XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki 2006

Session : 106

Kayhan Orbay
University of Vienna

Ottoman Central Administration and War Finance, Late Seventeenth Century

The course of the 16th and 17th centuries, which is recently called the “transformation

period” in the Ottoman historiography, was a crucial period of changes, crises and social

turmoil.1 The Ottoman fiscal system witnessed significant changes in the same period. The

Ottoman finance department experienced structural reorganization, fiscal practices and the

taxation system underwent several changes.2 Some changes in the fiscal sphere were

fundamental and long lasting whereas some financial measures were rather temporary and

developed as relatively prompt respond to meet urgent fiscal needs. To mention a few of these

changes during the 17th century, the taxation burden laid on large masses of the population

increased as some customary and extraordinary taxes were combined and regularly levied, as

well as new taxes were assessed. New methods supplying cash to the treasury for its

immediate needs were largely applied in tax collection. These changes and several other fiscal

arrangements of the 17th century such as debasements and tax reforms were mainly connected

with the crucial matter of war finance. However, the central administration was in desperate

1
It has been a commonly held argument in the contemporary historiography that the Ottoman Empire passed
through a period of transformation, and experienced an economic and fiscal crisis, as well as social disturbances
in the late sixteenth century and in the seventeenth century. For the general account of and major developments
in this period see Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman Decline and Its Effects Upon the Reaya”, in The Ottoman Empire:
Conquest, Organization, and Economy, London, Variorum Reprints, 1978, XIII, 338-354; Idem, “Military and
Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700”, in Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History,
London, Variorum Reprints, 1985; Mustafa Akdağ, Türkiyenin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi 2 (1453-1559),
İstanbul, Cem Yayınevi, 1995.
2
İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”; Ahmet Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı
Maliyesi, İstanbul, Dergah Yayınları, 1985; Linda Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy; Tax Collection and
Finance Administration in the Otoman Empire 1560-1660, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1996; Idem, “Ottoman Fiscal
Administration: Decline or Adaptation?”, The Journal of European Economic History, 26/1, Spring, 1997.
need of money under the pressure of growing military expenditures and compelled to resort to

some other tools for financing warfare as well.

The fiscal needs of the Empire and the ensuing fiscal transformation was closely related

to the developments in the military field in the 16th and 17th centuries. Growing size of the

standing army in these centuries expanded the salary payments, and put an increasing pressure

on the treasury together with the long wars on several fronts. Increasing military expenditures

eventually led to large budget deficits thus asked for additional financial measures. It is

striking that beside the well-known and most-resorted measures to increase revenues such as

extra taxation and borrowing, the fisc looked at the resources held by the charitable

foundations (waqfs) for its finance, more precisely for war finance. Although many waqfs

were regularly supporting the central treasuries through transfers from their budget surpluses,

drawing large sums directly from the waqf revenues was a completely new option for state

finance which was indeed applied once or perhaps twice. This particular case which depicts

the state treasury in desperate need for war finance and supposes further implications for the

waqf system is given a particular emphasis in the present study.

Waqf Funds for the Financing of Wars after the Vienna Defeat

When the Ottoman central administration attempted to draw financial resources for its

warfare from the waqfs at the end of the 17th century, the glorious victories of the Empire had

already belonged to past days. For more than a century, the Empire had waged long and

exhaustive wars on several fronts against strong armies of Iran, Venice, the Habsburgs and

Poland. The military campaigns in the 17th century were not bringing large profits through

territorial expansion as before, on the contrary they resulted in large budget deficits, and with

territorial losses at the end of the century, the central treasury lost revenue sources as well.
 The waqfs, in particular the imperial waqfs the largest economic and social institutions

in the Ottoman Empire, were already contributing to the central treasury and hence to the

campaign budgets through regular deliveries from their budget surpluses. However, after the

Ottoman defeat at Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire had to fight against the armies of the

Sacred Alliance of the Habsburgs, Venice and Poland in the following years. As the central

budget went into fiscal straits due to this costly warfare, it sought for more funding from the

foundations. In 1688, the Ottomans lost Belgrade, a large town in a highly strategic location

for maintaining sovereignty over the Balkans. The army was being prepared for the recovery

of Belgrade in spite of the drained treasury. In the year 1689, and then probably again in

1693-94, the central administration required the delivery of payments for six months’ salary

of the waqfs’ employees. The reason for this was that the treasury fell into difficulty due to

the military campaign.

“Military Revolution” in and against the Ottoman Army

The changes taking place in the Ottoman Empire’s fiscal administration and practices

during the 16th and 17th centuries were associated with the changes and needs in the military

sphere and all these changes were usually defined as “military and fiscal transformation” in

Ottoman historiography.3 The military transformation in the Ottoman Empire was stimulated

and forced by the contemporary military developments in the West. It has been widely

recognized in historiography that the European warfare experienced a “military revolution” in

the 16th and 17th centuries.4 The “military revolution” is defined –among others- with

3
İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”.
4
For the “military revolution” discussion in historiography see Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolution in
History and Historiography”, in The Military Revolution Debate, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, Westview Press, 1995,
1-10. Also see Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660, in The Military Revolution Debate, ed.
Clifford J. Rogers, Westview Press, 1995, 13-35; Geoffey Parker, The Military Revolution, Military Innovation
and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, Cambridge University Press, 1988; The term ‘revolution’ itself is
reference to the increasing military effectiveness of the firearms and consequent changes in

army composition and battle tactics accompanied by the spreading use of handguns and field

artillery. Engineering in new fortification designs called “trace italienne” was developed

against new threats of the battlefield with siege cannons. The growing size of the armies is

also argued as one of the fundamental developments in the “military revolution” conception.

