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Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community in Turkish

Politics: The Özal Years, 1983-87

Article  in  Middle Eastern Studies · January 2001

DOI: 10.1080/714004367

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 Middle Eastern Studies

ISSN: 0026-3206 (Print) 1743-7881 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20

Human Rights, Democratization and the European

Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years,
1983-87

I. Dagi

To cite this article: I. Dagi (2001) Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community
in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983-87, Middle Eastern Studies, 37:1, 17-40, DOI:
10.1080/714004367

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/714004367

Published online: 08 Sep 2010.

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371mes02.qxd 04/01/2001 16:03 Page 17

Human Rights, Democratization and the

European Community in Turkish Politics:
The Özal Years, 1983–87

IHSAN D. DAGI

The issues of human rights and democratization have in recent years

emerged as significant aspects of Turkey–European Union relations. This
can be seen as a change in the traditional pattern of Turkey–EU relations
that used to be centred around economic matters in the 1960s and 1970s.
This has obviously not been the choice of the Turkish side which tends to
describe raising the human rights and democratization questions by the
European partners as political manoeuvring to prevent Turkey’s accession
to the EU. It seems clear that EU’s adoption of the view that human rights
was a matter of legitimate international concern coupled with Turkey’s
determination to be part of the enlarging Union, while being criticized for
its record of human rights and speed of democratization, led to the
politicization of Turkey–EU relations since the early 1980s.

The first general elections after the military intervention of September 1980
took place in November 1983, bringing the Motherland Party of Turgut
Özal to power. Yet the transition to civilian government did not stop the
debate in Europe about the democratic nature of the new regime and its
respect for human rights.1 The elections were overshadowed by the vetos
and restrictions imposed on the new political parties. The National Security
Council banned former politicians from political activities for five to ten
years under provisional article 4 of the 1982 constitution. In addition the
generals were in a position to veto the founding members of the new
political parties and their parliamentary candidates. Eventually, only three
political parties were allowed to compete in the election, while two other
potentially popular parties were excluded. Furthermore, before handing
power over to the civilian government the military regime extended martial
law for another four months and enacted laws that outlawed the discussion
of any policy of the NSC and the public expression of political ideas by

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.37, No.1, January 2001, pp.17–40

PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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18 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

former politicians.2 Hence, by the end of 1983 when the elections were held
the whole of the country was still under martial law, mass trials were
continuing in military courts and the allegations about prison conditions and
torture were widespread.
When the Özal government came to power at the end of 1983, it was
widely believed that the government would look to the Middle East and
Islamic countries for political cooperation and economic expansion; a belief
that was held largely because of Özal’s role in opening up the Turkish
economy to the Middle Eastern markets in the early 1980s and his previous
connection with the National Salvation Party which had strong anti-
European Community orientations.3 He was even portrayed as being in
favour of an alternative Islamic Economic Community, proposed by the
Turkish Islamists as the best line of integration for Turkey.
But these views were proven wrong in a short time. Özal of the 1980s
was not an ideologically minded politician but rather a pragmatist. His
interest in Middle Eastern and Islamic countries was largely prompted by
his economic pragmatism of expanding Turkish trade, disregarding the
ideological or political leanings of the regimes in the region. He had a
balanced view of the West and the Middle East as complementary to each
other.4 As a political realist he was aware of both the economic and political
significance of the European Community and Turkey’s difficulties in
improving its relations with it while Turkey was below the Community’s
standard both economically and politically.
Thus the first Özal government expressed the membership of the
Community as its ‘ultimate aim’ in the government programme.5 Özal
believed that Turkey’s relations and cooperation with the West should not
be exclusively centred around a common defence strategy.6 He wanted to
have closer economic ties which were considered to be essential in order to
integrate Turkey into Europe structurally. Instead of relying solely on any
circumstantial military alliance, the promotion of economic ties would
make Turkey an indispensable part of Europe. The hope was that with the
dissolution of the National Security Council on 13 December 1983 and the
formal transition to civilian rule, Turkey would be readmitted to the
mainstream of Western democratic states. The degree of improvement in
Turkey’s relations with the EC would demonstrate how much the Turkish
hope was realistic. In fact, there were still many contentious issues on the
agenda. Continuing martial law and regulations on the press, trade unions
and associations were seen as an extension of the militaristic regime that
were obstacles to normalization of relations. Still continuing trials of DISK
trade unionists, the Peace Association members and the Intellectuals were
taken up as distractive issues in Community–Turkey relations.
As a result, despite the return to civilian government, Turkey’s de facto
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HUM AN RI GHTS, DEM OCRATI ZATI ON A N D E C I N T U R K E Y, 1 9 8 3 – 8 7 19

frozen relations with the Community did not immediately start moving. The
EC continued to make the reactivation of relations conditional on an
improvement in the Turkish human rights record. The prevailing view was
that despite general elections Turkey still had a long way to go for the full
realization of democracy. Western social democrats and liberals were
especially skeptical about the possibility of establishing a democratic polity
that was based on the 1982 constitution, criticized as it was containing many
illiberal articles. This was one of the reasons for excluding Turkey from the
centre of European politics.7
There was a common view in the West that Turkey’s human rights
performance might improve if ‘Turkey’s West European friends keep up the
pressure’.8 The European Community in this period emerged as a significant
political and economic centre which looked to be able to influence the
human rights policy of Özal’s transitional government. Turkey’s desire to
normalize its relations and re-activate the association agreement enabled the
Community to underline its conviction that ‘respect for human rights is one
of the cornerstones of European cooperation…and an important element in
relations between third countries and the Europe of Twelve’.9 The
Community declared that in its relations with non-member states and in the
administration of aid, the promotion of human rights would be taken into
consideration. The employment of diplomatic and economic means was
regarded as justified to promote respect for human rights. ‘Expression of
concern at violations of such rights cannot be considered interference in the
domestic affairs of a state’.10 In practice Community policy went beyond the
public denunciation of human rights abuses and involved pressures of the
economic and political kind; this especially so towards a country which
places itself in the sphere of Europe and strives for recognition of this self-
placement.
Initially, for the Özal government, the important issues with regard to the
Community were to improve the political relations that had suffered after
1980, in order to release the blocked aid, to reactivate the Association
Agreement, and to increase textile exports. Except for the last item, these
developments were all directly dependent on the level of political
cooperation Turkey would be able to develop in its relations with Europe.
As a first step in this direction the Turkish Foreign Minister Halefoğlu
visited the European Commission in late January 1984 just a month after the
formation of the first Özal government. He conveyed the government’s
desire to normalize its relations with the Community and informed the
Commission about political as well as economic developments. The
message he got from the Commission was that the normalization of
relations depended on the continuation of the process of democratization
and respect for human rights.11
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20 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

