aspects of the program for implementing the Maintenance Rule will support aging
management for mechanical penetrations, namely, the investigation of maintenance
preventable functional failures (MPFF) and the actual monitoring of penetration
performance.
10. To meet program performance goals and reduce the potential for MPFF occurrences, the
results of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J LLRTs for selected mechanical penetrations are trended
over time. The leakage data, along with other performance, maintenance, refurbishment, and
modification history information, can help develop future maintenance activities to ensure
meeting reliability goals. The investigation of MPFFs is considered an aging management
activity that can support the detection and mitigation of any type of degradation for all
penetration components. The trending of leakage test results can identify degradation for the
penetration components directly contributing to primary containment pressure integrity.
11. Special Considerations for Stainless Steel Bellows
The hot piping penetrations for steel containments and the fuel transfer tube penetration
contain metallic expansion joints that are pressure boundary components for the primary
containment. The two current issues associated with these stainless steel bellows are the
potential for degradation due to fatigue and stress corrosion cracking and the inability to leak
test the double-ply bellows with air pressure between the plies.
Degradation of these bellow elements and the inability to effectively repair these components
have caused the entire expansion joint to be replaced for feedwater and main steam piping
penetrations at two nuclear plants. These replacements are difficult and costly because of
poor access around the large diameter piping penetrations. The detection and mitigation of
bellows surface defects and cracks due to SCC and fatigue is important for long-term
reliability of this type of penetrations. The development of improved repair and
refurbishment methods for these bellows elements should also be undertaken.
6-6
6.4 References
6.1 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Electrical Cable
and Terminations,” SAND96-0344, September 1996.
6.2 Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J, “Primary
Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors,”
September 22, 1980.
6.3 Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Part 50.65, “Requirements for
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,” July 10, 1991.
6-7
A
DEFINITIONS
Note: Definitions are derived from one of the following sources unless otherwise noted:
1. EPRI TR-100844, “Nuclear Power Plant Common Aging Terminology,” prepared by MPR
Associates, Inc., November 1992.
2. Fink, D. and H. Beaty, “Standard Handbook for Electrical Engineers,” Twelfth Edition,
McGraw-Hill, 1987.
3. “IEEE Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations,” IEEE Std 317-1983.
accelerated aging artificial aging in which the simulation of natural aging approximates, in a
short time, the aging effects of longer-term service conditions
acceptance criterion specified limit of a functional or condition indicator used to assess the
ability of an SSC to perform its design function
accident environments the postulated conditions resulting from either a LOCA or HELB inside
primary containment, or from a HELB outside primary containment [IE Bulletin 79-01B]
age conditioning simulation of natural aging effects in an SSC by the application of any
combination of artificial and natural aging
age-related degradation synonym for aging degradation
aging general process in which characteristics of an SSC gradually change with time or use
aging assessment evaluation of appropriate information for determining the effects of aging on
the current and future ability of SSCs to function within acceptance criteria
aging degradation aging effects that could impair the ability of an SSC to function within
acceptance criteria
aging effects net changes in characteristics of an SSC that occur with time or use and are due to
aging mechanisms
aging management engineering, operations, and maintenance actions to control within

acceptable limits aging degradation and wearout of SSCs
A-1
Definitions
aging mechanism specific process that gradually changes characteristics of an SSC with time or
use
analysis a process of mathematical or other logical reasoning that leads from stated premises to
the conclusion concerning specific capabilities of equipment and its adequacy for a particular
application [IEEE 323-1974]
Arrhenius model an aging model for chemical degradation developed from the basic
probabilities of collision of reacting molecules. The model relates the rate of degradation to
absolute temperature by a simple exponential function.
artificial aging simulation of natural aging effects on SSCs by application of stressors

representing plant pre-service and service conditions, but perhaps different in intensity, duration,
and manner of application
breakdown synonym for complete failure
canister electric penetration assembly a penetration where pre-machined stainless steel header
plates are factory welded to the ends of a seamless pipe. Feedthroughs are assembled through the
header plates and sealed in place at each header [Conax Electrical Penetration Assembly
Brochure].
characteristic property or attribute of an SSC (such as shape, dimension, weight, condition

indicator, functional indicator, performance or mechanical, chemical, or electrical property)
combined effects net changes in characteristics of an SSC produced by two or more stressors
common cause failure two or more failures due to a single cause
common mode failure two or more failures in the same manner or mode due to a single cause
complete failure failure in which there is complete loss of function
condition the state or level of characteristics of an SSC that can affect its ability to perform a
design function
condition surrounding physical state or influence that can affect an SSC
condition indicator characteristic that can be observed, measured, or trended to infer or directly
indicate the current and future ability of an SSC to function within acceptance criteria
condition monitoring observation, measurement, or trending of condition or functional

indicators with respect to some independent parameter (usually time or cycles) to indicate the
current and future ability of an SSC to function within acceptance criteria
condition trending synonym for condition monitoring
A-2
Definitions
conduit a tube or trough in which insulated wires and cables are run
corrective maintenance actions that restore, by repair, overhaul, or replacement, the capability
of a failed SSC to function within acceptance criteria
degradation intermediate or gradual deterioration of characteristics of an SSC that could impair

its ability to function within acceptance criteria
degraded condition marginally acceptable condition of an unfailed SSC that could lead to a
decision to perform planned maintenance
degraded failure failure in which a functional indicator does not meet an acceptance criterion,
but design function is not completely lost
design basis conditions synonym for design conditions
design basis event any of the events specified in the station’s safety analysis that are used to
establish acceptable performance for safety-related functions of SSCs; events include anticipated
transients, design basis accidents, external events, and natural phenomena
design basis event conditions service conditions produced by design basis events
design conditions specified service conditions used to establish the specifications of an SSC
(generally includes margin of conservatism beyond expected service conditions)
design life period during which an SSC is expected to function within acceptance criteria
design service conditions the service conditions used as a basis for ratings and for the design
qualification of electric penetration assemblies [IEEE 317-1983]
design tests tests performed to verify that an electric penetration assembly meets design
requirements [IEEE Std 317-1983]
deterioration synonym for degradation
diagnosis examination and evaluation of data to determine either the condition of an SSC or the
causes of the condition
diagnostic evaluation synonym for diagnosis
double aperture seal two single aperture seals in series
double electric conductor seal two single electric conductor seals in series
A-3
Definitions
duty continuous duty: operation at a substantially constant load for an indefinitely long time
intermittent duty: operation for alternate intervals of (1) load and no load; or
(2) load and rest; or (3) load, no load, and rest
periodic duty: intermittent operation in which the load conditions are

regularly recurrent
short-time duty: operation at a substantially constant load for a short and

definitely specified time
varying duty: operation at loads, and for intervals of time, both of which
may be subject to wide variation
electric penetration assembly an assembly of insulated electric conductors, conductor seals,

and plates that provide the passage of the electric conductors through a single aperture in the
nuclear containment structure, while providing a pressure barrier between the inside and the
outside of the containment structure
environmental conditions physical service conditions external to the electric penetration

assembly, such as ambient temperature, pressure, radiation, humidity, vibration, chemical or
demineralized water spray, and submergence, expected as a result of normal operating
requirements, and postulated conditions appropriate for the design basis events applicable to the
electric penetration assembly
equipment qualification the generation and maintenance of evidence to assure that the
equipment will operate on demand, to meet system performance requirements
equivalent life the length of time at a specific temperature during which the amount of thermal
degradation that occurs to an organic material will be equal to that caused by a different
temperature applied for a different length of time [EPRI NP-1558]
error-induced aging degradation aging degradation produced by error-induced conditions
error-induced conditions adverse pre-service or service conditions produced by design,

fabrication, installation, operation, or maintenance errors
error-induced stress stress that stems from error-induced conditions and can produce immediate
or aging degradation beyond that produced by normal stressors
failure inability or interruption of ability of an SSC to function within acceptance criteria
failure analysis systematic process of determining and documenting the mode, mechanism,
causes, and root cause of failure of an SSC
failure cause circumstances during design, manufacture, test, or use that have led to failure
A-4
Definitions
failure evaluation synonym for failure analysis
failure mechanism physical process that results in failure
failure mode the manner or state in which an SSC fails
failure modes and effects analysis systematic process for determining and documenting
potential failure modes and their effects on SSCs
failure trending recording, analyzing, and extrapolating in-service failures on an SSC with
respect to some independent parameter (usually time or cycles)
feedthrough module the piping of the individual modules contained in a larger modular
electrical penetration assembly
field-fabricated electrical penetration assemblies EPAs that are manufactured at the site
flame resistance the ability of a material not to propagate flame once the heat source is removed
functional conditions influences on an SSC resulting from the performance of design functions
(operation of a system or component and loading of a structure)
functional indicator condition indicator that is a direct indication of the current ability of an
SSC to function within acceptance criteria
generic design a family of equipment units having similar materials, manufacturing processes,
limiting stresses, design, and operating principles, that can be represented for qualification
purposes by a representative unit(s)
inservice inspection methods and actions for assuring the structural and pressure-retaining
integrity of safety-related nuclear power plant components in accordance with the rules of
ASME Code, Section XI
inservice life synonym for service life (especially in discussions involving ASME Code, Section
XI]
inservice test a test to determine the operational readiness of a component or system [ASME
Code, Section XI]
inspection synonym for surveillance
installed life the interval of time from installation to permanent removal from service, during
which the electric penetration assembly is expected to perform its required function(s). Note:
Components of the assembly may require periodic replacement; thus, the installed life of such
components is less than the installed life of the assembly.
A-5
Definitions
junction box optional terminal box that is connected to the outboard and/or inboard sections of
the penetration
life period from fabrication to retirement of an SSC
life assessment synonym for aging assessment
life cycle management synonym for life management
life management integration of aging management and economic planning to: (1) optimize the
operation, maintenance, and useful life of SSCs; (2) maintain an acceptable level of performance
and safety; and (3) maximize return on investment over the useful life of the plant
lifetime synonym for life
maintenance aggregate of direct and supporting actions that detect, preclude, or mitigate
degradation of a functioning SSC or restore to an acceptable level the design functions of a failed
SSC
malfunction synonym for failure
margin the difference between the most severe specified service conditions of the plant and the
conditions used in type testing to account for normal variations in commercial production of
equipment and reasonable errors in defining satisfactory performance [IEEE 323-1974]
mean time between failures arithmetic average of operating times between failures of an item
[IEEE Std 100]
modular electric penetration assembly a number of individual modules mounted on a header

plate, the entirety of which comprises the penetration assembly
natural aging aging of an SSC that occurs under pre-service and service conditions, including
error-induced conditions
normal aging natural aging from error-free pre-service or service conditions
normal aging degradation aging degradation produced by normal conditions
normal conditions operating conditions of a properly designed, fabricated, installed, operated,

and maintained SSC excluding design basis event conditions
normal operating conditions synonym for normal conditions
normal stress stress that stems from normal conditions and can produce aging mechanisms and
effects in an SSC
A-6
Definitions
nozzles steel tubes or pipes traversing the containment wall thickness into which electrical
penetration assemblies are mounted [NUREG/CR-5461]
operating conditions service conditions, including normal and error-induced conditions, prior to
the start of a design basis accident or earthquake
operating service conditions synonym for operating conditions
operational conditions synonym for functional conditions
periodic maintenance form of preventive maintenance consisting of servicing, parts

replacement, surveillance, or testing at predetermined intervals of calendar time, operating time,
or number of cycles
planned maintenance form of preventive maintenance consisting of refurbishment or

replacement that is scheduled and performed prior to failure of an SSC
post-maintenance testing testing after maintenance to verify that maintenance was performed
correctly and that the SSC can function within acceptance criteria
pre-service conditions actual physical states or influences on an SSC prior to initial operation
(e.g., fabrication, storage, transportation, installation, and pre-operational testing)
preventive maintenance actions that detect, preclude, or mitigate degradation of a functional