With regard to the military field, the “military revolution” is supposed to result in

Western military superiority over the Ottomans first halting their advance in Europe and then

overcoming them. In the fiscal sphere, the “military revolution” brought about the overall

increase in warfare budgets with the bigger standing armies demanding larger salary

payments, costly fortifications to build, and the increasing costs of logistics coming with the

procurement, maintenance and deployment of diversified ordnance, as well as with the

reforms in administrative apparatus to support the new warfare.

Mentioning briefly the military developments in the Ottoman Empire and its reaction to

the European “military revolution”, it seems that the number of soldiers in the central

Ottoman army had already begun to increase towards the end of the 16th century.5 In addition,

the Ottoman army recruited mercenary troops equipped with firearms in the 17th century. In a

similar way to the developments in the Western armies, handguns diffused and field artillery

deployed on a large extent.6 Recent research reveals that the Ottoman army was not inferior to

disputable as a term accurately defining the developments against the fact that changes and innovations giving
way to military transformation and a new warfare took place in a process. The period which the “military
revolution” is ascribed to is also controversial, see Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution, 1560-1660’ – A
Myth?”, in The Military Revolution Debate, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, Westview Press, 1995, 37-54; Jeremy Black,
“A Military Revollution? A 1660-1792 Perspective”, in The Military Revolution Debate, ed. Clifford J. Rogers,
Westview Press, 1995, 95-114.
5
For the “military revolution” discussion in the context of Ottoman history, as well as for its military and fiscal
consequences see see John F. Guilmartin, “The Military Revolution: Origins and First Tests Abroad, in The
Military Revolution Debate, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, Westview Press, 1995, 299-333; Rhoads Murphy, Ottoman
Warfare, 1500-1700, London, UCL Press, 1999; Jonathan Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline’: Military
Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries”, Journal of World History,
Vol. 10, No. 1, 1999; Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002; Gabor Agoston, Guns for
the Sultan; Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire, Cambridge University Press,
2005.
6
Murphy, Ottoman Warfare; Virginia Aksan, “Ottoman War and Warfare 1453-1812”, in War in the Early
Modern World, ed. Jeremy Black, UCL Press, 1999, 147-175; Agoston, Guns for the Sultan. Also see Halil
its counterparts and even superior in some aspects. But it was the changing international

politics and balance of power that forced the Ottomans to engage long and multi-front wars.7

At the same time, the Ottoman Empire had to cope with the financial pressure of the increased

costs of new warfare. As the cost of warfare went up due both to the larger standing army and

the increasing ordnance and provisioning costs, and as the Empire engaged in long wars

fought on two fronts against Iran and the Habsburgs in the late 16th century, the central

treasury’s need for ready cash had increased.8

Fiscal Deterioration in the 17th Century

In addition to the rising military expenditures due to the frequent military campaigns

and long wars, during the 17th century, the size of the waged army further grew, almost

doubling the wage payments between the mid-16th and mid-17th centuries, and making the

salary payments for military personnel a considerable part of the central budget. This put an

additional pressure on the state budget. The army experienced another expansion between

1683 and 1699 increasing the salary payments further.9 In this period, the salary payments for

Inalcık, “The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East”, in The Ottoman Empire:
Conquest, Organization, and Economy, London, Variorum Reprints, 1978, XIV, 196-201; R. C. Jennings,
“Firearms, Bandits, and Gun-Control: some evidence on Ottoman policy towards firearms in the possession of
reaya, from judicial records of Kayseri, 1600-1627”, Archivum Ottomanicum, VI, 1980, 339-358.
7
Murphy, Ottoman Warfare; Agoston, Guns for the Sultan.
8
Caroline Finkel, The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606,
Wien, VWGÖ, 1988, Beihefte zur Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes; Caroline Finkel, “The
Cost of Ottoman Warfare and Defence”, Byzantinische Forschungen, XVI, 1991, 91-103; Darling, Revenue-
Raising and Legitimacy; Murphy, Ottoman Warfare; Agoston, Guns for the Sultan. In the same period, the
Ottoman naval fleet experienced an expansion. Logistics required large investment into production facilities,
transportation means, organizational structure, storing etc. however, some researchers argue that fire arm
technology contributed marginally to the total cost of warfare. Instead, the size of the waged-army was the major
determinant of the costs, I. A. A. Thompson, “Money, Money, and Yet More Money!” Finance, Fiscal-State, and
the Military Revolution: Spain 1500-1650”, in The Military Revolution Debate, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, Westview
Press, 1995, 273-298.
9
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 189.
the military amounted to 50-60% of the central budget and even to 80% in the campaign

years.10

In the 1690s, together with warfare against the Sacred Alliance, the central treasury

experienced a series of severe budget deficits in the campaign years.11 The Outer Treasury

drew large sums frequently from the Inner Treasury, the private treasury of the Sultan himself

in these years.12 The budget deficit of the years 1687-88 and 1690-91 were particularly large

and many extraordinary financial arrangements coincided with the financial troubles of these

years. 13

As the Ottoman Empire experienced an inflationary period parallel to the European