With regard to the credibility of Özal’s civilian government, the March

1984 local elections, which were held with the participation of all existing
political parties and resulted in the victory of the ruling Motherland Party
leaving no doubt about its legitimacy, raised the hope that an immediate
improvement in Turkey’s relations with Europe, including the European
Community, would be forthcoming. The European Parliament had criticized
the way in which the November general elections were conducted, and
denounced them for not reflecting the ‘true expression of democracy’. The
objection of the European Parliament was justified by reference to the
restrictions imposed on the process of formation of political parties and their
participation in the election.12 The Community and its organs, like the
Parliament, did not seem in a hurry to approve the regime in Turkey and to
begin to implement policies that would be the first signs of reactivation of
Turkey’s association agreement. The Foreign Ministers of the Community
discussed the internal political developments in Turkey, though
inconclusively, to shape their attitude towards the civilian government of
Özal.13 The European Commission also did not seem impressed when it
decided to impose further quantitative limits on textile imports from Turkey
at the end of 1984.14
The European Parliament also displayed its reactions to the political
developments in Turkey. In the third month of the Özal government the
Parliament adopted two resolutions ‘on respect for human rights in Turkey’
and ‘on the continuing violations of human rights in Turkey’.15 Following
the previous ones, the latest resolutions regarded the November elections as
being ‘of only limited significance’ because of the prevalence of martial
law. But the previous denunciation of the November elections by the same
Parliament had been based on the argument that the National Security
Council imposed undemocratic restrictions on the electoral process. By the
time of the latest resolutions though, the local elections of March had
eroded the doubts about the legitimacy of the Özal government. The
European Parliament, after protesting at the use of torture, continuing trials
in military courts and restriction of the press, urged the Turkish government
to stop the abuse of human rights and to guarantee full respect for them. The
European Parliament also called on the Turkish Grand National Assembly
‘to press for an end to martial law all over the country’ and take steps to
grant an amnesty for political prisoners. The resolutions ended with a clear
reminder, and in fact a threat, that the normalization of relations between
Turkey and the Community and reactivation of the EC–Turkey Association
agreement depended on the continuation of the process of re-establishment
of democracy and respect for human rights.16
The European Parliament’s tough stand against the violation of human
rights after the transition to a civilian regime was exemplified by the
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HUM AN RI GHTS, DEM OCRATI ZATI ON A N D E C I N T U R K E Y, 1 9 8 3 – 8 7 21

adoption of two resolutions on the same day. The second one expressed the
concern of the Parliament over ‘continuing violations of human rights’. It
seems that these resolutions were heavily influenced by international non-
governmental human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International,
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International
Commission of Jurists, the International Press Institute and such like, and
signalled that the European Parliament was willing to take up the concern
of these organizations in international forums. The Parliament took the lead
and publicized the cause of international human rights organizations by
expressing the common concern about the violations of human rights in
Turkey and instructing that the resolution be passed to the Council, the
Commission, the United Nations and the US State Department.17
The European Parliament showed its continuous concern about the
human rights situation in Turkey by adopting two further resolutions in
October 1984. One dealt specifically with death sentences and the execution
of two convicts, the first execution since the November elections. The
Parliament called on the Turkish government to suspend implementation of
any more death sentences.18 The other resolution, in October, asked for the
immediate release of a former Turkish ambassador and peace activist,
whose health was deteriorating while kept in detention.19 The European
Parliament also decided not to set up the Joint Parliamentary Committee of
Turkey and the European Parliament, as a move to question the legitimacy
of the Turkish representatives.20
Four highly critical resolutions from the European Parliament in a year
meant that despite a formal return to democracy Turkey needed to prove its
commitment to the observance of human rights in order to improve its
relations with the European Community. The content of criticism also
showed that the concern of the Europeans had shifted from the re-
establishment of democracy to more specific cases of human rights abuses.
On the other front, the Community was far from relaxing economic aid
to Turkey as a response to the transition to a civilian regime. The release of
600 million ECU was as yet out of the question despite British and German
support. Turkey’s quest to reactivate its relations was often objected to by
some member states, especially Denmark, the Netherlands, France and
Greece.
In Turkey–Community relations the European Parliament became an
obstacle to the reactivation of the association agreement and an international
arena where the Turkish regime was critically scrutinized. The language of
its resolutions became increasingly harder and harsher. The Parliament took
up the Kurdish issue and accused the government of ‘launching a systematic
campaign of genocide against the Kurdish minority’. In April 1985 the
Parliament described the regime in Turkey as ‘the bloody reign of terror’
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22 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

and denounced the death sentences given to ‘Kurdish soldiers’.21 From then
on the European Parliament took a continuing interest in the Kurdish issue
which was forwarded in the context of cultural rights of minorities in
Turkey. The issue was raised and supported mainly by the Communists, the
Socialists, the Greeks and some liberals. When Turkey was moving to lift
martial law gradually, investigate prison conditions and adopt politically a
more pluralistic regime, the strongly critical, uncompromising and non-
cooperative attitude of the European Parliament was partly due to its
internal political structure and partly to the self-righteous conviction of its
members as the genuine pursuers of human rights in the world. Continuing
domestic problems in Turkey and the activities of Turkish exiles in Europe
could also be added to the above mentioned reasons for the Parliament’s
critical approach. Mass trials were still held in military courts,
internationalized trials of DISK trade unionists, Peace Association members
and Intellectuals continued for years without any convictions. Social
Democrat and Socialist members of the European Parliament were
especially interested in these trials. The Parliament adopted another
resolution in mid-1985 entirely devoted to the trial of the members of the
Peace Association.22 The attempt of the Özal government to increase the
power of the police was also faced with opposition from the EC. The EC
representative in Ankara went public on the issue and argued that if the Bill
was enacted it would cause a ‘fatal blow’ to the efforts to reactivate the
relations between the two sides.23
Then, in late 1985, came the controversial Balfe report of the Political
Affairs Committee, which arrived at the conclusion that Turkey’s human
rights practice was still far from ‘complying with the most elementary
standards’ and recommended a further suspension of the setting-up of a
Turkey–Community Joint Parliamentary Committee.24 The report was
accompanied by a highly critical and comprehensive resolution of the
European Parliament which was received with anger and dismay in
Ankara.25 The resolution was adopted with the support of Socialists,
Communists and the Greeks. The European conservatives and the
democratic group were in favour of a dialogue between the two sides
through re-establishment of the Joint Parliamentary Committee.26 The
resolution coincided with the growing desire of the government to improve
its relations with the Community speedily. Therefore, it was a setback to the
efforts of the Turkish government to reactivate the association agreement,
and relations between the two sides became strained again as a result of
Turkey’s reaction to the report and the resolution. Even the Community’s
Turkey representative was publicly accused of misinforming the rapporteur
of the Community.27 The resolution condemned the practice of torture, death
sentences, restrictions on former politicians and trade unions, continuing
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HUM AN RI GHTS, DEM OCRATI ZATI ON A N D E C I N T U R K E Y, 1 9 8 3 – 8 7 23

mass trials, repression of minority Kurds etc. and called on the Turkish
government to abolish the death penalty, pardon political prisoners,
prosecute torturers, guarantee fair trials, discontinue mass trials, remove the
restrictions on freedom of political activity and accept the individual right
of appeal to the European Commission on Human Rights.28
But there were some domestic political improvements in 1986 which
were externally recognized and eased Turkey’s relations with the
Community. The main extra-parliamentary opposition parties, the SODEP
and TPP, began to be represented in the Turkish Parliament, helping the
establishment of its legitimacy, the ban on the public speeches of former
politicians was lifted, a partial amnesty was declared leading to the release
of the detainees of the DISK and Peace Association trials, and the
ratification of death sentences by the Parliament was stopped.29 Meanwhile,
Turkey was getting recognition from some international organizations for
its change of policy as the European Commission of Human Rights dropped
the case against Turkey by agreeing on a friendly settlement. Turkey began
to chair the OECD and was offered the postponed presidency of the Council
of Europe in the same year. These were the signs of the improving image of
Turkey in European politics which raised the hope again for a similar turn
in Turkey–Community relations.
In fact, the European Parliament was taking note of the normalization in
Turkey’s relations with other European organizations.30 For this, the Turkish
government wanted to table the EC–Turkey Association Council at
ministerial level. The Turkish call for the Council meeting was received
positively by the Foreign Ministers in early 1986 despite the objection of
Greece.31 The turn actually took place with the visit of Claude Cheysson, the
European Commissioner in charge of Mediterranean policy, which was the
first visit to Turkey by a member of the Commission since the military
intervention in 1980. Cheysson, while stating the Community’s desire to
improve relations, underlined its expectation that Turkey should improve its
human rights record.32 Both sides nevertheless decided to hold the Council
meeting in September. With these mutual expectations the Association
Council met, the first such meeting since the military intervention of 1980,
though without any result. Among the items discussed was the political
situation in Turkey about which the Turkish Foreign Minister gave details.
It was conveyed to the Turkish delegation that progress in restoring
democracy and respect for human rights was an essential part of the
normalization between the EC and Turkey.33 The Council meeting ended
without any decision on the reactivation of the association agreement which
Turkey was pressing for.34 It could still be regarded as progress by the Turks
who saw in it the beginning of the long waited ‘normalization’. Then the
British Foreign Secretary and the President of the Council of Ministers
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24 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

