PEOPLE vs CAOILE

G.R. No. 203041

FACTS:
Victim (AAA), an eighteen-year-old girl but examined and considered as a demented
person with a mental age of seven (7) years, nine-month-old child who is inadequate of
sustaining mental processes and in solving novel problems employing adoptive strategies.
Caoile invited the victim on several occasions to gather some fruits at the mountain, and
upon reaching the place perpetrated his intention of having carnal knowledge with the victim.
A friend of the victim complained to a barangay tanod that the accused mashed her
breast, and upon hearing the complaint, (AAA) blurted that she too was abused. After
examination, Doctors’ report found the presence of spermatozoa resulting from the carnal
knowledge.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
HELD:
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two
circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered
rape: 1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and 2. Paragraph
1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented.
Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person under
paragraph 1(d). The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of
deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual’s former intellectual
level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase
deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from
mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a
mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one
who is "demented." Although the Amended Information stated that he was being charged with
the crime of rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d), it also stated that his victim was "a
person with a mental age of seven (7) years old.
In People v. Valdez, the Court held: For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it
must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of
law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient
if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of
the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
Thus, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Amended Informations, did not
cause material and substantial harm to Caoile. Firstly, he simply ignored the error. Secondly,
particular facts stated in the Amended Information were averments sufficient to inform Caoile of
the nature of the charges against him
 PEOPLE vs. GUTIEREZ
G.R. No. 208007
FACTS: 
The victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old testified that on November 29, 2005, she
went home from school at around 12 noon to have lunch. On the way home, she met Rodrigo at
his house. He brought her to his room and laid her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt and
removed her panties. He pulled down his pants and then inserted his penis into her vagina.
According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew his
penis, white liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (P5.00) before she went back to school.
AAA went back to school at about 2:10 p.m. Her adviser, Agustina Chapap, asked her
where she came from because she was tardy. AAA initially did not answer. When asked again
why she was tardy, AAA admitted she came from “Uncle Rod.” She also admitted that she went
there to ask for money. Chapap then brought AAA to Rona Ambaken, AAA’s previous teacher.
Together, they brought AAA to the principal’s office. AAA was brought to the comfort room
where Ambaken inspected her panties. The principal was able to confirm that AAA was touched
since AAA’s private organ was swelling. Her underwear was also wet.
Another teacher, Jason Dalisdis, then brought AAA to Baguio General Hospital where
her underwear was again inspected. Dr. Anvic Pascua also examined her. On the way to the
hospital, Dalisdis passed by the barangay hall and the police station to report the incident. AAA
also disclosed during trial that the accused-appellant had done the same thing to her about 10
times on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten (P10.00) or five (P5.00) pesos.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code.
HELD: 
People vs. Teodoro explained the elements of statutory rape committed under Article
266- A, paragraph (1) (d): What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury
are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether
carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will
of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of her
presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at the time of the
incident. What is critical in this case, therefore, is whether there is a showing that Rodrigo had
carnal knowledge of AAA.
 AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the ordeal that was done to
her. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court, her testimony deserves
full weight and credence.
 PEOPLE vs ENTRAMPAS
G.R. No. 212161
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas and BBB were common-law spouses. They co-
habited for eight years. AAA, BBB’s daughter from previous relationship, lived with them. She
look up to Entrampas as her adoptive father.
Sometime in 2003, at about 5:00 pm., in a rural sitio of Barangay Bawod, San Isidro,
Leyte. AAA arrived from school to cook for her family. She was interrupted by Entrampas and
was asked to go to the room upstairs. The 11-year old girl obeyed.
Once in the room, Entrampas forced AAA to lie down on the floor. She was warned by
the accused-appellant that if she shouted he would kill her. She was also warned that if she told
her mother about what he was about to do, he would kill them. Entrampas took off the child’s
panty, undressed himself, and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain as he penetrated
her. Her vagina bled. She cried and pleaded him to stop. As he consummated the act, she noticed
a knife on the wall within his reach. She became more fearful. After satisfying himself, he again
warned the child that he would kill her and her mother if she informed anyone about the incident.