“price revolution of the 16th century”, but especially following the debasement of 1585, the

prices, pushing up the costs of employing, equipping and provisioning an army had steeply

risen at the end of the 16th century.14 Although prices fluctuated up and down throughout most

of the 17th century, they were more than twice as high as before and tending to increase in the

last three decades of the century.15 The price risings of the late 16th century worsened the

budget balance as the inflation pushed up the expenditures while the revenues from taxation

were relatively rigid to keep pace with the price rises.

Besides, large rebel armies were roaming through Anatolia plundering the villages and

even attacking towns in the late 16th and in the first half of the 17th century. The widespread

and large-scale revolts disrupted the revenue collection and despoiled the tax base, thus they

10
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 183-193, 209f.
11
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi; Murphy, Ottoman Warfare.
12
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 37.
13
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 15f, 74-80.
14
Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History
of the Near East”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1975, 6, 3-28; Cf. Haim Gerber, “The Monetary
System of the Ottoman Empire”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. XXV, Part III,
1982, 308-324, and Holm Sundhaussen, “Die Preisrevolution im Osmanischen Reich wahrend der zweiten
Halfte des 16. Jahrhunderts”, Südost-Forschungen, 1983, 42, 169-181; Şevket Pamuk, “The Price Revolution in
the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33, 2001, 69-89; Idem,
“Prices in the Ottoman Empire, 1469-1914”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36, 2004, 451-68.
15
Şevket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000;
Idem, Istanbul ve Diğer Kentlerde 500 Yıllık Fiyatlar ve Ücretler, 1469-1998, Ankara, Devlet Istatistik
Enstitüsü, 2000.
further exacerbated the fiscal balance.16 The uprisings were followed by depopulation and

then a population decline which is defined to the extent of “demographic catastrophe” by

some historians.17 The demographic decline accompanied by the stagnating rural and town

economy and by the commercial losses due to the changing international trade routes futher

reduced the revenue sources of the central treasury.

In the military sphere, as a result of the aforementioned developments in military

technology, the timariots, namely the provincial cavalry troops using traditional arms

gradually lost their previous importance against the new military troops equipped with

firearms. The timar system was a prebendal system in which the timariots were awarded

certain tax revenues in return for military service. Therefore its gradual disappearance brought

about a change in revenue collection. The revenue sources in the timar system were allocated

according to the land surveying system (tahrîr). Even long before the timar system

disappeared, the land surveying ceased to be performed and was replaced by the “avarız”

surveys in the late 16th century. The tax farming system (iltizâm) was applied extensively in

tax collection to meet the state’s demand for ready cash in the 17th century.18 In this system,

the collection of state revenues was farmed out under a contract for a cash-sum. The life-time

renting system (mâlikâne), which supplied cash revenue to the state, was also applied first

16
Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy. For the rebel movements and their effects on economy and society
see Çağatay Uluçay M., XVII. Asırda Saruhan’da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri, İstanbul, Manisa Halkevi
Yayınlarından Sayı: XI, 1944; İnalcık, “The Ottoman Decline and Its Effects”; Idem, “Military and Fiscal
Transformation”; William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020 / 1591-1611, Berlin, Klaus
Schwarz, 1983; Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, New York, Cornell University Press, 1994; Mustafa
Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası, Celali İsyanları, İstanbul, Cem Yayınevi, 1995.
17
For the depopulation and population decline in Anatolia in the 17th century see Ronald C. Jennings, “Urban
Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon, and
Erzurum”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, VII, 1976, 21-57; Bruce McGowan, Economic Life in
the Ottoman Europe; Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1981; Mehmet Öz, XV.-XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı, Ankara, Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1999; Mehmet Ali
Ünal, XVI. Yüzyılda Çemişgezek Sancağı, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999; Oktay Özel, “Population Changes
in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The “Demographic Crisis” Reconsidered”,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36, 2004, 181-205; Idem, “State, Banditry and Economy: On the
Financial Impact of the Celali Movement in Ottoman Anatolia”, in The Proceedings of the IXth Congress of
Economic and Social History of Turkey, Dubrovnik 20-23 August 2001, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu,
forthcoming.
18
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi; Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy;
İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation”, pp. 322-327, 333f.
from the last years of the 17th century onwards.19 With the introduction of new methods of tax

assessment and collection, and as will be seen later, along with the new impositions and

changing weights of various taxes in the central budget, the fiscal administration experienced

a reorganization. The finance department grew and some bureaus underwent an expansion and

diversification as well.20

Fiscal Measures to Increase Revenues

To review briefly, long and costly wars on several theaters in the late 16th and 17th

centuries and the rising military expenses to maintain a larger standing army brought about

fiscal difficulties which were exacerbated as the budget imbalance grew with the increasing

expenditures in the overall budget due to the inflationary period of the late 16th and late 17th

centuries. As the treasury began to experience constant fiscal straits and faced budget deficits,

the government was compelled to re-organize its financial system to find additional

revenues.21

In search for additional cash resources for the treasury, the Ottoman central

administration resorted to a variety of means ranging from coining copper money to the new

methods in tax collection that were mentioned above.22 The Ottoman Empire applied an

expansive monetary policy through debasements and coinage in the years of fiscal difficulty.