remarked on the occasion that Turkey was given ‘the green light’ to resume
political relations with EC.35 Although the blocked 600 million ECU was not
released, there were signs of a financially more relaxed Community
approach to Turkey. Some amount of aid was released throughout 1986
from the budget of the Commission, giving the impression that the EC was
moving closer to collaboration with Turkey.36
But these positive changes were immediately overshadowed by the
continuing critical attitude of the European Parliament which adopted a new
resolution ‘on relations between EEC and Turkey’ at the end of 1986. After
expressing its concern and criticism about the shortcomings of the regime
in the political and human rights fields, advising Turkey to pursue ‘a good
neighbour policy towards Greece’ and contribute to the solution of the
Cyprus problem, the Parliament declared that the Community was not yet
‘justified in fully normalizing its relations with Turkey’. It was also
concerned that the meeting of the Association Council gave the false
impression that the EC endorsed the political and human rights situation in
Turkey.37 Persistent in its opposition to the establishment of the Joint
Parliamentary Committee provided by the association agreement, the
European Parliament instead set up a parliamentary delegation in January
1987 as a compromise; a delegation which was institutionally and legally
different from that of a joint Parliamentary Committee.38 In fact, a year after
the adoption of the Balfe report and the resolution that strongly objected to
the re-establishment of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, Balfe himself
came to the conclusion that dialogue between the two Parliaments should be
established.39

The Turkish government had in fact been becoming rather annoyed by the
reluctance of the EC to take decisive and effective steps to improve
relations. There were suggestions in early 1986 that the Özal government
was considering an immediate application for full membership as a move to
break the standstill in relations. Özal was willing to use Turkey’s right,
provided by the Ankara Agreement of 1963, to be a full member, not only
as a threat to secure solutions to some long-standing problems, such as free
circulation of Turkish workers within the EC, but actually applying
officially for full membership, thereby exerting pressure on the Community.
But the European capitals were advising Turkey not to rush for full
membership, which could be vetoed by some member countries anyway
because of bilateral problems, or the concern about the level of democracy
and respect for human rights. Rather Turkey should first go for
normalization.40 There was also an emerging view that the EC was trying to
obstruct Turkey’s application and gain some time by raising the issues
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HUM AN RI GHTS, DEM OCRATI ZATI ON A N D E C I N T U R K E Y, 1 9 8 3 – 8 7 25

political in nature, since its economic arguments were rather weak to justify
obstruction.41 A fruitless meeting of the Association Council, a continuing
critical attitude of the European Parliament, and Greece’s blocking of any
attempt to improve relations in the end led the Özal government to the
conclusion that reactivation of the Association Agreement was not possible
in a short term under the prevailing conditions.42 Particularly the opposition
of Greece to the re-activization of Turkey’s relations with the EC, and the
non-existence of pressure by the other member states on Greece to soften its
opposition, became so irritating for the Turkish government that it saw no
other way but official application. In the same year as the government
declared its intention to apply for accession, a Minister of State responsible
for Community affairs was created, who embarked on heavy lobbying in the
Western capitals.43 At the beginning of 1986, while visiting London, Özal
outlined his plan to join the EC.44 In the end Turkey decided to lodge its
application in the course of 1987 and declared its intention despite the
opposition of the member states in the Community.
Although the prospect of full membership was recognized in the Ankara
Agreement of 1963, the member countries in the Community were reluctant
even to see the application for membership put forward. The member states
tried to discourage Turkey from lodging its application, at least until the
1990s. The Community had its own internal problems due to the recent
accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal, and to its concern about the
economic and political fitness of Turkey to join the EC.
Meanwhile, for the first time in the history of EC–Turkey relations there
was a wide consensus over the membership issue among different economic
and political interest groups in Turkey. It seemed that all segments of
society were in favour of integrating with Europe. For the pro-European
elites it was the ultimate aim of the Westernization process which should be
embarked on as soon as possible. There was also a widely held belief that
Turkey’s membership in the Community would guarantee the durability of
Turkish democracy and reduce the likelihood of another military
intervention, as in the countries of Southern Europe. Premier Özal too, in an
attempt to dismiss criticism that Turkey’s democratic standards were lower
than these of the other members of the Community, argued that Turkey’s
membership would enhance the democratic regime. He would assert that
this was precisely the point; membership of the Community would
irreversibly consolidate the parliamentary democratic regime. Therefore, if
the EC wanted Turkey to have a viable and durable democracy, the best way
of doing this was political integration of Turkey into the Community. In a
speech to EC ambassadors Özal said, ‘What we now need is encouragement
for further consolidation of democracy and strengthening the respect for
human rights’.45 The similarities were hastily drawn with Greece, Spain and
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26 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

Portugal whose levels of democracy were questionable when they were

accepted by the Community.46
Yet the government was confident that the democratic credentials of the
regime were strengthening in Europe towards the end of 1986. It was more
than a coincidence that Turkey lodged its application at a time when it was
the President of the Council of Europe: an approving sign of its international
credentials as a democratic country. If not, Özal was prepared to introduce
further reforms to satisfy the demands of the Europeans by 1987 when he
would have consolidated his position vis-à-vis the President.
While arguing that a strategic alliance should be based on solid mutual
economic interests Özal was also convinced that Turkey’s contribution to the
defence of the free world should be rewarded with further collaboration in
the economic field.47 It was ironically evident that the government was trying
to base its argument for membership on its contribution to the defence of
Western Europe. If Turkey was a member of the Western world in matters of
defence and political cooperation, why should it not be part of economic
integration? Özal asserted that Turkey could not be regarded only as a
strategic asset, but should also take part in the economic and political
integration of Europe.48 The argument that Turkey shared Western values and
ideals was also put forward; ‘Turkey’s crucial role for the West cannot be
confined to geo-strategic location or military alliance. Turkey also shares the
Western ideals.’49 For the Turks, as Steinbach pointed out, the membership in
NATO was ‘naturally leading to and justifying its membership of the EC’.50
Confirming this point, Özal claimed that it was ‘Turkey’s right to expect that
the doors of the EC will be open to us by partners and allies with whom we
have shared the common destiny for almost half a century, with whom we
strove so hard and selflessly to preserve peace and to defend our freedom and
our territorial integrity’.51 Thus the Turkish argument for membership was
always put in the context of its geopolitical significance and its vital
contribution to the defence of the ‘free world’.52
Apart from the legal, political and strategic justifications for Turkey’s
turn to the EC, there were some practical and immediate reasons for it.
Steinbach was right to argue that Özal’s attempt to enter the Community
was due to his pragmatism. Özal wanted to be part of a politically and
economically strong European Community and benefit from this
partnership as much as possible. Steinbach’s argument that unlike the
Kemalists, Özal’s commitment to the West in general and the EC in
particular was not ideological was correct but open to misunderstanding.53
Such an assertion might lead one to doubt Özal’s credibility about his
commitment to Western style government, liberal economy and pro-
Western foreign policy. The main difference, though, between Özal and the
Kemalists is that for Özal Westernization of Turkey is a natural direction of
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HUM AN RI GHTS, DEM OCRATI ZATI ON A N D E C I N T U R K E Y, 1 9 8 3 – 8 7 27