SSC to sustain or extend its useful life by controlling degradation and failures to an acceptable
level; there are three types of preventive maintenance: periodic, predictive, and planned
qualification verification of design limited to demonstrating that the electric equipment is

capable of performing its safety functions under significant environmental stresses resulting from
design basis accidents in order to avoid common-cause failures [Reg. Guide 1.89]
qualified life the period of time, prior to the start of a design basis event, for which the
equipment was demonstrated to meet the design requirements for the specified service
conditions. Note: At the end of the qualified life, the equipment shall be capable of performing
the safety function(s) required for the postulated design basis and post design basis events.
qualified life test tests performed on preconditioned test specimens to verify that an electric
penetration assembly will meet design requirements at the end of its qualified life
radiation damage threshold the lowest dose that induces permanent change in a measured
property(s) of a material; also, the first detectable change in a property of a material due to the
effect of radiation
refurbishment planned actions to improve the condition of an unfailed SSC
remaining design life period from a stated time to planned retirement of an SSC
A-7
Definitions
remaining life actual period from a stated time to retirement of an SSC
remaining service life synonym for remaining life
remaining useful life synonym for remaining life
repair actions to return a failed SSC to an acceptable condition
replacement removal of an undegraded, degraded, or failed SSC or a part thereof and

installation of another in its place that can function within the original acceptance criteria
safety function the required action, non-action, or non-failure of safety-related equipment
safety-related equipment that is relied upon to remain functional during and following design
basis events to ensure (i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (ii) the capability
to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and (iii) the capability to
prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential off-site exposures
comparable to 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. Safety-related electric equipment is referred to as
Class 1E in IEEE 323-1974 [10 CFR 50.49].
service conditions environmental, power, and signal conditions expected as a result of normal
operating requirements, expected extremes in operating requirements, and postulated conditions
appropriate for the design basis events applicable to the electric penetration assembly
service life actual period from initial operation to retirement of an SSC
simultaneous effects combined effects from stressors acting simultaneously
single aperture seal a single seal between the containment aperture and the electric penetration
assembly
single electric conductor seal a mechanical assembly arranged in such a way that there is a
single pressure barrier between the inside and the outside of the containment structure along the
axis of the electric conductor
stress synonym for stressor
stressor agent or stimulus that stems from pre-service and service conditions and can produce
immediate or aging degradation of an SSC
surveillance observation or measurement of condition or functional indicators to verify that an

SSC currently can function within acceptance criteria
surveillance requirements test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of
systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within the safety limits,
A-8
Definitions
and that the limiting conditions of operation will be met [10 CFR 50.36] (for use only when
specific regulatory and legal connotations are called for)
surveillance testing synonym for surveillance, surveillance requirements, and testing (use
only when specific regulatory and legal connotations are called for)
testing observation or measurement of condition indicators under controlled conditions to verify

that an SSC currently conforms to acceptance criteria
thermal aging one method of accelerated aging, usually associated with the Arrhenius model
thermal life the period of time for which a piece of equipment has been evaluated, on the basis
of Arrhenius plots of materials, to be able to endure thermal conditions and still perform its
required safety function during or after the occurrence of harsh environment conditions
time in service time from initial operation of an SSC to a stated time
useful life synonym for service life
wearout failure produced by an aging mechanism
A-9
B
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A Amperes
AC Alternating Current
AMG Aging Management Guideline
AMR Aging Management Review
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
B&PV Boiler and Pressure Vessel
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CM Condition Monitoring
CNTM Containment
COLWR Commercial Operating Light Water Reactor
CSPE Chlorosulfonated Polyethylene
C&VC Chemical and Volume Control
DBA Design Basis Accident
DBE Design Basis Event
DC Direct Current
DF Dissipation Factor
DOE Department of Energy
EPA Electrical Penetration Assembly
EPDM Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer
EPR Ethylene Propylene Rubber
B-1
Acronyms and Abbreviations
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

EQ Environmental Qualification
ETFE Ethylene Tetrafluoroethylene
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
Gy Grays (unit of radiation)
HELB High Energy Line Break
ICEA Insulated Conductor Electrical Association
IE (NRC) Inspection and Enforcement
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test
IN (NRC) Information Notice
INPO Institute for Nuclear Power Operations
LCM Life Cycle Management
LER Licensee Event Report
LLRT Local Leak Rate Test
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident
MPFF Maintenance Preventable Functional Failures
MSLB Main Steam Line Break
NEC National Electric Code
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute (formerly NUMARC)
NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association
NFPA National Fire Prevention Association
NMAC Nuclear Maintenance Application Center (EPRI)
NPAR Nuclear Plant Aging Research
NPRDS Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (INPO)
NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUMARC Nuclear Management and Resources Council (now NEI)
NUREG Nuclear Regulatory (NRC Publication)
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory
PVC Polyvinyl Chloride
B-2
Acronyms and Abbreviations
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor

RFO Refueling Outage
RG (NRC) Regulatory Guide
RHR Residual Heat Removal
RTV Room Temperature Vulcanizing
RWCU Reactor Water Cleanup
SCC Stress Corrosion Cracking
SF Service Factor
SNL Sandia National Laboratories
SSC System, Structure, or Component
TDR Time Domain Reflectometry
TED Time to Equivalent Damage
TID Total Integrated Dose
UL Underwriters Laboratory
V Volts
XLPE Cross-linked Polyethylene
XLPO Cross-linked Polyolefin
B-3
C
EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION
C.1 Electrical Penetration Assemblies
The general function of an electrical penetration is to permit the conduction or transmission

of electrical signals or power through the containment wall while maintaining the integrity
of the containment pressure boundary. EPAs are typically mounted within horizontal
cylindrical carbon steel sleeves (nozzles) attached to the steel containment wall liner.
These nozzles protrude radially from the center of the containment. The penetration may be
either welded or bolted to this nozzle. Welding helps ensure a continuous, leak-tight seal at
the nozzle/penetration interface, yet sacrifices some flexibility with regard to maintenance
and disassembly. Bolted flanges, on the other hand, permit such maintenance activities, yet
require O-rings or seals between the mating surfaces to ensure sealing. Such seals may be
organic or inorganic (typically the former), and are generally installed in concentric pairs.
A carbon steel weld ring is also often attached to the outer periphery of the header plate or
canister to avoid welding dissimilar metals (i.e., the stainless steel of the penetration to the
carbon steel of the nozzle), which provides ease of welding in the field.
EPAs may be attached to the applicable containment nozzle either at the inboard (reactor side)
or outboard end. Attachment of canister type EPAs at both ends is often avoided to preclude the
formation of any axial stresses resulting from thermal expansion of the penetration components
and/or nozzle. Attachment of the EPA to the nozzle at the outboard end allows greater access
during both plant operation and maintenance periods, and may also afford certain penetration
components some additional protection against potential high temperatures, pressures, humidity,
radiation, and jet spray/impingement during accident conditions.
Three major designs of electrical penetration have been implemented to accomplish these
functions: (1) the modular type, (2) the plate type, and (3) the canister type.
Modular EPAs use one or more individual modules to carry the electrical conductors through the
penetration. Each module is individually sealed (both internally and to the penetration assembly)
to prevent any leakage of the containment atmosphere past or through the module. In effect, each
module acts as its own penetration through the header plate. The largest benefit of modular
penetrations is their flexibility; in the event one module requires maintenance or replacement, it
can usually be readily removed from the EPA without significantly disturbing the other modules.
This can be especially important where large numbers of conductors pass through a given EPA;
the level of effort necessary to extract the entire penetration far exceeds that required for one
module. Modular EPAs are the most prevalent type in use, and are commonly retrofitted to
existing canister or plate applications.
C-1
Equipment Description
Plate type EPAs, as the name implies, generally use a single plate bolted or welded to the
containment sleeve or nozzle. Electrical connectors are usually welded or soldered directly
to the plate to form the conductor seal. This design was used primarily in early nuclear plant
applications before the advent of prefabricated modular and canister EPA designs. Although
simple, this design does not permit removal/replacement of connectors or monitoring of leakage
around penetration seals.
Canister type EPAs are generally composed of two end plates mounted to form a tubular
steel canister; the conductors pass between the end plates, and are sealed at each end using
a metal-to-metal or metal-to-ceramic seal. Canister EPAs are typically pressurized internally
with an inert gas (such as nitrogen or argon), which can also be used to monitor the integrity
of the pressure seals. Due to their use of epoxies, ceramics, and potting compounds for sealing,
individual conductors are not removable from the penetration when installed. Canister EPAs are
generally used more extensively in older plants (i.e., those constructed before the modular type
EPAs were available).
Many penetrations use stainless steel components for a variety of reasons, including reduced
susceptibility to corrosion or pitting due to moisture, ease of maintenance, and reduced hysteresis
effect.1 Ohmic heating and losses resulting from hysteresis are generally a concern only for high
current three-phase power circuits as opposed to low-current instrumentation or control
applications.
Leads used in many EPA types are similar in construction to field cable used throughout the
plant, having a multistrand tinned copper conductor and extruded polymeric insulation. In many
cases, commercially available field cable (such as Rockbestos Firewall) is used directly in the
assembly to simplify construction and reduce manufacturing costs. Some medium-voltage power
penetrations use solid copper conductors that are terminated at the end or header plate(s) and
insulated from the internals of the penetration assembly via various types of epoxy and potting
compounds.
Cable loading and spacing within a penetration or module is dictated largely by potential
heating concerns. During normal operation, instrument and control penetrations are not exposed
to any appreciable ohmic heating as a result of the electrical conductors. On the contrary, power
penetrations may generate considerable internal heat, which must be considered in the design
electrical and insulation thermal ratings. Proper spacing and support of conductors within a
penetration is essential to ensure proper airflow around the conductor/module. Furthermore,
ohmic heating in power penetrations may result in significant thermal aging of organic
components within the EPA (see Section 4). In addition to normal conductor loading
considerations, EPAs must be designed to withstand overload and fault conditions that may
occur in the circuits using the penetration. Fault conditions may also induce severe mechanical
stresses on EPA conductors and internal components, which must be accounted for in the design.
1
Circulating currents may be induced in metallic components by virtue of varying magnetic fields in their vicinity.
Alternating current circuits produce alternating magnetic fields which create an electromotive force (EMF) and
circulating current flow within the component. This circulating current may generate heat through ohmic losses in
the component [C.1]. Ferrous materials (such as low-alloy carbon steel) are particularly susceptible.
C-2
Most EPAs use field cable as the EPA internal conductors or leads.2 These cables are
usually manufactured and environmentally qualified by someone other than the penetration
manufacturer. Therefore, such cables are an important aspect of the overall electrical
performance of the penetration. For instrumentation circuits, EPA resistance and impedance
characteristics may significantly affect the overall performance of the circuit. Field cable inside
and outside of containment interface with the penetration by way of either electrical connectors,
cable splices, terminal blocks, or bushings.
Leakage monitoring systems are installed on most types of EPAs. These systems provide for the
establishment, monitoring, and maintenance of inert gas pressure within certain critical portions
of the penetration. The function of this inert gas volume is twofold. First, any variations in gas
pressure (not induced by anticipated events such as temperature changes) can be immediately
detected and evaluated as a possible sign of leakage. Second, the inert gas helps to prevent the
ingress or formation of moisture within the penetration, thereby avoiding any deleterious effects
that may result (such as reduced insulation resistance, metallic corrosion, etc.) and reducing the
oxygen concentration. Generally, the leakage monitoring/detection ports and passages within a
given penetration are of small volume in order to provide maximum sensitivity to leakage.
Purged volumes (such as those inside a canister type EPA) are typically larger, thereby having
somewhat less sensitivity to leakage (a given leak will produce a slower pressure drop in the
larger volume).
Epoxy is widely used as a potting or sealing compound in EPAs constructed by several
manufacturers. Ceramic seals were used in many of the earlier EPA designs; however, based
on their cost and spatial limitations (e.g., they require more space than a comparable epoxy seal),
they are generally no longer in use. Epoxies typically have excellent mechanical and electrical
properties, as well as excellent thermal and radiation resistance. These epoxies are cured at high
temperature during penetration manufacture to prevent further curing during installed lifetime
or under accident conditions. Aromatic amine-cured resins are common epoxy seal materials.
Some manufacturers (such as Conax) use resilient thermoplastic sealants (such as polysulfone
and polyimide [Kapton]) in place of the traditional epoxies and potting compounds.
In addition to the major subcomponents described above, penetrations may also have
other additional components, including terminations, junction boxes, and radiation shields.
Terminations
Terminations are commonly used in electrical penetration assemblies to provide a termination

point on the inboard and/or outboard side of the EPA for the conductors passing through the
assembly. Typical terminations types used on EPAs include the following:
· Compression Connectors. Provide for electrical connection of cable or wire lead conductor;
physically crimped or mechanically swaged to cable conductor(s).
· Fusion Connectors. Also provide for electrical connection of cable or wire lead conductor;
welded, brazed, or soldered to cable conductor(s).
2
The most notable exception is EPAs manufactured by Conax, which use Kapton insulated leads.
C-3
· Plug-in/Multi-pin/Coaxial/Triaxial Connectors. Connectors with multiple electrical