The incident occurred again a week later in February 2003. Entrampas told AAA to lie
down , penetrated her vagina, and then left her. Over the following months, Entrampas
repeatedly raped AAA, who out of fear, and remained silent.
In July 2003 BBB observed some changes in her daughter’s body. AAA’s belly had
become noticeably bigger. Entrampas and BBB went to BBB’s brother, CCC, on September
2003, To confess the crime he had committed against AAA. Entrampas allegedly felt remorseful
and told CCC to kill him for avenge AAA. CCC immediately reported the matter to the police
ISSUES:
Whether or not, accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of statutory rape.
HELD:
Yes, the accused-appellant Entrampas is guilty beyond reasonable Doubt of two (2)
statutory rape. On the two(2) charges of qualified rape, AAA clearly and consistently
communicated how the accused-appellant threatened and forced her into having sexual congress
with him. Her failures to resist the sexual aggression and to immediately report the incident to
the authorities or her mother do not undermine her credibility. The silence of the rape victim
does not negate her sexual molestation or make her charge baseless, untrue , or fabricated. A
minor cannot be expected to act like an adult or a mature experienced woman who would have a
courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that she had
been sexually assaulted.
 Forced and intimidation must be appreciated in light of the victim’s perception and
judgement when the assailant committed the crime. In rape perpetrated by close kin, such as the
common-law spouse of the child’s mother, actual force or intimidation need not be employed.
While accused-appellant was not a biological father of AAA. She considered him as a father
since she was a child. Moral influence or ascendancy added to the intimidation of AAA. It
enhanced the fear that cowed the victim into silence. Accused-appellant’s physical superiority
and moral influence depleted AAA’s resolved to stand up against her foster father. The threats to
her and her mother’s lives, as well as the knife within accused-appellant’s reach, further
prevented her for from resisting her assailant. As accused-appellant sexually assaulted AAA, she
cried and pleaded him to stop. Her failure to shout or to tenaciously repel the acussed-appellant
does not mean that she voluntarily submitted to his dastardly act.
Accused-appellant’s act amounted to statutory rape through carnal knowledge under
Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: Article 266-A. Rape, When and
How Committed. Rape is Committed- 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a). Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b). When the offended party is deprived of a reason otherwise unconscious;
c). By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d). When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be presented.
Accused-appellant also committed the crime with the aggravating/qualifiying
circumstance that he was the common-law spouse of AAA’s mother. Under Article 266-B (1) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended: Article 266-B. Penalties. –Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall punisher by reclusion perpetua.
 People vs. Crisostomo
G.R. No. 196435
FACTS:
In three separate Informations, accused was charged with rape. The victim in these cases
“AAA” testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was playing with her playmates
whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which was just below their house. “AAA”
clarified during her cross-examination that there was a vulcanizing shop owned by her father
located in their house and where accused was employed. While “AAA” was at the house of
accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette by the
said accused. “AAA” testified further that her clothes were taken off by the same accused who
also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis
and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge of the then six (6) year old girl.
Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding “AAA’s” testimony credible
considering that she was unsure whether a match, rod or a cigarette stick, was used in burning
her private parts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused should be guilty of the crimes charged against him.
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held appellant guilty of two counts of rape by sexual assault
and one count of rape by sexual intercourse.
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is “termed statutory rape
as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years.”
Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt for two counts of
rape by sexual assault. Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into “AAA’s”
genital orifice causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise inserted a
lit cigarette stick into “AAA’s” anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal region.
“AAA’s” “uncertainty” on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick that was inserted into
her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such “uncertainty” is so inconsequential and does
not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the
essence of rape by sexual assault. ” The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the
insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into another person’s genital or anal orifice.” In any event, “inconsistencies in a rape victim’s
testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters
that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.
 People v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 183652
FACTS:
After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with her friends, went to
Alson’s Palace for a drinking session to celebrate their graduation. During such session, they
shared their problems with each other. AAA became emotional and started crying, prompting her
to take her first shot of Emperador Brandy. After consuming more or less five glasses of drinks,
she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started kissing her head
and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply
tried to hide her face with the cap. The group just laughed at her and still made her drink more.