development due to economic, technological and cultural necessities and

linkages that should continue but not be imposed on the Turkish people by
the state elites as the Kemalists would approve.
But it is fair to argue that his decision in 1987 was a pragmatic turn to
the EC. By then Turkish foreign political and economic policy was
deadlocked on two fronts, which compelled the government to revise it.
First of all, Turkey’s export expansion to the Middle East became stagnant,
partly because of the drop in oil prices in 1985; even worse, it began to drop
significantly in comparison with the early years of the 1980s. Furthermore,
Turkey was unable to get its export and construction earnings from the main
Middle Eastern partners, namely Iraq, Iran and Libya.54 Therefore Turkey
needed to look for more stable and sustainable markets in the West. In doing
so the Özal government first turned to the US. The hope was that within the
renegotiation of the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement Turkey
could press for an increase in the Turkish-American trade volume by lifting
American quotas on some Turkish export products, especially textiles.55 The
outcome of the negotiations, however, turned out to be not very
encouraging. Özal’s hope to improve Turkey’s trade with the US and make
it Turkey’s main trade partner proved to be a misconceived one by 1986.56
As a result, Özal had no option but to turn to the EC to improve Turkey’s
economic performance.
With this state of mind Turkey presented its application for full
membership on 14 April 1987, showing the determination of the Turkish
government to integrate into Europe against all odds. As expressed by the
Minister of State Ali Bozer, responsible for European affairs, this was a
‘solemn and historic moment for Turkey’.57 It would be so if the application
led to the accession of Turkey into the Community. On the same day,
Premier Özal gave a press conference to explain Turkey’s full membership
application for the EC. Against the criticism levelled by the Community and
member states he claimed that Turkey was politically as well as
economically ready to be a member of the European Community. He
emphasized that ‘Turkey feels and is an integral part of Europe’.58
One could expect that the Turkish application for membership would
lead to some difficulties or compromises in the conduct of internal politics
for the government. With the lodging of the application the Turkish
government moved into the sphere of the Community’s influence and even
became vulnerable to external pressures originating from the EC or its
member states on the issues of human rights. It certainly increased
European public interest in Turkey’s internal affairs and led to continuing
public scrutiny of Turkey’s human rights record. The EC and the member
states were now able to assert their claim more rigorously on Turkish
politics. It gave political and even legal-procedural justification for
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28 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

‘external-European interferences’. It was obvious that despite his portrayal

of Turkey as politically fit for membership, Özal was aware that he needed
to improve the image of the country by taking further reformist steps in the
direction of democratization and respect for human rights.
While the agenda of the Özal government was largely redirected for the
realization of its European bid, the long post-application process began at a
very slow pace in Brussels where displeasure about the Turkish application
was evident. However, in a meeting at the end of April, the Council of the
EC decided, despite the opposition of Greece, to implement the procedure
and referred Turkey’s application to the Commission.59 The rest depended
on how fast and how positive the opinion formed by the Commission would
be. In fact both sides had time to make their demands clear. Especially for
Turkey the period in which the Commission was supposed to present its
opinion was a time to prove its commitment to democracy and human rights
as demanded by the EC and member states. The Turkish government had to
persuade the Europeans that it was ready to collaborate on political matters
as well as economic ones.
The European Parliament, under these favourable circumstances in
which Turkey seemed more than ever vulnerable to the European pressure,
moved in to assert that Turkey’s policy towards the Armenians, the Kurds,
Greece and Cyprus, coupled with the lack of true democracy and respect for
human rights, were ‘insurmountable obstacles to consideration of the
possibility of Turkey’s accession to the Community’. The Parliament with
the same resolution called on the Turkish government to ‘acknowledge the
Armenian genocide’ and further asserted that ‘the Armenian question and
the question of minorities in Turkey must be resituated within the
framework of relations between Turkey and the Community’.60 The
resolution on the Armenian issue, towards which the Turkish government
had been extremely sensitive, caused strong reactions from Turkey.
President Evren stated his dismay and, after highlighting the timing of the
resolution as following Turkey’s application, dismissed the resolution as a
plot to obstruct Turkey’s entry to the EC.61
The democratic credentials of the regime in Turkey were questioned
again when the returning exiled Communist leaders were arrested on arrival
to Turkey.62 In fact, the decision of the Communists to return, which was an
attempt to legalize the Party, was prompted by the Turkish application to
join the EC. Thus the leaders of the Communist Party relied heavily on
European support and the pressure to carry on the democratization process
in Turkey, which was thought to necessitate the legalization of the
Communist Party.63 It was obvious from the timing and staging of the whole
thing that the Communists, who were accompanied by European
parliamentarians, representatives of Amnesty International and journalists,
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wanted to increase European pressure on Turkey.64 As expected, a resolution

by the European Parliament called on the government to release Kutlu and
Sargin, and asserted that the Communist leaders would contribute to ‘the
establishment of democracy’ in Turkey.65 Despite public anger the
government and the public at large were aware that membership in the
Community and Turkey’s further liberalization, including legalization of the
Communist Party, were closely linked to each other.66
Over the issue the Parliamentary Assembly blocked the ratification of
Turkey’s Supplementary Agreement with Spain and Portugal and the release
of some other financial aid to Turkey in the same year.67 Nevertheless, the
Commission proposed to finance three projects in Turkey by releasing the
special aid voted in 1980, but then postponed it because of the military
regime.68 The aid that was extended to Turkey in 1987 from the budget
source of the Commission was not significant in amount but signalled the
Commission’s continuing interest in Turkey and its more relaxed attitude.
In this period the European Parliament posed a formidable obstacle to
the normalization of Turkey’s relations with the Community with its
uncompromising stand against Turkey’s human rights practice. The
message received from the Community was that for the reactivation of
relations the European Parliament must be satisfied about political issues,
that is, human rights. In its lobbying for reactivation, therefore, the Turkish
side set up an informal Friends of Turkey Group in the Parliament as a
response to the objection of the European Parliament to formation of an
official Joint Parliamentary Committee.69
There was widespread scepticism in Turkey about the role of the
European Parliament in blocking Turkey’s rapprochement with the
Community. Birand, for example, argued that member countries used it as a
shield to avoid criticism by Turkey. They impelled the Parliament to
highlight the political issues and argue that until these were settled, further
political and economic cooperation between Turkey and the Community
was unthinkable. Premier Özal also had a similar conviction that some
European countries, which found some Turkish goods competitive in the
Market, had tried to hide behind political issues and block reactivation of
the relations between the two sides.70
Whatever the rationale behind the attitude of the Parliament, it was
obvious that Turkey needed to win its support in order to realize its bid for
full membership, since the Single European Act empowered the Parliament
by giving it the authority to approve any new accession. Therefore, from the
time Turkey made its intention to apply for membership clear, the
Parliament moved to the position of judging the Turkish domestic political
structure in the light of Western democratic standards. The Parliament
emerged then as the organization which was enabled to decide the ‘political
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30 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

fitness’ of Turkey to join the European Community, whereas the

Commission became more concerned about ‘economic fitness’. Besides, the
concern of the Parliament about human rights in third countries was shared
and supported by the member countries.71 The Commission also supported
the resolutions of the Parliament on Turkey.72 In fact, during the period in
question the European Council and the Commission as well as the
Parliament all exerted significant pressure on Turkey with regard to human
rights. The presence of an association agreement and the later application
for full membership justified, and for the Europeans even necessitated, a
greater interest in Turkish domestic affairs. Turkey’s quest for reactivation
of the Association Agreement and later for admission to the Community
were immediately made conditional on the complete restoration of
democracy and human rights. As a result, Turkey faced an effective pressure
centre on the European front and a dilemma that put its self-image as a
modern European state into question.