After a long period of monetary stability, the central government debased the akça (silver

19
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi; İnalcık, “The Ottoman Decline and Its Effects”,
pp. 341, 349; idem, “Çiftliklerin Doğuşu: Devlet, Toprak Sahipleri ve Kiracılar”, in Osmanlı Toprak Mülkiyeti
ve Ticari Tarım, eds. Ç. Keyder, F. Tabak, İstanbul, Tarih Yurt Vakfı, 1998, pp. 22-24; Akdag, Türkiyenin
İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi, pp. 294, 317; Bruce McGowan, “The Study of Land and Agriculture in the Ottoman
Provinces within the Context of an Expanding World Economy in the 17th and 18th Centuries”, International
Journal of Turkish Studies, 1981, vol. 2, no. 1, 57-63.
20
Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy.
21
Akdağ, Türkiyenin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi, pp. 281, 287; Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman State: Economy and
Society, 1300-1600”, in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, eds. Halil İnalcık
with Donald Quataert, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 11-409, p. 24.
22
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, pp. 279-82; Yavuz Cezar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde
Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi, Alan Yayıncılık, 1986.
coin) in the late 16th century in order to create additional income for the treasury which was

experiencing fiscal difficulties.23 The decades following this debasement are known as the

period of fiscal and monetary instability in Ottoman history.24 Although the debasement

brought a relief to the treasury, its adverse effects coming with the debasement-pushed

inflation was not late to show up in the central budget.

The large group of irregular taxes known as “avarız” taxes paid in time of war was one

of the most important revenue sources of the central treasury. In the early 17th century, these

extraordinary impositions (avârız-i dîvâniyye) and customary levies (tekâlîf-i ‘örfiyye) were

combined and they became an annual and a regular revenue item in the budget.25 At the same

time, some extraordinary obligations that were traditionally being paid in kind were now

collected cash. In the late 17th century, the revenues coming from these taxes constituted

about 20% of the central budget.26

Beside the increasing taxation, the central administration sought for the widening of the

tax base to increase revenues.27 As mentioned before, the large-scale rebel movements and

ensuing social turmoil in Anatolia caused mass peasant flights and renomadization.28 Peasants

migrating to the towns and other villages or turning to the nomadic life meant the loss of

taxable sources because the lands remained uncultivated and immigrants were not registered

for taxation. Therefore, after long and fierce struggles to oppress rebellions, the central

23
Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire.
24
Şevket Pamuk, “The Monetary Crisis of the 17th Century”, in Histoire Economique et Sociale de L’Empire
Ottoman et de la Turquie (1326-1960), Actes du sixieme congres international tenu a Aix-en-Provence, ed.
Daniel Panzac, Paris, Peeters, 1995, 243-250; Idem, “In the Absence of Domestic Currency: Debased European
Coinage in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire”, Journal of Economic History, vol. 57, 2, June 1997, 345-
366; Idem, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire.
25
Halil İnalcık, “The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire”, in The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 1,
The Central Islamic Lands, eds. P. M. Holt et al., London, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 345; Akdağ,
Türkiyenin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi, p. 295; Idem, Celali İsyanları, pp. 54-58, 79-80; Darling, Revenue-Raising
and Legitimacy; Idem, “Ottoman Fiscal Administration”, pp. 164, 168-172.
26
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, pp. 156-164.
27
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi; Cezar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım; Darling,
Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy.
28
Suraiya Faroqhi, “Rural Society in Anatolia and the Balkans during the Sixteenth Century, II”, Turcica, Revue
D’Etudes Turques, tome XI, 1979, 103-153.
administration encouraged the peasant masses to return to their homes through granting tax

exemptions, and applied a policy of sedentarization of nomads.

The Late Seventeenth Century

The years following the Ottoman defeat in Vienna and offensive movements of the

Sacred Alliance in the late 17th century, provides us with some quite good examples for the

relationship between the military needs and fiscal policies. In this period, the central

administration carried out some substantial reforms in the taxation system but it also resorted

to some ad hoc measures.