She fell asleep but was woken up so that she could drink the remaining liquor inside the Brandy
bottle. She refused but they insisted so she drank. Again, AAA fell asleep.
When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging
House. She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall
back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw
Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her.
At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ.
Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the private
respondents?
HELD:
YES, the Court of Appeals erred in acquitting private respondents. As a general rule, the
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case. If there is grave abuse of discretion, however, granting petitioner’s
prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.
The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the respondent
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents. It appears
that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and
utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. A more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply
lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto,
Carampatana, and Alquizola. It presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as
though these were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support
its ruling of acquittal.
The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2)
such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. Here, the
accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still
forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having
sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the
time the private respondents ravished her.
Moreover, Alquizola should not only be deemed as an accomplice but a principal as well
by virtue of conspiracy. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so
the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room,
intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA and did not do anything
to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and
other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was a conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and
Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them,
Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape.
People vs. Laog
G.R. No. 178321
 People vs. Cataytay
GR 196315
FACTS:
Appellant Cataytay is charged with the crime of rape of AAA. BBB (AAA’s mother)
testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in their compound in
Mandaluyong City.
BBB left AAA in their house to look for BBB’s youngest daughter. Thirty minutes later,
her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost.
AAA and the accused-appellant were already at the outpost. Lito told the persons at the outpost
that she was the mother of the victim. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, “Mommy, ni-
rape po ako.” BBB asked her who raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-appellant.
During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by
accused appellant, which ended when a certain “Mimi” knocked at the door. When accused-
appellant answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the
house. AAA went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors,
Amelita Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost.
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). The report stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an
eight-year-old child. BBB also identified AAA’s birth certificate which showed that she was
biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident. Accused-appellant used denial and alibi as
his defense. RTC finds the accused guilty as charged. CA affirmed with modifications by adding
more damages to pay.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
AAA’s mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics of the
assault in her testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the same when she
was asked at the barangay outpost merely minutes after the incident. However, as we have ruled
in a litany of cases, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says,
in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and, as is more applicable
in the case at bar, immaturity are generally badges of truth. Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp.
Chua that the findings of the physical examination were consistent with recent sexual
intercourse, provide additional corroboration to the testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be
noted that this report was stipulated upon by the prosecution and the defense.
 The Information, as worded, can conceivably comprehend rape under either paragraph
1(b) or 1(d) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: Article 266-A. Rape;
When and How Committed. — Rape is committed — 1) By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or
intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c)
By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.
In People v. Caoile, we differentiated the terms “deprived of reason” and “demented,” as
follows:
The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a
condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the
individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or
insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b)
has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a
mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is “deprived of
reason,” and not one who is “demented.”
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the
mental capacity of a seven-year old child. The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on
the conclusion of the psychologist that the “mental age of the victim whose chronological age at
the time of the commission of the offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7)
year old child.” Accused-appellant is therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Since the accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s mental retardation was alleged in the
Information and admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying
circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of death should have been imposed. With the
passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed. The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty years and one day to forty years of reclusion
perpetua. The Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty to be simply reclusion perpetua.
Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be
applied.
 People v. Joson
G.R. No. 206393
FACTS:
AAA lives with appellant and his common-law partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00
in the morning of 14 May 2009, and while appellant's wife was away, AAA was awakened by
appellant undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After
undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into her
vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA
crying. At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for
what happened and begging her not to tell on his wife.
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to appellant's wife the
rape incident. AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the police and she
executed a sworn statement detailing the rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
HELD:
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he
accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her own brother. Her
testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her
own brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted
his penis into her vagina.
Second, appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. At this
juncture, we quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this point:
The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is
required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or
irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The
parties' relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluating the
existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not
suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a
person of tender age.
 Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings
the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.
We are not persuaded by the accused-appellant's insistence that the absence of any
resistance on the partnof AAA raised doubts as to whether the sexual congress was without her
consent. The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is
not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and
intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of fear.
Physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. After all, resistance
is not an element of rape and its absence does not denigrate AAA's claim that the accused-
appellant consummated his bestial act.
Anent appellant's argument that as a brother he lacks moral ascendancy over her sister,
the victim, that could substitute for force and intimidation, our ruling in People v. Villaruel, as
cited by the Court of Appeals, has rejected such proposition.
The fact remains that Myra positively testified in court that her brother sexually
molested her in the morning of February 21, 1996. The accused-appellant was her older
brother who had definitely moral ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest had
definitely moral ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest among the children since both
of their parents were dead, the accused-appellant stood as guardian of the siblings. Thus,
when the complainant was roused from her sleep to accompany the accused-appellant to
buy bread, the complainant obediently followed him. To the accused-appellant, this was
highly improbable that the complainant would entertain his plea to go out with him at
such an unholy hour or even allegedly knowing fully well that the latter had taken shabu
and liquor. There is nothing incredible with the complainant's story. Notwithstanding the
time or the physical condition of her brother, Myra certainly did not expect that he had
other ill motives against her. It certainly is not normal for a brother to take out his lust
on his sister. Myra also testified that she did not resist his advances for fear of her life as
her brother had two (2) fan knives poking at her as she was being raped. More
importantly, the moral ascendancy and influence the accused-appellant has over the
complainant sufficiently substitute for the force and intimidation required in rape.
People vs. Candellada
G.R. No. 189293
 People vs. Cial
G.R. No. 191362
FACTS:
“AAA” is one of the six (6) children born to “BBB” and “CCC.” After “CCC” died,
“BBB” cohabited with appellant Marciano Cial (also known as “Onot”). Appellant and “BBB”
have two (2) children.
In 2002, “AAA”, then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with
her family and appellant in x x x Quezon Province. “AAA” calls appellant “Papa.”
Sometime in December 2002, appellant called “AAA” and told her to go to the bedroom
inside their house. Once inside, appellant took off “AAA’s” shorts and panty and spread her legs.
Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the little girl’s vagina.
“AAA” felt intense pain but she did not try to struggle because appellant had a bolo on his waist.
After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill “AAA” and her family if she reported the
incident to anyone. At that time, “AAA’s” maternal grandmother was in the house but was
unaware that “AAA” was being ravished.
Unable to endure the torment, “AAA” confided her ordeal to her mother. But “AAA’s”
mother did not believe her. “AAA” ran away from home and went to her maternal uncle’s house.
There, she disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother’s siblings. Her uncle appeared to be
angered by appellant’s wrong doing. But nonetheless, her uncle allowed appellant to bring her
home when appellant fetched her.
For fear that she might be raped again, “AAA” ran away and went to the house of her
aunt. Her aunt helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Qualified Rape
HELD:
No, accused is only guilty of simple rape under the Revised Penal Code.
We find that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of the crime of
qualified rape. According to both courts, the twin qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship attended the commission of the crime. We rule otherwise.
In its Formal Offer of Evidence, the prosecution mentioned “AAA’s” Certificate of Live
Birth. Also attached to the Folder of Exhibits marked as Exhibit “B” is “AAA’s” Certificate of
Live Birth showing that “AAA” was born on October 31, 1991. However, upon closer scrutiny,
we note that the said Certificate of Live Birth was never presented or offered during the trial of
the case. During the March 28, 2006 hearing, the prosecution manifested before the RTC that it
will be presenting “AAA’s” Certificate of Live Birth at the next setting. In its Order dated June
27, 2006, the trial court reset the hearing of the case to allow the prosecution to present evidence
with respect to “AAA’s” Certificate of Live Birth. However, up until the prosecution rested its
case, nobody was presented to testify on “AAA’s” Certificate of Live Birth. Records show that
the prosecution presented only “AAA” and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial never
testified on “AAA’s” age. On the other hand, “AAA” even testified on the witness stand that she
does not know her age. Clearly, the prosecution failed to prove the minority of “AAA”.