Premier Özal characterized the West as ‘the expression of a way of life based
on freedom, democratic liberties and respect for human rights’ that went
beyond geographical boundaries.73 It is towards this way of life that the
Turkish state has directed the nation for almost two hundred years with the
initiative of its ruling elites. Under their leadership, no doubt ‘Turkey attaches
great importance to universal values of Western civilization’.74 Since freedom,
democracy and human rights constitute the Western way of life, if one aspires
to be Western one is justifiably expected to comply with these basic
principles. This poses a fundamental dilemma for the Turkish ruling elites in
times of nationwide political crises when the priority shifts from a Western
style government to ‘protection and safeguarding of the state and Kemalist
reforms’, during which the Westernization project can temporarily be
postponed for the future. As the aspirations of the elites to transform the
nation into a modern European one contradict the political realities of Turkey
in times of crisis, then Western institutions and countries begin justifiably to
criticize Turkey as not living up to European standards. The disparity between
the aspiration to be European and domestic political practice thus poses the
main dilemma of Turkish state-political elites and becomes a source of
vulnerability in the face of European criticism and pressure. As recognized by
Dodd, Turkey’s political leaders are ‘sensitive’ to criticism levelled by the
Europeans on the state of human and political rights.75 Turkey’s critics in
Europe are aware of this sensitivity which results in Turkey’s attempt to
‘Westernize’ the political system further as its quest to join Europe continues.
The existence of a European dimension, a place to aspire to, in Turkish
political history was certainly instrumental in constructing and legitimizing
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Turkish identity since the Republic. Therefore, there is some justification in

the claim that Turkey was taking European criticism into account as it
moved to restore parliamentary democracy. Specific examples can be drawn
to support this view. An issue over which Western influence can be argued
was the execution of death sentences, which prompted considerable
reactions in Europe. The human rights NGOs and European organizations
continuously asked Turkish governments to abolish the death sentence.
During the first Özal government courts continued to pass death sentences
despite the European demands.76 The first and last two executions in this
period were carried out in October 1984, ratification of which was strongly
influenced by the military and President Evren.77 Executions during the
civilian regime were a blow to the image of the new government in the
West. This was the last thing Özal wanted. As the head of a government
succeeding the military one, Özal was convinced that he was in a much
better position to improve Turkey’s relations with Europe and to this end he
tried to avoid set-backs in relations. But the executions resulted in strong
criticisms from human rights organizations as well as the EC and the
Council of Europe. The latter adopted a resolution specifically asking
Turkey not to ratify any more death sentences.78 The civilian government of
Özal, in fact, was not in a position to abolish the law on the death sentence,
nor did they want to, but by stopping ratification after 1984 they signalled a
change of heart on the part of the government with regard to abandoning the
harsh measures taken by the preceding military regime. President Evren
himself directly attributed this policy change of the civilian Özal
government to European pressure, mainly from the European Community
and the Council of Europe, which he stated that the military regime resisted
when it was in power.79 Evren strongly criticized the Turkish Parliament for
failing to ratify death sentences ‘in order to please the Europeans’ and win
their support.80
Özal willingly discussed internal matters with European delegations and
gave information to the officials as well as parliamentarians about Turkish
human rights policy in his trips to the Western capitals.81 But on some issues
he too took a publicly defiant stand when a row arose, for instance over the
proposed bill to increase the power of the police between the EC and
Turkey: ‘The EEC had no right to comment on, react to or oppose a Bill
being debated by the Turkish Parliament’.82 Despite this public fury, the fact
that he discussed these issues with European delegations highlighted the
actual influence of the Europeans, even if their right to intervene was
contested.
As a response to the increasing allegations of torture and deteriorating
prison conditions the government initiated the establishment of a
Parliamentary Committee in early 1985 to investigate those allegations and
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32 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

conditions. The Committee was chaired by Motherland Party deputy B.

Akarcali and assisted by M. Ozarslan, both of whom were also in the
Turkish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly. The coincidence that the
Committee was set up by the deputies who had contacts with the Council of
Europe displays the influences such contacts brought about.83 With a
balanced view one can argue that it was a response to the Western critics of
human rights, an information gathering centre to defend the human rights
record of Turkey against outside critics, as well as a purely internal
reformist move. Understandably, the government did not want to be
embarrassed by the ever increasing international pressure because of
alleged human rights violations. Instead it preferred to go along with the
democratization process which, it was argued, was embarked on with its
own will and option, but which was also a precondition of rapprochement
with Europe.
During this period in which the transition to a civilian regime was
achieved, external criticism focused on allegations of human rights abuses.
The argument was that despite the formal end of the military regime, human
rights violations continued systematically throughout the country, in the
police stations and prisons, particularly the military ones.84 Responding to
criticism, Özal claimed that all torture allegations made in Turkey and
abroad referred to the period of the military regime, and denied the
existence of torture in Turkey during his government.85 But, in fact, during
his first government allegations of torture and maltreatment increased. This
did not necessarily reflect an increase in torture cases. The continuing
democratization of the system and the gradual lifting of martial law, in fact,
enabled newspapers and human rights activists to raise the torture
allegations in Turkey more freely, unlike the previous period when the
allegations and criticism originated mainly from abroad.86
In the spring of 1986 the government took two significant steps to
silence internal and external critics of the regime. First of all, despite
opposition to a general amnesty the government introduced a limited
amnesty for prisoners covering ordinary and political prisoners alike
through an amendment law on the execution of penalties.87 The law reduced
prison terms by more than half, commuted death sentences to 30 years in
prison and life imprisonment to 20 years. With the new law most of the
controversial detainees of the Peace Association and DISK were released.88
In a parallel move in April, a new law was enacted lifting the ban on the
expression of opinion on political matters by former politicians.89 Although
the constitutional ban on engaging in politics remained in effect, this was
the first step to relax domestic political debates. It is hard to argue however
that the change was introduced as a response to European critics. In fact,
internal pressure had been mounting in this direction since the success in the
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local elections of 1984 of the SODEP and TPP, which were not represented
in the Parliament. The continued persecution of former politicians,
especially Ecevit, was also becoming a source of embarrassment for the
civilian government.
We should not forget, however, the international dimension in
explaining Turkish politics. By 1986 the Özal government was desperately
seeking to normalize its relations with Europe and reactivate the association
agreement with the EC after facing disappointments with its American and
Middle Eastern partners. There were expectations that Turkey would be
offered the presidency of the Council of Europe, and that the long sought
EC–Turkey Association Council would meet in the autumn of 1986. We
should also not forget that these two changes, amnesty and the lifting of the
ban on former politicians, were what the European pressure centres were
pushing for, and were in compliance with Turkey’s recent promises to them,
specifically with the friendly settlement in the ECHR at the end of 1985. As
far as the first move was concerned President Evren bitterly confirms that
the prosecution law was changed ‘under the influence of leftist campaigns
in Turkey and in the West which led to the release of many prisoners’.90
In fact, Turkey increased the level of European pressure by claiming
itself as European, and as a country which aspired to be a member of the
European Community. Özal himself recognized that after application for
full membership in the EC external European criticism began to increase.91
Therefore, when it applied for full membership in early 1987 Turkey was
then liable to criticism based on the European standards. As the political
fitness of Turkey to join the club was raised Turkey became more open and
vulnerable to Europe-centred criticism. With the application what Turkey
did, in fact, was to submit the prospect of its aspirations to the goodwill of
the Europeans. Then Turkey was to be judged by the Europeans using
Western political standards. During the proceedings Turkey was in a
defensive position, trying to prove its good intentions by taking some steps
at home that would convince the Europeans about Turkey’s commitment
and determination to develop a Western style political system. As expressed
by the State Minister in charge of EC affairs, Turkey’s decision to apply for
full membership was based on Turkey’s desire ‘to live in a world of peace
and security respectful of democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms
like member states’.92 If its application was based on enduring democracy
and human rights, then Turkey had to conform to these principles in practice
as a precondition set by the EC. This must have been clear to the Turks from
the beginning.93
On 14 April 1987, Premier Özal gave a press conference to explain
Turkey’s full membership application. In the speech his first concern was to
prove that Turkey was politically fit for full membership; a fitness that
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34 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