contacts that plug or screw into mating receptacle; usually used in instrumentation or data
transmission applications, some motor-operated valves, control circuits, and limit switches.
Some penetration types use connectors integral to the header plate assembly.
· Terminal Blocks. Insulating base with fixed points for landing of wiring or connection of
terminal (ring) lugs.
· Bushings. Provide enhanced electrical isolation between conductor leads. Typically used for
large medium- or low-voltage power penetrations.
Penetration bushings are discussed further in subsequent sections of this AMG.
Junction Boxes
Junction boxes affixed to the ends of EPAs provide several functions, including protection
of the penetration header plate area from environmental exposure to heat sources, radiation,
and chemical spray, and support of field cables and terminations. These boxes are typically
fabricated from low alloy or sheet steel, have volumes of several cubic feet to accommodate
various types of terminations or other related components, and are designed and constructed
in accordance with NEMA standards. Drain holes are typically provided in the bottom of the
box to allow drainage of any accumulated moisture.
Radiant and convective heating are reduced through direct shielding by the junction box.
This helps to reduce thermally-induced aging of organic penetration and cable components.
Furthermore, if suitably constructed, the junction box may function to protect the EPA from
damage from a nearby fire.
Additionally, during coolant or other system leaks, spray may directly strike on the header plate,
seal, or connector areas of the EPA, thereby increasing their likelihood of damage or failure.
Junction boxes act to prevent or limit the striking of high pressure (chemical) spray onto these
critical penetration components.
Under accident conditions, the junction box may also provide radiation shielding to EPA
components from airborne beta radiation. This issue relates solely to environmental qualification
as opposed to long-term component aging.3
3
Gamma radiation is shielded to a limited degree by the metal enclosure under both normal and accident conditions.
Beta radiation exposure of the penetration (which occurs only during accident conditions) is also reduced through
the shielding effect of the enclosure. Because junction boxes are generally vented to the local atmosphere via drain
holes, airborne beta radiation produced during an accident is not completely excluded from the interior cavity.
However, the particulate cloud volume that produces the beta exposure to the EPA is reduced to that inside the box
(because the beta dose contributed by the volume outside the box is effectively shielded by the box), plus the dose
resulting from Bremsstrahlung interactions of the incident beta radiation with the box itself (conservatively assumed
to be approximately 5% of the incident beta dose). This is significant primarily from an environmental qualification
standpoint, because the qualified lives of penetration components may be extended over those otherwise attainable
based on the presence of a junction box. No measurable reduction in neutron dose is afforded by the enclosure;
however, neutron radiation is not a significant aging concern for penetration components.
C-4
Junction boxes also provide support for field cable and terminations associated with an EPA.
If not properly supported, mechanical stress associated with the weight of the field cable may
damage the cable or parts of the penetration itself over time. Junction boxes are constructed to
provide routing and support of field cable running to or from the EPA to preclude such damage.
Radiation Shields
Radiation shields are installed on the inboard (i.e., reactor) side of some EPAs to attenuate
gamma and/or neutron radiation exposure during reactor operation. Their primary intent is to
reduce the dose rate to areas outside containment in proximity to the penetration resulting from
“shine” (i.e., streaming) through the penetration from radiation sources inside containment.
However, they may also provide a secondary benefit of reduced irradiation of organic EPA
components. Radiation shields are generally mounted on either the end (on or around the
junction box) or collar (around the perimeter of the inboard side of the nozzle) of the EPA.
These shields may be constructed of lead, borated polyethylene, or similar shielding material,
depending on the application.
EPA Manufacturers and Design Evolution
Much consolidation has occurred within the penetration industry over the past 20 years.
Although there were several independent manufacturers of EPAs during the early and mid-
1970s, only two suppliers remain (e.g., Conax Buffalo and Imaging and Sensing Technology) as
of the date of this writing. Therefore, the date of construction of a plant will largely determine
the types, manufacturers, and configurations of penetrations installed. As might be expected, the
comparatively large number of penetration manufacturers present during the construction phase
of many nuclear plants, coupled with assimilation of various product lines and companies into
others, has resulted in a relatively diverse array of installed EPA configurations.
For example, Amphenol SAMS (Space and Missile Systems) was a division of Bunker Ramo,
both of which originally offered penetration assemblies to the nuclear industry. These product
lines were consolidated into the commonly known Bunker Ramo penetration. Similarly, the
Crouse-Hinds penetration line was acquired by Westinghouse, which also offered its own EPA
design. The Westinghouse EPA line (which incorporated elements of the existing Westinghouse
designs and the Crouse-Hinds line) was eventually acquired by Imaging and Sensing
Technology, which currently markets these assemblies.
Some EPAs are one-of-a-kind designs unique to a given plant. Others are field fabricated units
that may be unique compared to other penetrations within the same plant. Many of the EPAs
used in the early plants were field fabricated by the constructor or architect-engineer; that is, the
penetration was constructed on-site based on the design requirements of the specific application.
In such assemblies, little uniformity or standardization exists because the requirements for each
plant (and even each individual EPA) may vary significantly. However, as increased
performance, standardization, and safety requirements were imposed, pre-fabricated EPAs
produced by dedicated manufacturers became the standard within the industry.
C-5
C.1.1 Amphenol SAMS/Bunker Ramo Electrical Penetration Assemblies
Since 1960, Amphenol SAMS EPA design has undergone a number of major evolutionary
stages, including:
1. single header plate (Humboldt Bay design)
2. double header plate (Surry design)
3. canister EPA (Calvert Cliffs design)
4. mated double header (AEC LOFT design)
5. unitized header assembly (designed for various plants, including ANO, Davis-Besse, and
Trojan).
Each of these designs is briefly described below. [C.2]
Single Header Plate
The single header plate design for Amphenol SAMS penetrations is shown in Figure C-1.
The assembly consists of a single carbon steel header plate into which glass hermetic bulkhead-
mounted connectors are brazed or soldered. The assembly is attached to the containment nozzle
via bolts. Field cables on the inboard and outboard sides are terminated to connectors that mate
with the hermetic connectors mounted in the header plate.
Figure C-1
Amphenol Single Header Plate Design
C-6
Double Header Plate
The double header plate design is shown in Figure C-2. This design is composed of two steel
header plates (each approximately 2.5 cm [1 in] thick) into which the glass hermetic seal
connector assemblies are welded. A prefabricated cable assembly runs between the two
connectors/header plates. The header plates are attached via bolts to either end of the
containment nozzle, with a dual O-ring sealing assembly between each plate and the nozzle
flange. The interstitial space between the grooves may be monitored for leakage; additionally,
the internal cavity formed between the header plates, internal seals, and nozzle can be
pressurized to facilitate leak testing of the assembly after installation or maintenance.
Figure C-2
Amphenol Double Header Plate Design
Canister EPA
Figure C-3 shows the Amphenol canister penetration design. The penetrations consist of two
steel header plates through which insulated feedthrough modules pass. The header plates fit
inside of the canister housing to complete the pressure-tight seal. The feedthrough modules are
insulated from the header plate by glass inserts; these glass inserts/feedthrough assemblies are
welded into the header plate. A conformal coating (such as Dow Corning 96-083 silicone
adhesive) may be applied over the outside face of the header plate and around the feedthrough
studs. Silicone rubber grommets (or in some cases, fired glass or RTV) are inserted over each
feedthrough module, which, in conjunction with the conformal coating, acts to electrically
insulate the module from the header plate. It also provides a seal against the Raychem heatshrink
C-7
tubing to prevent any moisture intrusion. A phenolic washer may also be used adjacent to the
silicone grommet to protect the grommet from the metallic connector and provide uniform
compression of the grommet. The grommet and washer are held in compression against the
header plate by the module connector, which is threaded and clamped to the module. In some
cases, the inboard end of the canister is encased in epoxy such that the feedthrough ends,
contacts, and heatshrink are completely covered.
Inside the penetration, a power, twisted shielded pair, or coaxial cable connects the inboard and
outboard feedthrough modules via bolted lugs or soldering covered with Raychem heatshrink.
The choice of cable type and insulation material is determined by the function of the penetration.
Linen reinforced phenolic or metallic cable supports are used to support the cables at various
points inside the length of the canister.
External connectors or lugs may be used to allow connection to the conductors in the module.
Terminal blocks and boxes may be present on the inboard or outboard sides of the penetration;
however, some applications connect the feedthrough module conductor directly to the field cable
via a lug. A pressure test port with valve and pressure gage assembly is provided at the outboard
end of the canister penetration assembly to facilitate leak testing of the redundant conductor seals
after field installation.
Figure C-3
Amphenol Canister EPA Design
C-8
Mated Double Header Assembly
The mated double header design for electric penetration assemblies is illustrated in Figure C-4.
The assembly consists of two steel header plates (each approximately 3.8 cm [1.5 in] thick).
The header plates are sealed together by a circular metallic flange seal. Metal flanged hermetic
modules of glass/glass reinforced epoxy are sealed to each header plate. A bimetallic pressure
seal is used to form the seal between each module and header plate. The hex-shaped metal flange
on each module is secured to the header plate by bolting. The electric conductors are terminated
to the hermetic modules by threaded studs, direct mating connectors, or crimp spliced to pigtails
that are terminated to the modules.
The mated double header assembly is typically designed for attachment to containment liner
nozzle flanges by bolting; however, attachment by welding is also possible. Redundant O-ring
seals between the assembly and the nozzle flange can be independently pressurized to verify leak
tightness of the aperture seal. A pressure test port with valve and gauge assembly is provided to
facilitate leak testing of the conductor seals.
Figure C-4
Amphenol Mated Double Header Design
Unitized Header Assembly
The unitized header EPA design, using glass reinforced epoxy hermetic modules, is shown in
Figure C-5. The assembly consists of a single header plate, approximately 7.6 cm [3 in] thick,
C-9
into which hermetic modules are installed. Except for concentrically shielded coaxial and triaxial
cables that use glass hermetics, all conductors are sealed with glass reinforced epoxy. A seal is
installed at each end of the module between the glass reinforced epoxy and the steel header plate.
Each module contains redundant conductor seals and when installed in the mounting holes in the
header plate, the assembly can be leak tested via an internal porting scheme between mounting
holes. A typical glass reinforced epoxy hermetic module is shown in Figure C-6. The electric
conductors that pass through the assembly may be terminated with threaded studs, module
mating connectors, pigtails, terminal blocks, or other conventional termination methods.
Figure C-5
Amphenol Unitized Header Plate Design
The unitized header assembly is typically designed for attachment to the containment liner
nozzle by bolting to a neck flange. Direct welded attachment may also be used. A pressure
test port with valve and gage assembly is provided to facilitate continuous leak testing of the
redundant conductor module seals. A separate test port is provided for periodic testing of the
O-ring seals between the nozzle flange and the header plate.
C-10
Figure C-6
Amphenol Epoxy Hermetic Module (Unitized Design)
C.1.2 Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) Electrical Penetration Assemblies
CB&I EPAs are canister type penetrations. The typical CB&I penetration consists of a low-alloy
carbon steel pipe with end-plates welded on either end. The end plates for large power circuit
EPAs are usually fabricated from stainless steel to reduce hysteresis heating/losses, the rest are
carbon steel. Each end-plate is machined to accommodate multiple compression type gland
assemblies that provide for sealing between the penetration end plate and the conductors(s).
The pipe and end-plate assembly is welded or bolted to the containment nozzle via a flange
around the outer periphery of the pipe near the outboard end. The bolted flange arrangement
is sealed via an O-ring. The interior of the penetration may be pressurized and monitored for
leakage, and may be partially filled with potting compound depending on the type of circuit
served. Figure C-7 shows a cross section of various applications of CB&I penetrations.
C-11
Figure C-7
Cross Section of CB&I EPA
The gland assembly designs used in the CB&I EPAs are of two general types. The first type is
used primarily with mineral insulated (MI) feedthrough conductors, and is comprised of a
compression ring, a Teflon thread seal ring (Miller “Tru-Seal”), a seal nut, and a gland body and
cap. The gland body is threaded into the header plate on the outboard side of the penetration; the
thread seal ring is interposed between the header plate and gland body and placed in compression
by the seal nut threaded onto the outside of the gland body. The seal ring therefore acts to seal
any leakage through the threads at the header plate/gland body interface. The MI conductor
passes through the center of the gland body. A compression ring (seal) is tightly fitted around
the conductor at the disengaged end of the gland body, which is threaded to receive the gland
cap. As the gland cap is tightened, the compression ring is compressed inward to seal the
conductor to the gland body. Additionally, a synthetic rubber potting compound (Sonneborn
Sonolastic polysulfide or equivalent) is used to fill the cavity between the conductor and the
inside of the gland body on the inboard side of the penetration.
The second type of gland assembly design is used for polymer-insulated (as opposed to MI)
cables. The most significant difference between this type and the MI conductor seal is the use
of a cast silicon-bronze cap and pressure ring that bear down on a silicone rubber grommet
placed around the conductor insulation.
C-12
Other differences in construction exist between CB&I penetrations based on their function.
For example, the transition between the MI feedthrough conductors and field cable on the low-
voltage power and control EPAs is accomplished by termination end seals that are composed of
a self-threading brass fitting that threads directly on the outer cable insulation sheath. The fittings
are filled with high temperature epoxy resin (Shell GCC-X-6) and sealed with a fiberglass wafer
that has silicone sleeve seals for each individual cable conductor. For the coaxial/triaxial
instrumentation penetrations, polyethylene insulated feedthroughs are used; an Amphenol plug
and jack connector (filled with epoxy) is located inside the canister to preclude leakage along the
cable braid.
Medium-voltage CB&I EPAs use solid copper feedthrough conductors insulated in Buna rubber
to a voltage insulation level of 5 kV. Compression type “T” lugs or similar terminations are used
to provide the interface between the feedthroughs and the field cable [C.3].
C.1.3 Conax Buffalo Corporation (Conax) Electrical Penetration Assemblies
Conax EPAs are of two distinct types: the canister and the capsule (modular). The latter type is
the more prevalent of the two, although the canisters are still available.
The canister series is constructed using machined stainless steel header plates (2) welded to the
ends of a seamless steel pipe. Mechanical compression fittings at each header plate secure and
seal each cable feedthrough.
The basic components of the capsule or modular penetration are the header plate, individual
feedthrough modules, midlock cap(s), and the internal module support structure. Internally, the
penetration uses a support structure composed of spacer plates and rods that both maintain the
alignment and provide intermediate support for each of the individual modules. The header plate,
module, and supporting structures are constructed of stainless steel. Conductors passing through
the module are sealed at both the inboard and outboard ends with a polysulfone polymer. Each
module is secured to the header plate by way of a midlock cap; this cap allows each module to
be removed and replaced individually. The cap creates a tightly sealed metal-to-metal friction
fit (swage) around the feedthrough module at either end of the cap to create a double pressure
boundary for each individual module. This feature is unique as compared to other penetration
designs, which generally use organic materials/components to form this seal. Figure C-8 shows a
cutaway view of a typical Conax EPA. Figure C-9 shows a detail of the feedthrough module and
midlock cap assembly.
C-13
Figure C-8
Cutaway View of Conax Buffalo EPA
Figure C-9
Detail of Conax Feedthrough Module
C-14
The penetration assembly is either welded or bolted to the containment liner nozzle. In the
bolted configuration, two concentric seals or O-rings (typically Viton) are located in recesses
in the flange mating surfaces to provide the necessary seal. In the welded configuration, no
O-rings are used due to the seal formed by the weld. The interstitial space formed between the
two concentric seals is monitored for pressure via passages machined in the flanges/header plate.
These passages also connect to the areas adjacent to the individual modules to monitor the
pressure between the inner and outer seals of each module end (a total of four seals per module).
The outer seal and module integrity may be monitored as a unit, or conversely may be monitored
separately to assist in localization of any leakage.
Each feedthrough module is constructed of one or more Kapton insulated conductors, the ends of
which are encased in polysulfone. Continuous (i.e., nonspliced) Kapton insulated leads are used
in the Conax EPAs; this material was chosen for its unique physical characteristics including a
lack of any appreciable compression set. The end caps create a void space in the center region of
each module that may be evacuated and purged with inert gas to monitor the pressure integrity of
the module assembly. This conductor with end caps is then fitted inside a thin-walled stainless
steel tube of roughly 2.5 cm [1 in] in diameter, which is then double roll crimped at both ends
around the end caps to form a completed feedthrough module. The crimping is conducted with
sufficient force (>100,000 psi) to ensure that the conductor/end cap/tube interfaces are sealed.
All penetration pressure boundaries in the EPA (including the header-to-nozzle, header-to-
module, and each module itself) therefore contain double pressure barriers. As opposed to many
other EPA designs, the Conax EPA uses continuous conductors (e.g., no splices or joints internal
to the penetration) to increase reliability.
Another unique feature of Conax penetrations is the optional “squirrel cage” assembly.
This assembly mounts on one or both ends of the EPA and aligns with its longitudinal axis.
It provides a means of mounting numerous terminal blocks or connectors in close proximity
to the end of the EPA, which can be useful for applications with large numbers of individual
circuits, such as those used for control or instrumentation.
In addition to prefabricated penetration assemblies, Conax supplies adapter assemblies to