The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship.  The
prosecution likewise miserably failed to establish “AAA’s” relationship with the appellant.
Although the Information alleged that appellant is the common-law husband of “AAA’s”
mother, “AAA’” referred to appellant as her step-father, meanwhile, appellant claimed that he is
married to “AAA’s” mother.
 People vs. Lucena
G.R. No. 190632
FACTS:
April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, was walking
and chatting with her friends, two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached
and informed them that they were being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew
against minors. AAA’s companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was
apprehended. AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that
she might spend the night in jail, AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit
any offense as she was just chatting with her friends. AAA’s plea, however, remained unheeded.
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San
Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went inside
the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a
while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall, returned, but, the appellant
told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her house.8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her
to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant
threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival,
the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would
do with her but the former did not respond. The appellant then took out the backseat of the
tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and
commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on
the ground and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to rape her.
Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the
appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third
time, the appellant inserted again his penis into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the
appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that
he would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between them.9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in
front of a school in Parañaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated
his threat to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident.
ISSUE:
The trial court gravely erred in convicting him of three (3) counts of rape.
RULLING:
 All the Information in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a),
Article 266–A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266–B, of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. These provisions specifically state:
ART. 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d)
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes
rape: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age.26
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so
great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.27 Further,
it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to
cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear
in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.
The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists that he cannot be convicted
of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by a
single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then
withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted
again his penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the
victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his
penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts,
this Court convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful
penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the
accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful
desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus,
viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the
accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
 The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case.
Here, we quote with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of
the trial court, to wit:
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3)
counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting
his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the
other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating
his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape
[AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant]
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was
not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his
conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA
were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s
conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
 PEOPLE v. TIONLOC
G.R. No. 212193
FACTS:
At around 9:30 PM of September 29, 2008, AAA was having a drinking session with
appellant and Meneses in the appellant’s house. After some time, she felt dizzy so she took a
nap. She was roused from her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis
into her vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife nearby would be
used to kill her if she resists. While still feeling dizzy, appellant approached her and asked if he
could also have sex with her. When she did not reply, appellant mounted and raped her.
The following day, AAA reported the incident to the police and underwent a medical
examination and the results revealed two lacerations in her hymen. The RTC clarified that
appellant is charged with rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of
the RPC based on the allegations in the Information and not with rape by sexual assault under
paragraph 2 of the same provision of the law. Appellant appealed the RTC’s decision arguing
that discrepancies in sworn statement of AAA and her testimony diminished her credibility. The
CA ruled that discrepancies between the affidavit and testimony of AAA did not impair her
credibility; the CA held that the rape victim AAA is not expected to make an errorless
recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might even try to obliterate it
from her memory. CA therefore affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?
HELD:
Yes. Force as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which
the accused had in mind. In this case, the prosecution established that appellant was 18 year old
man who had sexual intercourse with AAA, a woman who was 24 years old during the incident.
However, there was no evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat, or intimidation during
his sexual congress with AAA. There was no evidence that the knife was placed nearby precisely
to threaten or intimidate her. Appellant went on top of AAA without saying anything or uttering
threatening words. For her part, AAA neither intimated any form of resistance nor expressed any
word or rejection to appellant’s advances. Three things are thus clear from the testimony of
AAA: first, appellant never employed force, threat, or intimidation against her, second, AAA
never gave the slightest hint of rejection when appellant asked her to have sex with him, and
third, appellant did not act with force since he readily desisted when AAA felt slightest pain and
tried to move during their sexual congress. AAA could have resisted right from the start. But she
did not, and chose not to utter a word or make any sign of rejection of appellant’s sexual
advances. The fact that AAA was tipsy or drunk at that time cannot be held against the appellant.
Thus, as usual, she voluntarily went with them to the house of appellant and chatted with them
while drinking liquor, the prosecution failed to show that she was deprived of her will power. It
has been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from weakness of the defense. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an
acquittal.
PEOPLE VS AMARELA
G.R. No. 225642-43