would be measured with the level of democracy and respect for human
rights. In the first half of the speech Özal explained the steps Turkey had
taken on this course since 1983. He was anxious to show Turkey’s
determination to be regarded as a modern democratic country by referring
to both the ‘confirmation’ of the European organizations and domestic
developments. He gladly and specifically talked about Turkey’s
readmittance to the Parliamentary Assembly and the Turkish presidency of
the Council of Europe. The Premier also mentioned the dropped case in the
European Commission of Human Rights, which has been brought by five
European states, as a vindication of Turkey’s improving human rights
record. He then proudly proceeded to underline his government’s
acceptance of individual petition to the European Commission of Human
Rights as a significant move towards catching up the European standards
that his predecessors were so reluctant to do. On the basis of developments
and arguments Özal concluded that Turkey was politically mature enough to
be a full member of the EC.94
As could be read in Özal’s argument, Turkey was defensive vis-à-vis the
EC, which subjected Turkish membership to the precondition of its political
fitness. The way in which Özal presented his case showed Turkey’s
dependency on the Community’s understanding of the Turkish political
system, which he anxiously legitimated by reference to other European
organizations.95 It was also a very welcome coincidence that Turkey was in
the Presidency of the Council of Europe when it lodged its application to the
EC. This attitude also signalled the Özal government’s readiness to
collaborate with the Community to take other political measures to improve
Turkey’s image in and acceptance by the West. A first sign of this, which
seems more than a coincidence, was the permission given to an Amnesty
International team on the same day to study prison conditions in Adana.96
The government was aware of the restraint put on domestic politics by
its application to join the Community. On the one hand the new European
dimension in Turkish politics necessitated a commitment by the government
to protect and promote human rights and function as a complete democracy,
not as a Turkish version of it. On the other, it increased the interest of
Western public opinion in Turkish domestic politics and enabled each
member country to have some sort of say on Turkish politics, making the
illegitimacy of external interference obsolete. It may not be interference in
terms of using force, but Turkey was embarking on a process which
required the condition of a country seeking to join a club to be checked. If
not interference, the membership application provided the EC with political
and legal leverage and a framework of influence which the Community was
able to exert on Turkey. The constraining effect of Turkey’s Community bid
with regard to internal politics was also observed by President Evren who
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helplessly and painfully wrote in his memoirs, criticizing human rights

activists, that ‘if we seek to join the European Community what can we do
but put up with them’.97
Steinbach argues too that the Özal government became concerned about
matching Western standards in political changes as it contemplated the
decision to go for full membership of the EC.98 A striking example of this
was the Turkish government’s acceptance of individual petition to the
European Commission of Human Rights at the end of January 1987, two
months before Turkey’s official application to join the EC. This was a
decisive gesture by the government to show that it was genuinely committed
to improving its human rights record and to liberalizing the country in
parallel with European standards. Turkish government spokesman H. C.
Guzel stated, after the government’s acceptance of the right of individuals
to apply to the ECHR, that this decision would contribute to Turkey’s
relations with Europe.99 It was certainly greeted with support and pleasure
in the West.100
On the decision of the government, Özal denied the existence of any
domestic and international pressure, even any suggestion in this direction.101
In fact this did not quite fit the facts. Whether described as pressure or
suggestion, there was a European Parliament resolution calling on the
Turkish government to accept the right of individual appeal to the ECHR.102
It may not have been a direct response to this resolution, but the decision
was, to a large extent, prompted by the need to prepare the country
internally and internationally for the bid to join the EC. The certain thing
was that Turkey had traditionally been very sceptical about the
‘international forums’ and avoided taking vital issues to these multilateral
arenas, be it the United Nations, the International Court of Justice or the
ECHR. The country had also been very sensitive about the external concern
over its internal affairs which was always regarded as unwarranted
interference. Given this deep-rooted tradition, the acceptance of individual
petition was therefore a remarkable change which overcame traditional
scepticism about ‘the international’, despite some arguments that the
reservations that Turkey put made the whole thing dysfunctional. Therefore,
an explanation of the change of mind in the government cannot be divorced
from its bid for the EC. It was part and parcel of a liberalization programme
which emerged with the intensification of the European dimension in
Turkish politics. Thus, Premier Özal could immediately and proudly refer to
his government’s decision when he talked about the prospect of Turkish
membership in the EC.103
As a parallel move, just two weeks after lodging its membership
application there were two other steps in the same direction. Firstly, the day
after Turkey officially applied for full membership a law abolishing the
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36 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

long-criticized internal exile was passed.104 Secondly, Premier Özal

announced on 28 April 1987 that his party would submit a draft
constitutional amendment to lift the ban on former political leaders.105 A
constitutional change which would lift the ban had been discussed for some
time in Turkey. President Evren and the military were initially opposed to
such a change which was being pressed for by both domestic and European
actors.106 A referendum was held on 6 September 1987 which resulted in the
lifting of the provisional Article 4 of the Constitution which banned former
political leaders from active politics. The referendum had not only national
but international significance as well. In the end it was also another gesture
to the Europeans about Turkey’s commitment to democracy and civil and
political rights. It showed Turkey’s readiness to go along with internal
liberalization with a view to its quest to enter the Community. Thus, in the
same month when the Turkish Minister responsible for EC affairs met with
the President of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Twelve, Belgium’s
Tindemans, he argued that the EC should ‘no longer’ criticize the Turkish
regime for being undemocratic, and relations between the two sides should
‘now’ be completely normalized.107 At that time, it was expected and
justifiably argued by Hale that the result of the referendum would improve
‘the modest chance of success of Turkey’s recent application for
membership of the EC’.108 It was also commented that Özal ‘could expect to
strengthen ‘ Turkey’s bid for full membership in the EC by taking the step
to abolish the constitutional ban on the former politicians.109
The government was rather careful not to cause domestic controversies
that could harm the democratic credentials of the regime when yet another
debate erupted in April 1987 about the rising power of the ‘reactionary
forces’, that is, the Islamists. A headscarf ban was proposed by the secular
Kemalists for female university students, but over the issue Özal took a
different stand from the President who had warned in the new year
message against an Islamic revival. Özal linked the headscarf issue to EC
membership and said, ‘At a time when Turkey, as a democratic country,
has applied for full membership in the EC, blowing the issue of what
people should wear out of all proportion disturbs me very much’.110 This
statement reveals the importance of the European dimension in
strengthening Turkish democracy against the state’s elites who had
authoritarian leanings, and Özal’s skilful and well-concealed usage of it in
his disagreements with President Evren, the top representative of those
elites. Özal’s statement also reveals how important Turkey’s EC bid
was driving its liberalization process. It at least shows that the political
elites were very much concerned and also restrained by the fact that they
should prepare the country politically in order to enhance Turkey’s chance
in the Community.
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Ozbudun argues that criticisms of the European Community, the Council

of Europe and individual Western European governments with regard to
human rights were not well received, but on the contrary created
unfavourable reactions from the country and the government.111 At a
discursive and public level this might well be right; the government and
public were rather furious about some open criticism, especially on the
Kurdish and Armenian issues, which was rejected as unwarranted
interference. But it is impossible to deny the constructive and stimulating
effect of European concern over the conditions of democracy and human
rights in the process of Turkey’s political development in the post-1983
period. As explained, the Turkish government responded positively to
European concerns and criticism which were in line with its professed
direction towards the West culturally and politically. Furthermore, Turkish
concern to maintain its Western linkages was at the centre of European
influence. Especially after contemplating joining the European Community
in 1986 the government became much more responsive to the issues raised
by the Community and the member states. Everybody was aware that the
success of the Turkish application depended on Turkey’s performance in the
field of civil and political rights and human rights policy and practice as
well as the performance and strength of the Turkish economy. Therefore,
bearing in mind that unless a Western style democracy was fully operational
and human rights were effectively protected and promoted, Turkey’s chance
for full membership of the EC was out of the question, the Özal government
speeded up the liberalization of the political system though with a limited
yet significant program.