During the financially hardest years of the central treasury in the last two decades of the

17th century, new silver mines were opened as well as some mines and mints that had been

closed for a long time due mainly to the influx of American silver were operated again.29

Moreover, precious objects were taken out from the Inner Treasury to be minted. The most

striking monetary policy of the treasury to meet its need for ready cash was the excessive

coinage of copper money which was also overvalued against the akça between 1688-91.30

Following this inflationist policy, the central administration tried to establish a new monetary

system based on the Ottoman “guruş”, a silver coin larger than the existing “akça”.31

The poll tax on non-Muslims (cizye) was another important source of income. The

method of assessment of this tax was reformed in 1690. It was diversified in three categories

29
For the closing down of the mints see Halil Sahillioğlu, “The Role of International Monetary and Metal
Movements in Ottoman Monetary History 1300-1750”, Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early
Modern Worlds, ed. J. F. Richards, Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 1983, 269-304.
30
Sahillioğlu, “Ottoman Monetary History 1300-1750”; Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı
Maliyesi, pp. 276-282.
31
Pamuk, “The Monetary Crisis of the 17th Century”; Idem, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire.
in accordance with the taxpayers’ capacity which resulted in an enormous revenue increase,

about 240 million akça, for the treasury.32

In addition to the arrangements in already existing taxes and regularization of some

taxes, new ones called the “imdâd-ı seferiyye” and the “imdâd-ı hadariyye” were levied in

order to finance military expenses.33 The “imdâd-i seferiyye” was a wartime levy first

assessed in 1688 but regularized in the next century, and the “hadariyye” was basically the

same tax for peacetime that was levied in the first quarter of the 18th century.

The Ottoman central administration even demanded “cash substitute” called “bedel-i

timar” from the timariots who were originally from among the tax-exempt military class. It

was a tax on timar holders who did not go on campaign.34 Several other taxes associated with

military expenses were levied such as “kassabiye” which was a levy on the wealthy to

subsidize meat sales to Janissaries.

The central administration did not borrow from international banking or moneylenders,

nor issued bonds, however, central treasury drew funds through forced loans from state

officials and the wealthy.35 In addition, high-officials were requested to provide fully

equipped troops in the 1690s.36 In this period, confiscations increased in frequency and

property of high-ranking state officials was forfeit on their death.37

The central administration tried also to cut budget expenditures. In the 1690s, the central

administration performed a survey for the employees in state offices and achieved a

significant reduction in salary payments.38 As mentioned before, the years immediately

preceding the 90s and the 90s as well were the financially worst war years. The central

32
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, pp. 136-149, 276.
33
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, pp. 266-69; Cezar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde
Bunalım, pp. 54-64.
34
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, pp. 272f; Finkel, The Administration of Warfare,
p.255-59
35
Finkel, The Administration of Warfare, p. 261f.
36
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 191.
37
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi; Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy.
38
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 261f.
treasury postponed the debt repayments and late salary payments till the end of military

campaigns in 1689-90.39 In 1686 and then in 1688, six month salaries of the class of

“mütekaids” the retired pensioners and of the “duaguyan” the prayers, who were being paid

their salaries from the custom revenues of Istanbul and its surroundings as well as from the

tax farm and poll-tax revenues, were detained by the central administration. The imperial

decree relevant to this arrangement explains the reason for detainment itself as an aid for the

provisioning, ordnance and salaries of the troops participating in the military campaign.40

Lastly, in 1689, the central administration requested the financial contribution from the

hundreds of waqfs dispersed throughout the Empire.

Imperial Waqfs and Their Financial Contributions to the Central Treasuries

The waqf system occupied a significant place in economic order of the Ottoman Empire,

in particular the imperial waqfs called “evkâf-ı selâtîn”, which were established by the ruler

and his family, and the large waqfs of the high dignitaries called “vüzerâ” and “agayân”

waqfs were the largest economic institutions holding vast agricultural lands and diverse

revenue-yielding real estates.41 They performed various charitable services and functioned as

an instrument of poor-relief in the society.42 The imperial waqfs distributed food to the poor

and needy through public kitchens (‘imâret), provided free cure for the patients in their

39
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 263f, p. 263 note 11 also see notes 12 and 13
there.
40
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 271.
41
For the importance of the imperial waqfs in the Ottoman economy, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Edirne ve
Civarındaki Bazı İmaret Tesislerinin Yıllık Muhasebe Bilançoları”, Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, I/2, 1964, pp.
236-237; Halil İnalcık, “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire”, Journal of Economic History, XXIX-1,
1969, pp. 132-135; Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, “XVIII. Asır Türk Vakıflarının İktisadi Boyutu”, Vakıflar Dergisi, 18,
1984, 5-41; Haim Gerber, “The Waqf Institution in Early Ottoman Edirne”, Asian and African Studies, 17, 1983,
29-45.
42
For the charitable aspect of the waqfs and the waqfs as poor-relief institutions see Oded Peri, “Waqf and
Ottoman Welfare Policy”, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, XXXV, 1992, 167-186; Amy
Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence, An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem, State University of New
York Press, 2002; Miriam Hoexter, “Charity, the Poor, and Distribution of Alms in Ottoman Algiers”, in Poverty
and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts, edi. M. Bonner, M. Ener, A. Singer, State University of New York
Press, 2003.
hospitals (dârü’ş-şifâ, bîmârhâne), paid stipends to some sections in the society from their

income surpluses.43 The imperial waqfs employed a large number of employees in various

offices. The salary payments were usually the major expense items in the waqf budgets.44