allow replacement of existing modules in other manufacturer’s EPAs with those manufactured
by Conax. For example, a GE or Amphenol penetration may be outfitted with Conax modules
with use of the adapter assembly specifically designed for that penetration. Figure C-10
shows examples of Conax feedthroughs installed in various designs of modular penetration.
C-15
Figure C-10
Conax Adapter Modules
C.1.4 Crouse-Hinds Electrical Penetration Assemblies
A typical Crouse-Hinds penetration assembly is shown in Figure C-11. The Crouse-Hinds

penetration is composed of one or more ceramic bushings that are inserted into holes in the
penetration header plate. As with other EPAs, the stainless steel penetration header plate is
bolted or welded to the containment nozzle via a circumferential flange to form the seal at this
interface. A Kovar (42% nickel-iron) sleeve surrounds the bushing, and is brazed to the bushing
and welded to the header plate in order to form the bushing-header plate seal. A metallic lug is
crimped onto the underlying metallic conductor (which passes through the center bore of the
ceramic bushing). A second Kovar sleeve surrounds the interface between the metallic lug and
the ceramic bushing; this bushing is brazed to both the bushing and the lug to complete the
sealing of the bushing.
C-16
Figure C-11
Typical Crouse-Hinds EPA Used in Safety-Related Applications
In several older Westinghouse plants, Crouse-Hinds penetrations were used in all safety-related
electrical circuits. In the early 1970s, Crouse-Hinds discontinued manufacturing their EPAs.
At this point, Westinghouse acquired rights to the Crouse-Hinds design and began manufacturing
of the same device. As a result of the comparatively high cost of production, Westinghouse
began to institute changes to the design (such as use of organic and epoxy seals).
C.1.5 D. G. O’Brien Electrical Penetration Assemblies
The D. G. O’Brien EPA consists of three primary components: the penetration module, the
header plate, and the module connectors. Additionally, junction boxes may be added on either
or both ends. As with other types of penetrations, the stainless steel header plate may be either
bolted or welded to the containment wall nozzle, with bolting the typical form of attachment.
A double concentric O-ring sealing arrangement is used in the bolted attachment configuration.
Monitoring ports sample the space between the O-rings to verify the integrity of the seal.
Each of the individual modules is welded to the header plate to form the module-to-header seal;
accordingly, they are not readily removed in the event maintenance is required or the module
fails. Each module has provision for monitoring of its internal seal integrity via passages in the
module and the header plate; when the module is inserted and welded into place, the passages
are aligned to permit evacuation and backfill with inert gas (typically sulfur hexafluoride [SF6]).
C-17
The construction of the individual modules is somewhat unique as compared to other penetration
types. The conductors used in each module are not continuous, but rather are terminated at each
end of the module by means of a glass-to-metal seal assembly. These assemblies are welded to
the metal body of the module; hence each of the conductors is insulated from the body of the
module (and the other conductors) by the glass. This approach of using noncontinuous,
terminated conductors was used in an attempt to avoid leakage around the conductor seals; here,
the module electrical connectors act as a separate seal such that the individual conductors are not
exposed directly to containment pressure.
The design of the inboard and outboard electrical connectors vary somewhat from one another.
Figure C-12 shows an assembly drawing of the outboard connector. As shown in the diagram,
the connector is internally threaded such that it receives the threaded outer portion of module.
The insulator and grommet fit within the plug sleeve, the assembly being mated to the module
glass seal (and conductors contained therein). To ensure sealing of the module, a
noncompressible polymer gasket is interposed between the glass seal and the connector insulator
such that when the connector is assembled and threaded together, the gasket fills any voids
created in the region between the insulator, the plug sleeve, and the glass seal.
The inboard connector has, in addition to the components listed above for the outboard
connector, a means by which the thermal expansion of the polymer grommet may be
accommodated without damage to the internal components of the connector. These types
of connectors have in the past experienced component damage resulting from the combination
of significant thermal expansion and confinement of the grommet. Accordingly, the redesigned
connector includes a series of wave spring washers that deform under load to allow expansion
of the grommet and subsequent contraction (Figure C-13). This capability is particularly
important to the inboard connector due to the potentially higher temperatures and larger
transients that occur inside primary containment.
C-18
Figure C-12
Outboard Electrical Connector, D. G. O’Brien EPA Module
Figure C-13
Inboard Electrical Connector, D. G. O’Brien EPA Module
C-19
C.1.6 General Electric Electrical Penetration Assemblies
Three primary types of GE penetrations have been identified as being installed in nuclear power
plants. These include the 238X600NMG1, 100 Series, and the Model F-01 canister design.
238X600NMG1
Five types of the 238X600NMG1 modular penetrations have been installed in nuclear power
plants:
1. Neutron Monitoring Signals
2. Thermocouple
3. Instrument and Control
4. Low-Voltage Power
5. Low-Voltage Control
Each of these EPAs consists of a single header plate at each end of the penetration with
individual conductors passing through openings in the plates. The plates are sealed from the
outside. The conductors are sealed to the header plates by use of cast epoxy from both ends of
the header plates. The penetration ends are encapsulated with one weld ring as part of the
assembly and one weld ring as part of the installation. The primary penetration material is steel
pipe.
The five types has differing characteristics. The neutron monitoring signal penetrations are used
with power range monitor (PRM) cables or source range monitor/intermediate range monitor
(SRM/IRM) cables. PRM cables connect with the power plant cables by the use of splices.
SRM/IRM cables, which are used as a shield for the power plant coaxial cables, use connecters
to attach to the coaxial cables. Instrumentation and control penetrations use connecters with four
different types of wire bundles. Low-voltage control penetrations are used in 600-V applications
or less with 28-wire bundles. Thermocouple penetrations use 14-wire bundles. Low-voltage
power penetrations are used in 600-V applications or less with 38-wire bundles.
The typical EPA contains the following components:
Weld Ring Tubing

Backing Ring Terminal
Penetration Weld Detail
Plug Installation
Gage and Valve Relief Valve
Splice
C-20
The penetration itself contains the following subcomponents:
Potting Compound Shell Header