NOTES

1. For the transition to civilian government see I.D. Dagi, ‘Democratic Transition in Turkey:
The Impact of European Diplomacy’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.32, No.2 (1996),
pp.124–41; F. Ahmad, ‘The Transition to Democracy in Turkey’, Third World Quarterly,
Vol.7 (April 1985).
2. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (hereafter Keesing’s), June 1984, p.32925; and Ahmad,
‘The Transition’, pp.213–14.
3. For example see K. Mackenzie, Turkey in Transition: The West’s Neglected Ally (London:
Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1984), p.15; and Keesing’s, Dec. 1983,
p.32581.
4. See Hukumet Programi 1983 (Government Programme) (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi),
p.56; T. Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey (K. Rustem & Brothers, 1991),
pp.312–15.
5. Hukumet Programi 1983, p.53.
6. Basbakan Turgut Özal’in Basin Toplatilari, 7 Ocak 1984–30 Kasim 1987, 15 Dec. 1984,
p.22.
7. For some arguments raised by the European Parliamentarians, see Official Journal of the
European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament, 10 Dec. 1986, Nos.2–346,
pp.149–59; and Mackenzie, Turkey in Transition, p.7.
8. See E. Mortimer in The Times, 26 July 1985.
9. The statement of the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve on human rights, Bulletin of the
European Communities (hereafter Bulletin EC), 7/8, 1986, point 2.4.4.
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38 MI D D L E E A S T E R N S T U D I E S