Through the salary payments to their employees and to the beneficiaries, the imperial waqfs

undertook a re-distributive function in the economy and society.45

The imperial waqfs were not completely independent in terms of their administration

and financial decision-making. The central administration was the ultimate authority

supervising their operations. The most effective tool for regular monitoring and control of the

waqfs was the annual account books submitted by the waqfs to the central offices.46

Many imperial waqfs together with hundreds of other waqfs were forwarding funds to

the two Holy Places of Mecca and Medina as stipulated in their endowment deeds. The

collection and delivery of these funds as well as other revenues devoted to the Holy Places

was the responsibility of two central offices, the Two Holy Places Accountancy

(Haremenyü’ş-şerifeyn Muhâsebesi) and the Two Holly Places Tax Farms (Haremenyü’ş-

şerifeyn Mukâta‘ası). In the year 1691, the revenues held by these offices were 25 and 20

million akça respectively, which formed 5% of the central budget.47 In the following year,

these revenues declined to 12 and 19 million akça respectively and provided about 3% of the

budget income in the 90s. The revenues accumulated in these offices were not supporting only

the Holy Places but also the Outer Treasury and its military expenditures.

43
Miri Shefer, “Charity and Hospitality”, in Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts, edi. M. Bonner,
M. Ener, A. Singer, State University of New York Press, 2003, pp. 121-143. The retired members of the
Ottoman “military class”, some religious persons and widows were entitled to receive stipend from the waqfs.
44
Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “İmaret Sitelerinin Kuruluş ve İşleyiş Tarzına Ait Araştırmalar”, İstanbul Üniversitesi
İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, 23/1-2, (1962-63), 239-296; Haim Gerber, Economy and Society in an Ottoman
City: Bursa, 1600-1700, Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, 1988.
45
For the re-distributive function of the waqfs see Barkan, “Edirne ve Civarındaki Bazı İmaret Tesislerinin”, pp.
235f, Inalcık, “The Ottoman State: Economy and Society”, p. 47. Also see Murat Çizakça, “Cash Waqfs of
Bursa, 1555-1823”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 38,3, 1995, p. 351.
46
During the 16th and 17th centuries, several central offices were charged with the supervision and inspection of
the waqfs. These were the offices of Chief Black Eunuch (Dârü’s-sa‘âde Ağası), Chief White Eunuch (Bâbü’s-
sa‘âde Ağası), Şeyhü’l-islâm Efendi, the Grand Vizierate (Sadr-ı ‘Alî), and some local judges were also
supervising specific waqfs as well.
47
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 104f.
 In addition to the above mentioned waqf contributions, at the end of each accounting

year, some of the imperial waqfs forwarded large sums from their budget surpluses to the

treasury of the office of Chief Black Eunuch as seen in plenty of delivery records in the waqf

account books. *It is not clear that whether the imperial waqfs inspected by the other offices

were also forwarding their income surpluses to the relevant offices responsible for them. An

archival register records the aggregated figures for the financial contributions (‘avâ’id) and

the deliveries from budget surpluses (zevâ’id) of the waqfs to the treasury of the Chief Black

Eunuch between 1670 and 1679.48 In this register, the total amount of the contributions from

the waqfs was nearly four million akça in 1670 and it amounted to more than 31 million akça

for nine years. Another register compiled from the reports for the revenue collections and

expenditures submitted by the Chief Black Eunuch to the Sultan shows that beside some other

expenditures, the largest part of the treasury of Chief Black Eunuch was transferred to the

Inner Treasury.49 The same register provides the total figures for the collections as

contributions (‘avâ’id) and as surpluses (zevâ’id) from the waqfs and records the sum that

remained uncollected (bâkî) as well. According to this register, about eight million akça were

expected to be collected in 1640. The treasury delivered two and a half million akça the Inner

Treasury from the mentioned sum, as well as the salaries of some employees in the imperial

dockyard, which were normally paid by the Outer Treasury, were paid from the treasury of

the Chief Black Eunuch.

Financing the Warfare Through the Waqfs

According to the available budget figures, the revenues of the central treasury were

about 700 million akça in the fiscal year of 1687-88. The expenditures exceeded the revenues

48
EV-HMH 236.
49
MM 6040.
about 200 million akça in the same year. In the following fiscal year, the budget deficit rose to

247 million akça and the budget deficit occurred in every single year throughout the 90s.50

Such large deficits called for extraordinary measures for financing, and one of them was

drawing money from the revenues held by the waqfs.

It seems that the central administration first conducted surveys to find out the available

funds from the waqfs. Then, the imperial decrees were sent out to the provincial officers and

to the waqf administrators, and revenue collectors were appointed. The receipts and the

remaining amounts from the requested waqf funds were recorded in the separate registers

through which the extent of the funds supplied by the waqfs can be partially seen. I suggest

that the financial contribution of the hundreds of waqfs –though the total sum is unknown-

amounted to considerable sums and therefore should be taken into account with regard to both

the relationship between the central treasury and the foundations and to the waqfs’ role in

financing warfare.