Coating Epoxy
Washer Cover
Insulator Support
Eyebolt Glass Cloth
Pan Head Screw Clip
F Wash Glass Fiber
Potting Board Wire
Header Ring Nameplate
100 Series
Four types of GE 100 Series modular penetrations are in common use in nuclear plants:
1. NS102 - Shielded signal EPA for shielded and unshielded leads
2. NS103 - Medium-voltage EPA for 5-kV power cables
3. NS104 - Low-voltage EPA for 600-V power, control, and instrumentation leads
4. NS105 - High-voltage EPA for 15-kV power cables
Each electrical penetration listed above consists of a single stainless steel header plate with
individual conductor modules that pass through openings in the plate. A carbon steel ring is
welded to the header plate to permit a field weld between the ring and the carbon steel
containment nozzle.
Type NS102 and NS104 EPAs have seven stainless steel conductor modules. The modules are
held in position in the header plate by a series of bolts and washers. The bolts pass through the
center of the washers and are tightened into the header plate. The collar of each module is
positioned beneath a number of washers such that a metal-metal seal is formed between the
module and the header plate. An internal support cage consisting of several steel rods and
phenolic supports is designed to minimize fault current forces and provide adequate heat
dissipation.
Type NS103 medium-voltage EPAs have six individual modules that are welded to the header
plate and are nonreplaceable. The Type NS105 15-kV penetration has three stainless steel
nonreplaceable modules welded to the header plate. GE Vulkene XLPE insulated cable is
typically used as the internal conductor in GE penetrations.
C-21
Individual modules are constructed of a steel outer housing having two epoxy barriers at either
end. An insulated field conductor is mechanically crimped to a bare metal conductor on either
side of the module to provide electrical continuity through the module. The conductor is encased
at both ends in epoxy, which acts to seal the conductor and the outer housing. A void space with
a pressure monitoring port is located between the two epoxy end casings to permit monitoring of
any leakage through the module.
Type F-01
The GE Type F-01 EPA is a canister type penetration. This design uses an epoxy seal behind
each header plate, backed by a layer of potting compound, a barrier of glass cloth/fiber, and a
painted potting board. Hypalon (CSPE) paint is used on various surfaces. The outer (exposed)
side of the header plates is also protected by a layer of potting compound and paint. Phenolic
support members are interposed between the header plates at various intervals.
C.1.7 Physical Sciences Penetration Assemblies
Physical Sciences penetrations are located in several nuclear power plants. The EPA components
and materials are listed in Table C-1. See also Figure C-14, which shows the construction of the
EPA.
Table C-1
Physical Sciences EPA Materials
Component Material
Primary Seal - Low Volt; P/C/I Durock
Primary Seal - High Volt; P Alumina Ceramic
Cable Insulation General Electric SIS Vulkene
Thermocouple Leads PVC
Terminations Raychem RNF-100
Tape Bishop Bi-Seal Self-Bonding Tape
Test Potting Boot Sylgard resin
Test Insulating Media DuPont H-Film
Test Insulating Media Bishop Tri-Sil
Connector Insulation DuPont Neoprene Type W with Clay Filler
Seal Ring DuPont Neoprene Type W with Clay Filler
Connector Potting Boot DuPont Zytel 101
Potting Compound Dow Corning Sylgard
Pre-Potting Compound General Electric RTV 112
Barrier Potting Emerson & Cuming Stycast 1467
Brush Coatings Sylgard 1330
Primer Coating Dow Corning DC 1200
High Voltage Cable Supports Benelex No. 401
C-22
Figure C-14
Physical Sciences EPA Drawing (TVA)
C.1.8 Viking Electrical Penetration Assemblies
A limited number of nuclear plants use electrical penetration assemblies manufactured by Viking
Industries, which first supplied EPAs in the late 1960s. Early Viking penetrations were canister
type configurations with double seals. The canister configurations used glass-to-metal seals,
which were connectors welded to the header plate. The canister penetration had two design
types: either a single-ended double seal or a double-ended double seal. A flange with metallic O-
rings was bolted to the canister and then welded to a nozzle. Figure C-15 shows a Viking canister
penetration.
As with those of other manufacturers, this design was altered over time to incorporate organic
and epoxy seals in an effort to reduce manufacturing cost. At the same time, it was decided that a
modular design would be employed. Individual modules varied in size from 1.9 to 6.35 cm [0.75
to 2.5 in] in diameter and 12.7 to 15.2 cm [5 to 6 in] in length. The modules use swaging at the
end points and center to provide a mechanical lock for the epoxy. The modules are firmly placed
in position by the use of a threaded ring and a tapered brass ring, which are torqued into position.
Figure C-16 shows a Viking modular penetration.
C-23
Figure C-15
Viking Canister EPA
Figure C-16
Viking Modular EPA
Viking penetrations are no longer manufactured; as of about 1983, support and services were
being provided by Celmark Engineering.
C.1.9 Westinghouse (Imaging and Sensing Technologies) Electrical Penetration

Assemblies
Westinghouse (IST) EPAs are available in both modular and canister designs. As with other
manufacturer’s penetrations, the Westinghouse EPA may be either bolted or single-welded to the
containment nozzle.
C-24
Modular
Figure C-17 shows a typical Westinghouse modular EPA. This design uses a single header plate
that receives a varying number of individually sealed module assemblies. One or more bolted
clamping rings are used to maintain each module in place within the header plate when installed;
this helps ensure both the mechanical and pressure integrity of the module. However, the
clamping ring associated with each module is not required to maintain seal integrity; rather, it is
used merely to maintain the module seals in alignment with the appropriate surfaces of the
header plate. Redundant silicone O-rings are used to form the module housing to header plate
seal. An integral leak monitoring system is contained in the header plate to monitor the integrity
of the module to header seals when the module is installed. An internal cable support system is
used to support and maintain separation between cables.
Each module is sealed using an epoxy sealing compound4 on either end of the module; a void
space created in the center of each module (between the epoxy end plugs) is ported to the
pressure monitoring system such that when the module is installed, the integrity of the epoxy-to-
module and epoxy-to-conductor pressure boundary can be monitored as well. Figure C-18 shows
an individual Westinghouse module.
Figure C-17
Westinghouse Modular Type EPA
4
Some early Westinghouse EPAs manufactured prior to 1975 used a polycarbonate (Lexan) disk between the
sealing material; this was later abandoned in favor of epoxy laminate compounds.
C-25
Figure C-18
Individual Module for Westinghouse Modular EPA
Canister
Figure C-19 shows a cross-sectional view of a Westinghouse canister type EPA. The canister
structure is composed of two stainless steel header or end plates welded to a cylindrical stainless
steel pipe. Individual conductors are longitudinally routed in the canister and through holes in the
header plates. Potting compound is used to seal the conductor on either side of the header
plate(s). In this fashion, the canister EPA resembles the construction of a single module from the
modular type EPA described above. Additionally, crimp connectors and ceramic seals are used
on the outer side of the header plates for additional sealing. The crimp connector and ceramic
seal are encased (with the conductor) in an epoxy compound for rigidity and conductor strain
relief. Also, a coating of fire-retardant material is placed on the outer surface of the epoxy. The
internal volume of the canister is purged with an inert gas and may be outfitted with a pressure
monitoring system to monitor seal integrity.
C-26
Figure C-19
Westinghouse Canister Type EPA
C.2 Mechanical Penetrations (Including Piping Penetrations, Access, and

Equipment Hatches)
The configuration of the mechanical penetration types described below is to some extent
dependent on whether the primary containment structure is made from steel or concrete.
Containment materials for the currently operating 109 nuclear units are identified in Tables C-2
(BWRs) and C-3 (PWRs). Steel containments are used most often for BWRs (about 70%) and
concrete containment are used most often for PWRs (about 80%). On an overall basis there are
38 steel containments and 71 concrete containments. The concrete containments have an interior
steel liner plate and the steel containments are backed up by a thick concrete biological shield
wall. Therefore, regardless of the contaminant material, the penetrations must pass through a
relatively thin steel wall and a relatively thick concrete wall, except for the equipment hatches.
To some extent, the concrete containment with a steel liner is easier to penetrate because they
move together as the primary containment temperature and pressure increase. This is not the case
for the steel containment and separate concrete shield wall. Concrete containments also provide
an opportunity to use the concrete wall as an anchor point for elevated temperature piping
passing through piping penetrations. Table C-4 lists typical mechanical penetration materials.
C-27
Table C-2
BWR Containment List
Unit Containment Material
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3 Steel

Brunswick 1 and 2 Reinforced Concrete
Clinton 1 Reinforced Concrete
Cooper Steel
Dresden 2 and 3 Steel
Duane Arnold Steel
Fermi 2 Steel
FitzPatrick Steel
Grand Gulf 1 Reinforced Concrete
Hatch 1 and 2 Steel
Hope Creek Steel
LaSalle 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
Limerick 1 and 2 Reinforced Concrete
Millstone 1 Steel
Monticello Steel
Nine Mile Point 1 Steel
Nine Mile Point 2 Reinforced Concrete
Oyster Creek Steel
Peach Bottom 2 and 3 Steel
Perry 1 Steel
Pilgrim Steel
Quad Cities 1 and 2 Steel
River Bend 1 Steel
Susquehanna 1 and 2 Reinforced Concrete
Vermont Yankee Steel
WNP-2 Steel
Total Units = 36
Steel Units = 25
Reinforced Concrete Units =9
Prestressed Concrete Units =2
C-28
Table C-3
PWR Containment List
Unit Containment Material