10. Ibid.
11. Bulletin EC, Jan. 1984, p.48; and Keesing’s, July 1984, p.32986.
12. See Resolution on election in Turkey, Official Journal of the European Communities:
Information and Notices (hereafter Official Journal EC), NoC 307/79, 14 Nov. 1983.
13. Thirty Second Review of the Council’s Work 1984 (General Secretariat of the Council of the
EC, Brussels, 1985), p.164.
14. Bulletin EC, Dec. 1984, p.97.
15. Resolution, on respect for human rights in Turkey, Official Journal EC, No.C 172/128, 24
April 1984; and Official Journal EC, NoC 172/129.
16. Official Journal EC, NoC 172/128, 24 April 1984.
17. See ibid.
18. Resolution on death sentences in Turkey, Official Journal EC, No C 300/35, 11 Oct. 1984.
After these executions the Turkish Parliament did not ratify any death sentence.
19. The subject of the resolution was Mahmut Dikerdem who was a former ambassador and
President of Turkish Peace Association; see resolution on the release of Mr Dikerdem,
Official Journal EC, NoC 300/36, 11 Oct. 1984.
20. Survey of the Main Activities of the European Parliament, July 1985–June 1986 (Directorate
General for Research, 1986), p.27.
21. See Resolution ‘on the ruthless violation of human rights and the bloody reign of terror in
Turkey’, Official Journal EC, No C 122/120, 18 April 1985.
22. Resolution on those convicted at the trial of members of the Turkish Peace Committee,
Official Journal EC, No C 175/222, 13 June 1985.
23. The Times, 10 June 1985.
24. European Parliament Working Documents, Document A 2–117/85, 9 Oct. 1985, Report of
Political Affairs Committee On the Human Rights situation in Turkey, Rapporteur R. Balfe,
p.25.
25. Resolution on the human rights situation in Turkey, Official Journal EC, No C 343/60, 23
Oct. 1985; for the Parliamentary debate before the voting see Debates of the European
Parliament No.2–331/47–63.
26. See Debates of the European Parliament, No.2–331/47–63.
27. S. Gunver, Kizgin Dam Uzerinde Diplomasi:Avrupali olabilmenin Bedeli (Istanbul: Milliyet
Yay, 1989), p.303.
28. Official Journal EC, NoC 343/60, 23 Oct. 1985.
29. See Briefing, 29 Dec. 1986, p.21; and Keesing’s July 1986, pp.34500 and 34496. The Turkish
Grand National Assembly voted for a partial amnesty bill on 11 March 1986 and adopted
another bill in April 1986 which lifted the ban on the expression of opinion on domestic and
foreign policy by former politicians.
30. See Debates of the European Parliament, No.2, 346/129–139, 10 Dec. 1986.
31. Keesing’s, July 1986, p.34500; The Times, 18 Feb. 1986.
32. Bulletin EC, June 1986, p.87; Keesing’s, July 1986, p.34500.
33. Debates of the European Parliament, No.2, 346/132, 10 Dec. 1986; also see The Times, 17
Sept. 1986.
34. Bulletin EC, Sept. 1986, pp.69–70.
35. G. Howe’s statement in The Times, 17 Sept. 1986.
36. Turkey received 1in 1986 10 million ECU as special aid which was approved in 1980 and
later delayed. Another 20 million ECU was transfered from the contributions of Denmark,
Ireland and Britain to the Second EC-Turkey Financial Protocol, see Thirty Fourth Review
of the Council’s Work 1986 (General Sec. of EC, Brussels, 1987), p.126; Twentieth General
Report on the Activities of the European Commission 1986 (Brussels, 1987), p.318.
37. Resolution on relations between the EEC and Turkey, Official Journal EC, No C 7/109–111,
Dec. 1986.
38. See Survey of the Main Activities of the European Parliament, July 1987–June 1988
(Directorate General for Research, 1988), p.3
39. See Debates of the European Parliament, No.2–346/155, 10 Dec. 1986.
40. See Briefing, 29 Dec. 1986, p.13; The Times, 8 Dec. 1986. E. Noel, the Secretary General of
the European Community, said that the EC would give a negative answer to Turkey’s
application in the near future. As he expressed, Turkey was expected to establish a full
democratic system as understood by the West before an accession: Foreign Broadcast
Information Service: Western Europe (hereafter FBIS:WE) 21 Jan. 1987, T.4. On the other
hand, Cheysson, a member of the Commission, highlighted Turkey’s economic inadequacies
for membership, see Briefing, 30 Dec. 1985.
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41. See, for example, F. Armaoglu, Tercuman, 20 Jan. 1987, p.4 in FBIS: WE, 28 Jan. 1987; and
M.A. Birand, Türkey’nin Ortak Pazar Macerasi (Ankera: Bilgi, 1985) p.439.
42. As stated by the Minister of State Ali Bozer in March 1986, Keesing’s, May 1987, p.35137.
43. Briefing, 29 Dec. 1986, p.13.
44. The Times, 19 Feb. 1986; and Basbakan Özal’in Konusma, Mesaj, Beyanat ve Mulakatlari,
13 Dec. 1985–12 Dec. 1986 (Ankara: Basbakanlik, 1986), 18 Feb. 1986, p.261.
45. Quoted in The Times, 15 April 1987.
46. See Özal’s statements in Turkish Review (1987), pp.17–18; and FBIS: WE, 18 March 1877,
T.2–4.
47. Basbakan Özal’in Basin Toplantilari, 15 Dec. 1984, p.22.
48. Özal, Turkish Review (1986), p.135; See also T. Özal, Turkey in Europe, pp.312–15.
49. T. Özal, ‘Turkey in the Southern Flank’, Brassey’s Defence Yearbook (1989), p.6.
50. U. Steinbach, ‘Turkey’s Third Republic’, Aussenpolitik, Vol.39, No.3 (1988), p.248.
51. Özal speaking in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, PACE, Official
Report, 27 Sept. 1989, p.503.
52. See A. Bozer, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy in the Changing World’, Mediterranean Quarterly,
Vol.1, No.3 (1990), pp.20–2.
53. See the interview with Steinbach in H.Cemal, Özal Hikayesi (Ankara: Bilgi, 1989), p.181;
See Barlas, Turgut Özal’in Anilari (Istanbul: Sabah Kitaplari, 1994), pp.115–35 for Özal’s
understanding of foreign affairs.
54. Turkey: Country Report, p.9; for an analysis of Turkish trade with the Middle East, which
drew the conclusion that Turkish trade with the Middle East was volatile, see H. Akder,
‘Turkey’s Export Expansion in the Middle East, 1980–1985’, The Middle East Journal,
Vol.41, No.4 (1987).
55. See Basbakan Özal’in Basin Toplantilari, 4 Dec. 1985.
56. Briefing, 29 Dec. 1986, p.19. Turkey obviously did not get from the US what it wanted. What
it got was a memorandum of understanding signed in July 1987 aimed at increasing Turkish
textile product exports to the US, see Keesing’s, May 1987, p.35136.
57. Bulletin EC, April 1987, p.11; and Keesing’s, May 1987, p.35137.
58. Basbakan Özal’in Basin Toplantilari, 14 April 1987, pp.3–6.
59. Thirty-Fifth Review of the Council’s Work, 1 Jan.–31 Dec. 1987 (General Sec. of the Council
of the EC, Brussels, 1988), pp.127–8; The Times, 28 April 1987.
60. Resolution on a political solution to the Armenian question, Official Journal EC, No
C190/119, 18 June 1987.
61. FBIS: WE, 24 June 1987. The European Parliament was accused of encouraging Armenian
and Kurdish terrorist activities by the President and the Defence Minister, see The Times, 22
June and 23 June 1987.
62. FBIS: WE, 17 Nov. 1987. The Communist leaders Kutlu and Sargin were arrested on arrival.
During interrogations they claimed that they were continously tortured. For their testimony
before the court, see Kutlu-Sargin Sorgu, The Interrogation (Istanbul: Amac, 1988), pp.203,
230–43.
63. See FBIS: WE, 9 Nov. 1987, p.23 for the view of the Communist leaders.
64. See ibid. for the delegation accompanied Kutlu and Sargin.
65. Resolution on the arbitrary arrests in Turkey on 16 Nov. 1987, Official Journal EC, No
C345/133, 19 Nov. 1987.
66. See the editorial of daily Milliyet, 28 Oct. 1987, in FBIS: WE, 5 Nov. 1987, p.22.
67. See Briefing 4 Jan. 1988, pp.4–5.
68. Total financial aid amounted 10 million ECU, see Thirty-fifth Review of the Council’s work,
1 Jan.–31 Dec. 1987 (Gen. Sec. of The Council of the EC, Brussels, 1988), p.127.
69. See Birand, Türkiy’nin Ortak Pazar Macerasi, p.439.
70. Basbakan Özal’in Basin Toplantilari, 16 Sept. 1985, p.16.
71. See the statement of the Foreign Ministers of the twelve, Bulletin EC, 7/8–1986, No.2.4.4.
72. Speeches of Giolitti and Sutherland, members of the Commission, before the European
Parliament, see respectively Debates of the European Parliament, 2–317/151, 11 Oct. 1984;
and No.2–331/61, 22 Oct. 1985.
73. PACE, Official Report, 27 Sept. 1989, p.503, speech to the Assembly.
74. Özal, speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Turkish Review (1986), p.134.
75. C. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy (London: Eothen, 1990), p.127.
76. According to Amnesty International figures between 1985 till mid 1986 the courts passed
179 death sentences, Keesing’s, July 1986. p.34500.
77. See Kenan Evren’in Anilari (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1991), Vol.5, p.135.
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78. Resolution 840 (1985), Texts Adopted by the Assembly. Rapporteur of Legal Affairs
Committee Stoffelen also denounced the executions and urged the Turkish government
stop approving other death sentences, See PACE, Official Report, 22–26 April 1985, p.61.
79. See quotation from Evren’s speech he made while visiting West Germany in 1988, in M.S.
Gemalmaz, The Institutionalization Process of the ‘Turkish Type of Democracy’: A
Politico-Juridical Analysis of Human Rights (Istanbul: Amac, 1989), p.51.
80. ‘Kenan Evren’in Anilari’, serial in daily Milliyet, 9 Nov. 1990, p.25.
81. See, for instance his speech to British MPs, The Times, 20 Feb. 1986.
82. The Times, 10 June 1985.
83. PACE greeted the establisment and work of the Parliamentary Committee.
84. Amnesty International continuously claimed that torture remained systematic and widespread
in Turkey, Turkey: Testimony on Torture (London: Amnesty International, 1985).
85. See Özal’s interview in Der Spiegel, 16 March 1987, p.165, as printed in FBIS: WE, 18
March 1987, T.2–4.
86. The prosecution of torturers was carried on during this period, between May 1985 and May
1986 nearly 30 policemen were convicted for their part in torture cases, Keesing’s, July
1986: p.34500. A Foreign Ministry spokesman gave the number convicted for torturing
from 1980 to mid-1985 as 105, see The Times, 26 July 1985.
87. Keesing’s, July 1986, p.34500. See Özal’s explanation of the change in the law on the
execution of penalties, in Basbakan Özal’in Konusma, Mesaj, Beyanat ve Mulakatlari,
1985–1986 (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi) 7 Feb. 1986, p.232; and ibid. 11 Feb. 1986,
pp.239–40.
88. Evren believed that the Europeans were giving Turkey a hard time because of these trials,
Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anilari, Vol.5. p.59.
89. Keesing’s, July 1986, p.34496.
90. Evren, Kenan Evren’in Anilari, Vol.5, p.383. He was strongly against a general amnesty,
ibid., pp.88, 96.
91. See Özal’s speech published in, Türk Demokrasi Vakfi Bulteni, p.15.
92. FBIS: WE, 25 March 1987, T.2.
93. See editorial of Milliyet for a reminder of this, 28 Oct. 1987, in FBIS: WE, 5 Nov. 1987, p.22.
94. See Basbakan Özal’in Basin Toplantilari, 14 April 1987, pp.3–6. In the second half of the
speech Özal argued for the economic fitness of Turkey to enter the EC.
95. Özal, in September 1987 again directly said that the acceptance of his ruling Motherland
Party as a member of the International Democratic Union showed that there was no human
rights problem in Turkey, see FBIS: WE, 25 Sept. 1987, p.14.
96. FBIS: WE, 15 April 1987, t.6.
97. Evren, kenan Evren’in Anilari., Vol.5, p.62.
98. Steinbach, ‘Turkey Third Republic’, p.248.
99. FBIS: WE, 28 Jan. 1987, p.5.
100. See, for instance, the speech of the President of the Council of Europe, in PACE, Official
Report, 18th Session, 27 Sept. 1989.
101. Özal’in Basin Toplantilari, 12 Sept. 1987, pp.22–3.
102. See Official Journal EC, No C343/62, 23 Oct. 1985.
103. Özal said in an interview with Der Spiegel, on 16 March 1987, ‘it can only be helpful for our
democracy if we were to become a Community member. By the way my government only
recently permitted the Turks to turn to the ECHR’, in FBIS: WE, 18 March 1987, T.2–4.
104. Gemalmaz, The institutionalization Process, p.24.
105. Keesing’s, May 1987, p.35131.
106. President Evren explains that he was considering lifting the ban in mid-1986 but after
consulting his military collegues, he says, he abandoned this idea; see Cemal, Özal
Hikayesi, pp.205–21, for a journalistic story of the debate.
107. The meeting between Bozer and Tindemans took place at the end of September, see FBIS:
WE, 2 Oct. 1987.
108. See The Times, 9 Sept. 1987.
109. A. Finkel and W. Hale, ‘Politics and Procedure in the 1987 Turkish General Election’, in
A. Finkel and N. Sirman (eds.), Turkish State, Turkish Society (London: Routledge, 1990),
p.108.
110. FBIS: WE, 20 April 1987.
111. E. Ozbudun, ‘Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions
and Reequilibrations’, in E. Ozbudun (ed.), Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey (Ankara:
Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), p.45.

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