As far as I could know, Tabakoğlu has first mentioned the demand of the central

administration for the financial contribution from the waqfs. He dealt with this subject quite

briefly in a few footnotes by using mainly the records in the registers of important affairs

(mühimme defterleri). However he may have confused this contribution with the wartime tax

of “imdad-ı seferiyye”. He wrote that in 1689, about sixteen and a half million akça was

collected from the waqfs of sultans, viziers and of some other persons. He also noted that the

central administration requested six months salaries from the waqfs in Istanbul, in Jerusalem

and in Damascus in the same year.51

As mentioned before, the annual account books of the large imperials waqfs have been

audited in central offices. It seems that based on these accounts the central administration

wanted to know how much revenue could be drawn from the waqfs. An archive register for

50
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 14-16; Pamuk, A Monetary History of the
Ottoman Empire, p. 133.
51
Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi, p. 271 note 34 and p. 272 note 35.
instance, which was compiled in 1688 upon the imperial decree, contains the main revenue

and expenditure figures of all the imperial – including that of the high dignitaries- and several

other waqfs under the authority of the Two Holy Places Accountancy.52 The register first

records the waqfs under the supervision of the grand vizierate, then the waqfs belonging to the

other offices follow. *The register gives the annual revenue expected and expenditure figures

for each waqf. The total expenditures are singled out as simply the expenses and the salary

payments; in other words, only the salary payments were stated precisely in recording

expenditures. Lastly, based on these figures, the budget surplus was estimated for each waqf.

The register gives a particular emphasis recording of these surpluses, certain parts of which

were annually sent to the central treasuries. The salary payments of the waqfs, which -as will

be seen- will be requested a year later, were also given a particular importance in the register.

For instance, some additional notes are written for each waqf showing the monthly sum of

salary payments while all the other records give only the annual aggregated figures.

The importance given to the record of salary payments can be seen at the end of each

section in the book. After the waqfs under the supervision of the grand vizierate, the register

records the total sum of the expected waqf revenues as more than 15 million akça. Then the

total annual amounts of the salaries and expenditures are recorded. The salary payments are,

however, recorded both on a monthly and annual basis. And lastly the expected amount of

budget surpluses is recorded which is more than 3 million akça. It is striking that only the

monthly sum of salaries and the total amount of waqf budget surpluses were recorded in red

ink, which implies that the registrar was specifically instructed to highlight these records.

The register also recorded the other waqfs whose supervision was under the authority of

the office of the Şeyhü’l-islâm, of the Chief White Eunuch and of judge of Istanbul. The total

52
MM 1876.
expected revenues of the waqfs is given as more than 53 million akça. It seems that almost

half of this sum, nearly 24 million akça is to be paid for the salaries.

In the remaining parts of the register, the waqfs located in the provinces of Anatolia and

Rumili (Ottoman Balkans) under the supervision of the office of the Chief Black Eunuch are

recorded in the same manner. At the end of the register, the sum of monthly salaries for the all

waqfs was written in red ink as 3.352.382 akça which means that the central administration

would draw nearly 20 million akça from the waqfs by demanding 6 months salaries. The

register in question preceded the central administration’s request for the waqf funds and it is

therefore an examination for estimating the available resources.53 Although the registers are

not available, the central government must have ordered the compilation of similar registers

for the waqfs in the other parts of the empire as the registers recording the collection of

salaries from such waqfs clearly imply.

After the total amount of revenue to draw from the waqfs had been estimated, the

imperial decrees were sent, ordering the actual collections in 1689. Few archival registers are

available today to reveal the whole process of financing warfare by the waqf funds. In a

register compiled for the collections from waqfs in the province of Tripoli, each waqf is

recorded with its 6 months salaries.54 According to the register, 73.209 akça was collected

from the waqfs in the town of Tripoli and 316.260 akça from the waqfs in the rest of the

province. In another register, the waqfs in the Province of Damascus are recorded each with

its annual and six months salary levels which latter totals about 2 million akça.55 The

53
The register MM 4774 seems to be the same type of register showing the sums of salary payments for many
waqfs under the authority of “haremeynü’ş-şerifeyn mukataası” and under the supervision of several other
offices.
54
MM 1864.
55
MM 1883.
contribution from the waqfs in the province of Karaman was about half a million akça

according to another register of the same type.56

Let me remind you that the central administration requested compilation of a register in

order to be informed about the financial situation of the imperial, the viziers’ and some other

large waqfs, another register probably dated 1689 was kept, in which the actual collections

from these waqfs were recorded.57 In this register, each waqf was recorded with its annual

salary payments and then the sum of salaries for six months was calculated. A certain part of

this sum was removed (furûnihâde) from the total sum for several reasons. For instance, some

funds were allocated to the distribution of meals, and some were needed for important waqf

affairs or expenses (mühimme), and the salaries of part of the personnel etc. were not

requested and left to the waqfs and the rest was collected for the central treasury. The

remaining sums which could not be collected are also recorded. According to the records,

more than 8 million akça was collected while about two million akça was removed from the

initially planned sum and about 300.000 akça remained uncollected.