Arkansas 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
Beaver Valley 1 and 2 Reinforced Concrete
Braidwood 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
Byron 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
Callaway 1 Prestressed Concrete
Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
Catawba 1 and 2 Steel
Comanche Peak 1 Reinforced Concrete
Cook 1 and 2 Reinforced Concrete
Crystal River 3 Prestressed Concrete
David-Besse 1 Steel
Diablo Canyon 1 and 2 Reinforced Concrete
Farley 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
Fort Calhoun Prestressed Concrete
Ginna Prestressed Concrete
Haddam Neck Reinforced Concrete
Indian Point 2 and 3 Reinforced Concrete
Kewaunee Steel
Maine Yankee Reinforced Concrete
McGuire 1 and 2 Steel
Millstone Point 2 Prestressed Concrete
Millstone Point 3 Reinforced Concrete
North Anna 1 and 2 Reinforced Concrete
Oconee 1, 2 and 3 Prestressed Concrete
Palisades Prestressed Concrete
Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 Prestressed Concrete
Point Beach 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
Point Beach 2 Prestressed Concrete
Prairie Island 1 and 2 Steel
Robinson 2 Prestressed Concrete
Salem 1 and 2 Reinforced Concrete
San Onofre 2 and 3 Prestressed Concrete
Seabrook Reinforced Concrete
Sequoyah 1 and 2 Steel
Shearson Harris Reinforced Concrete
South Texas 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
St. Lucie 1 and 2 Steel
Summer 1 Prestressed Concrete
Surry 1 and 2 Reinforced Concrete
Three Mile Island 1 Prestressed Concrete
Turkey Point 3 and 4 Prestressed Concrete
Vogtle 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
Waterford 3 Steel
Watts Bar 1 Reinforced Concrete
Wolf Creek I Prestressed Concrete
Zion 1 and 2 Prestressed Concrete
Total Units =73
Steel Units =13
Reinforced Concrete Units = 21
Prestressed Concrete Units = 39
C-29
Table C-4
Typical Mechanical Penetration Materials
I. Piping Penetrations
Sleeve SA-106 Grade B, SA-155 Class 1,
SA-533 Grade 1 or 6
Guard Pipe SA-106 Grade B
End Plate SA-516 Grade 60 or 70, SA-537 Class 1
Expansion Joint (Steel)
Spools - SA-516 Grade 70, SA-358 Type 304
Bellows - SA-240, Type 304, A-167-63 Type 304
Expansion Joint (Elastomer) Rubber, Silicone Rubber
II. Access Penetrations
Cover SA-516 Grade 70, SA-212 Grade B
Cover Ring, Sleeve Ring SA-516 Grade 60 or 70, SA-350LF1
Sleeve SA-106 Grade B, SA-155 Class 1
Fuel Transfer Tube SA-240 Type 304
Fuel Transfer Tube Flange SA-182 Type 304
Doors (Airlock) SA-537 Class 1, SA-300 (MS-504B)
End Plate (Airlock) SA-516 Grade 70
Stiffeners/Gussets (Drywell Cover) SA-212 Grade B
Fasteners SA-197 Grade B7, SA-320 Grade L7,
SA-194 Grade 4 or 7, SA-194 Grade 2H
AISI-4140 or 4340 (washers)
Gaskets/Seals Neoprene, Silicone Rubber, Buna N Rubber,
Ethylene Propylene (EP), (EPDM), Rubber
Expansion Joint (Steel) Spools-SA-516 Grade 70, SA-358 Type 304
Bellows-SA-240 Type 304
Expansion Joint (Elastomer) Rubber, Silicone Rubber, Buna N Rubber
C.2.1 Piping Penetrations
Piping penetrations provide a means for the passage of piping transmitting fluids across the
primary containment pressure boundary. For some units, these penetrations are also designed to
limit radiation streaming to areas that occasionally require personnel accessibility. From a
descriptive viewpoint it is useful to separate piping penetrations carrying hot fluids (generally
above 121°C [250°F]) from those carrying colder fluids.
Typical hot piping penetrations for concrete containments are shown in Figure C-20. Piping
systems (hot or cold) that penetrate primary containment are generally designed with the
containment penetration as a pipe anchor location. This is the situation depicted in Figure C-20.
The expansion joint shown in the pipe sleeve outside containment relieves the thermal stresses
that would develop due to differential thermal movement of the pipe and sleeve and can
accommodate some misalignment of the penetration centerline and slightly reduce transverse
loadings generated by piping outside containment.
C-30
Typical hot piping penetrations for steel containments are shown in Figure C-21 (annulus
between steel containment and shield wall) and Figure C-22 (small gap or compressible
materials between steel containment and shield wall). In these situations a significant amount of
pipe movement must be accommodated at the penetration to avoid high loads at the connection
to the metal containment wall. The sleeved opening in the concrete shield wall is relatively
unimportant provided it is large enough not to interfere with the penetration design. The double
bellows stainless steel expansion joints in the penetration sleeve can absorb both axial and
transverse movement. The guard pipe protects the bellows from damage in the case of a pipe
break and the concrete from overheating due to a pipe leak. The primary containment
atmosphere resides between the process pipe and the guard pipe and between the guard pipe and
the sleeve. The multiple flued head (part of the piping), the sleeve, and the expansion joint all
represent primary containment pressure boundaries. The shield building elastomer expansion
joint (Figure C-21) accommodates pipe movement while minimizing the opening between the
auxiliary building and large annulus between the biological shield and the steel containment.
Failure of this seal would not compromise primary containment pressure integrity. Some hot
penetrations include an air or water cooled channel between the pipe insulation and the sleeve
(see Figure C-20). In these situations the sleeve may function as part of the flow channel as well
as a primary containment boundary. The cooling system was usually installed to keep the
temperature of the surrounding concrete from reaching its design limit. In some cases the cooling
can also improve the thermal environment for elastomer materials.
The stainless steel bellows have been tested to determine their response under severe accident
conditions (high temperature and pressure) within the primary containment. These studies have
shown that the level of extension or compression necessary to cause bellows failure (loss of
pressure boundary) is several times greater than that required to satisfy the primary containment
design specifications. The analytical studies accompanying these tests also provided information
regarding the fatigue resistance of these stainless steel bellows and showed that they could
withstand many more extension and compression cycles than expected during the operating life
of the plant. These tests and analyses were conducted for new, undegraded bellows.
Figure C-20
Typical Hot Piping Penetration
C-31
A listing of typical hot piping penetrations for BWRs and PWRs with process pipe and
penetration diameters is presented in Tables C-5 and C-6, respectively.
The design of typical cold piping penetrations, for both concrete and steel containments, are
similar to those for hot piping penetrations, except that no provisions to accommodate pipe
movement are necessary.
Many piping penetrations contain one or more bimetallic welds. The stainless steel expansion
joint are welded to carbon steel sleeves and stainless steel piping is welded to a carbon steel end
plate. However, the penetration component welded to the carbon steel containment shell or the
carbon steel containment liner is generally also made from carbon steel.
Figure C-21
Typical Hot Piping Penetration - Concrete Containment
Figure C-22
Typical Hot Piping Penetration - Steel Containment
C-32
Table C-5
BWR Hot Piping Penetrations
Penetration Sleeve OD
Quantity Service Process Pipe Size cm in
1 Primary Steam Drain 3 SCH. 80 40.6 16
1 RCIC Steam Supply 3 SCH. 80 45.7 18
1 Control Rod Drive Return 4 SCH. 160 20.3 8
1 Reactor Water Cleanup Supply 6 SCH. 80S 50.8 20
1 HPCI Steam Supply 10 SCH. 80 71.1 28
2 Core Spray 10 SCH. 80 66.0 26
2 RHRS Return 16 Thk. 0.722 86.4 34
2 Primary Feed Water 18 SCH. 120 86.4 34
1 RHRS Supply 20 Thk. 0.840 91.4 36
4 Primary Steam 20 SCH. 80 91.4 36
1 RHRS Head Spray 4 SCH. 80 50.8 20
Table C-6
PWR Hot Piping Penetrations
Penetration OD
Quantity Service Process Line Size cm in
1 Accumulator to Hold-up-TK 3/4" SCH. 160 45.7 18
1 RC Drain to Gas Analy. 3/4" SCH. 40 S 45.7 18
4 Steam Gen Blowdown 2" SCH. 160 45.7 18
1 C&VC System Letdown 2" SCH. 40 S 50.8 20
1 Boron Injections Tank Disch 3" SCH. 160 55.9 22
1 RC Drain Tank Pump Disch 3" SCH. 40 S 50.8 20
1 Safety Injection to Hot Legs 4" SCH. 120 66.0 26
2 Safety Injecting Recirculation
SI to Low Hd SI 4" SCH. 120 45.7 18
2 Low Head Safety Injections 8" SCH. 140 76.2 30
2 Upper RPV Head Inject. 12" SCH. 140 76.2 30
1 RHR Return 12" SCH. 40
1 RHR Supply 12" SCH. 40 86.4 34
4 Feedwater 16" SCH. 80 86.4 34
2 RHR Supply (Sump) 18" SCH. 40 86.4 34
2
4 Main Steam 32" OD 1.088 Min Wall 142.2 56
C.2.2 Equipment Hatches
Equipment hatches provide a means for moving large pieces of equipment and large amounts of
materials across the primary containment boundary during planned refueling and maintenance
outages. Typical equipment hatches for concrete containments and steel containments are shown
C-33
in Figures C-23 and C-24. With the exception of the longer sleeve on the concrete containment
hatch to extend through the concrete wall, these penetrations are identical from a design
viewpoint. These hatches are generally sealed with a relatively narrow cover ring and hatch ring
and a series of swing bolts around the circumference (10° to 15° apart) to compress a set of
double elastomer gaskets. Typical gasket arrangements are shown in Figure C-25. The clear
diameter opening for equipment hatches range from 3.66 to 7.3 m [12 to 24 feet] in diameter.
Due to the large diameter and the flexible sealing design many studies and tests have been
performed regarding the relative rotation of the hatch closure rings and subsequent loss of gasket
compression during accident conditions that increase primary containment temperature and
pressure. These studies have concluded that the containment conditions necessary to cause
failure of the seal are significantly greater than those stated in the primary containment design
specification.
Figure C-23
Typical Equipment Hatch - Concrete Containment
C-34
Figure C-24
Typical Equipment Hatch - Steel Containment
Figure C-25
Typical Gasket Arrangements - Equipment Hatch
Some other smaller specialized hatches are designed in a manner similar to flanged nozzles in a
pressure vessel with blind flange cover. Typical examples are the control rod drive removal
hatch and the suppression chamber access hatch for Mark I containment BWRs as shown in
Figures C-26 and C-27.
C-35
Figure C-26
CRD Removal Hatch for Mark I Containment
Figure C-27
Suppression Pool Access Hatch for Mark I Containment
C-36
The equipment hatch sleeves are generally welded to the steel containment shell or the concrete
containment steel liner. For steel containment the hatch sleeve does not continue through the
concrete biological shield wall. Therefore, the design does not need to consider differential
movement between the steel containment and the shield wall. The shield wall generally contains
a removable concrete plug to allow equipment to enter the primary containment through the
equipment hatch.
C.2.3 Personnel Airlocks
Personnel airlocks provide a means for safe, reliable, and recordable passage of personnel and
small tools and components across the primary containment pressure boundary during start-up,
shutdown and plant operation without compromising the containment integrity. A typical
personnel airlock for concrete containments is shown in Figure C-28.
Figure C-28
Personnel Airlock - Concrete Containment
C-37
A typical personnel airlock for a steel containment is shown in Figure C-29. Most of the airlocks
are designed with rectangular doors, as shown in Figure C-29. A few airlocks have larger
circular doors. The airlocks are prefabricated assemblies with inner and outer doors and a floor.
Similar to the equipment hatches the airlocks are welded to the steel containment shell or the
concrete containment steel liner. However, for steel containments, the airlock normally includes
an expansion joint to accommodate the differential movement between the steel containment and
the biological shield wall. The two airlock doors are interlocked to avoid opening one door while
the other door is open, which would compromise primary containment integrity. This type of
design requires an elaborate mechanical system and generally a supporting electrical system.
Some of the mechanical complexity is shown in Figure C-30. These mechanical interlock
systems contain hand wheels, shafts, bearings, breech locks, gears and other structural parts as
well as hydraulic devices, proximity switches, solenoid valves and various control components.
The end plates for the rectangular door airlocks generally have their own penetrations for
pressure equalizing lines and shafts. The integrity of the door seals are of prime importance to
maintaining containment integrity. Most plants contain two or more personnel airlocks. One of
these may be a smaller diameter lock used only in emergencies. The interlocking system between
the inner and outer airlock doors can usually be deactivated during plant shutdowns, as permitted
by plant Technical Specifications, to provide more ready access to the primary containment.
C-38
Figure C-29
Personnel Airlock - Steel Containment
C-39
Figure C-30
Personnel Airlock - Door and Interlock Mechanism
C.2.4 Drywell Head
The drywell head is a special penetration located at the top of BWR containments that
allows safe areas to reactor pressure vessel for the removal of spent fuel assemblies, the
repositioning of fuel assemblies and insertion of new fuel assemblies by the containment
polar crane. The drywell head is a primary containment boundary only for Mark I and Mark II
BWR containment designs. Although the Mark III BWR containment has a drywell head the
primary containment boundary is the steel or concrete cylindrical building surrounding the
annular suppression pool, drywell, refueling floor and polar crane. The Mark III BWR
containment was used for only a limited number of units (including Grand Gulf 1, Clinton 1,
and River Bend 1). The drywell head penetration is a steel bolted top cover for the drywell as
shown in Figure B-31. The design is similar regardless of whether a steel or concrete
containment is used. The clear diameter opening for the drywell head ranges from 8.53 to 10.97
m [28 to 36 feet]. The seal is formed by welding rings (flanges) to the bottom of the drywell
cover and the top of the drywell shell maintained to accept a double gasket configuration. The
cover and shell contain continuous horizontal stiffness that support the penetration fasteners. The
bolts, spherical washers, and nuts that compress the gasket are located about 6° apart.
C-40
Figure C-31
Typical Drywell Head Cover
C.2.5 Fuel Transfer Tube

The fuel transfer tube is a penetration required only for PWRs. The fuel transfer tube links the
primary containment refueling canal with the fuel transfer canal and spent fuel pit in the fuel
handling building. The tube serves as the underwater pathway for moving spent fuel assemblies
out of and new fuel assemblies into the primary containment during refueling operations.
A typical fuel transfer tube for a concrete containment is shown in Figure C-32. With the
exception of an extra gap between the steel shell and biological shield wall there is little
difference between the fuel transfer tube design for a steel or concrete containment. Because
the fuel transfer tube ends in the spent fuel pit, it must be designed with expansion provisions
regardless of the type of containment. The expansion joints shown in the figure are necessary
for accommodating both construction misalignment and differential movement between the
refueling canal, containment structure and spent fuel pit. During normal operation the fuel
transfer tube is closed by a blind flange on the containment side and a valve on the fuel handling
building side. The seal to the containment steel liner is through a weld between the sleeve and
the liner. Expansion provisions within containment and the spent fuel pit and between the
containment outer wall and the spent fuel pipe are not directly related to the primary containment
seal. However, the expansion joint in containment may reduce loads on the weld, which does
seal the primary containment. The blind flange on the containment side of the tube is double
gasketed with a leak off between the gaskets and is a primary containment seal.
C-41
Figure C-32
Typical Fuel Transfer Tube (PWR)
C.3 References
C.1 “Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Electrical Cable
and Terminations,” Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND96-0344, September
1996.
C.2 Sorensen, D.K. “Electrical Penetration Assembly Design Evolution at Amphenol

SAMS,” January 12, 1973.
C.3 YEAC No. 1806, “Yankee Nuclear Power Station Lead Plant License Renewal Project -
Evaluation of the Electrical Penetrations,” Rev. 0, July 1992.
C-42
D
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING CODES,
STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS
D.1 Design Requirements: Codes, Standards and Regulations