The same register also recorded the waqfs whose contributions were not delivered yet or

more correctly their collection of requested funds was not started at all. The total sum

expected to collect from these waqfs was exceeding one million akça. The last part of the

register listed some other waqfs58, which delivered about 200.000 akça. In addition, more than

3 million akça was received from the budget surpluses of three imperial waqfs in Istanbul.

The central treasury followed the arrears (bakâyâ) in separate registers. Another register

dated 1690, for instance, records the arrears from the province of Karaman which totals about

56
MM 5917. Another register MM 18518 was compiled for the district of Aleppo. In this registers, not the actual
collections but the waqfs from which collection was not possible are recorded.
57
MM 7042. The register of MM 14935 dated 1100/1689 is a very small register of two pages. It contains the
records of collections only from two waqfs under the supervision of the Two Holy Cities Accountancy. A long
explanatory writing is also provided in the register which tells that recording of the annual sum of waqf salaries
and the collection of six months’ equivalents for the central treasury was ordered by the imperial treasury for the
reason that the central treasury fell into difficulty due to the military campaign.
58
Because the records of these waqfs double recorded in the registers of two offices but the collection of the
contributions should be made in accordance with the records in the registers of the Two Holy Cities
Accountancy (Haremenynü’ş-şerîfeyn Muhâsebesi), these waqfs were recorded separately.
half a million akça.59 It is likely that the central administration requested funds from the

waqfs for warfare again in 1105/1693-94 as several registers kept for the waqfs in Istanbul

and in Sivas seem to imply.60

Concluding Remarks

In a process beginning from the late 16th century, in which the military needs of the

Empire and the financing of war occupied a particular place, the Ottoman fiscal system went

through changes and transformations and fell into a fiscal crisis. In the 17th century, in order

to increase revenues several wartime taxes were combined and assessed on a regular basis,

and new taxes were levied. To meet the treasury’s need for ready cash, new methods of tax

collection were applied. The last two decades of the 17th century were the time of multi-front

wars and were particularly difficult years of the central treasury. In this period, the central

administration introduced new taxes, attempted to coin copper money excessively, detained

the salary payments as well as resorted to some other financial measures which were

previously unheard of in the Ottoman financial system.

The waqfs were traditionally enjoying tax-exempt status, the central administration

could not intervene with this since the waqfs were made in accordance with the long-

established traditions and Islamic law. However, the central administration still sought a way

for drawing vast resources from these institutions. Some waqfs devoted certain parts of their

revenues to the Holy Cities. The funds for this purpose were collected in the central treasury

and these were partly transferred to the expenditure items of the central treasury. At the same

time, several imperial waqfs were forwarding their income surpluses to the treasury of the

Chief Black Eunuch. This treasury was also supporting both the Inner and Outer treasuries.

59
MM 1874.
60
For Istanbul see MM 1881 and EV-HMH 811. For the province of Sivas see MM 3687. The register MM 5303
for the province of Sivas seems to be a similar register, too.
However, the central administration asked for more contribution from the waqfs directly for

the reason that these funds would support the army on campaign. The central administration

requested the delivery of six months’ salaries of the waqf employees in 1689 and maybe in

1693-94.

The money transfers from waqfs to the central treasury have profound implications for

the waqfs. The regular contributions of the waqfs through their budget surplus leave very

limited resources for the waqfs better to perform their services and more importantly to make

any investment for additional revenue sources. Secondly, as already mentioned the waqfs, in

particular the large imperial waqfs, were redistributive institutions. They drew resources from

agricultural holdings and channeled them to the town economies. They had quite a number of

revenue-yielding properties in different towns, from which the revenues were drawn to the

towns where the waqfs were run. Beside all their other redistributive activities, their purchases

supporting the town economy and their salary and stipend payments, which constituted half of

the waqf budgets, functioned as one of the most effective tools for revenue distribution and

also provided great employment capacities to the extent that the waqfs could be used well as a

tool for employment policy.

The registers so far examined clearly state that the financial contribution from the waqfs

was asked for the central treasury which fell into financial difficulty due to military campaign.

Thus, the money transfers reveal the financial and social effects of the warfare on the social

institutions and society at large. Secondly, they show us how even the waqfs supported the

war budget and enlighten us on how the long and costly warfare was financed.

When the central authority requested the delivery of large funds normally to be paid for

salaries, it interfered directly with the redistributive function of the waqfs and redetermined it

according to its own priorities. In this case, it requested not only the waqf sources but also the

daily earnings of a large section, thereby directly affecting their daily life.
Archival Registers61

MM 6040 dated 1639-40 MM 1876 dated 1100/1689 MM 1881 dated 1105/1693-94

MM 4774 dated 1099/1688 MM 1883 dated 1100/1689 MM 3687 dated 1105/1693-94
EV-HMH 236 dated 1091/1680 MM 5917 dated 1100/1689 MM 7042 dated 1105/1693-94
MM 1864 dated 1100/1689 MM 14935 dated 1100/1689 EV-HMH 811 dated 1105/1693-94
MM 1874 dated 1100/1689 MM 18518 dated 1100/1689 MM 5303 dated 1106/1694-95

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