The basic requirements for development of electrical penetration assemblies for nuclear power
plants are contained in General Design Criteria 17 and 18 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 [D.1,
D.2]. These criteria provide general guidance with respect to redundance, independence, and
testability of the distribution system. Although these criteria provide guidance concerning
attributes of the electrical system, they provide no direct guidance with respect to design or the
application of cable or terminations.
Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) from various plants were reviewed to identify any
additional criteria pertinent to electrical penetration assembly design. These FSARs provide
varying levels of detail about licensing commitments regarding electrical penetration assembly.
In general, however, these documents list only ratings and other data specific to the installed
equipment, and provide no further references to applicable standards or design commitments
other than the applicable 10 CFR Part 50 Design Criteria discussed above.
D.1.1 Environmental Qualification
There are seven primary codes, standards and regulations that define and control all of the
activities that must be performed to establish environmental qualification (EQ) for an electrical
penetration assembly. Although there are other Regulatory Guides and IEEE Standards that can
be used in the process of establishing qualification for specific pieces of equipment, the
following seven documents are universally applicable to all equipment:
· DOR Guidelines [D.3]
· NUREG-0588 Rev. 1 [D.4]
· 10 CFR 50.49 [D.5]
· Regulatory Guide 1.89 Rev.1 [D.6]
· Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 3 [D.7]
· IEEE Standard 323-1971 [D.8]
· IEEE Standard 323-1974 [D.9]
D-1
Design Requirements Including Codes, Standards and Regulations
Division of Operating Reactor (DOR) Guidelines
The DOR Guidelines were developed in November 1979 as a tool for the NRC staff to use in
evaluating EQ submittals from a limited number of older nuclear plants. They were published in
January 1980 for the industry’s information and guidance. Section 7.0 of Reference [D.3] stated
that a plant did not have to demonstrate a qualified life1 if the plant was already constructed and
operating, unless the plant used material(s) that had already been identified as being susceptible
to significant degradation due to thermal and radiation aging. Maintenance or replacement
schedules were to include consideration of the specific aging characteristics of the material(s),
and ongoing programs were to be established to review surveillance and maintenance records to
assure that equipment that was exhibiting age-related degradation was identified and replaced as
necessary.
Thus, an aging management program was established for electrical penetration assemblies
qualified to the requirements of the DOR Guidelines, and records should be available for
evaluation as part of the 10 CFR 54 Aging Management Review.
NUREG-0588
NUREG-0588 [D.4] applied to all plants in existence at the time it was published except for
those covered by the DOR Guidelines [D.3]. NUREG-0588 was initially published for industry
comment in December 1979; it was subsequently revised and issued in July 1981. The regulation
divided the population of nuclear plants into two categories, namely, Category I and Category II.
Section 4 of Reference [D.4] required that aging effects on all equipment, regardless of its
location in the plant, should be considered and included in the qualification program for
Category I plants. Category II plants had to comply in the same manner for qualification of valve
operators and motors; however, for all other equipment, the program had to address aging only to
the extent that equipment that is composed, in part, of material susceptible to aging effects
should be identified and a schedule for periodically replacing the equipment and/or materials
should be established.
Thus, an aging management program was established for electrical penetration assemblies
qualified to the Category II requirements of NUREG-0588, and records should be available for
evaluation as part of the 10 CFR 54 Aging Management Review. Category I plants should not be
expected to have such an aging management program or the historical replacement schedules.
NUREG-0588 contained an aging-related element for an EQ program (Category I) that may not
be evaluated the same way in a general Aging Management Program developed for 10 CFR 54:
1
“The period of time for which satisfactory performance can be demonstrated for a specific set of conditions.” [D.9]
The definition was changed in the 1983 revision of IEEE Standard 323 to be “the period of time, prior to the start of
a design basis event, for which equipment was demonstrated to meet the design requirement for the specified service
conditions.” The 1983 revision has never been endorsed by the NRC, and the change in definition occurred many
years after most qualifications were established for operating plants. Therefore, this more specific/restrictive
definition is not applicable to most of the operating plants in the United States.
D-2
· Periodic surveillance testing under normal service conditions is not considered an acceptable
method for on-going qualification, unless the plant design includes provisions for subjecting
the equipment to the limiting service environmental conditions (specified in Section 3 (7) of
IEEE Standard 279-1971) during such testing.
10 CFR 50.49
10 CFR 50.49 [D.5] applies to all electric equipment important to safety. However, if the
equipment had been previously qualified to the requirements of the DOR Guidelines [D.3] or
NUREG-0588 [D.4], then it did not have to be requalified to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
Section (e) (5) of Reference [D.5] requires that equipment qualified by test must be
preconditioned by natural or artificial (accelerated) aging to its end-of-installed life condition. If
this is not practical, then the equipment can be preconditioned to a shorter designated life and
must be refurbished at the end of this designated life unless ongoing qualification demonstrates
that the item has additional life.
Regulatory Guide 1.89
Regulatory Guide 1.89, Revision 1 [D.6] describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for
complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 [D.5]. In its discussion on aging, Reference
[D.6] states that there are considerable uncertainties regarding the processes and environmental
factors that could result in such degradation. Because of these uncertainties, state-of-the-art
preconditioning techniques are not capable of simulating all significant types of degradation, and
natural pre-aging is difficult and costly.
Section C.5 of Reference [D.6] emphasizes the following:

· Periodic surveillance and testing programs are acceptable to account for uncertainties
regarding age-related degradation that could affect the functional capability of equipment.
· Results of such programs will be acceptable as ongoing qualification to modify qualified life
of equipment and should be incorporated into the maintenance and
refurbishment/replacement schedules.
Because Regulatory Guide 1.89, Rev. 1 applies only to the implementation of 10 CFR 50.49
[D.5], the comments concerning an aging management program and Aging Management Review
are the same as those stated previously for Reference [D.5].
Regulatory Guide 1.97
Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 [D.7] is an application-specific document, which describes a

method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission’s regulations to provide
instrumentation to monitor plant variables and systems during and following an accident in a
D-3
light-water-cooled nuclear power plant.2 Table 1 of Reference [D.7] presents Design and
Qualification Criteria for Instrumentation and states that the instrumentation should be qualified
in accordance with References [D.4] and [D.6].
No additional or special guidance is given concerning aging.
IEEE Standard 323-1971
IEEE Standard 323-1971 [D.8] was the first industry standard developed to provide guidance for
demonstrating and documenting the adequacy of electric equipment used for the prevention of
accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents. It described the basic
requirements for the qualification of Class I electrical equipment (which was defined to be
essential to the safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor or whose failure or damage could
result in significant release of radioactive material).
Neither the word nor concept of aging is mentioned; consequently, electrical penetration
assemblies qualified to the requirements of this standard should not be expected to have much
information related to aging. However, this Standard is the one referenced in NUREG-0588
[D.4] for Category II plants. Thus, the concepts of aging management and ongoing aging review
discussed previously for Category II plants qualified to Reference [D.4] apply.
IEEE Standard 323-1974
IEEE Standard 323-1974 [D.9] is the definitive industry standard for establishing qualification. It
is specifically cited in NUREG-0588 [D.4], 10 CFR 50.49 [D.5], and Regulatory Guide 1.89,
Rev. 1 [D.6]; it is also endorsed by Reference [D.6]. The concept of aging was addressed
explicitly for the first time in IEEE Std 323-1974, and this standard contained the first published
definitions for the phrases “equipment qualification” and “qualified life.”
Sections 6.3 and 6.6 of IEEE Std 323-1974 [D.9] discuss aging and on-going qualification,
respectively. Neither section considers the concept of aging management as envisioned by 10
CFR 54. Rather, the focus of Reference [D.9] is qualification by testing, such that even on-going
qualification is based on additional periodic type testing instead of condition monitoring.
Because IEEE Std 323-1974 [D.9] describes the methods to be used for electrical penetration
assemblies qualified in accordance with the requirements of Category I NUREG-0588 [D.4], 10
CFR 50.49 [D.5], and Regulatory Guide 1.89 Rev. 1 [D.6], the comments stated previously for
References [D.4], [D.5], and [D.6] concerning an aging management program and aging
management review apply to Reference [D.9].
2
Revision 2 was issued as an active guide in December 1980, and is the revision number specifically cited in
10 CFR 50.49 [D.5]. None of the changes in Revision 3 had any effect on the aging of cables and connectors that
might be used with post-accident monitoring equipment.
D-4
D.1.2 Compliance with Applicable Elements of Standard Review Plan,

NUREG-0800
Section 8.1 of NUREG-0800 [D.10] provides a Standard Review Plan (SRP) for the review of
electric power systems. Although the SRP did not form the licensing basis for the older plants,
the SRP was reviewed to identify the issues and concepts related to aging management for
electrical cable and terminations.
Table 8-1 of the SRP lists the “Acceptance Criteria and AMGs for Electric Power Systems.”
Review of this table indicated that eleven documents apply to onsite ac power systems. Each
document was reviewed for specific criteria related to the control of aging of electrical
penetration assembly components important to license renewal. Overall, the review of the
NUREG-0800 and the listed documents did not produce any criteria related to cable system
aging beyond requirements for testability. Thus, NUREG-0800 provides no direct guidance
about the control of aging of electrical cable or terminations.
Standard Description
ANSI Stds.
ANSI C.96
ANSI C96.1
ANSI C96.1-1964 “Temperature Measurement Thermocouples”
ANSI MC 96.1-1982 “Tables for Thermocouples Temperatures-Electromotive Force
(EMF)”
ANSI K65.2-1969 “Method of Test for Flammability of Self-Supporting Plastics”
ANSI N45.2-1977 “Requirements for Nuclear Facilities, Quality Assurance Program”
ANSI N45.2-2-1978 “Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling of Items
for Nuclear Power Plants (during the Construction Phase)”
ANSI/NFPA-70-1981 “NEC”
ASME Codes
ASME, “N” and “NPT” certification
ANSI/ASME NQA-1
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection NE for Class MC Components
IEEE Stds.
*IEEE Std. 51-1955 “Guiding Principles for Dielectric Tests”
D-5
IEEE Std 308-1980 “IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations” (ANSI)
IEEE Std 317-1983 “IEEE Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in
Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations”
(ANSI)
IEEE Std 323-1983 “Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating
Stations” (ANSI)
IEEE Std 336-1985 “IEEE Standard Installation, Inspection, and Testing Requirements
for Power, Instrumentation, and Control Equipment at Nuclear
Facilities” (ANSI)
IEEE Std 344-1987 “IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class
1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations” (ANSI)
IEEE Std 383-1974 (R 1980) “IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric
Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power
Generating Stations” (ANSI)
IEEE Std 384-1981 “IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment
and Circuits” (ANSI)
*IEEE Std 422-1977 “Fire Stops and Raceway, Floor or Ceiling, Metal Enclosed
Equipment, Wall”
*IEEE Std 500-1977 Chapter 10: Cables, Joints, and Terminations
IEEE Std 634-1978 “IEEE Standard Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification Test”
(ANSI)
IEEE Std. 741-1986 “IEEE Standard Criteria for the Protection of Class 1E Power
Systems and Equipment in Nuclear Generating Stations” (ANSI)
*IEEE C37.09-1979 “American National Standard Test Procedure for AC High Voltage
Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Basis” (ANSI)
*USAS C37.20
*USAS C37.05
*USAS C37.09
*USAS C37.13
* Designates not listed in either current IEEE Standards Collection or IEEE Archives Collection.
IPCEA Stds.
IPCEA P-32-382 “Short Circuit Characteristics of Insulated Cable”
IPCEA S-19-81 “Rubber-Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and
Distribution of Electrical Energy,” NEMA WC3-1969
IPCEA S-61-402 “Thermoplastic-Insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and
Distribution of Electrical Energy,” NEMA WC5-1968
D-6
IPCEA S-66-524 “Cross-Linked Thermosetting-Polyethylene-Insulated Wire and

Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy,”
NEMA WC7-1971
IPCEA S-68-516 “Ozone-Resistant Ethylene-Propylene-Rubber-Insulated Wire and
Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy,”
NEMA WC8-1971
Other
Expansion Joint Manufacturers Association Standards, 5th Edition.
D.2 References
D.1 Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, “General Design
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” Part II, Criterion 17, January 1991
D.2 Title 10, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, “General Design
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” Part II, Criterion 18, January 1991
D.3 “Class IE Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors,” Enclosure 4 to “Environmental
Qualification of Class IE Equipment,” Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 14, 1980
D.4 NUREG-0588 Rev. 1, “Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-
Related Equipment Including Staff Responses of Public Comments, Resolution of
Generic Technical Activity A-24,” Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, July 1981
D.5 “Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear
Power Plants,” Federal Register Vol. 48 No. 15, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
January 21, 1983
D.6 Regulatory Guide 1.89 Revision 1, “Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric
Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, June 1984
D.7 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Revision 3, “Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear
Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an
Accident,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1983
D.8 IEEE Standard 323-1971, “IEEE Trial Use Standard: General Guide for Qualifying Class
1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” The Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc., April 1971
D.9 IEEE Standard 323-1974, “IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for
Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” The Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc., corrected copy June 1976
D.10 NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for
Nuclear Power Plants,” July 1981, Chapter 8: Electric Power.
D-7
E
DISCUSSION OF NPRDS DATA
This Appendix discusses specific attributes and limitations regarding the use of the NPRDS
database during preparation of this AMG.
E.1 Categorization of Reports

Due to the virtual interchangeability of the terms “cable” and “wire,” drawing a clear dividing
line between the two categories was difficult. What may be described as a cable in one report is
often described as a wire in another. Additionally, the distinction between field cable, panel
(SIS) or local wire, and wiring internal to various electrical components or subcomponents is
often unclear. Some applications have a wire terminated directly on or within a component; some
have the wire terminated on a terminal block within a panel or control board. Others have wiring
harnesses that emanate from the component. Additionally, individual conductors within a cable
may be termed “wires.” Hence, some effort was made to distinguish field cable from panel or
local wiring. Internal component/subcomponent wiring (such as that found in electrical
switchgear or instrument drawers) was not considered within scope, except where it could be
ascertained that the wire originated from outside the component. Although these criteria are
somewhat imprecise and subjective, they do provide some boundary for evaluation of the
NPRDS data.
In many NPRDS reports, oxidized or corroded conductor surfaces were identified as being
“dirty” or requiring cleaning. This is somewhat confusing in that failures caused by actual dirt or
foreign material contamination were also often referred to as “dirty.” Accordingly, dirty,
oxidized, or corroded components were grouped together with respect to cause of failure because
they could not be accurately differentiated in many cases.
Another difficulty encountered while analyzing the NPRDS reports relates to the primary type of
failure noted; that is, loose or broken “terminations.” It is very difficult to determine from the
NPRDS reports exactly what the failed component/subcomponent is. For example, a “loose”
termination may include a lug or compression fitting which is loose on the conductor, or a
termination which is loose at its point of connection to the device (i.e., loose terminal nut or
screw). Similarly, a “broken” termination may mean a lug or fitting which has itself broken, or a
wire conductor which has broken in the immediate vicinity of the termination (i.e., termination is
broken off). Although apparently trivial, these distinctions are important in characterizing the
failure rate of specific components such as wire conductors and compression lugs. Reports in
which the connected device terminal hardware was the root cause were considered out of scope.1
Failure reports deemed to be applicable were then grouped by major component (i.e., cable,
panel (SIS) wiring, splice, compression fitting, connector, or terminal block); each component
1
This is true with the exception of loose or broken terminal block hardware, which was considered within scope.
E-1
Discussion of NPRDS Data
was then sorted by failed subcomponent, failure mode, failure cause, and method of failure
detection. Due to the absence of any substantial information regarding the component
manufacturer, the relative reliability of cable/terminations from various manufacturers cannot be
estimated from the available data. Although infrequently stated in explicit terms, the voltage
class of the failed component described could almost always be deduced based on the application
described in the narrative. No effort was made to classify reports in terms of application type
(i.e., power, control, or instrumentation), as these categories are not commonly defined from
plant to plant, and substantial overlap often occurs. In several cases, the failure mode and/or
failure cause were not identified; these reports were tagged as “unidentified.”
“Normal aging” was cited in numerous reports as the cause for the component/subcomponent
failure. In most cases, this term is not descriptive of the actual failure cause; however, these
reports were assigned their own failure cause category so as to differentiate them from other
causes, and provide some indication of the fraction of total failures that these reports constituted.
E.2 Method of Detection
The method of failure detection refers to the circumstances under which the component failure
was noted. Different categories of detection method were considered, including detection during
maintenance, during surveillance testing, during operations, and during in-service inspection.
Those failures detected during operation of the equipment were further categorized as to the
effect of the detection on the functionality of the cable, termination, or circuit in general. For
example, a cable or wire failure noted during operation which prevented or limited the circuit or
connected load from fulfilling its required function was categorized separately from a failure
detected during circuit operation which had no appreciable effect on functionality. For
conservatism, circuit grounds were considered to affect functionality unless clearly indicated
otherwise in the applicable report.
E.3 Cable Insulation Materials
Little specific information regarding cable insulation material was recorded in the NPRDS
reports pertaining to cable failure. Some of the reports describing failures of components or
subcomponents other than cable insulation (such as the cable conductor, connectors, splices, and
terminal blocks) had information regarding the type of insulation material; however, this was not
considered relevant to the failure of the insulation. Accordingly, only those reports with
insulation data and which related to the failure of the insulation were included in the statistics for
insulation failures. The number of such reports was a very small fraction of the total (only a few
percent of the total reports related to insulation failure). Therefore, little meaningful inference
can be made regarding the failure or degradation propensity of certain types of insulation
materials.
E-2
F
SAMPLE PLANT SURVEY
F-1
Sample Plant Survey
Table F-1
Types of Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) Installed
Directions; Place an “X” or provide requested information in spaces below, as appropriate.
F-2
Sample Plant Survey
Table F-1
Types of Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) Installed (Continued)
F-3
Sample Plant Survey
Table F-2
Aging Management Activities
Directions: Place an ”X“ in the appropriate spaces, or describe as required.
F-4
Sample Plant Survey
Table F-3
Description of Significant Observed Aging Mechanisms and Effects
Directions: Fill in Information regarding observed aging mechanisms and effects as appropriate.
F-5
Target: SINGLE USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN YOU AND THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH
Nuclear Power INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI). PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY BEFORE REMOVINGTHE WRAPPING MATERIAL.
BY OPENINGTHIS SEALED PACKAGEYOU ARE AGREEINGTOTHETERMS OFTHIS AGREEMENT. IFYOU DO NOT AGREETO
THETERMS OFTHISAGREEMENT,PROMPTLY RETURNTHE UNOPENED PACKAGETO EPRIANDTHE PURCHASE PRICEWILL
BE REFUNDED.
1. GRANT OF LICENSE
EPRI grants you the nonexclusive and nontransferable right during the term of this agreement to use this package only for your own
benefit and the benefit of your organization.This means that the following may use this package: (I) your company (at any site owned
or operated by your company); (II) its subsidiaries or other related entities; and (III) a consultant to your company or related entities,
if the consultant has entered into a contract agreeing not to disclose the package outside of its organization or to use the package for
its own benefit or the benefit of any party other than your company.
This shrink-wrap license agreement is subordinate to the terms of the Master Utility License Agreement between most U.S. EPRI
member utilities and EPRI.Any EPRI member utility that does not have a Master Utility License Agreement may get one on request.
2. COPYRIGHT
About EPRI This package, including the information contained in it, is either licensed to EPRI or owned by EPRI and is protected by United States
and international copyright laws. You may not, without the prior written permission of EPRI, reproduce, translate or modify this
EPRI creates science and technology solutions for package, in any form, in whole or in part, or prepare any derivative work based on this package.
the global energy and energy services industry. U.S. 3. RESTRICTIONS
electric utilities established the Electric Power You may not rent, lease, license, disclose or give this package to any person or organization, or use the information contained in this
package, for the benefit of any third party or for any purpose other than as specified above unless such use is with the prior written
Research Institute in 1973 as a nonprofit research permission of EPRI.You agree to take all reasonable steps to prevent unauthorized disclosure or use of this package.Except as specified
consortium for the benefit of utility members, their above, this agreement does not grant you any right to patents, copyrights, trade secrets, trade names, trademarks or any other
intellectual property, rights or licenses in respect of this package.
customers, and society. Now known simply as EPRI,
4.TERM ANDTERMINATION
the company provides a wide range of innovative This license and this agreement are effective until terminated.You may terminate them at any time by destroying this package. EPRI has
products and services to more than 1000 energy- the right to terminate the license and this agreement immediately if you fail to comply with any term or condition of this agreement.
Upon any termination you may destroy this package, but all obligations of nondisclosure will remain in effect.
related organizations in 40 countries. EPRI’s
5. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES
multidisciplinary team of scientists and engineers
NEITHER EPRI,ANY MEMBER OF EPRI,ANY COSPONSOR, NOR ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ACTING ON BEHALF
draws on a worldwide network of technical and OF ANY OF THEM:
business expertise to help solve today’s toughest (A) MAKES ANY WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, (I) WITH RESPECT TO THE USE
OF ANY INFORMATION,APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS PACKAGE, INCLUDING
energy and environmental problems.
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR (II) THAT SUCH USE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON OR
EPRI. Electrify the World INTERFERE WITH PRIVATELY OWNED RIGHTS, INCLUDING ANY PARTY’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, OR (III) THAT THIS
PACKAGE IS SUITABLE TO ANY PARTICULAR USER’S CIRCUMSTANCE; OR
(B) ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY WHATSOEVER (INCLUDING ANY
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF EPRI OR ANY EPRI REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUCH DAMAGES) RESULTING FROMYOUR SELECTION OR USE OF THIS PACKAGE OR ANY INFORMATION,APPARATUS,
METHOD, PROCESS OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS PACKAGE.
6. EXPORT
The laws and regulations of the United States restrict the export and re-export of any portion of this package, and you agree not to
export or re-export this package or any related technical data in any form without the appropriate United States and foreign
government approvals.
7. CHOICE OF LAW
This agreement will be governed by the laws of the State of California as applied to transactions taking place entirely in California
between California residents.
8. INTEGRATION
You have read and understand this agreement, and acknowledge that it is the final, complete and exclusive agreement between you
and EPRI concerning its subject matter, superseding any prior related understanding or agreement. No waiver, variation or different
terms of this agreement will be enforceable against EPRI unless EPRI gives its prior written consent, signed by an officer of EPRI.
© 2002 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Inc. All rights

reserved. Electric Power Research Institute and EPRI are registered
service marks of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc.
EPRI. ELECTRIFY THE WORLD is a service mark of the Electric
Power Research Institute, Inc.
Printed on recycled paper in the United States of America
1003456
EPRI • 3412 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94304 • PO Box 10412, Palo Alto, California 94303 • USA
800.313.3774 • 650.855.2121 • askepri@epri.com • www.epri.com

Aging Management Guideline For Commercial Nuclear Power Plant

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aging Management Guideline For Commercial Nuclear Power Plant

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aging Management Guideline for

Commercial Nuclear Power Plants—

Please read the License Agreement

Final Report, April 2002

EPRI Project Manager

(A) MAKES ANY WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, (I)

(B) ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY WHATSOEVER

ORGANIZATION(S) THAT PREPARED THIS DOCUMENT

Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc.

This report was prepared by

Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc.

Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants—Electrical and

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 1-1

2 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 2-1

3 EQUIPMENT EVALUATED ................................................................................................. 3-1

Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Electrical Penetration Assemblies.......................... 3-5

IEB 77-06, “Potential Problems with Containment Electrical Penetration

3.6.3.1.1.9 Unknown ......................................................................................3-30

4 STRESSORS, AGING MECHANISMS, AND EFFECTS...................................................... 4-1

4.2 Thermal Stressors, Aging Mechanisms, and Effects ................................................. 4-3

Overvoltage Transients ............................................................................................4-42

5 EVALUATION OF AGING MECHANISMS AND EFFECTS ................................................ 5-1

Insulation Resistance ..........................................................................................5-16

6 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL AGING MANAGEMENT

B ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................. B-1

C EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION.............................................................................................. C-1

D DESIGN REQUIREMENTS INCLUDING CODES, STANDARDS AND

E DISCUSSION OF NPRDS DATA ........................................................................................ E-1

F SAMPLE PLANT SURVEY ................................................................................................. F-1

Figure C-19 Westinghouse Canister Type EPA..................................................................... C-27

Table C-4 Typical Mechanical Penetration Materials............................................................. C-30

1.1 Purpose and Objective

2. Non-safety-related whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of a

3. Those relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that

1.4 Conclusions of This Study

1.4.1 Historical Performance

2. Electrical penetrations can, in general, be expected to perform their safety function

3. Shorting of the penetration insulation/leads and leakage of the penetration modules or

5. Roughly one-fourth of all penetration-related failures noted were attributable to improper

6. No evidence of widespread Kapton® lead degradation was noted. Instances of degradation

2. Mechanical penetrations can, in general, be expected to perform their safety function

1.4.2 Significant Component/Aging Mechanism Combinations Not Always

1.4.3 Recommendations Regarding Aging Management of Electrical and

The following recommendations regarding aging management of electrical and mechanical

2. An effective program for monitoring and control of age-related degradation of Kapton

1. Battery Chargers, Inverters and Uninterruptible Power Supplies [2.1]

2. Batteries, Stationary [2.2]

3. Heat Exchangers [2.3]

4. Motor Control Centers [2.4]

6. Switchgear, Electrical [2.6]

7. Transformers, Power and Distribution [2.7]

8. Tanks and Pools [2.8]

9. Electrical Cables and Terminations [2.9].

Aging management activities such as preventive maintenance and refurbishment may be

2.2 Purpose and Objectives

· EPRI and other Industry Reports

2.3 Contents of Aging Management Guideline

Section 6 discusses management options to address action items identified in Section 5.

Appendix D includes a discussion of the design requirements that apply to penetrations,

2.4 Generic License Renewal Requirements

1. An Integrated Plant Assessment (IPA),

3. An evaluation of time-limited aging analyses (TLAA),

4. A Final Safety Analysis Report supplement.